[SEARCH & SEIZURE: e.

Search incidental to a lawful arrest]

04 Cadua vs. CA
August 19, 1999 | Quisimbing, J. |

Doctrine: Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, provides that:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule
112, Section 7.

Facts:
 On January 2, 1992, between 6:30 and 7:00 in the evening, PO3 Joselito Burdeos and his companions
werepatrolling the vicinity of Fairview, Quezon City. Their tour of duty was from 3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m.
 They received a radio dispatch requesting them to proceed to Lot 10 Block 14, Alden Street, North
Fairview. Said dispatch was based on a report concerning an alleged holdup of complainants Lourdes
Bulos and her daughter Bernadette, who were in need of police assistance.
 Both complainants who stated that the alleged holduppers had just fled and that they were held up by
two (2) men at the corner of Archer and Regalado Streets, near their house.
 The police officers also asked in what direction the alleged holduppers fled and what they were
wearing and requested the complainants to board the patrol unit in order to facilitate the search for
the two men.
 As they were patrolling around the area, complainants informed the police officers that one of the
suspects was dressed in jeans and a t-shirt while the other was dressed in a black top and black
pants
 The police officers then noticed two men walking alongside the street and as the officers slowed
down the mobile unit to get a closer look, the complainants identified the men as the alleged
holduppers, one of which is the petitioner in this case.
 The police called out to the suspects. As Burdeos was approaching the suspects, he noticed that
petitioner Cadua was about to pull something which was tucked at the right side of his waist. Burdeos
promptly pointed his firearm at Cadua and warned him not to move.
 He then frisked Cadua and found in his possession a .38 caliber "paltik" revolver. PO3 Reynoso
Bacnat the apprehended Cadua's companion, who was later identified as Joselito Aguilar. In Aguilar's
possession was found a fan knife.

Issue:

W/N THE "PALTIK" WAS RECOVERED IN AN INCIDENTAL SEARCH DURING A WARRANTLESS

ARREST MADE BY THE POLICE OFFICERS IS ADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE?

– YES.

Held:
 Petitioner claims since his arrest is null and void, the search conducted by the police officers as an
incident to his arrest is likewise defective. He sought to invoke his constitutional right to be secure
 against unreasonable searches and seizures, and the corresponding prohibition against admitting into
evidence anything obtained in violation of such right.
 Petitioner further claims that the police officers incorrectly premised their action on the instances
provided for in warrantless arrests. He adds that since the complainants later on disclaimed petitioners
identity as the holdupper and that no case of robbery was filed against him, any probable cause or
personal knowledge thereof, alleged by the arresting officers, had been totally negated. Absent
probable cause or personal knowledge by the arresting officers, the arrest and the incidental search
are illegal; hence, the paltik they seized is inadmissible in evidence. According to petitioner, despite
lack of probable cause, he was still arrested because [k]nowing that the police officers committed a
blunder they concocted a story that they were able to recover a paltik from the accused, so that even if
the accused is freed from the robbery charge they can still keep him for alleged possession of firearms
 The SC affirmed the ruling of CA that the warrantless arrest of petitioner was based on probable
cause and that the police officers had personal knowledge of the fact which led to his arrest.
The subsequent search was therefore an incident to the arrest, making the firearm found in
his possession admissible in evidence. Moreover, the CA stated that the positive declaration of
prosecution witness Joselito Burdeos, that the .38 "paltik" revolver was found in petitioner's
possession, already proved one of the essential elements of the crime of Illegal Possession of
Firearms.
 There was sufficient reason to justify a warrantless arrest of petitioner for illegal possession of
firearms. Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, provides that:
 Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in
accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.

 It has been ruled that "personal knowledge of facts", in arrests without warrant must be based
upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. . . .
Peace officers may pursue and arrest without warrant any person found in suspicious places
or under suspicious circumstances reasonably tending to show that such person has
committed, or is about to commit, any crime or breach of the peace.
 Probable cause for an arrest without warrant is such a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves as to warrant a reasonable man
in believing the accused to be guilty.
 Given the circumstances of the case, the Court affirmed the finding that the warrantless arrest of
petitioner is lawful. The incidental search and subsequent seizure of the unlicensed firearm in
question is likewise lawful and valid pursuant to Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
Warrantless Searches – Search Incidental to a lawful Arrest
05 Padilla v CA
March 12, 1997 | Francisco, J. |

Doctrine: WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE are valid in the ff:

1. Search incidental to a lawful arrest.
2. Plain view, elements which are:
a. A prior valid intrusion based on a valid warrantless arrest
b. Evidence was inadvertently discovered
c. Evidence was immediately apparent
d. Plain view justified mere seizure
3. Search of a Moving Vehicle
4. Consented warrantless searches
5. Customs Search

Facts:
● At about 8:00pm in the evening, Enrique Manarang and Danny Perez saw a Mitsubishi Pajero with plate number PMA
777 crash and hit a balut vendor. Manarang, a member of Spectrum, a civic group and the Barangay Disaster
Coordinating Council decided to report the accident to PNP of Angeles City. By the time he completed the call, the
Pajero had started to leave the scene of the accident heading north
● Manarang rode in his motorcycle and chased the Pajero. He also informed the police of the plate number and where it
was heading. However, upon reaching Abacan bridge, he only saw two police men, SPO2 Borja, and SPO2 Miranda
who were already informed of the hit and run incident.
● Manarang then went to Tina’s Restaurant where he saw the Pajero that was involved in the hit and run. The Pajero
then headed towards Abacan Bridge and Borja and Miranda gave chase when they saw the Pajero approaching.
● They eventually caught up with the Pajero and instructed the driver to alight who turned out to be Robin Padilla, the
appellant. Padilla complied with the officer and stepped out of his car with his hands raised
● Padilla was wearing a short leather jacket and so when he raised his hands, a gun with 6 live bullets inside was
tucked on the left side of his waist with its butt protruding.
● Officer Borja attempted to confiscate the gun but Padilla told him that the gun was covered by legal papers to which
Borja replied that the papers would have to be shown in the office.
● After confiscating the gun, Padilla was informed about the hit and run incident which he denied being involved in.
● 3 other officers arrived, SPO Ruben Mercado, SPO Tan, and SPO2 Odejar, and Mercado took over being the most
senior officer. Mercado pointed out that Padilla’s plate number was dangling and the railing and the hood were dented.
Padilla again angrily denied being involved.
● As this was happening, a crowd started to form, and so Padilla played with the crowd by holding their hands with one
hand and pointing to Borja for taking his gun. His gesture exposed a long magazine of an armalite rilfe tucked in his
back right pocket.
● Mercado confiscated the magazine and, suspecting that Padilla could be carrying a rifle inside his car, he prevented
Padilla from going back to his car by opening the car door. He saw a baby armalite rifle lying horizontally at the front
of the driver seat. He asked for the papers but Padilla said that the papers were at his home.
● He then arrested Padilla for the hit and run incident but also modified it to include illegal possession of firearms.
● At the station (Traffic Division), Padilla voluntarily surrendered a pietro berreta pistol with a single round in its
chamber and magazine with 7 rounds, and a black bag containing two long magazines and one short magazines.
● Padilla admitted to possessing the firearms but was not able to produce any permit to carry or memorandum receipt
to cover the three firearms.
● It was also revealed in a certification that the firearms were not registered in his name (Robin C. Padilla) and another
certification stated that the firearms were not also registered in the name of Robinhood C. Padilla.
Issue:
W/N his arrest was illegal and consequently, the firearms and ammunition are inadmissible in evidence

Held:
NO. His arrest was lawful and the firearms are admissible even without a search warrant.
● Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in the ff:
1. When in the presence of a peace officer or private person, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit and offense
2. When an offense has in fact been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person
to be arrested has committed it
3. When the person to be arrested is an escaped prisoner
● Both elements of the first paragraph concurred as it was established that Padilla’s Pajero figured in a hit and run which
was committed in the presence of Manarang, a private person. Presence does not require that the arresting person
see the offense but also hear the disturbance AND proceed to the scene. Manarang heard the incident, reported it
and then gave chase to Padilla. SPO2 Miranda then effected the actual arrest of Padilla. Manarang seeking the police’s
aid in arresting Padila did not affect the propriety of the apprehension
● The arrest could also be justified under the 2nd paragraph as the offense had in fact just been committed with no lapse
of time between the offense and the arrest. Police also saw the Pajero when they stationed themselves at Abacan
Bridge and saw the dented hood and railings, and the dangling plate number which formed part of their personal
knowledge of the incident.
● WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE are valid in the ff:
6. Search incidental to a lawful arrest.
7. Plain view, elements which are:
e. A prior valid intrusion based on a valid warrantless arrest
f. Evidence was inadvertently discovered
g. Evidence was immediately apparent
h. Plain view justified mere seizure
8. Search of a Moving Vehicle
9. Consented warrantless searches
10. Customs Search
● The police stumbled on the firearms and ammunition without undertaking any active search. The Smith and Wesson
and the M-16 was justified for they came within Plain View when police discovered the revolver and magazine tucked
in Padilla’s waist and back pocket. The M-16 was immediately apparent when they took a casual glance at the Pajero
and saw the rifle inside.
● The pistol and black bag were voluntarily surrendered by Padilla which indicated a waiver of his right against search
and seizure and his failure to quash the information estopped him from assailing any purported defect.
● Assuming that the firearms were products of an active search, their seizure could be justified under a search incidental
to a lawful arrest. Once the lawful arrest was effected, the police may undertake a protective search of the
passenger compartment and containers in the vehicle which are within Padilla’s grabbing distance regardless of
the nature of the offense.
● This satisfies the two-tiered test of an incidental search: the item to be seized was within the arrestee’s custody or
area of immediate control and the search was contemporaneous with the arrest.
● The arrest could also be justified under Moving vehicle since the police had probable or reasonable cause to believe
that the motorist is a law-offender or the contents or cargo of the vehicle are or have been instruments of the subject
matter or the proceeds of some criminal offense.

Dispositive
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the CA sustaining petitioner’s conviction by the lower court of the crime of
illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions is Affirmed except that petitioner’s indeterminate penalty is Modified to ten
years and one day as minimum, to 18 years, 8 months, and 1 day as maximum.

Notes
Other issues: License to carry
- 2 requisites for illegal possession
1. Existence of subject firearm
2. Fact that the accused who owed firearm does not have the license or permit to possess
- Firearms were seized in a valid warrantless arrest
 -Padilla’s permit (Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt) were mere afterthoughts and issued under suspicious
circumstances. They were issued AFTER he had been arrested nor did Padilla take the witness stand to explain his
possession.
- Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt came from an unauthorized source and his name does not appear in the list
of Civilian Agents.
- They were fabricated pieces of evidence since the testimony of the Chief of the records branch of the Firearms and
Explosives office (FEO) of the PNP declared that the firearms were not licensed or registered in Padilla’s name.
- Testimony by FEO that a person is not a licensee of any firearms would suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the
second element of illegal possession.
- Certification may be dispensed with since an M-16 rifle and any short firearm higher than a .38 caliber cannot be
licensed to a civilian.
[Search incidental to a lawful arrest –
Warrantless searches – Search and seizure (Rule 126)]
PEOPLE V. MARTINEZ
December 13, 2010 | Mendoza, J. | G.R. No. 191366

Doctrine: Personal knowledge of facts in arrests without warrant must be based upon probable cause 1, which means
an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when the suspicion, that
the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing an offense, is based on actual facts, that is, supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested.

Although this Court has ruled in several dangerous drugs cases that tipped information is sufficient probable cause to
effect a warrantless search, such rulings cannot be applied in the case at bench because said cases involve either a
buy-bust operation or drugs in transit, basically, circumstances other than the sole tip of an informer as basis for the
arrest. None of these drug cases involve police officers entering a house without warrant to effect arrest and seizure
based solely on an informer's tip.

Facts:
This is an appeal from the Decision of RTC Dagupan City fnding the accused guilty of Possession of Dangerous Drugs
During Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings (violating Section 13, in relation to Section 11, Article II of Republic Act
No. 9165).

Version of the Prosecution2

PO1 Azardon was on duty when a concerned citizen entered the precinct and reported that a pot session was going
on in the house of accused Gonzales. Upon receipt of the report, PO1 Azardon, PO1 Dela Cruz, and members of the
SWAT team hied to Trinidad Subdivision and located the house of Gonzales.

They saw accused Doria coming out of the side door and immediately arrested him. Inside the house, they saw accused
Gonzales, A. Martinez, Dizon, and R. Martinez in a room. The four were surprised by the presence of the police.

In front of them were open plastic sachets (containing shabu residue), pieces of rolled used aluminum foil and pieces
of used aluminum foil.

The accused were arrested and brought to the police precinct.

The items found in the room were seized and turned over to the Pangasinan Provincial Police Crime Laboratory Officer,
P/Insp. Maranion, who conducted a laboratory examination on the seized items. All3 tested positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride.

The accused were subjected to a drug test and, except for Doria, they were found to be positive for methamphetamine

1
Probable cause has been held to signify a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.

2
testimonies of prosecution witnesses, Police Officer 1 Bernard Azardon (PO1 Azardon), one of the apprehending officers, and Police
Inspector Lady Ellen Maranion (P/Insp. Maranion), the forensic chemical officer

3
115 plastic sachets, 11 pieces of rolled used aluminum foil, and 27 of the 49 pieces of used aluminum foil
hydrochloride.

Version of the Defense4

Accused A. Martinez, Dizon, and R. Martinez were to meet with a certain Apper who bumped the passenger jeep of R.
Martinez and who was to give the materials for the painting of said jeep.

As they were going Trinidad Subdivision looking for Apper, they saw Gonzales in front of his house and asked him if
he noticed a person pass by. While they were talking, Doria arrived.

It was then that five to seven policemen emerged and apprehended them. They were handcuffed and brought to the
police station in Perez, Dagupan City, where they were incarcerated and charged with sniffing shabu.

Issue:
W/N prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused – YES

Held: YES.
A. The evidence against the accused are inadmissible. (TOPIC in the class syllabus)

The clear infringement of the accused's right to be protected against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be
ignored. A review of the facts reveal that the arrest of the accused was illegal and the subject items were confiscated
as an incident thereof.

Applicable Laws / Doctrines:

 Rules of procedure are mere tools intended to facilitate the attainment of justice, rather than frustrate it.
Technicalities should never be used to defeat substantive rights.

o A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of
evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.

o Although the admissibility of the evidence was not raised as in issue by the accused, this Court has
the power to correct any error, even if unassigned, if such is necessary in arriving at a just decision,
especially when the transcendental matter of life and liberty is at stake.

 Sec. 2, Art. III, of the 1987 Constitution5

o The State cannot, in a manner contrary to its constitutional guarantee, intrude into the persons of its
citizens as well as into their houses, papers and effects.

o This constitutional guarantee, however, is not a blanket prohibition against all searches and seizures
without warrant. Arrests and seizures in the following instances are allowed even in the absence of
a warrant.6

 Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure7 (circumstances under which a warrantless arrest

4
through its witnesses, accused A. Martinez, Dizon, and R. Martinez

5
Art. III, of the 1987 Constitution: Section 2. — The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized.

6
(i) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; 11 (ii) search of evidence in "plain view;" (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv)
consented warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) stop and frisk; and (vii) exigent and emergency circumstances.

7
Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for the circumstances under which a warrantless arrest is lawful.
 is lawful)

o Paragraph (c) of Rule 113 is clearly inapplicable to this case.

o Paragraphs (a) and (b), on the other hand, may be applicable and both require probable cause to be
present in order for a warrantless arrest to be valid.

 As to paragraph (a) of Section 5 of Rule 113, the arresting officers had no personal
knowledge that at the time of the arrest, accused had just committed, were committing, or
were about to commit a crime, as they had no probable cause to enter the house of accused
Rafael Gonzales in order to arrest them.

 As to paragraph (b), the arresting officers had no personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances that would lead them to believe that the accused had just committed an
offense.

 Personal knowledge of facts in arrests without warrant must be based upon probable cause8, which
means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable
when the suspicion, that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing an offense, is
based on actual facts, that is, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create
the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested.

Supporting Facts:

 Despite the procedural lapses of the accused, this Court shall rule on the admissibility of the evidence in the
case at bench.

 (On lack of probable cause) Prosecution witnesses proceeded to, and entered, the house of accused
Gonzales based solely on the report of a concerned citizen that a pot session was going on in said house
(according to the testimony of PO1 Azardon and his Joint Affidavit with PO1 Dela Cruz). Also, the tip originated
from a concerned citizen who himself had no personal knowledge of the information that was reported to the
police (as admitted in the testimony of PO1 Azardon).

 (On lack of probable cause & citing People v. Bolasa) Although this Court has ruled in several dangerous
drugs cases that tipped information is sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search, such
rulings cannot be applied in the case at bench because said cases involve either a buy-bust operation
or drugs in transit, basically, circumstances other than the sole tip of an informer as basis for the
arrest. None of these drug cases involve police officers entering a house without warrant to effect
arrest and seizure based solely on an informer's tip.

Thus:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest
police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.

8
Probable cause has been held to signify a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.
  (Neither can it be said that the subject items were seized in plain view. 9) The evidence was not inadvertently
discovered as the police officers intentionally entered the house with no prior surveillance or investigation
before they discovered the accused with the subject items.

B. The chain of custody has not been duly established. (Not the topic in the class syllabus)

 Even granting that the seized items are admissible as evidence, the acquittal of the accused would still be in
order for failure of the apprehending officers to comply with the chain of custody requirement in dangerous
drugs cases.

 The accused content that the corpus delicti was not proven, thereby producing reasonable doubt as to their
guilt. Thus, they assert that the presumption of innocence in their favor was not overcome by the presumption
of regularity in the performance of official duty.

o Reasons:10

o Doctrines11

 In the case at bench, the presence of dangerous drugs was only in the form of residue on the drug
paraphernalia, and the accused were found positive for use of dangerous drugs. Granting that the arrest was
legal, the evidence obtained admissible, and the chain of custody intact, the law enforcers should have filed
charges under Sec. 15, R.A. No. 9165 or for use of dangerous drugs and, if there was no residue at all, they
should have been charged under Sec. 14 (Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other
Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings).

 In order to effectively fulfill the intent of the law to rehabilitate drug users, this Court thus calls on law enforcers
and prosecutors in dangerous drugs cases to exercise proper discretion in fiing charges when the presence
of dangerous drugs is only and solely in the form of residue and the confirmatory test required under Sec. 15
is positive for use of dangerous drugs. In such cases, to afford the accused a chance to be rehabilitated, the
􏰁ling of charges for or involving possession of dangerous drugs should only be done when another separate
quantity of dangerous drugs, other than mere residue, is found in the possession of the accused as provided
for in Sec. 15.

Dispositive
WHEREFORE, the August 7, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. HC-NO. 03269 is REVERSED and

9
The elements of plain view are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present
in the pursuit of their of􏰁cial duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they
are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and, (d) "plain view" justi􏰁ed mere seizure of evidence without further search.

10
(1) The identity of the seized drug was not established with moral certainty as the chain of custody appears to be questionable,
the authorities having failed to comply with Sections 21 and 86 of R.A. No. 9165, and Dangerous Drug Board (DDB) Resolution No.
03, Series of 1979, as amended by Board Regulation No. 2, Series of 1990. (2) There was no prior coordination with the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), no inventory of the confiscated items conducted at the crime scene, no photograph of the items
taken, no compliance with the rule requiring the accused to sign the inventory and to give them copies thereof, and no showing of
how the items were handled from the time of confiscation up to the time of submission to the crime laboratory for testing.

11
The essential requisites to establish illegal possession of dangerous drugs are: (i) the accused was in possession of the
dangerous drug, (ii) such possession is not authorized by law, and (iii) the accused freely and consciously possessed the dangerous
drug. 25 Additionally, this being a case for violation of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9165, an additional element of the crime is (iv) the
possession of the dangerous drug must have occurred during a party, or at a social gathering or meeting, or in the proximate
company of at least two (2) persons.

The existence of the drug is the very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs and, thus, a condition sine
qua non for conviction. In order to establish the existence of the drug, its chain of custody must be sufficiently established. The chain
of custody requirement is essential to ensure that doubts regarding the identity of the evidence are removed through the monitoring
and tracking of the movements of the seized drugs from the accused, to the police, to the forensic chemist, and 􏰁nally to the court.
SET ASIDE and another judgment entered ACQUITTING the accused and ordering their immediate release from
detention, unless they are confined for any other lawful cause.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, for immediate
implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to report to this Court within 􏰁ve days from
receipt of this decision the action he has taken. Copies shall also be furnished the Director-General, Philippine
National Police, and the Director-General, Philippine Drugs Enforcement Agency, for their information and guidance.

The Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Dagupan City, is directed to turn over the seized items to the Dangerous Drugs
Board for destruction in accordance with law.

SO ORDERED.
 Carpio, Nachura, Peralta and Abad, JJ., concur.

Notes
Insert notes

Knowles v. Iowa | 525 U.S. 113 (1998)

SUMMARY: A police officer stopped Knowles or speeding, but issued him a citation rather than
arresting him. The officer then conducted a full search of the car and under the driver’s seat he
found a bag of marijuana and a “pot pipe.” Knowles was then arrested. The further search made
was not valid.

1. Facts:

- An Iowa policeman stopped petitioner Knowles for speeding

- The policeman issued him a CITATION rather than arresting him.
- Then, officer conducted a full SEARCH of the car, without either Knowles' consent or probable
cause
- Thereafter, he FOUND marijuana and a "pot pipe," and ARRESTED Knowles.

2. Petitioner's Argument
- before his trial, Knowles moved to suppress the evidence
- His argument is that because he had not been arrested, the search could not be sustained
under the "search incident to arrest" exception

3. Trial Court's Ruling

- The trial court denied the motion and found Knowles GUILTY
- The BASIS is the state law giving officers authority to conduct a full-blown search of an
automobile and driver where they issue a citation, instead of making a custodial arrest.

4. State Supreme Court's Ruling

- It affirmed the trial court's ruling
- Its BASIS is its applied "search incident to citation" exception to the Fourth Amendment's
warrant requirement. As long as the officer had probable cause to make a custodial arrest, it's
not necessary that there was in fact an arrest.

5. SC's Ruling
- It reverses the lower courts' rulings.
- EVEN IF the search is authorized by state law, IT STILL violates the Fourth Amendment.
- The BASIS is that it cannot be justified by the "search incident to arrest" exception.

FACTS
1. The speed limit in Iowa was only 25 mph. But Knowles was clocked driving 43 mph. So, the
police officer stopped him.

2. The police officer issued a CITATION to Knowles, although under Iowa law he might have
arrested him.

3. After the citation, The officer conducted a FULL SEARCH of the car. Under the driver's seat,
he found a bag of marijuana and a "pot pipe." ***During the trial later on, the police officer
concedes that he did the search WITHOUT knowles's consent, and WITHOUT probable
cause

4. Knowles was then ARRESTED and CHARGED with violation of state laws dealing with
controlled substances.

5. During trial, Knowles moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the search. He argued
that the search CANNOT be sustained under the "search incident to arrest" exception--the
exception recognized in United States v. Robinson-- because there was no arrest, to begin with,
prior to the search.

6. The police officer relies upon the IOWA CODE.

--First, Iowa Law authorizes officers to make a citation, instead of an arrest.
--Second, Section 805.1(4) provides that the issuance of a citation in lieu of an arrest "does not
affect the officer's authority to conduct an otherwise lawful search." According to the Iowa
Supreme Court, this provides the authority for officers to conduct a fullblown search of an
automobile and driver in those cases where police chooses not to make a custodial arrest, and
instead issues a citation-that is, a search incident to citation.

7. Based on this interpretation of that provision, the TRIAL COURT denied the motion to
suppress and found Knowles GUILTY

8. The SUPREME COURT OF IOWA, sitting en banc, AFFIRMED by a divided vote. It upheld
the constitutionality of the search as a "search incident to citation" exception to the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement
-- The reasoning here is all that is necessary is that the arresting officer had probable cause to
make a custodial arrest. It's not necessary if there was any factual arrest. Hence, it suffices if
there was only a citation, and no factual arrest.

ISSUE
WON the search, although authorized by state law, violates the Fourth Amendment

RULING: YES.

1. First, there is a need to understand the two historical rationales for the "search incident to
arrest" exception: (1) the need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody. This
first rationale focuses on OFFICER'S SAFETY. (2) the need to PRESERVE EVIDENCE for
later use at trial.

2. The search that was conducted after a citation IS NOT JUSTIFIED by the two historical
rationales.

3. For the first rationale, the threat to officer safety from issuing a traffic citation is NOT
PRESENT TO THE SAME EXTENT as the threat in making a custodial arrest. In issuing a
citation, it is a lot less than the threat that is present in making an actual custodial arrest.

--The danger that justifies the exception flows from the FACT OF ARREST ITSELF, NOT on the
grounds for arrest. In making a custodial arrest, there is the "extended exposure which follows
the taking of a suspect into custody and transporting him to the police station."

-- In contrast, there is no such "extended exposure" in a routine traffic stop. There is only a
relatively brief encounter and "is more analogous to a so-called 'Terry stop' ... than to a formal
arrest."

-- Because of this important difference between a traffic stop and an actual custodial arrest, a
person might well be less hostile to the police and less likely to take conspicuous, immediate
steps to destroy incriminating evidence. HENCE, the search after the citation does not fit into
the rationale for the 'search incidental to arrest' exception.

-- NOTE: This is not to say that the concern for officer safety is absent in the case of a routine
traffic stop. It plainly is not. But while the concern for officer safety in this context may justify the
"MINIMAL" additional intrusion of ordering a driver and passengers out of the car, it does not by
itself justify the often considerably GREATER INTRUSION attending a full fieldtype search. SO
WHAT CAN THE POLICE OFFICER DO IN A TRAFFIC STOP, TO PROTECT HIMSELF? For
example, (1) he may order out of a vehicle both the driver, and any passengers, (2) perform a
"patdown" of a driver and any passengers upon reasonable suspicion that they may be armed
and dangerous, (3) conduct a "Terry pat down" of the passenger compartment of a vehicle upon
reasonable suspicion that an occupant is dangerous and may gain immediate control of a
weapon, (4) and even conduct a full search of the passenger compartment, including any
containers therein, pursuant to a custodial arrest

4. For the second rationale, the need to discover and preserve evidence is NOT PRESENT AT
ALL.

-- At the very moment that Knowles was stopped for speeding and issued a citation, all the
evidence necessary to prosecute that offense had been OBTAINED. No further evidence of
excessive speed was going to be found either on the person of the offender or in the passenger
compartment of the car.

-- Now Iowa nevertheless argues that a "search incident to citation" is justified because a
suspect who is subject to a routine traffic stop may attempt to hide or destroy evidence related
to his identity (e.g., a driver's license or vehicle registration), or destroy evidence of another, as
yet undetected crime.

-- Regarding destruction of evidence relating to identity, if the police officer is not satisfied with
the identification furnished by the driver, this may be a basis for arresting him rather than merely
issuing a citation

-- Regarding destroying evidence of other undetected crimes, the possibility that an officer
would stumble onto evidence wholly unrelated to the speeding offense seems remote.

5. FINAL NOTE. In Robinson, the authority to conduct a "full field search as incident to an
arrest" was a "bright-line rule". It is based on the concern for (1) officer safety and (2)
destruction or loss of evidence

The Court is now asked by Iowa to extend that "bright-line rule" to a situation where (1) the
concern for officer safety is NOT PRESENT TO THE SAME EXTENT and (2) the concern for
destruction or loss of evidence is NOT PRESENT AT ALL.

We decline to do so.

Disposition: The judgment of the Supreme Court of Iowa is REVERSED, and the cause is
REMANDED for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

Search incidental to a lawful arrest

08 PEOPLE V. DELOS REYES
August 31, 2011 | Leonardo-de Castro, J. |

Doctrine: In in flagrante delicto arrests (a lawful kind of warrantless arrest), “reliable information” alone, absent any overt act
indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within view of the arresting officers, are not sufficient to constitute
probable cause that would justify the arrest.

Facts:
● Accused-appellants Delos Reyes and Reyes were arrested for delivery of shabu during an illegal drug deal bust. They
were arrested along with one De Claro and Lantion-Tom for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972
● Office of the City Prosecutor initially found probable cause to indict all accused but later, on reinvestigation,
recommended to the RTC to dismiss charges against delos Reyes and Lantion-Tom
● RTC: adjudged that probable cause exists against Reyes, De Claro, and Delos Reyes, but not Lantion-Tom
Prosecution’s version
● 10:30am: Operation chief received confidential informant that an illegal drug deal was to take place between Botong
(Delos Reyes) and Mac-Mac (Reyes) in Shangri-La Plaza parking lot, Mandaluyong, some time between 6pm-11pm.
● Police team arrived at the location at 2pm. At 10pm the suspected vehicles arrived, both stopping along the driveway
of Shangri-La Plaza. The drivers (Delos Reyes and Reyes) alighted and talked to each other then Delos Reyes made a
call on his cellphone after which he proceeded to the Whistle Stop Restaurant, leaving Reyes behind. While at the
 restaurant Delos Reyes talked tp another person, De Claro then they both went outside and approached a car parked.
At the back seat was Lantion-Tom who handed to De Claro a white plastic bag containing a box, who then handed it
to Delos Reyes who then handed it to Reyes. De Claro went back inside the restaurant. At that point the police team
leader “sensed” the drug deal had already been consummated, so the police arrested the drug dealers. The plastic bag
with the box was seized then the suspects were brought to the police station for investigation where the plastic bag
was also then marked for identification and physical examination.
● Presented as witnesses PO3 Santiago, SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Yumul, and SPO1 David (members of the Regional Mobile
Group of PNP) who corroborated each others’ testimonies
Accused-appellants’ version
● Presented as witnesses Marlon David (neighbor of Delos Reyes), Delos Reyes, E. De Claro, R. De Claro (brother of De
Claro), Lantion-Tom (common law wife of De Claro)
○ David and Delos Reyes’ testimonies corroborated each other’s: Delos Reyes was accompanied by David to
the Buenas Market in Cainta to collect some money from Reyes, who was his friend and owed him money.
While inside the car the police surrounded them with guns and carrying an SM shopping bag, asking them if
they knew who the owner of the bag was. They denied knowing who owned it and any knowledge of the bag
itself but the police transferred them to the backseat of the car, beat them to force them to admit who the
owner of the bag was, later on separated them, and brought them to Camp Bagong Diwa. David was released
the next day. He told the wife of Delos Reyes what had happened and she had the incident recorded in the
barangay blotter.
○ E. De Claro, R. De Claro, and Lantion-Tom’s testimonies corroborated each other’s: Lantion-Tom had an
appointment with her accountant Daisy Milan at Whistle Stop Restaurant regarding matters on a business
permit they were trying to acquire. She was accompanied by both De Claros and James, accused De Claro’s
friend. When the meeting ended Lantion-Tom walked Milan outside the restaurant when accused De Claro
was suddenly approached by the police and gave a warning to go with them. They brought him to a waiting
car outside the restaurant and he was punched, handcuffed, blindfolded, being forced to admit something
about shabu when he denied knowing anything. He was brought to camp Bagong Diwa where he met his co-
accused for the first time and saw Lantion-Tom. They were interrogated together and were forced to admit
that the druges being shown to them belonged to them. They asked for a lawyer but their plea was ignored.
● RTC: found them guilty, penalty of life imprisonment
○ The 3 (De Claro, Delos Reyes, Reyes) filed an appeal, but De Claro later withdrew his and filed instead an
Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to reopen Proceedings and a Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration – principally arguing that the accusations were suspicious, and that he had a well-supported
alibi
● RTC: acquitted De Claro
● Pending notices of appeal of the other 2 accused were transferred to the CA
● CA: sustained the conviction but modified the penalty from life imprisonment to reclusion perpetua.
○ The Police Officers’ testimonies deserve more credence over the defense of denial and alibi since there is
presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties
● Delos Reyes and Reyes now essentially assert that:
○ The charge of illegal drug deal is a complete fabrication and frame up
○ Even assuming the prosecution’s version of the arrest and seizure is true it is still in violation of their
fundamental rights since there was no warrant nor any special circumstance to justify a warrantless arrest.
They were arrested on a mere tip and not because of any apparent criminal activity. The tip does not
constitute probable cause so the shabu allegedly seized should be inadmissible in evidence.
● Prosecution assert that the accused-appellants were caught in flagrante delicto in the delivery of drugs, which justifies
their arrest

Issue:
W/N the crime was committed in flagrante delicto, justifying a warrantless arrest NO
W/N the prosecution was able to establish proof beyond reasonable doubt of the accused-appellants’ guilt NO

Held:
NO. The police officers had compromised the integrity of the shabu purportedly seized from the accused-appellants by
only relying on the confidential information to identify the suspects and conclude a crime had been consummated
● Among the permissible search and seizures (see notes), the first, search incidental to a lawful arrest, includes a valid
warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest which must precede the search. The law
requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made – the process cannot be reversed.
 ● Even assuming that the prosecution’s version of the events were true, it still failed to establish probable cause to justify
the in flagrante delicto arrests and search, resulting in the seizure of the shabu in the accused-appellants’ possession
● 2 requisites of a valid in flagrante delicto arrest:
1. person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime and
2. such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer
● In in flagrante delicto arrests (a lawful kind of warrantless arrest), “reliable information” alone, absent any overt act
indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within view of the arresting officers, are not sufficient to
constitute probable cause that would justify the arrest.
● There must be reasonable grounds of suspicion. Suspicion is reasonable when in the absence of actual belief, the
probability of guilt is based on actual facts supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the
probable cause of guilt. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith
on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.
● The testimonies of the officers showed they simply relied on the information provided by their confidential informant
without any other independent information. They only saw the suspects pass a white plastic bag with a box/carton
inside and they already concluded that it contained shabu and “sensed” that an illegal drug deal took place.
● The acts witnessed by the police officers hardly constitute overt acts “indicative of a felonious enterprise.” They
had no prior knowledge of the suspects’ identities and relied on the confidential informant to identify them. None of
the officers actually saw what was inside the box and no evidence was shown that the confidential informant himself
knew that the box contained shabu. No effort at all was taken to confirm that the arrested suspects actually knew that
the box contained shabu
● Further, the reliability of the confiscated items were struck down for not being marked at the place where they
were seized but at the police office
NO. Without valid justification for the in flagrante delicto arrests of accused-appellants, the search of accused-appellants
persons incidental to said arrests, and the eventual seizure of the shabu from accused-appellants possession, are also
considered unlawful and, thus, the seized shabu is excluded in evidence as fruit of a poisonous tree. Without the corpus
delicti for the crime charged, then the acquittal of accused-appellants is inevitable.
● Other circumstances justifies the acquittal
○ In doubt, the presumption of innocence prevails. At the outset, prosecutors and the RTC both displayed
uncertainty as to the facts surrounding accused-appellants’ arrest and even after trial the RTC wavered in its
findings and conclusion
■ Dropping charge on Lantion-Tom and suddenly acquitting De Claro
○ RTC in its subsequent Order dated January 12, 2004 (in which it acquitted Emmanuel de Claro) is more in
keeping with the evidence on record in this case. It bears to stress that the very same evidence were
presented against Emmanuel de Claro and accused-appellants; if the evidence is insufficient to convict the
former, then it is also insufficient to convict the latter.
○ The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are unreliable and suspiciously fabricated: since they gave
identical testimonies of the events from 2pm-10:30pm, indicating it was well-thought out and fabricated;
their testimonies are so general, not giving particulars and details in relation to the principal facts;
explanation on how their confidential informant obtained the information was never presented; even their
operation is not recorded since no documentary evidence was presented
○ Material inconsistencies between the police’s sworn statements after they arrested and their testimonies
before the RTC: in sworn statement they said accused-appellants admitted they were in the possession of
shabu while in trial they said they arrested them in flagrante delicto
○ The fact that Lantion-Tom was never charged with any criminal involvement even when, according to the
prosecution’s version of events, she was the first person to deliver the shabu
○ In contrast accused-appellants presented clear and convincing evidence in support of their defenses, which
the prosecution failed to rebut.
■ Delos Reyes: that he was arrested in Buenos Market, Cainta instead of Shangri-La Plaza,
Mandaluyong
■ Reyes: that they were at the restaurant to meet with his common law wife’s accountant regarding
a business permit

Dispositive
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 12, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01733 is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Accused-appellants Rolando delos Reyes and Raymundo Reyes are ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt
and they are ORDERED forthwith released from custody, unless they are being lawfully held for another crime.
SO ORDERED.
Notes
Permissible search and seizures:
Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following
instances:
(1) search incident to a lawful arrest;
(2) search of a moving motor vehicle;
(3) search in violation of customs laws;
(4) seizure of evidence in plain view;
(5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures; and
(6) stop and frisk situations.
Permissible warrantless arrests:
A peace officer or a private person may, without warrant, arrest a person:
(a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense (arrest in flagrante delicto);
(b) when an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts
or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it (arrest effected in hot pursuit); and
(c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or a place where he is serving
final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another (arrest of escaped prisoners).

People v DImalanta
June 18, 2014| LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:J|

Doctrine: The purpose of allowing a warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest is "to protect the arresting officer from being
harmed by the person arrested, who might be armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence within reach."

Facts:

PROSECUTION:

 While PO1 NELSON MARIANO and PO3 EDUARDO RAMIREZ were on duty, a certain EDWIN LOJERA arrived at their
office and asked for police assistance regarding a shooting incident.
 Per report of the latter, it appears that while driving a towing truck and traversing along EDSA, Balintawak, Quezon City, he
had a traffic dispute (gitgitan) with a white taxi cab prompting him to follow said vehicle until they reached along 8th Avenue
Street corner C-3 Road, Caloocan City.
 Thereat, the passengers of said taxi cab, one of them was accused Calantiao, alighted and fired their guns.
 Surprised, Lojera could not do anything but continued his driving until he reached a police station nearby where he reported
the incident.

 PO1 Mariano testified that they immediately responded to said complaint by proceeding to 5th Avenue corner 8th Street,
Caloocan City where they found the white taxi.
 While approaching said vehicle, two armed men alighted therefrom, fired their guns towards them (police officers)
and ran away. PO1 Mariano and PO3 Ramirez chased them but they were subdued
 PO1 Mariano recovered from Calantiao a black bag containing two (2) bricks of dried marijuana fruiting tops and a magazine
of super 38 stainless with ammos, while PO3 Ramirez recovered from Calantiao’s companion [a] .38 revolver.

 The suspects and the confiscated items were then turned over to SPO3 PABLO TEMENA, police investigator at Bagong
Barrio Police Station for investigation.
 PO1 Mariano marked the bricks of marijuana contained in a black bag with his initials, "NM". Thereafter, said specimen were
forwarded to the PNP Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis. The result of the examination conducted by P/SINSP. JESSSE
DELA ROSA revealed that the same was positive for marijuana, a dangerous drug.

DEFENSE:
  This instant case originated from a traffic mishap where the taxi he and his companion Rommel Reyes were riding almost
collided with another car.
 Reyes then opened the window and made a "fuck you" sign against the persons on board of that car.
 That prompted the latter to chase them and when they were caught in a traffic jam,
 PO1 Nelson Mariano, one of the persons on board of that other car alighted and kicked their taxi.
 Calantiao and Reyes alighted and PO1 Mariano slapped the latter and uttered, "Putang ina mo bakit mo ako pinakyu hindi
mo ba ako kilala?"
 PO1 Mariano then prepared some documents and informed them that they will be charged for drugs. A newspaper
containing marijuana was shown to them and said police officer told them that it would be sufficient evidence against them.
They were detained and subjected to medical examination before they were submitted for inquest at the prosecutor’s office.

RTC: “SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO A LAWFUL ARREST (IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO)”

-the illegal drug seized was admissible in evidence as it was discovered during a body search after Calantiao was caught in flagrante
delicto of possessing a gun and firing at the police officers.
CA:

- It found that there was sufficient reason to justify a warrantless arrest, as the police officers were acting on a legitimate
complaint and had a reasonable suspicion that the persons identified at the scene were the perpetrators of the offense.
- Likewise, the Court of Appeals held that the search and subsequent seizure of the marijuana in question was lawful and
valid, being incidental to a lawful arrest.9

Issue:
1. WON search and seizure of marijuan is valid? (YES)
2. WON inventory and chain of custody was broken? (NO)

Held:

1. Searches and seizure incident to a lawful arrest are governed by Section 13, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, to wit:
a. Section 13.Search incident to lawful arrest.– A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons
or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search
warrant.

The purpose of allowing a warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest is to protect (1) law enforcers from the
injury that may be inflicted on them by a person they have lawfully arrested; and (2) evidence from being destroyed by the
arrestee. It seeks to ensure the safety of the arresting officers and the integrity of the evidence under the control and within
the reach of the arrestee.

In the case at bar, the marijuana was found in a black bag in Calantiao’s possession and within his immediate control. He
could have easily taken any weapon from the bag or dumped it to destroy the evidence inside it.

As the black bag containing the marijuana was in Calantiao’s possession, it was within the permissible area that
the apprehending officers could validly conduct a warrantless search

2. This Court has held that the failure to strictly comply with Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, such as immediately
marking seized drugs, will not automatically impair the integrity of chain of custody because what is of utmost
importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would be
utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

Section 21 and its IRR do not even mention "marking." What they require are (1) physical inventory, and (2) taking of
photographs.

The prosecution was able to establish the chain of custody of the seized marijuana from the time the police officers
confiscated it, to the time it was turned over to the investigating officer, up to the time it was brought to the forensic
chemist for laboratory examination
 The defenses of denial and frame-up have been invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor for it can easily be concocted
and is a common and standard defense ploy in prosecutions for violation of Dangerous Drugs Act.

Dispositive
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the January 17, 2012 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
04069.
Notes
Insert notes

U.S. v. Robinson
Date: December 11, 1973
Petitioner: UNITED STATES
Respondent: WILLIE ROBINSON, Jr.
Ponente: REHNQUIST
Facts:
 April 23, 1968, ~11 PM: Officer Richard Jenks, a police for 15 years, observed Robinson driving a 1965
Cadillac near the intersection of 8th and C Streets, N.E., in the District of Columbia.
 Jenks, as a result of previous investigation following a check of Robinson’s operator's permit four days
earlier, determined there was reason to believe that Robinson was operating a motor vehicle after the
revocation of his operator's permit. This is an offense defined by statute in the District of Columbia which
carries a mandatory minimum jail term, a mandatory minimum fine, or both.
  Jenks signaled Robinson to stop the automobile, which Robinson did, and all three of the occupants
emerged from the car.
 Jenks informed Robinson that he was under arrest for ‘operating after revocation and obtaining a permit by
misrepresentation.’
o It was assumed by the Court of Appeals, and is conceded by Robinson here, that Jenks had
probablecause to arrest Robinson, and that he effected a full-custody arrest.
 In accordance with procedures prescribed in police department instructions, Jenks then began to search
Robinson.
o He explained at a subsequent hearing that he was ‘face-to-face’ with Robinson, and ‘placed (his)
hands on (Robinson), my right- hand to his left breast like this (demonstrating) and proceeded to
pat him down thus (with the right hand).’
 During this patdown, Jenks felt an object in the left breast pocket of the heavy coat Robinson was wearing,
but testified that he ‘couldn't tell what it was' and also that he ‘couldn't actually tell the size of it.’ Jenks then
reached into the pocket and pulled out the object, which turned out to be a ‘crumpled up cigarette package.’
o Jenks testified that at this point he still did not know what was in the package:
 ‘As I felt the package I could feel objects in the package but I couldn't tell what they
were. . . . I knew they weren't cigarettes.’
 The officer then opened the cigarette pack and found 14 gelatin capsules of white powder which he thought
to be, and which later analysis proved to be, heroin. Jenks then continued his search of Robinson to
completion, feeling around his waist and trouser legs, and examining the remaining pockets. The heroin
seized from Robinson was admitted into evidence at the trial
 Robinson was convicted before the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, of possession
and facilitation of concealment of heroin and he appealed.
 US CA District of Columbia Circuit remanded for evidentiary hearing.
 CA reversed judgment of conviction
o The heroin had been obtained as a result of a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Issue: W/N the search was valid - YES

Held:
 Where officer had probable cause to arrest defendant for operating motor vehicle after revocation of
his operator's permit and effected a full-custody arrest, search of defendant's person without a
search warrant, inspection of crumpled cigarette package found on defendant's person and seizure
of heroin capsules found in the package were permissible.
 In the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a ‘reasonable’ search under that Amendment.
o A search incident to a valid arrest is not limited to a frisk of the suspect's outer clothing and removal
of such weapons as the arresting officer may, as a result of such frisk, reasonably believe and
ascertain that the suspect has in his possession, and the absence of probable fruits or further
evidence of the particular crime for which the arrest is made does not narrow the standards
applicable to such a search.
o A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth
Amendment and a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification, such as the
probability in a particular arrest situation that weapons or evidence would in fact be found upon the
suspect's person; and whether or not there was present one of the reasons supporting the authority
for a search of the person incident to a lawful arrest need not be litigated in each case.
 Since the custodial arrest here gave rise to the authority to search, it is immaterial that the arresting officer
did not fear Robinson or suspect that he was armed.
 Persons arrested for offense of driving while their licenses have been revoked are not excepted from
officer's general authority to search incident to lawful custodial arrest on assumption that such persons are
less likely to possess dangerous weapons than those arrested for other crimes; all custodial arrests are alike
for purposes of search justification.

Dispositive: CA REVERSED
Arizona v. Gant
Date: April 21, 2009
Petitioner: ARIZONA
Respondent: RODNEY JOSEPH GANT
Ponente: STEVENS
Facts:
 August 25, 1999: acting on an anonymous tip that the residence at 2524 North Walnut Avenue was being
used to sell drugs, Tucson police officers Griffith and Reed knocked on the front door and asked to speak to
the owner. Gant answered the door and, after identifying himself, stated that he expected the owner to
return later. The officers left the residence and conducted a records check, which revealed that Gant's
driver's license had been suspended and there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest for driving with a
suspended license.
 When the officers returned to the house that evening, they found a man near the back of the house and a
woman in a car parked in front of it. After a third officer arrived, they arrested the man for providing a false
name and the woman for possessing drug paraphernalia. Both arrestees were handcuffed and secured in
separate patrol cars when Gant arrived. The officers recognized his car as it entered the driveway, and
 Officer Griffith confirmed that Gant was the driver by shining a flashlight into the car as it drove by him. Gant
parked at the end of the driveway, got out of his car, and shut the door. Griffith, who was about 30 feet
away, called to Gant, and they approached each other, meeting 10–to–12 feet from Gant's car. Griffith
immediately arrested Gant and handcuffed him.
 Because the other arrestees were secured in the only patrol cars at the scene, Griffith called for backup.
When two more officers arrived, they locked Gant in the backseat of their vehicle. After Gant had been
handcuffed and placed in the back of a patrol car, two officers searched his car: One of them found a gun,
and the other discovered a bag of cocaine in the pocket of a jacket on the backseat.
 Gant was charged with two offenses—possession of a narcotic drug for sale and possession of drug
paraphernalia (i.e., the plastic bag in which the cocaine was found).
 He moved to suppress the evidence seized from his car:
o The warrantless search violated the Fourth Amendment.
o Belton did not authorize the search of his vehicle because he posed no threat to the officers after
he was handcuffed in the patrol car and because he was arrested for a traffic offense for which no
evidence could be found in his vehicle. When asked at the suppression hearing why the search
was conducted, Officer Griffith responded: “Because the law says we can do it.”
 Arizona TC:
o Denied his motion to suppress the evidence
o The police saw Gant commit the crime of driving without a license and apprehended him only
shortly after he exited his car
o The search was permissible as a search incident to arrest
o He was convicted of possession of a narcotic drug for sale and possession of drug paraphernalia.
 SC Arizona: reversed TC, search was unreasonable:
o Distinguished New York v. Belton: Police may search the passenger compartment of a vehicle and
any containers therein as a contemporaneous incident of a recent occupant's lawful arrest—on the
ground that it concerned the scope of a search incident to arrest but did not answer the question
whether officers may conduct such a search once the scene has been secured.
o Chimel v. California: requires that a search incident to arrest be justified by either the interest in
officer safety or the interest in preserving evidence
 The circumstances of Gant's arrest implicated neither of those interests.

Issue: W/N the search was reasonable - NO

Held:
 Police may search the passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest
only if it is reasonable to believe that the arrestee might access the vehicle at the time of the search
or that the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.
 Warrantless searches “are per se unreasonable,” “subject only to a few specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions.” The exception for a search incident to a lawful arrest applies only to “ the area from
within which [an arrestee] might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.” This Court applied
that exception to the automobile context in Belton, the holding of which rested in large part on the
assumption that articles inside a vehicle's passenger compartment are “generally ... within ‘the area into
which an arrestee might reach.’
 This Court rejects a broad reading of Belton that would permit a vehicle search incident to a recent
occupant's arrest even if there were no possibility the arrestee could gain access to the vehicle at the time of
the search. The safety and evidentiary justifications underlying Chimel 's exception authorize a vehicle
search only when there is a reasonable possibility of such access. Although it does not follow from Chimel,
circumstances unique to the automobile context also justify a search incident to a lawful arrest when it is
“reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.” Neither Chimel
's reaching-distance rule nor Thornton 's allowance for evidentiary searches authorized the search in this
case. In contrast to Belton, which involved a single officer confronted with four unsecured arrestees, five
officers handcuffed and secured Gant and the two other suspects in separate patrol cars before the search
began. Gant clearly could not have accessed his car at the time of the search. An evidentiary basis for the
search was also lacking. Belton and Thornton were both arrested for drug offenses, but Gant was arrested
for driving with a suspended license—an offense for which police could not reasonably expect to find
evidence in Gant's car. The search in this case was therefore unreasonable.
 This Court is unpersuaded by the State's argument that its expansive reading of Belton correctly balances
law enforcement interests with an arrestee's limited privacy interest in his vehicle. The State seriously
undervalues the privacy interests at stake, and it exaggerates both the clarity provided by a broad reading of
Belton and its importance to law enforcement interests. A narrow reading of Belton and Thornton, together
 with this Court's other Fourth Amendment decisions, permit an officer to search a vehicle when safety or
evidentiary concerns demand
 Stare decisis does not require adherence to a broad reading of Belton. The experience of the 28 years since
Belton has shown that the generalization underpinning the broad reading of that decision is unfounded, and
blind adherence to its faulty assumption would authorize myriad unconstitutional searches.

Dispositive: AFFIRMED (search of Gant’s vehicle while he was handcuffed in patrol car was unreasonable, and
doctrine of stare decisis did not require Supreme Court to adhere to broad reading of its prior decision in New York v.
Belton)

[SEARCH AND SEIZURE – EXIGENT AND EMERGENCY CIRCUMSTANCES]

PEOPLE V. DE GRACIA
1994 | Regalado, J. |

Doctrine: Under such urgency and exigency of the moment, a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with. The arrest of
persons involved in the rebellion is more of an act of capturing them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion,
than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. Therefore, the arrest need not follow the
usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses.

Facts:
● Background: The incidents took place at the height of the coup d’état staged in December 1989 by ultra-rightist elements
headed by the Reform the Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of the Filipino People (RAM-SFP) against the Government.
At that time, various government establishments and military camps in Metro Manila were being bombarded by the rightist
group with their "tora-tora" planes.
● At around midnight of 30 November 1989, the 4th Marine Battalion of the Philippine Marines occupied Villamor Air Base,
while the Scout Rangers took over the Headquarters of the Philippine Army, the Army Operations Center, and Channel 4,
the government television station.
● Also, some elements of the Philippine Army coming from Fort Magsaysay occupied the Greenhills Shopping Center in San
Juan, Metro Manila.
● On 1 December 1989, Maj. Efren Soria of the Intelligence Division, National Capital Region Defense Command, was on
board a brown Toyota car conducting a surveillance of the Eurocar Sales Office located at Epifanio de los Santos Avenue
(EDSA) in Quezon City, together with his team composed of Sgt. Crispin Sagario, M/Sgt. Ramon Briones, S/Sgt. Henry
Aquino, one S/Sgt. Simon and a Sgt. Ramos.
● The surveillance, which actually started on the night of 30 November 1989 at around 10:00 p.m., was conducted pursuant
to an intelligence report.
● Sgt. Crispin Sagario, the driver of the car, parked the vehicle around 10 to 15 meters away from the Eurocar building near
P. Tuazon Street. S/Sgt. Henry Aquino had earlier alighted from the car to conduct his surveillance on foot.
● A crowd was then gathered near the Eurocar office. After a while a group of 5 men disengaged themselves from the crowd
and walked towards the car of the surveillance team. At that moment, Maj. Soria, who was then seated in front, saw the
approaching group and immediately ordered Sgt. Sagario to start the car and leave the area.
● As they passed by the group, then only 6 meters away, the latter pointed to them, drew their guns and fired at the team,
which attack resulted in the wounding of Sgt. Sagario on the right thigh. Nobody in the surveillance team was able to
retaliate because they sought cover inside the car and they were afraid that civilians or bystanders might be caught in the
cross-fire.
● As a consequence, at around 6:30 a.m. of 5 December 1989, searching them composed of F/Lt. Virgilio Babao as team
leader, M/Sgt. Lacdao, Sgt. Magallion, Sgt. Patricio Pacatang, and elements of the 16th Infantry Battalion under one Col.
delos Santos raided the Eurocar Sales Office.
● They were able to find and confiscate: 6 cartons of M-16 ammunition, five bundles of C-4 dynamites, M-shells of different
calibers, and "molotov" bombs inside one of the rooms belonging to a certain Col. Matillano which is located at the right
portion of the building.
● As a result of the raid, the team arrested de Gracia, as well as Soprieso Verbo and Roberto Jimena who were janitors at the
Eurocar building.
● They were then made to sign an inventory, written in Tagalog, of the explosives and ammunition confiscated by the raiding
team.
● No search warrant was secured by the raiding team because, according to them, at that time there was so much disorder
considering that the nearby Camp Aguinaldo was being mopped up by the rebel forces and there was simultaneous firing
within the vicinity of the Eurocar office, aside from the fact that the courts were consequently closed.
● The group was able to confirm later that the owner of Eurocar office is a certain Mr. Gutierrez and that de Gracia is
supposedly a "boy" therein.
● de Gracia was charged in two separate informations for illegal possession of ammunition and explosives in furtherance of
rebellion, and for attempted homicide which were tried jointly by the RTC.
● the trial court rendered judgment acquitting de Gracia of attempted homicide, but found him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense of illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion and sentenced him to serve the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. De Gracia appealed.
Issue:
W/N the military operatives made a valid search and seizure during the height of the December 1989 coup d’etat.

Held:
YES. The search and seizure made was valid.
 It is admitted that the military operatives who raided the Eurocar Sales Office were not armed with a search warrant at that
time. The raid was actually precipitated by intelligence reports that said office was being used as headquarters by the RAM.
 Prior to the raid, there was a surveillance conducted on the premises wherein the surveillance team was fired at by a group
of men coming from the Eurocar building.
 When the military operatives raided the place, the occupants thereof refused to open the door despite the requests for
them to do so, thereby compelling the former to break into the office.
 The Eurocar Sales Office is obviously not a gun store and it is definitely not an armory or arsenal which is the usual
depositories for explosives and ammunition. It is primarily and solely engaged in the sale of automobiles.
 In addition, there was general chaos and disorder at that time because of simultaneous and intense firing within the vicinity
of the office and in the nearby Camp Aguinaldo which was under attack by rebel forces.
 Under the foregoing circumstances, the case falls under one of the exceptions to the prohibition against a warrantless
search.

o The military operatives, taking into account the facts obtaining in this case, had reasonable ground to believe that a
crime was being committed.
o There was consequently more than sufficient probable cause to warrant their action.
o Under the situation then prevailing, the raiding team had no opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant
from the courts.
The trial judge himself manifested that on 5 December 1989 when the raid was conducted, his court was closed.
o Under such urgency and exigency of the moment, a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with.

Dispositive
WHEREFORE, the impugned judgment of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED, but its recommendation therein for executive
clemency and the supposed basis thereof are hereby DELETED, with costs against accused-appellant.
Notes
[SEARCH & SEIZURE - Warrantless searches – Exigent and emergency circumstances]
02 People v. Ayangao
April 14, 2004 | CORONA, J. |

Doctrine: There is no need for a search warrant if what is relied upon by the officers is an on-the-spot tip; it would be
unreasonable to require the police to produce a search warrant if they did not know when the suspect is to arrive, given the
possibility of it expiring before the arrival, because the search warrant is only valid up to 10 days.

Facts:
 Lita Ayangao was charged with transporting 14.75 kg of marijuana
 Ayangao filed a motion to quash:
o the facts charged did not constitute an offense
 RTC denied motion. Upon arraignment, Ayangao pleaded not guilty
 Prosecution witnesses (PO3 Nestor Galez, PO3 Bienvenido Sagum, Chief Forensic Chemist Daisy Panganiban-Babor):
o Two weeks prior: PO3 Sagum and PO3 Galvez, members of the Criminal Detection and Intelligence Group
based at Angeles City received information from one of their informants that a certain woman from
Mountain Province delivers dried marijuana leaves for sale at Sapang Biabas, Mabalacat, Pampanga to some
drug pushers.
o This information was also relayed by the informant to C/Insp. Rhodel O. Sermonia who instructed the two
operatives to conduct surveillance operation against their target female.
 Described by their informant as about 50 years old, 5 feet in height, straight long hair and coming
from Kalinga province
o 5:00 AM, August 13, 1999: Their informant went to their headquarters and informed them that their suspect
is due to arrive at Sapang Biabas, Mabalacat.
o While they were in their car parked their car near the entrance of the road going to Sapang Biabas, the
informer pointed to them a woman bearing the same description given by the former. The woman alighted
from the tricycle and subsequently loaded two sacks with camote fruits on top.
o The two officers proceeded to the place where the woman was and noticed marijuana dried leaves
protruding through a hole of one of the sacks. Sagum and Galvez introduced themselves as police officers
and requested the woman to put out the contents of the said sacks. The sacks yielded sweet potatoes mixed
with 15 brick-like substance wrapped in brown paper and masking tape.
o A brick, which was damaged on the side and in plain view of the officers revealed dried marijuana leaves.
o The woman who was arrested identified herself as accused Lita Ayangao of Kalinga Province.
o Ayangao and the suspected dried marijuana leaves were brought to the police officers headquarters. The
evidence were examined by Babor at the PNP Crime Laboratory.
o The laboratory report found the evidence to be positive for marijuana.
 Defense witnesses (Ayangao and Reynaldo Nunag, purok chairman of Sitio Makabakle):
o Ayangao went from Kalinga to Pampanga on August 13, 1999 only upon the request of a certain Magda
Dumpao.
o Magda instructed her to go to the house of Madga’s real estate agent, Jaime Alarcon. She arrived at the
house at 3:00 AM, welcomed by his wife and daughter-in-law, as Jaime was not around.
 o She took a nap and at 6:00 AM, two men, who identified themselves as CIS agents, looked for somebody
who came from Baguio City.
o The wife led the agents to the sofa where Ayangao was lying. The police officers asked her (accused) to go
with them as they wanted to talk to her, to which she refused.
o The policemen forced her out of the house and boarded her to their car. While she was inside the car, she
saw a sack and a carton box.
o The police brought her to their headquarters at Angeles City.
o She was made to sit in a chair and heard from the policemen that the contents of the sack were marijuana
and accused her of owning it.
o Reynaldo Nunag, purok chairman of Sitio Makabakle, Marimar, Biabas, Mabalacat, Pampanga, testified
that, as tricycle driver whose terminal is near the house of Jaime Alarcon, he did not see any unusual incident
that happened in said vicinity in the morning of August 13, 1999. He also did not see how the accused was
arrested and did not see the policemens car.
 RTC convicted Ayangao of violating Sec. 4, Art. 2 of the Dangerous Drugs Act
o Defense of frame-up was not supported by evidence and thus could not prevail over the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses.
o The law enforcer’s testimonies carried the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties.

Issue:
 W/N the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were credible despite existing serious inconsistencies
and incredibility – YES
 W/N Ayangao’s Miranda rights are violated - NO
 W/N her warrantless arrest was lawful - YES
 W/N the RTC erred in not giving weight to her defense of alibi - NO

Held:
YES, the witnesses are credible.
 Court ruled that the trial court is in the best position to assess this; moreover the inconsistencies were only minor
ones which did not negate the truth nor diminish their credibility
NO, the Ayangao’s Miranda rights are not violated.
 By entering a plea upon arraignment and actively 
participating in the trial, accused is deemed to have waived any
objection to his arrest and warrantless 
search .
 Any objection must be made before the plea is entered; otherwise it is considered as waived via willing 
submission
of accused to the jurisdiction of the court and participation in the proceedings
YES, the warrantless arrest was lawful.
 Assuming that there was no waiver, the warrantless arrest was still lawful as Ayangao was actually committing a
crime when she was arrested—transporting marijuana, an act prohibited by law.
 As such, the resulting warrantless search on appellant was also valid as the legitimate warrantless arrest authorized
the arresting police officers to validly search and seize from the offender (1) any dangerous weapons and (2) the
things which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense.
 Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
o A peace officer may arrest a person even without a warrant when, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing or is attempting to commit an offense.
 However, the police officer should be spurred by probable cause12 in making the arrest.
o In this case, 
the arresting officers had probable cause to make the arrest in view of the tip they received
from their informant. This Court has already ruled that tipped information is sufficient probable cause to
effect a warrantless search. 


12 Probable cause signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion 
 supported by

circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man’s belief that

 the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. 

 o Although the apprehending officers received the tip two weeks prior to the arrest, they could not be
faulted for not applying for a search warrant inasmuch as the exact date of Ayangao’s arrival was not
known by the informant, unlike in cases like People v. Encinada, where they have sufficient time to get a
warrant. In fact, they received the tip only an hour before (at 5:00 AM, when the informant arrived at the
station).
NO, the RTC did not err in not giving weight to her defense of alibi.
 Alibi as a defense is inherently weak and for it to serve as basis for an acquittal, the accused must establish by clear
and convincing evidence (a) his presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense and (b) the
physical impossibility to be at the scene of the crime. 

 Ayangao failed to meet these two requirements. Jaime Alarcons house where Ayangao claimed to be sleeping at the
time of her arrest, was only 10 meters from the tricycle terminal where she was arrested by the officers. Thus, the
trial court was correct in ruling that the alibi of Ayangao was not enough to acquit her of the charges.
Dispositive
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, of Angeles City, finding the Ayangao guilty of transporting
a prohibited drug and sentencing her to reclusion perpetua and to pay the fine of P500,000, is hereby AFFIRMED.
People v. De Lara
G.R. No. 94953; September 5, 1994
Quiason, J.

Petitioners: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Respondents: ARMANDO DE LARA

Doctrine: An arrest that follows the policemen’s entry in the house of person without a search warrant, in hot-
pursuit of the same person caught committing an offense in flagrante is valid.

Facts:
 A team led by Sgt. David conducted a surveillance operation, as instructed by Capt. Cablayan of the
National Criminal Investigation Service (NCIS), and confirmed the reported drug-pushing activities in that
area by the group of De Lara and a certain Ricky alias “Pilay.”
 No arrest was made because the instruction was to conduct a surveillance operation only.
 “Malaya” and “People’s Tonight” reported that there were rampant drug-pushing activities in Garrido and
Zamora Streets in Sta. Ana, Manila. Gen. Alfredo Lim (WPD superintendent) reprimanded the NCIS
office.
 Subsequently, Capt. Cablayan instructed Sgt. David to plan a buy-bust operation and to form a six-man
team with Martin Orolfo, Jr. as the poseur-buyer.
 The team went to Garrido Street. They strategically positioned themselves.
 o The informant went to De Lara’s house, where they saw him standing outside.
o The informant introduced Orolfo to De Lara. He then asked, “Ilan ang bibilhin niyo?” Orolfo replied
“two foils,” handing at the same time a 20-peso bill.
o After placing the money in the right pocket of his pants, De Lara went inside his house. He came back
and handed two foils wrapped in onion paper.
o After he handed the two foils, he sensed the presence of police operatives.
o He tried to retrieve the foils but Orolfo prevented him from doing so. During the scuffle, one foil was
torn.
o De Lara ran inside his house with Orolfo in pursuit, succeeding in subduing the former.
o Sgt. David confronted De Lara, and he admitted that he kept prohibited drugs in his house.
o A receipt of the seized articles was made by Orolfo.
 They went to the WPD headquarters for investigation.
 The drugs were brought to the NBI for chemical analysis. A report and certification from Ms. Aida Pascual
(forensic chemist) indicate that the drugs were positive for marijuana.
 De Lara denied having sold marijuana, claiming that police officers merely planted he marijuana on his
person.
o He said that he arrived home from work as a security guard and fetched his son who was being taken
care of by a neighbor. Upon returning to his house with his son, he was arrested by the police.
o The police searched his house without any warrant.
o He also denied that the 20-peso bill was given to him. He said that he was just forced to sign on the
photocopy of the bill.
o He said that the first time he saw the blue plastic bag containing the prohibited drugs was at the police
station.
 Trial court found him guilty of violation of Sec. 4, Art. II of R.A. 6425.
 De Lara appealed, questioning the legality of his arrest and the seizure of prohibited drugs inside his house.

Issue/s:
1. W/N the arrest of De Lara and the seizure of prohibited house inside his house were valid

Held:
1. Yes, the police operatives acted within the bounds of law.
 Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for lawful warrantless
arrests.
“Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person;

a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

b) When an offense has in fact just been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it”
 De Lara was caught red-handed in delivering two foils of marijuana to Orolfo (poseur-buyer).
Applying Sec. 5, Rule 113, his arrest was lawfully done despite the absence of a warrant.
 People v. Kalubiran, People v. De Los Santos: “Having caught the appellant in flagrante as a
result of the buy-bust operation, the policemen were not only authorized but were also under
obligation to apprehend the drug pusher even without a warrant of arrest.”
 De Lara contends that his arrest was precipitated by reports by newspapers.
 However, a surveillance was earlier conducted by the Sgt. David’s team. De Lara’s eventual
arrest was the result of the surveillance and the buy-bust operation.
 Evidence shows that De Lara ran inside his house upon sensing the presence of the police.
 The policemen’s entry in his house without a search warrant was in hot-pursuit of a person
caught committing an offense in flagrante. The arrest that followed the hot-pursuit was
valid.
  The seizure of the plastic bag containing prohibited drugs found inside De Lara’s house was
likewise valid. It was the result of his arrest inside his house.
 A contemporaneous search may be conducted upon the person of the arrestee and the immediate
vicinity where the arrest was made.

Dispositive Portion:
“WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the modification that appellant shall suffer an
indeterminate penalty of FOUR (4) years and TWO (2) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to EIGHT (8)
years and ONE (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.”

BOAC v PEOPLE (Velasco, Jr; 2008)

RAUL BASILIO D. BOAC, RAMON B. GOLONG, CESAR F. BELTRAN, and ROGER A. BASADRE, petitioners,
vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
FACTS:
• Petitioners are part of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group
(CIDG) of the PNP. They were charged with a violation of Sec. 2203 in
relation to Sec. 3612 of the Tariff and Customs Code for flagging down,
searching and seizing 3 container vans consigned to Japan Trak
surplus (Kakiage Surplus) without lawful authority or delegation from
the Collector of Customs
• At pretrial, the prosecution and defense stipulated that in the evening of July
27, 2004, Golong, Beltran, Basdre and Alfonso, upon the order of Boac, but
without authority from and coordination with the Bureau of Customs (BOC),
flagged down 3 container vans consigned to Kakiage Surplus
• Vans were allowed to be brought to the warehouse of the consignee and the
actual search was done on July 28, 2004
• Atty. Mangaoan, Customs District Collector of CDO, testified that petitioners
did not have written authority from the Commissioner of Customs or District
Collector. Golong claimed they had clear orders form Boac to open and
search the vans. She instructed her personnel to open the vans only to show
that there was nothing illegal in their contents.
• Dario Amolata, a licensed customs broker, went to the warehouse with Yamit
and Godoy (BOC officers) to witness inspection of the vans. No contrabands
were found.
Defense
• Boac was in Manila on leave on July 27, 2004
• Beltran allegedly informed him that 3 container vans with contrabands were
released by BOC, thus he instructed Golong and team to flag down the vans
• When nothing illegal was found, Boac directed Golong to leave the premises
• Golong added that he and his team waited until July 28 to open the vans
because there were no representatives from the BOC to witness the
inspection
• Beltran testified that the morning of July 27, Voltaire Sabelina, a BOC
appraiser, informed him that 3 container vans will be released from the pier
at 5pm, and that 2 of the containers allegedly had TV sets from Japan
Sandiganbayan:
• Tariff and Customs Code, Sec. 2203. Persons Having Police Authority - For
the enforcement of the tariff and customs laws, the ff persons are authorized
to effect searches, seizures and arrests conformably with the provisions of
said laws. xxx (d) Officers generally empowered by law to effect arrests
and execute processes the courts, when acting under the direction of
the collector
• Petitioners needed a written authority from the Commissioner of Customs or
District Collector, which they did not have. Even Beltran and Golong
admitted they did not have authorization to search the vans.
• “The PNP-CIDG cannot arrogate upon itself the power which, under the law,
is exclusively vested to the Collector of Customs” → petitioners found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt
Petitioners
• They did not conduct any search, seizure or arrest → no violation of Tariff
and Customs Code
• During the search conducted in consignee’s warehouse on July 28, the
employees of the owner of the shipment unloaded the goods under BOC
personnel supervision. Petitioners allege they only witnessed the search,
they did not make any seizures or arrests
• Police’s authority to stop, search and effect seizure and arrest, if necessary,
is no longer exclusively vested in the Collector of Customs. Regular PNP
members are empowered by law in accordance with RA 6975:
◦ Section 24. Powers and Functions.—The PNP shall have the following
powers and functions: xxx (c) Investigate and prevent crimes, effect the
arrest of criminal offenders, bring offenders to justice and assist in their
prosecution; (d) Exercise the general powers to make arrest, search and
seizure in accordance with the Constitution and pertinent laws;
• They contend they were investigating a possible connivance of smugglers
with some corrupt customs personnel
• Flagging down container vans was not connected with enforcement of the
tariff and customs laws. Smuggling is a form of economic sabotage
within the powers of the PNP-CIDG to monitor and investigate, therefore
no prior authority from the Collector of Customs is required in performing
their duties as police officers.
ISSUES
1. W/N petitioners conducted search, seizure or arrest (therefore being in
violation of Sec 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code) - NO, they did not
conduct a search, seizure and arrest
2. W/N authority or delegation from the collector of customs is required
when petitioners flagged down the vans outside the territorial jurisdiction
of the collector of customs in the exercise of their official duties as police
officers - NO
RATIO:
1. Petitioners should be acquitted of the charge petitioners cannot be convicted under the Tariff and Customs Code since
• Prosecution witness Customs Broker Amolata testified that petitioners did there is no evidence they actually searched the vans
not open the container vans, and they agreed to bring the container vans to
the warehouse of the consignee DISPOSITIVE:
• As testified by petitioners Beltran and Golong, on July 28, the vans were WHEREFORE, the August 16, 2007 Decision and November 14, 2007
searched by persons from the Bureau of Customs and Mr. Bernales, the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
owner of the vans. Petitioners merely watched the unloading of the contents. Petitioners are ACQUITTED of the charge against them. No costs.
The employees of the owner of the shipment unloaded the cargo while
the Customs people supervised.
◦ Prosecution did not rebut the testimony of the petitioners
• Amolata testified that there was no seizure nor arrest, and that the search
was made by the Kakiage Surplous personnel
• Search was conducted by Customs Police Yamit and Godoy who had keys
to the vans as attested by Amolata
◦ Captain Capacite of Enforcement and Security Services of the Bureau of
Customs had the keys to the van because he said he should also be
present when the contents of the container vans are unloaded
◦ Amolata admitted that it was not normal procedure for Captain Capacite
to have the keys despite the vans being released by the Bureau of
Customs
• Vans were opened without PNP-CIDG’s team leader, Inspector Golong. The
search was under the direction of the Customs Police. When they decided
to stop the search, petitioners left the premises.
• Petitioners merely observed the search which they requested to be
undertaken to check for contrabands. Notably, the consignee did not file any
complaint against the petitioners.
• The information charged petitioners for illegally flagging down,
searching and seizing the vans on July 27.
◦ However, petitioners could not be held liable for those acts since
there was no search and seizure done that night. The act of flagging
down vehicles is not among those proscribed by Sec 2203 of the
Tariff and Customs Code. Mere flagging down of the container vans
is not punishable under said law.

2. No conflict between the aforequoted provisions of the Tariff and Customs

Code and RA 6975
• Jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Customs is clearly with regard to
customs duties
• Should the PNP suspect anything, it should coordinate with the bOC and
obtain the written authority from the Collector
• While there was no such coordination in this instance, nevertheless,