REMEDIAL LAW>Special Procedure>Extrajudicial Foreclosure Sale

Overlap with
CIVIL LAW>Credit Transactions>Real Estate Mortgage

SPOUSES BENITO BAYSA AND VICTORIA BAYSA, Petitioners

vs.
SPOUSES FIDEL PLANTILLA AND SUSAN PLANTILLA, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY,
AND THE SHERIFF OF QUEZON CITY, Respondents
G.R. No. 159271, July 13, 2015
(FIRST DIVISION)

FACTS: To secure the payment of their indebtedness to the spouses Fidel and Susan Plantilla, spouses
Benito and Victoria Baysa, herein petitioners executed a deed of real estate mortgage, involving
a parcel of land in Quezon City, in favor of the former, and a mortgage note, containing the terms
of payment and interest rate. Also, the said deed expressly stated that “[i]n the event of non-payment of the
entire principal and accrued interest due under the conditions described in this paragraph, the mortgagors
expressly and specifically agree to the extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgaged property.” However,
Spouses Baysa defaulted in payment after nine (9) months of regular payment of interest. Hence, Spouses
Plantilla commenced the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage to recover from the petitioners
the unpaid balance. Spouses Baysa sued Spouses Plantilla to annul the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real
estate mortgage and the public auction conducted pursuant to the extrajudicial foreclosure alleging that
there has been no power or authority to sell inserted in or attached to the said deed as required by Section
1 Act No. 3135, and, hence, the extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding is null and void. Both the lower court
and appellate court held the validity of said proceeding and ruled that the authority stated on said deed to
extrajudicially foreclose, by necessary implication, carries with it the grant of power to sell the property at a
public auction. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the consent given by Spouses Baysa in the deed of real estate mortgage to the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the property, by necessary implication, carries with it the grant of power to sell
the property at public action, which will validate the extrajudicial foreclosure.

HELD: No.

The petitioners evidently agreed only to the holding of the extrajudicial foreclosure should they default in
their obligations. Their agreement was a mere expression of their amenability to extrajudicial foreclosure
as the means of foreclosing the mortgage, and did not constitute the special power or authority to sell the
mortgaged property to enable the mortgagees to recover the unpaid obligations. What was necessary was
the special power or authority to sell -whether inserted in the REM itself, or annexed thereto - that authorized
the respondent spouses to sell in the public auction their mortgaged property.

To enable the extra judicial foreclosure of the REM of the petitioners, the special power to sell should have
been either inserted in the REM itself or embodied in a separate instrument attached to the REM. But it is
not disputed that no special power to sell was either inserted in the REM or attached to the REM. Hence,
the respondent spouses as the foreclosing mortgagees could not initiate the extrajudicial foreclosure, but
must resort to judicial foreclosure pursuant to the procedure set forth in Rule 68 of the Rules of Court. The
omission of the special power to sell the property subject of the mortgage was fatal to the validity and
efficacy of the extrajudicial foreclosure, and warranted the invalidation of the entire proceedings conducted
by the sheriff.

Likewise, pursuant to Article 1878, (5), of the Civil Code, a special power of attorney was necessary for
entering "into any contract by which the ownership of an immovable is transmitted or acquired either
gratuitously or for a valuable consideration," the written authority must be a special power of attorney to
sell.
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure>Estoppel by deed>Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of
Judgments
Overlap with: POLITICAL LAW>Constitutional Law>Judicial Department> Judicial Review>Moot
Questions; Grave Abuse of Discretion

JOSE C. GO, GOTESCO PROPERTIES, INC., GO TONG ELECTRICAL SUPPLY, INC., EVER
EMPORIUM, INC., EVER GOTESCO RESOURCES AND HOLDINGS, INC., GOTESCO TYAN MING
DEVELOPMENT, INC. EVERCREST CEBU GOLF CLUB, NASUGBU RESORTS, INC., GMCC UNITED
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, AND GULOD RESORT, INC., Petitioners, vs. BANGKO SENTRAL
NG PILIPINAS, AND REGISTER OF DEEDS OF NASUGBU BATANGAS, Respondents

G.R. No. 202262, July 8, 2015

First Division

FACTS: Petitioner Jose C. Go was the principal and biggest stockholder of Orient Commercial Banking
Corporation (OCBC). The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) filed a collection case against OCBC and
herein petitioners, for failure to pay loans and overdraft obligations. Thereafter, a compromise agreement
was entered into between BSP and OCBC. As such, petitioners committed to pay their obligations, subject
to the attachment of real properties such as the Ever Crest Cebu Golf Club (Ever Crest) and Mega Heights,
Inc., as security for the faithful payment of their obligation.

Upon failure of Jose C. Go, and other petitioner-corporations to pay their obligation, the BSP sought the
enforcement of the agreement and the Motion for Execution was granted by the Regional Trial Court. The
properties of Ever Crest and Mega Heights were accordingly levied upon by the sheriff.

Subsequently, Ever Crest, Jose C. Go and his affiliate companies filed a petition for certiorari with the Court
of Appeals imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction to the lower court
for issuing a writ of execution against Ever Crest despite its not having been a party to the compromise
agreement.

Meanwhile, the public auction of Ever Crest proceeded with the Bangko Sentral submitting the winning bid.
New Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs), in the name of the BSP were issued by the Register of Deeds.
Thus, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for injunction for being moot and academic.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petition for certiorari for being moot
and academic

HELD: YES.

By their express commitments, the petitioners and Ever Crest were estopped from claiming that the
properties of Ever Crest and Mega Heights could not be the subject of levy pursuant to the writ of execution
issued by the Regional Trial Court.

The petitioners are estopped by deed, by virtue of the execution of the compromise agreement. They were
the ones who offered the properties of Ever Crest to Bangko Sentral, and who had also given assurance
that all the legalities and formalities for that purpose had been obtained, and that they should not now be
allowed to escape or to evade their responsibilities under the compromise agreement just to prevent the
levy on execution of Ever Crest’s properties.

Finally, in the term grave abuse of discretion, the abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power was exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or hostility. Here, the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition because the petitioners
has failed to show how the Regional Trial Court could have been guilty of abusing its discretion for allowing
the execution of the properties designated as security for an obligation.
REMEDIAL LAW>Criminal Procedure>Appeal/Judgment

HORACIO SALVADOR, Petitioner,

v.
LISA CHUA, Respondent.
G.R. No. 212865, July 15, 2015
(First Division)

FACTS: On the date scheduled for the promulgation of the judgment against Spouses Salvador for the
crime of estafa, their counsel moved for the deferment of the promulgation since the accused was then
suffering from hypertension. Unconvinced of the reason, the RTC proceeded to promulgate its decision
and found the spouses Salvador guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa.

The petitioner filed his Motion for Leave to file Notice of Appeal and attached thereto the medical certificate
purportedly issued by Dr. Paulo Miguel A. David, certifying that the petitioner is suffering from hypertension.
RTC Judge initially denied the petitioner's Motion for Leave to file Notice of Appeal on the ground of non-
compliance with Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.

Respondent, who was the complainant in Criminal Case filed her Motion for Execution. The petitioner
moved for the reconsideration which was granted by the RTC. RTC, acting on the respondent's Motion for
Execution, issued another order granting the Motion for Execution and Motion to Commit the Person of
Accused Horacio Salvador to the National Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City, to serve his sentence. On its
part, the Prosecution, represented by the private prosecutor, filed its Motion for Reconsideration against
the order attaching to the motion the affidavit executed by Dr. Paolo Miguel A. David affirming that he had
not examined the petitioner; that he had not issued any medical certificate in favor of the petitioner; that his
name of Paolo had been misspelled Paulo in the medical certificate submitted by the petitioner; that the
signature appearing in the medical certificate was not his; and that the Rizal Medical Center did not officially
issue the medical certificate in question. The petitioner opposed the Prosecution's Motion for
Reconsideration,and prayed that he be allowed to post bail pending appeal. The Criminal Case was re-
raffled to Judge Francisco G. Mendiola who denied the Prosecution's Motion for Reconsideration, and fixed
bail. Consequently, the respondent commenced a special civil action for certiorari in the CA to nullify the
orders giving due course to the petitioner's notice of appeal and allowing him to post bail for his provisional
liberty. The CA denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

ISSUES: (1) Whether the respondent as the complainant in the criminal case had the legal personality to
file the petition for certiorari in the CA to assail the orders of the RTC despite the lack of consent of the
OSG; and (2) Whether the petitioner had lost his standing in court for his failure to appear at the
promulgation of his conviction.

HELD: (1) YES; (2) YES

(1). Yes, the respondent had legal standing to assail the questioned orders through certiorari.

The Court has stressed that the People of the Philippines, being the real party in interest in every criminal
proceedings, can be represented only by the OSG in criminal proceedings in the CA or in this Court. Yet,
this rule admits of exceptions. A special civil action for certiorari may be filed by an aggrieved party alleging
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court. In a long
line of cases, this Court construed the term aggrieved parties to include the State and the private offended
party or complainant. There can be cases where a private offended party is allowed to prosecute as an
aggrieved party in the interest of substantial justice for a party cannot be left without recourse to address a
substantive issue in law. Her interest in the criminal case did not end upon the granting of her Motion for
Execution because the questioned orders opened the possibility of defeating the judgment in her favor
should the CA reverse or modify his conviction. She remained an aggrieved party like the State in every
sense, and, consequently, she had as much right as anyone else in the criminal proceedings to adopt and
to take the necessary procedural steps within the bounds of the Rules of Court to serve and protect her
substantial interest. Although it is true that she could be represented by the OSG if it wanted to, she would
be reckless at that point to be disinterested in the appellate proceedings. Moreover, we would violate her
fundamental right to due process of law if we were to deny her the opportunity to assail and set aside the
improperly resurrected appeal of the petitioner.

(2) Yes, the Petitioner has lost his right to appeal his conviction.

If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable cause, he
shall lose the remedies available in these rules against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest.
Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment, however, the accused may surrender and file a
motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence at the
scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed
to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice [Section 6, Rule 120]. Under Section 6 supra,
the personal presence of the petitioner at the promulgation of the judgment was mandatory because the
offense of which he was found guilty was not a light felony or offense. Even assuming that he had suffered
hypertension, which could have validly excused his absence from the promulgation, the petitioner did not
fulfill the other requirement of Section 6, supra, to surrender himself to the trial court. The term surrender
used in the rule visibly necessitated his physical and voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court to
suffer any consequences of the verdict against him. His failure to fulfill the requirements rendered the
conviction final and immutable. He ought to be reminded that the right to appeal, being neither a natural
right nor a part of due process, is a merely statutory privilege that should be exercised in the manner and
in accordance with the provisions of the law establishing the right; otherwise, it is lost.
Remedial Law> Civil Procedure> Appeals
HEIRS OF ARTURO GARCIA I, (IN SUBSTITUTION OF HEIRS OF MELECIO BUENO), Petitioners,
vs.
MUNICIPALITY OF IBA, ZAMBALES, Respondent
G.R. No. 162217, July 22, 2015
First Division
FACTS: The late Melecio R. Bueno was the tenant-farmer beneficiary of an agricultural land located in
Poblacion, Iba, Zambales. He brought an ejectment suit in the MTC of Iba against the Municipality of Iba,
Province of Zambales, claiming that in 1983 the Municipality of Iba had constructed the public market on a
substantial portion of his land without his consent; and that his repeated demands for the Municipality of
Iba to vacate the property had remained unheeded. After due proceedings, the MTC ruled in favor of
Bueno. Hence, the Municipality of Iba filed its notice of appeal, but the MTC denied due course to the notice
of appeal.
Municipality of Iba filed its petition for certiorari in the RTC in Iba, Zambales to assail the denial of due
course by the MTC. RTC granted the petition for certiorari. The petitioners, substituted Bueno upon his
death, moved for the reconsideration of the judgment granting the petition for certiorari, but the RTC denied
their motion for reconsideration. Aggrieved, the petitioners appealed to the CA by petition for review under
Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.
The CA “dismissed” the petition for review for not being the proper mode of appeal, observing that the
assailed orders had been issued by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. The motion for
reconsideration of the petitioners was ultimately denied by the CA.
ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for review under Rule 42 is the proper mode of appeal for petition for
certiorari granted by the RTC due to denial of due process by the MTC?

HELD: No.

The petitioners’ resort to the petition for review under Rule 42 was wrong.

The petitioners should have filed a notice of appeal in the RTC within the period of 15 days from their notice
of the judgment of the RTC, and within the same period should have paid to the clerk of the RTC the full
amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees. The filing of the notice of appeal within the
period allowed by Section 3 sets in motion the remedy of ordinary appeal because the appeal is deemed
perfected as to the appealing party upon his timely filing of the notice of appeal. It is upon the perfection of
the appeal filed in due time, and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties that the RTC shall
lose jurisdiction over the case. On the other hand, the non-payment of the appellate court docket fee within
the reglementary period as required by Section 4, is both mandatory and jurisdictional, the non-compliance
with which is fatal to the appeal, and is a ground to dismiss the appeal under Section 1 (c), Rule 50 of
the Rules of Court. The compliance with these requirements was the only way by which they could have
perfected their appeal from the adverse judgment of the RTC.

The appeal by notice of appeal under Rule 41 is a matter of right, but the appeal by petition for review under
Rule 42 is a matter of discretion. An appeal as a matter of right, which refers to the right to seek the review
by a superior court of the judgment rendered by the trial court, exists after the trial in the first instance. In
contrast, the discretionary appeal, which is taken from the decision or final order rendered by a court in the
exercise of its primary appellate jurisdiction, may be disallowed by the superior court in its discretion.
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure>Venue of Action

BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC., Petitioner, v. SPOUSES BENEDICTO & TERESITA
YUJUICO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 175796, July 22, 2015
First Division

FACTS
The City of Manila filed a complaint against the respondents for the expropriation of five parcels of land
located in Tondo, Manila and registered in the name of respondent Teresita Yujuico. Two of the parcels of
land were previously mortgaged to Citytrust Banking Corporation under a First Real Estate Mortgage
Contract. Manila RTC rendered its judgment declaring the five parcels of land expropriated for public use.
The judgment became final and executory. The petitioner subsequently filed a Motion to Intervene in
Execution with Partial Opposition to Defendant’s Request to Release but the RTC denied. Hence, the
petitioner decided to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage constituted on the two parcels of land. the sheriff
awarded the two lots to the petitioner as the highest bidder at P10,000,000.00.

Claiming a deficiency, the petitioner sued the respondents to recover such deficiency in the Makati RTC
The respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on several grounds. Makati RTC denied the respondents’
motion to dismiss. In its reply, the respondents raised for the first time their objection on the ground of
improper venue. They contended that the action for the recovery of the deficiency, being a supplementary
action of the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, was a real action that should have been brought in the
Manila RTC because Manila was the place where the properties were located.

ISSUE: Whether or not the action to recover the deficiency after the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real
property mortgage is a personal action?

HELD: YES

It is basic that the venue of an action depends on whether it is a real or a personal action. The determinants
of whether an action is of a real or a personal nature have been fixed by the Rules of Court and relevant
jurisprudence. According to Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, a real action is one that affects title to
or possession of real property, or an interest therein. Thus, an action for partition or condemnation of, or
foreclosure of mortgage on, real property is a real action.20 The real action is to be commenced and tried
in the proper court having jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof,
is situated, which explains why the action is also referred to as a local action. In contrast, the Rules of Court
declares all other actions as personal actions.21Such actions may include those brought for the recovery of
personal property, or for the enforcement of some contract or recovery of damages for its breach, or for the
recovery of damages for the commission of an injury to the person or property.22 The venue of a personal
action is the place where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any
of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at
the election of the plaintiff,23 for which reason the action is considered a transitory one.

Based on the distinctions between real and personal actions, an action to recover the deficiency after the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the real property mortgage is a personal action, for it does not affect title to or
possession of real property, or any interest therein.
REMEDIAL LAW>Evidence
Overlap with
COMMCERCIAL LAW> Corporation Code>Stock Certificates

GRACE BORGONA INSIGNE, DIOSDADO BORGONA, OSBOURNE BORGONA, IMELDA

BORGONA RIVERA, AND ARISTOTLE BORGONA, Petitioners,
vs.
ABRA VALLEY COLLEGES, INC. AND FRANCIS BORGONA, Respondent.
G.R. No. 204089 July 29, 2015
FIRST DIVISION

FACTS:
Pedro was the founder, president and majority stockholder of respondent Abra Valley. Francis, son of
Pedro in his first marriage, succeeded him as the president after his death. The petitioners, the children
of the late Pedro Borgoña (Pedro) in his second wife, Teresita Valeros, filed a complaint with
application for preliminary injunction and damages before the RTC against Abra Valley to allow them
to inspect its corporate books and records and to provide them with its financial statements. Due to
Abra Valley’s failure to file its responsive pleading within the reglementary period, RTC rendered
judgment in favor of the petitioners. On appeal, CA ordered RTC to admit Abra Valley’s answer despite
its belated filing and remanded the case for further proceedings.

The RTC ordered the petitioners to present the stock certificates under their names. However, instead
of presenting the said certificates, the petitioners submitted secretary’s certificates, official receipts of
their payments for their subscriptions and minutes of the meetings, among others. The petitioners also
filed a Motion for Production/Inspection of Documents asking the RTC to direct the respondents to
produce Stock and Transfer Book (STB) and allow them to to inspect the same. The Court dismissed
the case due to failure of the plaintiffs to comply with the order to present the stock certificates.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the Court is correct when it ruled that the burden of proving the stock
ownership lies with the petitioners?
2. Whether or not RTC properly dismissed the case due to failure to to produce stock certificates?

Held 1: Yes
The party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. The
party who asserts the affirmative of an issue bears the onus to prove his assertion in order to obtain a
favorable judgment. From the plaintiff the burden to prove his positive assertions never parts. Yet, for
the defendant, an affirmative defense is one that is not a denial of an essential ingredient in the
plaintiff’s cause of action, but rather one that, if established, will be a good defense. Being the parties
who filed the Motion for Preliminary Hearing of Special and Affirmative Defenses, the respondents
bore the burden of proof to establish that the petitioners were not stockholders. The respondents’
assertion partook of a good defense, if established, would result to their avoidance of the claim.

Held 2: No
To establish their stock ownership, the petitioners submitted various documents showing their stock
ownership, specifically: the official receipts of their payments for their subscriptions of the shares of
Abra Valley; and the copies duly certified by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) stating
that Abra Valley had issued shares in favor of the petitioners, such as the issuance of part of authorized
and unissued capital stock; the secretary’s certificate; and the general information sheet. They were
able to show that the respondents had allowed the petitioners to become members of the Board of
Directors according to the Minutes of the Annual Meeting of Directors and Stockholders of the Abra
Valley College. The dismissal of the case by virtue of Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court should
be undone because the petitioners’ production of the stock certificates was rendered superfluous by
their submission of other competent means of establishing their shareholdings in Abra Valley.
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure>Partition

BERLINDA ORIBELLO, Petitioner

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL FORMER TENTH DIVISION), AND REMEDIOS ORIBELLO,
Respondents
G.R. No. 163504, August 05, 2015
(FIRST DIVISION)

FACTS: Remedios Oribello, claiming to be an adopted child of the deceased Toribio Oribello, filed an action
for partition and damages involving twelve parcels of land in Agoo, La Union declared, for taxation
purposes, under the name of the deceased. Berlinda Oribello, the surviving spouse of the deceased, denied
the claim and averred that the adoption decree was fraudulently secured by Alfredo Selga, the natural father
of Remedios; that the proceedings in the first adoption case and the decree of adoption are void ab initio;
that Toribio could not have filed the first adoption case before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Occidental
Mindoro because he was a resident of Agoo, La Union throughout his life; that the Toribio referred to in the
first adoption case and the husband of Berlinda, Toribio, are two different persons; that the birth certificate
of Remedios was simulated; that Remedios never lived with nor submitted herself to the parental authority
and care of Toribio even after the marriage of Berlinda to him. The lower court dismissed the action for
partition and damages and ruled that Remedios is not a co-owner of the properties which Berlinda inherited
from Toribio Oribello except three (3) parcels of land which are unknown to and not in the possession of
the latter. However, the appellate court reversed the decision of the lower court and pointed out that the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) did not have the authority to annul the adoption decree and to dismiss the
complaint for partition for that reason; and that at any rate the petitioner still had the option either to file a
petition for relief or an action for the annulment of the adoption decree in the appropriate court. Hence, this
appeal.

ISSUE #1: Whether or not the validity of the adoption decree can be assailed in an action for partition.
ISSUE #2: Whether or not Remedios Oribello has the right to institute the action for partition.

HELD #1: No.

The RTC did not have the jurisdiction to determine or to review the validity of the decree of adoption by
virtue of the equal rank and category between the RTC and the CFI. The proper court with jurisdiction to
do so was the CA, which has been vested by Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 12916 with the exclusive
original jurisdiction over actions for the annulment of the judgments of the RTC. [However, t]he foregoing
findings by the RTC, that the Tomas Orivillo who had legally adopted Remedios Oribello under the CFI's
decree of adoption was not the same person as the Tomas Oribello whose property was the subject of her
demand for judicial partition, were supported by the records. In finding so, the RTC did not interfere with
the jurisdiction of the CFI as a court of equal rank and category, and did not negate the adoption decree,
but simply determined whether or not the claim of Remedios Oribello to the partition of the property of
Tomas Oribello was competently substantiated by preponderance of evidence. What the RTC thereby
settled was only whether Remedios Oribello was a co-owner of the property with Berlinda Oribello, the
widow of Tomas Oribello. The RTC, being the trial court with jurisdiction over the action for partition,
undeniably possessed the fullest authority to hear and settle the conflicting claims of the parties.

HELD #2: No.

Remedios Oribello did not satisfactorily establish her co-ownership of the properties left by the late Toribio
Oribello. Under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court is a judicial controversy between persons who, being co-
owners or coparceners of common property, seek to secure a division or partition thereof among
themselves, giving to each one of them the part corresponding to him. There are two stages defined under
Rule 69: the first relates to the determination of the rights of the parties to the property held in common and
the second concerns the physical segregation of each party's just share in the property held in common.
The second stage need not be gone into should the parties agree on the physical partition. As the plaintiff,
Remedios had the burden of proof to establish her right to a share in the property by preponderance of
evidence, but she failed to provide the factual basis of her right to the partition warranted the dismissal of
her claim.
REMEDIAL LAW>Criminal Procedure> Search Warrant

CHARLIE TE, Petitioner

vs.
HON. AUGUSTO V. BREVA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, 11TH JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH 10, DAVAO CITY; U R. BAHINTING, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS SPECIAL INVESTIGATOR OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
SARANGGANI DISTRICT OFFICE; AND PRYCE GASES, INC., Respondents.
G.R. No. 164974, August 05, 2015
(First Division)

FACTS: An application for the search warrant was filed at the instance of Pryce Gases. Respondent Judge
Breva issued a search warrant against the petitioner upon his finding of probable cause for hoarding large
quantities of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) in steel cylinders belonging to respondent Pryce Gases, Inc.
(Pryce Gases, a violation of Sections 155, 156, 168 and 169 of Republic Act No. 8293 (Intellectual Property
Code of the Philippines).
Petition for certiorari for grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction was filed against the
Presiding Judge when the latter denied the petitioner's Omnibus Motion to Quash Warrant and/or Suppress
Evidence and to Order Return of Seized. However, CA dismissed the petition for failure to implead the
People of the Philippines as respondents despite the argument of the petitioner that impleading the People
of the Philippines as respondents was premature because no criminal case had yet been filed against him
with only the application for the issuance of the search warrant having been made.

ISSUE: Whether or not failure to implead People of the Philippines in a special civil action for certiorari to
nullify the search warrant issued is a sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition pursuant to Section
3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court?

RULING: YES
The omission of the People of the Philippines from the petition was fatal. The requirement that the search
warrant be issued in the name of the People of the Philippines is imposed by Section 1, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court.—Impleading the People of the Philippines in the petition for certiorari did not depend on
whether or not an actual criminal action had already been commenced in court against the petitioner. It
cannot be denied that the search warrant in question had been issued in the name of the People of the
Philippines, and that fact rendered the People of the Philippines indispensable parties in the special civil
action for certiorari brought to nullify the questioned orders of respondent Presiding Judge. We also note
that the impleading is further expressly demanded in Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court. . x x x x The
failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal of the petition.
Every search warrant is applied for and issued by and under the authority of the State, regardless of who
initiates its application or causes its issuance.—We may agree with the petitioner that the application for
the search warrant was not a criminal action; and that the application for the search warrant was not of the
same form as that of a criminal action. Verily, the search warrant is not similar to a criminal action but is
rather a legal process that may be likened to a writ of discovery employed by no less than the State to
procure relevant evidence of a crime. In that respect, it is an instrument or tool, issued under the State’s
police power, and this is the reason why it must issue in the name of the People of the Philippines. Equally
clear is that the sworn application for the search warrant and the search warrant itself were upon the behest
of the People of the Philippines. It defies logic and common sense for the petitioner to contend, therefore,
that the application against him was not made by the People of the Philippines but by the interested party
or parties. The immutable truth is that every search warrant is applied for and issued by and under the
authority of the State, regardless of who initiates its application or causes its issuance.
REMEDIAL LAW> Criminal Procedure> Bail
Overlap with
POLITICAL LAW> Constitutional Law> Bill of Rights> Right to Bail

JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner

vs
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents
G.R. No 213847, August 18, 2015
En Banc

FACTS: Petitioner was charged with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of his purported
involvement in the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) Scam. Initially, Enrile in an Omnibus
Motion requested to post bail, which the Sandiganbayan denied. A warrant was issued, leading to
Petitioner's voluntary surrender. Petitioner again asked the Sandiganbayan in a Motion to Fix Bail which
was heard by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner argued that: (a) Prosecution had not yet established that the
evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) that, because of his advanced age and voluntary surrender, the penalty
would only be reclusion temporal, thus allowing for bail and; (c) he is not a flight risk due to his age and
physical condition. Sandiganbayan denied this in its assailed resolution. Motion for Reconsideration was
likewise denied.

ISSUE #1: Whether or not admission to bail in offenses punished by death, life imprisonment or reclusion
perpetua is subject to judicial discretion.
ISSUE #2: Whether or not Enrile’s poor health justifies his admission to bail.
ISSUE #3: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying Enrile’s
motion to fix bail.

HELD #1: YES.

For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not evidence of guilt is strong in criminal
cases involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment lies
within the discretion of the trial court. But, as the Court has held in Concerned Citizens v. Elma, "such
discretion may be exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for
the purpose of whether or not he should be granted provisional liberty." It is axiomatic, therefore, that bail
cannot be allowed when its grant is a matter of discretion on the part of the trial court unless there has been
a hearing with notice to the Prosecution.

In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial judge is expected to comply with the guidelines outlined
in Cortes v. Catral, to wit:

1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of
the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court, as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of
whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is
strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8,
supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the
prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is no t strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond
(Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be denied.

HELD #2: YES.

This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity
of every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those charged in criminal proceedings but also
to extraditees upon a clear and convincing showing: (1) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger
to the community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances.
In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to the authorities upon
his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely.
His personal disposition from the onset of his indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated
his utter respect for the legal processes of this country. We also do not ignore that at an earlier time many
years ago when he had been charged with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, he already
evinced a similar personal disposition of respect for the legal processes, and was granted bail during the
pendency of his trial because he was not seen as a flight risk. With his solid reputation in both his public
and his private lives, his long years of public service, and history’s judgment of him being at stake, he
should be granted bail.

The currently fragile state of Enrile’s health presents another compelling justification for his admission to
bail, but which the Sandiganbayan did not recognize.

HELD #3: YES.

Accordingly, we conclude that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to ensure the
appearance of the accused during the trial; and unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing of the fragile
health and advanced age of Enrile. As such, the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying
Enrile’s Motion To Fix Bail. Grave abuse of discretion, as the ground for the issuance of the writ of certiorari
, connotes whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment as is equivalent to excess, or lack of jurisdiction.
The abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised
in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure>Special Civil Action>Certiorari

HILARIO P. SORIANO, Petitioner

vs.
DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR LUZON VICTOR C. FERNANDEZ, FLORIZA A. BRIONES,
GRAFT INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OFFICER II, DONNA B. PASCUAL, GRAFT
INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OFFICER II, and ATTY. ADONIS C. CLEOFE,
Respondents
G.R. No. 168157, August 19, 2015
(First Division)

FACTS: The petitioner was the president of Soriano Holdings Corporation. He attested that on September
8, 1999, one Romeo L. Santos executed a Deed of Assignment transferring and conveying to Soriano
Holdings Corporation the parcel of land situated on P. Burgos Street, Batangas City, where the First
Coconut Rural Bank, Inc. (First Coconut) conducted its business. Santos delivered the owner’s copy of TCT
No. T-43029 to Soriano Holdings Corporation but the petitioner was not able to register the same.

On or about August 25, 2003, First Coconut received a copy of the writ of possession directing First Coconut
to vacate the leased premises within five days from notice. First Coconut then learned for the first time that
the land had been the subject of a litigation between Santos and one Ma. Teresa Robles.

Respondent Atty. Cleofe, then the Acting Registrar of Deeds, canceled TCT No. T-43029, and issued a
new owner’s TCT in the name of Robles without the payment of proper taxes and fees.

The petitioner charged Atty. Cleofe in the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon for violating Section
3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. The latter rendered her findings on the lack of probable cause to hold Atty.
Cleofe liable as charged, and recommended the dismissal of the criminal complaint of the petitioner.

By petition for certiorari, the complainant assails the resolution of the Deputy Ombudsman.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Deputy Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction?

HELD: NO.
The public respondents, in dismissing the charge against Atty. Cleofe, did not gravely abuse their discretion.
The Office of the Ombudsman found the evidence against him to be insufficient to support a finding of
probable cause to charge him.
It is a settled rule that the courts do not interfere in the determination of the Ombudsman regarding the
existence of probable cause, provided there is no grave abuse in the exercise of such discretion.
To justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari, the petitioner must show that the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in making
its determination and in arriving at the conclusion reached. In short, the petitioner must establish grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, which connotes the
whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment as is equivalent to excess, or lack of jurisdiction; the abuse
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform
a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. Obviously, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon, having correctly resolved the question of probable cause, did not abuse their discretion, least of all
gravely, in dismissing the charge against Atty. Cleofe.
REMEDIAL LAW; Civil Procedure; Intervention; Final Judgment Rule

NILO V. CHIPONGIAN, Petitioner,

vs.
VICTORIA BENITEZ-LIRIO, FEODOR BENITEZ AGUILAR, AND THE COURT OF APPEALS,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 162692, August 26, 2015
FIRST DIVISION

FACTS: Isabel Chipongian, the petitioner's sister, predeceased Vicente and had no offspring. After the
death of Isabel, Vicente and the petitioner had executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement respecting the
estate of Isabel, whereby the latter waived all his rights to the estate in favor of Vicente. However, Vicente
executed an affidavit on the same date whereby he affirmed that the waiver did not extend to the
paraphernal properties of Isabel. Upon the death of Vicente, Victoria and Feodor, sister and nephew of
Vicente, respectively, initiated proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Vicente. RTC appointed
Feodor as administrator of Vicente's estate.
The petitioner intervened and sought to exclude the paraphernal properties of Isabel from inclusion in the
estate of Vicente. RTC dismissed the complaint-in-intervention. RTC ruled that the intervenor actively
participated in the execution of the extra-judicial settlement of his sister's estate. CA dismissed the appeal
of the petitioner on the ground that petitioner did not submit a record on appeal in accordance with Section
3 of Rule 41, hence, he did not perfect his appeal of the judgment dismissing his intervention.
Petitioner assailed that appeal was from the decision of the trial court and not 'the final order or judgment
rendered in the case', the intestate estate case. The intervention was not an independent proceeding but
only ancillary or supplemental to the main case, the rule on multiple appeals does not apply and the filing
of a record on appeal is not a pre-requisite to the acceptance and consideration of the appeal by the
appellate court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner lost his right to appeal through his failure to file the record on appeal,
and rendered the dismissal of his intervention final and immutable pursuant to Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court?

RULING: YES
The right to appeal, being statutory in nature, required strict compliance with the rules regulating the
exercise of the right. As such, perfection of appeal within the prescribed period was mandatory and
jurisdictional, and failure to perfect the appeal within the prescribed time rendered the judgment final and
beyond review on appeal.
Section 1 of Rule 41 enunciates the final judgment rule by providing that an appeal “may be taken from a
judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared
by these Rules to be appealable.” The proper mode of appealing a judgment or final order in special
proceedings is by notice of appeal and record on appeal. This is pursuant to Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court, viz.: Section 2. Modes of appeal.—(a) Ordinary appeal.—The appeal to the Court of Appeals
in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing
a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a
copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings
and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In such cases,
the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.
In the context of the final judgment rule, Section 1 of Rule 109 does not limit the appealable orders and
judgments in special proceedings to the final order or judgment rendered in the main case, but extends the
remedy of appeal to other orders or dispositions that completely determine a particular matter in the case.
The dismissal of the petitioner’s intervention constituted “a final determination in the lower court of the rights
of the party appealing,” that is, his right in the paraphernal properties of his deceased sister. As such, it fell
under paragraph (c) of Section 1, Rule 109, because it had the effect of disallowing his claim against the
estate of Vicente, as well as under paragraph (e) of Section 1, Rule 109, because it was a final
determination in the trial court of his intervention. Conformably with either or both paragraphs, which are
boldly underscored above for easier reference, the dismissal was the proper subject of an appeal in due
course by virtue of its nature of completely disposing of his intervention.
REMEDIAL LAW>Criminal Procedure>Prosecution of Offenses>Amendment of Information
Overlap with
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure>Contempt

MAYOR ANWAR BERUA BALINDONG, LT. COL. JALANDONI COTA, MAYOR AMER ODEN
BALINDONG, AND ALI BALINDONG, Petitioners
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, STATE PROSECUTOR LEAH ARMAMENTO, OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR
GENERAL AND ZENAIDA LIMBONA, Respondents
G.R. No. 177600, October 19, 2015

ZENAIDA M. LIMBONA, Petitioner

vs.
HON. JUDGE ALEXANDER S. BALUT OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY,
BRANCH 76, Respondent
G.R. No. 178684
(FIRST DIVISION)

FACTS: Due to a shooting incident that resulted in the death of two (2) persons and seriously wounded two
(2) others, Lt. Col. Jalandoni D. Cota, Anwar Berua Balindong, PO1 Kennedy Balindong, Amer Oden
Balindong and Ali Sarip Balindong (Balindong, et al.) were charged with frustrated murder with attempted
murder, frustrated murder, and attempted murder. After several motions for reconsideration filed by both
Balindong, et al. before the Department of Justice, and petition for certiorari filed by Zenaida Limbona, the
surviving spouse of one of the deceased, before the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court affirmed, with
finality, the DOJ Resolution for the filing of information on above charges against Balindong, et al., and
ordered to implement RTC Resolution dated 03 December 2003 relative to the issuance of warrants of
arrest against all the accused. The cases were re-raffled to different RTC branches due to inhibitions of the
presiding judges. When cases were re-raffled, Balindong et al. filed motions to Re-Determine the Existence
or Non-Existence of Probable Cause Which May Even Warrant Dismissal - Even of the Appropriate
Charges of Homicide, Frustrated and Attempted Homicides, which was granted by RTC Judge Ralph Lee
and affirmed by RTC Judge Vivencio Baclig when it was re-raffled to his sala but was thereafter reversed
by the Court of Appeals in its ruling on the petition for certiorari filed by the State, through the Office of
Solicitor General, against Judges Lee and Baclig. Hence, this appeal (G.R. No. 177600) ALLEGING that
the private respondents were not precluded from still seeking from the RTC, as the trial court, the judicial
determination of probable cause against them despite the decision of the SC in another case in which they
only upheld the executive determination of probable cause; that they were not prevented by the SC to resort
to available judicial remedies, like filing the proper motions for the judicial determination of probable cause
in the trial court, anchoring their argument on Section 14, Rule 110, in relation to Section 19, Rule 119, both
of the Rules of Court. Zenaida Limbona also filed her petition citing RTC Judge Alexander Balut in contempt
for willfully disobeying the decision and resolutions issued by the Supreme Court directing the
implementation of the arrest warrants against Balindong, et al.
ISSUE #1: Whether or not the private respondents Balindong, et al. may invoke Section 14, Rule 110 or
Section 19, Rule 119 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure for the judicial determination of
probable cause against them.
ISSUE #2: Whether or not Judge Balut is in contempt of court by deferring action on the Motion for
Reconsideration and/or Recall Suspend Order of Arrest of Balindong, et al., and suspension of the
enforcement of the alias warrants of arrest despite the decisions of the Supreme Court directing the
implementation of the arrest warrants against them.
HELD #1: No.
Balindong, et al. could not reasonably support their position that they could still have the trial court determine
the existence of probable cause in their criminal cases independently of the executive determination of
probable cause by the DOJ by relying on Section 14, Rule 110, in relation to Section 19, Rule 119, both of
the Rules of Court. Ostensibly, Section 14, supra, applies only to a situation in which there has been a
mistake on the part of public prosecutor in charging the proper offense. There was no mistake in charging
the proper offenses. Balindong, et al. fully exhausted the procedure to determine the proper offenses to be
charged against them by going all the way up to the Secretary of Justice. Their quest was ultimately settled
with finality by the Secretary of Justice denying their second motion for reconsideration and declaring that
such offenses were two counts of murder with attempted murder, two counts of frustrated murder, and one
count of attempted murder. They thereafter attempted to undo such final determination by filing a third
motion for reconsideration in the DOJ, and they initially succeeded because Secretary Perez directed the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Lanao del Sur "to cause the filing of the amended information for
double homicide with multiple frustrated homicide against Mayor Anwar Berua Balindong, Lt. Col. Jalandoni
Cota and PO1 Kennedy Balindong," and dropped Amer Oden Balindong and Ali S. Balindong from the
informations. But their success was overturned by the CA, whose nullification of Secretary Perez's favorable
action on their third motion for reconsideration was affirmed in G.R. No. 159962. Thus, this Court even
issued its judicial imprimatur on the probable cause for two counts of murder with attempted murder, two
counts of frustrated murder, and one count of attempted murder. For Balindong, et al. to rely on Section 14,
supra, as basis for the RTC to still reach a determination of probable cause different from those sanctioned
in G.R. No. 159962 would be untenable.

HELD #2: No.

Contempt of court is defined in jurisprudence in this manner: “Contempt of court is defined as a
disobedience to the Court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice and dignity. It signifies not only a
willful disregard or disobedience of the courts orders, but such conduct which tends to bring the authority
of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or in some manner to impede the due administration
of justice. Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court; such conduct as
tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice
parties litigant or their witnesses during litigation.” Judge Balut has justified his actions by invoking judicial
courtesy and asserting his judicial discretion on the matters in question. It is clear that Judge Balut did not
thereby disobey the decisions of the Court in G.R. No. 159962 and G.R. No. 173290. To start with, there
was no indication in his Order that bad faith had moved him to suspend the implementation of the warrants
of arrest against Balindong, et al., or that he had thereby acted with a willful and deliberate intent to disobey
or to ignore the Court's bidding, or to cause injustice to any of the parties. In the absence of the clear
showing of bad faith on his part, his being prudent could only be an error of judgment, for which he could
not be held to account. Secondly, the history of the criminal cases, from the transfer of venue at the behest
of Secretary Tuquero from Cagayan de Oro to Quezon City; to the successive inhibitions of several RTC
Judges; to the succession of petitions for certiorari bearing on the handling of the criminal cases brought to
the higher courts, including this Court,32 must have probably persuaded Judge Balut to tread the path of
prudence and caution. Indeed, he expressed in his Order of July 16, 2007 the desire "to avert any conflicting
determinations" pending the promulgation of the Court's Decision in G.R. No. 177600. And, thirdly, his
actuations were entirely different from those of Judge Lee's, who downgraded the offenses from two counts
of murder with attempted murder, two counts of frustrated murder, and one count of attempted murder to
double homicide with multiple frustrated homicide, and ordered the issuance of the warrants of arrest for
such downgraded offenses. Judge Lee thereby directly contradicted the ruling in G.R. No. 159962.
REMEDIAL LAW> Civil Procedure>Preliminary Injunction

THE CITY OF ILOILO, REPRESENTED BY HON. MAYOR JERRY P. TREÑAS, Petitioner, v. HON.
JUDGE RENE B. HONRADO, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 29, ILOILO
CITY, AND JPV MOTOR VEHICLE EMISSION TESTING & CAR CARE CENTER, CO.,
REPRESENTED BY JIM P. VELEZ, Respondent.
G.R. No. 160399, December 09, 2015
First division

FACTS: JPV Motor Vehicle Emission Testing and Car Care Center (JPV), a partnership in Iloilo City, was
granted an authority to four lanes that could cater a total capacity of 60,000 motor vehicles for emission
testing center (ETC).

JPV filed the complaint to prevent the petitioner from acting on the pending application for the operation of
another ETC in Iloilo City. It averred that there was no need for another because it already had the capability
to serve all the registered motor vehicles in Iloilo City pursuant to Department Order No. 2002-31.

In its answer, the petitioner contested the injunctive relief, insisting that such relief, if issued, would result
into a monopoly on the part of JPV in the operation of a ETC; that the writ of injunction would prevent the
exercise by the City Mayor of his discretionary power to issue or not to issue business permits; and that
JPV did not establish the existence of its right in esse to be protected by the writ of injunction.

RTC granted the application of JPV for the writ of preliminary injunction prohibiting the issuance of a Mayor's
Permit to operate an ETC in the City of Iloilo. The petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the first
assailed order and prayed for the dissolution of the writ however, the RTC issued the second assailed order
denying said motion.

ISSUE
1. Whether or not the RTC contravened the guidelines in Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court when
it granted JPV's application for the writ of preliminary injunction prohibiting the issuance of Mayor’s
permit to operate another ETC in the City of Ilo Ilo

2. Whether there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of RTC in issuing the writ of preliminary
injunction

HELD: (1) YES; (2) YES

1. The prevailing rule is that courts should avoid issuing a writ of preliminary injunction which would in
effect dispose of the main case without trial. The function of the writ of preliminary injunction was not
to determine the merits of the case or to decide controverted tacts, because an interlocutory injunction
was but a preliminary and preparatory order that still looked to a future final hearing, and, although
contemplating what the result of that hearing would be, it should not settle what the result should be.

In the case at bar, if the lower court issued the desired writ to enjoin the sale of the properties premised
on the aforementioned justification of the petitioners, the issuance of the writ would be a virtual
acceptance of their claim that the foreclosure sale is null and void. There would in effect be a
prejudgment of the main case and a reversal of the rule on the burden of proof since it would assume
the proposition which the petitioners are inceptively bound to prove.

If it was plain from the pleadings that the main relief being sought was to enjoin the petitioner from
exercising its legal power as a local government unit to consider and pass upon applications for
business permits for the operation of businesses like the ETC, and to issue business permits within its
territory, we find it appalling how the RTC casually contravened the foregoing guidelines and easily
ignored the exhortation by granting JPV's application for injunction in the initial stage of the case.
Granting of JPV's application already amounted to the virtual acceptance of JPV's alleged entitlement
to preventing the petitioner from considering and passing upon the applications of other parties to
 operate their ETC. The granting amounted to the prejudgment of the merits of the case, something the
RTC could not validly do.

2. The RTC did not exercise its broad discretion soundly because it blatantly violated the right to be heard
of the petitioner, whose right to substantiate its defense of the power to regulate businesses within its
territorial jurisdiction should be fully recognized.

The challenged orders of the RTC were undeniably tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious or whimsical exercise
of judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. To justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari, the
abuse of discretion must be grave, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner
by reason of passion or personal hostility, and the abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all, in
contemplation of law, as to be equivalent to having acted without jurisdiction.
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure>Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

WINSTON F. GARCIA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT AND GENERAL MANAGER OF THE

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), Petitioner
vs.
MARIO I. MOLINA, Respondent
G.R. No. 165223, January 11, 2016
(First Division)

FACTS: In his affidavit, Elino F. Caretero pointed to the respondent as the person who had handed to him
on August 26, 2003 the letter entitled Is It True supposedly written by one R. Ibasco containing "scurrilous
and libellous statements" against petitioner. Considering that Ibasco denied authorship of the letter, the
finger of suspicion came to point at the respondent, who was consequently administratively investigated for
grave misconduct. After the investigation, the Investigation Unit transmitted its Memorandum dated
September 1, 2003 to the respondent to require him to explain the circulation and publication of the letter,
and to show cause why no administrative sanction should be imposed on him for doing so. In response, he
denied the imputed act. Thereafter, the petitioner issued Memorandum dated September 8, 2003 to formally
charge the respondent with grave misconduct, and to preventively suspend him for 60 days effective upon
receipt. The respondent sought the dismissal of the charge on the ground of its being baseless; and
requested the conduct of a formal investigation by an impartial body. The respondent also instituted in the
CA a special civil action for certiorari to challenge the legality of the Memorandum dated September 8,
2003. The CA, on 29 April 2004 granted the petition. The petitioner, in an appeal by petition for certiorari,
insists among others that the respondent did not exhaust his administrative remedies when he instituted in
the CA a special civil action for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is strictly bound by the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies.

HELD: NO.
Section 21 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service provides the respondent the
following options: either of filing a motion for reconsideration against the preventive suspension order by
the disciplining authority, or of elevating the preventive suspension order by appeal to the Civil Service
Commission within 15 days from receipt thereof. The respondent’s failure to file the motion for
reconsideration did not justify the immediate dismissal of the petition for certiorari, for the court have
recognized certain exceptional circumstances that excused his non-filing of the motion for reconsideration.
Among the exceptional circumstances are the following, namely: (1) when there is a violation of due
process; (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question; (3) when the administrative action is patently
iilegal and amounts to lack or excess of jurisdiction; (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the
administrative agency concerned; (5) when there is irreparable injury; (6) when the respondent is a
Department Secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of the President, bears the implied and assumed
approval of the latter; (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable;
(8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim; (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land
case proceedings; (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (11) when
there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention, and unreasonable delay would
greatly prejudice the complainant; (12) when no administrative review is provided by law; (13) where the
rule of qualified political agency applies; and (14) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies has been rendered moot.
Considering that the matter brought to the CA - whether the act complained against justified the filing of the
formal charge for grave misconduct and the imposition of preventive suspension pending investigation -
was a purely legal question due to the factual antecedents of the case not being in dispute. Hence, the
respondent had no need to exhaust the available administrative remedy of filing the motion for
reconsideration.
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure>Judgement Based on the Pleadings

FERNANDO MEDICAL ENTERPRISES, INC., Petitioner

vs.
WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondent
G.R. No. 207970, January 20, 2016
(First Division)

FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for a sum of money in the RTC for the latter’s failure to pay the following:
supply of hospital furnishings, medical equipment, and one unit Diamond Select Slice CT and Diamond
Select CV-9, and installation of medical gas pipeline system. The respondent moved to dismiss the
complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, improper venue, litis
pendentia, and forum shopping. In support of the ground of litis pendentia, it stated that it had earlier filed
a complaint for the rescission of the four contracts and of the February 11, 2009 agreement in the RTC in
Cabanatuan City; and that the resolution of that case would be determinative of the petitioner’s action for
collection. After the RTC denied the motion to dismiss on July 19, 2009,16 the respondent filed its answer
(ad cautelam). On September 28, 2011, the petitioner filed its Motion for Judgment Based on the
Pleadings, stating that the respondent had admitted the material allegations of its complaint and thus did
not tender any issue as to such allegations. The respondent opposed the Motion for Judgment Based on
the Pleadings, arguing that it had specifically denied the material allegations in the complaint, particularly
paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 11 and 12. On November 23, 2011, the RTC issued the order denying the Motion for
Judgment Based on the Pleadings of the petitioner. The CA affirmed the denial of the motion ruling that a
judgement on the pleadings would be improper because the outstanding balance due to the petitioner
remained to be an issue in the face of the allegations of the respondent in its complaint for rescission in the
RTC in Cabanatuan City.

ISSUE: Whether or not the denial of the Motion for Judgement Based on the Pleadings is proper.

HELD: NO.
In order to resolve the petitioner’s Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings, the trial court could
rely only on the answer of the respondent filed in Civil Case No. 09-122116. Under Section 1, Rule 34
of the Rules of Court, the answer was the sole basis for ascertaining whether the complaint’s material
allegations were admitted or properly denied. As such, the respondent’s averment of payment of the
total of P78,401,650.00 to the petitioner made in its complaint for rescission had no relevance to the
resolution of the Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings. The CA thus wrongly held that a factual
issue on the total liability of the respondent remained to be settled through trial on the merits. It should
have openly wondered why the respondent's answer in Civil Case No. 09-122116 did not allege the
supposed payment of the P78,401,650.00, if the payment was true, if only to buttress the specific
denial of its alleged liability. The omission exposed the respondent's denial of liability as insincere.
Section 1, Rule 34 of the Rules of Court provides that where an answer fails to tender an issue, or
otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading, the court may, on motion of
that party, direct judgment on such pleading. The essential query in resolving a motion for judgment
on the pleadings is whether or not there are issues of fact generated by the pleadings. Whether issues
of fact exist in a case or not depends on how the defending party’s answer has dealt with the ultimate
facts alleged in the complaint. The defending party’s answer either admits or denies the allegations of
ultimate facts in the complaint or other initiatory pleading. The answer admits the material allegations
of ultimate facts of the adverse party’s pleadings not only when it expressly confesses the truth of such
allegations but also when it omits to deal with them at all. The controversion of the ultimate facts must
only be by specific denial pursuant to Section 10, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court. Any material averment
in the complaint not so specifically denied are deemed admitted except an averment of the amount of
unliquidated damages. In the case of a written instrument or document upon which an action or
defense is based, the adverse party is deemed to admit the genuineness and due execution of the
actionable document unless he specifically denies them under oath, and sets forth what he claims to
be the facts, but the requirement of an oath does not apply when the adverse party does not appear
to be a party to the instrument or when compliance with an order for an inspection of the original
instrument is refused.

Here, in Civil Case No. 09-122116, the respondent expressly admitted paragraphs no. 2, 3, 4, 5, 9
and 10 of the complaint. The admission related to the petitioner’s allegations on: (a) the four
transactions for the delivery and installation of various hospital equipment; (b) the total liability of the
respondent; (c) the payments made by the respondents; (d) the balance still due to the petitioner; and
(e) the execution of the February 11, 2009 agreement. The admission of the various agreements,
especially the February 11, 2009 agreement, significantly admitted the petitioner’s complaint. To
recall, the petitioner’s cause of action was based on the February 11, 2009 agreement, which was the
actionable document in the case. The complaint properly alleged the substance of the February 11,
2009 agreement, and contained a copy thereof as an annex. Upon the express admission of the
genuineness and due execution of the February 11, 2009 agreement, judgment on the pleadings
became proper. There is no need for proof of execution and authenticity with respect to documents
the genuineness and due execution of which are admitted by the adverse party.

The respondent denied paragraphs no. 6, 7 and 8 of the complaint "for lack of knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity thereof, inasmuch as the alleged
transactions were undertaken during the term of office of the past officers of defendant Wesleyan
University-Philippines." The manner, however, of the denial, is not effective as a specific denial.
Paragraph no. 6 alleged that the respondent’s total obligation as of February 15, 2009 was
P123,901,650.00, but its balance thereafter became only P54,654,195.54 because it had since then
paid P67,357,683.23 to the petitioner. Paragraph no. 7 stated that the petitioner had agreed with the
respondent on February 11, 2009 to reduce the balance to only P50,400,000.00, which the respondent
would pay in 36 months through 36 postdated checks of P1,400,000.00 each, which the respondent
then issued for the purpose. Paragraph no. 8 averred that after four of the checks totalling
P5,600,000.00 were paid the respondent stopped payment of the rest, rendering the entire obligation
due and demandable pursuant to the February 11, 2009 agreement. Considering that paragraphs no.
6, 7 and 8 of the complaint averred matters that the respondent ought to know or could have easily
known, the answer did not specifically deny such material averments. It is settled that denials based
on lack of knowledge or information of matters clearly known to the pleader, or ought to be known to
it, or could have easily been known by it are insufficient, and constitute ineffective or sham denials.
That the respondent qualified its admissions and denials by subjecting them to its special and
affirmative defenses of lack of jurisdiction over its person, improper venue, litis pendentia and forum
shopping was of no consequence because the affirmative defenses, by their nature, involved matters
extrinsic to the merits of the petitioner’s claim, and thus did not negate the material averments of the
complaint.
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure>Allegations in the Complaint

FE U. QUIJANO, Petitioner
vs.
ATTY. DARYLL A. AMANTE, Respondent
G.R. No. 164277, October 8, 2014
(First Division)

FACTS: The petitioner and her siblings, namely: Eliseo, Jose and Gloria, inherited from their father,
the late Bibiano Quijano, the parcel of land registered in the latter's name. On April 23, 1990, prior to
any partition among the heirs, Eliseo sold a portion of his share, measuring 600 square meters, to
respondent Atty. Daryll A. Amante (respondent). On July 25, 1991, Eliseo, sickly and in need of money,
sold an additional 1/3 portion of his share in the property to the respondent, with their deed of absolute
sale stating that the sale was with the approval of Eliseo’s siblings. On September 30, 1992, Fe, Eliseo,
Jose and Gloria executed a deed of extrajudicial partition to divide their father’s estate among
themselves. The partition resulted in the portions earlier sold by Eliseo to the respondent being
adjudicated to the petitioner instead of to Eliseo. Due to the petitioner’s needing her portion that was
then occupied by the respondent, she demanded that the latter vacate it. Despite several demands,
the respondent refused to vacate, prompting her to file against him on February 14, 1995 a complaint
for ejectment and damages in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Cebu City (MTCC). She alleged
therein that she was the registered owner of the parcel of land, a portion of which was being occupied
by the respondent. The respondent denied that his possession of the disputed portion had been by
mere tolerance of Eliseo. He even asserted that he was in fact the owner and lawful possessor of the
property, having bought it from Eliseo. The MTCC rendered its decision in favor of the petitioner. On
appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) reversed the judgment of the MTCC, and dismissed the
complaint. The CA observed that the RTC correctly dismissed the ejectment case because a question
of ownership over the disputed property was raised. That after the execution of the deeds of sale, the
respondent became a co-owner along with Eliseo and his co-heirs, giving him the right to participate
in the partition of the estate owned in common by them; that because the respondent was not given
any notice of the project of partition or of the intention to effect the partition, the partition made by the
petitioner and her co-heirs did not bind him; and that, as to him, the entire estate was still co-owned
by the heirs, giving him the right to the co-possession of the estate, including the disputed portion.
Hence, the petitioner has come to the Court on appeal by certiorari.

ISSUE #1: Whether or not the CA is correct in holding that the respondent was either a co-owner or an
assignee with the right of possession over the disputed property.
ISSUE #2: Whether or not the complaint for ejectment filed by the petitioner is proper.

HELD #1: YES.

The CA properly ruled on the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of determining who between
them had the better right to possess the disputed property, considering that the parties are both
claiming ownership of the disputed property.

An ejectment case can be either for forcible entry or unlawful detainer. It is a summary proceeding
designed to provide expeditious means to protect the actual possession or the right to possession of
the property involved. The sole question for resolution in the case is the physical or material
possession (possession de facto) of the property in question, and neither a claim of juridical
possession (possession de jure) nor an averment of ownership by the defendant can outrightly deprive
the trial court from taking due cognizance of the case. Hence, even if the question of ownership is
raised in the pleadings, like here, the court may pass upon the issue but only to determine the question
of possession especially if the question of ownership is inseparably linked with the question of
possession. The adjudication of ownership in that instance is merely provisional, and will not bar or
prejudice an action between the same parties involving the title to the property.
HELD #2: NO.
Considering that the allegation of the petitioner’s tolerance of the respondent’s possession of the
disputed property was not established, the possession could very well be deemed illegal from the
beginning. In that case, her action for unlawful detainer has to fail. Even so, the Court would not be
justified to treat this ejectment suit as one for forcible entry because the complaint contained no
allegation that his entry in the property had been by force, intimidation, threats, strategy or stealth.

Regardless, the issue of possession between the parties will still remain. To finally resolve such issue,
they should review their options and decide on their proper recourses. In the meantime, it is wise for
the Court to leave the door open to them in that respect. For now, therefore, this recourse of the
petitioner has to be dismissed.
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure> Appeal
Overlap with
REMEDIAL LAW>Criminal Procedure>Information

FELINA ROSALDES, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
G.R. No. 173988, October 8, 2014
FIRST DIVISION

FACTS: Michael Ryan Gonzales, then a Grade 1 pupil, hurriedly entered his classroom and accidentally
bumped the knee of his teacher, petitioner Felina Rosaldes. Petitioner asked Michael Ryan to apologize
but when Michael did not obey she proceeded to his seat and pinched him on his thigh. Then, she held
him up by his armpits and pushed him to the floor. As he fell, Michael Ryan’s body hit a desk. As a result,
he lost consciousness. Petitioner proceeded to pick Michael Ryan up by his ears and repeatedly slammed
him down on the floor. RTC convicted Rosaldes with child abuse which was affirmed by CA.
In petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner submits that CA erred in convicting her by holding
that the constitutional right to due process and right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against her was not violated when the essential elements of the crime charged were not
properly recited in the information.
Countering, the State, through the OSG, insists that the issues raised are mainly factual and not
reviewable under the mode of appeal chosen; that the affirmance of her conviction by the CA was in accord
with the pertinent law and jurisprudence, and supported by the overwhelming evidence of the trial; and
that the information charging her with child abuse was sufficient in form and substance.

ISSUE 1: Whether or not factual issues are reviewable under petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE 2: Whether or not the information charging her with child abuse was insufficient in form and
substance, in that the essential elements of the crime charged were properly alleged therein.

HELD 1: Yes. But none of the exceptions applies in the case.

First, the State correctly contends that the petitioner could raise only questions of law in her
present recourse. Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the appeal is limited to questions of law.
It is true that the limitation of the review to errors of law admits of exceptions. Under Section 4,
Rule 3 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court, the following are the situations: (a) the conclusion is a
finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (b) the inference made is manifestly
mistaken; (c) there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(e) the findings of fact are conflicting; (f) the collegial appellate courts went beyond the issues of the case,
and their findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (g) the findings of fact of
the collegial appellate courts are contrary to those of the trial court; (h) said findings of fact are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (i) the facts set forth in the petition aswell as
in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; (j) the findings of fact of the
collegial appellate courts are premised on the supposed evidence, but are contradicted by the evidence
on record; and (k) all other similar and exceptional cases warranting a review of the lower courts’ findings
of fact. A further exception is CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties,
which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. None of the exceptions applies herein.

HELD 2: No.
Under Section 6, Rule 110, the information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the
designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party; the proximate date of the commission of the offense; and the
place where the offense was committed. In this cases, the information explicitly averred the offense of
child abuse charged against the petitioner. Moreover, the Court should no longer entertain the petitioner’s
challenge against the sufficiency of the information in form and substance. Her last chance to pose the
challenge was prior to the time she pleaded to the information through a motion to quash on the ground
that the information did not conform substantially to the prescribed form, or did not charge an offense. She
did not do so, resulting in her waiver of the challenge.
REMEDIAL LAW>Evidence

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
PABLITO ANDAYA y REANO, Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 183700, October 13, 2014
FIRST DIVISION

FACTS: SPO2 Delfin Alea testified that their asset who was conducting surveillance of Pablito Andaya in
Barangay San Jose Sico, Batangas City, arrived at their station. Said asset reported that he had arranged
to buy shabu from Pablito. A team and asset Bagsit was constituted to conduct a buy-bust. The asset
knocked on the door of Pablito's house. Pablito came out. Pablito and the asset talked briefly. The asset
gave Pablito the marked money. The asset received something from appellant. The pre-arranged signal
signifying consummation of the transaction was given. The team members approached Pablito and the
asset, introduced themselves as police officers and arrested accused.
Accused-appellant denied the charge. He stated that in the evening of December 2002 he was
at home watching TV with his family when police officers arrived. When he opened the door, a police
officer poked his gun at him. Pablito was handcuffed and brought outside. He refused to negotiate and
asked for a warrant. The policemen searched the house, turned over the beddings and uncovered their
furniture. No gun nor shabu was found. Pablito was brought to the police station and detained. After three
(3) days he was released. He received a subpoena from the Public Prosecutor afterwards.
The Regional Trial Court rendered its judgment convicting Andaya as charged, and meted him
the penalty of life imprisonment. The CA affirmed the conviction.
Hence, Andaya appeals, insisting that the search of his house and his person and his arrest by
the police officers violated his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures; and that
the Prosecution's nonpresentation of the confidential informant was adverse to the Prosecution, indicating
that his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Prosecution's nonpresentation of the confidential informant was adverse to the
Prosecution, indicating that his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

HELD: Yes.
In every criminal prosecution, it is the State, and no other, that bears the burden of proving the
illegal sale of the dangerous drug beyond reasonable doubt. This responsibility imposed on the State
accords with the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused, who has no duty to prove his innocence
until and unless the presumption of innocence in his favor has been overcome by sufficient and competent
evidence.
Here, the confidential informant was not a police officer. He was designated to be the poseur
buyer himself. It is notable that the members of the buy-bust team arrested Andaya on the basis of the
pre-arranged signal from the poseur buyer. The pre-arranged signal signified to the members of the buy-
bust team that the transaction had been consummated between the poseur buyer and Andaya. However,
the State did not present the confidential informant/poseur buyer during the trial to describe how exactly
the transaction between him and Andaya had taken place. There would have been no issue against that,
except that none of the members of the buy-bust team had directly witnessed the transaction, if any,
between Andaya and the poseur buyer due to their being positioned at a distance from the poseur buyer
and Andaya at the moment of the supposed transaction.
The record does not show what the prearranged signal consisted of. The reliance on the
supposed signal to establish the consummation of the transaction between the poseur buyer and Andaya
was unwarranted because the unmitigatedly hearsay character of the signal rendered it entirely bereft of
trustworthiness. The arresting members of the buy-bust team interpreted the signal from the anonymous
poseur buyer as the sign of the consummation of the transaction. Their interpretation, being necessarily
subjective without the testimony of the poseur buyer, unfairly threatened the liberty of Andaya. We should
not allow that threat to perpetuate itself. And, lastly, the reliance on the signal would deprive Andaya the
right to confront and test the credibility of the poseur buyer who supposedly gave it.
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure>Special Civil Action for Certiorari
Overlap With
REMEDIAL LAW>Criminal Procedure>Motion to Quash

GODOFREDO ENRILE AND DR. FREDERICK ENRILE, Petitioners,

vs.
HON. DANILO A. MANALASTAS, et al., Respondents.
G.R. No. 166414, October 22, 2014
FIRST DIVISION

FACTS: The mauling incident involving neighbors outside the house of the petitioners. Claiming
themselves to be the victims in that mauling, Josefina Guinto Morano, Rommel Morano and Perla Beltran
Morano charged the petitioners and one Alfredo Enrile in the MTC with frustrated homicide, and with less
serious physical injuries. MTC issued its joint resolution, whereby it found probable cause against the
petitioners for less serious physical injuries. The petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the joint
resolution, arguing that the complainants had not presented proof of their having been given medical
attention lasting 10 days or longer, thereby rendering their charges of less serious physical injuries
dismissible; and that the two cases for less serious physical injuries, being necessarily related to the case
of frustrated homicide still pending in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, should not be governed by
the Rules on Summary Procedure. The MTC denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration because
the grounds of the motion had already been discussed and passed upon in the resolution sought to be
reconsidered; and because the cases were governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure, which
prohibited the motion for reconsideration. Thereafter, the petitioners presented a manifestation with motion
to quash and a motion for the deferment of the arraignment. The MTC denied the motion to quash, and
ruled that the cases for less serious physical injuries were covered by the rules on ordinary procedure;
and reiterated the arraignment previously scheduled.
Unsatisfied, the petitioners commenced a special civil action for certiorari assailing the order
denying their motion to quash, and the order denying their motion for reconsideration. RTC Judge
Manalastas dismissed the petition for certiorari
The petitioners next went to the CA via a petition for certiorari and prohibition to nullify the orders
issued by the RTC, averring grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of the RTC. They urged the dismissal of the criminal cases on the same grounds they advanced in
the RTC. CA promulgated its assailed resolution dismissing the petition for .certiorari and prohibition for
being the wrong remedy, the proper remedy being an appeal; and ruling that they should have filed their
notice of appeal

ISSUE #1: Whether or not petition for certiorari and prohibition is proper in assailing the decision of RTC
dismissing an original action for certiorari.
ISSUE #2: Whether or not it is proper to invoke motion to quash the information filed in the MTC.

HELD #1: No. Considering that the certiorari case in the RTC was an original action, the dismissal of the
petition for certiorari, and the denial of the motion for reconsideration, were in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction. As such, the orders were final by reason of their completely disposing of the case, leaving
nothing more to be done by the RTC. The proper recourse for the petitioners should be an appeal by
notice of appeal, taken within 15 days from notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration.

Yet, the petitioners chose to assail the dismissal by the RTC through petitions for certiorari and prohibition
in the CA, instead of appealing by notice of appeal. Such choice was patently erroneous and
impermissible, because certiorari and prohibition, being extra ordinary reliefs to address jurisdictional
errors of a lower court, were not available to them. Worthy to stress is that the RTC dismissed the petition
for certiorari upon its finding that the MTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying the petitioners’
motion to quash. In its view, the RTC considered the denial of the motion to quash correct, for it would be
premature and unfounded for the MTC to dismiss the criminal cases against the petitioners upon the
supposed failure by the complainants to prove the period of their incapacity or of the medical attendance
for them. Indeed, the timeand the occasion to establish the duration of the incapacity or medical
attendance would only be at the trial on the merits.

HELD #2: No.

The motion to quash is the mode by which an accused, before entering his plea, challenges the complaint
or information for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects apparent on its face. Section 3,
Rule 117 of the Rules of Court enumerates the grounds for the quashal of the complaint or information,
as follows: (a) the facts charged do not constitute an offense; (b) the court trying the case has no
jurisdiction over the offense charged; (c) the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of
the accused; (d) the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so; (e) the complaint or
information does not conform substantially to the prescribed form; (f) more than one offense is charged
except when a single punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law; (g) the criminal action or liability
has been extinguished; (h) the complaint or information contains averments which, if true, would constitute
a legal excuse or justification; and (i) the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense
charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
Xxx

In the context of Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, the complaints sufficiently charged the
petitioners with less serious physical injuries. Indeed, the complaints only needed to aver the ultimate facts
constituting the offense, not the details of why and how the illegal acts allegedly amounted to undue injury
or damage, for such matters, being evidentiary, were appropriate for the trial. Hence, the complaints were
not quashable.
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure>Foreclosure of Mortgage

ROLANDO ROBLES, REPRESENTED BY ATTY. CLARA C. ESPIRITU, Petitioner,

vs.
FERNANDO FIDEL YAPCINCO, et al., Respondents
G.R. No. 169568, October 22, 2014
FIRST DIVISION

FACTS: The property in the name of Fernando F. Yapcinco was mortgaged to Jose C. Marcelo. Marcelo
transferred his rights as mortgagee to Apolinario Cruz. When Yapcinco did not pay, Apolinario Cruz brought an
action for judicial foreclosure. The CFI rendered its decision for the administratrix to pay Cruz; and in case of the
failure to pay after 90 days from the date of the decision, the property would be sold at a public auction.
Cruz was then issued the certificate of absolute sale and took possession of the property. However, he
did not register the certificate of sale; nor was a judicial confirmation of sale issued. The respondents, instituted
an action against Apolinario Bernabe and his co-vendees in the RTC for the annulment of TCT No. 243719,
document restoration, reconveyance and damages. They claimed that although the property had been
mortgaged, the mortgage had not been foreclosed, judicially or extra-judicially
RTC rendered its judgment declaring TCT No. 243719 and the deed of absolute sale null and void. TCT
No. 243719 was cancelled, and TCT No. 20458 in the name of Yapcinco was restored. The CA reversed the
judgment of the RTC, and holding that due to the nonregistration of the certificate of sale, the period of redemption
did not commence to run. It also held that Cruz never acquired title to the property. The CA denied his motion for
reconsideration, observing that there had been no order confirming the auction sale; hence, the respondents were
never divested of their rights and interest in the property.

ISSUE : Whether or not the non-registration of property after judicial foreclosure and sale had the effect of
invalidating the foreclosure proceedings, such that ownership reverts to the original owner.

HELD : No.
Failure of Cruz to register the certificate of sale was of no consequence in this adjudication. The
registration of the sale is required only in extrajudicial foreclosure sale because the date of the registration is the
reckoning point for the exercise of the right of redemption. In contrast, the registration of the sale is superfluous
in judicial foreclosure because only the equity of redemption is granted to the mortgagor, except in mortgages
with banking institutions. The equity of redemption is the right of the defendant mortgagor to extinguish the
mortgage and retain ownership of the property by paying the secured debt within the 90-day period after the
judgment becomes final, or even after the foreclosure sale but prior to the confirmation of the sale. In this light, it
was patent error for the CA to declare that: "By Apolinario Cruz’s failure to register the 18 March 1958 Certificate
of Absolute Salein the Office of the Register of Deeds, the period of redemption did not commence to run."
The records show that no judicial confirmation of the sale was made despite the lapse of more than 40
years since the date of the sale. Hence, it cannot be said that title was fully vested in Apolinario Cruz.
However, the Court will not be dispensing true and effective justice if it denies the petition for review on
the basis alone of the absence of the judicial confirmation of the sale. Although procedural rules are not to be
belittled or disregarded considering that they insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice, it is equally
true that litigation is not a game of technicalities. Law and jurisprudence grant to the courts the prerogative to
relax compliance with procedural rules of even the most mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile
both the need to speedily put an end to litigation and the parties’ right to an opportunity to be heard.38 The Rules
of Court itself calls for a liberal construction of its rules with the view of promoting their objective of securing a
just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.
To better serve the ends of justice, the Court holds that the real issue to consider and resolve is who
between the parties had the better right to the property, not whether there was a valid transfer of ownership to
Apolinario Cruz.
It was not denied that Yapcinco did not pay his obligation and that his default led to the filing of the action
for judicial foreclosure against him, which he actively participated in the proceedings and upon his death was
substituted by the administratrive of his estateDue to the subsequent failure of the estate of Yapcinco to exercise
the equity of redemption, the property was sold at the public sale, and Apolinario Cruz was declared the highest
bidder. Under the circumstances, the respondents as the successors-in-interest of Yapcinco were fully bound
by that decision and by the result of the ensuing foreclosure sale.
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure>Special Civil Actions>Jurisdictions>Judicial Notice>Special Civil
Actions>Forcible Entry>Unlawful Detainer>

PENTA PACIFIC REALTY CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. LEY CONSTRUCTION AND

DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondent. Penta Pacific Realty Corporation vs. Ley
Construction and Development Corporation.
G.R. No. 161589, November 24, 2014

FACTS: The petitioner owned the 25th floor of the Pacific Star Building located in Makati City with an area
of 1,068.67 square meters. The respondent leased 444.03 square meters of the premises (subject property)
through the petitioner’s authorized agent, Century Properties Management, Inc. Under the terms of the
contract of lease, the petitioner gave the respondent possession of the subject property under a stipulation
to the effect that in case of the respondent’s default in its monthly rentals, the petitioner could immediately
repossess the subject property. The respondent expressed the intention to purchase the entire 1,068.67
square meters, including the subject property. The parties executed a contract to sell, denominated as a
reservation agreement, in which they set the purchase price. The reservation agreement contained the
following cancellation or forfeiture provision, viz.: Any failure on [the respondent’s] part to pay the full down
payment, or deliver the postdated checks or pay the monthly amortization on the due date, shall entitle [the
petitioner], at its option, to impose a penalty interest at the rate of three percent (3%) per month on the
outstanding balance or to cancel this agreement without need of any court action and to forfeit, in its favor,
any reservation deposits or payments already made on the unit, without prior notice. The MeTC, ruling in
favor of the petitioner, found that the respondent’s lawful possession of the property had been by virtue of
the contract of lease, but had become unlawful when the respondent had failed to comply with its obligation
to pay the monthly rentals for the subject property; and that, in any event, the reservation agreement proved
that the petitioner had held the better right to possess the subject property as the owner thereof. The RTC
rendered its judgment nullifying the MeTC’s decision on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, holding that the
appropriate action was either accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria over which the MeTC had no
jurisdiction. It found that the basis of recovery of possession by the petitioner was the respondent’s failure
to pay the amortizations arising from the violations of the reservation agreement; that the complaint did not
specifically aver facts constitutive of unlawful detainer, i.e., it did not show how entry had been effected and
how the dispossession had started; and that the requirement of formal demand had not been complied with
by the petitioner. The CA affirmed the judgment of the RTC,declaring that the respondent’s possession was
not by virtue of the contract of lease but pursuant to the reservation agreement, which was more of “contract
of sale.” It concluded that the petitioner’s action was not unlawful detainer, but another kind of action for the
recovery of possession. Not in agreement with the decision of the CA, the petitioner filed the present
petition.

Issue(s):
1. Whether the complaint was for unlawful detainer, accion publiciana, or accion reivindicatoria.
2. What court has jurisdiction over this action.

Held: Unlawful Detainer

“In an action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer, the main issue is possession de facto, independently of
any claim of ownership or possession de jure that either party may set forth in his pleading.”
The plaintiff must prove that it was in prior physical possession of the premises until it was deprived thereof
by the defendant. The principal issue must be possession de facto, or actual possession, and ownership is
merely ancillary to such issue. The summary character of the proceedings is designed to quicken the
determination of possession de facto in the interest of preserving the peace of the community, but the
summary proceedings may not be proper to resolve ownership of the property. Consequently, any issue on
ownership arising in forcible entry or unlawful detainer is resolved only provisionally for the purpose of
determining the principal issue of possession. On the other hand, regardless of the actual condition of the
title to the property and whatever may be the character of the plaintiff’s prior possession, if it has in its favor
priority in time, it has the security that entitles it to remain on the property until it is lawfully ejected through
an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria by another having a better right. The MeTC correctly
exercised its authority in finding for the petitioner as the plaintiff. In unlawful detainer, the possession was
originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or termination of the right to possess; hence, the
issue of rightful possession is decisive for, in the action, the defendant is in actual possession and the
plaintiff’s cause of action is the termination of the defendant’s right to continue in possession.

The METc
The amendments have made the assessed value of the property whose possession or ownership is in
issue, or the assessed value of the adjacent lots if the disputed land is not declared for taxation purposes
determinative of jurisdiction. The allegation of the assessed value of the realty must be found in the
complaint, if the action (other than forcible entry or unlawful detainer) involves title to or possession of the
realty, including quieting of title of the realty. If the assessed value is not found in the complaint, the action
should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the trial court is not thereby afforded the means of
determining from the allegations of the basic pleading whether jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
action pertains to it or to another court. Courts cannot take judicial notice of the assessed or market value
of the realty. The settled rule is that the nature of the action as appearing from the averments in the
complaint or other initiatory pleading determines the jurisdiction of a court; hence, such averments and the
character of the relief sought are to be consulted. The court must interpret and apply the law on jurisdiction
in relation to the averments of ultimate facts in the complaint or other initiatory pleading regardless of
whether or not the plaintiff or petitioner is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.
The reliefs to which the plaintiff or petitioner is entitled based on the facts averred, although not the reliefs
demanded, determine the nature of the action. The defense contained in the answer of the defendant is
generally not determinant. The complaint must further allege the plaintiff’s compliance with the jurisdictional
requirement of demand as prescribed by Section 2, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, viz.: Section 2. Lessor
to proceed against lessee only after demand.—Unless otherwise stipulated, such action by the lessor shall
be commenced only after demand to pay or comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate is made
upon the lessee, or by serving written notice of such demand upon the person found on the premises, or
by posting such notice on the premises if no person be found thereon, and the lessee fails to comply
therewith after fifteen (15) days in the case of land or five (5) days in the case of buildings. For the action
to come under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC, therefore, the complaint must allege that: (a)
the defendant originally had lawful possession of the property, either by virtue of a contract or by tolerance
of the plaintiff; (b) the defendant’s possession of the property eventually became illegal or unlawful upon
notice by the plaintiff to the defendant of the expiration or the termination of the defendant’s right of
possession; (c) the defendant thereafter remained in possession of the property and thereby deprived the
plaintiff the enjoyment thereof; and (d) the plaintiff instituted the action within one year from the unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession.
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure>Special Civil Actions>Ejectment>Appeals
RUBEN MANALANG, CARLOS MANALANG, CONCEPCION GONZALES and LUIS MANALANG,
Petitioners
vs.
BIENVENIDO and MERCEDES BACANI, Respondents
G.R. No. 156995, January 12, 2015
(First Division)

FACTS: Petitioners were the co-owners of a lot adjacent to respondents’ lot. In 1997, relocation and
verification survey results showed that the respondents had encroached on petitioners’ lot to the extent of
405 square meters. DENR confirmed the result on the encroachment. When the respondents refused to
vacate the encroached portion and to surrender peaceful possession thereof despite demands, the
petitioners commenced this action for unlawful detainer on April 21, 1997 in the MTC of Guagua.
The MTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. RTC reversed the decision of MTC and remanded the
case for further proceedings and upon remand, the MTC ultimately dismissed the complaint and
counterclaim for lack of merit.
On further appeal, the RTC ordered the petitioners to conduct a relocation survey to determine their
allegation of encroachment and it subsequently reversed the MTC’s decision observing that the
respondents had encroached on the petitioners’ property based on the court-ordered relocation survey.
The CA declared such action by the RTC as unwarranted because it amounted to the reopening of the trial,
which was not allowed under Section 13(3) Rule 70 of the Rules of Court and that jurisdiction did not vest
in the MTC to try and decide the case.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in its decision that the action of RTC is unwarranted and that jurisdiction did
not vest in the MTC.
HELD: NO.
The RTC, in an appeal of the judgment in an ejectment case, shall not conduct a rehearing or trial de novo.
In this connection, Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court clearly provides: Sec. 18. Judgment conclusive
only on possession; not conclusive in actions involving title or ownership.—x x x. x x x x The judgment or
final order shall be appealable to the appropriate Regional Trial Court which shall decide the same on the
basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs
as may be submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trial Court. Hence, the RTC violated the
foregoing rule by ordering the conduct of the relocation and verification survey “in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction” and by hearing the testimony of the surveyor, for its doing so was tantamount to its holding of
a trial de novo. The violation was accented by the fact that the RTC ultimately decided the appeal based
on the survey and the surveyor’s testimony instead of the record of the proceedings had in the court of
origin.
The case should be dismissed without prejudice to the filing of a non-summary action like accion
reivindicatoria. The CA correctly held that a boundary dispute must be resolved in the context of accion
reivindicatoria, not an ejectment case. The boundary dispute is not about possession, but encroachment,
that is, whether the property claimed by the defendant formed part of the plaintiff’s property. A boundary
dispute cannot be settled summarily under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the proceedings under which are
limited to unlawful detainer and forcible entry. In unlawful detainer, the defendant unlawfully withholds the
possession of the premises upon the expiration or termination of his right to hold such possession under
any contract, express or implied. The defendant’s possession was lawful at the beginning, becoming
unlawful only because of the expiration or termination of his right of possession. In forcible entry, the
possession of the defendant is illegal from the very beginning, and the issue centers on which between the
plaintiff and the defendant had the prior possession de facto.
Remedial Law>Civil Procedure>Special Civil Action

FORTUNE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA) PROPER; COA REGIONAL OFFICE NO. VI-WESTERN VISAYAS;
AUDIT GROUP LGS-B, PROVINCE OF ANTIQUE; AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF
ANTIQUE, Respondents.
G.R. No. 213525 January 27, 2015
(En Banc)

FACTS: Respondent and the petitioner executed a memorandum subsequently submitting the
corresponding disbursement voucher to COA Antique for pre-audit. The latter office disallowed the payment
for lack of legal basis under Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code). Respondent LGU appealed
but its appeal was denied. Consequently, the petitioner filed its petition for money claim in the COA. On
November 15, 2012, the COA issued its decision denying the petition, holding that under Section 447 and
Section 458 of the Local Government Code only municipal or city governments are expressly vested with
the power to secure group insurance coverage for barangay workers; and noting the LGU’s failure to comply
with the requirement of publication under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9184 (Government Procurement
Reform Act).The petitioner received a copy of the COA decision on December 14, 2012, and filed its motion
for reconsideration on January 14, 2013. However, the COA denied the motion, the denial being received
by the petitioner on July 14, 2014. Hence, the petitioner filed the petition for certiorari on August 12, 2014,
but the petition for certiorari was dismissed as earlier stated through the resolution promulgated on August
19, 2014 for (a) the late filing of the petition; (b) the non-submission of the proof of service and verified
declaration; and (c) the failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents.

ISSUE#1: Whether or not the petitioner complied with the rule on proof of service
ISSUE#2: Whether the fresh period rule applies in petition for certiorari under Rule 64

HELD#1: No.
The petitioner obviously ignores that Section 13, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court concerns two types of proof
of service, namely: the affidavit and the registry receipt, viz: Section 13. Proof of Service. – x x x. If service
is made by registered mail, proof shall be made by such affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the
mailing office. The registry return card shall be filed immediately upon its receipt by the sender, or in lieu
thereof the unclaimed letter together with the certified or sworn copy of the notice given by the postmaster
to the addressee. Section 13 thus requires that if the service is done by registered mail, proof of service
shall consist of the affidavit of the person effecting the mailing and the registry receipt, both of which must
be appended to the paper being served. A compliance with the rule is mandatory, such that there is no
proof of service if either or both are not submitted.

Here, the petition for certiorari only carried the affidavit of service executed by one Marcelino T. Pascua,
Jr., who declared that he had served copies of the petition by registered mail "under Registry Receipt Nos.
70449, 70453, 70458,70498 and 70524 attached to the appropriate spaces found on pages 64-65 of the
petition." The petition only bore, however, the cut print-outs of what appeared to be the registry receipt
numbers of the registered matters, not the registry receipts themselves. The rule requires to be appended
the registry receipts, not their reproductions. Hence, the cut print-outs did not substantially comply with the
rule. This was the reason why the Court held in the resolution of August 19, 2014 that the petitioner did not
comply with the requirement of proof of service.

HELD#2: No.
As to the nature of the procedures, Rule 42 governs an appeal from the judgment or final order rendered
by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Such appeal is on a question of fact,
or of law, or of mixed question of fact and law, and is given due course only upon a prima facie showing
that the Regional Trial Court committed an error of fact or law warranting the reversal or modification of the
challenged judgment or final order. In contrast, the petition for certiorari under Rule 64 is similar to the
petition for certiorari under Rule 65, and assails a judgment or final order of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), or the Commission on Audit (COA). The petition is not designed to correct only errors of
jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. Questions of fact cannot be raised except to determine whether the
COMELEC or the COA were guilty of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The reglementary periods under Rule42 and Rule 64 are different. In the former, the aggrieved party is
allowed 15 days to file the petition for review from receipt of the assailed decision or final order, or from
receipt of the denial of a motion for new trial or reconsideration. In the latter, the petition is filed within 30
days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a motion
for new trial or reconsideration, if allowed under the procedural rules of the Commission concerned,
interrupts the period; hence, should the motion be denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within
the remaining period, which shall not be less than five days in any event, reckoned from the notice of denial.

The petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration on January 14, 2013, which was 31 days after receiving
the assailed decision of the COA on December 14, 2012. Pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 64, it had only five
days from receipt of the denial of its motion for reconsideration to file the petition. Considering that it
received the notice of the denial on July 14, 2014, it had only until July19, 2014 of agreement concerning
the life insurance coverage of qualified barangay secretaries, treasurers and tanod, the former
obligating P4,393,593.60for the premium payment, and to file the petition. However, it filed the petition on
August 13, 2014, which was 25 days too late.
Remedial Law>Jurisdiction

MANUEL JUSAYAN, ALFREDO JUSAYAN, AND MICHAEL JUSAYAN Petitioners,

vs.
JORGE SOMBILLA, Respondent.
G.R. No. 163928 January 21, 2015
(First Division)

FACTS: Wilson Jesena (Wilson) owned four parcels of land situated in New Lucena, Iloilo. On June 20,
1970, Wilson entered into an agreement with respondent Jorge Sombilla (Jorge), wherein Wilson
designated Jorge as his agent to supervise the tilling and farming of his riceland in crop year 1970-1971.
On August 20, 1971, before the expiration of the agreement, Wilson sold the four parcels of land to Timoteo
Jusayan (Timoteo). Jorge and Timoteo verbally agreed that Jorge would retain possession of the parcels
of land and would deliver 110 cavans of palay annually to Timoteo without need for accounting of the
cultivation expenses provided that Jorge would pay the irrigation fees. From 1971 to 1983, Timoteo and
Jorge followed the arrangement. In 1975, the parcels of land were transferred in the names of Timoteo’s
sons, namely; Manuel, Alfredo and Michael (petitioners). In 1984, Timoteo sent several letters to Jorge
terminating his administration and demanding the return of the possession of the parcels of land. Due to
the failure of Jorge to render accounting and to return the possession of the parcels of land despite
demands, Timoteo filed on June 30, 1986 a complaint for recovery of possession and accounting against
Jorge in the RTC (CAR Case No. 17117). Following Timoteo’s death, the petitioners substituted him as the
plaintiffs. In his answer, Jorge asserted that he enjoyed security of tenure as the agricultural lessee of
Timoteo; and that he could not be dispossessed of his landholding without valid cause. The RTC upheld
the contractual relationship of agency between Timoteo and Jorge. Jorge appealed to the CA. The CA
reversed the RTC and dismissed the case, declaring that the contractual relationship between the parties
was one of agricultural tenancy; and that the demand of Timoteo for the delivery of his share in the harvest
and the payment of irrigation fees constituted an agrarian dispute that was outside the jurisdiction of the
RTC, and well within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DAR).

ISSUE: Whether or not Regional Trial Court and Court of Agrarian Relations had jurisdiction over the herein
case.

HELD: The RTC still had jurisdiction over the dispute at the time the complaint was filed in the RTC on
June 30, 1986.
Although the CA has correctly categorized Jorge’s case as an agrarian dispute, it ruled that the RTC lacked
jurisdiction over the case based on Section 50 of Republic Act No. 6657, which vested in the Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR) the "primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters"
and the "exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform"
except disputes falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources.
The rule is settled that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of an action. In 1980, upon the passage of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (Judiciary
Reorganization Act), the Courts of Agrarian Relations were integrated into the Regional Trial Courts and
the jurisdiction of the Courts of Agrarian Relations was vested in the Regional Trial Courts. It was only on
August 29, 1987, when Executive Order No. 229 took effect, that the general jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Courts to try agrarian reform matters was transferred to the DAR. Therefore, the RTC still had
jurisdiction over the dispute at the time the complaint was filed in the RTC on June 30, 1986.
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure>Period

RE: COMPLAINT DATED JANUARY 28, 2014 OF WENEFREDO PARREÑO, ET AL., AGAINST HON.
CELIA C. LIBREA-LEAGOGO, HON. ELIHU A. YBAÑEZ AND HON. AMY C. LAZARO-JAVIER,
ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, RELATIVE TO CA G.R. SP NO. 108807
OCA IPI NO. 14-220-CA-J, March 17, 2015
(EN BANC)

FACTS: Complainants Wenefredo Parreño and Ronnie Cuevas, with Joseph Denamarca, filed a protest
in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources of the National Capital Region (DENR-NCR)
against the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 14391 and TCT No. 14188 in favor of Susan
Enriquez and Alma Rodriguez covering two lots inside the Signal Village, Taguig. The DENR-NCR
dismissed the protest, but the dismissal was subsequently reversed by the DENR. Aggrieved, Enriquez
and Rodriguez appealed to the Office of the President (OP), which denied their appeal. With their motion
for reconsideration having been similarly denied, Enriquez and Rodriguez appealed to the CA by petition
for review, and it is such appeal from which this administrative complaint arose.
It appears that on June 26, 2012, the Special Sixteenth (16th) Division of the CA issued its resolution
submitting C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 for decision. However, the complainants lament that from the
issuance of the resolution until the filing of their complaint on February 8, 2014, the respondents, who
comprised the Special 16th Division of the CA, had not rendered the decision, which the complainants insist
was in patent violation of the mandatory period within which the respondents should decide under Section
15(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents are liable for undue delay in deciding C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807
on the ground that it was in violation of the mandatory period within which to decide?

HELD: NO.
Although C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 was submitted for decision by the Special 16th Division on June 26,
2012 after the parties did not file their memoranda, it was the 13th Division of the CA (composed of Justice
Ybañez as the ponente, Justice Japar B. Dimaampao as the Chairman, and Justice Melchor Quirino C.
Sadang) that promulgated the decision on February 28, 2014, or nearly 20 months later. Accordingly, the
Court answers the query in the negative, for, pursuant to Section 1, Rule VI of the 2009 IRCA, the
adjudication of cases was the responsibility of the assigned Justice and the Members of the Division to
which he or she then belonged. Determining who should be administratively accountable must consider the
specific role each of the respondents played leading to the resolution of C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807. Under
the applicable rule of the 2009 IRCA, the liability for undue delay in resolving C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807
might devolve only on the Members of the 13thDivision who actually promulgated the decision.

Justice Ybañez, as the ponente for C.A. G.R. SP No. 108807, carried the case with him when he was
transferred to the 13th Division. But whether or not he was administratively liable for the delay of eight
months should depend on the relevant circumstances. The delay in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 could not
be said to have been incurred by Justice Ybañez with malice or deliberate attempt to impede the
dispensation of justice. He assigned C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 to a member of his legal staff, but the latter
had fallen seriously ill in the meantime, forcing him to hire a contractual-lawyer for the purpose. The latter
subsequently joined another agency of the Government on a permanent basis. Thus, Justice Ybañez could
promulgate the decision only on February 28, 2014. His explanation for the delay, being entirely plausible,
is accepted.
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure>Dismissal of Appeal

JOSE “PEPE” SANICO, Petitioner

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND JENNIFER SON-TENIO, Respondent.
G.R. No. 198753, March 25, 2015
FIRST DIVISION

FACTS: The petitioner and Marsito Batiquin were criminally charged of violating Section 103 of Republic
Act No. 7942 otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 for trespassing and theft of minerals.
However, the accused were declared not guilty for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Consequently, Sanico’s counsel filed a notice of appeal in the MCTC. Then, RTC ordered
Sanico to file his memorandum on appeal. Sanico did not comply; hence, the RTC dismissed the appeal
on the ground of failure to file a memorandum on appeal with prejudice. Atty. Cañete, another lawyer acting
for Sanico, filed a Motion for reconsideration on the dismissal of the appeal, stating that Sanico had not
filed the memorandum because he had been beset with problems due to his wife’s debilitating illness, as
well as his first counsel, Atty. Baring’s own medical condition which caused her to forget how she got this
case and whom to contact as principal counsel hereof. RTC denied the MR. CA Affirmed.
In the meantime, respondent filed an Ex Parte Motion for Entry of Judgment, which the RTC authorized the
issuance. Sanico filed an omnibus motion to recall the order and to quash the entry of judgment, but the
RTC denied. The entry of judgment was issued; the writ of execution; and that execution sales covering
several personal properties of the petitioner were made, and the certificates of sale were issued in favor of
Tenio.

ISSUE: Whether CA committed reversible error in not nullifying the RTC’s order dismissing the appeal for
failure to file a memorandum

HELD: YES
Both RTC and CA were guilty of the prejudicial error of misapplying the Rules of Court in its dismissal of
the appeal timely made by the petitioner. In dismissing the appeal for the sole reason that he did not file
the memorandum on appeal, the RTC wrongly relied on Section 7, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court, which
authorizes the dismissal of the appeal once the appellant fails to file the memorandum on appeal. While,
CA erroneously upheld the RTC.

The failure to file the memorandum on appeal is a ground for the RTC to dismiss the appeal ONLY in civil
cases. The same rule does not apply in criminal cases, because Section 9(c) Rule 122, imposes on the
RTC the duty to decide the appeal “on the basis of the entire record of the case and of such memoranda
or briefs as may have been filed” upon the submission of the appellate memoranda or briefs, or upon the
expiration of the period to file the same. Hence, the dismissal of the petitioner’s appeal cannot be properly
premised on the failure to file the memorandum on appeal. Having timely perfected his appeal by filing the
notice of appeal in the MCTC, the petitioner was entitled to expect that the RTC would resolve his appeal
in due course, whether he filed his memorandum on appeal or not. The unwarranted dismissal of the appeal
by the RTC was, therefore, an outright denial of due process to him in a manner that occasioned severe
prejudice because his conviction was not reviewed despite his first-time appeal being a matter of right, and
because his conviction was then declared to have attained finality, causing the execution of the decision as
to its civil aspect.
REMEDIAL LAW> RES JUDICATA

HEIRS OF MARCELO SOTTO, REPRESENTED BY: LOLIBETH SOTTO NOBLE, DANILO C.

SOTTO, CRISTINA C. SOTTO, EMMANUEL C. SOTTO, and FILEMON C. SOTTO; and
SALVACION BARCELONA, AS HEIR OF DECEASED MIGUEL BARCELONA, Petitioners,
vs.
MATILDE S. PALICTE, Respondent.
G.R. No. 159691, June 13, 2013
(First Division)

FACTS: Filemon Sotto had four children, namely: Marcelo Sotto (Marcelo), Pascuala Sotto-Pahang
(Pascuala), Miguel Barcelona (Miguel), and Matilde. Marcelo was the administrator of the Estate of
Sotto. Marcelo and Miguel were the predecessors-in-interest of petitioners. In June 1967, Pilar Teves
(Pilar) and other heirs of Carmen Rallos (Carmen), the deceased wife of Filemon, filed in the Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Cebu City a complaint against the Estate of Sotto (Civil Case No. R-10027)
seeking to recover certain properties that Filemon had inherited from Carmen, and damages.
The CFI rendered judgment awarding to Pilar and other heirs of Carmen damages of P233,963.65,
among other reliefs. To satisfy the monetary part of the judgment, levy on execution was effected
against six parcels of land and two residential houses belonging to the Estate of Sotto. The levied
assets were sold at a public auction. Later on, Matilde redeemed four of the parcels of land in her own
name (i.e., Lots No. 1049, No. 1051, No. 1052 and No. 2179-C), while her sister Pascuala redeemed
one of the two houses because her family was residing there. On July 9, 1980, the Deputy Provincial
Sheriff of Cebu executed a deed of redemption in favor of Matilde, which the Clerk of Court approved.
On July 24, 1980, Matilde filed in Civil Case No. R-10027 a motion to transfer to her name the title to
the four properties. However, the CFI denied her motion, and instead declared the deed of redemption
issued in her favor null and void, holding that Matilde, although declared in Special Proceedings No.
2706-R as one of the heirs of Filemon, did not qualify as a successor-in-interest with the right to
redeem the four properties. Matilde directly appealed the adverse ruling to the Court via petition for
review, and on September 21, 1987, the Court, reversing the CFI’s ruling, granted Matilde’s petition
for review but allowed her co-heirs the opportunity to join Matilde as co-redemptioners for a period of
six months before the probate court (i.e., RTC of Cebu City, Branch 16) would grant her motion to
transfer the title to her name.
On September 10, 1999, the heirs of Marcelo (herein petitioners), instituted the present action for
partition against Matilde in the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 20 (Civil Case No. CEB24293). 2 Alleging in
their complaint that despite the redemption of the four properties having been made in the sole name
of Matilde, the four properties still rightfully belonged to the Estate of Sotto for having furnished the
funds used to redeem the properties, they prayed that the RTC declare the four properties as the
assets of the Estate of Sotto, and that the RTC direct their partition among the heirs of Filemon.

Issue: Whether or not res judicata is applicable in the case at bar.

Held: Yes.
All these judgments and order upholding Matilde’s exclusive ownership of the subject properties
became final and executory except the action for partition which is still pending in this Court. The
judgments were on the merits and rendered by courts having jurisdiction over the subject matter and
the parties. There is substantial identity of parties considering that the present case and the previous
cases involve the heirs of Filemon.

There is identity of parties not only when the parties in the case are the same, but also between those
in privity with them, such as between their successors-in-interest. Absolute identity of parties is not
required, and where a shared identity of interest is shown by the identity of relief sought by one person
in a prior case and the second person in a subsequent case, such was deemed sufficient. There is
identity of causes of action since the issues raised in all the cases essentially involve the claim of
ownership over the subject properties. Even if the forms or natures of the actions are different, there
is still identity of causes of action when the same facts or evidence support and establish the causes
of action in the case at bar and in the previous cases.

Res judicata exists when as between the action sought to be dismissed and the other action these
elements are present, namely; (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) the former judgment must
have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties; (3) the former
judgment must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be between the first and subsequent
actions (i) identity of parties or at least such as representing the same interest in both actions; (ii)
identity of subject matter, or of the rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the
same facts; and, (iii) identity of causes of action in both actions such that any judgment that may be
rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the
action under consideration.

The first three elements were present. The decision of the Court in G.R. No. 55076 (the first case), the
decision of the Court in G.R. No. 131722 (the second case), the order dated October 5, 1989 of the
RTC in Civil Case No. R-10027 as upheld by the Court in G.R. No. 154585 (the third case), and the
decision in G.R. No. 158642 (the fourth case) – all of which dealt with Matilde’s right to the four
properties – had upheld Matilde’s right to the four properties and had all become final. Such rulings
were rendered in the exercise of the respective courts’ jurisdiction over the subject matter, and were
adjudications on the merits of the cases.
REMEDIAL LAW> Foreclose of mortgage

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
GUARIÑA AGRICULTURAL AND REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
G.R. No. 160758, January 15, 2014
(First Division)

Facts: In July 1976, Guariña Corporation applied for a loan from DBP to finance the development of
its resort complex, in the amount of P3,387,000.00. Guariña Corporation executed a promissory note
that would be due on November 3, 1988. Guariña Corporation executed a real estate mortgage over
several real properties in favor of DBP as security for the repayment of the loan and executed a chattel
mortgage over the personal properties existing at the resort complex and those yet to be acquired out
of the proceeds of the loan, also to secure the performance of the obligation. The loan was released
in several instalments, and Guariña Corporation used the proceeds to defray the cost of additional
improvements in the resort complex. In all, the amount released totalled P3,003,617.49, from which
DBP withheld P148,102.98 as interest.

Guariña Corporation demanded the release of the balance of the loan, but DBP refused. Instead, DBP
directly paid some suppliers of Guariña Corporation over the latter's objection. DBP found upon
inspection of the resort project, its developments and improvements that Guariña Corporation had not
completed the construction works. DBP thus demanded that Guariña Corporation expedite the
completion of the project, and warned that it would initiate foreclosure proceedings should Guariña
Corporation not do so.
Unsatisfied with the non-action and objection of Guariña Corporation, DBP initiated extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings. A notice of foreclosure sale was sent to Guariña Corporation. Guariña
Corporation sued DBP in the RTC to demand specific performance of the latter's obligations under the
loan agreement, and to stop the foreclosure of the mortgages. However, DBP moved for the dismissal
of the complaint, stating that the mortgaged properties had already been sold to satisfy the obligation
of Guariña Corporation at a public auction. Due to this, Guariña Corporation amended the complaint
on February 6, 1979 to seek the nullification of the foreclosure proceedings and the cancellation of the
certificate of sale. In the meantime, DBP applied for the issuance of a writ of possession by the RTC.

Issue: Whether the action of DBP to foreclose the mortgage proper.

Held: NO.
The Court held that the foreclosure of a mortgage prior to the mortgagor’s default on the principal
obligation is premature, and should be undone for being void and ineffectual. The mortgagee who has
been meanwhile given possession of the mortgaged property by virtue of a writ of possession issued
to it as the purchaser at the foreclosure sale may be required to restore the possession of the property
to the mortgagor and to pay reasonable rent for the use of the property during the intervening period.

The appellant did not release the total amount of the approved loan. Appellant therefore could not
have made a demand for payment of the loan since it had yet to fulfil its own obligation. Moreover, the
fact that appellee was not yet in default rendered the foreclosure proceedings premature and improper.

By its failure to release the proceeds of the loan in their entirety, DBP had no right yet to exact on
Guariña Corporation the latter’s compliance with its own obligation under the loan. Indeed, if a party
in a reciprocal contract like a loan does not perform its obligation, the other party cannot be obliged to
perform what is expected of it while the other’s obligation remains unfulfilled. In other words, the latter
party does not incur delay.
REMEDIAL LAW>Annulment of Judgment

PINAUSUKAN SEAFOOD HOUSE, ROXAS BOULEY ARD, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
FAR EAST BANK & TRUST COMPANY, NOW BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS AND HECTOR I.
GALURA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 159926, January 20, 2014
FIRST DIVISION

Facts: On various dates in 1993, Bonier de Guzman (Bonier), then the President of petitioner corporation
(Pinausukan), executed four real estate mortgages involving the petitioner’s parcel of land situated in Pasay
City in favor of Far East Bank and Trust Company (now Bank of Philippine Islands). The parcel of land was
registered in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 126636 of the Register of Deeds of Pasay City under the name
of Pinausukan. When the unpaid obligation secured by the mortgages had ballooned to P15,129,303.67,
the Bank commenced proceedings for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgages.

Learning of the impending sale of its property by reason of the foreclosure of the mortgages, Pinausukan,
brought against the Bank and the sheriff an action for the annulment of real estate mortgages in the RTC,
averring that Bonier had obtained the loans only in his personal capacity and had constituted the mortgages
on the corporate asset without Pinausukan’s consent through a board resolution. The counsels of the
parties did not appear in court on the hearing scheduled despite having agreed thereto. Accordingly, the
RTC the case for failure to prosecute. The order of dismissal attained finality.

On June 24, 2003, the sheriff issued a notice of extrajudicial sale concerning the property of Pinausukan.
The notice was received by Pinausukan a week later. Claiming surprise over the turn of events, Pinausukan
inquired from the RTC and learned that Atty. Michael Dale Villaflor, its counsel of record, had not informed
it about the order of dismissal issued on October 31, 2002. Pinausukan brought the petition for annulment
in the CA seeking the nullification of the order of dismissal. Its petition, stating that its counsel had been
guilty of gross and palpable negligence in failing to keep track of the case he was handling, and in failing
to apprise Pinausukan of the developments on the case

The CA dismissed the petition for annulment, citing the failure to attach the affidavits of witnesses attesting
to and describing the alleged extrinsic fraud supporting the cause of action as required by Section 4, Rule
47 of the Rules of Court; and observing that the verified petition related only to the correctness of its
allegations, a requirement entirely different and separate from the affidavits of witnesses required under
Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition for annulment.

HELD: No.
The objective of the remedy of annulment of judgment or final order is to undo or set aside the judgment or
final order, and thereby grant to the petitioner an opportunity to prosecute his cause or to ventilate his
defense. If the ground relied upon is lack of jurisdiction, the entire proceedings are set aside without
prejudice to the original action being refiled in the proper court.28 If the judgment or final order or resolution
is set aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud, the CA may on motion order the trial court to try the case as if
a timely motion for new trial had been granted therein.29 The remedy is by no means an appeal whereby
the correctness of the assailed judgment or final order is in issue; hence, the CA is not called upon to
address each error allegedly committed by the trial court.30

Given the extraordinary nature and the objective of the remedy of annulment of judgment or final order,
Pinausukan must be mindful of and should closely comply with the following statutory requirements for the
remedy as set forth in Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.

The first requirement prescribes that the remedy is available only when the petitioner can no longer resort
to the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies through no
fault of the petitioner. The second requirement limits the ground for the action of annulment of judgment to
either extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction. The third requirement sets the time for the filing of the action.
The action, if based on extrinsic fraud, must be filed within four years from the discovery of the extrinsic
fraud; and if based on lack of jurisdiction, must be brought before it is barred by laches or estoppel. The
fourth requirement demands that the petition should be verified, and should allege with particularity the
facts and the law relied upon for annulment, as well as those supporting the petitioner’s good and
substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be.

Pinausukan’s failure to include the affidavits of witnesses was fatal to its petition for annulment. Worthy to
reiterate is that the objective of the requirements of verification and submission of the affidavits of witnesses
is to bring all the relevant facts that will enable the CA to immediately determine whether or not the petition
has substantial merit. In that regard, however, the requirements are separate from each other, for only by
the affidavits of the witnesses who had competence about the circumstances constituting the extrinsic fraud
can the petitioner detail the extrinsic fraud being relied upon as the ground for its petition for annulment.

This is because extrinsic fraud cannot be presumed from the recitals alone of the pleading but needs to be
particularized as to the facts constitutive of it. The distinction between the verification and the affidavits is
made more pronounced when an issue is based on facts not appearing of record. In that instance, the issue
may be heard on affidavits or depositions presented by the respective parties, subject to the court directing
that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions.53

The substantive defect related to the supposed neglect of Atty. Villaflor to keep track of the case, and to his
failure to apprise Pinausukan of the developments in the case, which the CA did not accept as constituting
extrinsic fraud. What is certain, for purposes of the application of Rule 47, is that mistake and gross
negligence cannot be equated to the extrinsic fraud that Rule 47 requires to be the ground for an annulment
of judgment. By its very nature, extrinsic fraud relates to a cause that is collateral in character, i.e., it relates
to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in litigation which is committed outside of the trial of the case,
where the defeated party has been prevented from presenting fully his side of the cause, by fraud or
deception practiced on him by his opponent. Even in the presence of fraud, annulment will not lie unless
the fraud is committed by the adverse party, not by one’s own lawyer. In the latter case, the remedy of the
client is to proceed against his own lawyer and not to re-litigate the case where judgment had been
rendered.
REMEDIAL LAW>Criminal Procedure>Prosecution of Offenses>Civil Liability

DR. FERNANDO P. SOLIDUM, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent

G.R. No. 192123, March 10, 2014.

FACTS: (Gerald) was born with an imperforate anus. Two days after his birth, Gerald underwent colostomy,
a surgical procedure to bring one end of the large intestine out through the abdominal wall, enabling him to
excrete through a colostomy bag attached to the side of his body. Gerald, then three years old, was admitted
at the Ospital ng Maynila for a pull-through operation. Gerald experienced bradycardiaand went into a
comaHis coma lasted for two weeks, but he regained consciousness only after a month. He could no longer
see, hear or move. Agitated by her son’s helpless and unexpected condition, Mrs. Gercayo lodged a
complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries with the City Prosecutor’s Office of
Manila against the attending physicians.Upon a finding of probable cause, the City Prosecutor’s Office filed
an information solely against Dr. Solidum. The RTC rendered its judgment finding Dr. Solidum guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries. CA has also affirmed the
lower court’s decision.

ISSUE: Whether the award of moral damages and exemplary damages is not justified, since there is no
negligence on the part of the petitioner.

HELD: YES
In criminal prosecutions, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability that is deemed instituted with the
criminal action refers only to that arising from the offense charged. It is puzzling, therefore, how the RTC
and the CA could have adjudged Ospital ng Maynila jointly and severally liable with Dr. Solidum for the
damages despite the obvious fact that Ospital ng Maynila, being an artificial entity, had not been charged
along with Dr. Solidum. The lower courts thereby acted capriciously and whimsically, which rendered their
judgment against Ospital ng Maynila void as the product of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. Ospital ng Maynila could be held civilly liable only when subsidiary liability would be properly
enforceable pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. But the subsidiary liability seems far-fetched
here. The conditions for subsidiary liability to attach to Ospital ng Maynila should first be complied with.
Firstly, pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, Ospital ng Maynila must be shown to be a
corporation “engaged in any kind of industry.” The term industry means any department or branch of art,
occupation or business, especially one that employs labor and capital, and is engaged in industry. However,
Ospital ng Maynila, being a public hospital, was not engaged in industry conducted for profit but purely in
charitable and humanitarian work. Secondly, assuming that Ospital ng Maynila was engaged in industry for
profit, Dr. Solidum must be shown to be an employee of Ospital ng Maynila acting in the discharge of his
duties during the operation on Gerald. Yet, he definitely was not such employee but a consultant of the
hospital. And, thirdly, assuming that civil liability was adjudged against Dr. Solidum as an employee (which
did not happen here), the execution against him was unsatisfied due to his being insolvent.
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure>Special Civil Actions> Indirect Contempt

Re: VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DISBARMENT OF AMA LAND, INC. (REPRESENTED BY JOSEPH
B. USITA) AGAINST COURT OF APPEALS ASSOCIATE JUSTICES HON. DANTON Q. BUESER, HON.
SESINANDO E. VILLON AND HON. RICARDO R. ROSARIO. Re: Verified Complaint for Disbarsement
of AMA Land, Inc. (represented by Joseph B. Usita) Against Court of Appeals Associate Justices
Hon. Danton Q. Bueser, Hon. Sesinando E. Villon and Hon. Ricardo R. Rosario,
OCA I.P.I. No. 12-204-CA-J March 11, 2014

FACTS: WWRAI filed in Civil Case No. 65668 an urgent motion to set for hearing its prayer for a TRO
and/or writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) contained in its answer. The denial of the prayer for injunction by
the RTC impelled Wack Wack Residents Associations Inc. (WWRAI) to bring a petition for certiorari with
an application for a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction in the CA to enjoin the RTC from proceeding
in Civil Case No. 65668. After hearing, the CA issued a TRO, which prompted AMALI to file an Urgent
Motion to Lift and/or Dissolve Temporary Restraining Order and later on a Compliance and Motion for
Reconsideration, the CA issued a preliminary injunction and required AMALI to file its Comment. AMALI
complied and filed a Comment which also served as its motion for partial reconsideration of the Resolution.
AMALI filed an Urgent Motion to Resolve and to Approve Counter bond. Allegedly, these motions were left
unresolved when the CA Tenth Division, which included Associate Justices Bueser and Rosario, required
the parties to submit their respective memoranda. The Special Former Tenth Division of the CA
promulgated a decision granting the petition of WWRAI. AMALI consequently filed a petition for review on
certiorari in this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 202342, entitled AMA Land, Inc. v. Wack Wack Residents
Association, Inc. AMALI then brought this administrative complaint, alleging that respondent Justices had
conspired with the counsels of WWRAI, namely: Atty. Archibald F. de Mata and Atty. Myra Jennifer D. Jaud-
Fetizanan, in rendering an unjust judgment. AMALI stated that the decision of the CA had been rendered
in bad faith and with conscious and deliberate intent to favor WWRAI, and to cause grave injustice to AMALI.

ISSUE: Are the respondent Justices liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment and violating Canon
1, Rule 1.01; Canon 1, Rules 10.01 and 10.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court?

HELD:No
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving the allegations of the complaint
by substantial evidence. Failure to do so will lead to the dismissal of the complaint for its lack of merit. This
is because an administrative charge against any official of the Judiciary must be supported by at least
substantial evidence. But when the charge equates to a criminal offense, such that the judicial officer may
suffer the heavy sanctions of dismissal from the service, the showing of culpability on the part of the judicial
officer should be nothing short of proof beyond reasonable doubt, especially because the charge is penal
in character. The filing of the meritless administrative complaints by AMALI was not only repulsive, but also
an outright disrespect of the authority of the CA and of this Court. Unfounded administrative charges against
judges truly degrade the judicial office, and interfere with the due performance of their work for the Judiciary.
Although the Court did not then deem fit to hold in the first administrative case AMALI or its representative
personally responsible for the unfounded charges brought against respondent Justices, it is now time,
proper and imperative to do so in order to uphold the dignity and reputation of respondent Justices, of the
CA itself, and of the rest of the Judiciary. AMALI and its representatives have thereby demonstrated their
penchant for harassment of the judges who did not do its bidding, and they have not stopped doing so even
if the latter were sitting judges. To tolerate the actuations of AMALI and its representatives would be to
reward them with undeserved impunity for an obviously wrong attitude towards the Court and its judicial
officers. The filing of unfounded and baseless administrative charges against sitting judicial officers may
constitute indirect contempt under Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.
Jeff
Pascual vs. Daquioag, 720 SCRA 230, March 31, 2014
People vs. Mendoza, 727 SCRA 113, June 23, 2014
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure> Section 2, Rule 42

JUANITO MAGSINO, Petitioner,

vs.
ELENA DE OCAMPO and RAMON GUICO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 166944, August 18, 2014
(First division)

FACTS: The petitioner filed against the respondents a complaint for forcible entry with prayer for
preliminary mandatory injunction and/or temporary restraining order in the Metropolitan Trial Court in
Antipolo City alleging that he was the owner in fee simple of a parcel of agricultural land situated in Sapinit,
San Juan, Antipolo City; that the respondents, through force, intimidation, threats and strategy and with the
aid of armed men, had unlawfully bulldozed the eastern and northern portions of his land, cutting lengthwise
through the land, destroying ornamental plants and fruit-bearing trees that he had himself planted several
years before, thereby illegally depriving him of the possession of the land.

The petitioner filed a motion for preliminary mandatory injunction but the Municipal Trial Court in Taytay,
Rizal (MTC) issued only a writ of preliminary injunction. Respondent Elena De Ocampo countered that she
had held a registered title in the land by virtue of the original certificate of title issued to her mother, Cecilia
De Ocampo; and that the petitioner was a squatter on the land with no possessory rights.

The MTC rendered its judgment in favor of the respondents. Dissatisfied, the petitioner appealed to the CA
by petition for review. However, the CA promulgated its first assailed resolution dismissing the petition for
review as the petition is not accompanied by copies of the pleadings and other material portions as would
support the allegations of the petition. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition for review on the ground that the petitioner
did not comply with Section 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.

HELD: NO.
The Court recognized three guideposts for the CA to consider in determining whether or not the rules of
procedures should be relaxed, as follows: First, not all pleadings and parts of case records are required to
be attached to the petition. Only those which are relevant and pertinent must accompany it. Second, even
if a document is relevant and pertinent to the petition, it need not be appended if it is shown that the contents
thereof can also (sic) found in another document already attached to the petition. Third, a petition lacking
an essential pleading or part of the case record may still be given due course or reinstated (if earlier
dismissed) upon showing that petitioner later submitted the documents required, or that it will serve the
higher interest of justice that the case be decided on the merits.

The guideposts, which equally apply to a petition for review filed in the CA under Rule 42, reflect that the
significant determinant of the sufficiency of the attached documents is whether the accompanying
documents support the allegations of the petition.

Under the first guidepost recognized in Galvez, only the relevant pleadings and parts of the case records
needed to be attached to the petition for review. Hence, not every pleading or document filed or submitted
in the lower courts had to be attached to the petition. The test of relevancy is whether the document in
question would support the material allegations of the petition. Accordingly, we turn to what were omitted
by the petitioner.

The first omitted document was the complaint in Civil Case No. 4141. Being the initiatory pleading, the
complaint included all the material facts and dates necessary to support the petitioner’s cause of action for
forcible entry, specifically: (1) his prior physical possession of the property; (2) his being deprived of the
physical possession either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth; and (3) his filing of the action
within one year from the time he or his representative learned of the deprivation of physical possession of
the land or building.
The next omitted pleading was the answer of the respondents. As with the complaint, the answer was
relevant in the appeal in the CA, for the respondents as the defendants had set forth their defenses therein.

The third omitted document was the motion to dismiss. Although the motion to dismiss would appear to be
less relevant in view of the filing of the answer by the respondents, the CA could have had good reasons
for noting its omission as a ground to dismiss the petition for review.

The memoranda on appeal the parties respectively filed in the RTC were the fourth kind of omitted
documents. In respect of the petitioner, his memorandum, which was due to be filed within 15 days from
the filing of his notice of appeal as required by Section 7, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court, would have specified
and supported the errors he imputed to the MTC. Such filing in the RTC could not be dispensed with, for
the RTC would consider only the errors specifically assigned and argued in his memorandum, except errors
affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter as well as plain and clerical errors. If the memorandum was
not filed, the appeal could be dismissed. Unless his memorandum was part of his petition for review,
therefore, the CA would likely find his appeal frivolous, or even consider it dismissible pursuant to Section
3, Rule 42. Based on the foregoing considerations, the petitioner entirely bypassed the first guidepost
recognized in Galvez.

The second guidepost – which stipulates that a document, although relevant to the petition for review, need
not be appended if it is shown that its contents could be found in or could be drawn from another document
already attached to the petition – refers to a process whereby the CA derives the contents of the omitted
relevant document from another attached to the petition for review filed in the CA.

The petitioner posited in his motion for reconsideration that the copy of the MTC decision was a sufficient
basis to resolve the issues he was raising in his petition for review. Even with the copy of the MTC judgment
being actually attached to the petition for review, however, the second guidepost could not be complied
with because the copy was hopelessly illegible. Moreover, the MTC judgment did not contain the statement
of the issues relied upon by the petitioner in his appeal in the CA, for such statement was made only in his
memorandum on appeal.

The mere fact that a petition for review is filed does not call for the elevation of the record, which means
that until this Court finds that the elevation of the record is necessary, such record should remain with the
trial court during the pendency of the appeal in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 39, let alone the fact that
in ejectment cases the decision of the RTC is immediately executory pursuant to Section 21 of the Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure. Thus, more often than not, this Court has resolved petitions for review under
Rule 42 without unnecessary movement of the original record of the case which could entail not only undue
delay but also the possibility of the record being lost in transit.
REMEDIAL LAW>Evidence>Parol Evidence Rule
Overlap with
CIVIL LAW>Damages>Moral Damages

BPI EXPRESS CARD CORPORATION, Petitioner

vs.
MA. ANTONIA R. ARMOVIT, Respondent
G.R. No. 163654, October 08, 2014
(FIRST DIVISION)

FACTS: Ma. Antonia R. Armovit (Armovit) received a pre-approved credit card from BPI. When she used
it to treat her British friends in a restaurant in Pasig City, it was not honored because BPI cancelled her
credit card. When Armovit called BPI to verify the status of her card, she was informed by the latter that
credit card had been summarily cancelled for failure to pay her outstanding obligations. Because of the
shame, embarrassment and humiliation she had suffered, Armovit demanded compensation from BPI.
However, the said bank countered the demand of Armovit for monetary consideration and said, among
others, that although she settled her obligation, she still failed to submit the required application form in
order to reactivate her credit card privileges. As a result, Armovit filed a suit against BPI Express Card
Corporation for damages, which the lower and appellate courts ruled in her favor. Hence, BPI filed this
petition contending that it was not grossly negligent in refusing to lift the suspension of Armovit's credit card
privileges inasmuch as she had not complied with the requisite submission of a new application form; and
that under the circumstances its negligence, if any, was not so gross as to amount to malice or bad faith

ISSUE: Whether or not BPI is grossly negligent for not lifting the suspension of the credit card of Armovit
after the payment of the obligation of and by the latter.

HELD: Yes.
The relationship between the credit card issuer and the credit card holder is a contractual one that is
governed by the terms and conditions found in the card membership agreement. Such terms and conditions
constitute the law between the parties. In case of their breach, moral damages may be recovered where
the defendant is shown to have acted fraudulently or in bad faith. Considering that the terms and conditions
nowhere stated that the card holder must submit the new application form in order to reactivate her credit
card, to allow BPI Express Credit to impose the duty to submit the new application form in order to enable
Armovit to reactivate the credit card would contravene the Parol Evidence Rule. Indeed, there was no
agreement between the parties to add the submission of the new application form as the means to
reactivate the credit card. When she did not promptly settle her outstanding balance, BPI Express Credit
sent a message on March 19, 1992 demanding payment with the warning that her failure to pay would force
it to temporarily suspend her credit card effective March 31, 1992. It then sent another demand letter dated
March 31, 1992 requesting her to settle her obligation in order to lift the suspension of her credit card and
prevent its cancellation. In April 1992, she paid her obligation. In the context of the contemporaneous and
subsequent acts of the parties, the only condition for the reinstatement of her credit card was the payment
of her outstanding obligation. Had it intended otherwise, BPI Express Credit would have surely informed
her of the additional requirement in its letters of March 19, 1992 and March 31, 1992. That it did not do so
confirmed that they did not agree on having her submit the new application form as the condition to
reactivate her credit card. Bereft of the clear basis to continue with the suspension of the credit card
privileges of Armovit, BPI Express Credit acted in wanton disregard of its contractual obligations with her.
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure>Service of Summons
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure>Real Party in Interest>
Overlap with
COMMERCIAL LAW>Corporation Law>Corporation by Estoppel

ALLEN A. MACASAET, NICOLAS V. QUIJANO, JR., ISAIAS ALBANO, LILY REYES, JANET BAY,
JESUS R. GALANG, AND RANDY HAGOS, Petitioners
vs.
FRANCISCO R. CO, JR., Respondent
G.R. No. 156759, June 05, 2013
(FIRST DIVISION)

FACTS: Abante Tonight and herein petitioners, employees of the said daily tabloid, were sued by herein
respondent because of an allegedly libelous article petitioners published in one of their issues. When case
was raffled, RTC issued summons to be served to each petitioner, including Abante Tonight, at their
business address. The RTC Sheriff Medina proceeded to the stated address to effect the personal service
of the summons on the defendants. But his efforts to personally serve each defendant in the address were
futile because the defendants were then out of the office and unavailable. He returned in the afternoon to
make a second attempt but he was informed that petitioners were still out of the office. He decided to resort
to substituted service of the summons. Petitioners moved for dismissal alleging lack of jurisdiction over their
persons because of the invalid and ineffectual substituted service of summons. They further moved to drop
Abante Tonite as a defendant by virtue of its being neither a natural nor a juridical person that could be
impleaded as a party in a civil action.

ISSUE #1: Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction over the petitioners upon substituted service of
the summons.
ISSUE #2: Whether or not Abante Tonite is a real party in interest.

HELD #1: Yes.

Under the Rules of Court, the service of the summons should firstly be effected on the defendant himself
whenever practicable. If, for justifiable reasons, the defendant cannot be served in person within a
reasonable time, the service of the summons may then be effected either (a) by leaving a copy of the
summons at his residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by
leaving the copy at his office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
The latter mode of service is known as substituted service. Only when the defendant cannot be served
personally within a reasonable time may substituted service be resorted to. The impossibility of prompt
personal service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant himself and the fact that
such efforts failed, which statement should be found in the proof of service or sheriff’s return. After Medina
learned that there was no likelihood of any of petitioners going to the office during the business hours of
that or any other day, he concluded that further attempts to serve them in person within a reasonable
time would be futile. The circumstances fully warranted his conclusion. He was not expected or required as
the serving officer to effect personal service by all means and at all times, considering that he was expressly
authorized to resort to substituted service should he be unable to effect the personal service within a
reasonable time. While we are strict in insisting on personal service on the defendant, we do not cling to
such strictness should the circumstances already justify substituted service instead.

HELD #2: Yes.

Abante Tonite is a corporation by estoppel as the result of its having represented itself to the reading public
as a corporation despite its not being incorporated. RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in holding that
the non-incorporation of Abante Tonite with the SEC was of no consequence, for, otherwise, whoever of
the public who would suffer any damage from the publication of articles in the pages of its tabloids would
be left without recourse. We cannot disagree with the CA, considering that the editorial box of the daily
tabloid disclosed that although Monica Publishing Corporation had published the tabloid on a daily basis,
nothing in the box indicated that Monica Publishing Corporation had owned Abante Tonite
REMEDIAL LAW> Civil Procedure> Res Judicata

HEIRS OF MARCELO SOTTO, REPRESENTED BY: LOLIBETH SOTTO NOBLE et al, Petitioners
vs.
MATILDE S. PALICTE, Respondent
G.R. No. 159691, June 13, 2013
First Division

FACTS: Filemon Sotto had four children namely: Marcelo Sotto, Pascuala Sotto-Pahang, Miguel
Barcelona, and Matilde. Marcelo was the administrator of the Estate of Sotto. Marcelo and Miguel were the
predecessors-in-interest of petitioners. The heirs of Carmen Rallos, the deceased wife of Filemon,
subsequently filed a complaint against the Estate of Sotto to recover certain properties that Filemon
inherited from Carmen, to which the CFI ruled in their favor. To satisfy the judgment, levy on execution was
effected against certain properties and were sold at a public auction. Matilde and Pascuala redeemed four
parcels of land and two houses respectively. The CFI declared Matilde’s deed of redemption holding that
she did not qualify as successor-in-interest with the right to redeem the properties. Matilde directly appealed
the adverse ruling to the Court via petition for review and the Court reversed the CFI’s ruling, granting her
petition for review but allowed her co-heirs the opportunity to join Matilde as co-redemptioner for a period
of six months before the probate court would grant her motion to transfer the title to her name. More than
six months later, the heirs of Miguel filed a motion for reconsideration praying that they be included as
Matilde’s co-redemptioners. The RTC denied the motion. The heirs of Miguel assailed such denial by
petition for certiorari and prohibition. The CA also dismissed such petition. The Court also dismissed a
petition for certiorari filed by the same for being filed out of time and for lack of merit. Later on, petitioners
instituted the present action for partition against Matilde alleging that despite the redemption of the four
properties having been made in the sole name of Matilde, the same still rightfully belonged to the Estate of
Sotto for having furnished the funds used to redeemed the properties. They pray that the four properties be
declared as assets of the Estate of Sotto and direct the partition among the heirs of Filemon.

ISSUE: Whether or not the present action for partition has been barred by prior judgment.

HELD: YES.

Res judicata exists when as between the action sought to be dismissed and the other action these elements
are present, namely; (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) the former judgment must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties; (3) the former judgment must
be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be between the first and subsequent actions (i) identity of
parties or at least such as representing the same interest in both actions; (ii) identity of subject matter, or
of the rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and, (iii) identity of
causes of action in both actions such that any judgment that may be rendered in the other action will,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.

The first three elements were present. The decisions of the court…had upheld Matilde’s right to the four
properties and had all become final. Such ruling were rendered in the exercise of the of the respective
courts’ jurisdiction over the subject matter, and were adjudications on the merits of the cases.
REMEDIAL LAW> Civil Procedure> Judgment> Immutability of Judgment> Exceptions

SIMPLICIA O. ABRIGO AND DEMETRIO ABRIGO, Petitioners

vs.
JIMMY F. FLORES, et al, Respondents
G.R. No. 160786, June 17, 2013
First Division
FACTS: This case emanated from the judicial partition involving a parcel of residential land that siblings
Francisco Faylona and Gaudencia Faylona had inherited from their parents. When both have died, the heirs
of Francisco filed a complaint for judicial partition of such land. The trial court ruled in favor of the heirs of
Francisco, after which such decision was slightly modified. After and Entry of Judgment was issued by the
court, the heirs of Francisco filed for a motion of execution to which the court granted herein petitioners an
amount of time to remove all improvements on the western half of the land. However, during this time, one
of the successors-in-interest of Francisco, Jimmy Flores, sold his share of the undivided portion of the land
to herein petitioner. Petitioner instituted a special civil action of certiorari against the trial court after the
latter denied the motion to defer resolution filed by the former. Petitioner argues that the sale to them by
Jimmy had meanwhile made them co-owners of the western portion, and constituted a supervening event
occurring after the finality of the earlier decision that rendered the execution inequitable as to them. The
CA denied their petition, thus this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the sale by Jimmy Flores of his share in the lot constituted a supervening event that
rendered the execution of the final judgment against petitioners inequitable.

HELD: NO.
Although it is true that there are recognized exceptions to the execution as a matter of right of a final and
immutable judgment, one of which is a supervening event, such circumstance did not obtain herein. To
accept their contention would be to reopen the final and immutable judgment in order to further partition the
western portion thereby adjudicated to the heirs and successors-in-interest of Francisco Faylona for the
purpose of segregating the ¼ portion supposedly subject of the sale by Jimmy Flores. The reopening would
be legally impermissible, considering that the decision, as modified by the CA, could no longer be altered,
amended or modified, even if the alteration, amendment or modification was meant to correct what was
perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or of law and regardless of what court, be it the highest
Court of the land, rendered it. This is pursuant to the doctrine of immutability of a final judgment, which may
be relaxed only to serve the ends of substantial justice in order to consider certain circumstances like: (a)
matters of life, liberty, honor or property; (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (c) the
merits of the case; (d) the cause not being entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored
by the suspension of the doctrine; (e) the lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and
dilatory; or (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced by the suspension.

We deem it highly relevant to point out that a supervening event is an exception to the execution as a matter
of right of a final and immutable judgment rule, only if it directly affects the matter already litigated and
settled, or substantially changes the rights or relations of the parties therein as to render the execution
unjust, impossible or inequitable. A supervening event consists of facts that transpire after the judgment
became final and executory, or of new circumstances that develop after the judgment attained finality,
including matters that the parties were not aware of prior to or during the trial because such matters were
not yet in existence at that time. In that event, the interested party may properly seek the stay of execution
or the quashal of the writ of execution, or he may move the court to modify or alter the judgment in order to
harmonize it with justice and the supervening event. The party who alleges a supervening event to stay the
execution should necessarily establish the facts by competent evidence; otherwise, it would become all too
easy to frustrate the conclusive effects of a final and immutable judgment.
REMEDIAL LAW> Civil Procedure> Consolidation of Cases

RE: LETTER COMPLAINT OF MERLITA B. FABIANA AGAINST PRESIDING JUSTICE ANDRES B.

REYES, JR., ASSOCIATE JUSTICES ISAIAS P. DICDICAN AND STEPHEN C. CRUZ; \VILLAREAL
LAW OFFICES AND ITS LAWYERS AND BEATRIZ O. GERONILLA-VILLEGAS, LAWYERS FOR
MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORPORATION AND VISAYAN SURETY AND INSURANCE
CORPORATION.
A.M. No. CA-13-51-J July 2, 2013
En Banc

FACTS: Merlita Fabiana claimed death benefits against Magsaysay Maritime Corporation (MMC) and its
principal Air Sea Holiday. When the NLRC reduced the moral damages and exemplary damages awarded
by Labor Arbiter, Fabiana appealed before CA seeking the reinstatement of moral and exemplary damages
awarded by Labor Arbiter. On the other hand, MMC likewise appealed before the CA, challenging the
propriety of the monetary awards granted to heirs of Fabiana. Fabiana’s appeal was partly granted and
achieved finality. In view of the decision made on the first appeal, Fabiana moved to dismiss the second
petition as according to her the first petition rendered the second petition moot and academic.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitions should have been consolidated on the ground that the two petitions
arose from the same controversy.

HELD: YES
The consolidation of two or more actions is authorized where the cases arise from the same act, event or
transaction, involve the same or like issues, and depend largely or substantially on the same evidence,
provided that the court has jurisdiction and that consolidation will not give one party an undue advantage
or that consolidation will not prejudice the substantial rights of any of the parties. As to parties, their
substantial identity will suffice. Substantial identity of parties exists when there is a community of interest
or privity of interest between a party in the first case and a party in the second, even if the latter has not
been impleaded in the first case. As to issues, what is required is mere identity of issues where the parties,
although not identical, present conflicting claims. The justification for consolidation is to prevent a judge
from deciding identical issues presented in the case assigned to him in a manner that will prejudice another
judge from deciding a similar case before him.

It is true that under the Rules of Court, the consolidation of cases for trial is permissive and a matter of
judicial discretion. But the permissiveness of consolidation does not carry over to the appellate stage where
the primary objective is less the avoidance of unnecessary expenses and undue vexation than it is the ideal
realization of the dual function of all appellate adjudications.

Therefore, the rigid policy is to make the consolidation of all cases and proceedings resting on the same
set of facts, or involving identical claims or interests or parties mandatory. Such consolidation should be
made regardless of whether or not the parties or any of them requests it. A mandatory policy eliminates
conflicting results concerning similar or like issues between the same parties or interests even as it
enhances the administration of justice.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Intra-Corporate Controversy;

PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS TELECOMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION (POTC) AND PHILIPPINE

COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORPORATION (PHILCOMSAT), Petitioners,
vs.
VICTOR AFRICA, ERLINDA I. BILDNER, SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO, HONORIO POBLADOR III, VICTORIA
C. DELOS REYES, JOHN BENEDICT SIOSON, AND JOHN/JANE DOES. Respondents
G.R. No. 184622 July 3, 2013
FIRST DIVISION

Facts: On July 22, 1987, the Government, represented by the PCGG, filed in the Sandiganbayan a
complaint for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages against Jose L. Africa, Manuel
H. Nieto, Jr., President Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, et., al. The Complaint alleged that the defendants "acted
in collaboration with each other as dummies, nominees and/or agents of defendants Marcos Family in
several corporations, such as the Mid-Pasig Land Development Corporation and the Independent Realty
Corporation which, through manipulations by said defendants, appropriated a substantial portion of the
shareholdings in Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation and Philippine Communications
Satellite Corporation held by the late Honorio Poblador, Jr., Jose Valdez and Francisco Reyes, thereby
further advancing defendants’ scheme to monopolize the telecommunications industry;" that through their
illegal acts, they acquired ill-gotten wealth; that their acts constituted "breach of public trust and the law,
abuse of rights and power, and unjust enrichment;" and that their illgotten wealth, real and personal, "are
deemed to have been acquired (by them) for the benefit of the plaintiff (Republic) and are, therefore,
impressed with constructive trust in favor of (the latter) and the Filipino people."9

The Complaint prayed that all the funds, properties and assets illegally acquired by the defendants, or their
equivalent value, be reconveyed or reverted to the Government; and that the defendants be ordered to
render an accounting and to pay damages. On June 28, 1996, after a decade of litigation, the Republic,
IRC and Mid-Pasig, and the PCGG (acting through PCGG Commissioner Hermilo Rosal) entered into a
compromise agreement. The result was the redistribution of the POTC shareholdings. It was not until June
8, 1998, or nearly two years from its execution, that the Sandiganbayan approved the compromise
agreement. On August 28, 1998, PHILCOMSAT stockholders held an informal gathering at the Manila Golf
Club for the apparent purpose of introducing the new PCGG nominees to the stockholders.

On August 5, 2004, the Nieto-PCGG Group conducted the annual stockholders’ meeting for POTC at the
Manila Golf Club. Elected were Nieto, Jr. as President and Guy de Leon, a government nominee to POTC,
as Chairman. At the same meeting, the Nieto-PCGG Group, through its elected Board of Directors, issued
a proxy in favor of Nieto, Jr. and/or Locsin authorizing them to represent POTC and vote the POTC shares
in the PHILCOMSAT stockholders’ meeting scheduled on August 9, 2004.

On August 11, 2004, POTC (Africa-Bildner Group), Victor Africa, Honorio Poblador III and Katrina Ponce
Enrile filed a Complaint for injunction with prayer for TRO and WPI in the RTC against Nieto, Jr., Luis Lokin,
Jr., and Alma Kristina O. Alobba seeking to enjoin the latter from acting as Directors and Officers of POTC.
RTC denied the Africa Group’s complaint.

POTC (Africa Group) went to the CA on certiorari to annul and set aside the orders issued on August 27,
2004 and December 7, 2004 in Civil Case No. 04-935 by the RTC

Issue: Whether or not the petition for certiorari is the proper mode of appeal in intra-corporate dispute?

Held:
The Court has expounded that the appropriate mode of appeal for an aggrieved party in an intra-corporate
dispute is a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, to wit: Verily, the first part of Section 4,
Rule 1 of the Interim Rules is categorical. Save for the exceptions clearly stated therein, the provision
enunciates that a decision and order issued under the Interim Rules shall be enforceable immediately after
the rendition thereof. In order to assail the decision or order, however, the second part of the provision
speaks of an appeal or petition that needs to be filed by the party concerned. In this appeal or petition, a
restraining order must be sought from the appellate court to enjoin the enforcement or implementation of
the decision or order. Unless a restraining order is so issued, the decision or order rendered under the
Interim Rules shall remain to be immediately executory.
REMEDIAL LAW> Criminal Procedure> Prejudicial Question

RAFAEL JOSE-CONSING, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 161075, July 15, 2013
First Division

FACTS: Petitioner and his mother obtained several loans from Unicapital Inc., (Unicapital) secured by a
real estate mortgage over a parcel of land. It was later found out by Unicapital that the title presented by
petitioner was spurious. Petitioner filed for injunctive relief at the Pasig RTC to enjoin Unicapital from
proceeding against him (Pasig Civil Case). Unicapital then sued petitioner for recovery of sum of money
and damages (Makati Civil Case. Unicapital also filed a criminal complaint for estafa through falsification of
public document against petitioner at the Makati City Prosecutor’s Office, where the prosecutor
subsequently filed an information (Makati Criminal Case). Petitioner moved to defer his arraignment on the
ground of existence of a prejudicial question due to the pendency of the Pasig and Makati Civil cases. The
RTC granted the petitioners motion and issued an order suspending the proceedings. The State assailed
such order through a petition for certiorari with the CA (G.R. No. 148193). CA ruled in favor of the petitioner.
State filed a petition for review with the Court which the Court reversed the CA’s decision. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether or not there exists a prejudicial question that warranted the suspension of the proceedings
in the Makati Criminal case.

HELD: No.
It is well settled that a civil action based on defamation, fraud and physical injuries may be independently
instituted pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, and does not operate as a prejudicial question that will
justify the suspension of a criminal case. This was precisely the Court’s thrust in G.R. No. 148193, thus:
Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law,
proceed independently of each other. Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, in the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the independent civil
action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages
twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure>Prescriptive Period

SPOUSES CELSO DICO, SR. AND ANGELES DICO, Petitioners,

v.
VIZCAYA MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
G.R. No. 161211, July 17, 2013
FIRST DIVISION

FACTS: Petitioner Celso Dico was the registered owner of a Lot in the Cadiz Cadastre. Said Lot was
adjacent to Lot No. 29-B and Lot No. 1412 (formerly Lot No. 1118-B), both also of the Cadiz Cadastre.
Celso and his wife Angeles resided on the said Lot since 1958. Angeles filed in the District Office of the
Bureau of Lands in Bacolod City, her free patent application covering a portion of Lot No. 29-B. On his part,
Celso also filed in the same office an application for free patent covering Lot No. 1412. It does not appear,
however, that the Bureau of Lands acted on their applications. Respondent Vizcaya Management
Corporation (VMC) was the registered owner of Lot No. 29-B, also of the Cadiz Cadastre. VMC derived its
title to Lot No. 29-B from Eduardo and Cesar, both surnamed Lopez, the registered owners under TCT No.
T-14827, which emanated from TCT No. RT-9933 (16739) in the names of Victoria, Eduardo and Cesar,
all surnamed Lopez.VMC filed against the Dicos a complaint for unlawful detainer in the City Court of Cadiz.
The City Court of Cadiz rendered its decision in favor of VMC, ordering the Dicos to demolish the concrete
water gate or sluice gate (locally known as trampahan) located inside Lot No. 1 of the Cristina Village
Subdivision. Inasmuch as the Dicos did not appeal, the decision attained finality. The City Court of Cadiz
issued a writ of execution. And a second alias writ of execution was issued. The Dicos commenced an
action for the annulment and cancellation of the titles of VMC, impleading VMC, the National Land Titles
and Deeds Registration Administration, and the Director of the Bureau of Lands. The Dicos amended the
complaint. Celso died during the pendency of the action, and was substituted by Angeles and their children
pursuant to the order.

ISSUE: Whether or not the the prescription already barred petitioners’ cause of action.

HELD: YES.
The aforequoted findings of fact and conclusions were based on the evidence presented at the trial. In view
of this, the Court accepts the findings of fact and conclusions of the CA, not just because we are not a trier
of facts, but, more importantly, because the CA creditably performed its main task of conducting a thorough
review of the evidence and records of the case in order to eruditely and carefully address each of the issues
raised and argued by the Dicos. The CA correctly pointed out that under Article 1456 of the Civil Code, the
person obtaining property through mistake or fraud is considered by force of law a trustee of an implied
trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes. Under Article 1144, Civil Code, an action
upon an obligation created by law must be brought within 10 years from the time the right of action accrues.
Consequently, an action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in 10 years.

The insistence of the Dicos that prescription could not be used by the CA to bar their claim for reconveyance
by virtue of VMC's failure to aver them in a motion to dismiss or in the answer was unwarranted.

The Court agrees with VMC's contention to the contrary. Although defenses and objections not pleaded in
a motion to dismiss or in an answer are deemed waived, it was incorrect for the Dicos to insist that
prescription could not be appreciated against them for that reason. Their insistence was contrary to Section
1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court. Under the rule, the defenses of lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter, litis pendentia, res judicata, and prescription of action may be raised at any stage of the proceedings,
even for the first time on appeal, except that the objection to the lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
may be barred by laches.
REMEDIAL LAW>Criminal Procedure>Primary Jurisdiction

SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
SEC. HERNANDO B. PEREZ, et al, Respondents.
G.R. No. 166836, September 4, 2013
(First Division)

FACTS: Petitioner San Miguel Properties Inc. a domestic corporation engaged in the real estate business,
purchased from B.F. Homes, Inc. then represented by Atty. Florencio B. Orendain as its duly authorized
rehabilitation receiver appointed by the Securities and Exchange Commission. The transactions were
embodied in three separate deeds of sale. The TCTs covering the lots bought under the first and second
deeds were fully delivered to San Miguel Properties, but TCTs covering 20 of the 41 parcels of land
purchased under the third deed of sale, executed in April and for which San Miguel Properties paid the full
price, were not delivered to San Miguel Properties. On its part, BF Homes claimed that it withheld the
delivery of the 20 TCTs for parcels of land purchased under the third deed of sale because Atty. Orendain
had ceased to be its rehabilitation receiver at the time of the transactions after being meanwhile replaced
as receiver by FBO Network Management, Inc. pursuant to an order from the SEC. BF Homes refused to
deliver the 20 TCTs despite demands. Thus, San Miguel Properties filed a complaint-affidavit in the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City charging respondent directors and officers of BF Homes with non-
delivery of titles in violation of Section 25, in relation to Section 39, both of Presidential Decree No. 957.
At the same time, San Miguel Properties sued BF Homes for specific performance in the HLURB, praying
to compel BF Homes to release the 20 TCTs in its favor. In their joint counter-affidavit, respondent directors
and officers of BF Homes refuted San Miguel Properties’ assertions by contending that: (a) San Miguel
Properties’ claim was not legally demandable because Atty. Orendain did not have the authority to sell the
130 lots in 1992 and 1993 due to his having been replaced as BF Homes’ rehabilitation receiver by the
SEC; (b) the deeds of sale conveying the lots were irregular for being undated and unnotarized; (c) the
claim should have been brought to the SEC because BF Homes was under receivership; (d) in receivership
cases, it was essential to suspend all claims against a distressed corporation in order to enable the receiver
to effectively exercise its powers free from judicial and extra-judicial interference that could unduly hinder
the rescue of the distressed company; and (e) the lots involved were under custodia legis in view of the
pending receivership proceedings, necessarily stripping the OCP Las Piñas of the jurisdiction to proceed
in the action.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court of appeals committed grave, serious and reversible errors when it
dismissed petitioner’s certiorari and mandamus petition to order and direct respondent secretary to indict
respondents for violation of Section 25, PD. 957.

HELD: NO.

Action for specific performance, even if pending in the HLURB, an administrative agency, raises a
prejudicial question BF Homes’ posture that the administrative case for specific performance in the HLURB
posed a prejudicial question that must first be determined before the criminal case for violation of
The Doctrine of primary jurisdiction is applicable; That the action for specific performance was an
administrative case pending in the HLURB, instead of in a court of law, was of no consequence at all. As
earlier mentioned, the action for specific performance, although civil in nature, could be brought only in the
HLURB. This situation conforms to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. There has been of late a proliferation
of administrative agencies, mostly regulatory in function. It is in favor of these agencies that the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction is frequently invoked, not to defeat the resort to the judicial adjudication of controversies
but to rely on the expertise, specialized skills, and knowledge of such agencies in their resolution. The Court
has observed that one thrust of the proliferation is that the interpretation of contracts and the determination
of private rights under contracts are no longer a uniquely judicial function exercisable only by the regular
courts.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction has been increasingly called into play on matters demanding the special
competence of administrative agencies even if such matters are at the same time within the jurisdiction of
the courts. A case that requires for its determination the expertise, specialized skills, and knowledge of
some administrative board or commission because it involves technical matters or intricate questions of
fact, relief must first be obtained in an appropriate administrative proceeding before a remedy will be
supplied by the courts although the matter comes within the jurisdiction of the courts. The application of the
doctrine does not call for the dismissal of the case in the court but only for its suspension until after the
matters within the competence of the administrative body are threshed out and determined.
To accord with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the courts cannot and will not determine a controversy
involving a question within the competence of an administrative tribunal, the controversy having been so
placed within the special competence of the administrative tribunal under a regulatory scheme. In that
instance, the judicial process is suspended pending referral to the administrative body for its view on the
matter in dispute. Consequently, if the courts cannot resolve a question that is within the legal competence
of an administrative body prior to the resolution of that question by the latter, especially where the question
demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and
services of the administrative agency to ascertain technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity
of ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute administered, suspension or
dismissal of the action is proper.
REMEDIAL LAW>Rule on Evidence>Sufficient Documentary Evidence
Overlap with
TAXATION LAW>Tax refund or Tax credit

LUZON HYDRO CORPORATION, Petitioner,

v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.
G.R. No. 188260, November 13, 2013
(First Division)

FACTS: Luzon Hyrdo Corporation, VAT taxpayer, formed a consortium of several corporations. Pursuant
to the Power Purchase Agreement entered into with the National Power Corporation (NPC), the electricity
produced by the petitioner was to be sold exclusively to NPC. Relative to its sale to NPC, the petitioner was
granted by the BIR a certificate for Zero Rate for VAT purposes. The petitioner alleged herein that it had
incurred input VAT on its domestic purchases of goods and services used in its generation and sales of
electricity to NPC in the four quarters of 2001; and that it had declared the input VAT in its amended VAT
returns for the four quarters on 2001.

The petitioner filed a written claim for refund or tax credit relative to its unutilized input VAT. Subsequently,
it amended the claim for refund or tax credit. The Revenue Examiner of Vigan City concluded an
investigation and made a recommendation favorable to the petitioner’s claim. Respondent Commissioner
of Internal Revenue (Commissioner) did not ultimately act on the petitioner’s claim despite the favorable
recommendation. Hence, the petitioner filed its petition for review in the CTA, praying for the refund or tax
credit certificate (TCC) corresponding to the unutilized input VAT paid for the four quarters of 2001. The
CTA in Division promulgated its decision in favor of the respondent on the ground that in the petitioner’s
VAT returns for the four quarters of 2001, no amount of zero-rated sales was declared. Without zero-rated
sales for the four quarters of 2001, the input VAT payments allegedly attributable thereto cannot be
refunded. The CTA En Banc promulgated the assailed decision affirming the Division, and denying the
claim for refund or tax credit.

The petitioner prayed for the reversal of the decision of the CTA En Banc, and to the remand of the case
to the CTA for the reception of its VAT official receipts as newly discovered evidence. It has supported the
latter relief prayed for by representing that the VAT official receipts had been misplaced by Edwin Tapay,
its former Finance and Accounting Manager, but had been found only after the CTA En Banc has already
affirmed the decision of the CTA in Division.

ISSUES: Whether or not the misplaced VAT official receipt is a newly discovered evidence to remand the
case for tax refund?

HELD: NO.

The concept of newly discovered evidence is applicable to litigations in which a litigant seeks a new trial or
the re-opening of the case in the trial court. Seldom is the concept appropriate when the litigation is already
on appeal, particularly in this Court. The absence of a specific rule on newly discovered evidence at this
late stage of the proceedings is not without reason. The propriety of remanding the case for the purpose of
enabling the CTA to receive newly discovered evidence would undo the decision already on appeal and
require the examination of the pieces of newly discovered evidence, an act that the Court could not do by
virtue of its not being a trier of facts. Although the petitioner has correctly contended here that the sale of
electricity by a power generation company like it should be subject to zero-rated VAT under Republic Act
No. 9136,31 its assertion that it need not prove its having actually made zero-rated sales of electricity by
presenting the VAT official receipts and VAT returns cannot be upheld. It ought to be reminded that it could
not be permitted to substitute such vital and material documents with secondary evidence like financial
statements.

Nonetheless, on the proposition that we may relax the stringent rules of procedure for the sake of rendering
justice, we still hold that the concept of newly discovered evidence may not apply herein. In order that newly
discovered evidence may be a ground for allowing a new trial, it must be fairly shown that: (a) the evidence
is discovered after the trial; (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial
even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) such evidence is material, not merely cumulative,
corroborative, or impeaching; and (d) such evidence is of such weight that it would probably change the
judgment if admitted.

The first two requisites are not attendant. To start with, the proposed evidence was plainly not newly
discovered considering the petitioner’s admission that its former Finance and Accounting Manager had
misplaced the VAT official receipts. If that was true, the misplaced receipts were forgotten evidence. And,
secondly, the receipts, had they truly existed, could have been sooner discovered and easily produced at
the trial with the exercise of reasonable diligence. But the petitioner made no convincing demonstration that
it had exercised reasonable diligence. The Court cannot accept its tender of such receipts and return now,
for, indeed, the non-production of documents as vital and material as such receipts and return were to the
success of its claim for refund or tax credit was improbable, as it goes against the sound business practice
of safekeeping relevant documents precisely to ensure their future use to support an eventual substantial
claim for refund or tax credit.
REMEDIAL LAW>Writ of Preliminary Injunction under Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court
Overlap with
CIVIL LAW>Credit Transactions>Redemption Period of Foreclosed Property

UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK, Petitioner,

v.
CHRISTOPHER LUMBO and MILAGROS LUMBO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 162757, December 11, 2013
(First Division)

FACTS: The respondents borrowed an aggregate amount of money from UCPB. To secure the
performance of their obligation, they constituted a real estate mortgage on a parcel of land located in
Boracay, Aklan and all the improvements thereon that they owned and operated as a beach resort known
as Titay’s South Beach Resort. Upon their failure to settle the obligation, UCPB applied for the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the mortgage, and emerged as the highest bidder at the ensuing foreclosure sale. The
certificate of sale was issued on the same day, and UCPB registered the sale in its name. The title over the
mortgaged property was consolidated in the name of UCPB after the respondents failed to redeem the
property within the redemption period. The respondents brought against UCPB in the RTC an action for the
annulment of the foreclosure, legal accounting, injunction against the consolidation of title, and damages.
During the pendency of the Civil Case, UCPB filed an ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession to recover possession of the property. The RTC granted the ex parte petition of UCPB, and
issued the writ of possession directing the sheriff of the Province of Aklan to place UCPB in the actual
possession of the property. The writ of possession was served on the respondents with a demand for them
to peacefully vacate. Although the possession of the property was turned over to UCPB, they were allowed
to temporarily remain on the property for humanitarian reasons. The respondents filed in the RT, handling
the Special Proceedings of a petition to cancel the writ of possession and to set aside the foreclosure sale.
They included an application for a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order to prevent
the implementation of the writ of possession. The RTC denied the respondents’ application for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly granted the injunctive writ to enjoin the implementation of the writ
of possession the RTC had issued to place UCPB in the possession of the mortgaged property.

HELD: YES.
Assuming, though not conceding, that the RTC did err in denying the respondents’ application for injunction
to prevent the implementation of the writ of possession, its error related only to the correct application of
the law and jurisprudence relevant to the application for injunction. As such, the error amounted only to one
of judgment, not of jurisdiction. An error of judgment is one that the court may commit in the exercise of its
jurisdiction, and such error is reviewable only through an appeal taken in due course. In contrast, an error
of jurisdiction is committed where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of
jurisdiction, and such error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. The error amounted only
to one of judgment, not of jurisdiction. An error of judgment is one that the court may commit in the exercise
of its jurisdiction, and such error is reviewable only through an appeal taken in due course. In contrast, an
error of jurisdiction is committed where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess
of jurisdiction, and such error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. A preliminary
injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order
requiring a party or a court, an agency, or a person to refrain from a particular a particular act or acts. It
may also require the performance of a particular act or acts, in which case it is known as a preliminary
mandatory injunction. Thus, a prohibitory injunction is one that commands a party to refrain from doing a
particular act, while a mandatory injunction commands the performance of some positive act to correct a
wrong in the past.

The CA effectively thereby granted the respondents’ application for the injunctive writ. In so doing, however,
the CA ignored the essential requirements for the grant of the injunctive writ, and disregarded the patent
fact that the respondents held no right in esse that the injunctive writ they were seeking would protect. Thus,
the CA committed another serious error. A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an
action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order requiring a party or a court, an agency, or a person
to refrain from a particular a particular act or acts. It may also require the performance of a particular act or
acts, in which case it is known as a preliminary mandatory injunction. Thus, a prohibitory injunction is one
that commands a party to refrain from doing a particular act, while a mandatory injunction commands the
performance of some positive act to correct a wrong in the past.

A right is in esse if it exists in fact. In the case of injunction, the right sought to be protected should at least
be shown to exist prima facie. Unless such a showing is made, the applicant is not entitled to an injunctive
relief. However, the respondents made no such showing of their holding a right in esse. They could not do
so simply because their non-redemption within the period of redemption had lost for them any right in the
property, including its possession. The absence of a right in esse on their part furnishes a compelling reason
to undo the CA's reversal of the RTC's denial of their application for injunction as well as to strike down the
injunctive relief the CA afforded to the respondents. It cannot be otherwise, for they had no "right clearly
founded on or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of law".
Remedial Law>Evidence
RICARDO MEDINA, JR. y ORIEL, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 161308 January 15, 2014
First Division
FACTS: The case concerns the stabbing of Lino Mulinyawe. The stabbing was preceded by a fight during
a basketball game between Ross Mulinyawe, Lino’s son, and Ronald Medina, the younger brother of
Ricardo and Randolf. In that fight, Ronald had hit Ross with a piece of stone. Hearing about the involvement
of his brother in the fight, Randolf rushed to the scene and sent Ronald home. Once Lino learned that his
son had sustained a head injury inflicted by one of the Medinas, he forthwith went towards the house of the
Medinas accompanied by his drinking buddies, Jose Tapan and Abet Menes. He had a bread knife tucked
in the back, but his companions were unarmed. Along the way, Lino encountered Randolf whom he
confronted about the fight. The two of them had a heated argument. Although Randolf tried to explain what
had really happened between Ross and Ronald, Lino lashed out at Randolf and gripped the latter’s hand.
Tapan almost simultaneously punched Randolf in the face. Lino, already holding the knife in his right hand,
swung the knife at Randolf who was not hit. Randolf retreated towards the store and took two empty bottles
of beer, broke the bottles and attacked Lino with them. Arriving at the scene, Ricardo saw what was
happening, and confronted Lino. A commotion ensued between them. Ricardo entered their house to get a
kitchen knife and came out. Lino made a thrust at Ricardo but failed to hit the latter, who then stabbed Lino
on the left side of his chest, near the region of the heart. Lino fell face down on the ground. After that,
Ricardo walked away, while Randolf threw the broken bottles at the fallen Lino. Lino’s cause of death is a
stab wound of the chest. The Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City charged Randolf with homicide.
The defense claimed that it was Lino who had attacked Ricardo with a knife, and that Lino had accidentally
stabbed himself by falling frontward and into his own knife. the RTC acquitted Randolf but convicted Ricardo
of homicide. Ricardo appealed, but the CA affirmed his conviction with modification of the penalty and the
civil liability.

ISSUE: Whether the lower court gravely erred in its factual finding that the petitioner stabbed Lino in spite
of the fact that the prosecution withheld the presentation of the actual knives during the hearing of the case.

HELD: No.
The nonidentification and nonpresentation of the weapon actually used in the killing did not diminish the
merit of the conviction primarily because other competent evidence and the testimonies of witnesses had
directly and positively identified and incriminated Ricardo as the assailant of Lino. Hence, the establishment
beyond reasonable doubt of Ricardo’s guilt for the homicide did not require the production of the weapon
used in the killing as evidence in court, for in arriving at its findings on the culpability of Ricardo the RTC,
like other trial courts, clearly looked at, considered and appreciated the entirety of the record and the
evidence. For sure, the weapon actually used was not indispensable considering that the finding of guilt
was based on other evidence proving his commission of the crime.

In addition, the witnesses incriminating Ricardo were not only credible but were not shown to have harbored
any ill-motive towards him. They were surely entitled to full faith and credit for those reasons, and both the
RTC and the CA did well in according such credence to them. Their positive identification of him as the
assailant prevailed over his mere denial, because such denial, being negative and self-serving evidence,
was undeserving of weight by virtue of its lack of substantiation by clear and convincing proof. Hence, his
denial had no greater evidentiary value than the affirmative testimonies of the credible witnesses presented
against him.
Remedial Law>Civil Procedure>Ejectment; Immediate Execution of Judgment
HERMINIA ACBANG, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. JIMMY H.F. LUCZON, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 01,
SECOND JUDICIAL REGION, TUGUEGARAO CITY, CAGAYAN, and SPOUSES MAXIMO LOPEZ
and HEIDI L. LOPEZ, Respondents.
G.R. No. 164246 January 15, 2014
First Division

FACTS: Respondent Spouses Lopez commenced an ejectment suit against the petitioner the Acbangs in
the Municipal Trial Court of Alcala, Cagayan. Acbang did not file an answer. Thus, the MTC rendered its
decision in favor of the Spouses Lopez. The petitioner appealed to the RTC. The Spouses Lopez moved
for the execution of the decision pending appeal in the RTC, alleging that the defendants had not filed a
supersedeas bond to stay the execution. The Acbangs opposed the motion for execution pending
appeal, insisting that the failure of the Spouses Lopez to move for the execution in the MTC constituted a
waiver of their right to the immediate execution; and that, therefore, there was nothing to stay, rendering
the filing of the supersedeas bond unnecessary. Judge Luczon granted the motion for immediate execution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the granting of motion for immediate execution is proper.

HELD: Yes.
As a general rule, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is immediately executory, in order
to prevent further damage to him arising from the loss of possession of the property in question. To stay
the immediate execution of the said judgment while the appeal is pending the foregoing provision requires
that the following requisites must concur: (1) the defendant perfects his appeal; (2) he files a supersedeas
bond; and (3) he periodically deposits the rentals which become due during the pendency of the appeal.
The failure of the defendant to comply with any of these conditions is a ground for the outright execution of
the judgment, the duty of the court in this respect being "ministerial and imperative." Hence, if the defendant-
appellant perfected the appeal but failed to file a supersedeas bond, the immediate execution of the
judgment would automatically follow. Conversely, the filing of a supersedeas bond will not stay the
execution of the judgment if the appeal is not perfected. Necessarily then, the supersedeas bond should
be filed within the period for the perfection of the appeal.

In short, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is immediately executory, but the defendant,
to stay its immediate execution, must: (1) perfect an appeal; (2) file a supersedeas bond; and (3) periodically
deposit the rentals becoming due during the pendency of the appeal. Although the petitioner correctly states
that the Spouses Lopez should file a motion for execution pending appeal before the court may issue an
order for the immediate execution of the judgment, the spouses Lopez are equally correct in pointing out
that they were entitled to the immediate execution of the judgment in view of the Ac bangs failure to comply
with all of the three abovementioned requisites for staying the immediate execution. The filing of the notice
of appeal alone perfected the appeal but did not suffice to stay the immediate execution without the filing
of the sufficient supersedeas bond and the deposit of the accruing rentals.

The foregoing notwithstanding, the decision of the R TC favored the petitioner because it declared the
judgment of the MTC void as far as she was concerned for lack of jurisdiction over her person. The RTC
thus directed the MTC to cause the service of the summons on her and to conduct further proceedings
without any delay. In effect, the supervening declaration of the nullity of the judgment being sought to be
executed against her has rendered moot and academic the issue in this special civil action as far as she
was concerned.
Remedial Law>Civil Procedure>Special Civil Action>Certiorari
JUAN B. BANEZ, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
HON. CRISANTO C. CONCEPCION, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE RTC-
BULACAN, MALOLOS CITY, AND THE ESTATE OF THE LATE RODRIGO GOMEZ, REPRESENTED
BY ITS ADMINISTRATRIX, TSUI YUK YING, Respondents.
G.R. No. 159508 August 29, 2012
First Division

FACTS: The Estate of Gomez brought a complaint for specific performance against Ramos and the
petitioner in the RTC in Valenzuela in order to recover the 1,233 square meter lot. However, the Valenzuela
RTC dismissed the complaint on the ground of improper venue and because the proper recourse was to
enforce the judgment by compromise agreement through a motion for execution. The Estate of Gomez
appealed the order of dismissal to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the Valenzuela RTC ruling. The
Estate of Gomez commenced a civil case in the Valenzuela RTC, ostensibly to revive the judgment by
compromise praying that Ramos be ordered to execute the deed of absolute sale covering the 1,233 square
meter lot pursuant to the fourth stipulation of the compromise agreement. The petitioner was impleaded as
a party-defendant because of his having guaranteed the performance by Ramos of his obligation and for
having actively participated in the transaction. The petitioner moved for the dismissal of said case, alleging
that the action was already barred by res judicata and by prescription. The RTC granted the petitioner’s
motion to dismiss, finding that the right of action had already prescribed due to more than 12 years having
elapsed from the approval of the compromise agreement on October 9, 1990. The RTC reversed itself upon
motion of the Estate of Gomez and set aside its order. The RTC reinstated the case holding that the filing
of the complaint for specific performance on July 6, 1995 in the Valenzuela RTC had interrupted the
prescriptive period pursuant to Article 1155 of the Civil Code. The petitioner sought reconsideration, but the
RTC denied his motion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion

HELD: No.
The orders that the petitioner seeks to challenge and to annul are the orders denying his motion to dismiss.
It is settled, however, that an order denying a motion to dismiss, being merely interlocutory, cannot be the
basis of a petition for certiorari. An interlocutory order is not the proper subject of a certiorari challenge by
virtue of its not terminating the proceedings in which it is issued. To allow such order to be the subject of
review by certiorari not only delays the administration of justice, but also unduly burdens the courts. But a
petition for certiorari may be filed to assail an interlocutory order if it is issued without jurisdiction, or with
excess of jurisdiction, or in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. This is
because as to such order there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.

The exception does not apply to this challenge. The petitioner has not demonstrated how the assailed
orders could have been issued without jurisdiction, or with excess of jurisdiction, or in grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Nor has he convinced us that he had no plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In fact and in law, he has, like filing his answer and
going to pre-trial and trial. In the end, should he still have the need to seek the review of the decision of the
RTC, he could also even appeal the denial of the motion to dismiss. That, in reality, was his proper remedy
in the ordinary course of law. Yet another reason to dismiss the petition for certiorari exists. Although the
Court, the CA and the RTC have concurrence of jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, the petitioner had
no unrestrained freedom to choose which among the several courts might his petition for certiorari be filed
in. In other words, he must observe the hierarchy of courts.
Remedial Law>Civil Procedure>Injunction

SPOUSES HUMBERTO P. DELOSSANTOS AND CARMENCITA M. DELOS SANTOS, Petitioners,

vs.
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, Respondent.
G.R. No. 153852 October 24, 2012
First Division

FACTS: Humberto and Carmencita obtained two loans from Metrobank, secured by a real estate
mortgage. Among the terms and conditions of the loans were the following: 15.75 and 22.04 percent
interest rates per annum, fixed at the first year and with escalation and de-escalation clauses without
advance notice to the spouses. Further, upon failure of the spouses to pay, the entire obligation will become
due and demandable, and the security will be foreclosed. Metrobank filed a petition for extrajudicial
foreclosure of the real estate mortgage. The spouses, to forestall the foreclosure sale, filed an action before
the Regional Trial Court for damages, fixing of interest and application of excess payments. Among their
allegations in their complaint was that they are not yet in default of their obligation, that Metrobank levied
excessive interest and applied the escalation clause without their consent, and then have made excess
payment of the interest which should be applied to the principal. Upon receipt of the complaint, the RTC
issued a temporary restraining order and later a preliminary injunction to restrain Metrobank from
proceeding with the foreclosure sale. But on motion for reconsideration of Metrobank, where the spouses
did not file a comment, and did not attend during the hearing on the motion, the RTC reversed itself and
lifted the preliminary injunction. The spouses sought reconsideration of the order but was denied, hence
they filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals which also denied it.

ISSUE: Whether the lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction was proper.

HELD: Yes.
The Court must find that the petitioners were not entitled to enjoin or prevent the extrajudicial foreclosure
of their mortgage by Metrobank. They were undeniably already in default of their obligations the
performance of which the mortgage had precisely secured. Hence, Metrobank had the unassailable right
to the foreclosure. In contrast, their right to prevent the foreclosure did not exist. Hence, they could not be
validly granted the injunction they sought. The foreclosure of a mortgage is but a necessary consequence
of the non-payment of an obligation secured by the mortgage. Where the parties have stipulated in their
agreement, mortgage contract and promissory note that the mortgagee is authorized to foreclose the
mortgage upon the mortgagor’s default, the mortgagee has a clear right to the foreclosure in case of the
mortgagor’s default. Thereby, the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction upon the application of the
mortgagor will be improper. Mindful that an injunction would be a limitation upon the freedom of action of
Metrobank, the RTC justifiably refused to grant the petitioners’ application for the writ of preliminary
injunction. We underscore that the writ could be granted only if the RTC was fully satisfied that the law
permitted it and the emergency demanded it. That, needless to state, was not true herein.
Remedial Law>Civil Procedure>Default
DENNIS Q. MORTEL, Petitioner,
vs.
SALVADOR E. KERR, Respondent.
G.R. No. 156296 November 12, 2012
First Division

FACTS: Kerr instituted a complaint for foreclosure of mortgage against Mortel, who duly filed a belated
answer through Atty. Mas of the Public Attorney’s Office. The RTC declared Mortel as in default and allowed
Kerr to present evidence ex parte. Later, Atty. Tumulak filed a notice of appearance in behalf of Mortel, but
the RTC did not act on the notice of appearance. The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Kerr. Mortel,
through Atty. Lacambra, filed a motion for new trial. Atty. Mas filed his withdrawal of appearance. The RTC
denied Mortel’s motion for new trial. Mortel, this time through Atty. Tumulak, filed a verified petition for relief
from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. The RTC denied the verified petition for relief from
judgment on the ground that the petition for relief had been filed beyond the reglementary period of 60 days
based on a reckoning of the start of the period from March 1, 2001, the date when Atty. Mas received the
notice and copy of the Order. Mortel moved for the reconsideration of the denial of his petition for relief from
judgment. The RTC granted the withdrawal of Atty. Lacambra and Atty. Mas as counsels for Mortel, and
finally recognized Atty. Tumulak as the only counsel. The RTC treated Mortel’s motion for reconsideration
as a mere scrap of paper and ordered it stricken from the records for failure of the counsel to serve a notice
of hearing with the motion for reconsideration. Mortel filed an urgent motion for reconsideration vis-à-vis
the RTC’s order which the RTC denied. Mortel, through Atty. Tumulak, filed in the CA a petition for review
on certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a restraining order. The CA issued a resolution dismissing
Mortel’s petition for review for failing to state the specific material dates showing that the petition had been
filed within the reglementary period, in violation of Section 6(d), Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. It observed
that Mortel thereby resorted to the wrong remedy considering that he was assailing the propriety of the
RTC’s order declaring him in default, against which the proper remedy was a petition for certiorari. Mortel
sought the reconsideration of the denial of his petition for review but was denied for lack of. Instead of
appealing via petition for review on certiorari in the Supreme Court (SC), Mortel, through Atty. Tumulak,
filed in the CA an urgent motion for extension of time to appeal to the SC. Mortel, sought an extension of
time to file a petition for review on certiorari. The Court granted Mortel’s motion for extension with a warning
that no further extension would be given. Mortel, still by himself, filed his petition for review on certiorari
assailing the CA’s dismissal of his petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether the negligence of Mortel’s counsels was so gross and palpable as to deprive him of his
property without due process of law.

HELD: Yes.
Mortel did not have his day in court, because he was unable to submit his evidence to controvert the claim
of Kerr about his contractual default after the RTC declared Mortel as in default due to his counsel’s failure
to appear at the fifth setting of the pre-trial. Yet, he explained that he was only late because he arrived in
court a few minutes after the case had been called. His explanation appears plausible, considering that he
had unfailingly appeared in court in the four previous settings of the pre-trial. In view of the fact that it was
his first time not to be present when the case was called at the fifth setting of the pre-trial, the RTC could
have allowed a second or a third call instead of immediately granting his adverse party’s motion to declare
him as in default. In Leyte v. Cusi, 152 SCRA 496 (1987), the Court has admonished against precipitate
orders of default because such orders have the effect of denying a litigant the chance to be heard. Indeed,
we have reminded trial courts that although there are instances when a party may be properly defaulted,
such instances should be the exception rather than the rule and should be allowed only in clear cases of a
litigant’s obstinate refusal or inordinate neglect to comply with the orders of the court. Without such a
showing, the litigant must be given every reasonable opportunity to present his side and to refute the
evidence of the adverse party in deference to due process of law.

Nevertheless, the negligence that actually warrants the undoing of the RTC’s decision was serial on the
part of Atty. Mas, the RTC and Atty. Tumulak.
The primary negligence occurred on the part of Atty. Mas. He did not appear at the pre-trial despite being
notified of it. What is very disturbing is that he was then an attorney in the Public Attorney’s Office in
Olongapo City whose place of work was located in the same Hall of Justice of Olongapo City where the
RTC was then sitting. Moreover, he did not offer any explanation for his non-appearance at the pre-trial
despite notice to him; nor did he take the necessary move to protect the interest of Mortel upon learning
that Mortel had been declared as in default by the RTC. His non-appearance despite notice and his
subsequent inaction for his client’s cause manifested his indifference and lack of professionalism, and is
difficult to comprehend considering that he was the primary cause why Mortel was declared as in default
by the RTC.

Atty. Tumulak shared the blame for the predicament of Mortel through his own series of errors that mirrored
an ignorance of the rules of procedure. There is no question that the errors deprived Mortel of the timely
means to successfully undo the adverse decision rendered by the RTC. Atty. Tumulak’s first error was in
filing a motion for reconsideration vis-à-vis the RTC’s denial of the petition for relief from judgment without
including a proper notice of hearing. He next filed a motion for reconsideration vis-à-vis the RTC’s denial of
his first motion for reconsideration, which the RTC then denied on the ground of its being already a
prohibited second motion for reconsideration. This was another fatal error. The series of errors did not end
there, for Atty. Tumulak opted to file in the CA a petition for review on certiorari instead of a petition for
certiorari, which was the appropriate remedy due to his alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
RTC. This was one more error. The ultimate error was not any less serious, because Atty. Tumulak filed in
the CA instead of in this Court the motion for extension of time to appeal the CA’s November 18, 2002
denial of Mortel’s motion for reconsideration. Atty. Tumulak’s moves in behalf of Mortel, no matter how well
intentioned, were contrary to the pertinent rules of procedure and worked against the client’s interest.
REMEDIAL LAW>Evidence>Presumption of Regularity
Overlap with
CRIMINAL LAW>Dangerous Drugs Act>Chain of Custody Rule

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee

vs.
LOUIE CATALAN y DEDALA, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 189330, November 28, 2012.
(First Division)

FACTS: Louie Catalan y Dedala was arrested during a buy-bust operation conducted at a billiard hall for
selling shabu, a dangerous drug, to a police officer poseur-buyer. Upon receiving the plastic sachet, PO1
Ignacio introduced himself as a police officer and moved to seize the seller, but the latter was able to run
away. PO1 Ignacio caught up with the suspect, frisked him, and recovered from him another plastic sachet
and the buy-bust money. At the police station, PO1 Ignacio turned the two plastic sachets and their
contents over to the investigator, who placed the marking “BLCO 020804” on the sachet handed to him by
the accused in exchange for the P100.00. The confiscated articles were brought to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for forensic examination. The Regional Trial Court in San Pedro, Laguna (RTC) convicted him
for violating Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165, as charged, and imposed life imprisonment and a fine of
P500,000.00. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed his conviction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is entitled to an acquittal from the charge of illegal sale of dangerous
drugs in violation of Republic Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) if the
Prosecution does not establish that the links in the chain of custody from the time of the seizure of the
dangerous drugs until the time of their presentation as evidence in court are unbroken

HELD: YES.
“Chain of Custody” means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or
controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the
time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for
destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature
of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of
custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.
Presuming that the members of the buy-bust team regularly performed their duty was patently bereft of any
factual and legal basis. The presumption of regularity in the performance of duty could not prevail over the
stronger presumption of innocence favoring the accused. Otherwise, the constitutional guarantee of the
accused being presumed innocent would be held subordinate to a mere rule of evidence allocating the
burden of evidence. Where, like here, the proof adduced against the accused has not even overcome the
presumption of innocence, the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty could not be a factor to
adjudge the accused guilty of the crime charged.
As a rule, a presumed fact like the regularity of performance by a police officer must be inferred only from
an established basic fact, not plucked out from thin air. To say it differently, it is the established basic fact
that triggers the presumed fact of regular performance. Where there is any hint of irregularity committed
by the police officers in arresting the accused and thereafter there can be no presumption of regularity of
performance in their favor.
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure>Appeals>Petition for Review on Certiorari>Special Civil
Actions> Mandamus

SPECIAL PEOPLE, INC. FOUNDATION, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN, ROBERTO P.

CERICOS, petitioner
vs.
NESTOR M. CANDA, BIENVENIDO LIPAYON, JULIAN D. AMADOR, BOHOL PROVINCIAL CHIEF,
REGIONAL DIRECTOR, AND NATIONAL DIRECTOR, RESPECTIVELY, ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT BUREAU, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, AND
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, ALL
SUED IN BOTH THEIR OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE CAPACITIES, respondents.
G.R. No. 160932, January 14, 2013
(First Division)

FACTS: The petitioner was a proponent of a water-resource development and utilization project in
Barangay Jimilia-an in the Municipality of Loboc, Bohol that would involve the tapping and purifying of water
from the Loboc River, and the distribution of the purified water to the residents of Loboc and six other
municipalities. The petitioner applied for a Certificate of Non-Coverage (CNC) with the Environmental
Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region 7,
seeking to be exempt from the requirement of the Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) under
Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1586.

On March 27, 2003, the petitioner filed a petition for mandamus and damages in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Loay, Bohol, alleging that it was now entitled to a CNC as a matter of right after having complied
with the certification requirements; and that the EMB had earlier issued a CNC to the DPWH for a similar
waterworks project in the same area. In the decision dated November 18, 2003, the RTC dismissed the
petition for mandamus. Hence, this appeal brought directly to the Court via petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has exhausted available administrative remedies through an appeal to
respondent DENR Secretary who has sat on said appeal up to the present

HELD: NO.
The petitioner failed to exhaust the available administrative remedies, and because it failed to show that it
was legally entitled to demand the performance of the act by the respondents.
It is axiomatic, to begin with, that a party who seeks the intervention of a court of law upon an administrative
concern should first avail himself of all the remedies afforded by administrative processes. The issues that
an administrative agency is authorized to decide should not be summarily taken away from it and submitted
to a court of law without first giving the agency the opportunity to dispose of the issues upon due
deliberation. The court of law must allow the administrative agency to carry out its functions and discharge
its responsibilities within the specialized areas of its competence. This rests on the theory that the
administrative authority is in a better position to resolve questions addressed to its particular expertise, and
that errors committed by subordinates in their resolution may be rectified by their superiors if given a chance
to do so.

The peremptory writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that is issued only in extreme necessity, and
the ordinary course of procedure is powerless to afford an adequate and speedy relief to one who has a
clear legal right to the performance of the act to be compelled.
REMEDIAL LAW>Special Civil Actions>Certiorari>Commission on Audit (COA)
Overlap with
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; Article VI, Section 29 (1) of the 1987 Constitution

BRENDA L. NAZARETH, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,

REGIONAL OFFICE NO. IX, ZAMBOANGA CITY, petitioner
vs.
THE HON. REYNALDO A. VILLAR, HON. JUANITO G. ESPINO, JR., (COMMISSIONERS OF THE
COMMISSION ON AUDIT), and DIR. KHEM M. INOK, respondents.
G.R. No. 188635,January 29, 2013
(EN BANC)

FACTS: Being assailed by petition for certiorari on the ground of its being issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is the decision rendered on June 4, 2009 by the
Commission on Audit (COA) in COA Case No. 2009-045 entitled Petition of Ms. Brenda L. Nazareth,
Regional Director, Department of Science and Technology, Zamboanga City, on disallowances of
subsistence, laundry, hazard and other benefits in the total amount of P3,591,130.36,2 affirming the
issuance of notices of disallowance (NDs) by the Audit Team Leader of COA Regional Office in Zamboanga
City against the payment of benefits to covered officials and employees of the Department of Science and
Technology (DOST) for calendar year (CY) 2001 out of the savings of the DOST.
The petitioner DOST Regional Director hereby seeks to declare the decision dated June 4, 2009 “null and
void,” and prays for the lifting of the disallowance of the payment of the benefits for CY 2001 for being within
the ambit of Republic Act No. 8439 (R.A. No. 8439), otherwise known as the Magna Carta for Scientists,
Engineers, Researchers, and other Science and Technology Personnel in the Government (Magna Carta,
for short), and on the strength of the Memorandum of Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora dated April
12, 2000 authorizing the use of the savings for the purpose.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COA gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in affirming the disallowance of the Magna Carta benefits for CY 2001 despite the provisions of R.A. No.
8439, and in ruling that the Memorandum of April 12, 2000 did not cover the payment of the Magna Carta
benefits for CY 2001

HELD: NO.
The April 12, 2000 Memorandum was not a blanket authority from the OP to pay the benefits out of the
DOST’s savings. No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made
by law. A violation of this constitutional edict warrants the disallowance of the payment. However, the
refund of the disallowed payment of a benefit granted by law to a covered person, agency or office of the
Government may be barred by the good faith of the approving official and of the recipient.

The COA’s assailed decision was issued in steadfast compliance of its duty under the Constitution and in
the judicious exercise of its general audit power conferred to it by the Constitution. The COA is endowed
with sufficient latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow the irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures of government funds. It has the power to ascertain whether
public funds were utilized for the purposes for which they had been intended by law. Only when the COA
has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, may the Court entertain and grant a petition for certiorari brought to assail its actions.

Inasmuch as the sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, which includes
the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, the petitioner should establish
that the COA gravely abused its discretion. The abuse of discretion must be grave, which means either that
the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion
or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually
refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or
board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough to warrant the issuance of the writ.
REMEDIAL LAW>Evidence>Presumption of Regularity>Witnesses>Dangerous Drugs Act
Overlap with
CRIMINAL LAW> Illegal Sale of Shabu>Instigation>Entrapment

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee

vs.
NOEL BARTOLOME y BAJO, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 191726, February 6, 2013
(First Division)

FACTS: That on or about the 10th day of August 2003 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any authority of law, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver to PO1 Borban Paras, who posed as
poseur buyer, one (1) heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 0.06 gram of Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride (shabu), knowing the same to be dangerous drug.
The RTC convicted Bartolome of the crime charged. On appeal, the accused argued that the operation
mounted against him was not an entrapment but an instigation, contending that without the proposal and
instigation made by poseur buyer Paras no transaction would have transpired between them; that the police
team did not show that its members had conducted any prior surveillance of him; and that the Prosecution
should have presented the informant as a witness against him. The CA affirmed his conviction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the validity of the arrest of the accused resulted from a legitimate entrapment and
not from an instigation

HELD: YES.
A buy-bust operation has been recognized in this jurisdiction as a legitimate form of entrapment of the
culprit. It is distinct from instigation, in that the accused who is otherwise not predisposed to commit the
crime is enticed or lured or talked into committing the crime. While entrapment is legal, instigation is not.
In instigation, where law enforcers act as co-principals, the accused will have to be acquitted. But
entrapment cannot bar prosecution and conviction. As has been said, instigation is a “trap for the unwary
innocent,” while entrapment is a “trap for the unwary criminal.”
The trial judge and the CA agreed in their findings on the arrest of the accused being the result of a
legitimate entrapment procedure. Such findings were based on the credible testimonies of the poseur buyer
and other competent witnesses of the Prosecution. The State showed here that the chain of custody of
the shabu was firm and unbroken. The buy-bust team properly preserved the integrity of the shabu as
evidence from the time of its seizure to the time of its presentation in court.
REMEDIAL LAW>Criminal Procedure>Appeals

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee

vs.
PO2 EDUARDO VALDEZ and EDWIN VALDEZ, accused-appellants.
G.R. No. 175602, February 13, 2013
(Special First Division)

FACTS: The two accused were tried for three counts of murder by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
86, in Quezon City. On January 20, 2005, after trial, the RTC convicted them as charged, prescribed on
each of them the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count, and ordered them to pay to the heirs of each
victim P93,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
The Court of Appeals (CA) upheld the RTC on July 18, 2006, subject to the modification that each of the
accused pay to the heirs of each victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages,
P25,000.00 as temperate damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, plus costs of suit.
The two accused then came to the Court on final appeal, but on May 9, 2007, Edwin Valdez filed a motion
to withdraw appeal, which the Court granted on October 10, 2007, thereby deeming Edwin’s appeal closed
and terminated. On January 18, 2012, the Court promulgated its judgment on the appeal of PO2 Eduardo
Valdez, finding him guilty of three counts of homicide, instead of three counts of murder, and meting on him
for each count of homicide the indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years
of reclusion temporal as maximum. Subsequently, Edwin sent to the Court Administrator a self-explanatory
letter dated March 12, 2012, where he pleaded for the application to him of the judgment promulgated on
January 18, 2012 on the ground that the judgment would be beneficial to him as an accused.

ISSUE: Whether or not an appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall affect those who did not
appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter, that
the benefits of this provision extended to all the accused, regardless of whether they appealed or not

HELD: YES.
Edwin cannot be barred from seeking the application to him of the downgrading of the crimes committed
(and the resultant lighter penalties) despite the finality of his convictions for three counts of murder due to
his withdrawal of his appeal. The downgrading of the crimes committed would definitely be favorable to
him. Worth pointing out is that to deny to him the benefit of the lessened criminal responsibilities would be
highly unfair, considering that this Court had found the two accused to have acted in concert in their deadly
assault against the victims, warranting their equal liability under the principle of conspiracy.
A literal interpretation of the phrase “did not appeal,” as espoused by private respondent, will not give justice
to the purpose of the provision. It should be read in its entirety and should not be myopically construed so
as to defeat its reason, i.e., to benefit an accused who did not join in the appeal of his co-accused in case
where the appellate judgment is favorable. In fact, several cases rendered by the Court applied the
foregoing provision without regard as to the filing or non-filing of an appeal by a co-accused, so long as the
judgment was favorable to him.
Remedial Law>Criminal Procedure>Prejudicial Question

TEODORO A. REYES, Petitioner,

vs.
ETTORE ROSSI, Respondent.
G.R. No. 159823, February 18, 2013
(First Division)

FACTS: Petitioner and Advanced Foundation Construction Systems Corporation (Advanced Foundation),
represented by respondent, executed a deed of conditional sale involving the purchase by Reyes of
equipment consisting of a Warman Dredging Pump HY 300A. The checks issued by Reyes as payment
were: a) denied payment ostensibly upon Reyes’ instructions to stop their payment, b) dishonored for
insufficiency of funds, and c) were returned with the notation Account Closed stamped on them. Reyes
commenced an action for rescission of contract and damages in the RTC, while, Rossi charged Reyes with
five counts of estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22. Reyes claims that the checks had not been issued for any
valuable consideration since there is misrepresentation in the rating of the Caterpillar diesel engine
powering the pump.

ISSUE: Whether the lower court erred in ruling that there was no prejudicial question that warranted the
suspension of the criminal proceedings against petitioner.

HELD: NO.
A prejudicial question generally comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are
both pending, and there exists in the former an issue that must first be determined before the latter may
proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et
de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The rationale for the suspension on
the ground of a prejudicial question is to avoid conflicting decisions.

Two elements that must concur in order for a civil case to be considered a prejudicial question are expressly
stated in Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit: (a) the previously instituted
civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal
action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

To properly appreciate if there is a prejudicial question to warrant the suspension of the criminal actions,
reference is made to the elements of the crimes charged. The violation of BP Blg. 22 requires the
concurrence of the following elements, namely: (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply
for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does
not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its
presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds
or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to
stop payment. The issue in the criminal actions upon the violations of BP Blg. 22 is, therefore, whether or
not Reyes issued the dishonoured checks knowing them to be without funds upon presentment. On the
other hand, the issue in the civil action for rescission is whether or not the breach in the fulfillment of
Advanced Foundation’s obligation warranted the rescission of the conditional sale. If, after trial on the merits
in the civil action, Advanced Foundation would be found to have committed material breach as to warrant
the rescission of the contract, such result would not necessarily mean that Reyes would be absolved of the
criminal responsibility for issuing the dishonored checks because, as the aforementioned elements show,
he already committed the violations upon the dishonor of the checks that he had issued at a time when the
conditional sale was still fully binding upon the parties. His obligation to fund the checks or to make
arrangements for them with the drawee bank should not be tied up to the future event of extinguishment of
the obligation under the contract of sale through rescission. Indeed, under BP Blg. 22, the mere issuance
of a worthless check was already the offense in itself. Under such circumstances, the criminal proceedings
for the violation of BP Blg. 22 could proceed despite the pendency of the civil action for rescission of the
conditional sale.
Remedial Law>Civil Procedure>Separate Trials
Remedial Law>Courts>Sandiganbayan>Jurisdiction

METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, as successor-in-interest of ASIAN BANK

CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. EDILBERTO G. SANDOVAL, HON. FRANCISCO H. VILLARUZ, JR. and HON. RODOLFO A.
PONFERRADA (in their capacities as Chairman and Members, respectively, of the Second Division
of SANDIGANBAYAN) and the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
G.R. No. 169677, February 18, 2013
(First Division)

FACTS: On July 17, 1987, the Republic brought a complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution,
accounting and damages in the Sandiganbayan against Andres V. Genito, Jr., Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda
R. Marcos and other defendants. The action was obviously to recover allegedly ill-gotten wealth of the
Marcoses, their nominees, dummies and agents. Among the properties subject of the action were two
parcels of commercial land located in Tandang Sora (Old Balara), Quezon City. On February 5, 2001, the
Republic moved for the amendment of the complaint in order to implead Asian Bank as an additional
defendant. The Sandiganbayan granted the motion. It appears that Asian Bank claimed ownership of the
two parcels of land as the registered owner. Asian Bank was also in possession of the properties by virtue
of the writ of possession issued by the RTC in Quezon City.
When the Republic was about to terminate its presentation of evidence against the original defendants, it
moved to hold a separate trial against Asian Bank. Asian Bank sought the deferment of any action on the
motion until it was first given the opportunity to test and assail the testimonial and documentary evidence
the Republic had already presented against the original defendants, and contended that it would be
deprived of its day in court if a separate trial were to be held against it without having been sufficiently
apprised about the evidence the Republic had adduced before it was brought in as an additional defendant.

ISSUE #1: Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the Republic
was entitled to a separate trial against Asian Bank.
ISSUE #2: Whether the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the issue of Asian Bank’s alleged bad faith in
acquiring the properties.

HELD #1: YES.

The rule on separate trials in civil actions is found in Section 2, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
Section 2. Separate trials.—The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, may order a
separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party complaint, or of any separate issue or
of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party complaints or issues.
The text of the rule grants to the trial court the discretion to determine if a separate trial of any claim, cross-
claim, counterclaim, or third-party complaint, or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-
claims, counterclaims, third-party complaints or issues should be held, provided that the exercise of such
discretion is in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice to any party.
Exceptions to the general rule are permitted only when there are extraordinary grounds for conducting
separate trials on different issues raised in the same case, or when separate trials of the issues will avoid
prejudice, or when separate trials of the issues will further convenience, or when separate trials of the
issues will promote justice, or when separate trials of the issues will give a fair trial to all parties. Otherwise,
the general rule must apply.
As we see it, however, the justification of the Sandiganbayan for allowing the separate trial did not constitute
a special or compelling reason like any of the exceptions. To begin with, the issue relevant to Asian Bank
was not complicated. In that context, the separate trial would not be in furtherance of convenience. And,
secondly, the cause of action against Asian Bank was necessarily connected with the cause of action
against the original defendants. Should the Sandiganbayan resolve the issue against Spouses Genito in a
separate trial on the basis of the evidence adduced against the original defendants, the properties would
be thereby adjudged as ill-gottenand liable to forfeiture in favor of the Republic without Metrobank being
given the opportunity to rebut or explain its side. The outcome would surely be prejudicial towards
Metrobank.

HELD #2: YES.

Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act No. 7975 and Republic Act No. 8249, vests
the Sandiganbayan with original exclusive jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases instituted pursuant to
and in connection with Executive Orders No. 1, No. 2, No. 14 and No. 14-A, issued in 1986 by then
President Corazon C. Aquino. Executive Order No. 1 refers to cases of recovery and sequestration of ill-
gotten wealth amassed by the Marcoses their relatives, subordinates, and close associates, directly or
through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or by using their powers, authority,
influence, connections or relationships. Executive Order No. 2 states that the ill-gotten wealth includes
assets and properties in the form of estates and real properties in the Philippines and abroad. Executive
Orders No. 14 and No. 14-A pertain to the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases relative
to the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses and their cronies.
Executive Order No. 1 refers to cases of recovery and sequestration of ill-gotten wealth amassed by the
Marcoses their relatives, subordinates, and close associates, directly or through nominees, by taking undue
advantage of their public office and/or by using their powers, authority, influence, connections or
relationships. Executive Order No. 2 states that the ill-gotten wealth includes assets and properties in the
form of estates and real properties in the Philippines and abroad. Executive Orders No. 14 and No. 14-A
pertain to the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases relative to the ill-gotten wealth of
the Marcoses and their cronies.
Remedial Law>Evidence>Witnesses>Recantation

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
TOMAS TEODORO y ANGELES, Accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 175876, February 20, 2013
(First Division)

FACTS: Tomas Teodoro the stepfather of minor, AAA, is accused of raping AAA on two separate occasions
in their home in Agusan Del Norte.

During the trial, AAA and BBB (the mother of the minor) testified for the Prosecution, but two years later
recanted and turned hostile towards the Prosecution, now telling the RTC that Teodoro had only touched
AAA’s vagina on the nights of December 18, 1997 and February 8, 1998.

The RTC convicted Teodoro on both counts of statutory rape notwithstanding the recantations by AAA and
BBB and was sustained by the CA.

ISSUE: Whether the recantation by AAA should be accepted.

HELD: NO.
As a rule, recantation is viewed with disfavor firstly because the recantation of her testimony by a vital
witness of the State like AAA is exceedingly unreliable, and secondly because there is always the possibility
that such recantation may later be repudiated.33 Indeed, to disregard testimony solemnly given in court
simply because the witness recants it ignores the possibility that intimidation or monetary considerations
may have caused the recantation. Court proceedings, in which testimony upon oath or affirmation is
required to be truthful under all circumstances, are trivialized by the recantation. The trial in which the
recanted testimony was given is made a mockery, and the investigation is placed at the mercy of an
unscrupulous witness. Before allowing the recantation, therefore, the court must not be too willing to accept
it, but must test its value in a public trial with sufficient opportunity given to the party adversely affected to
cross-examine the recanting witness both upon the substance of the recantation and the motivations for it.
The recantation, like any other testimony, is subject to the test of credibility based on the relevant
circumstances, including the demeanor of the recanting witness on the stand. In that respect, the finding of
the trial court on the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great weight on appeal unless cogent reasons
necessitate its re-examination, the reason being that the trial court is in a better position to hear first-hand
and observe the deportment, conduct and attitude of the witnesses.
Remedial Law>Civil Procedure>Parties>Real Party in Interest

STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
TOMAS CUENCA, MARCELINA CUENCA, MILAGROS CUENCA, BRAMIE T. TAYACTAC, and
MANUEL D. MARAÑON, JR., Respondents.
G.R. No. 173297, March 6, 2013
(First Division)

FACTS: Marañon filed a complaint in the RTC against the Cuencas for the collection of a sum of money
and damages. Marañon posted bond issued by Stronghold Insurance. Enforcing the writ of preliminary
attachment, the sheriff levied upon the equipment, supplies, materials and various other personal property
belonging to Arc Cuisine, Inc. that were found in the leased corporate office-cum-commissary or kitchen of
the corporation. Afterwhich, Cuencas and Tayactac claim for damages sustained from the enforcement of
the writ of preliminary attachment.
After trial, the RTC held Marañon and Stronghold Insurance jointly and solidarily liable for damages to the
Cuencas and Tayactac, which was affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE: Whether the Cuencas and Tayactac have legal standing to recover damages arising from the
wrongful attachment of the assets of Arc Cuisine, Inc. by claiming against the bond issued by Stronghold
Insurance.

HELD: NO.
There is no question that a litigation should be disallowed immediately if it involves a person without any
interest at stake, for it would be futile and meaningless to still proceed and render a judgment where there
is no actual controversy to be thereby determined. Courts of law in our judicial system are not allowed to
delve on academic issues or to render advisory opinions. They only resolve actual controversies, for that is
what they are authorized to do by the Fundamental Law itself, which forthrightly ordains that the judicial
power is wielded only to settle actual controversies involving rights that are legally demandable and
enforceable.

To ensure the observance of the mandate of the Constitution, Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court
requires that unless otherwise authorized by law or the Rules of Court every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest. Under the same rule, a real party in interest is one who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or one who is entitled to the avails of the suit.
Accordingly, a person, to be a real party in interest in whose name an action must be prosecuted, should
appear to be the present real owner of the right sought to be enforced, that is, his interest must be a present
substantial interest, not a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest.
Where the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the ground for the motion to dismiss is lack of cause of
action. The reason for this is that the courts ought not to pass upon questions not derived from any actual
controversy. Truly, a person having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court
as the plaintiff in an action. Nor does a court acquire jurisdiction over a case where the real party in interest
is not present or impleaded.

The purposes of the requirement for the real party in interest prosecuting or defending an action at law are:
(a) to prevent the prosecution of actions by persons without any right, title or interest in the case; (b) to
require that the actual party entitled to legal relief be the one to prosecute the action; (c) to avoid a
multiplicity of suits; and (d) to discourage litigation and keep it within certain bounds, pursuant to sound
public policy. Indeed, considering that all civil actions must be based on a cause of action, defined as the
act or omission by which a party violates the right of another, the former as the defendant must be allowed
to insist upon being opposed by the real party in interest so that he is protected from further suits regarding
the same claim. Under this rationale, the requirement benefits the defendant because “the defendant can
insist upon a plaintiff who will afford him a setup providing good res judicata protection if the struggle is
carried through on the merits to the end.”
Remedial Law>Civil Procedure>Appeals>Petition for Review
Overlap>Special Civil Actions>Certiorari
Overlap>Criminal Procedure>Preliminary Investigation>The Three Purposes of a
Preliminary Investigation
Overlap>Criminal Procedure>Preliminary Investigation>Prosecutors>Probable Cause
Overlap>Evidence>Circumstantial Evidence
Overlap>Evidence>Documentary Evidence>Complaints

MARIE CALLO-CLARIDAD, Petitioner,

vs.
PHILIP RONALD P. ESTEBAN and TEODORA ALYN ESTEBAN, Respondents.
G.R. No. 191567, March 20, 2013.
(First Division)

FACTS: The petitioner is the mother of the late Cheasare Armani “Chase” Callo Claridad, whose lifeless
but bloodied body was discovered in the evening of February 27, 2007 between vehicles parked at the
carport of a residential house located at No. 10 Cedar Place, Ferndale Homes, Quezon City. Allegedly,
Chase had been last seen alive with respondent Philip Ronald P. Esteban (Philip) less than an hour before
the discovery of his lifeless body.
The OCP observed that there was lack of evidence, motive, and circumstantial evidence sufficient to charge
Philip with homicide, much less murder; that the circumstantial evidence could not link Philip to the crime;
that several possibilities would discount Philip’s presence at the time of the crime, including the possibility
that there were more than one suspect in the fatal stabbing of Chase; that Philip was not shown to have
any motive to kill Chase; that their common friends attested that the two had no ill-feelings towards each
other; that no sufficient evidence existed to charge Teodora with the crime, whether as principal,
accomplice, or accessory; and that the allegation that Teodora could have been the female person engaged
in a discussion with a male person inside the car with plate JTG 333 was unreliable being mere hearsay
and was affirmed by the Secretary of Justice. The CA, likewise, dismissed the petition for review.

ISSUE: Whether the CA committed a reversible error in upholding the decision of the Secretary of Justice
finding that there was no probable cause to charge Philip and Teodora with murder for the killing of Chase.

HELD: NO.
We note, to start with, that the petitioner assailed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice by filing in the
CA a petition for review under Rule 43, Rules of Court. That was a grave mistake that immediately called
for the outright dismissal of the petition. The filing of a petition for review under Rule 43 to review the
Secretary of Justice’s resolution on the determination of probable cause was an improper remedy. Indeed,
the CA had no appellate jurisdiction vis-à-vis the Secretary of Justice.

A petition for review under Rule 43 is a mode of appeal to be taken only to review the decisions, resolutions
or awards by the quasi-judicial officers, agencies or bodies, particularly those specified in Section 1 of Rule
43. In the matter before us, however, the Secretary of Justice was not an officer performing a quasi-judicial
function. In reviewing the findings of the OCP of Quezon City on the matter of probable cause, the Secretary
of Justice performed an essentially executive function to determine whether the crime alleged against the
respondents was committed, and whether there was probable cause to believe that the respondents were
guilty thereof.

On the other hand, the courts could intervene in the Secretary of Justice’s determination of probable cause
only through a special civil action for certiorari. That happens when the Secretary of Justice acts in a limited
sense like a quasi-judicial officer of the executive department exercising powers akin to those of a court of
law. But the requirement for such intervention was still for the petitioner to demonstrate clearly that the
Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Unless
such a clear demonstration is made, the intervention is disallowed in deference to the doctrine of separation
of powers.
A preliminary investigation, according to Section 1, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, is “an inquiry or
proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime
has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.” The
investigation is advisedly called preliminary, because it is yet to be followed by the trial proper in a court of
law. The occasion is not for the full and exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence but for the presentation
only of such evidence as may engender a well-founded belief that an offense has been committed and that
the accused is probably guilty of the offense. The role and object of preliminary investigation were “to secure
the innocent against hasty, malicious, and oppressive prosecutions, and to protect him from open and public
accusation of crime, from the trouble, expenses and anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the State
from useless and expensive prosecutions.”

The Court rendered the three purposes of a preliminary investigation, to wit: (1) to inquire concerning the
commission of a crime and the connection of the accused with it, in order that he may be informed of the
nature and character of the crime charged against him, and, if there is probable cause for believing him
guilty, that the State may take the necessary steps to bring him to trial; (2) to preserve the evidence and
keep the witnesses within the control of the State; and (3) to determine the amount of bail, if the offense is
bailable. The officer conducting the examination investigates or inquires into facts concerning the
commission of a crime with the end in view of determining whether an information may be prepared against
the accused.

The determination of the existence of probable cause lies within the discretion of the public prosecutor after
conducting a preliminary investigation upon the complaint of an offended party. Probable cause for
purposes of filing a criminal information is defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof. A finding of
probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been
committed, and that it was committed by the accused. Probable cause, although it requires less than
evidence justifying a conviction, demands more than bare suspicion.

A public prosecutor alone determines the sufficiency of evidence that establishes the probable cause
justifying the filing of a criminal information against the respondent because the determination of existence
of a probable cause is the function of the public prosecutor. Generally, the public prosecutor is afforded a
wide latitude of discretion in the conduct of a preliminary investigation. Consequently, it is a sound judicial
policy to refrain from interfering in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and to just leave to the
Department of Justice the ample latitude of discretion in the determination of what constitutes sufficient
evidence to establish probable cause for the prosecution of supposed offenders. Consistent with this policy,
courts do not reverse the Secretary of Justice’s findings and conclusions on the matter of probable cause
except in clear cases of grave abuse of discretion. By way of exception, however, judicial review is permitted
where the respondent in the preliminary investigation clearly establishes that the public prosecutor
committed grave abuse of discretion, that is, when the public prosecutor has exercised his discretion in an
arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, patent and
gross enough as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law. Moreover, the trial court may ultimately resolve the existence or non-existence of probable cause by
examining the records of the preliminary investigation when necessary for the orderly administration of
justice. Although policy considerations call for the widest latitude of deference to the public prosecutor’s
findings, the courts should never shirk from exercising their power, when the circumstances warrant, to
determine whether the public prosecutor’s findings are supported by the facts, and by the law.

This Court disagrees with the reliance of petitioner solely on circumstantial evidence, which she insists to
be enough to warrant the indictment of respondents for murder.

For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances must be consistent
with one another and must constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion that
a crime has been committed and that the respondents are probably guilty thereof. The pieces of evidence
must be consistent with the hypothesis that the respondents were probably guilty of the crime and at the
same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that they were innocent, and with every rational hypothesis
except that of guilt. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient, therefore, if: (a) there is more than one
circumstance, (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven, and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
To be sure, some of the affidavits were unsworn. The statements subscribed and sworn to before the
officers of the Philippine National Police (PNP) having the authority to administer oaths upon matters
connected with the performance of their official duties undeniably lacked the requisite certifications to the
effect that such administering officers had personally examined the affiants, and that such administering
officers were satisfied that the affiants had voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits.
The lack of the requisite certifications from the affidavits of most of the other witnesses was in violation of
Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, which pertinently provides thusly:

Section 3. Procedure.―The preliminary investigation shall be conducted in the following manner:

(a) The complaint shall state the address of the respondent and shall be accompanied by the affidavits of
the complainant and his witnesses, as well as other supporting documents to establish probable cause.
They shall be in such number of copies as there are respondents, plus two (2) copies for the official file.
The affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor or government official authorized to
administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, before a notary public, each of who must certify that
he personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood
their affidavits.
REMEDIAL LAW>CIVIL PROCEDURES>PETITION FOR REVIEW

SEGUNDINA A. GALVEZ, Petitioner,

vs
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES HONORIO C. MONTANO and SUSANA P. MONTANO and
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Respondents
G.R. No. 157445, April 3, 2013

FACTS: The case involves a parcel of land, which used to be owned by Spouses Eustacio and Segundina
Galvez. After their marital relationship turned sour, they separated and cohabited with other partners.
Eustacio sold the property to their daughter Jovita without the knowledge or consent of Segundina. Jovita
constituted a mortgage on the property to secure her loan from PNB but failed to pay her obligation, hence,
the property was extrajudicially foreclosed. The property became PNB’s acquired asset and was
subsequently sold to respondents Spouses Honorio and Susana Montaño. Montaños sued Segundina for
recovery of ownership and possession, and damages in the MTC Leyte. Segundina countered that the
sale of the property by Eustacio to Jovita was null and void for having been done without her knowledge
and consent; that the sale to PNB as well as to the Montaños were consequently void; and that the
Montaños were also buyers in bad faith. MTC ruled in favor of the Montaños. The RTC affirmed the MTC’s
decision. Segundina appealed to the CA by petition for review but the CA ruled that the instant petition for
review is hereby DISMISSED outright. Segundina moved for the reconsideration of the resolution but the
same was denied. The CA held that, at any rate, the procedural repercussion of petitioner’s omission is
evidence from Section 3, Rule 43 of Rules, viz: "Section 3. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. –
The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the x x x contents
of the document which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof."

ISSUES: WON the CA committed an error of law when it (1) imposed an unreasonable requirement that
all pleadings filed before the lower courts should be attached to the petition; and (2) dismissed the petition
for review despite the attachment of material portions of the record as would support the petition.

HELD: Yes.
Petitioner’s failure to append the pleadings and pertinent documents to the petition can be rectified by the
subsequent filing of a motion for reconsideration to which is attached the omitted pleadings and documents
as required by the CA. Mere failure to attach copies of the pleadings and other material portions of the
record as would support the allegations of the petition for review is not necessarily fatal as to warrant the
outright denial of due course when the clearly legible duplicate originals or true copies of the judgments or
final orders of both lower courts, certified correct by the clerk of court of the RTC, and other attachments of
the petition sufficiently substantiate the allegations.

The Court has laid down three guideposts in determining the necessity of attaching the pleadings and
portions of the records to the petition: First, not all pleadings and parts of case records are required to be
attached to the petition. Only those which are relevant and pertinent must accompany it. The test of
relevancy is whether the document in question will support the material allegations in the petition, whether
said document will make out a prima facie case of grave abuse of discretion as to convince the court to
give due course to the petition; Second, even if a document is relevant and pertinent to the petition, it need
not be appended if it is shown that the contents thereof can also found in another document already
attached to the petition; Third, a petition lacking an essential pleading or part of the case record may still
be given due course or reinstated upon showing that petitioner later submitted the documents required, or
that it will serve the higher interest of justice that the case be decided on the merits. The guideposts, which
equally apply to a petition for review filed in the CA.

For this case, then, the Court considers the attachments of Segundina’s petition for review is sufficient to
enable the CA to pass upon her assigned errors and to resolve her appeal even without the pleadings and
other portions of the records. To still deny due course to her petition for not attaching the complaint and the
answer despite the MTC decision having substantially summarized their contents was to ignore the spirit
and purpose of the requirement to give sufficient information to the CA.
REMEDIAL LAW>CRIMINAL PROCEDURES>RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO BE INFORMED OF THE
NATURE AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM / VARIANCE RULE

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

Vs
CHAD MANANSALA y LAGMAN, Accused-Appellant
G.R. No. 175939, April 3, 2013
FIRST DIVISION

FACTS: The information filed alleged that the above-named accused, without being lawfully authorized did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly engage in selling, delivering, giving away to another and
distributing more or less 750 grams or 3/4 kilo of marijuana dried leaves placed in a small wooden box
inside the cabinet, which are prohibited drugs, found in his possession and control. To substantiate the
charge, the Prosecution showed that the PNP conducted a test-buy operation against Manansala.
Following the test-buy, the PNP applied for and obtained a search warrant to authorize the search for and
seizure of prohibited drugs in Manansala’s residence. The search yielded the 750 grams of dried marijuana
leaves subject of the information. Also seized was the amount of P655.00 that included the two marked
P50.00 bills used during the test buy. Manansala pleaded not guilty. City Prosecutor Mario F. Manalansan
filed a motion for the admission of an amended information, ostensibly to modify the offense charged from
illegal sale of prohibited drugs under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425 to illegal possession of prohibited
drugs under Section 8 of the same law. The RTC did not act on the motion but the trial proceeded.
Manansala denied the charge, alleging that he had been the victim of a frame-up. The RTC convicted
Manansala for illegal possession of marijuana in violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425. The CA
promulgated its assailed decision, affirming the conviction subject to modification. Hence, the appeal.

ISSUE: Whether the conviction of Manansala for a violation of Section 8, which the information did not
allege, instead of for a violation of Section 4, which the information alleged, was not in violation of his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation brought against him.

HELD: No.
There have been many occasions in which the Court has found an accused charged with the illegal sale of
marijuana in violation of Section 4 guilty instead of the illegal possession of marijuana in violation of Section
8. The Court held as prevailing the doctrine that the illegal sale of marijuana absorbs the illegal possession
of marijuana, except if the seller was also apprehended in the illegal possession of another quantity of
marijuana not covered by or not included in the illegal sale, and the other quantity of marijuana was probably
intended for some future dealings or use by the accused. It being established that illegal possession is an
element of and is necessarily included in the illegal sale of prohibited drugs, the Court will thus determine
appellant’s culpability under Section 8.

The CA correctly declared that the illegal possession of marijuana was "a crime that is necessarily included
in the crime of drug pushing or dealing, for which the accused have been charged with." The right of
Manansala to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him enunciated in Section
14(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution was not violated simply because the information had precisely
charged him with selling, delivering, giving away and distributing more or less 750 grams of dried marijuana
leaves. Thereby, he was being sufficiently given notice that he was also to be held to account for possessing
more or less 750 grams of dried marijuana leaves. The crime of illegal sale of marijuana defined and
punished under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, implied the prior possession of the
marijuana. As such, the crime of illegal sale included or absorbed the crime of illegal possession. The rule
is that when there is a variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information, and that
proved or established by the evidence, and the offense as charged necessarily includes the offense proved,
the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved included in that which is charged. According to Section
5, Rule 120, Rules of Court (1985), the rule then applicable, an offense charged necessarily includes that
which is proved, when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the
complaint or information, constitute the latter.
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedures/Criminal Procedures>Mandamus/State Witness

DATU ANDAL AMPATUAN JR., Petitioner

vs.
SEC. LEILA DE LIMA, as Secretary of the Department of Justice, CSP CLARO ARELLANO, as
Chief State Prosecutor, National Prosecution Service, and PANEL OF PROSECUTORS OF THE
MAGUINDANAO MASSACRE, headed by RSP PETER MEDALLE, Respondents.
G.R. No. 197291, April 3, 2013

FACTS: Innocent civilians were massacred in Sitio Masalay, Municipality of Ampatuan, Maguindanao
Province. Among the principal suspects was petitioner, then the Mayor of the Municipality of Datu Unsay,
Maguindanao Province. Inquest proceedings were conducted against petitioner. In the joint resolution, the
Panel of Prosecutors charged 196 individuals with multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao
massacre. It appears that in issuing the joint resolution, the Panel of Prosecutors partly relied on the twin
affidavits of one Kenny Dalandag. Dalandag was admitted into the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ.
Petitioner, through counsel, wrote to respondent Secretary of Justice Leila De Lima and Assistant Chief
State Prosecutor Richard Fadullon to request the inclusion of Dalandag in the informations for murder
considering that Dalandag had already confessed his participation in the massacre through his two sworn
declarations. Secretary De Lima denied petitioner’s request. Petitioner brought a petition for mandamus
in the RTC in Manila seeking to compel respondents to charge Dalandag as another accused in the various
murder cases undergoing trial in the QC RTC. The RTC of Manila dismissed the petition for mandamus.
Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE#1: Whether respondents may be compelled by writ of mandamus to charge Dalandag as an

accused for multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao massacre despite his admission to the Witness
Protection Program of the DOJ.
ISSUE#2: Whether the subsequent inclusion of Kenny Dalandag in the Witness Protection Program
justifies exclusion as an accused and his non-indictment for his complicity in the Maguindanao massacre
notwithstanding admissions made that he took part in its planning and execution.

HELD#1: No.
Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It
is proper when the act against which it is directed is one addressed to the discretion of the tribunal or officer.
In matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus may only be resorted to in order
to compel respondent tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person to take action, but it cannot be used to
direct the manner or the particular way discretion is to be exercised,or to compel the retraction or reversal
of an action already taken in the exercise of judgment or discretion.
As such, respondent Secretary of Justice may be compelled to act on the letter-request of petitioner, but
may not be compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such letter-request. Considering that
respondent Secretary of Justice already denied the letter-request, mandamus was no longer available as
petitioner's recourse.

HELD#2: Yes.
The admission as a state witness under Republic Act No. 6981 also operates as an acquittal, and said
witness cannot subsequently be included in the criminal information except when he fails or refuses to
testify. The immunity for the state witness is granted by the DOJ, not by the trial court. Should such witness
be meanwhile charged in court as an accused, the public prosecutor, upon presentation to him of the
certification of admission into the Witness Protection Program, shall petition the trial court for the discharge
of the witness. The Court shall then order the discharge and exclusion of said accused from the information.
That he admitted his participation in the commission of the Maguindanao massacre was no hindrance to
his admission into the Witness Protection Program as a state witness, for all that was necessary was for
him to appear not the most guilty. Accordingly, he could not anymore be charged for his participation in the
Maguindanao massacre, as to which his admission operated as an acquittal, unless he later on refuses or
fails to testify in accordance with the sworn statement that became the basis for his discharge against those
now charged for the crimes.
REMEDIAL LAW>CIVIL PROCEDURES> MOTION TO DISMISS>RES JUDICATA

CATALINA B. CHU, THEANLYN B. CHU, THEAN CHING LEE B. CHU, THEAN LEEWN B. CHU, and
MARTIN LAWRENCE B. CHU, Petitioners,
vs
SPOUSES FERNANDO C. CUNANAN and TRINIDAD N. CUNANAN, BENELDA ESTATE
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, and SPOUSES AMADO E. CARLOS and GLORIA A. CARLOS,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 156185, September 12, 2011
FIRST DIVISION

FACTS: Spouses Manuel and Catalina Chu (Chus) executed a deed of sale with assumption of mortgage
involving their five parcels of land in favor of Trinidad N. Cunanan (Cunanan). The parties further stipulated
that the ownership of the lots would remain with the Chus as the vendors and would be transferred to
Cunanan only upon complete payment of the total consideration. Cunanan was able to transfer the title of
the five lots to her name without the knowledge of the Chus. [S]he later transferred two of the lots to
Spouses Carlos and assigned the remaining three lots to Cool Town Realty. Chus commenced Civil Case
No. G-1936 in the RTC to recover the unpaid balance from Cunanans but later amended the complaint to
implead Cool Town Realty. The Carloses had meanwhile sold the two lots to Benelda Estate. Chus, the
Cunanans, and Cool Town Realty entered into a compromise agreement whereby the Cunanans
transferred to the Chus their 50% share in all the parcels of land for and in consideration of the full
settlement of their case. RTC approved the compromise agreement. Subsequently, the petitioners herein
brought another suit, Civil Case No. 12251, against the Carloses and Benelda Estate, seeking the
cancellation of the TCTs of the two lots in the name of Benelda Estate, and the issuance of new TCTs in
their favor, plus damages. The Cunanans moved to dismiss the amended complaint based on two grounds:
(a) bar by prior judgment, and (b) the claim or demand had been paid, waived, and abandoned. Benelda
Estate likewise moved to dismiss the amended complaint, citing as grounds: (a) forum shopping; (b) bar by
prior judgment, and (c) failure to state a cause of action. RTC denied both motions to dismiss. The CA
ruled that the compromise agreement had ended the legal controversy between the parties with respect to
the cause of action arising from the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage covering all the five parcels
of land; x x x; and that the filing of Civil Case No.12251 contravened the rule against splitting of a cause of
action, and rendered Civil Case No.12251 subject of a motion to dismiss based on bar by res judicata.

ISSUE: Whether or not Civil Case No. 12251 was barred by res judicata although the compromise
agreement did not expressly include Benelda Estate as a party and although the compromise agreement
made no reference to the lots now registered in Benelda Estates name.

HELD: Yes.
A compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a
litigation or put an end to one already commenced. It encompasses the objects specifically stated therein,
although it may include other objects by necessary implication, and is binding on the contracting parties,
being expressly acknowledged as a juridical agreement between them. It has the effect and authority of res
judicata upon the parties. Yet, in order that res judicata may bar the institution of a subsequent action, the
following requisites must concur: (a) the former judgment must be final; (b) it must have been rendered by
a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and
(d) there must be between the first and second actions (i) identity of parties, (ii) identity of the subject matter,
and (iii) identity of cause of action.

The first requisite was attendant. Civil Case No. G-1936 was already terminated under the compromise
agreement, for the judgment, being upon a compromise, was immediately final and unappealable. As to
the second requisite, the RTC had jurisdiction over the cause of action in Civil Case No. G-1936 for the
enforcement or rescission of the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage, which was an action whose
subject matter was not capable of pecuniary estimation. That the compromise agreement explicitly settled
the entirety of Civil Case No. G-1936 by resolving all the claims of the parties against each other indicated
that the third requisite was also satisfied. There is identity of parties when the parties in both actions are
the same, or there is privity between them, or they are successors-in-interest. The requirement of the
identity of parties was fully met, because the Chus, on the one hand, and the Cunanans, on the other hand,
were the parties in both cases along with their respective privies. The fact that the Carloses and Benelda
Estate, defendants in Civil Case No. 12251, were not parties in the compromise agreement was
inconsequential, for they were also the privies of the Cunanans as transferees and successors-in-interest.
It is settled that the absolute identity of parties was not a condition sine qua non for res judicata to apply,
because a shared identity of interest sufficed. Mere substantial identity of parties, or even community of
interests between parties in the prior and subsequent cases, even if the latter were not impleaded in the
first case, was sufficient. As to identity of the subject matter, both actions dealt with the properties involved
in the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage. Identity of the causes of action was also met, because
Case No. G-1936 and Civil Case No. 12251 were rooted in one and the same cause of action the failure of
Cunanan to pay in full the purchase price of the five lots. In other words, Civil Case No. 12251 reprised
Civil Case No. G-1936.
REMEDIAL LAW>CIVIL PROCEDURES>APPEAL BY CERTIORARI

MAGLANA RICE AND CORN MILL, INC., and RAMON P. DAO, Petitioners,
vs
ANNIE L. TAN and her husband MANUEL TAN, Respondents.
G.R. No. 159051, September 21, 2011
FIRST DIVISION

FACTS: The vehicular accident, which involved the Fuso truck owned by petitioner Maglana Rice and Corn
Mill, Inc., driven by its employee, petitioner Ramon P. Dao, and the Honda Accord sedan owned by the
respondents, driven by respondent Manuel Tan. The respondents demanded reimbursement of their
expenses for the repair of their car, but the petitioners, denying liability, refused the demand. The version
of the respondents is that their car was travelling along the Davao-Agusan Road, but had to stop upon
reaching the All Trac Compound. Dao, who was driving the truck, failed to stop and his truck bumped the
car at its rear. The petitioners gave a different version. As he decelerated preparatory to coming to a full
stop, the respondents car overtook the truck from the right lane and suddenly cut into his lane at a very
unsafe distance. This cutting-in caused the right front portion of the truck to come into contact with the left
rear of the respondents car just when the car was in a diagonal position with about two feet of its rear still
on the right lane. The MTCC accorded greater credence to the version of the respondents. RTC upheld
the MTCC. The petitioners further appealed to the CA, which denied their petition for lack of merit. Hence,
this appeal to the Court by petition for review on certiorari, whereby the petitioners reiterate that the fault
for the vehicular accident was attributable to the respondents.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents car suddenly cut into the lane of the petitioners truck, and whether
or not Dao simply failed to stop on time despite the respondents car having already come to a full stop due
to traffic congestion along the road.

RULING: The appeal deserves outright rejection. The issue is obviously a factual one because it requires
the ascertainment of which driver was negligent. As such, the appeal fails, for a petition for review on
certiorari, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, shall raise only questions of law. A question,
to be one of law, must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the
litigants or any of them. The limitation exists, because the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts that
undertakes the re-examination and re-assessment of the evidence presented by the contending parties
during the trial. The appreciation and resolution of factual issues are the functions of the lower courts,
whose resulting findings are then received with respect and are binding on the Supreme Court subject to
certain exceptions. Although the Court has recognized several exceptions to the limitation of an appeal by
certiorari to only questions of law, including: (a) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (c)
when there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e)
when the findings of facts are conflicting; (f) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond
the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
(g) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (h) when the findings are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (i) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as
in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (j) when the findings of fact are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (k) when
the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion, this appeal does not come under the exceptions.

In this recourse, the petitioners have presented no ground sufficient to persuade the Court to treat their
appeal as coming under any of the aforementioned exceptions as to warrant the review of the uniform
findings of fact and conclusions made by the MTCC, RTC and CA. After the CA upheld the appellate
judgment of the RTC, they should have desisted on their own volition from coming to the Court, seeing that
the only issues that they would be raising were plainly factual in nature. . They did not desist despite their
attorney being surely aware of the limitation to questions of law of any appeal to the Court on account of its
not being a trier of facts. Under such circumstances, their appeal was made notwithstanding its being
patently frivolous.
REMEDIAL LAW>Criminal Procedure/Bail
Overlap with
Legal Ethics

ATTY. FRANKLIN G. GACAL, Complainant

vs.
JUDGE JAIME I. INFANTE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 38, IN ALABEL, SARANGANI,
Respondent..
A.M. No. RTJ- 04-1845; October 5, 2011
[FIRST DIVISION]

FACTS: Judge Balanag, Jr. of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Kiamba-Maitum, Sarangani issued a
warrant for the arrest of Faustino Ancheta in connection with a murder case and without recommendation
for bail. Ancheta, who had meanwhile gone into hiding, was not arrested. Upon review, the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor, acting through Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Barcelona, Jr., affirmed the findings
and recommendation of Judge Balanag on the offense to be charged, and accordingly filed in the RTC an
information for murder (Criminal Case No. 1136-03), but with a recommendation for bail in the amount of
P400,000.00. Criminal Case No. 1136-03 was raffled to Judge Infantes Branch.

Judge Infante issued twin orders, one granting bail to Ancheta, and another releasing Ancheta from
custody. Atty. Gacal, upon learning of the aforesaid twin orders, filed a Very Urgent Motion For
Reconsideration And/Or To Cancel Bailbond With Prayer To Enforce Warrant Of Arrest Or Issue Warrant
Of Arrest Anew Or In The Alternative Very Urgent Motion For This Court To Motu Prop[r]io Correct An
Apparent And Patent Error. Judge Infante denied Atty. Gacal’s very urgent motion on the ground that the
motion was pro forma for not bearing the conformity of the public prosecutor and that he had not been
authorized to act as such pursuant to Section 5, Rule 110, of the Rules of Court. When no order regarding
the matter of bail was issued, Atty. Gacal sought the inhibition of Judge Infante on the ground of his gross
incompetence manifested by his failure to exercise judicial power to resolve the issue of bail. He also
contend that the granting of bail without a petition for bail being filed by the accused or a hearing being held
for that purpose constituted gross ignorance of the law and the rules.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Infante is correct in granting bail to the accused without conducting the
requisite bail hearing?

HELD: NO.
Rule 114, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, as amended, states that: No person charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment when the evidence of guilt is
strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of criminal action. Even where there is no petition
for bail in a case like Criminal Case No. 1138-03, a hearing should still be held. This hearing is separate
and distinct from the initial hearing to determine the existence of probable cause, in which the trial judge
ascertains whether or not there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty of the crime. The Prosecution must be given a chance
to show the strength of its evidence; otherwise, a violation of due process occurs. Being the trial judge,
Judge Infante had to be aware of the precedents laid down by the Supreme Court regarding the bail hearing
being mandatory and indispensable. He ought to have remembered, then, that it was only through such
hearing that he could be put in a position to determine whether the evidence for the Prosecution was weak
or strong. Hence, his dispensing with the hearing manifested a gross ignorance of the law and the rules.
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure>Appeal/Non-Forum Shopping

PRISCILLA ALMA JOSE, Petitioner,

vs.
RAMON C. JAVELLANA, ET AL., Respondents.
G.R. No. 158239; January 25, 2012
[FIRST DIVISION]

FACTS: Alma Jose sold to Javellana a land. After the former died, her undertaking fall on her sole surviving
heir – Priscilla. Priscilla did not comply with the undertaking to cause the registration of the properties and
instead began to improve the properties with the intention of converting it into a residential or industrial
subdivision. Javellana commenced an action for specific performance, injunction and damages against her
in the RTC. Priscilla filed a motion to dismiss w/c was initially denied by the RTC. Upon her motion for
reconsideration, the RTC granted her motion to dismiss. Javellana appealed which the RTC gave due
course to hence this petition.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Ramon Javellana’s appeal was belatedly filed.
2. Whether or not Ramon Javellana is guilty of forum shopping.

HELD:

1. NO. To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity
to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which
to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing
a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.

2. NO. For forum shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same transaction, same essential
facts and circumstances and must raise identical causes of action, subject matter and issues.
Clearly, it does not exist where different orders were questioned, two distinct causes of action and
issues were raised, and two objectives were sought.

Two distinct cause of action: In his appeal, Javellana aimed to undo the RTC’s erroneous dismissal
of Civil Case to clear the way for his judicial demand for specific performance to be tried and
determined in due course by the RTC; but his petition for certiorari had another ostensible objective
"to prevent (Priscilla) from developing the subject property and from proceeding with the ejectment
case until his appeal is finally resolved.
REMEDIAL LAW>Criminal Procedure/Evidence

ANNA LERIMA PATULA, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 164457; April 11, 2012
[FIRST DIVISION]

FACTS: Petitioner was charged with estafa in the RTC in Dumaguete City. The said accused, being then
a saleswoman of Footluckers Chain of Stores, Inc., Dumaguete City, having collected and received the
total sum of P131,286.97 from several customers of said company under the express obligation to
account for the proceeds of the sales and deliver the collection to the said company, but far from
complying with her obligation and after a reasonable period of time despite repeated demands therefore,
unlawfully failed to deliver the said collection to the said company but instead, misappropriated the
proceeds of the sale to her own use and benefit.

Lamberto Go (Branch Manager) had requested the store auditor to audit petitioner after some customers
had told him that they had already paid their accounts but the office ledger had still reflected outstanding
balances for them. Karen Guivencan (Company Auditor) discovered in the course of her audit that the
amounts appearing on the original copies of receipts in the possession of around 50 customers varied from
the amounts written on the duplicate copies of the receipts petitioner submitted to the office.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the failure of the information for estafa to allege the falsification of the duplicate receipts
issued by petitioner to her customers violated petitioners right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation;
(2) Whether or not Guivencan’s testimony on the ledgers and receipts (Exhibits B to YY, and their
derivatives, inclusive) to prove petitioner’s misappropriation or conversion was inadmissible for being
hearsay.

HELD:
1. NO. Failure of information to allege falsification did not violate petitioner’s right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation as guaranteed under the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. Rule
110 of the Revised Rules of Court, the rule then in effect when the information was filed in the RTC,
contained the provisions on the proper manner of alleging the nature and cause of the accusation in
the information particularly under Section 8 (Designation of the Offense) and Section 9 (Cause of
Accusation). An accused cannot be convicted of an offense that is not clearly charged in the complaint
or information. To convict him of an offense other than that charged in the complaint or information
would be violative of the Constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.
Indeed, the accused cannot be convicted of a crime, even if duly proven, unless the crime is alleged
or necessarily included in the information filed against him. The crime of estafa charged against
petitioner was defined and penalized by Article 315, paragraph 1 (b), Revised Penal Code.

Petitioner misappropriated or converted the sums paid by her customers, and later falsified the
duplicates of the receipts before turning such duplicates to her employer to show that the customers
had paid less than the amounts actually reflected on the original receipts. Obviously, she committed
the falsification in order to conceal her misappropriation or conversion. Considering that the
falsification was not an offense separate and distinct from the estafa charged against her, the
Prosecution could legitimately prove her acts of falsification as its means of establishing her
misappropriation or conversion as an essential ingredient of the crime duly alleged in the information.
In that manner, her right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her was not
infringed or denied to her.

The SC consider it inevitable to conclude that the information herein completely pleaded the estafa
defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b), Revised Penal Code within the context of
 the substantive law and the rules. Verily, there was no necessity for the information to allege the acts
of falsification by petitioner because falsification was not an element of the estafa charged.

2. YES. Testimonial and documentary evidence, being hearsay, did not prove petitioners guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Go essentially described for the trial court the various duties of petitioner as
Footluckers sales representative. On her part, Guivencan conceded having no personal knowledge of
the amounts actually received by petitioner from the customers or remitted by petitioner to Footluckers.
This means that persons other than Guivencan prepared Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives,
inclusive, and that Guivencan based her testimony on the entries found in the receipts supposedly
issued by petitioner and in the ledgers held by Footluckers corresponding to each customer, as well
as on the unsworn statements of some of the customers. Accordingly, her being the only witness who
testified on the entries effectively deprived the RTC of the reasonable opportunity to validate and test
the veracity and reliability of the entries as evidence of petitioner’s misappropriation or conversion
through cross-examination by petitioner. The denial of that Opportunity rendered the entire proof of
misappropriation or conversion hearsay, and thus unreliable and untrustworthy for purposes of
determining the guilt or innocence of the accused.

Section 36 of Rule 130, Rules of Court states that a witness can testify only to those facts that she
knows of her personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from her own perception, except as
otherwise provided in the Rules of Court. In case a witness is permitted to testify based on what she
has heard another person say about the facts in dispute, the person from whom the witness derived
the information on the facts in dispute is not in courtand under oath to be examined and cross-
examined. The weight of such testimony then depends not upon the veracity of the witness but upon
the veracity of the other person giving the information to the witness without oath. The information
cannot be tested because the declarant is not standing in court as a witness and cannot, therefore, be
cross-examined. Thus, the rule against hearsay testimony rests mainly on the ground that there was
no opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. The rule excluding hearsay as evidence is based upon
serious concerns about the trustworthiness and reliability of hearsay evidence due to its not being
given under oath or solemn affirmation and due to its not being subjected to cross-examination by the
opposing counsel to test the perception, memory, veracity and articulateness of the out-of-court
declarant or actor upon whose reliability the worth of the out-of-court statement depends.

Based on the foregoing considerations, Guivencans testimony as well as Exhibits B to YY, and their
derivatives, inclusive, must be entirely rejected as proof of petitioners misappropriation or conversion.
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure>Preliminary Injunction

NERWIN INDUSTRIES CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
PNOC-ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, and ESTER R. GUERZON, Chairman,
Bids and Awards Committee, Respondents.
G.R. No. 167057; April 11, 2012
[FIRST DIVISION]

FACTS: In 1999, the National Electrification Administration (NEA) published an invitation to pre-qualify and
to bid for a contract, otherwise known as IPB No. 80, for the supply and delivery of about 60,000 pieces of
woodpoles and 20,000 pieces of cross-arms needed in the country’s Rural Electrification Project. Following
a thorough review of the bidders’ qualifications and eligibility, only four (4) bidders, including private
respondent, qualified to participate in the bidding for the IPB-80 contract wherein respondent emerged as
the lowest bidder. NEA then conducted a pre-award inspection of private respondents manufacturing plants
and facilities to determine its capability to supply and deliver NEAs requirements. NEA administrator
recommended to NEAs Board of Directors (BOD) the approval of award to private respondent. However,
NEAs BODs passed Resolution No. 32 reducing by 50% the material requirements for IBP No. 80 given
the time limitations for the delivery of the materials, and with the loan closing date fast approaching. In turn,
it resolved to award the 4 schedules of IPB No. 80 at a reduced number to private respondent. The latter
protested the said 50% reduction, alleging that the same was a ploy to accommodate a losing bidder and
that NEA held negotiations with other bidders relative to the IPB-80 contract, prompting private respondent
to file a complaint for specific performance with prayer for the issuance of an injunction, which was granted.
Nerwin also filed a civil action in the RTC in Manila alleging that Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 [an invitation
to pre-qualify and to bid for wooden poles needed for its Samar Rural Electrification Project (O-ILAW)] was an attempt to subject
a portion of the items covered by IPB No. 80 to another bidding; and praying that a TRO issue to enjoin
respondents proposed bidding for the wooden poles. RTC issued preliminary injunction enjoining the
defendant PNOC-EDC and its Chairman of Bids and Awards Committee from continuing the holding of the
subject bidding.

Respondents commenced in the CA a special civil action for certiorari, alleging that the RTC had hereby
committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Nerwin had been entitled to the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction despite the express prohibition from the law and from the Supreme Court; in issuing
the TRO in blatant violation of the Rules of Court and established jurisprudence.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the case on the basis of Rep. Act 8975 prohibiting the issuance
of temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions, except if issued by the Supreme Court, on
government projects.

HELD: NO.
The RTC gravely abused its discretion, firstly, when it entertained the complaint of Nerwin against
respondents notwithstanding that Nerwin was thereby contravening the express provisions of Section 3 and
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8975 for its seeking to enjoin the bidding out by respondents of the O-ILAW
Project; and, secondly, when it issued the TRO and the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction.

Section 3. Prohibition on the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Orders, Preliminary Injunctions and
Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions. No court, except the Supreme Court, shall issue any temporary
restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction against the government, or any
of its subdivisions, officials or any person or entity, whether public or private, acting under the governments
irection, to restrain, prohibit or compel the following acts: xxx (b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of
the national government as defined under Section 2 hereof; xxx.

Section 4. Nullity of Writs and Orders. - Any temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or
preliminary mandatory injunction issued in violation of Section 3 hereof is void and of no force and effect.
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or
final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or person, to refrain from a particular act or acts. It is an
ancillary or preventive remedy resorted to by a litigant to protect or preserve his rights or interests during
the pendency of the case. As such, it is issued only when it is established that:

(a) The applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in
restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the
performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually; or
(b) The commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the
litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) A party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or
suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting
the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.

In this regard, the Rules of Court grants a broad latitude to the trial courts considering that conflicting claims
in an application for a provisional writ more often than not involve and require a factual determination that
is not the function of the appellate courts. Nonetheless, the exercise of such discretion must be sound,
that is, the issuance of the writ, though discretionary, should be upon the grounds and in the
manner provided by law. When that is done, the exercise of sound discretion by the issuing court in
injunctive matters must not be interfered with except when there is manifest abuse.
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure>Extrajudicial Foreclosure/Doctrine of Immutability of a Final Judgment
Overlap with
CIVIL LAW>Sales>Extrajudicial Foreclosure

SPOUSES FRANCISCO and MERCED RABAT, Petitioners

vs.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Respondent.
G.R. No. 158755; June 18, 2012
[FIRST DIVISION]

FACTS:
Respondent spouses Francisco and Merced Rabat (hereafter RABATs) was granted a medium-term loan
of P4.0 Million by the PNB, to mature three years from the date of implementation. RABATs signed a Credit
Agreement and executed a Real Estate Mortgage (REM) over twelve (12) parcels of land which stipulated
that the loan would be subject to interest at the rate of 17% per annum, plus the appropriate service charge
and penalty charge of 3% per annum. Subsequently, RABATs executed another Agreement purposely to
increase the interest rate to 21% per annum, and likewise executed another REM over nine (9) parcels of
land as additional security for their loan. The several availments of the loan accommodation on various
dates by the RABATs reached the aggregate amount of P3,517,380. For failure of the RABATs to pay their
obligation, the PNB filed a petition for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage. After due
notice and publication, the mortgaged parcels of land were sold at a public auction. The PNB was the lone
and highest bidder with a bid of P3,874,800.00. As the proceeds of the public auction were not enough to
satisfy the entire obligation of the RABATs, the PNB sent anew demand letters to settle their remaining
outstanding obligation which then stood at P14,745,398.25.

RTC nullify the auction sales on the ground that the PNB’s winning bid is very low. In the CA second
decision, it set aside its first decision upholding the RTC decision and ordered the RABATS to pay the
deficiency in the loan obligation of appellees.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the inadequacy of the bid price of PNB invalidated the forced sale of the properties.
(2) Whether or not PNB was entitled to recover any deficiency from the Spouses Rabat.
(3) Whether or not the CA validly rendered its second amended decision.

HELD:
(1) NO. The SC consistently held that the inadequacy of the bid price at a forced sale, unlike that in an
ordinary sale, is immaterial and does not nullify the sale; in fact, in a forced sale, a low price is
considered more beneficial to the mortgage debtor because it makes redemption of the property
easier. At any rate, SC consider it notable enough that PNBs bid price of ₱3,874,800.00 might not
even be said to be outrageously low as to be shocking to the conscience.

(2) YES. The fact that the mortgaged property was sold at an amount less than its actual market value
should not militate against the right to such recovery. Equally axiomatic are that a contract is the law
between the contracting parties, and that they have the autonomy to include therein such stipulations,
clauses, terms and conditions as they may want to include. Inasmuch as the Spouses Rabat did not
challenge the legitimacy and efficacy of the additional liabilities being charged by PNB, they could not
now bar PNB from recovering the deficiency representing the additional pecuniary liabilities that the
proceeds of the forced sales did not cover.

(3) YES. Verily, all courts of law have the unquestioned power to alter, modify, or set aside their decisions
before they become final and unalterable. A judgment that has attained finality becomes immutable
and unalterable, and may thereafter no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is
meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that
rendered it or by the highest court of the land. The reason for the rule of immutability is that if, on the
application of one party, the court could change its judgment to the prejudice of the other, the court
could thereafter, on application of the latter, again change the judgment and continue this practice
indefinitely. The doctrine of immutability and inalterability of a final judgment has a two-fold purpose,
namely: (a) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and, thus, procedurally, to make orderly the
discharge of judicial business; and (b) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional
errors, which is precisely why courts exist. Indeed, controversies cannot drag on indefinitely; the rights
and obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time. As such,
the doctrine of immutability is not a mere technicality to be easily brushed aside, but a matter of public
policy as well as a time-honored principle of procedural law.

The decision that favored the Spouses Rabat would have attained finality only after the lapse of 15
days from notice thereof to the parties without a motion for reconsideration being timely filed or an
appeal being seasonably taken. Had that happened, the amended decision might have become final
and immutable. However, considering that PNB timely filed its motion for reconsideration vis--vis the
amended decision, the CAs reversal of the amended decision and its promulgation of the second
amended decision were valid and proper.
REMEDIAL LAW >Civil Procedure>Appeal from the RTC>Subject of Appeal
REMEDIAL LAW >Civil Procedure>Special Civil Action>Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
REMEDIAL LAW >Civil Procedure>Cause of Action

SPOUSES RAMON MENDIOLA and ARACELI N. MENDIOLA, Petitioners,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, and
TABANGAO REALTY, INC., Respondents.
G.R. No. 159746 July 18, 2012

FACTS: Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. (Shell) entered an agreement for the distribution of Shell
petroleum products by Pacific Management & Development (Pacific). To secure Pacific’s performance of
its obligations under the agreement, petitioners executed on August 1, 1985 a real estate mortgage in
favor of Shell3 covering their real estate and its improvements. Pacific defaulted on its obligations,
impelling Shell to commence extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings in April 1987. Having received a notice
of the extrajudicial foreclosure scheduled to be held at the main entrance of the Parañaque Municipal Hall
on May 14, 1987,5 petitioners proceeded to the announced venue on the scheduled date and time but did
not witness any auction being conducted and did not meet the sheriff. They later learned that the auction
had been held as scheduled by Deputy Sheriff Bernardo San Juan of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Makati, and that their mortgaged realty had been sold to Tabangao Realty, Inc., as the certificate of sale
bears out.

After application of the proceeds of the sale to the obligation of Pacific, a deficiency remained andwas not
paid by Ramon. Thus, Shell sued in the RTC in Manila to recover the deficiency. Petitioners then
commenced in the RTC in Makati an action to annul the extrajudicial foreclosure. As defendants in the
Makati case, Shell and Tabangao separately moved for dismissal, stating similar grounds, namely: (a) that
the Makati RTC had no jurisdiction due to the pendency of the Manila case; (b) that the complaint stated
no cause of action, the Makati case having been filed more than a year after the registration of the certificate
of sale; (c) that another action (Manila case) involving the same subject matter was pending; (d) that the
venue was improperly laid; and (e) that the Makati case was already barred by petitioners’ failure to raise
its cause of action as a compulsory counterclaim in the Manila case.

After the Makati RTC denied both motions, Shell filed its answer ad cautelam, denying petitioners’ allegation
that no auction had been held and averred that petitioners’ failure to file their compulsory counterclaim in
the Manila case already barred the action. Pending the trial of the Makati case, the Manila RTC rendered
its judgment in favor of Shell. Ramon appealed but his appeal was decided adversely to him with the CA
affirming the Manila RTC’s decision and finding that he was guilty of forum shopping for instituting the
Makati case. He next appealed to the Court which denied his petition for review 16 and upheld the
foreclosure of the mortgage. The decision of the Court became final and executory, as borne out by the
entry of judgment issued

Shell sought the reconsideration of the decision, maintaining that the issues raised on the validity of the
foreclosure sale and on the amount of the outstanding obligation of Pacific had been settled in the Manila
case; and that the Makati RTC became bereft of jurisdiction to render judgment on the same issues
pursuant to the principle of res judicata. Tabangao adopted Shell’s motion for reconsideration. On October
5, 1999, however, the Makati RTC denied Shell’s motion for reconsideration,20 to wit:
Aggrieved by the decision of the Makati RTC, Shell and Tabangao filed a joint notice of appeal.22 The
appeal

ISSUE
1. Whether an appeal may be taken from the denial of a motion for reconsideration
2. Whether the petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition lies.
3. Whether the Makati case could prosper independently of the Manila case.
HELD:

1. YES, Petitioners’ contention that the appeal by Shell and Tabangao should be rejected on the ground
that an appeal of the denial of their motion for reconsideration was prohibited cannot be sustained.

It is true that the original text of Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure expressly
limited an appeal to a judgment or final order, and proscribed the taking of an appeal from an order
denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration, among others
The denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint is not an
interlocutory order, however, but a final order as it puts an end to the particular matter resolved, or
settles definitely the matter therein disposed of, and nothing is left for the trial court to do other than to
execute the order.
Not being an interlocutory order, an order denying a motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal
of a complaint is effectively an appeal of the order of dismissal itself.
2. NO, The petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition lacks merit.
The petition cannot prosper if the CA acted in accordance with law and jurisprudence. Certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus are extraordinary remedies intended to correct errors of jurisdiction and to
check grave abuse of discretion. The term grave abuse of discretion connotes capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to excess, or a lack of jurisdiction.35 The abuse must
be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.36 Yet, here, petitioners utterly failed
to establish that the CA abused its discretion, least of all gravely.

3. NO, Shell and Tabangao’s insistence has merit. The Makati case should have been earlier disallowed
to proceed on the ground of litis pendentia, or, once the decision in the Manila case became final,
should have been dismissed on the ground of being barred by res judicata.

In the Manila case, Ramon averred a compulsory counterclaim asserting that the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the mortgage had been devoid of basis in fact and in law; and that the foreclosure and
the filing of the action had been made in bad faith, with malice, fraudulently and in gross and wanton
violation of his rights. His pleading thereby showed that the cause of action he later pleaded in the
Makati case - that of annulment of the foreclosure sale - was identical to the compulsory counterclaim
he had set up in the Manila case.

The foregoing conclusion of the Makati RTC on lack of identity between the causes of action was patently
unsound. The identity of causes of action does not mean absolute identity; otherwise, a party may easily
escape the operation of res judicata by changing the form of the action or the relief sought. The test to
determine whether the causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain
the actions, or whether there is an identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of the actions. If the
same facts or evidence will sustain the actions, then they are considered identical, and a judgment in the
first case is a bar to the subsequent action.42 Petitioners’ Makati case and Shell’s Manila case undeniably
required the production of the same evidence. In fact, Shell’s counsel faced a dilemma upon being required
by the Makati RTC to present the original copies of certain documents because the documents had been
made part of the records of the Manila case elevated to the CA in connection with the appeal of the Manila
RTC’s judgment.43 Also, both cases arose from the same transaction (i.e., the foreclosure of the mortgage),
such that the success of Ramon in invalidating the extrajudicial foreclosure would have necessarily negated
Shell’s right to recover the deficiency.
c/o jeneve
Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Ltd. vs. Surio, 679 SCRA 21, August 23, 2012
REMEDIAL LAW >Civil Procedure>Filing and Service of Pleadings, Judgments and Other Papers
REMEDIAL LAW >Civil Procedure>Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgments>Garnishment
Overlap
POLITICAL LAW>Constitutional Law>Suability of the State

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, JOSE V. ABUEVA, RAUL P. DE GUZMAN, RUBEN P. ASPIRAS,

EMMANUEL P. BELLO, WILFREDO P. DAVID, CASIANO S. ABRIGO, and JOSEFINA R.
LICUANAN,Petitioners,
vs.
HON. AGUSTIN S. DIZON, his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 80, STERN BUILDERS, INC., and SERVILLANO DELA CRUZ, Respondents.
G.R. No. 171182 August 23, 2012
FACTS: UP, through its President Jose V. Abueva, entered into a General Construction Agreement with
Stern Builders, represented by its President and General Manager Servillano dela Cruz, for the construction
of the extension building and the renovation in the campus in Los Baños (UPLB). Stern Builders submitted
three progress billings of the work accomplished, but the UP paid only two. The third billing was not paid
due to its disallowance by the Commission on Audit (COA). Despite the lifting of the disallowance, the UP
failed to pay the billing, prompting Stern Builders and dela Cruz to sue the UP and its co-respondent officials
to collect the unpaid billing and to recover various damages. The RTC rendered its decision in favor of the
plaintiffs.
Following the RTC’s denial of its motion for reconsideration on May 7, 2002,6 the UP filed a notice of appeal
on June 3, 2002.7 Stern Builders and dela Cruz opposed the notice of appeal on the ground of its filing
being belated, and moved for the execution of the decision. On September 26, 2002, the RTC denied due
course to the notice of appeal for having been filed out of time and granted the private respondents’ motion
for execution.
The RTC issued the writ of execution on October 4, 2002,9 and the sheriff of the RTC served the writ of
execution and notice of demand upon the UP, through its counsel, on October 9, 2002.10 The UP filed an
urgent motion to reconsider the order dated September 26, 2002, to quash the writ of execution, and to
restrain the proceedings.11 However, the RTC denied the urgent motion.12
On June 24, 2003, the UP assailed the denial of due course to its appeal through a petition for certiorari in
the Court of Appeals (CA). CA dismissed the petition for certiorari upon finding that the UP’s notice of
appeal had been filed late,

ISSUE:
1. Whether UP’s funds may be subject to garnishment in order to satisfy the judgment award
2. Whether the service upon Atty. Nolasco of the denial of the motion for reconsideration is valid

HELD:
1. NO
UP’s funds, being government funds, are not subject to garnishment
The funds of the UP are government funds that are public in character. They include the income
accruing from the use of real property ceded to the UP that may be spent only for the attainment of its
institutional objectives.77Hence, the funds subject of this action could not be validly made the subject
of the RTC’s writ of execution or garnishment. The adverse judgment rendered against the UP in a
suit to which it had impliedly consented was not immediately enforceable by execution against the
UP,78 because suability of the State did not necessarily mean its liability.79

Also, in Republic v. Villasor,81 where the issuance of an alias writ of execution directed against the
funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to satisfy a final and executory judgment was nullified,
the Court said:
xxx The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by
general or special law, it may limit claimant’s action "only up to the completion of proceedings anterior
to the stage of execution" and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since
government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy
such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds
 must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and public
services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of
public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.
2. NO
Verily, the service of the denial of the motion for reconsideration could only be validly made upon the
OLS in Diliman, and no other. The fact that Atty. Nolasco was in the employ of the UP at the UPLB Legal
Office did not render the service upon him effective. It is settled that where a party has appeared by
counsel, service must be made upon such counsel.95 Service on the party or the party’s employee is not
effective because such notice is not notice in law.96 This is clear enough from Section 2, second
paragraph, of Rule 13, Rules of Court, which explicitly states that: "If any party has appeared by counsel,
service upon him shall be made upon his counsel or one of them, unless service upon the party himself
is ordered by the court. Where one counsel appears for several parties, he shall only be entitled to one
copy of any paper served upon him by the opposite side." As such, the period to appeal resumed only
on June 1, 2002, the date following the service on May 31, 2002 upon the OLS in Diliman of the copy of
the decision of the RTC, not from the date when the UP was notified.97
REMEDIAL LAW >Civil Procedure>Cause of Action
REMEDIAL LAW >Civil Procedure>Special Civil Action>Certiorari

PHILIP TURNER and ELNORA TURNER, Petitioners,

vs.
LORENZO SHIPPING CORPORATION, Respondent.
G.R. No. 157479 November 24, 2010

FACTS: In June 1999, the respondent decided to amend its articles of incorporation to remove the
stockholders’ pre-emptive rights to newly issued shares of stock. Feeling that the corporate move would
be prejudicial to their interest as stockholders, the petitioners voted against the amendment and
demanded payment of their shares at the rate of P2.276/share based on the book value of the shares.
The respondent found the fair value of the shares demanded by the petitioners unacceptable.
Subsequently, the petitioners demanded payment based on the valuation of the appraisal committee, plus
2%/month penalty from the date of their original demand for payment, as well as the reimbursement of
the amounts advanced as professional fees to the appraisers.

In its letter, the respondent refused the petitioners’ demand, explaining that pursuant to the Corporation
Code, the dissenting stockholders exercising their appraisal rights could be paid only when the corporation
had unrestricted retained earnings to cover the fair value of the shares, but that it had no retained earnings
at the time of the petitioners’ demand. Upon the respondent’s refusal to pay, the petitioners sued the
respondent for collection and damages in the RTC in Makati on January 22, 2001. The petitioners filed their
motion for partial summary judgment claiming that the defendant has an accumulated unrestricted retained
earnings P11,975,490.00 evidenced by its Financial Statement as of the Quarter Ending March 31, 2002.
The respondent opposed the motion for partial summary judgment, stating that the determination of the
unrestricted retained earnings should be made at the end of the fiscal year of the respondent, and that the
petitioners did not have a cause of action against the respondent.

ISSUE
1. Whether CA erred in holding that the petitioners had no cause of action
2. Whether CA committed serious errors of law when it granted the petition for certiorari when the RTC
of manila did not act beyond its jurisdiction amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting The Motion
For Partial Summary Judgment And In Granting The Motion For Immediate Execution Of Judgment;

HELD
1. NO, That the respondent had indisputably no unrestricted retained earnings in its books at the time
the petitioners commenced Civil Case No. 01-086 on January 22, 2001 proved that the respondent’s
legal obligation to pay the value of the petitioners’ shares did not yet arise. Thus, the CA did not err in
holding that the petitioners had no cause of action, and in ruling that the RTC did not validly render the
partial summary judgment.

A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.27 The essential
elements of a cause of action are: (a) the existence of a legal right in favor of the plaintiff; (b) a
correlative legal duty of the defendant to respect such right; and (c) an act or omission by such
defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff with a resulting injury or damage to the plaintiff for
which the latter may maintain an action for the recovery of relief from the defendant.28 Although the
first two elements may exist, a cause of action arises only upon the occurrence of the last element,
giving the plaintiff the right to maintain an action in court for recovery of damages or other appropriate
relief.29

The RTC’s construal of the Corporation Code was unsustainable, because it did not take into account
the petitioners’ lack of a cause of action against the respondent. In order to give rise to any obligation
to pay on the part of the respondent, the petitioners should first make a valid demand that the
respondent refused to pay despite having unrestricted retained earnings. Otherwise, the respondent
could not be said to be guilty of any actionable omission that could sustain their action to collect.
2. NO, Although the respondent’s petition for certiorari targeted only the RTC’s orders granting the motion
for partial summary judgment and the motion for immediate execution, the CA’s directive for the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 01-086 was not an abuse of discretion, least of all grave, because such
dismissal was the only proper thing to be done under the circumstances. According to Surigao Mine
Exploration Co., Inc. v. Harris:35
Subject to certain qualification, and except as otherwise provided by law, an action commenced
before the cause of action has accrued is prematurely brought and should be dismissed. The
fact that the cause of action accrues after the action is commenced and while the case is pending is
of no moment. It is a rule of law to which there is, perhaps no exception, either in law or in equity, that
to recover at all there must be some cause of action at the commencement of the suit. There are
reasons of public policy why there should be no needless haste in bringing up litigation, and why people
who are in no default and against whom there is as yet no cause of action should not be summoned
before the public tribunals to answer complaints which are groundless. An action prematurely brought
is a groundless suit. Unless the plaintiff has a valid and subsisting cause of action at the time
his action is commenced, the defect cannot be cured or remedied by the acquisition or accrual
of one while the action is pending, and a supplemental complaint or an amendment setting up such
after-accrued cause of action is not permissible.
Lastly, the petitioners argue that the respondent’s recourse of a special action for certiorari was the
wrong remedy, in view of the fact that the granting of the motion for partial summary judgment
constituted only an error of law correctible by appeal, not of jurisdiction.

The argument of the petitioners is baseless. The RTC was guilty of an error of jurisdiction, for it
exceeded its jurisdiction by taking cognizance of the complaint that was not based on an existing cause
of action.
REMEDIAL LAW > Provisional Remedies>Preliminary Injunction
CITY GOVERNMENT OF BUTUAN and CITY MAYOR LEONIDES THERESA B. PLAZA, the latter in
her personal capacity and as representative of her co-defendant, Petitioners,
vs.
CONSOLIDATED BROADCASTING SYSTEM (CBS), INC., doing business under the name and style
"DXBR" Bombo Radyo Butuan, represented by its Manager, Norberto P. Pagaspas, and HON.
ROSARITO F. DABALOS, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BRANCH 2, OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE AND
BUTUAN CITY, Respondents.
G.R. No. 157315 December 1, 2010
THIRD DIVISION
FACTS: In February, 2002, City Mayor Plaza wrote to the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Butuan City to
solicit its support for her decision to deny the application for mayor’s permit of Bombo Radyo/Consolidated
Broadcasting System (CBS), and to eventually close down CBS’s radio station. She claimed that CBS’s
operating its broadcasting business within the Arujiville Subdivision, a residential area, had violated the
City’s zoning ordinance. Thereupon, the Sangguninang Panlungsod adopted Resolution-057-2002 to
strongly support the decision of the City Mayor to deny the application of Consolidated Broadcasting System
Development Corporation (Bombo Radyo-Butuan) for a Mayor’s Permit and thereafter close the radio
station. Then, the City’s licensing officer served on CBS’s station manager a final/last notice of violation
and demand to cease and desist illegal operation, with a warning that he would recommend the closure of
its business in case of non-compliance.
CBS and its manager, Norberto Pagaspas, filed a complaint for prohibition, mandamus, and damages
against the petitioners in the RTC in Butuan City (RTC) with prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO)
and writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the petitioners from closing its station, or from disturbing and
preventing its business operations. On March 8, 2002, the petitioners filed their answer to the complaint,
alleging affirmative and special defenses and praying for the dismissal of the complaint, the lifting of the
TRO, the denial of the prayer for preliminary injunction, and the granting of their counterclaims for moral
and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses.
During the hearing on March 11, 2002 of CBS’s application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, at which the petitioners and their counsel did not appear, CBS’s counsel manifested that he was
desisting from his earlier request with the Court for the designation of another judge. Judge Dabalos noted
the manifestation but reset the hearing of the application for preliminary injunction on March 12, 2002, to
give the petitioners an opportunity to show cause why the writ prayed for should not issue. For the purpose
of the resetting, Judge Dabalos caused a notice of hearing to be served on the petitioners. Upon receipt of
the notice of hearing, the petitioners moved to quash the notice and prayed that the TRO be lifted, insisting
that Judge Dabalos had already lost his authority to act on Civil Case No. 5193 by virtue of his inhibition.12

ISSUE: Whether Judge Dabalos improperly resolved CBS’s application for preliminary injunction by not
first requiring the applicant to adduce evidence in support of the application.

HELD: NO.
It was error on the part of the petitioners to insist that the evidence of CBS should have first been required
before Judge Dabalos issued the writ of preliminary injunction. Rule 58 of the Rules of Court clearly lays
the burden on the shoulders of the petitioners, as the parties against whom the TRO was issued, to show
cause why the application for the writ of preliminary injunction should not issue,31 thus:

Section 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception. — No preliminary injunction shall
be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined. If it shall appear
from facts shown by affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable injury would result to
the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the court to which the application for preliminary
injunction was made, may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order to be effective only for a period of
twenty (20) days from service on the party or person sought to be enjoined, except as herein provided.
Within the said twenty-day period, the court must order said party or person to show cause, at a specified
time and place, why the injunction should not be granted, determine within the same period whether or not
the preliminary injunction shall be granted, and accordingly issue the corresponding order.
REMEDIAL LAW >Civil Procedure>Appeal from the RTC>Subject of Appeal
>Civil Procedure>Special Civil Action>Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
>Civil Procedure>Cause of Action

SPOUSES RAMON MENDIOLA and ARACELI N. MENDIOLA, Petitioners,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, and
TABANGAO REALTY, INC., Respondents.
G.R. No. 159746 July 18, 2012

FACTS: Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. (Shell) entered an agreement for the distribution of Shell
petroleum products by Pacific Management & Development (Pacific). To secure Pacific’s performance of
its obligations under the agreement, petitioners executed on August 1, 1985 a real estate mortgage in
favor of Shell3 covering their real estate and its improvements. Pacific defaulted on its obligations,
impelling Shell to commence extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings in April 1987. Having received a notice
of the extrajudicial foreclosure scheduled to be held at the main entrance of the Parañaque Municipal Hall
on May 14, 1987,5 petitioners proceeded to the announced venue on the scheduled date and time but did
not witness any auction being conducted and did not meet the sheriff. They later learned that the auction
had been held as scheduled by Deputy Sheriff Bernardo San Juan of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Makati, and that their mortgaged realty had been sold to Tabangao Realty, Inc., as the certificate of sale
bears out.

After application of the proceeds of the sale to the obligation of Pacific, a deficiency remained andwas not
paid by Ramon. Thus, Shell sued in the RTC in Manila to recover the deficiency. Petitioners then
commenced in the RTC in Makati an action to annul the extrajudicial foreclosure. As defendants in the
Makati case, Shell and Tabangao separately moved for dismissal, stating similar grounds, namely: (a) that
the Makati RTC had no jurisdiction due to the pendency of the Manila case; (b) that the complaint stated
no cause of action, the Makati case having been filed more than a year after the registration of the certificate
of sale; (c) that another action (Manila case) involving the same subject matter was pending; (d) that the
venue was improperly laid; and (e) that the Makati case was already barred by petitioners’ failure to raise
its cause of action as a compulsory counterclaim in the Manila case.

After the Makati RTC denied both motions, Shell filed its answer ad cautelam, denying petitioners’ allegation
that no auction had been held and averred that petitioners’ failure to file their compulsory counterclaim in
the Manila case already barred the action. Pending the trial of the Makati case, the Manila RTC rendered
its judgment in favor of Shell. Ramon appealed but his appeal was decided adversely to him with the CA
affirming the Manila RTC’s decision and finding that he was guilty of forum shopping for instituting the
Makati case. He next appealed to the Court which denied his petition for review 16 and upheld the
foreclosure of the mortgage. The decision of the Court became final and executory, as borne out by the
entry of judgment issued

Shell sought the reconsideration of the decision, maintaining that the issues raised on the validity of the
foreclosure sale and on the amount of the outstanding obligation of Pacific had been settled in the Manila
case; and that the Makati RTC became bereft of jurisdiction to render judgment on the same issues
pursuant to the principle of res judicata. Tabangao adopted Shell’s motion for reconsideration. On October
5, 1999, however, the Makati RTC denied Shell’s motion for reconsideration.

ISSUES
4. Whether an appeal may be taken from the denial of a motion for reconsideration
5. Whether the petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition lies.
6. Whether the Makati case could prosper independently of the Manila case.

HELD 1: YES,
Petitioners’ contention that the appeal by Shell and Tabangao should be rejected on the ground that an
appeal of the denial of their motion for reconsideration was prohibited cannot be sustained.
It is true that the original text of Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure expressly limited
an appeal to a judgment or final order, and proscribed the taking of an appeal from an order denying a
motion for new trial or reconsideration, among others The denial of the motion for reconsideration of an
order of dismissal of a complaint is not an interlocutory order, however, but a final order as it puts an end
to the particular matter resolved, or settles definitely the matter therein disposed of, and nothing is left for
the trial court to do other than to execute the order.

Not being an interlocutory order, an order denying a motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of
a complaint is effectively an appeal of the order of dismissal itself.

HELD 2: NO.
The petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition lacks merit. The petition cannot prosper if the CA acted
in accordance with law and jurisprudence. Certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are extraordinary remedies
intended to correct errors of jurisdiction and to check grave abuse of discretion. The term grave abuse of
discretion connotes capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to excess, or a lack of
jurisdiction.35 The abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power
is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.36 Yet, here, petitioners
utterly failed to establish that the CA abused its discretion, least of all gravely.

HELD 3: NO.
Shell and Tabangao’s insistence has merit. The Makati case should have been earlier disallowed to
proceed on the ground of litis pendentia, or, once the decision in the Manila case became final, should have
been dismissed on the ground of being barred by res judicata.

In the Manila case, Ramon averred a compulsory counterclaim asserting that the extrajudicial foreclosure
of the mortgage had been devoid of basis in fact and in law; and that the foreclosure and the filing of the
action had been made in bad faith, with malice, fraudulently and in gross and wanton violation of his rights.
His pleading thereby showed that the cause of action he later pleaded in the Makati case - that of annulment
of the foreclosure sale - was identical to the compulsory counterclaim he had set up in the Manila case.

The foregoing conclusion of the Makati RTC on lack of identity between the causes of action was patently
unsound. The identity of causes of action does not mean absolute identity; otherwise, a party may easily
escape the operation of res judicata by changing the form of the action or the relief sought. The test to
determine whether the causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain
the actions, or whether there is an identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of the actions. If the
same facts or evidence will sustain the actions, then they are considered identical, and a judgment in the
first case is a bar to the subsequent action.42 Petitioners’ Makati case and Shell’s Manila case undeniably
required the production of the same evidence. In fact, Shell’s counsel faced a dilemma upon being required
by the Makati RTC to present the original copies of certain documents because the documents had been
made part of the records of the Manila case elevated to the CA in connection with the appeal of the Manila
RTC’s judgment.43 Also, both cases arose from the same transaction (i.e., the foreclosure of the mortgage),
such that the success of Ramon in invalidating the extrajudicial foreclosure would have necessarily negated
Shell’s right to recover the deficiency.
REMEDIAL LAW>Criminal Procedure>Appeals
Overlap with
Legal Ethics
PETER BEJARASCO, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 159781 February 2, 2011
THIRD DIVISION

FACTS: The petitioner was convicted on February 16, 2001, for grave threats and grave oral defamation
MTC. On July 31, 2001, the RTC, affirmed the convictions. In due course, the petitioner, then represented
by the PAO, sought the reconsideration of the RTC decision, However, the RTC denied the petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration on September 24, 2001.

On October 12, 2001, the petitioner, this time represented by Atty. Luzmindo B. Besario (Atty. Besario), a
private practitioner, filed in the Court of Appeals (CA) a motion for extension of time to file his petition for
review. The CA granted his motion. Instead of filing his petition for review within the period granted,
however, Atty. Besario sought another extension, but still failed in the end to file the petition for review.
Thus, on March 13, 2002, the CA dismissed his appeal. After the dismissal became final and executory,
entry of judgment was made on April 4, 2002.

On July 16, 2003, the petitioner filed in the CA his petition for review through another attorney, alleging that
Atty. Besario had recklessly abandoned him and had disappeared without leaving a trace.

ISSUE: Whether or not the reckless abandonment of the lawyer is a valid ground for petition for review?

HELD: NO.
The general rule is that a client is bound by the counsel’s acts, including even mistakes in the realm of
procedural technique. A recognized exception to the rule is when the reckless or gross negligence of the
counsel deprives the client of due process of law. For the exception to apply, however, the gross negligence
should not be accompanied by the client’s own negligence or malice, considering that the client has the
duty to be vigilant in respect of his interests by keeping himself up-to-date on the status of the case. Failing
in this duty, the client should suffer whatever adverse judgment is rendered against him.

Truly, a litigant bears the responsibility to monitor the status of his case, for no prudent party leaves the fate
of his case entirely in the hands of his lawyer.

Here, the petitioner took nearly 16 months from the issuance of the entry of judgment by the CA, and almost
22 months from when the RTC affirmed the convictions before he actually filed his petition for review in the
CA. He ought to have been sooner alerted about his dire situation by the fact that an unreasonably long
time had lapsed since the RTC had handed down its dismissal of his appeal without Atty. Besario having
updated him on the developments, including showing to him a copy of the expected petition for review.
Also, he could have himself verified at the CA whether or not the petition for review had been filed, especially
upon realizing that Atty. Besario had started making himself scarce to him. In short, the petitioner’s failure
to know or to find out the real status of his appeal rendered him undeserving of any sympathy from the
Court vis-à-vis the negligence of his former counsel.
The right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process, but is merely a statutory privilege that may
be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the law. The right is unavoidably forfeited by the litigant who
does not comply with the manner thus prescribed. So it is with the petitioner.
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure>Appeals
EMILIANA G. PEŇA, AMELIA C. MAR, and CARMEN REYES, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES ARMANDO TOLENTINO AND LETICIA TOLENTINO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 155227-28 February 9, 2011
THIRD DIVISION
FACTS: The petitioners are lessees of three distinct and separate parcels of land owned by the
respondents, located at Tondo, Manila. Based on the parties’ oral lease agreements, the petitioners agreed
to pay monthly rents.
On August 15, 1995, the respondents wrote a demand letter to each of the petitioners, informing that they
were terminating the respective month-to-month lease contracts effective September 15, 1995; and
demanding that the petitioners vacate and remove their houses from their respective premises, with warning
that should they not heed the demand, the respondents would charge them P3,000.00/month each as
reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of the premises from October 1, 1995 until they would
actually vacate.
After the petitioners refused to vacate within the period allowed, the respondents filed on October 9, 1995
three distinct complaints for ejectment against the petitioners in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Manila.
The petitioners contend that the decisions of the MeTC, RTC, and CA were contrary to law; that they held
the right of first refusal to purchase their leased premises pursuant to Sections 6 of P.D. 1517, because
they had resided on the leased lots for almost 40 years, even before the respondents purchased the
properties from the former owners, and because they had erected their own apartments on the leased lots;
that under Section 5 of R.A. No. 3516, a lessor was prohibited from selling the leased premises to any
person other than his lessee, without securing the latter’s written renunciation of his right of first refusal to
purchase the leased property; and that Section 2 of P.D. 2016 likewise protected them.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioners can validly raise their rights under the aforesaid law, for the first time on
appeal.

HELD: NO.
Petitioners are precluded from invoking their supposed right of first refusal at this very late stage after failing
to assert it within a reasonable time from the respondents’ purchase of the respective properties where
their premises were respectively located. The settled rule in this jurisdiction, according to Mon v. Court of
Appeals, 427 SCRA 165 (2004), is that a party cannot change his theory of the case or his cause of action
on appeal. This rule affirms that “courts of justice have no jurisdiction or power to decide a question not in
issue.” Thus, a judgment that goes beyond the issues and purports to adjudicate something on which the
court did not hear the parties is not only irregular but also extrajudicial and invalid. The legal theory under
which the controversy was heard and decided in the trial court should be the same theory under which the
review on appeal is conducted. Otherwise, prejudice will result to the adverse party.
REMEDIAL LAW>Criminal Procedure>Appeals
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
RUEL TUY, Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 179476 February 9, 2011
Third Division

FACTS: Together with Ramon Salcedo, Jr. and Raul Salcedo, who have remained at large, appellant Ruel
Tuy was charged with murder in the Regional Trial Court for the killing of Orlando Barrameda. Upon
arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge of murder. Thereafter, trial on the
merits ensued.

For the Prosecution, Severino Barrameda (Severino), the son of the victim, declared that he had witnessed
the Salcedos shooting and Tuy hacking his father. The medico-legal evidence presented through Dr.
Salvador Betito, Jr. (Betito), who had conducted the autopsy, established that the victim had sustained five
hack wounds and two gunshot wounds. Betito concluded that the cause of death was rapid external and
internal hemorrhage secondary to multiple gunshot wounds and hack wounds.
In his defense, Tuy denied his participation in the crime and claimed that he was processing copra at the
time of the killing in Sitio Olango, Brgy. Bani Tinambac, Camarines Sur. His brother Ramil Tuy corroborated
him.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction, rejecting Tuy’s defenses of denial and alibi.
It ruled that it was still physically possible for him to come from Brgy. Olango and be at the seashore of
Brgy. Bani, Tinambac, Camarines Sur where the killing happened. The decretal portion of the decision
reads:

ISSUE: Whether the CA commited reversible error in affirming his conviction

HELD: NO.
The findings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) are accorded the highest degree of respect, especially if
adopted and confirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA). Court agrees with the rejection of alibi by the Court
of Appeals (CA) and the Regional Trial Court (RTC).

To begin with, his absence from the scene of the murder was not firmly established considering that he
admitted that he could navigate the distance between Brgy. Olango (where he was supposed to be) and
Brgy. Bani (where the crime was committed) in an hour by paddle boat and in less than that time by
motorized banca. Also, eyewitness Severino positively identified him as having hacked his father. The
failure of Tuy to prove the physical impossibility of his presence at the crime scene negated his alibi.
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure>Independent Civil Action>Litis pendentia

HEIRS OF EDUARDO SIMON, Petitioners,

vs.
ELVIN* CHAN AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 157547 February 23, 2011
Third Division

FACTS: On July 11, 1997, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Manila (MeTC) an information charging the late Eduardo Simon (Simon) with a violation of BP 22,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 275381 entitled People v. Eduardo Simon.
More than three years later, or on August 3, 2000, respondent Elvin Chan who is the offended party in the
Criminal Case No. 275381 commenced in the MeTC in Pasay City a civil action for the collection of the
principal amount of P336, 000.00, coupled with an application for a writ of preliminary attachment (docketed
as Civil Case No. 915-00).

ISSUE #1: Whether Chan’s civil action to recover the amount of unfunded check was an independent civil
action.
ISSUE #2: Whether the pendency of the civil action in the MeTC in Manila (as the civil aspect in Criminal
Case No. 275381) bar the filing of Civil Case No. 915-00 in the MeTC in Pasay City on the ground of litis
pendentia

HELD #1: NO.

There is no independent civil action to recover the value of a bouncing check issued in contravention of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22; The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to
include the corresponding civil action; No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.
This is clear from Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, effective December 1, 2000, which relevantly provides:
x x x (b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.
The aforequoted provisions of the Rules of Court, even if not yet in effect when Chan commenced Civil
Case No. 915-00 on August 3, 2000, are nonetheless applicable. It is axiomatic that the retroactive
application of procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel adversely affected, nor
is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason is simply that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach
to, or arise from, procedural laws. Any new rules may validly be made to apply to cases pending at the time
of their promulgation, considering that no party to an action has a vested right in the rules of procedure,
except that in criminal cases, the changes do not retroactively apply if they permit or require a lesser
quantum of evidence to convict than what is required at the time of the commission of the offenses, because
such retroactivity would be unconstitutional for being ex post facto under the Constitution.

HELD #2: YES

For litis pendentia to be successfully invoked as a bar to an action, the concurrence of the following
requisites is necessary, namely: (a) there must be identity of parties or at least such as represent the same
interest in both actions; (b) there must be identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being
founded on the same facts; and, (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may
be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in respect of the
other. Absent the first two requisites, the possibility of the existence of the third becomes nil.
A perusal of Civil Case No. 01-0033 and Criminal Case No. 275381 ineluctably shows that all the elements
of litis pendentia are attendant. First of all, the parties in the civil action involved in Criminal Case No.
275381 and in Civil Case No. 915-00, that is, Chan and Simon, are the same. Secondly, the information in
Criminal Case No. 275381 and the complaint in Civil Case No. 915-00 both alleged that Simon had issued
Landbank Check No. 0007280 worth P336,000.00 payable to "cash," thereby indicating that the rights
asserted and the reliefs prayed for, as well as the facts upon which the reliefs sought were founded, were
identical in all respects. And, thirdly, any judgment rendered in one case would necessarily bar the other
by res judicata; otherwise, Chan would be recovering twice upon the same claim.
REMEDIAL LAW > Civil Procedure > Appeals
VENANCIO GIVERO, EDGARDO GIVERO and FLORIDA GAYANES, petitioners,
vs.
MAXIMO GIVERO and LORETO GIVERO, respondents.
G.R. No. 157476 , March 16, 2011
FACTS:
The dispute involves a portion of Lot No. 2618 of the Matnog Cadastre (with an area of 5,000 square meters,
more or less) that the petitioners, particularly Venancio Givero, have claimed to belong to them, but which
claim was denied by the respondents who have insisted that the whole of Lot No. 2618, consisting of 12,952
square meters, more or less, was the share of their late father Rufino Givero, a brother of Venancio,
pursuant to the oral partition among 11 children. In his lifetime, Teodorico orally partitioned the properties
among their children by pointing to them their respective shares. On appeal, the petitioners urged that the
donation by Severina in favor of Rufino’s heirs contradicted the respondents’ claim that an oral partition of
Teodorico’s estate had taken place during Teodorico’s lifetime, for there would have been no need for the
donation had such partition inter vivos really taken place. Thus, the petitioners concluded that the
respondents’ right to the disputed portion was solely based on the deed of donation that was void due to
the donor not being the owner of the property.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners submit that the respondents did not preponderantly establish that the oral
partition been really made. Thus, making CA’s finding that the properties had remained under co-ownership
discredited its pronouncement on the validity of the oral partition by Teodorico.

HELD: No.
The petitioners thereby raise factual issues. However, the Court may not review all over again the findings
of fact of the RTC, especially as such findings were affirmed by the CA. This appeal is brought under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court,9 whose Section 1 restricts the review only to questions of law, viz.:

“Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court.—A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a
judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court
or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review
on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.

The restriction of the review to questions of law emanates from the Court’s not being a trier of facts. As
such, the Court cannot determine factual issues in appeals taken from the lower courts. As the
consequence of the restriction, the Court accords high respect, if not conclusive effect, to the findings of
fact by the RTC, when affirmed by the CA, unless there exists an exceptional reason to disregard the
findings of fact, like the following, namely: (a) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises, or conjectures;(b) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;(c)
When there is grave abuse of discretion;(d) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;(e)
When the findings of facts are conflicting;(f) When in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues
of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee. questions
of law, which must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek the same provisional remedies by verified
motion filed in the same action or proceeding at any time during its pendency.
REMEDIAL LAW>Criminal Procedure> Information>Demurrer to Evidence
REMEDIAL LAW> Evidence> Admissions

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
OLIVIA ALETH GARCIA CRISTOBAL, accused-appellant. People vs. Cristobal
G.R. No. 159450, March 30, 2011

FACTS: The information charged the accused with qualified theft, alleging: OLIVIA ALETH GARCIA
CRISTOBAL, being then the teller of Prudential Bank, Angeles City, and as such is entrusted with cash and
other accountabilities, with grave abuse of trust and confidence reposed upon her by her employer, with
intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did steal and carry away cash
money amounting to $10,000.00, belonging to the Prudential Bank, Angeles Main Branch, represented by
its Branch Manager, EDGARDO PANLILIO, to the damage and prejudice of Prudential Bank, in the
aforementioned amount of TEN THOUSAND DOLLARS ($10,000.00) or its equivalent of TWO HUNDRED
SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS (P260,000.00), Philippine Currency and parity rate. Upon the State resting its
case against the accused, her counsel filed a Demurrer to Evidence and Motion to Defer Defense
Evidence,5 praying for the dismissal of the charge on the ground that the evidence of the State did not
suffice to establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. However, the RTC denied the Demurrer to Evidence
and Motion to Defer Defense Evidence and deemed the case submitted for decision on the basis that her
filing her demurrer to evidence without express leave of court as required by Section 15, Rule 119, of the
Rules of Court had waived her right to present evidence.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether the information filed against the accused was fatally defective;
(2) Whether the RTC correctly found that the accused had waived her right to present evidence in her
defense; and
(3) Whether the extrajudicial admission of taking the amount involved contained in the letter of the
accused to the President of Prudential Bank was admissible under the rules and jurisprudence.

HELD:(1) No
The information was sufficient because it stated the approximate time of the commission of the offense
through the words “on or about the 2nd of January, 1996,” and the accused could reasonably deduce the
nature of the criminal act with which she was charged from a reading of its contents as well as gather by
such reading whatever she needed to know about the charge to enable her to prepare her defense.

HELD (2) Yes.

Under the rule, the RTC properly declared the accused to have waived her right to present evidence
because she did not obtain the express leave of court for her demurrer to evidence, thereby reflecting her
voluntary and knowing waiver of her right to present evidence. The RTC did not need to inquire into the
voluntariness and intelligence of the waiver, for her opting to file her demurrer to evidence without first
obtaining express leave of court effectively waived her right to present her evidence.

HELD (3) Yes

An admission, if voluntary, is admissible against the admitter for the reason that it is fair to presume that
the admission corresponds with the truth, and it is the admitter’s fault if the admission does not. By virtue
of its being made by the party himself, an admission is competent primary evidence against the admitter.
REMEDIAL LAW> Civil Procedure> Certiorari>Appeals>Res judicata
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, petitioner
vs.
Hon. VICENTE Q. ROXAS (Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 227,)
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY, LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, OFFICE OF THE
CITY PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, and the COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. 161204. April 06, 2011

FACTS: People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC), NHA’s predecessor,3 was the registered
owner of two large parcels of land situated in the then Municipality of San Juan Del Monte, Province of
Rizal, but now a part of Quezon City (QC), covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 1356 of the
QC Register of Deeds (QCRD), with an estimated area of 386,732.40 square meters and 15,555,534.60
square meters. The parcels of land, which encompassed almost the entire area of the Diliman Estate,
comprised various subdivisions like Project 1, Project 2, Project 3, Project 4, Project 6, Project 7, North
Bago-Bantay, U.P Village, Barangay Central, Sikatuna Village, Barangay Piñahan, Barangay South
Triangle, West Triangle, Barangay Sacred Heart, and other Barangays found inside the Diliman Estate.
TCT No. 1356 was subdivided into 17,387 lots, more or less, under several survey plans. The subdivided
lots were sold and disposed off to NHA’s beneficiaries/lot buyers. Of the 17,387 subdivided lots, only 389
lots either remained undisposed or the sales contracts covering them had been executed by the PHHC or
NHA in favor of the beneficiaries but the corresponding individual TCTs were yet to issue. The RTC set the
petition for initial hearing on April 13, 1999 and directed NHA to submit twelve copies of the petition, certified
true copies or originals of the annexes, certified true copies of tax declarations and tax receipts, and other
jurisdictional requirements as provided by law.NHA failed to comply with the directive and to appear at the
initial hearing. Thus, on April 13, 1999, the RTC issued an order archiving LRC Case No. Q-99-11347 until
compliance by NHA with the jurisdictional requirements.

ISSUE(S):
(1) Whether or not the CA erred when it dismissed NHA’s petition for certiorari based on technical
grounds.
(2) Whether or not the CA erred when it did not consider that the RTC’s dismissal with prejudice of NHA’s
partition for reconstitution was made with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

HELD:(1) Yes.
National Housing Authority (NHA), as the petitioner, had the obligation to comply with the basic
requirements for the filing of a petition for certiorari prescribed in Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.—Anent
whether the CA correctly dismissed NHA’s petition for certiorari, the Court stresses that NHA, as the
petitioner, had the obligation to comply with the basic requirements for the filing of a petition for certiorari
prescribed in Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, specifically to accompany the petition with a “certified true
copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant
and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph
of section 3, Rule 46.” Although Neypes had been intended to standardize the appeal periods under the
Rules of Court, and has been applied retroactively in some cases due to its being a dictum on remedial
law, the pronouncement could not now benefit National Housing Authority (NHA) considering that the
issue of whether or not the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had been guilty of grave abuse of discretion x x x
should be determined on the basis of the rules and jurisprudence then prevailing.—At the time the RTC
issued its resolution denying due course to NHA’s notice of appeal on July 24, 2001, the applicable rule
was Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, which stated that the period for taking an ordinary appeal
is within 15 days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. The filing of a motion for new
trial or reconsideration interrupted the running of the period of appeal, which began to run again from the
movant’s receipt of notice of the order denying the motion. Thus, NHA had only the balance of the period
within which to perfect an appeal, the balance being the number of days remaining in its reglementary
period after deducting the time during which the motion was pending, that is, from the date it filed the
motion for reconsideration to the date it received the notice of denial of its motion for reconsideration.
Considering that NHA filed its motion for reconsideration on the last day of the reglementary period, its
appeal must be brought within the day following the service to it of the order denying its motion for
reconsideration. Under the circumstances, NHA’s notice of appeal was undeniably filed out of time.
NHA’s stance might be correct under the pronouncement in Neypes v. Court of Appeals, 469 SCRA 633
(2005), where the Court has allowed a fresh period of 15 days within which an aggrieved party may file
the notice of appeal in the RTC, reckoned from the receipt of the order denying said party’s motion for
new trial or motion for reconsideration. Although Neypes has been intended to standardize the appeal
periods under the Rules of Court, and has been applied retroactively in some cases due to its being a
dictum on remedial law, the pronouncement could not now benefit NHA considering that the issue of
whether or not the RTC had been guilty of grave abuse of discretion—the precise subject matter of its
petition for certiorari—should be determined on the basis of the rules and jurisprudence then prevailing.

HELD (2) Yes.

The RTC’s express barring of NHA’s right to refile its petition for reconstitution emanated more from
judicial disapproval of NHA’s mishandling of the petition than from any other reason. Yet, the bar was not
insuperable, considering that the stated reason of thereby preventing NHA’s possible forum shopping was
unnecessary. The venue for a new petition for reconstitution would still be Quezon City due to the parcels
of land covered by TCT No. 1356 being located entirely within Quezon City. As such, the RTC in Quezon
City remained as the proper court for a refiled petition for reconstitution. Moreover, considering that at the
time the orders of dismissal were issued NHA had not yet established the facts essential for the RTC to
proceed on its petition for reconstitution, the RTC’s dismissal did not amount to an adjudication on the
merits of the petition and was thus not a viable basis for a bar by res judicata.
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure>Appeal> (Failure to state) Cause of Action>Ejectment

DOLORES ADORA MACASLANG, petitioner

vs.
RENATO AND MELBA ZAMORA, respondents.
G.R. No. 156375 May 30, 2011

Facts: On March 10, 1999, the respondents filed a complaint for unlawful detainer in the MTCC, alleging
that “the [petitioner] sold to [respondents] a residential land located in Sabang, Danao City” and that “the
[petitioner] requested to be allowed to live in the house” with a “promise to vacate as soon as she would be
able to find a new residence.” They further alleged that despite their demand after a year, the petitioner
failed or refused to vacate the premises. Despite the due service of the summons and copy of the complaint,
the petitioner did not file her answer. The MTCC declared her in default upon the respondents’ motion to
declare her in default, and proceeded to receive the respondents’ oral testimony and documentary
evidence. The respondents appealed to the CA, assailing the RTC’s decision for “disregarding the
allegations in the complaint” in determining the existence or non-existence of a cause of action. On July 3,
2002, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC’s decision and reinstated the MTCC’s decision in favor of the
respondents, disposing: “Wherefore, foregoing premises considered, the Petition is hereby given due
course.”

ISSUE(S):
1. Whether or not the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its Appellate Jurisdiction is limited to the
assigned errors in the Memorandum or brief filed before it or whether it can decide the case based on the
entire records of the case, as provided for in Rule 40, Sec. 7. This is a novel issue which, we respectfully
submit, deserves a definitive ruling by this Honorable Supreme Court since it involves the application of a
new provision, specifically underlined now under the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil procedure.
2. Whether or not in an action for unlawful detainer, where there was no prior demand to vacate and
comply with the conditions of the lease made, a valid cause of action exists.
3. Whether or not the CA erred in finding that there was a valid demand to vacate made by the
respondents on the petitioner; and

HELD:1. No,
The RTC, in exercising appellate jurisdiction, was not limited to the errors assigned in the petitioner’s appeal
memorandum, but could decide on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the trial court
and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by the RTC. The
difference between the procedures for deciding on review is traceable to Section 22 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129.

HELD:2. Yes.
In resolving whether the complaint states a cause of action or not, only the facts alleged in the complaint
are considered. The test is whether the court can render a valid judgment on the complaint based on the
facts alleged and the prayer asked for. Only ultimate facts, not legal conclusions or evidentiary facts, are
considered for purposes of applying the test. Failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action
are really different from each other. On the one hand, failure to state a cause of action refers to the
insufficiency of the pleading, and is a ground for dismissal under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. On the
other hand, lack of cause action refers to a situation where the evidence does not prove the cause of action
alleged in the pleading.

3. No, Where the cause of action in an ejectment suit is based on ownership of the property, the defense
that the defendant retained title or ownership is a proper subject for determination by the MTC but only for
the purpose of adjudicating the rightful possessor of the property. This is based on Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court, viz.: Section 16. Resolving defense of ownership.—When the defendant raises the defense of
ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue
of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.
REMEDIAL Law>Civil Procedure>Contempt

LORENZO SHIPPING CORPORATION, OCEANIC CONTAINER LINES, INC., SOLID SHIPPING LINES
CORPORATION, SULPICIO LINES, INC., ET AL., Petitioners
vs.
DISTRIBUTION MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, LORENZO CINCO, and
CORA CURAY, Respondents.
G.R. No. 155849 August 31, 2011
(First Division)

FACTS: The Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA) issued a Letter-Resolution, advising respondent
Distribution Management Association of the Philippines (DMAP) that a computation of the required freight
adjustment by MARINA was no longer required for freight rates officially considered or declared
deregulated in accordance with MARINA Memorandum Circular No. 153 which was issued pursuant to
Executive Order No. 213, entitled Deregulating Domestic Shipping Rates.

In order to challenge the constitutionality of EO 213, MC 153 and the Letter-Resolution, DMAP Commenced
in the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition but the CA dismissed the same
and upheld its constitutionality. DMAP appealed to the Court but was denied with finality.

DMAP Held a general membership meeting (GMM) on the occasion of which DMAP publicly circulated Sea
Transport Update which contains statements such as: 1. The Motion for Reconsideration filed with the
Supreme Court was denied based on technicalites and not on the legal issues DMAP presented; and 2.
Supreme Court Ruling issued in one month only, normal lead time is at least 3 to 6 months.

ISSUE: Whether the statements contained in the Sea Transport Update Constitute or amount to indirect
contempt of court.

HELD: No.
The petitioners mere allegation was insufficient to charge indirect contempt. The unmistakable intent was
to inform DMAP’s members of the developments in the case, and on the taking of the next viable move of
going back to MARINA on the issues.

The test for criticizing a judges decision is whether or not the criticism is bona fide or done in good faith,
and does not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. The Sea Transport Update was not disrespectful,
abusive, or slanderous, and did not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. Thereby, the respondents
were not guilty of indirect contempt of court. The power to punish for contempt of court is exercised on the
preservative and not on the vindictive principle, and only occasionally should a court invoke its inherent
power in order to retain that respect without which the administration of justice must falter or fail.

As discussed in the case

Contempt of court (Concept)

A willful disregard or disobedience of a public authority. In its broad sense, it is disregard of, or
disobedience to, the rules or orders of a legislative or judicial body or an interruption of its proceedings by
disorderly behavior or insolent language in its presence or so near thereto as to disturb its proceedings or
to impair the respect due to such a body. In its restricted and more usual sense, contempt comprehends a
despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of a court.
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts, and need not be specifically granted by
statute. It lies at the core of the administration of a judicial system. The power essentially exists for the
preservation of order in judicial proceedings and for the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates
of the courts, and, consequently, for the due administration of justice.

Kinds of Contempt:
1. Direct Contempt;
 a. Is committed in the presence of or so near the judge as to obstruct him in the administration
of justice;
b. The punishment is generally summary and immediate and no process or evidence is
necessary because the act is committed in facie curiae. Such summary conviction and
punishment accord with due process of law;
c. To constitute direct contempt punishable by summary proceeding, need not be committed
in the immediate presence of the court, if it tends to obstruct justice or to interfere with the
actions of the court in the courtroom itself; and
d. Contemptuous acts committed outside out of the presence of the court, if admitted by the
in open court, may be punished summarily as a direct contempt, although it is advisable to
proceed by requiring the person charged to appear and show cause why he should not be
punished when the judge is without personal knowledge of the misbehavior and is informed
of it only by a confession of the contemnor or by testimony under oath of other persons.
2. Indirect Contempt
a. Consists of willful disobedience of the lawful process or order of the court;
b. Usually required proceedings less summary; and
c. The proceedings for the punishment of the contumacious act committed outside the
personal knowledge of the judge generally need the observance of all the elements of due
process of law, that is, notice, written charges, and an opportunity to deny and to defend
such charges before guilt is adjudged and sentence imposed.
Proceedings for contempt are sui generis
Two classes of contempt:
1. Criminal Contempt
a. Consists in conduct that is directed against the authority and dignity of a court or of a judge
acting judicially, as in unlawfully assailing or discrediting the authority and dignity of the
court or court, or in doing a duly forbidden act.
b. Purpose is primarily punishment.
2. Civil Contempt
a. Consists in the failure to do something ordered to be done by a court of judge in a civil case
for the benefit of the opposing party therein.
b. Purpose is primarily compensatory or remedial
The Character of contempt is determined by the nature of the contempt involved, regardless of the cause
in which the contempt arose, and by the relief sought or dominant purpose.
REMEDIAL LAW>Special Proceedings>Appeal

SPOUSES ELBE LEBIN and ERLINDA LEBIN, Petitioners

vs.
VILMA S. MIRASOL, and REGIONAL TRIAL COURTOF ILOILO, BRANCH XXVII, Respondents.
G.R. No. 164255. September 7, 2011
(First Division)

FACTS: Petitioners relayed their offer to the administrator of the Estate of L.J. hodges to purchase Lot
18, Block 7 of 971 (Lot 18), situated in Iloilo City. The administrator sought judicial approval of the offer
which the RTC granted. Respondent Mirasol also offered to purchase the lot where her house stood. The
lot was initially identified as Lot No. 4, Block 7 of 971 (Lot 4), but a later survey revealed that her house
was actually standing on Lot 18, not Lot 4. Learning of the approval of the petitioners offer to purchase
Lot 18, Mirasol filed a petition for relief from the order. On May 3, 1995, the RTC resolved the petition for
relief to execute the corresponding deed of sale over the aforecited subject lot in favor of Lebin and
Mirasol.

On May 23, 1995, the petitioners moved for reconsideration and/or new trial. On March 2, 1998, the RTC
denied the motion for reconsideration and/or new trial of the petitioners. Thus, on March 27, 1998, the
petitioners filed a notice of appeal in the RTC. Allegedly, on May 5, 1998, they also filed a record on
appeal. On January 25, 1999, they presented an ex parte motion to approve the record on appeal. On June
15, 2000, Mirasol filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, insisting that the record on appeal had been filed
late. The RTC granted the motion to dismiss the appeal on February 1, 2002. The petitioners moved for
reconsideration on March 13, 2002, but the RTC denied their motion for reconsideration on May 21, 2004.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioners failed to timely file a record on appeal on the decision by the RTC to execute
the deed of sale for Lot 18.

HELD:YES
A judgment or final order in special proceedings is appealed by record on appeal. A judgment or final order
determining and terminating a particular part is usually appealable, because it completely disposes of a
particular matter in the proceeding, unless otherwise declared by the Rules of Court.

The petitioners appeal comes under item (e) of Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules of Court, due to the final
order of May 3, 1995 issued in the settlement of the estate of L.J. Hodges being a final determination in the
lower court of the rights of the party appealing. In order to elevate a part of the records sufficient for appellate
review without the RTC being deprived of the original records, the remedy was to file a record on appeal to
be approved by the RTC.

Although they filed a notice of appeal on March 27, 1998, they submitted the record on appeal only on May
5, 1998. Undoubtedly, they filed the record on appeal 43 days from March 23, 1998, the date they received
the denial of their motion for reconsideration and/or new trial. They should have filed the record on appeal
within 30 days from their notice of the judgment. Their appeal was not perfected because their filing of the
record on appeal happened beyond the end of their period for the perfection of their appeal.
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure>Parties to Civil Action>Indigent Party

RE: QUERY OF MR. ROGER C. PRIORESCHI RE EXEMPTION FROM LEGAL AND FILING FEES OF
THE GOOD SHEPHERD FOUNDATION, INC.
A.M. No. 09-6-9-SC August 19, 2009
(En Banc)

FACTS: The Good Shepherd Foundation Inc., is about to pay a nominal fee of Php. 5,000 and the
balance upon collection acction of 10 million pesos. The Hon. Court Administrator Perez pointed out the
need of complying with OCA Circular No. 42-2005 and Rule 141 of the Rules of Court (Legal Fees) that is
reserved the privilege to indigent persons. The Foundation pointed out that have been working hard for
the very Filipino people, that the Government and the society cannot react to, or have rejeceted or
abandoned them.

ISSUE: Whether a Foundation who works for indigent and underpriviledged people, be granted by the
court the same exemption from payment of legal fees granted to indigent people.

HELD: No.
The Foundation cannot be extended the exemption from legal and filing fees despite its working for
indigent and underprivileged people.

The clear intent and precise language of Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court [re: indigent party]
indicates that only natural party litigant may be regarded as an indigent litigant. The Foundation, being a
corporation invested by the State with a juridical personality separate and distinct from that of its members,
is a juridical person. As a juridical person, it cannot be accorded the exemption from legal and filing fees
granted to indigent litigants. Extending the exemption to a juridicacl person on the ground that it works for
indigent and underprivileged people may be prone to abuse particuclarly by corporations and entities bent
on circumventing the rule on payment of the fees. Also, the Constitution has explicitly premised the free
access clause on a person’s poverty, a condition that only a natural person can suffer.
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure>Parties to Civil Actions>Parties in Interest
FRANCISCO ALONSO, substituted by MERCEDES V. ALONSO, TOMAS V. ALONSO and
ASUNCION V. ALONSO, Petitioners
vs.
CEBU COUNTRY CLUB, INC., Respondent, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL,Public Respondent.
G.R. No. 188471. April 20, 2010
(First Division)

FACTS: Francisco M. Alonso (Francisco) was the only son and sole heir of the late spouses Tomas N.
Alonso and Asuncion Medalle. Francisco died during the pendency of this case, and was substituted by
his legal heirs. Francisco discovered documents showing that his father Tomas N. Alonso had acquired
Lot No. 727 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate from the Government but the final deed of sale had not
been registered with the Register of Deeds because of lack of requirements.

Francisco subsequently found that the certificate of title covering Lot No. 727-D-2 of the Banilad Friar Lands
Estate had been administratively reconstituted from the owners duplicate of Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. RT-1310 in the name of United Service Country Club, Inc., the predecessor of respondent Cebu
Country Club, Inc (Cebu Country Club); and that upon the order of the court that had heard the petition for
reconstitution of the TCT, the name of the registered owner in TCT No. RT-1310 had been changed to that
of Cebu Country Club.

Francisco commenced against Cebu Country Club in the RTC an action for the declaration of nullity and
non-existence of deed/title, the cancellation of certificates of title, and the recovery of property but was
denied by the RTC and affirmed by CA. Motion for reconsideration was also denied. Upon appeal to SC,
the Court decided declaring that Lot No. 727-D-2 legally belongs to the Government of the Philippines. The
decision became final and executory.

The Government, through OSG, filed in the RTC a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution but was
denied by the RTC. The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, questioning the denial of the
OSGs motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. The motion for reconsideration was denied stating that
the petitioners had no legal standing to file the motion for reconsideration, especially that they were not
authorized by the OSG for that purpose and that the Cebu Country Club is the absolute owner of the said
Lot.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioners were the real parties-in-interest to question the denial by the RTC of the
OSG’s motion for the issuance of a writ of execution.

HELD: No.
Every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest, unless otherwise
authorized by law or the rules. An appeal is an action to be prosecuted by a party in interest before a higher
court. In order for the appeal to prosper, the litigant must of necessity continue to hold a real or present
substantial interest that entitles him to avails of the suit on appeal. If he does not, the appeal, as to him, is
an exercise in futility.

The Government being the legal owner of Lot No. 727-D-2, is the only party adversely affected by the
denial, and is the proper party entitled to assail the denial. In G.R. No. 130876, the Court found that the
petitioners did not validly acquire ownership over the Lot and declared that it belongs to the Government.

The pronouncement in G.R. No. 130876 renders beyond dispute that the non-execution of the judgment
would not adversely affect the petitioners, who hold no right whatsoever in Lot No. 727-D-2. Otherwise
put, they are not the proper parties to assail the questioned orders of the RTC, because they stand to derive
nothing from the execution of the judgment against Cebu Country Club.
REMEDIAL LAW> CIVIL PROCEDURE>JURISDICTION

MINERVA GOMEZ-CASTILLO, Petitioner,

vs.
COMISSION ON ELECTIONS and STRIKE B. REVILLA, Respondents.
GR No. 187231, June 22, 2010
En Banc

FACTS: Castillo and respondent Strike P. Revilla ran for Municipal Mayor of Bacoor, Cavite during the
May 14, 2007 local elections. After the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Revilla as the elected
Municipal Mayor of Bacoor, Cavite, Castillo filed an Election Protest Ad Cautelam in the Regional Trial
Court in Bacoor, Cavite, which was eventually raffled to Branch 19.
Through his Answer, Revilla sought the dismissal of the election protest, alleging that it was filed in the
wrong Branch of the RTC. He pointed out that Supreme Court Administrative Order (SCAO) No. 54-2007
designated Branch 22 of the RTC in Imus, Cavite and Branch 88 of the RTC in Cavite City to hear, try
and decide election contests involving municipal officials in Cavite; and that contrary to SCAO No. 54-
2007, Castillo filed his protest in the RTC in Bacoor, Cavite, which was not the proper court.
On November 21, 2008, Branch 19 dismissed Castillo’s election protest for being violative of SCAO No.
54-2007.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 13 of Rule 2 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC designate the RTC Branch that has
jurisdiction over an election contest, or does it merely designate the proper venue for filing?

HELD: No. It only designate the proper venue for filing.

It is well-settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law. As such, jurisdiction cannot be fixed by the will of the
parties; nor be acquired through waiver nor enlarged by the omission of the parties; nor conferred by any
acquiescence of the court. The allocation of jurisdiction is vested in Congress, and cannot be delegated to
another office or agency of the Government.

The Rules of Court does not define jurisdictional boundaries of the courts. In promulgating the Rules of
Court, the Supreme Court is circumscribed by the zone properly denominated as the promulgation of rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, consequently, the Rules of Court can only
determine the means, ways or manner in which said jurisdiction, as fixed by the Constitution and acts of
Congress, shall be exercised. The Rules of Court yields to the substantive law in determining jurisdiction.
The jurisdiction over election contests involving elective municipal officials has been vested in the RTC by
Section 251, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code). On the other hand, A.M. No. 07-4-15-
SC, by specifying the proper venue where such cases may be filed and heard, only spelled out the manner
by which an RTC with jurisdiction exercises such jurisdiction. Like other rules on venue, A.M. No. 07-4-15-
SC was designed to ensure a just and orderly administration of justice, and is permissive, because it was
enacted to ensure the exclusive and speedy disposition of election protests and petitions for quo
warranto involving elective municipal officials.
Castillo’s filing her protest in the RTC in Bacoor, Cavite amounted only to a wrong choice of venue. Hence,
the dismissal of the protest by Branch 19 constituted plain error, considering that her wrong choice did not
affect the jurisdiction of the RTC. What Branch 19 should have done under the circumstances was to
transfer the protest to Branch 22 of the RTC in Imus, Cavite, which was the proper venue. Such transfer
was proper, whether she as the protestant sought it or not, given that the determination of the will of the
electorate of Bacoor, Cavite according to the process set forth by law was of the highest concern of our
institutions, particularly of the courts.
REMEDIAL LAW> CIVIL PROCEDURE>FORUM SHOPPINNG

IN RE: RECONSTITUTION OF TRANSFER CERTIFICATES OF TITLE NOS. 303168 AND 303169 AND
ISSUANCE OF OWNER'S DUPLICATE CERTIFICATES OF TITLE IN LIEU OF THOSE LOST,
ROLANDO EDWARD G. LIM, Petitioner.
G.R. NO. 156797, July 6, 2010
Third Division

FACTS: On December 29, 1998, Lim filed in the RTC his petition for judicial reconstitution of TCT No.
303168 and TCT No. 303169 of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City, and for the issuance of owner’s
duplicate copies of said TCTs. He alleged that he was a registered co-owner of the parcels of land covered
by the TCTs, and that he was filing the petition for the beneficial interest of all the registered owners thereof;
that the original copies of the TCTs kept in the custody of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City had been
lost or destroyed as a consequence of the fire that had burned certain portions of the Quezon City Hall,
including the Office of said Registry of Deeds, on July 11, 1988; that the originals of the owner’s duplicates
of the TCTs kept in his custody had also been lost or destroyed in a fire that had gutted the commercial
establishment located at 250 Villalobos Street, Quiapo, Manila on February 24, 1998; and that no co-
owner’s, mortgagee’s, or lessee’s TCTs had ever been issued.

On April 27, 1999, the RTC issued an order, setting the petition for hearing on September 3, 1999. As the
RTC required, a copy of the order was published in the Official Gazette on July 19, 1999 and July 26, 1999;
and posted at the main entrance of the Quezon City Hall, and in other specified places. The Office of the
Register of Deeds for Quezon City, the Land Registration Authority (LRA), the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources, the Office of the City Attorney of Quezon City, the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City, the Office of the Solicitor General, and the owners of the adjoining properties were each
similarly duly furnished a copy of the order.

The RTC received a report from LRA which states:

(2) Our record shows that Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 303168 and 303169, covering Lot 7, Block 586
and Lot 5, Block 585 respectively, both of the subdivision plan Psd-38199 are also applied for reconstitution
of titles under Administrative Reconstitution Proceedings, (Republic Act 6732). The aforesaid TCTs are
included in Administrative Reconstitution Order No. Q-577 (98) dated November 3, 1998, however, they
were not reconstituted administratively, it appearing that their owner's duplicate were likewise lost.
On the basis of such report, the RTC dismissed the petition on the ground of forum shopping.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC correctly dismiss the petition of Lim on the ground of forum shopping.

HELD: No.
Forum shopping is the act of a party litigant against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one
forum seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or the special
civil action of certiorari, or the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause
or supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. Forum shopping happens
when, in the two or more pending cases, there is identity of parties, identity of rights or causes of action,
and identity of reliefs sought. Where the elements of litis pendentia are present, and where a final judgment
in one case will amount to res judicata in the other, there is forum shopping. For litis pendentia to be a
ground for the dismissal of an action, there must be: (a) identity of the parties or at least such as to represent
the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded
on the same acts; and (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment which may be
rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other.

For forum shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same transaction, same essential facts and
circumstances and must raise identical causes of action, subject matter and issues. Clearly, it does not
exist where different orders were questioned, two distinct causes of action and issues were raised, and two
objectives were sought.
Lim was not guilty of forum shopping, because the factual bases of his application for the administrative
reconstitution of the TCTs and of his petition for their judicial reconstitution, and the reliefs thereby sought
were not identical.

When he applied for the administrative reconstitution in the LRA on July 21,1988, he still had his co-owner’s
duplicate copies of the TCTs in his possession, but by the time the LRA resolved his application on
November 3, 1998, allowing the relief prayed for,his co-owner’s duplicate copies of the TCTs had
meanwhile been destroyed by fire on February 24, 1998, a fact that he had duly reported in an affidavit
dated May 29, 1998 presented on June 1, 1998 to the Office of the Register of Deeds for Quezon City. The
loss by fire was corroborated by the certification issued by the Chief of Fire District I of Manila to the effect
that the commercial establishment for Cheer-up Foods Corporation, the petitioner’s company, had been
gutted by fire on February 24, 1998. Thus, the intervening loss of the owner’s duplicate copies that left the
favorable ruling of the LRA no longer implementable gave rise to his need to apply for judicial reconstitution
in the RTC pursuant to Section 12 of Republic Act No. 26.
REMEDIAL LAW> CIVIL PROCEDURE>RES JUDICATA

SPOUSES NICANOR TUMBOKON (deceased), substituted by: ROSARIO SESPEÑE and their
Children, namely: NICANOR S. TUMBOKON, JR., NELIA S. TUMBOKON, NEMIA T. SEGOVIA,
NOBELLA S. TUMBOKON, NABIGAIL T. TAAY, NAZARENE T. MONTALVO, NORGEL S.
TUMBOKON, NEYSA S. TUMBOKON, SILVESTRE S. TUMBOKON, NORA T. MILCZAREK, NONITA
T. CARPIO, NERLYN S. TUMBOKON, and NINFA T. SOLIDUM, Petitioners,
vs.
APOLONIA G. LEGASPI, and PAULINA S. DE MAGTANUM, Respondents.
G.R. No. 153736,August 12, 2010
THIRD DIVISION

FACTS: A land was originally owned by the late Alejandra Sespeñe, who had had two marriages. The
first marriage was to Gaudencio Franco, by whom she bore Ciriaca Franco, whose husband was Victor
Miralles. The second marriage was to Jose Garcia, by whom she bore respondent Apolonia Garcia, who
married Primo Legaspi. Alejandra died without a will in 1935, and was survived by Apolonia and Crisanto
Miralles, the son of Ciriaca and Victor Miralles.

Spouses Nicanor Tumbokon and Rosario Sespeñe asserted their right over the land after they purchased
it from Cresenciana Inog, who had supposedly acquired it by purchase from Victor Miralles. The issue over
the property between the petitioners and the respondents first led to the commencement of a criminal case.
The Spouses Nicanor Tumbokon and Rosario Sespeñe filed a criminal complaint for qualified theft against
respondents Apolonia and Paulina S. Magtanum and others not parties herein, charging them with stealing
coconut fruits from the land subject of the present case.

After trial, the CFI found the respondents and their co-accused guilty as charged and was affirmed by the
CA. However, prior to the CA’s rendition of its decision in the criminal case, the petitioners commenced
this suit for recovery of ownership and possession of real property with damages against the respondents
in the CFI.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ruling in the criminal prosecution barred the RTC or CA from adjudicating the
same issue in a civil case filed prior to the promulgation of the decision in the criminal case

HELD: No.
Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment or decree on the merits rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits and on all points and
matters determined in the previous suit. The foundation principle upon which the doctrine rests is that the
parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once; that when a right or fact has
been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed,
should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate.

For res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following requisites must concur: (1) the
former judgment must be final; (2) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be between the first and
second actions (a) identity of parties, (b) identity of the subject matter, and (c) identity of cause of action.
The doctrine of res judicata has two aspects: the first, known as bar by prior judgment, or estoppel by
verdict, is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim,
demand, or cause of action; the second, known as conclusiveness of judgment, also known as the rule
of auter action pendant, ordains that issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be
raised in any future case between the same parties involving a different cause of action and has the effect
of preclusion of issues only.

Based on the foregoing standards, this action is not barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
First of all, bar by prior judgment, the first aspect of the doctrine, is not applicable, because the causes of
action in the civil and the criminal actions were different and distinct from each other. The civil action is for
the recovery of ownership of the land filed by the petitioners, while the criminal action was to determine
whether the act of the respondents of taking the coconut fruits from the trees growing within the disputed
land constituted the crime of qualified theft. In the former, the main issue is the legal ownership of the land,
but in the latter, the legal ownership of the land was not the main issue. The issue of guilt or innocence was
not dependent on the ownership of the land, inasmuch as a person could be guilty of theft of the growing
fruits even if he were the owner of the land.

Conclusiveness of judgment is not also applicable. The petitioners themselves commenced both actions,
and fully and directly participated in the trial of both actions. Any estoppel from assailing the authority of the
CA to determine the ownership of the land based on the evidence presented in the civil action applied only
to the petitioners, who should not be allowed to assail the outcome of the civil action after the CA had ruled
adversely against them.

Moreover, the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment is subject to exceptions, such as where there is a
change in the applicable legal context, or to avoid inequitable administration of justice. Applying the doctrine
of conclusiveness of judgments to this case will surely be iniquitous to the respondents who have rightly
relied on the civil case, not on the criminal case, to settle the issue of ownership of the land. This action for
recovery of ownership was brought precisely to settle the issue of ownership of the property. In contrast,
the pronouncement on ownership of the land made in the criminal case was only the response to the
respondents having raised the ownership as a matter of defense.
REMEDIAL LAW>CIVIL PROCEDURE>APPEAL

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PALEA), herein represented by ALEXANDER

O. BARRIENTOS, Petitioner,
vs.
Hon. HANS LEO J. CACDAC (Director of Bureau of Labor Relations), Hon. ALEXANDER MARAAN
(Regional Director, National Capital Region), CYNTHIA J. TOLENTINO (Representation Officer,
Labor Relations Division, National Capital Region, Department of Labor and Employment), NIDA J.
VILLAGRACIA, DOLLY OCAMPO, GERARDO F. RIVERA (In their respective capacities as
candidates for President of petitioner PALEA), Respondents.
G.R. No. 155097, September 27, 2010
THIRD DIVISION

FACTS: PALEA, the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all regular rank-and-file employees
of Philippine Air Lines,held a general election for its new officers on February 17, 21, 23 and 24, 2000.

The Regional Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations nullified the general election and the proclamation
of the winners on the ground that the general election was found to be riddled with fraud and irregularities;
and ordered the holding of another general election under the direct supervision of the Department of Labor
and Employment. During the pre-election proceedings, some PALEA members assigned in the PAL Cargo
Sub-department filed with the BLR Regional Director a petition to conduct a plebiscite to amend the PALEA
Constitution and By-Laws in order that they would have a representative in the PALEA Board of Directors.
The filing of the petition caused the BLR to suspend the conduct of the pre-election conference until the
issue on the amendment of the PALEA Constitution and By-Laws was resolved.

On February 15, 2002, the BLR Regional Director dismissed the petition to conduct a plebiscite to amend
the PALEA Constitution and By-Laws and directed the immediate conduct of the general election. The order
of February 15, 2002 was appealed. BLR Director denied the appeal because the assailed order was not
appealable for being interlocutory in nature.

PALEA elevated the denial of the appeal to respondent BLR Director. PALEA, filed a petition for certiorari,
ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the Regional Director and the BLR Director and prayed that a
temporary restraining order (TRO) be issued to restrain the holding of the general election.

ISSUE: Whether or not petition for certiorari in the proper remedy for interlocutory order of the BLR.

HELD: Yes.
Relief in a special civil action for certiorari is available only when the following essential requisites concur:
(a) the petition must be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions; (b) the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (c) there is no appeal, nor any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. There is no concurrence of the requisites in
C.A.-G.R. SP No. 69889. Firstly, PALEA should have first waited for the final election results as certified by
DOLE-NCR before filing the petition for certiorari. As the BLR Director pointed out in the letter dated
February 27, 2002, the petition for the plebiscite to amend PALEA’s Constitution and By-Laws was merely
incidental to the conduct of the general election pursuant to the final and executory decision of the BLR. As
such, the recourse open to PALEA was not to forthwith file the petition for certiorari to assail such denial,
but to first await the final election results as certified by DOLE-NCR. That PALEA did not so wait signified
that it ignored the character of certiorari as an extraordinary recourse to resort to when there is no plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. And, secondly, the Regional Director and the
BLR Director were definitely not exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions in respectively issuing the
February 15, 2002 order and the February 27, 2002 letter. Instead, they were thereby performing the purely
ministerial act of enforcing the already final and executory BLR resolution dated July 28, 2000 directing the
conduct of the general election.
Remedial Law> Non payment of fees

Ricardo C. Duco, Petitioner vs. Commission on Elections, First Division; and Narciso B. Avelino,
Respondents
G.R. No. 183366 August 19, 2009
(EN BANC)

FACTS: On October 29, 2007, simultaneous barangay and sangguniang kabataan (SK) elections were
held all over the country. In Barangay Ibabao, Loay, Bohol, the petitioner was proclaimed as the
elected Punong Barangay. His opponent, respondent Narciso Avelino, initiated an election protest in the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), seeking a recount of the ballots in four precincts upon his allegation
that the election results for the position of Punong Barangay were spurious and fraudulent and did not
reflect the true will of the electorate.

MCTC ultimately ruled in favor of respondent Avelino. Petitioner is therefore restrained from assuming the
post of Punong Barangay of Barangay Ibabao, Loay, Bohol and from performing the functions of such office.
Thus, Petitioner filed his Notice of Appeal with COEMELEC.

However, the COMELEC dismissed Duco’s appeal in failure to pay the correct appeal fee. Duco moved for
the reconsideration of the COMELEC Decision however, the motion was denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not the non payment of the correct fee warrants the case dismissal

HELD: Yes.
The Court have ruled that the payment of the full amount of docket fee within the period to appeal is a sine
qua non requirement for the perfection of an appeal. Such payment is not a mere technicality of law or
procedure, but an essential requirement, without which the decision or final order appealed from becomes
final and executory, as if no appeal was filed.

The bare invocation of "interest of substantial justice" is not a magic wand that will automatically compel
this Court to suspend procedural rules. Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because
their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party’s substantive rights. Like all rules, they are
required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve
a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the
procedure prescribed. The Court reiterates that rules of procedure especially those prescribing the time
within which certain acts must be done, have oft been held as absolutely indispensable to the prevention
of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of business.

Having determined that the petitioner’s appeal was properly dismissed, the COMELEC did not commit any
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In a special civil action for certiorari,
the petitioner carries the burden of proving not merely reversible error, but grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, on the part of the public respondent for his issuance of the
impugned order. Grave abuse of discretion is present "when there is a capricious and whimsical exercise
of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.” In other words, the tribunal or administrative body must have issued the assailed
decision, order or resolution in a capricious or despotic manner. Alas, the petitioner did not discharge his
burden.

Considering that a year has elapsed after the issuance on July 15, 2008 of Comelec Resolution No. 8486,
and to further affirm the discretion granted to the Comelec which it precisely articulated through the specific
guidelines contained in said Resolution, the Court now declares, for the guidance of the Bench and Bar,
that for notices of appeal filed after the promulgation of this decision, errors in the matter of non-payment
or incomplete payment of the two appeal fees in election cases are no longer excusable.