Case No.
1 
Villavicencio vs. Lukban
G.R. No. L-14639, Mar. 25, 1919
Facts:
 Justo Lukban, Manila City's Mayor, through the police took custody of about 170 women without their consent
and knowledge and thereafter were shipped to Davao where they were signed as laborers.
 Said women are inmates of the houses of prostitution in Sampaloc, Manila.
Held:
1. Law defines power. No official, no matter how high, is above the law. Lukban committed a grave abuse of
discretion by deporting the prostitutes to a new domicile against their will. There is no law expressly authorizing
his action.
2. These women have been deprived of their liberty by being exiled to Davao. Their choice of profession should not
be a cause for discrimination. It does not authorize anyone to compel said prostitutes to isolate themselves from
the rest of humanity.
3. On the contrary, there is a law punishing public officials, not expressly authorized by law or regulation, who
compels any person to change his residence. For this, Lukban must be severely punished.
Case No. 2
SHIGENORI KURODA, petitioner, vs. Major General RAFAEL JALANDONI, Brigadier General CALIXTO DUQUE, Colonel
MARGARITO TORALBA, Colonel IRENEO BUENCONSEJO, Colonel PEDRO TABUENA, Major FEDERICO ARANAS, MELVILLE S.
HUSSEY and ROBERT PORT, respondents.
Facts:
Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding General of the
Japanese Imperial Forces in The Philippines during a period covering 19433 and 19444 who is now charged before a military
Commission convened by the Chief of Staff of the Armed forces of the Philippines with having unlawfully disregarded and
failed "to discharge his duties as such command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against
noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Imperial Japanese Forces in violation of the laws and customs of war" — comes
before this Court seeking to establish the illegality of Executive Order No. 68 of the President of the Philippines: to enjoin and
prohibit respondents Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port from participating in the prosecution of petitioner's case before the
Military Commission and to permanently prohibit respondents from proceeding with the case of petitioners. Kuroda raised
the following principal arguments: first, that E.O. 68 is illegal on the ground that it violates not only the provision of our
constitutional law, but also our local laws to say nothing to the fact that the Philippines is not a signatory nor an adherent to
the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare and therefore petitioner is charged of crimes not
based on law, national and international. Second, that the participation in the prosecution of the case against petitioner
before the Commission in behalf of the United State of America of attorneys Melville Hussey and Robert Port who are not
attorneys authorized by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines is a diminution of our personality as an
independent state and their appointment as prosecutor are a violation of our Constitution for the reason that they are not
qualified to practice law in the Philippines. And third, that Attorneys Hussey and Port have no personality as prosecution the
United State not being a party in interest in the case.
Issues:
WON E.O. No. 68 is constitutional
Held:
The petition was denied; Executive Order No. 68 which was issued by the President of the Philippines on the 29th
day of July, 1947, is valid in its section 3 that "The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts
the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation."
Case No. 3
Mijares vs. Ranada
G.R. No. 139325, April 12, 2005
Facts:
Invoking the Alien Tort Act, petitioners who all suffered human rights violations during the Marcos era, obtained
a Final Judgment in their favor against the Estate of the late Ferdinand Marcos amounting to roughly 1.9 Billion
U.S. Dollars. This Final Judgment was affirmed by the US Court of Appeals.
 As a consequence, Petitioners filed a Complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Makati for the enforcement of
the Final Judgment, where the value of the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The Estate of
Marcos however, filed a MTD alleging the non-payment of the correct filing fees.
 The Regional Trial Court of Makati dismissed the Complaint stating that the subject matter was capable of
pecuniary estimation as it involved a judgment rendered by a foreign court ordering the payment of a definite
sum of money allowing for the easy determination of the value of the foreign judgment.
 As such, the proper filing fee was 472 Million Philippine pesos, which Petitioners had not paid.
Held:
1. The amount paid by the Petitioners is the proper filing fee, but on a different basis—amount merely corresponds
to the same amount required for “other actions not involving property”.
2. The Regional Trial Court of Makati erred in concluding that the filing fee should be computed on the basis of the
total sum claimed or the stated value of the property in litigation.
3. What governs the proper computation of the filing fees over Complaints for the enforcement of foreign
judgments is Section7(b)(3), involving “other actions not involving property.”
Case No. 4
Poe-Llamanzares vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 221697, Mar. 8, 2016
Facts: Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) instituted the present petitions for certiorari with urgent prayer
for the issuance of an ex parte temporary restraining order/status quo ante order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
assailing the resolutions of the COMELEC cancelling her certificate of candidacy for 2016 Presidential elections for having been
issued without or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
COMELEC and President Estrella Elamparo and COMELEC and Francisco Tatad, Antonio P. Contreras and Amado D. Caldez –
(respondents from 2 consolidated petitions) filed the petitions to deny due course or cancel the COC of Grace Poe on the
grounds of false material misrepresentation when she stated in her COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and that she
is a resident of the Philippines for at least ten (10) years and eleven (11) months up to the day before the 9 May 2016
Elections. She also answered 6 years and 6 months to the period of residency before May 13, 2013 in her COC for 2013
Senatorial Elections.
Held:
The petitioner is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.
Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Under the 1987 Constitution, the generally accepted principles of
international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from
treaty obligations. The principles found in two conventions, while yet unratified by the Philippines, are generally accepted
principles of international law. 1) Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of
Nationality Laws under which a foundling is presumed to have the "nationality of the country of birth," 2) Article 2 of the 1961
United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness which provides for the principle that a foundling is presumed
born of citizens of the country where he is found. The common thread of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UN
Convention on the Rights of the Child and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is to obligate the Philippines to
grant nationality from birth and ensure that no child is stateless.
Case No. 5
ICHONG VS HERNANDEZ
G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957
LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships adversely affected. by
Republic Act No. 1180, petitioner,
vs.
JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City Treasurer of Manila, respondents.
Facts:
Driven by aspirations for economic independence and national security, the Congress enacted Act No. 1180 entitled “An Act
to Regulate the Retail Business.” The main provisions of the Act, among others, are:
(1) Prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, among others, from engaging directly
or indirectly in the retail trade; and
(2) Prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or
branches of retail business.
Lao H. Ichong,. Petitioner attacked the constitutionality of the Act, contending that:
 It denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due
process of law.
 The subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof.
 The Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines.
Issue/s:
Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles.
Ruling/s:
Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, the Supreme Court saw no conflict between
the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause “does not demand absolute
equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions
both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced”; and, that the equal protection clause “is not infringed by legislation
which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and
reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.”
b) He had taken and finished in Spain the course of “Bachillerato Superior” (Senior High School);
c) He was approved, selected, and qualified by the “Instituto de Cervantes” for admission to the
Central University of Madrid where he studied and finished the law course graduating there as
“Licenciado En Derecho” (Degree in Law);
d) Thereafter, he was allowed to practice law profession in Spain; and
e) Under the provision of the Treaty of Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions between the
Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish state, he is entitled to practice the law profession in the
Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not the “Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions between the Republic of the
Philippines and the Spanish State” can modify the regulations governing the admission to the Philippine Bar
HELD:
 SUPREME COURT’S RULING – The Supreme Court resolved to DENY the petition
 PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY – The applicant/petitioner cannot invoke the provisions contained in the treaty
because it only covers:
a) Filipino Citizens desiring to practice their profession in Spain; and
b) Citizens of Spain desiring to practice their profession in the Philippines
The applicant/petitioner herein is a Filipino citizen desiring to practice the legal profession in the Philippines. He is therefore
subject to the laws of his own country and is not entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish nationals desiring to practice in
the Philippines.

Case No. 6  CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS – The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the Republic of the Philippines and
Sec of Justice vs. Lantion the Spanish State could not have been intended to modify the laws and regulations governing admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines, for the reason that the Executive Department may not encroach upon the
Facts: constitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of law in the
- Sec of justice Franklin Drilon, representing the government of the Philippines signed the “Extradition treaty Philippines, the lower to repeal, alter or supplement such rules being reserved only to the Congress of the
between the government of the Philippines and the government of the US. Philippines.
- Department of Justice received a request from the DFA for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez.
- Department of Justice then assigned a panel of attorneys to evaluate the request and its supporting documents. Case No. 8
During evaluation, private respondent through counsel requested copies of extradition request and be given time Alih vs. Castro
to assess it. G.R. No. L-69401, June 23, 1987
- Department of Justice denied request on the grounds of art. 7 of the Extradition treaty
- Department of justice also contends that their evaluation of the request and its documents is not a preliminary FACTS:
investigation like in criminal cases making the constitutionality guaranteed rights of the accused in criminal  Rizal Alih, et al. – occupied a compound at Gov. Alvarez Street, Zamboanga City, which was raided by a
prosecution inapplicable contingent of more than 200 Philippine Marines and elements of the Home Defense Forces to search for loose
- Private respondent filed a petition against Sec of justice, RTC presiding judge Lantion favoured Jimenez on that it firearms, ammunitions, and other explosives.
will be a deprivation of his rights to due process of notice and hearing.  The people inside the compound resisted the invasion and a crossfire between the Philippine marines and the
petitioner occurred, resulting in number of casualties.
Held:  The petitioners surrendered the next morning and 16 occupants were arrested, later to be finger-printed,
- The human rights of a person, whether citizen or alien, and the rights of the accused guaranteed in our paraffin-tested and photographed over their objection. The military also inventoried and confiscated several M16
constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting state. rifles, M14 rifle, rifle grenades and rounds of ammunition.
 December 21, 1984 – Rizal Alih, et al. filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction
Case No. 7 and restraining order for the following reasons
IN RE GARCIA a) To recover the articles seized from them
August 15, 1961 b) To prevent these from being used as evidence against them
c) To challenge their finger-printing, photographing and paraffin-testing as violative of their right
FACTS: against self-incrimination.
 Arturo Efren Garcia – applied for the admission to the Philippine Bar without submitting and taking the necessary Lastly, the petitioners argued that the arms and ammunition were taken without a search warrant as required by law under
requirements and examination. He filed a petition with the following arguments: our constitution.
a) He is a Filipino Citizen born in Bacolor, Negros Occidental of Filipino parentage;
  The Court, treating the petition as an injunction suit with a prayer for the return of the articles alleged to have
been illegally seized, referred it for hearing to Judge Omar U. Amin of the regional trial court, Zamboanga City
 Counterargument of the Respondents – While admitting to the absence of a search warrant, the respondents
contended that they were acting under superior orders. There was also the suggestion that the measure was
necessary because of the aggravation of the peace and order problem generated by the assassination of Mayor
Cesar Climaco.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not the warrantless search was legal
 Whether or not petitioners’ right against self-incrimination was violated
HELD:
 SUPREME COURT’S RULING – The Supreme court held that the search of the petitioners' premises is hereby
declared ILLEGAL and all the articles seized as a result thereof are INADMISSIBLE in evidence against the
petitioners in any proceedings.
 Superior orders cannot countermand the Constitution. The fact that the petitioners were suspected of the
Climaco killing did not excuse the constitutional short-cuts the respondents took. The Constitution is a law for
rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at
all times and under all circumstances. No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented
by the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of
government.
 The precarious state of lawlessness in Zamboanga City at the time in question certainly did not excuse the non-
observance of the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures. There was no state of
hostilities in the area to justify, assuming it could, the repressions committed therein against the petitioners.
Case No. 9
IBP vs. Zamora
G.R. No. 141284 - Aug. 15, 2000
Facts:
 Following an alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, Pres. Estrada ordered the deployment of the
Phil. Marines to join in visibility patrols around the metropolis.
 The President invoked his Commander-in-Chief powers under Sec 18, Art VII of the Constitution. The IBP seeks to
nullify the order on constitutional grounds.
Held:
1. IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the
Constitution. Apart from this declaration the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi. While
undoubtedly true it is not sufficient to merit standing.
2. However, when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the Court may brush aside
technicalities of procedure. The Court relaxed the rules on standing and resolved the issue now.
Case No. 10
Olaguer vs. Military Commission No. 34
G.R. No. L-54558 - May 22, 1987
Facts:
 Petitioners, as civilians, have been charged the crime of subversion. Consequently, the Chief-of-Staff of the AFP
created a military tribunal, named Military Commission No. 34, to try criminal case against petitioners.
 Petitioners were then convicted and have been imposed a penalty of death penalty. Thereafter, petitioners filed
a petition to enjoin the military tribunal from taking further action on their case for the tribunal should be
considered null and void.
 Respondents invoked that the creation of Military Commission is constitutional as ruled upon in a previous case
– Aquino v. Military Commission No. 2.-as decided upon by the Supreme Court. However, petitioners contend
that such ruling must be overturned because the ruling is now inapplicable since Martial Law has already been
lifted.
Held:
1. The Court considered that since the martial law has been lifted during the case is still pending, military tribunals,
which were created for the purpose of martial law, shall be held void already since the law itself is lifted.
2. The Court relied on the dissenting views of some justices in Aquino v. MilComm, stating that “Civilians like the
petitioner placed on trial for civil offenses under general law are entitled to trial by judicial process, not by
executive or military process.”
Case No. 11
People vs. Lagman
G.R. No. L-45892, July 13, 1938
Facts:
Tranquilino and Primitivo de Sosa are charged with a violation of section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 1, known as the
National Defense Law for refusing to register in the military service despite being required to do so.
Their defense is that Primitivo de Sosa is fatherless and has a mother and a brother eight years old to support, and Tranquilino
Lagman also has a father to support, has no military learnings, and does not wish to kill or be killed.
The constitutionality of the National Defense Law is impugned.
Held:
Section 2, Article II of the Constitution provides “The defense of the state is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment
of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal military or civil service.”
The National Defense Law in so far as it establishes compulsory military service, does not go against this constitutional
provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be
performed except through an army.
The circumstance that the appellants have dependent families to support does not excuse them from their duty to present
themselves before the Acceptance Board because, if such circumstance exists, they can ask for determent in complying with
their duty and, at all events, they can obtain the proper pecuniary allowance to attend to these family responsibilities.
Ratio:
In the United States the courts have held in a series of decisions that the compulsory military service adopted by reason of the
civil war and the world war does not violate the Constitution, because the power to establish it is derived from that granted to
Congress to declare war and to organize and maintain an army. This is so because the right of the Government to require
compulsory military service is a consequence of its duty to defend the State and is reciprocal with its duty to defend the life,
liberty, and property of the citizen.
Case No. 12
Aglipay vs. Ruiz
G.R. No. L-45459, Mar. 13, 1937
Facts:
Director of Posts announced that he would order the issues of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of
Manila of the Thirty-third international Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church.
Petitioner Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, seeks the issuance from this court of
a writ of prohibition against the Director of Posts.
Petitioner alleged that the issuance of the postage stamps violates the provisions of section 23, subsection 3, Article VI, of the
Constitution of the Philippines, which provides as follows:
No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support
of any sect, church, denomination, secretarian, institution, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any
priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or
dignitary is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage, or leprosarium.
Held:
Director of Posts issued the postage stamps in question under the provisions of Act No. 4052 of the Philippine Legislature.
The Act appropriates the sum of sixty thousand pesos for the costs of plates and printing of postage stamps with new designs
and other expenses incident thereto, and authorizes the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications, to dispose of the amount appropriated in the manner indicated and "as often as may be deemed
advantageous to the Government".
Act No. 4052 has no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the discretionary power to determine
when the issuance of special postage stamps would be "advantageous to the Government." Of course, the phrase
"advantageous to the Government" does not authorize the violation of the Constitution.
Ratio:
The issuance of the postage stamps in question by the Director of Posts and the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications was not inspired by any sectarian denomination. The stamps were not issue and sold for the benefit of the
Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. The only purpose in issuing
and selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist to this country."
Case No. 13
ANDRES GARCES, Reverend Father SERGIO MARILAO OSMEÑA, NICETAS DAGAR and JESUS EDULLANTES, petitioners,
vs.
Hon. NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, Ormoc City Branch V, BARANGAY
COUNCIL of Valencia, Ormoc City, Barangay Captain MANUEL C. VELOSO, Councilmen GAUDENCIO LAVEZARES, TOMAS
CABATINGAN and MAXIMINO NAVARRO, Barangay Secretary CONCHITA MARAYA and Barangay Treasurer LUCENA
BALTAZAR, respondents.
FACTS:
On March 23, 1976, the barangay council of Valencia, Ormoc City adopted Resolution No. 5, "reviving the traditional socio-
religious celebration" every fifth day of April "of the feast day of Señor San Vicente Ferrer, the patron saint of Valencia". That
resolution designated the members of nine committees who would take charge of the 1976 festivity. lt provided for (1) the
acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and (2) the construction of a waiting shed as the barangay's projects. Funds for
the two projects would be obtained through the selling of tickets and cash donations "
On March 26, 1976, the barangay council passed Resolution No. 6 which specified that, the Chairman or hermano mayor of
the fiesta, would be the caretaker of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and that the image would remain in his residence for one
year and until the election of his successor as chairman of the next feast day.
With those funds, the waiting shed was constructed and the wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer was acquired. The image
was temporarily placed in the altar of the Catholic church of Barangay Valencia so that the devotees could worship the saint
during the mass for the fiesta. After the mass the parish priest refused to return that image to the barangay council on the
pretext that it was the property of the church because church funds were used for its acquisition. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: : Whether or Not any freedom of religion clause in the Constitution violated?
HELD: No
Petitioners contend that the resolutions contravene the constitutional provisions that "no law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion" and that "no public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, paid, or used, directly or
indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or for
the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such. except when such
priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage
or leprosarium (Sec. 8, Article IV and sec. 18[2], Article VIII, Constitution).
The image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta and not for the purpose of favoring any
religion nor interfering with religious matters or beliefs of the barrio residents. Any activity intended to facilitate the worship
of the patronsaint(such as the acquisition) is not illegal. Practically, the image was placed in a layman’s custody so that it could
easily be made available to any family desiring to borrow the image in connection with prayers and novena. It was the
council’s funds that were used to buy the image, therefore it is their property. Right of the determination of custody is their
right, and even if they decided to give it to the Church, there is no violation of the Constitution, since private funds were used.
Not every government activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and which has some religious tint is violative of
the constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state, freedom of worship and banning the use of public
money or property.
Case No. 14
Estrada vs. Escritor [A.M. No. P—02-1651, August 4, 2003]
Facts:
Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City.
Alejandro Estrada, the complainant, wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, presiding judge of Branch 253, RTC of Las Pinas City,
requesting for an investigation of rumors that Escritor has been living with Luciano Quilapio Jr., a man who is not her husband,
for more than twenty five years and had a son with him as well. Respondent’s husband died a year before she entered into
the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally married to another woman.
Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent. According to complainant, respondent
should not be allowed to remain employed therein for it will appear as if the court allows such act.
Escritor is a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society
where her conjugal arrangement with Quilapio is in conformity with their religious beliefs. After ten years of living together,
she executed on July 28, 1991 a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” which was approved by the congregation. Such
declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union. Gregorio, Salazar, a
member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses since 1985 and has been a presiding minister since 1991, testified and explained the
import of and procedures for executing the declaration which was completely executed by Escritor and Quilapio’s in
Atimonan, Quezon and was signed by three witnesses and recorded in Watch Tower Central Office. Respondent claims that
their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religion—the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace
Society. They allegedly have a ‘Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness’ under the approval of their congregation. Such a
declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of “gross and immoral conduct” and be
penalized by the State for such conjugal arrangement?
Held:
No. A distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the
Court extends only to public and secular morality.
The Court states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of
religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of
morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.
Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and interests but at the same time strives to
uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality
contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided
it does not offend compelling state interests. It still remains to be seen if respondent is entitled to such doctrine as the state
has not been afforded the chance has demonstrate the compelling state interest of prohibiting the act of respondent, thus the
case is remanded to the RTC.
In the area of religious exercise as preferred freedom, however, man stands accountable to an authority higher than the state,
and so the state interest sought to be upheld must be so compelling that its violation will erode the very fabric of the state
that will also protect the freedom. In the absence of a showing that the state interest exists, man must be allowed to
subscribe to the Infinite.
The state’s interest is the preservation of the integrity of the judiciary by maintaining among its ranks a high standard of
morality and decency. “There is nothing in the OCA’s (Office of the Court Administrator) memorandum to the Court that
demonstrates how this interest is so compelling that it should override respondent’s plea of religious freedom. Indeed, it is
inappropriate for the complainant, a private person, to present evidence on the compelling interest of the state. The burden
of evidence should be discharged by the proper agency of the government which is the Office of the Solicitor General”.
In order to properly settle the case at bar, it is essential that the government be given an opportunity to demonstrate the
compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the respondent’s position that her conjugal arrangement is not
immoral and punishable as it is within the scope of free exercise protection. The Court could not prohibit and punish her
conduct where the Free Exercise Clause protects it, since this would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her right to
religious freedom. Furthermore, the court cannot simply take a passing look at respondent’s claim of religious freedom but
must also apply the “compelling state interest” test.
Case No. 15
Taruc vs. De la Cruz
G.R. No. 144801 March 10, 2005
FACTS:
Petitioners – led by Dominador Taruc filed a civil case against respondents Bishop De La Cruz and Fr. Florano on the grounds
of excommunicating them from the church without due process. Both parties are a part of the Philippine Independent Church
(PIC) and are disputing this matter at the church of the same locality in Surigao City.
Differences of political affiliation – between the parties was the main cause for the tension, petitioners held an open mass
with Fr. Ambong as the celebrant to pressure Fr. Florano to leave and transfer to another church. Fr. Ambong was not a
member of the clergy of the diocese of Surigao.
Bishop Dela Cruz – excommunicated petitioners from the PIC on three grounds; 1. Disobedience to church authority, 2.
Inciting dissension, 3. Threatening to forcibly occupy the parish church causing fear and anxiety. Petitioners filed for civil
damages.
HELD:
Petitioner’s – argue that the excommunication was illegal because they were not given due process of law in their dismissal.
Respondent’s – filed a motion to dismiss petitions but was denied at the RTC, upon elevating it to the CA, RTC’s decision was
reversed on the following argument. Civil courts cannot rule on ecclesiastical matters, therefore, it is unnecessary to rule on
the validity of the excommunication order. Civil courts may only interfere with the church regarding civil or property rights as
enshrined in Article III Sec. 5 on religious freedom and separation of Church and State.
CA – commented regarding petitioner’s claims that they were not heard. Bishop Dela Cruz warned them several times, despite
the reminder of the consequences, petitioners proceeded with the act anyway. It is within that church organization that
members are bound to be governed.
Petition – is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
Case No. 16
Lim vs. Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 151445 April 11, 2002
FACTS:
Petitioners – assail the constitutionality of the “Balikatan 02-1” joint exercises created under the Mutual Defense Treaty
(MDT) and Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) out of fear that the exercises would be an excuse to conceal offensive military
operations of the U.S. army inside Philippine territory under the pre-tense of self-defense.
HELD:
Petitioners – argue that 1. The MDT has no point to continue because it was created only to provide military assistance when
the countries are at war with a third party, rebel groups are not an external aggressor and therefore, cannot invoke the MDT
to provide military assistance. 2. The VFA does not authorize U.S. Soldiers to engage in combat, not even when they are fired
upon. (Without prejudice to the right of self-defense)
Locus Standi – was granted as the Supreme Court relaxed the technical procedures, the OSG affirmed that what petitioners
would like to raise was not constitutionality, but a mere inquiry or interpretation of the VFA and its purposes.
International law – under the principle of Pacta Sunt Servanda, is to be obligatory followed by the Philippine government in
good faith when the treaty was ratified by a 2/3rds majority vote by Congress. The rule is that international treaties and
national laws have equal weight in obligations, but National law takes precedence first over international law. This principle
adheres to Art. 2 of the charter of the United Nations and the aid of interpretation of the treaties by the Vienna Convention
which obligates member States to renounce the use of force and war. This is in line with the Philippine’s foreign policy in
advancing its national interest and objectives.
National law – under Article II Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution the “Philippines renounces war as an instrumental of national
policy and adopts the generally accepted principles of International law as part of the law of the land…”
The Supreme Court – cannot take cognizance of the speculations forwarded by petitioners regarding “Balikatan 02-1”,
respondents have not committed grave abuse of discretion because the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.
Wherefore, the petitions are dismissed, noting that the petitioners may file a new petition at the proper Regional Trial Court.
CASE NO. 17
Saguisag vs. Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 212426, Jan. 12, 2016
Facts:
RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, et al. – the petitioners of this case, questioned the constitutionality of the Enhanced Defense
Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America (U.S.). Petitioners
alleged that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when they entered
into EDCA with the United States claiming that the instrument violated multiple constitutional provisions.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., et al. - in reply, respondents argue that petitioners lack standing to bring the
suit. To support the legality of their actions, respondents invoke the 1987 Constitution, treaties, and judicial precedents.
The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement - authorizes the U.S. military forces to have access to and conduct activities
within certain "Agreed Locations" in the country. It was not transmitted to the Senate on the executive's understanding that
to do so was no longer necessary. According to the Philippine government, the conclusion of EDCA was the result of intensive
and comprehensive negotiations in the course of almost two years. After eight rounds of negotiations, the Secretary of
National Defense and the U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines signed the agreement on 28 April 2014. President Benigno S.
Aquino III ratified EDCA on 6 June 2014.
Petitions for Certiorari - primarily argue that it should have been in the form of a treaty concurred in by the Senate, not an
executive agreement.
November 10 2015 - after the oral arguments were concluded and the parties ordered to file their respective memoranda, the
Senators adopted Senate Resolution No. (SR) 105. The resolution expresses the "strong sense" of the Senators that for EDCA
to become valid and effective, it must first be transmitted to the Senate for deliberation and concurrence.
Issue:
Whether or not the provisions under EDCA are consistent with the Constitution, as well as with existing laws and treaties
Held:
Yes. The practice of resorting to executive agreements in adjusting the details of a law or a treaty that already deals with the
presence of foreign military forces is not at all unusual in this jurisdiction. After a thorough examination of the content,
purpose, and framework of the Mutual De!ense Treaty (MDT) and the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), the court find that
EDCA has remained within the parameters set in these two treaties.
EDCA - not permanent in nature compared to the practice of states as shown in other defense cooperation
agreements. The phrasing in EDCA is similar to that in the U.S.-Australia treaty but with a term less than half of that is
provided in the latter agreement. This means that EDCA merely follows the practice of other states in not specifying a non-
extendible maximum term. This practice, however, does not automatically grant a badge of permanency to its terms. Article
XII(4) of EDCA provides very clearly, in fact, that its effectivity is for an initial term of 10 years, which is far shorter than the
terms of effectivity between the U.S. and other states. It is simply illogical to conclude that the initial, extendible term of 10
years somehow gives EDCA provisions a permanent character.
Rationale - The reasoning behind this interpretation is rooted in the constitutional role of the President who, as Commander-
in-Chief of our armed forces, is the principal strategist of the nation and, as such, duty-bound to defend our national
sovereignty and territorial integrity; who, as chief architect of our foreign relations, is the head policymaker tasked to assess,
ensure, and protect our national security and interests; who holds the most comprehensive and most confidential information
about foreign countries that may affect how we conduct our external affairs; and who has unrestricted access to highly
classified military intelligence data that may threaten the life of the nation.
The VFA already authorizes the presence of U.S. military equipment in the country. Therefore, there is no basis to invalidate
EDCA on fears that it increases the threat to our national security. If anything, EDCA increases the likelihood that, in an event
requiring a defensive response, the Philippines will be prepared alongside the U.S. to defend its islands and insure its
territorial integrity pursuant to a relationship built on the MDT and VFA.
Case No. 18
Calalang v Williams
G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940
Facts:
 July 17, 1940- In its resolution, The National Traffic Commission resolved to recommend to the Director of the
Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited
 from passing along Rosario Street extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from
7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic.
 July 18, 1940- The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission recommended to the Director of Public Works
the adoption of the measure proposed in the said resolution in pursuance of the provisions of the
Commonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of
the Public Works and Communications to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and
traffic on national roads.
 Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 548 states that:
“SECTION 1. To promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts
of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines, the Director of Public Works, with the
approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to
regulate and control the use of and traffic on such roads and streets. Such rules and regulations, with the approval of the
President, may contain provisions controlling or regulating the construction of buildings or other structures within a
reasonable distance from along the national roads. Such roads may be temporarily closed to any or all classes of traffic by the
Director of Public Works and his duly authorized representatives whenever the condition of the road or the traffic thereon
makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest, or for a specified period, with the approval
of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.”
 August 2, 1940- the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of the recommendations made by the
Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with modifications.
 August 10, 1940- The Secretary of Public Works approved the recommendations. The Mayor of Manila and the
Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a
consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above
mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.
 Maximo Calalang, as a private citizen and as a tax payer, brought before this court this petition for a writ of
prohibition against the respondents on the ground that it infringes upon the constitutional precept regarding the
promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people.
Held:
 No, the promotion of social justice is to be adhered not through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group.
 Social justice is “neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,” but the humanization of laws
and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively
secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the
people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent
elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of
the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-
constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored
principle of salus populi est suprema lex (“Let the good of the people be the supreme law.”)
 Therefore, social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers
and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a
combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the
state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about “the greatest good to the
greatest number.”
Case No. 19
GUIDO VS RURAL PROGRESS ADMINISTRATION
G.R. No. L-2089, October 31, 1949
FACTS:
 This case is a petition for prohibition to prevent the Rural Progress Administration and Judge Oscar Castelo of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal from proceeding with the expropriation of petitioner Justa G. Guido's land, two
adjoining lots, part commercial, with a combined area of 22,655 square meters, situated in Maypajo, Caloocan,
Rizal, just outside the north Manila boundary, on the main street; running from this city to the North.
 This case is based on four grounds to which among others included (2) That the land sought to be expropriated is
commercial and therefore excluded within the purview of the provisions of Act 539.
 Commonwealth Act No. 539 authorized the President of the Philippines to acquire private lands or any interest
therein through purchaser or farms for resale at a reasonable price.
 The National Assembly approved this enactment on the authority of section 4 of Article XIII of the Constitution
which provides that the Congress may authorize, upon payment of just compensation, the expropriation of lands
to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not the expropriation of Guido’s land conforms to the Social Justice Principle?
HELD:
 NO. The announced principle, herein invoked, that "the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and
economic security of all the people should be the concern of the state," is a declaration, with which the former
should be reconciled, that "the Philippines is a Republican state" created to secure to the Filipino people "the
blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy." Democracy, as a way of life
enshrined in the Constitution, embraces as its necessary components freedom of conscience, freedom of
expression, and freedom in the pursuit of happiness.
 The promotion of social justice ordained by the Constitution does not supply paramount basis for untrammeled
expropriation of private land by the Rural Progress Administration or any other government instrumentality.
Social justice does not champion division of property or equality of economic status; what it and the Constitution
do guaranty are equality of opportunity, equality of political rights, equality before the law, equality between
values given and received, and equitable sharing of the social and material goods on the basis of efforts exerted
in their production.
 Expropriation of large estates, trusts in perpetuity, and land that embraces a whole town, or a large section of a
town or city, bears direct relation to the public welfare. The size of the land expropriated, the large number of
people benefitted, and the extent of social and economic reform secured by the condemnation, clothes the
expropriation with public interest and public use.
 The condemnation of a small property in behalf of 10, 20 or 50 persons and their families does not insure to the
benefit of the public to a degree sufficient to give the use public character. The expropriation proceedings at bar
have been instituted for the economic relief of a few families devoid of any consideration of public health, public
peace and order, or other public advantage.
 No fixed line of demarcation between what taking is for public use and what is not can be made; each case has to
be judged according to its peculiar circumstances. It suffices to say for the purpose of this decision that the case
under consideration is far wanting in those elements which make for public convenience or public use.
 It is patterned upon an ideology far removed from that consecrated in our system of government and embraced
by the majority of the citizens of this country. If upheld, this case would open the gates to more oppressive
expropriations. If this expropriation be constitutional, the Court see no reason why a 10-, 15-, or 25-hectare farm
land might not be expropriated and subdivided, and sold to those who want to own a portion of it.
 To make the analogy closer, the Court find no reason why the Rural Progress Administration could not take by
condemnation an urban/lot containing an area of 1,000 or 2,000 square meters for subdivision into tiny lots for
resale to its occupants or those who want to build thereon. The petition is granted without special finding as to
costs.
Case No. 20
Almeda v. CA
FACTS: Respondent Eulogio Gonzales is an agricultural share tenant of Glicerio, Sinfroso, Susana, Maria, Sebastian,
Rufina, Bienvenido, Besmark and Cesar, all surnamed Angeles, on their 46,529-square land situated in Tanauan, Batangas, and
devoted to sugar cane and coconuts. On September 30, 1968, the landowners sold the property to petitioners-spouses Leonila
Laurel Almeda and Venancio Almeda without notifying respondent-tenant in writing of the sale. The document of sale was
registered with the Register of Deeds of Tanauan, Batangas on March 27, 1969. Respondent-tenant thus seeks the
redemption of the land in a complaint filed on March 27, 1971, pursuant to the provisions of Sections 11 and 12 of the Code
of Agrarian Reforms, with the Court of Agrarian Relations at Lipa City.
Answering the complaint, petitioners-spouses state, among other things, that long before the execution of the
deed of sale, Glicerio Angeles and his nephew Cesar Angeles first offered the sale of the land to respondent Gonzales, but the
latter said that he had no money; that respondent-tenant, instead, went personally to the house of petitioners-spouses and
implored them to buy the land for fear that if someone else would buy the land, he may not be taken in as tenant; that
respondent-tenant is a mere dummy of someone deeply interested in buying the land, that respondent-tenant made to
tender of payment or any valid consignation in court at the time he filed the complaint for redemption.
At the hearing of May 29, 1973, the parties waived their right to present evidence and, instead, agreed to file
simultaneous memoranda upon which the decision of the court would be based. On October 10, 1973, the Agrarian Court
rendered judgment authorizing, the respondent-tenant, Eulogio Gonzales, to redeem the tenanted land for P24,000.00, the
said amount to be deposited by him with the Clerk of Court within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the decision.
Petitioners-spouses excepted to the ruling of the Agrarian Court and appealed the case to the Court of Appeals.
On January 30, 1976, the Appellate Court, however, affirmed the decision of the Agrarian Court. Denied of their motions for
reconsideration, petitioners- spouses instituted the present petition for review.
ISSUE: Whether respondent Gonzales validly exercised his right of redemption over his tenanted land
HELD: No. It is to be noted that under the new Constitution, property ownership is impressed with social function.
Property use must not only be for the benefit of the owner but of society as well. The State, in the promotion of social
justice, may "regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of private property, and equitably diffuse
property ownership and profits."
The existence of the right of redemption operates to depress the market value of the land until the period
expires, and to render that period indefinite by permitting the tenant to file a suit for redemption, with either party unable to
foresee when final judgment will terminate the action, would render nugatory the period of two years (180 days under the
new law) fixed by the statute for making the redemption and virtually paralyze any efforts of the landowner to realize the
value of his land. No buyer can be expected to acquire it without any certainty as to the amount for which least his investment
in case of redemption. In the meantime, the landowner's needs and obligations cannot be met. It is doubtful if any such result
was intended by the statute, absent clear wording to that effect." In this case, neither prior tender nor judicial consignation of
the redemption price accompanied the filing of the redemption suit.
As a consequence, the Court of Agrarian Relations has jurisdiction over suits for redemption, like the present
case, of sugar and coconut lands.
Case No. 21
Ondoy vs. Ignacio
GR no. L-47178 May 16, 1980
FACTS:
Estrella B. Ondoy – mother of Jose Ondoy filed a claim for compensation for the death of her son while employed by Virgilio
Ignacio. Jose Ondoy was a fisherman boarding a fishing vessel when he was invited by friends to a drinking spree, left the
vessel, and was found dead after. His chief-mate gave an affidavit stating that Jose was in the actual performance of his work
with said fishing enterprises when he drowned and died, dying in line of duty. Such affidavit was ignored by the referee or
hearing officer and dismissed the case for lack of merit. A motion for reconsideration was filed but the Secretary of Labor also
denied the motion for lack of merit. Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not Estrella Ondoy can claim compensation for the death of her son.
HELD:
The petition was granted and Estrella B. Ondoy was awarded P6,000 as compensation for the death of her son. This Court, in
recognizing the right of petitioner to the award, merely adheres to the interpretation uninterruptedly followed by this Court
resolving all doubts in favor of the claimant. What was said in Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation
Commission is not amiss: "There is need, it seems, even at this late date, for [private respondent] and other employers to be
reminded of the high estate accorded the Workmen's Compensation Act in the constitutional scheme of social justice and
protection to labor." Further: "No other judicial attitude may be expected in the face of a clearly expressed legislative
determination which antedated the constitutionally avowed concern for social justice and protection to labor. It is easily
understandable why the judiciary frowns on resort to doctrines, which even if deceptively plausible, would result in frustrating
such a national policy.” A realistic view is that expressed in Agustin v. Workmen's Compensation Commission: 'As between a
laborer, usually poor and unlettered, and the employer, who has resources to secure able legal advice, the law has reason to
demand from the latter stricter compliance. Social justice in these cases is not equality but protection.”
Case No, 22
Salonga v. Farrales
FACTS: Defendant Julia B. Farrales is the titled owner of a residential lot in Sta. Rita Olongapo City. Within the owned
parcel of land by the defendant, plaintiff, spouses Salonga are the lessess of the 156 sq. meters of land where the latter
erected a house and is paying rentals to the defendant. Sometime before 1968, plaintiff failed to pay rental and that as a
result, defendant filed an ejectment case. Plaintiff then offered that they will just buy their occupied parcel of land instead of
vacating, however, defendant regused. Plaintiff subsequently filed a petition for relief invoking Article II, Section 6, (9) of the
constitution which they contended that it delimits and regulated property rights and private gains.
ISSUE: Whether Sec. 6, Article II of the New Constitution is applicable to the case at bar
HELD: No. The contention that Sec. 6, Article II of the New Constitution is applicable to the case at bar, it must be
remembered that social justice cannot be invoked to trample on the rights of property owners who under our Constitution
and laws are also entitled to protection. The social justice consecrated in our constitution was not intended to take away
rights from a person and give them to another who is not entitled thereto. Evidently, the plea for social justice cannot nullify
the law on obligations and contracts, and is, therefore, beyond the power of the Court to grant.
Case No. 23
CARIÑO vs. CHR
G.R. No. 96681 December 2, 1991
Facts
Sept 17 1990 - 800 public school teachers who among were members of Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA)
and Association of Concerned Teachers of ACTS took part of a protest on the allege inaction of public officers on grievances
laid to them
ISIDRO CARINO - Plaintiff acting in the capacity as Education secretary issued an order for the teachers to return to their post
within 24 hours or face dismissal. also acted and filed motion to dismiss case filed by the removed teachers through the
Solicitor General's office.
CHR - Dismissed motion filed by Carino and asserts that the commission has the power to hear and resolve such cases on basis
that the teachers who filed were denied process of law.
Issue
whether or not the CHR has the power to hear and resolve such cases.
Held
 No the CHR has no such power for the constitution provides the role of CHR and can only investigate such cases if
there is a violation on its human or political rights as explicitly stated in the constitution.
 the Court reiterated that the constitution provides the role and functions of CHR as a separate office and as such
cannot exercise powers or functions not given by the constitution.
 Petition of Secretary of Education was granted and the case filed was dismissed
Case No. 24
Secretary of National Defense vs. Manalo
GR no. 180906, October 7, 2008
FACTS:
Raymond Manalo – together with his brother Reynaldo Manalo, filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to Treat Existing
Petition as Amparo Petition, to Admit Supporting Affidavits, and to Grant Interim and Final Amparo Reliefs on Aug. 23, 2007,
praying that the petition be considered a Petition for the Writ of Amparo under Sec. 26 of the Amparo Rule. The petition was
granted by the Court of Appeals on Dec. 26, 2007 requiring the Secretary of National Defense and AFP Chief of Staff to answer
to the Writ of Amparo filed against them. Raymond Manalo narrated that on Feb. 14, 2006, several armed soldiers wearing
white shirts, fatigue pants, and army boots (which he later on identified as members of the Citizens Armed Forces
Geographical Unit ((CAFGU))) came to their residence in Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, at around noon, and asked
him if he was Bestre. Upon learning that he was not Bestre, he was slapped, boxed in the stomach, kicked on the hip,
handcuffed, and was forcibly taken away. The men forced Raymond to board an L-300 van, was blindfolded, and after some
time, the vehicle stopped and boarded another person which he later discovered was his brother, Reynaldo Manalo. From
Feb. 2006 to Aug. 2007, the Manalo brothers were tortured and maltreated in admitting that they were members of the New
People’s Army and when the brothers answered they were not, they were continuedly beaten. The Manalo brothers were
detained in different houses, brought to different military units, which they met other abducted persons which they later
witnessed being killed or just completely disappeared. On Aug. 15, 2007, two days after the Manalo brothers’ escape from
detention, they were examined by Dr. Molino, and his findings were consistent with their accounts of physical injuries inflicted
upon them.
Sec. of National Defense & Chief of Staff of the AFP – filed a petition for review and prohibition, questioning the decision of
the CA stating that it “seriously and grievously erred in believing and giving full faith and credit to the incredible,
uncorroborated, contradicted, and obviously scripted, rehearsed, and self-serving affidavit/testimony of Raymond Manalo.”
HELD:
The Court dismissed the case and continued to grant the privilege of the writ of amparo to the Manalo brothers. The Court
held that “the writ of amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses; it
is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators as it will inevitably yield leads to subsequent
investigation and action. In the long run, the goal of both the preventive and curative roles is to deter the further commission
of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.” After careful perusal of the evidence presented, we affirm the findings of
the Court of Appeals that respondents were abducted from their houses in Sito Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso,
Bulacan on February 14, 2006 and were continuously detained until they escaped on August 13, 2007. The abduction,
detention, torture, and escape of the respondents were narrated by respondent Raymond Manalo in a clear and convincing
manner. His account is dotted with countless candid details of respondents' harrowing experience and tenacious will to
escape, captured through his different senses and etched in his memory. The Court rejects the claim of petitioners that
respondent Raymond Manalo's statements were not corroborated by other independent and credible pieces of evidence.
Raymond's affidavit and testimony were corroborated by the affidavit of respondent Reynaldo Manalo. The testimony and
medical reports prepared by forensic specialist Dr. Molino, and the pictures of the scars left by the physical injuries inflicted
on respondents, also corroborate respondents' accounts of the torture they endured while in detention. Respondent
Raymond Manalo's familiarity with the facilities in Fort Magsaysay such as the "DTU", as shown in his testimony and
confirmed by Lt. Col. Jimenez to be the "Division Training Unit", firms up respondents' story that they were detained for some
time in said military facility.
In discussing the right of the respondents to the privilege of the writ of amparo, there is no quarrel that the enforced
disappearance of both respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo has now passed as they have escaped from captivity and
surfaced. But while respondents admit that they are no longer in detention and are physically free, they assert that they are
not "free in every sense of the word" as their "movements continue to be restricted for fear that people they have named in
their Judicial Affidavits and testified against (in the case of Raymond) are still at large and have not been held accountable in
any way. These people are directly connected to the Armed Forces of the Philippines and are, thus, in a position to threaten
respondents' rights to life, liberty and security." Respondents claim that they are under threat of being once again abducted,
kept captive or even killed, which constitute a direct violation of their right to security of person.
Elaborating on the "right to security, in general", respondents point out that this right is "often associated with liberty"; it is
also seen as an "expansion of rights based on the prohibition against torture and cruel and unusual punishment." Conceding
that there is no right to security expressly mentioned in Article III of the 1987 Constitution, they submit that their rights "to be
kept free from torture and from incommunicado detention and solitary detention places fall under the general coverage of
the right to security of person under the writ of Amparo." They submit that the Court ought to give an expansive recognition
of the right to security of person in view of the State Policy under Article II of the 1987 Constitution which enunciates that,
"The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights." In sum, respondents
assert that their cause of action consists in the threat to their right to life and liberty, and a violation of their right to security.
First, the right to security of person is "freedom from fear". In its "whereas" clauses, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR) enunciates that "a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from
fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people." In the context of Section 1 of the
Amparo Rule, "freedom from fear" is the right and any threat to the rights to life, liberty or security is the actionable wrong.
Fear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of action. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range from
being baseless to well-founded as people react differently. The degree of fear can vary from one person to another with the
variation of the prolificacy of their imagination, strength of character or past experience with the stimulus. Thus, in the
amparo context, it is more correct to say that the "right to security" is actually the "freedom from threat". Viewed in this light,
the "threatened with violation" Clause in the latter part of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the right to
security mentioned in the earlier part of the provision.
Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security. Article III, Section II of
the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, one's body cannot be searched or invaded without a search warrant.
Physical injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or
invasion of the body. It may constitute dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As the degree of
physical injury increases, the danger to life itself escalates. Physical torture, force, and violence are a severe invasion of bodily
integrity. When employed to vitiate the free will such as to force the victim to admit, reveal or fabricate incriminating
information, it constitutes an invasion of both bodily and psychological integrity as the dignity of the human person includes
the exercise of free will. Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution more specifically proscribes bodily and psychological
invasion.
Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one's rights by the government. In the context of the writ
of amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution and the right to security of person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity)
under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State
"guarantees full respect for human rights" under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is the chief
guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered
ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat. Protection includes
conducting effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal
killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice.
In blatant violation of our hard-won guarantees to life, liberty and security, these rights are snuffed out from victims of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. The writ of amparo is a tool that gives voice to preys of silent guns and
prisoners behind secret walls.
Case No. 25
Meyer vs. Nebraska
263 U.S. 393 (1923)
Facts:
 April 9, 1919 – The state of Nebraska, the respondent, enacted a statute called Siman Act, a restriction relating to
the teaching of foreign languages in the state of Nebraska. After World War I, Americans were not in favor of all
German related things. Some states and towns even banned the use of German language.
 May 25, 1920 - Robert T. Meyer, the plaintiff, while being an instructor in Zion Parochial School in Hampton,
Nebraska, taught the subject of reading in the German language to 10-year-old Raymond Parpart, a fourth-
grader.
 The statute further prohibited teaching foreign languages per se to any pupil who had not yet “attained and
successfully passed the eighth grade”. The school charged Meyer with violation the Siman Act. He was found
guilty in the Nebraska Supreme Court, he then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court which invalidated the statute
as applied.
Held:
1. The Court declared the Nebraska law unconstitutional, reasoning that it violated the liberty protected by Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The statute as applied is unconstitutional because it infringes on
the liberty interests of the plaintiff and fails to reasonably relate to any end within the competency of the state.
 2. Liberty, the Court explained, means more than freedom from bodily restraint. It also includes the right of a
teacher to teach German to a student, and the right of parents to control the upbringing of their child as they see
fit.
3. While the state has a legitimate interest in encouraging the growth of a population that can engage in discussions
of civic matters, the means it chose to pursue this objective was excessive. This was one of the very first cases in
which the Court found that people had liberty rights not specifically listed in the Constitution.
Case No. 26
Pierce vs. Society of Sisters
262 U.S. 390 (1925)
Facts:
 After World War I, some states, concerned about the influence of immigrants and "foreign" values, looked to
public schools for help. The states drafted laws designed to use schools to promote a common American culture.
 In 1922, The Compulsory Education Act of the State of Oregon required parents or guardians to send children
between the ages of eight and sixteen to public school in the district where the children resided.
 The Society of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, a corporation with the power to establish and
maintain academies or schools and Hill Military Academy, a private organization conducting an elementary,
college preparatory, and military training school, challenged the constitutionality of the statute under
the Fourteenth Amendment, alleging that it deprived them of property without due process of law and it
deprived parents the right to send their children to parochial schools.
 Appellees, Society of Sisters and Hill Military Academy, obtained preliminary restraining orders prohibiting
appellant, the State of Oregon, from enforcing Oregon’s Compulsory Education Act. The appellant, through
Governor Walter M. Pierce, appealed the granting of the preliminary restraining orders.
Held:
1. The Act violates the Fourteenth Amendment because it interferes with protected liberty interests and has no
reasonable relationship to any purpose within the competency of the state.
2. The Appellees have standing because the result of enforcing the Act would be destruction of the appellees’
schools. The state has the power to regulate all schools, but parents and guardians have the right and duty to
choose the appropriate preparation for their children.
3. The unanimous Court held that "the fundamental liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose
excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from
public teachers only."
Case No. 27
DECS vs. San Diego
G.R. No. 89572 Dec. 21, 1989
FACTS:
DECS (Petitioner) - Respondent, who has thrice failed the National Medical Admission Test, can no longer retake the exam.
Petitioner contends he may not, under its rule that-
h) A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the NMAT. After three (3) successive failures, a student shall not
be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time.
ROBERTO REY C. SAN DIEGO (private respondent) - took the NMAT three times and flunked it as many times. He invoked his
constitutional rights to academic freedom and quality education. He squarely challenged the constitutionality of MECS Order
No. 12, Series of 1972, containing the above-cited rule. The additional grounds raised were due process and equal protection.
Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong (respondent)- held that the petitioner had been deprived of his right to pursue a medical
education through an arbitrary exercise of the police power.
HELD:
The Supreme Court did not sustain ruling of respondent judge
 Tablarin v. Gutierrez - this Court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure intended to limit the
admission to medical schools only to those who have initially proved their competence and preparation for a
medical education
 While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional right to be a doctor. This
is true of any other calling in which the public interest is involved.
 The right to quality education invoked by the private respondent is not absolute. The Constitution also provides
that "every citizen has the right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and
equitable admission and academic requirements.
 It is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as a guarantee of the Constitution: one must show
that he is entitled to it because of his preparation and promise.
CASE 28 & 31
VIRTOUSO, JR. v. MUNICIPAL JUDGE OF MARIVELES and CHIEF OF POLICE OF MARIVELES
FACTS
The Municipal Judge of Mariveles issued a warrant of arrest against Virtouso asserting that there was probable cause of the
allegations imputed against him that he stole a certain tv set. Virtuouso filed a writ of habeas corpus alleging that there were
constitutional infirmities with the preliminary investigation conducted by the judge. Virtouso also argued that he is a minor
(he was 17 years of age) entitled to the protection of the Child and Youth Welfare Code.
The Child and Youth Welfare Code provides that a youthful offender being defined therein as "one who is over nine years but
under eighteen years of age at the time of the commission of the offense." 5 As such, he could be provisionally released on
recognizance in the discretion of a court.
ISSUE
Whether or not Virtouso’s petition should be granted?
HELD
Virtuouso being a 17-year old minor is released on the recognizance of his parents Francisco Virtouso, Sr. and Manuela
Virtouso and his counsel, Atty. Guillermo B. Bandonil, who, in open court, agreed to act in such capacity, without prejudice to
further proceedings in a pending case against petitioner being taken in accordance with law." This Court should, whenever
appropriate, give vitality and force to the Youth and Welfare Code, which is an implementation of this specific constitutional
mandate: "The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote their physical, intellectual, and
social well-being.
Case No. 29
Imbong vs. Ochoa
G.R. No. 204829, April 8, 2014
FACTS: The Republic Health Law was passed by Congress in 2012 because of the alarming overpopulation rates that the
Philippines is facing. The RH Law, at the very least, will provide free contraceptives to women, will make prescription
contraceptives over the counter, and will incorporate sex education in the current curriculum of Philippine education.
CFC assailed a certain provision of the RH Law (Section 23(a) (2) (i)) for being violative of the provisions of the constitution
relating to marital privacy and autonomy. CFC argues that the law promotes disunity and fosters animosity in the family rather
than promote its solidarity and total development. (Family)
Section 7 of the RH Law prohibits parents of minors, the latter being already parents or has had a miscarriage, from providing
parental consent. (Unborn Child)
ISSUE: Whether or not the RH Law is unconstitutional with respect to one’s marital privacy and autonomy
RULING: Yes, section 23 (a) (2) (i) of the RH Law is unconstitutional with respect to one’s marital privacy and autonomy.
The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual decision-making. By giving absolute authority to the spouse who
would undergo a procedure, and barring the other spouse from participating in the decision would drive a wedge between
the husband and wife, possibly result in bitter animosity, and endanger the marriage and the family, all for the sake of days. In the job application form she indicated that her civil status was single despite the fact that she contracted marriage a
reducing the population. This would be a marked departure from the policy of the State to protect marriage as an inviolable few months earlier.
social institution. (Family) When PT&T knew about the false information, the branch supervisor, Delia Oficial, sent to de Guzman a memorandum
Section 7 does not promote unity in the family. It is this exact instance where the child would need the counsel of her parents. requiring her to explain the discrepancy and reminded her that the company has a policy of not accepting married women for
The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of parents in the care and custody of a minor child, employment.
whether or not the latter is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest can justify a state De Guzman stated that she was not aware of the policy regarding married women at the time and that all along she had not
substitution of their parental authority. (Unborn Child) deliberately hidden her true civil status.
She was dismissed from the company, which resulted in the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter.
Exceptions: At the preliminary conference, she volunteered the information that she had failed to remit the amount of P2,380.75 of her
collections. To which she executed a promissory note for the amount.
1.Access to Information The Labor arbiter decided that de Guzman already gained he statues of a regular employee and was illegally dismissed by
the Court finds no constitutional objection to the acquisition of information by the minor referred to under the exception in PT&T.
the second paragraph of Section 7 that would enable her to take proper care of her own body and that of her unborn child. On appeal, the NLRC upheld the decision of the LA saying that de Guzman was subjected to unjust and unlawful
2. Life Threatening Cases discrimination by her employer.
the life of the minor who has already suffered a miscarriage and that of the spouse should not be put at grave risk simply for MR was denied by the NLRC. Hence, this special civil action assailing the aforestated decisions.
lack of consent. It should be emphasized that no person should be denied the appropriate medical care urgently needed to ISSUE/s:
preserve the primordial right, that is, the right to life. WON policy of not hiring married women is valid - NO
RULING: The petition of PT&T is dismissed for lack of merit.
HOLDING: The state gives prime importance to family as evidenced in the creation of a separate Article in the Constitution HELD:
and the presence in the State Declaration and Policies. To effect this provision in the RH Law would mean to violate the 1. The Constitution recognizes the disparity in rights between men and women in almost all phases of social and
sanctity of family life. (Family) political life. It therefore contains several provisions which cater specifically to the protection of womens’ rights.
1. Section 14, Article II recognizing the role do women in nation building
The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of parents in the care and custody of a minor child, 2. Section 3, Article XIII requires the State to afford full protection to labor and equality of employment
whether or not the latter is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest can justify a state opportunities for all
substitution of their parental authority. (Unborn Child) 3. Section 14, Article XIII mandates that the State shall protect working women
2. Several Repulic Acts were also enacted to promote gender equality in labor.
Case No. 30 1. RA 6727 which prohibits discrimination against women with respect to terms and conditions of
Obergefell vs. Hodges employment RA 6955 which bands the mail order bride practice
576 U.S. (June 26, 2015) 2. RA 7192 or the Women Development and Nation Building Act which affords equal opportunities with
Facts: men to act and to enter into contracts.
 Groups of same-sex couples sued their relevant state agencies in Ohio, Michigan, Kentucky, and Tennessee to 3. RA 7322 increasing the maternity benefits granted to women
challenge the constitutionality of those states' bans on same-sex marriage or refusal to recognize legal same-sex 4. RA 7877 which outlaws and punishes sexual harassment in the workplace
marriages that occurred in jurisdictions that provided for such marriages. 3. The Labor code specifically Article 136 explicitly prohibits discrimination
 The plaintiffs in each case argued that the states' statutes violated the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process merely by reason of the marriage of female employees.
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and one group of plaintiffs also brought claims under the Civil Rights Act. 4. An employer is free to regulate, according to his discretion and best business judgment, all aspect so employment
In all the cases, the trial court found in favor of the plaintiffs. except in cases of unlawful discrimination or those which may be provided by law.
 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that the states' bans on same-sex marriage and 5. PT&T’s policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any woman worker who contracts
refusal to recognize marriages performed in other states did not violate the couples' Fourteenth Amendment marriage runs afoul of the test of and the right against discrimination afforded all women workers by the labor
rights to equal protection and due process. laws and the Constitution.
Held: 6. de Guzman’s act of concealing the true nature of her status from PT&T could not be properly characterizes a
1. The Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the right to marry as one willful or in bad faith as she was moved to act the way she did mainly because he wanted to retain a permanent
of the fundamental liberties it protects, and that analysis applies to same-sex couples in the same manner as it job in ta stable company.
does to opposite-sex couples.
2. While same-sex marriage might be good and fair policy, the Constitution does not address it, and therefore it is 7. The collateral insistence of PT&T on the admission of de Guzman that she misappropriated company funds as an
beyond the purview of the Court to decide whether states have to recognize or license such unions. additional ground to dismiss her is insincere. Their main reason for dismissing her was her marriage status.
8. PT&T’s rule is directed towards married women but not against married men. The variable is sex and the
CASE 32 discrimination is unlawful.
PT & T v. NLRC
G.R. No. 118978, May 23, 1997
Grace de Guzman was initially hired by PT&T as a reliever for a fixed period in substitution for CF Tenorio who went on
maternity leave. Under the Reliever Agreement she signed, her employment was o be immediately terminated upon
expiration of the agreed period. After the lapse, she was again hired as reliever this time in replacement of Erlinda Dizon who
went on leave. de Guzman was once more asked to work for PT&T, this time however, as probationary employee to cover 150