G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003
DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SENATE PRESIDENT, AND JOSE
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,
NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA
MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND
MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. AND
REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160262 November 10, 2003
SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR. AND HENEDINA
RAZON-ABAD, petitioners,
ATTYS. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL AND PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, petitioners-
in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING
SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA,
REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTA-TIVE FELIX
WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS
PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160263 November 10, 2003
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO AND SOLEDAD M. CAGAMPANG, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioners-in-intervention,
vs.
FRANKLIN M.
G. DE VENECIA, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160277 November 10, 2003
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
JOSE G. DE VENECIA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT
OF THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, GILBERT TEODORO,
JR., FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, JULIO LEDESMA IV, HENRY LANOT, KIM
BERNARDO-LOKIN, MARCELINO LIBANAN, EMMYLOU TALIÑO-SANTOS,
DOUGLAS CAGAS, SHERWIN GATCHALIAN, LUIS BERSAMIN, JR., NERISSA
SOON-RUIZ, ERNESTO NIEVA, EDGAR ERICE, ISMAEL MATHAY, SAMUEL
DANGWA, ALFREDO MARAÑON, JR., CECILIA CARREON-JALOSJOS,
AGAPITO AQUINO, FAUSTO SEACHON, JR., GEORGILU YUMUL-HERMIDA,
JOSE CARLOS LACSON, MANUEL ORTEGA, ULIRAN JUAQUIN, SORAYA
JAAFAR, WILHELMINO SY-ALVARADO, CLAUDE BAUTISTA, DEL DE
GUZMAN, ZENAIDA CRUZ-DUCUT, AUGUSTO BACULIO, FAUSTINO DY III,
AUGUSTO SYJUCO, ROZZANO RUFINO BIAZON, LEOVIGILDO BANAAG,
ERIC SINGSON, JACINTO PARAS, JOSE SOLIS, RENATO MATUBO, HERMINO
TEVES, AMADO ESPINO, JR., EMILIO MACIAS, ARTHUR PINGOY, JR.,
FRANCIS NEPOMUCENO, CONRADO ESTRELLA III, ELIAS BULUT, JR., JURDIN
ROMUALDO, JUAN PABLO BONDOC, GENEROSO TULAGAN, PERPETUO
YLAGAN, MICHAEL DUAVIT, JOSEPH DURANO, JESLI LAPUS, CARLOS
COJUANGCO, GIORGIDI AGGABAO, FRANCIS ESCUDERRO, RENE
VELARDE, CELSO LOBREGAT, ALIPIO BADELLES, DIDAGEN DILANGALEN,
ABRAHAM MITRA, JOSEPH SANTIAGO, DARLENE ANTONIO-CUSTODIO,
ALETA SUAREZ, RODOLF PLAZA, JV BAUTISTA, GREGORIO IPONG, GILBERT
REMULLA, ROLEX SUPLICO, CELIA LAYUS, JUAN MIGUEL ZUBIRI, BENASING
MACARAMBON, JR., JOSEFINA JOSON, MARK COJUANGCO, MAURICIO
DOMOGAN, RONALDO ZAMORA, ANGELO MONTILLA, ROSELLER
BARINAGA, JESNAR FALCON, REYLINA NICOLAS, RODOLFO ALBANO,
JOAQUIN CHIPECO, JR., AND RUY ELIAS LOPEZ, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160292 November 10, 2003
HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, MA. CECILIA PAPA,
NAPOLEON C. REYES, ANTONIO H. ABAD, JR., ALFREDO C. LIGON, JOAN
P. SERRANO AND GARY S. MALLARI, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR. AND ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, IN
HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160295 November 10, 2003
SALACNIB F. BATERINA AND DEPUTY SPEAKER RAUL M.
GONZALES, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESEN-TATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING
SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA,
REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX
WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS
PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160310 November 10, 2003
LEONILO R. ALFONSO, PETER ALVAREZ, SAMUEL DOCTOR, MELVIN
MATIBAG, RAMON MIQUIBAS, RODOLFO MAGSINO, EDUARDO
MALASAGA, EDUARDO SARMIENTO, EDGARDO NAOE, LEONARDO
GARCIA, EDGARD SMITH, EMETERIO MENDIOLA, MARIO TOREJA,
GUILLERMO CASTASUS, NELSON A. LOYOLA, WILFREDO BELLO, JR., RONNIE
TOQUILLO, KATE ANN VITAL, ANGELITA Q. GUZMAN, MONICO PABLES, JR.,
JAIME BOAQUINA, LITA A. AQUINO, MILA P. GABITO, JANETTE ARROYO,
RIZALDY EMPIG, ERNA LAHUZ, HOMER CALIBAG, DR. BING ARCE, SIMEON
ARCE, JR., EL DELLE ARCE, WILLIE RIVERO, DANTE DIAZ, ALBERTO
BUENAVISTA, FAUSTO BUENAVISTA, EMILY SENERIS, ANNA CLARISSA
LOYOLA, SALVACION LOYOLA, RAINIER QUIROLGICO, JOSEPH LEANDRO
LOYOLA, ANTONIO LIBREA, FILEMON SIBULO, MANUEL D. COMIA, JULITO
U. SOON, VIRGILIO LUSTRE, AND NOEL ISORENA, MAU RESTRIVERA, MAX
VILLAESTER, AND EDILBERTO GALLOR, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY HON. SPEAKER JOSE C.
DE VENECIA, JR., THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY HON. SENATE PRESIDENT
FRANKLIN DRILON, HON. FELIX FUENTEBELLA, ET AL., respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160318 November 10, 2003
PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., CRISPIN T. REYES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, ALL MEMBERS, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, AND ALL
MEMBERS, PHILIPPINE SENATE, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160342 November 10, 2003
ATTY. FERNANDO P.R. PERITO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, MANILA III, AND ENGR. MAXIMO N.
MENEZ JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS A TAXPAYER AND MEMBER OF THE
ENGINEERING PROFESSION, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES REPRESENTED BY THE 83 HONORABLE
MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE LED BY HON. REPRESENTATIVE WILLIAM
FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160343 November 10, 2003
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING
SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA,
REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX
WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES THROUGH ITS
PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160360 November 10, 2003
CLARO B. FLORES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE SPEAKER, AND THE SENATE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH THE SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160365 November 10, 2003
U.P. LAW ALUMNI CEBU FOUNDATION, INC., GOERING G.C. PADERANGA,
DANILO V. ORTIZ, GLORIA C. ESTENZO-RAMOS, LIZA D. CORRO, LUIS V.
DIORES, SR., BENJAMIN S. RALLON, ROLANDO P. NONATO, DANTE T.
RAMOS, ELSA R. DIVINAGRACIA, KAREN B. CAPARROS-ARQUILLANO,
SYLVA G. AGUIRRE-PADERANGA, FOR THEMSELVES AND IN BEHALF OF
OTHER CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HOUSE
REPRESENTATIVES FELIX FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERTO TEODORO, BY
THEMSELVES AND AS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GROUP OF MORE THAN 80
HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES WHO SIGNED AND FILED THE IMPEACHMENT
COMPLAINT AGAINST SUPREME COURT CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE,
JR. respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160370 November 10, 2003
FR. RANHILIO CALLANGAN AQUINO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, THE HONORABLE SPEAKER OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160376 November 10, 2003
NILO A. MALANYAON, petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERT TEODORO, IN
REPRESENTATION OF THE 86 SIGNATORIES OF THE ARTICLES OF
IMPEACHMENT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. AND THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED
BY ITS SPEAKER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160392 November 10, 2003
VENICIO S. FLORES AND HECTOR L. HOFILEÑA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA,
AND THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT
FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160397 November 10, 2003
IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE
HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., ATTY. DIOSCORO U. VALLEJOS, JR., petitioner.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160403 November 10, 2003
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR PRESIDING
OFFICER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G.
TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELA, THE SENATE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT, HON. FRANKLIN
DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160405 November 10, 2003
DEMOCRITO C. BARCENAS, PRESIDENT OF IBP, CEBU CITY CHAPTER,
MANUEL M. MONZON, PRESIDING OF IBP, CEBU PROVINCE, VICTOR A.
MAAMBONG, PROVINCIAL BOARD MEMBER, ADELINO B. SITOY, DEAN OF
THE COLLEG EOF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF CEBU, YOUNG LAWYERS
ASSOCAITION OF CEBU, INC. [YLAC], REPRSEENTED BY ATTY. MANUEL
LEGASPI, CONFEDERATION OF ACCREDITED MEDIATORS OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC. [CAMP, INC], REPRESENTED BY RODERIC R. POCA,
MANDAUE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, [MANLAW], REPRESENTED BY FELIPE
VELASQUEZ, FEDERACION INTERNACIONAL DE ABOGADAS [FIDA],
REPRESENTED BY THELMA L. JORDAN, CARLOS G. CO, PRESIENT OF CEBU
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY AND CEBU LADY LAWYERS
ASSOCIATION, INC. [CELLA, INC.], MARIBELLE NAVARRO AND
BERNARDITO FLORIDO, PAST PRESIDENT CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
AND INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU CHAPTER, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, REPRESENTED BY REP. JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, AS HOUSE SPEAKER AND THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATOR
FRANKLIN DRILON, AS SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict, no matter
how passionate and seemingly irreconcilable it may appear to be, over
the determination by the independent branches of government of the
nature, scope and extent of their respective constitutional powers
where the Constitution itself provides for the means and bases for its
resolution.
Our nation's history is replete with vivid illustrations of the often frictional,
at times turbulent, dynamics of the relationship among these co-equal
branches. This Court is confronted with one such today involving the
legislature and the judiciary which has drawn legal luminaries to chart
antipodal courses and not a few of our countrymen to vent
cacophonous sentiments thereon.
There may indeed be some legitimacy to the characterization that the
present controversy subject of the instant petitions – whether the filing of
the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year
bar provided in the Constitution, and whether the resolution thereof is a
political question – has resulted in a political crisis. Perhaps even more
truth to the view that it was brought upon by a political crisis of
conscience.
In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is
sufficient to address all the issues which this controversy spawns that this
Court unequivocally pronounces, at the first instance, that the feared
resort to extra-constitutional methods of resolving it is neither necessary
nor legally permissible. Both its resolution and protection of the public
interest lie in adherence to, not departure from, the Constitution.
In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this
Court is ever mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of
separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial
branches of government by no means prescribes for absolute
autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the governmental
power assigned to it by the sovereign people.
At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which
has been carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official
acts of each of these three branches must be given effect without
destroying their indispensable co-equality.
Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines of republican
government, intended as they are to insure that governmental power is
wielded only for the good of the people, mandate a relationship of
interdependence and coordination among these branches where the
delicate functions of enacting, interpreting and enforcing laws are
harmonized to achieve a unity of governance, guided only by what is in
the greater interest and well-being of the people. Verily, salus populi est
suprema lex.
Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides:
ARTICLE XI
Accountability of Public Officers
SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of
employees must at all times be accountable to the people, the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the
Senate.
SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the
Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, (7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further
and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office
impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted
Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and
crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and punishment according to law.
employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but
not by impeachment. (8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to
effectively carry out the purpose of this section. (Emphasis and
SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have underscoring supplied)
the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI of the Constitution,
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and
Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House
a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall Impeachment Rules) on November 28, 2001, superseding the previous
be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and House Impeachment Rules1 approved by the 11th Congress.
referred to the proper Committee within three session days The relevant distinctions between these two Congresses' House
thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote Impeachment Rules are shown in the following tabulation:
of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty
session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
11TH CONGRESS RULES 12TH CONGRESS NEW RULES
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration
by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
RULE II RULE V
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House
shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the INITIATING IMPEACHMENT BAR AGAINST INITIATION OF
Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS
contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded. Section 2. Mode of Initiating AGAINST THE SAME OFFICIAL
Impeachment. – Impeachment
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is shall be initiated only by a verified Section 16. – Impeachment
filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the complaint for impeachment filed Proceedings Deemed Initiated. –
same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by by any Member of the House of In cases where a Member of the
the Senate shall forthwith proceed. Representatives or by any citizen House files a verified complaint of
upon a resolution of endorsement impeachment or a citizen files a
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the by any Member thereof or by a verified complaint that is
same official more than once within a period of one year. verified complaint or resolution of endorsed by a Member of the
impeachment filed by at least House through a resolution of
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all one-third (1/3) of all the Members endorsement against an
cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the

of the House.
RULE V
BAR AGAINST IMPEACHMENT
Section 14. Scope of Bar. – No
impeachment proceedings shall
be initiated against the same
official more than once within the
period of one (1) year.
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a
impeachable officer,
Resolution,2 sponsored by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella,
impeachment proceedings
which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation,
against such official are deemed
in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures
initiated on the day the
by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development
Committee on Justice finds that
Fund (JDF)."3
the verified complaint and/or
resolution against such official, as
the case may be, is sufficient in On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an
substance, or on the date the impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief
4
House votes to overturn or affirmJustice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court
5
the finding of the said Committee for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust
that the verified complaint and other high crimes."6 The complaint was endorsed by
and/or resolution, as the case Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang
may be, is not sufficient in Dilangalen,7 and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on
substance. August 5, 20038 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the
Constitution which reads:
In cases where a verified
complaint or a resolution of Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed
impeachment is filed or by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any
endorsed, as the case may be, citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member
by at least one-third (1/3) of the thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within
Members of the ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within
House, impeachment three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and
proceedings are deemed by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the
initiated at the time of the filing of House within sixty session days from such referral, together with
such verified complaint or the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared
resolution of impeachment with for consideration by the House within ten session days from
the Secretary General. receipt thereof.
The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first
impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form,"9 but voted to dismiss
Section 17. Bar Against Initiationthe same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance.10 To
Of Impeachment Proceedings. date, – the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the
Within a period of one (1) year House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of
from the date impeachment the Constitution.
proceedings are deemed
initiated as provided in Section Four
16 months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first
hereof, no impeachment complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on
proceedings, as such, can be Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint 11 was
initiated against the same official.
filed with the Secretary General of the House12 by Representatives
(Italics in the original; emphasis Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B.
and underscoring supplied) Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry
initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second
impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the
Members of the House of Representatives.13
Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et.
al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second
impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of
Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once
within a period of one year."
In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging that
he has a duty as a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to
use all available legal remedies to stop an unconstitutional
impeachment, that the issues raised in his petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus are of transcendental importance, and that
he "himself was a victim of the capricious and arbitrary changes in the
Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings introduced by the 12th
Congress,"14 posits that his right to bring an impeachment complaint
against then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto had been violated due to
the capricious and arbitrary changes in the House Impeachment Rules
adopted and approved on November 28, 2001 by the House of
Representatives and prays that (1) Rule V, Sections 16 and 17 and Rule
III, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 thereof be declared unconstitutional; (2) this
Court issue a writ of mandamus directing respondents House of
Representatives et. al. to comply with Article IX, Section 3 (2), (3) and (5)
of the Constitution, to return the second impeachment complaint
and/or strike it off the records of the House of Representatives, and to
promulgate rules which are consistent with the Constitution; and (3) this
Court permanently enjoin respondent House of Representatives from
proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et. al., as citizens
and taxpayers, alleging that the issues of the case are of transcendental
importance, pray, in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition, the issuance
of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondent House of Representatives
from filing any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice with
the Senate; and for the issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting
respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon from accepting
any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the event
that the Senate has accepted the same, from proceeding with the
impeachment trial.
In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M. de Castro and Soledad
Cagampang, as citizens, taxpayers, lawyers and members of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that their petition for
Prohibition involves public interest as it involves the use of public funds
necessary to conduct the impeachment trial on the second
impeachment complaint, pray for the issuance of a writ of prohibition
enjoining Congress from conducting further proceedings on said
second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, alleging that this Court
has recognized that he has locus standi to bring petitions of this nature
in the cases of Chavez v. PCGG15 and Chavez v. PEA-Amari Coastal Bay
Development Corporation,16 prays in his petition for Injunction that the
second impeachment complaint be declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et. al., as taxpayers
and members of the legal profession, pray in their petition for Prohibition
for an order prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from
drafting, adopting, approving and transmitting to the Senate the
second impeachment complaint, and respondents De Venecia and
Nazareno from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate.
In G.R. No. 160295, petitioners Representatives Salacnib F. Baterina and
Deputy Speaker Raul M. Gonzalez, alleging that, as members of the
House of Representatives, they have a legal interest in ensuring that only
constitutional impeachment proceedings are initiated, pray in their
petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that the second impeachment
complaint and any act proceeding therefrom be declared null and
void.
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso et al., claiming that they
have a right to be protected against all forms of senseless spending of
taxpayers' money and that they have an obligation to protect the
Supreme Court, the Chief Justice, and the integrity of the Judiciary,
allege in their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that it is instituted as
"a class suit" and pray that (1) the House Resolution endorsing the
second impeachment complaint as well as all issuances emanating
therefrom be declared null and void; and (2) this Court enjoin the
Senate and the Senate President from taking cognizance of, hearing,
trying and deciding the second impeachment complaint, and issue a
writ of prohibition commanding the Senate, its prosecutors and agents
to desist from conducting any proceedings or to act on the
impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc., whose
members are citizens and taxpayers, and its co-petitioner Crispin T.
Reyes, a citizen, taxpayer and a member of the Philippine Bar, both
allege in their petition, which does not state what its nature is, that the
filing of the second impeachment complaint involves paramount public
interest and pray that Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment
Rules and the second impeachment complaint/Articles of
Impeachment be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160342, petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R. Perito, as a citizen and
a member of the Philippine Bar Association and of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and petitioner Engr. Maximo N. Menez, Jr., as a taxpayer,
pray in their petition for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and Permanent Injunction to enjoin the House of Representatives from
proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160343, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging
that it is mandated by the Code of Professional Responsibility to uphold
the Constitution, prays in its petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that
Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V and Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 of Rule III of the
House Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional and that the
House of Representatives be permanently enjoined from proceeding
with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160360, petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro Flores prays in his
petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that the House Impeachment Rules
be declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu Foundation Inc., et.
al., in their petition for Prohibition and Injunction which they claim is a
class suit filed in behalf of all citizens, citing Oposa v. Factoran17 which
was filed in behalf of succeeding generations of Filipinos, pray for the
issuance of a writ prohibiting respondents House of Representatives and
the Senate from conducting further proceedings on the second
impeachment complaint and that this Court declare as unconstitutional
the second impeachment complaint and the acts of respondent House
of Representatives in interfering with the fiscal matters of the Judiciary.
In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio Callangan
Aquino, alleging that the issues in his petition for Prohibition are of
national and transcendental significance and that as an official of the
Philippine Judicial Academy, he has a direct and substantial interest in
the unhampered operation of the Supreme Court and its officials in
discharging their duties in accordance with the Constitution, prays for
the issuance of a writ prohibiting the House of Representatives from
transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate and the Senate
from receiving the same or giving the impeachment complaint due
course.
In G.R. No. 160376, petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as a taxpayer, alleges
in his petition for Prohibition that respondents Fuentebella and Teodoro
at the time they filed the second impeachment complaint, were
"absolutely without any legal power to do so, as they acted without
jurisdiction as far as the Articles of Impeachment assail the alleged
abuse of powers of the Chief Justice to disburse the (JDF)."
In G.R. No. 160392, petitioners Attorneys Venicio S. Flores and Hector L.
Hofileña, alleging that as professors of law they have an abiding interest
in the subject matter of their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition as it
pertains to a constitutional issue "which they are trying to inculcate in
the minds of their students," pray that the House of Representatives be
enjoined from endorsing and the Senate from trying the Articles of
Impeachment and that the second impeachment complaint be
declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr., without alleging
his locus standi, but alleging that the second impeachment complaint is
founded on the issue of whether or not the Judicial Development Fund
(JDF) was spent in accordance with law and that the House of
Representatives does not have exclusive jurisdiction in the examination
and audit thereof, prays in his petition "To Declare Complaint Null and
Void for Lack of Cause of Action and Jurisdiction" that the second
impeachment complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner Philippine Bar Association, alleging that the
issues raised in the filing of the second impeachment complaint involve
matters of transcendental importance, prays in its petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment complaint and
all proceedings arising therefrom be declared null and void; (2)
respondent House of Representatives be prohibited from transmitting
the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate; and (3) respondent Senate
be prohibited from accepting the Articles of Impeachment and from
conducting any proceedings thereon.
In G.R. No. 160405, petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas et. al., as citizens
and taxpayers, pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the
second impeachment complaint as well as the resolution of
endorsement and impeachment by the respondent House of
Representatives be declared null and void and (2) respondents Senate
and Senate President Franklin Drilon be prohibited from accepting any
Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the event that
they have accepted the same, that they be prohibited from
proceeding with the impeachment trial.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262 and 160263,
the first three of the eighteen which were filed before this
Court,18 prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or preliminary injunction to prevent the House of Representatives
from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment arising from the second
impeachment complaint to the Senate. Petition bearing docket number
G.R. No. 160261 likewise prayed for the declaration of the November 28,
2001 House Impeachment Rules as null and void for being
unconstitutional.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277, 160292 and 160295,
which were filed on October 28, 2003, sought similar relief. In addition,
petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160292 alleged that House
Resolution No. 260 (calling for a legislative inquiry into the administration
by the Chief Justice of the JDF) infringes on the constitutional doctrine of
separation of powers and is a direct violation of the constitutional
principle of fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
On October 28, 2003, during the plenary session of the House of
Representatives, a motion was put forth that the second impeachment
complaint be formally transmitted to the Senate, but it was not carried
because the House of Representatives adjourned for lack of
quorum,19 and as reflected above, to date, the Articles of
Impeachment have yet to be forwarded to the Senate.
Before acting on the petitions with prayers for temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction which were filed on or before
October 28, 2003, Justices Puno and Vitug offered to recuse themselves,
but the Court rejected their offer. Justice Panganiban inhibited himself,
but the Court directed him to participate.
Without necessarily giving the petitions due course, this Court in its
Resolution of October 28, 2003, resolved to (a) consolidate the petitions;
(b) require respondent House of Representatives and the Senate, as well
as the Solicitor General, to comment on the petitions not later than 4:30
p.m. of November 3, 2003; (c) set the petitions for oral arguments on
November 5, 2003, at 10:00 a.m.; and (d) appointed distinguished legal
experts as amici curiae.20 In addition, this Court called on petitioners
and respondents to maintain the status quo, enjoining all the parties
and others acting for and in their behalf to refrain from committing acts
that would render the petitions moot.
Also on October 28, 2003, when respondent House of Representatives
through Speaker Jose C. De Venecia, Jr. and/or its co-respondents, by
way of special appearance, submitted a Manifestation asserting that
this Court has no jurisdiction to hear, much less prohibit or enjoin the
House of Representatives, which is an independent and co-equal
branch of government under the Constitution, from the performance of
its constitutionally mandated duty to initiate impeachment cases. On
even date, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., in his own behalf, filed a
Motion to Intervene (Ex Abudante Cautela)21 and Comment, praying
that "the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of
the Court over the issues affecting the impeachment proceedings and
that the sole power, authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as the
impeachment court to try and decide impeachment cases, including
the one where the Chief Justice is the respondent, be recognized and
upheld pursuant to the provisions of Article XI of the Constitution." 22
Acting on the other petitions which were subsequently filed, this Court
resolved to (a) consolidate them with the earlier consolidated petitions;
(b) require respondents to file their comment not later than 4:30 p.m. of
November 3, 2003; and (c) include them for oral arguments on
November 5, 2003.
On October 29, 2003, the Senate of the Philippines, through Senate
President Franklin M. Drilon, filed a Manifestation stating that insofar as it
is concerned, the petitions are plainly premature and have no basis in
law or in fact, adding that as of the time of the filing of the petitions, no
justiciable issue was presented before it since (1) its constitutional duty to
constitute itself as an impeachment court commences only upon its
receipt of the Articles of Impeachment, which it had not, and (2) the
principal issues raised by the petitions pertain exclusively to the
proceedings in the House of Representatives.
On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a "Petition for Leave to
Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, and
160295, questioning the status quo Resolution issued by this Court on
October 28, 2003 on the ground that it would unnecessarily put
Congress and this Court in a "constitutional deadlock" and praying for
the dismissal of all the petitions as the matter in question is not yet ripe
for judicial determination.
On November 3, 2003, Attorneys Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino
Quadra filed in G.R. No. 160262 a "Motion for Leave of Court to
Intervene and to Admit the Herein Incorporated Petition in Intervention."
On November 4, 2003, Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga
Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. filed a Motion for Intervention in G.R. No.
160261. On November 5, 2003, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the
Philippines, Inc. also filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to
Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295,
and 160310.
The motions for intervention were granted and both Senator Pimentel's
Comment and Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra's Petition in
Intervention were admitted.
On November 5-6, 2003, this Court heard the views of the amici
curiae and the arguments of petitioners, intervenors Senator Pimentel
and Attorney Makalintal, and Solicitor General Alfredo Benipayo on the
principal issues outlined in an Advisory issued by this Court on November
3, 2003, to wit:
Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be
invoked; who can invoke it; on what issues and at what time;
and whether it should be exercised by this Court at this time.
In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up:
a) locus standi of petitioners;
b) ripeness(prematurity; mootness);
c) political question/justiciability;
d) House's "exclusive" power to initiate all cases of
impeachment;
e) Senate's "sole" power to try and decide all cases of
impeachment;
f) constitutionality of the House Rules on
Impeachment vis-a-vis Section 3(5) of Article XI of the
Constitution; and
g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original)
In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and substantive issues
arising from the instant petitions as well as the myriad arguments and
opinions presented for and against the grant of the reliefs prayed for,
this Court has sifted and determined them to be as follows: (1) the
threshold and novel issue of whether or not the power of judicial review
extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings; (2) whether or
not the essential pre-requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial
review have been fulfilled; and (3) the substantive issues yet remaining.
These matters shall now be discussed in seriatim.
Judicial Review
As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the
power of judicial review to determine the validity of the second
impeachment complaint.
This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch
of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987
Constitution:
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the government. (Emphasis supplied)
Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively expounded
upon by Justice Jose P. Laurel in the definitive 1936 case of Angara v.
Electoral Commission23 after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution
whose provisions, unlike the present Constitution, did not contain the
present provision in Article VIII, Section 1, par. 2 on what judicial power
includes. Thus, Justice Laurel discoursed:
x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the
great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or
marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial
department is the only constitutional organ which can be called
upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the
several departments and among the integral or constituent units
thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking
perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was within the
power of our people, acting through their delegates to so
provide, that instrument which is the expression of their
sovereignty however limited, has established a republican
government intended to operate and function as a harmonious
whole, under a system of checks and balances, and subject to
specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said
instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language
the restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and
agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are transcended it
would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for
a mechanism by which to direct the course of government along
constitutional channels,for then the distribution of powers would
be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of
sentiment, and the principles of good government mere political
apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and restrictions embodied
in our Constitution are real as they should be in any living
constitution. In the United States where no express constitutional
grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this
moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its historical
origin and development there, has been set at rest by popular
acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half
centuries. In our case, this moderating power is granted, if not
expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of article VIII of our
Constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who
is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers?
The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the
judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to
allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify
or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn
and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of authority under the
Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual
controversy the rights which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is
termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of
judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of
judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be
exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and
limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis
mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to
dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions
unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this
manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom,
justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts
accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative
enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to
abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the
determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the
wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their
representatives in the executive and legislative departments of
the government.24 (Italics in the original; emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this "moderating power" to "determine
the proper allocation of powers" of the different branches of
government and "to direct the course of government along
constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts25 as a necessary
consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the power of the
court to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable."26
Thus, even in the United States where the power of judicial review is not
explicitly conferred upon the courts by its Constitution, such power has
"been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than
one and a half centuries." To be sure, it was in the 1803 leading case
of Marbury v. Madison27 that the power of judicial review was first
articulated by Chief Justice Marshall, to wit:
It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring
what shall be the supreme law of the land, the constitution itself
is first mentioned; and not the laws of the United States generally,
but those only which shall be made in pursuance of the
constitution, have that rank.
 Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United
States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be
essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the
constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other departments,
are bound by that instrument.28(Italics in the original; emphasis
supplied)
In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its express grant
in the 1935 Constitution, the power of judicial review was exercised by
our courts to invalidate constitutionally infirm acts.29 And as pointed out
by noted political law professor and former Supreme Court Justice
Vicente V. Mendoza,30 the executive and legislative branches of our
government in fact effectively acknowledged this power of judicial
review in Article 7 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their
violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or
custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the
Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be
valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the
Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 judicial review is
indeed an integral component of the delicate system of checks and
balances which, together with the corollary principle of separation of
powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of government and
insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people
for which it serves.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our
system of government. It obtains not through express provision
but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of
the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not
follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept
separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be
absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The
Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and
balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various
departments of the government. x x x And the judiciary in turn,
with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the
other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the
law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if
violative of the Constitution.32 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino
Feliciano, "x x x judicial review is essential for the maintenance and
enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers
among the three great departments of government through the
definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control
between them."33 To him, "[j]udicial review is the chief, indeed the only,
medium of participation – or instrument of intervention – of the judiciary
in that balancing operation."34
To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave
abuse of discretion by "any branch or instrumentalities of government,"
the afore-quoted Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution engraves, for
the first time into its history, into block letter law the so-called
"expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of this Court, the nature of and
rationale for which are mirrored in the following excerpt from the
sponsorship speech of its proponent, former Chief Justice Constitutional
Commissioner Roberto Concepcion:
xxx
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions.
It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first
and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
 excess of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the
government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of
our experience during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has
some antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during
the deposed regime was marred considerably by the
circumstance that in a number of cases against the government,
which then had no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set
up the defense of political questions and got away with it. As a
consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ
of habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the
release of political detainees, and other matters related to the
operation and effect of martial law failed because the
government set up the defense of political question. And the
Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is political, we have no
authority to pass upon it." The Committee on the Judiciary feels
that this was not a proper solution of the questions involved. It did
not merely request an encroachment upon the rights of the
people, but it, in effect, encouraged further violations thereof
during the martial law regime. x x x
xxx
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of
the agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its
officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the
question whether or not a branch of government or any of its
officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction,
or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is
not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters
of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means
that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters
of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political
question.35 (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this
Court must necessarily turn to the Constitution itself which employs the
well-settled principles of constitutional construction.
First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the
Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed. Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land
Tenure Administration,36 this Court, speaking through Chief Justice
Enrique Fernando, declared:
We look to the language of the document itself in our search for
its meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that is where we
begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional
provisions are couched express the objective sought to be
attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except
where technical terms are employed in which case the
significance thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution
is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule
of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people's
consciousness, its language as much as possible should be
understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says
according to the text of the provision to be construed compels
acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it,
based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean
what they say. Thus these are the cases where the need for
construction is reduced to a minimum.37 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the
Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its
framers. And so did this Court apply this principle in Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary38 in this wise:
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention
underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it has been
held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in
mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and
the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful
provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times,
and the condition and circumstances under which the
Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason
which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the
particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished
thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words
consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that
purpose.39 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue40 where,
speaking through Madame Justice Amuerfina A. Melencio-Herrera, it
declared:
x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the
fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the
intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people
adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in
constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure
the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in
the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed
that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly
by the explanation offered by the framers.41 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be
interpreted as a whole. Thus, in Chiongbian v. De Leon,42 this Court,
through Chief Justice Manuel Moran declared:
x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not
have dedicated a provision of our Constitution merely for the
benefit of one person without considering that it could also affect
others.When they adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not
willed, that said provision should function to the full extent of its
substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction
with all other provisions of that great document.43 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,44 this Court
affirmed that:
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no
one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the
others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing
upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be
so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the
instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be
considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole
purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed
to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can
be made to stand together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable,
and must lean in favor of a construction which will render every
word operative, rather than one which may make the words idle
and nugatory.45 (Emphasis supplied)
If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear,
resort to other aids is available. In still the same case of Civil Liberties
Union v. Executive Secretary, this Court expounded:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and
proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at
the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort
thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said
proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the
Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the
constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of
the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their
votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large
majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow
citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force
of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution
from what appears upon its face." The proper interpretation
therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people
adopting it than in the framers's understanding
thereof.46 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It is in the context of the foregoing backdrop of constitutional
refinement and jurisprudential application of the power of judicial
review that respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor
Senator Pimentel raise the novel argument that the Constitution has
excluded impeachment proceedings from the coverage of judicial
review.
Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents Speaker De Venecia et.
al. that impeachment is a political action which cannot assume a
judicial character. Hence, any question, issue or incident arising at any
stage of the impeachment proceeding is beyond the reach of judicial
review.47
For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that the Senate's "sole
power to try" impeachment cases48 (1) entirely excludes the application
of judicial review over it; and (2) necessarily includes the Senate's power
to determine constitutional questions relative to impeachment
proceedings.49
In furthering their arguments on the proposition that impeachment
proceedings are outside the scope of judicial review, respondents
Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel rely heavily
on American authorities, principally the majority opinion in the case
of Nixon v. United States.50 Thus, they contend that the exercise of
judicial review over impeachment proceedings is inappropriate since it
runs counter to the framers' decision to allocate to different fora the
powers to try impeachments and to try crimes; it disturbs the system of
checks and balances, under which impeachment is the only legislative
check on the judiciary; and it would create a lack of finality and
difficulty in fashioning relief.51 Respondents likewise point to deliberations
on the US Constitution to show the intent to isolate judicial power of
review in cases of impeachment.
Respondents' and intervenors' reliance upon American jurisprudence,
the American Constitution and American authorities cannot be credited
to support the proposition that the Senate's "sole power to try and
decide impeachment cases," as provided for under Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of
the Constitution, is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment
of all issues pertaining to impeachment to the legislature, to the total
exclusion of the power of judicial review to check and restrain any
grave abuse of the impeachment process. Nor can it reasonably
support the interpretation that it necessarily confers upon the Senate the
inherently judicial power to determine constitutional questions incident
to impeachment proceedings.
Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American
Constitution, are of dubious application for these are no longer
controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive merit
insofar as Philippine constitutional law is concerned. As held in the case
of Garcia vs. COMELEC,52 "[i]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this
Court] should not be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which
are hardly applicable because they have been dictated by different
constitutional settings and needs."53 Indeed, although the Philippine
Constitution can trace its origins to that of the United States, their paths
of development have long since diverged. In the colorful words of
Father Bernas, "[w]e have cut the umbilical cord."
The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine
Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the
power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme
Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine
Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the
Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an
expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of
discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality.
There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the
Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the House of
Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S.
Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of
Representatives without limitation,54 our Constitution, though vesting in
the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate
impeachment cases,55 provides for several limitations to the exercise of
such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI
thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to
impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the
same official.
Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments
undermines their finality and may also lead to conflicts between
Congress and the judiciary. Thus, they call upon this Court to exercise
judicial statesmanship on the principle that "whenever possible, the
Court should defer to the judgment of the people expressed
legislatively, recognizing full well the perils of judicial willfulness and
pride."56
But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the
above-mentioned safeguards in the Constitution? This shows that the
Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the
sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined
limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr,57"judicially discoverable
standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion,
through the power of judicial review.
The cases of Romulo v. Yniguez58 and Alejandrino v. Quezon,59 cited by
respondents in support of the argument that the impeachment power is
beyond the scope of judicial review, are not in point. These cases
concern the denial of petitions for writs of mandamus to compel the
legislature to perform non-ministerial acts, and do not concern the
exercise of the power of judicial review.
There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the
power of judicial review over congressional action. Thus, in Santiago v.
Guingona, Jr.,60 this Court ruled that it is well within the power and
jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether the Senate or its officials
committed a violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in
the exercise of their functions and prerogatives. In Tanada v.
Angara,61 in seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the
ground that it contravened the Constitution, it held that the petition
raises a justiciable controversy and that when an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution,
it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle
the dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda,62 this Court declared null and void a
resolution of the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination,
and rescinding the election, of a congressman as a member of the
House Electoral Tribunal for being violative of Section 17, Article VI of the
Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra,63 it held that the resolution of whether
the House representation in the Commission on Appointments was
based on proportional representation of the political parties as provided
in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution is subject to judicial review.
In Daza v. Singson,64 it held that the act of the House of Representatives
in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments is
subject to judicial review. In Tanada v. Cuenco,65 it held that although
under the Constitution, the legislative power is vested exclusively in
Congress, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass
upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress. In Angara v. Electoral
Commission,66 it ruled that confirmation by the National Assembly of the
election of any member, irrespective of whether his election is
contested, is not essential before such member-elect may discharge
the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National
Assembly.
Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the
exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset
the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be
interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat
another."67 Both are integral components of the calibrated system of
independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of
government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.
Essential Requisites for Judicial Review
As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the courts' power of
judicial review, like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, is
subject to several limitations, namely: (1) an actual case or controversy
calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the
act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and
(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
x x x Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual
cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of
argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional
question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at
abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal
questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.
Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not
pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of
constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the
legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also
because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and
controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people
as expressed through their representatives in the executive and
legislative departments of the government.68 (Italics in the
original)
Standing
Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party
alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.69
Intervenor Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of the petitions, contends
that petitioners do not have standing since only the Chief Justice has
sustained and will sustain direct personal injury. Amicus curiae former
Justice Minister and Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza similarly
contends.
Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that petitioners have
standing since this Court had, in the past, accorded standing to
taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, legislators in cases involving
paramount public interest70 and transcendental importance,71 and that
procedural matters are subordinate to the need to determine whether
or not the other branches of the government have kept themselves
within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not
abused the discretion given to them.72 Amicus curiae Dean Raul
Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law is of the same opinion, citing
transcendental importance and the well-entrenched rule exception
that, when the real party in interest is unable to vindicate his rights by
seeking the same remedies, as in the case of the Chief Justice who, for
ethical reasons, cannot himself invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, the
courts will grant petitioners standing.
There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-party-in-interest
and the rule on standing, for the former is a concept of civil
procedure73 while the latter has constitutional underpinnings.74 In view of
the arguments set forth regarding standing, it behooves the Court to
reiterate the ruling in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato75 to clarify what is meant
by locus standi and to distinguish it from real party-in-interest.
The difference between the rule on standing and real party in
interest has been noted by authorities thus: "It is important to
note . . . that standing because of its constitutional and public
policy underpinnings, is very different from questions relating to
whether a particular plaintiff is the real party in interest or has
capacity to sue. Although all three requirements are directed
towards ensuring that only certain parties can maintain an
action, standing restrictions require a partial consideration of the
merits, as well as broader policy concerns relating to the proper
role of the judiciary in certain areas.
Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in
some cases suits are brought not by parties who have been
personally injured by the operation of a law or by official action
taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who
actually sue in the public interest. Hence the question in standing
is whether such parties have "alleged such a personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions."
xxx
On the other hand, the question as to "real party in interest" is
whether he is "the party who would be benefited or injured by
the judgment, or the 'party entitled to the avails of the
suit.'"76 (Citations omitted)
While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by the
alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives, none of
the petitioners before us asserts a violation of the personal rights of the
Chief Justice. On the contrary, they invariably invoke the vindication of
their own rights – as taxpayers; members of Congress; citizens,
individually or in a class suit; and members of the bar and of the legal
profession – which were supposedly violated by the alleged
unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives.
In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and
legislators when specific requirements have been met have been given
standing by this Court.
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the
constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be
able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but
also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct
injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers
thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person
complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to
which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some
burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.77 In
fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right,78 the
mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal
interest.
In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim
that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that public money is being
deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of public
funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional
law.79 Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, however, he
must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the
illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he would
sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned
statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general
interest common to all members of the public.80
At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a
taxpayer's suit should be entertained.81 This Court opts to grant standing
to most of the petitioners, given their allegation that any impending
transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of Impeachment and the
ensuing trial of the Chief Justice will necessarily involve the expenditure
of public funds.
As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any
official action which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a
legislator.82 Indeed, a member of the House of Representatives has
standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges
vested by the Constitution in his office.83
While an association has legal personality to represent its
members,84 especially when it is composed of substantial taxpayers and
the outcome will affect their vital interests,85 the mere invocation by
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any member of the legal
profession of the duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more,
although undoubtedly true, does not suffice to clothe it with standing. Its
interest is too general. It is shared by other groups and the whole
citizenry. However, a reading of the petitions shows that it has
advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court
in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents.86 It,
therefore, behooves this Court to relax the rules on standing and to
resolve the issues presented by it.
In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all
citizens, persons intervening must be sufficiently numerous to fully
protect the interests of all concerned87 to enable the court to deal
properly with all interests involved in the suit,88 for a judgment in a class
suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to the class, is, under the res
judicata principle, binding on all members of the class whether or not
they were before the court.89 Where it clearly appears that not all
interests can be sufficiently represented as shown by the divergent issues
raised in the numerous petitions before this Court, G.R. No. 160365 as a
class suit ought to fail. Since petitioners additionallyallege standing as
citizens and taxpayers, however, their petition will stand.
The Philippine Bar Association, in G.R. No. 160403, invokes the sole
ground of transcendental importance, while Atty. Dioscoro U. Vallejos, in
G.R. No. 160397, is mum on his standing.
There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the
following instructive determinants formulated by former Supreme Court
Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the
funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear
case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the
public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3)
the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in
raising the questions being raised.90 Applying these determinants, this
Court is satisfied that the issues raised herein are indeed of
transcendental importance.
In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude on
the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an
issue of transcendental significance to the people, as when the issues
raised are of paramount importance to the public.91 Such liberality does
not, however, mean that the requirement that a party should have an
interest in the matter is totally eliminated. A party must, at the very least,
still plead the existence of such interest, it not being one of which courts
can take judicial notice. In petitioner Vallejos' case, he failed to allege
any interest in the case. He does not thus have standing.
With respect to the motions for intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of the
Rules of Court requires an intervenor to possess a legal interest in the
matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest
against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a
distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or
of an officer thereof. While intervention is not a matter of right, it may be
permitted by the courts when the applicant shows facts which satisfy
the requirements of the law authorizing intervention.92
In Intervenors Attorneys Romulo Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra's
case, they seek to join petitioners Candelaria, et. al. in G.R. No. 160262.
Since, save for one additional issue, they raise the same issues and the
same standing, and no objection on the part of petitioners Candelaria,
et. al. has been interposed, this Court as earlier stated, granted the
Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and Petition-in-Intervention.
Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang
Pilipino, Inc., et. al. sought to join petitioner Francisco in G.R. No. 160261.
Invoking their right as citizens to intervene, alleging that "they will suffer if
this insidious scheme of the minority members of the House of
Representatives is successful," this Court found the requisites for
intervention had been complied with.
Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262,
160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310 were of transcendental
importance, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc.
filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" to raise the
additional issue of whether or not the second impeachment complaint
against the Chief Justice is valid and based on any of the grounds
prescribed by the Constitution.
Finding that Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga
Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et al. and World War II Veterans
Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. possess a legal interest in the matter
in litigation the respective motions to intervene were hereby granted.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to intervene for
the limited purpose of making of record and arguing a point of view
that differs with Senate President Drilon's. He alleges that submitting to
this Court's jurisdiction as the Senate President does will undermine the
independence of the Senate which will sit as an impeachment court
once the Articles of Impeachment are transmitted to it from the House
of Representatives. Clearly, Senator Pimentel possesses a legal interest in
the matter in litigation, he being a member of Congress against which
the herein petitions are directed. For this reason, and to fully ventilate all
substantial issues relating to the matter at hand, his Motion to Intervene
was granted and he was, as earlier stated, allowed to argue.
Lastly, as to Jaime N. Soriano's motion to intervene, the same must be
denied for, while he asserts an interest as a taxpayer, he failed to meet
the standing requirement for bringing taxpayer's suits as set forth
in Dumlao v. Comelec,93 to wit:
x x x While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the
expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said
petitioners allege that their tax money is "being extracted and
spent in violation of specific constitutional protection against
abuses of legislative power," or that there is a misapplication of
such funds by respondent COMELEC, or that public money is
being deflected to any improper purpose. Neither do petitioners
seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through
the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional
law.94 (Citations omitted)
In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed even to allege
that the act of petitioners will result in illegal disbursement of public
funds or in public money being deflected to any improper purpose.
Additionally, his mere interest as a member of the Bar does not suffice to
clothe him with standing.
Ripeness and Prematurity
In Tan v. Macapagal,95 this Court, through Chief Justice Fernando, held
that for a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, "it is a prerequisite
that something had by then been accomplished or performed by either
branch before a court may come into the picture."96 Only then may the
courts pass on the validity of what was done, if and when the latter is
challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding.
The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity of the filing
of the second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice in
accordance with the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th
Congress, the constitutionality of which is questioned. The questioned
acts having been carried out, i.e., the second impeachment complaint
had been filed with the House of Representatives and the 2001 Rules
have already been already promulgated and enforced, the
prerequisite that the alleged unconstitutional act should be
accomplished and performed before suit, as Tan v. Macapagal holds,
has been complied with.
Related to the issue of ripeness is the question of whether the instant
petitions are premature. Amicus curiae former Senate President Jovito R.
Salonga opines that there may be no urgent need for this Court to
render a decision at this time, it being the final arbiter on questions of
constitutionality anyway. He thus recommends that all remedies in the
House and Senate should first be exhausted.
Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of
Law who suggests to this Court to take judicial notice of on-going
attempts to encourage signatories to the second impeachment
complaint to withdraw their signatures and opines that the House
Impeachment Rules provide for an opportunity for members to raise
constitutional questions themselves when the Articles of Impeachment
are presented on a motion to transmit to the same to the Senate. The
dean maintains that even assuming that the Articles are transmitted to
the Senate, the Chief Justice can raise the issue of their constitutional
infirmity by way of a motion to dismiss.
The dean's position does not persuade. First, the withdrawal by the
Representatives of their signatures would not, by itself, cure the House
Impeachment Rules of their constitutional infirmity. Neither would such a
withdrawal, by itself, obliterate the questioned second impeachment
complaint since it would only place it under the ambit of Sections 3(2)
and (3) of Article XI of the Constitution97 and, therefore, petitioners
would continue to suffer their injuries.
Second and most importantly, the futility of seeking remedies from either
or both Houses of Congress before coming to this Court is shown by the
fact that, as previously discussed, neither the House of Representatives
nor the Senate is clothed with the power to rule with definitiveness on
the issue of constitutionality, whether concerning impeachment
proceedings or otherwise, as said power is exclusively vested in the
judiciary by the earlier quoted Section I, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Remedy cannot be sought from a body which is bereft of power to
grant it.
Justiciability
In the leading case of Tanada v. Cuenco,98 Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion defined the term "political question," viz:
[T]he term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it
means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In
other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum, it refers
to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated
to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality,
of a particular measure.99(Italics in the original)
Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and seemingly without
any rhyme or reason, this Court vacillated on its stance of taking
cognizance of cases which involved political questions. In some cases,
this Court hid behind the cover of the political question doctrine and
refused to exercise its power of judicial review.100 In other cases,
however, despite the seeming political nature of the therein issues
involved, this Court assumed jurisdiction whenever it found
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon
political bodies.101 Even in the landmark 1988 case of Javellana v.
Executive Secretary102 which raised the issue of whether the 1973
Constitution was ratified, hence, in force, this Court shunted the political
question doctrine and took cognizance thereof. Ratification by the
people of a Constitution is a political question, it being a question
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity.
The frequency with which this Court invoked the political question
doctrine to refuse to take jurisdiction over certain cases during the
Marcos regime motivated Chief Justice Concepcion, when he became
a Constitutional Commissioner, to clarify this Court's power of judicial
review and its application on issues involving political questions, viz:
MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
I will speak on the judiciary. Practically, everybody has made, I suppose,
the usual comment that the judiciary is the weakest among the three
major branches of the service. Since the legislature holds the purse and
the executive the sword, the judiciary has nothing with which to enforce
its decisions or commands except the power of reason and appeal to
conscience which, after all, reflects the will of God, and is the most
powerful of all other powers without exception. x x x And so, with the
body's indulgence, I will proceed to read the provisions drafted by the
Committee on the Judiciary.
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions.
It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first
and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the
government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of
our experience during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has
some antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary
during the deposed regime was marred considerably by the
circumstance that in a number of cases against the government,
which then had no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set
up the defense of political questions and got away with it. As a
consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ
of habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the
release of political detainees, and other matters related to the
operation and effect of martial law failed because the
government set up the defense of political question. And the
Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is political, we have no
authority to pass upon it." The Committee on the Judiciary feels
that this was not a proper solution of the questions involved. It did
not merely request an encroachment upon the rights of the
people, but it, in effect, encouraged further violations thereof
during the martial law regime. I am sure the members of the Bar
are familiar with this situation. But for the benefit of the Members
of the Commission who are not lawyers, allow me to explain. I will
start with a decision of the Supreme Court in 1973 on the case
of Javellana vs. the Secretary of Justice, if I am not mistaken.
Martial law was announced on September 22, although the
proclamation was dated September 21. The obvious reason for
the delay in its publication was that the administration had
apprehended and detained prominent newsmen on September
21. So that when martial law was announced on September 22,
the media hardly published anything about it. In fact, the media
could not publish any story not only because our main writers
were already incarcerated, but also because those who
succeeded them in their jobs were under mortal threat of being
the object of wrath of the ruling party. The 1971 Constitutional
Convention had begun on June 1, 1971 and by September 21 or
22 had not finished the Constitution; it had barely agreed in the
fundamentals of the Constitution. I forgot to say that upon the
proclamation of martial law, some delegates to that 1971
Constitutional Convention, dozens of them, were picked up.
One of them was our very own colleague, Commissioner
Calderon. So, the unfinished draft of the Constitution was taken
over by representatives of Malacañang. In 17 days, they finished
what the delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention had
been unable to accomplish for about 14 months. The draft of the
1973 Constitution was presented to the President around
December 1, 1972, whereupon the President issued a decree
calling a plebiscite which suspended the operation of some
provisions in the martial law decree which prohibited discussions,
much less public discussions of certain matters of public
concern. The purpose was presumably to allow a free discussion
on the draft of the Constitution on which a plebiscite was to be
held sometime in January 1973. If I may use a word famous by
our colleague, Commissioner Ople, during the interregnum,
however, the draft of the Constitution was analyzed and
criticized with such a telling effect that Malacañang felt the
danger of its approval. So, the President suspended indefinitely
the holding of the plebiscite and announced that he would
consult the people in a referendum to be held from January 10
to January 15. But the questions to be submitted in the
referendum were not announced until the eve of its scheduled
beginning, under the supposed supervision not of the
Commission on Elections, but of what was then designated as
"citizens assemblies or barangays." Thus the barangays came
into existence. The questions to be propounded were released
with proposed answers thereto, suggesting that it was
unnecessary to hold a plebiscite because the answers given in
the referendum should be regarded as the votes cast in the
plebiscite. Thereupon, a motion was filed with the Supreme
Court praying that the holding of the referendum be suspended.
When the motion was being heard before the Supreme Court,
the Minister of Justice delivered to the Court a proclamation of
the President declaring that the new Constitution was already in
force because the overwhelming majority of the votes cast in
the referendum favored the Constitution. Immediately after the
departure of the Minister of Justice, I proceeded to the session
room where the case was being heard. I then informed the
Court and the parties the presidential proclamation declaring
that the 1973 Constitution had been ratified by the people and is
now in force.
A number of other cases were filed to declare the presidential
proclamation null and void. The main defense put up by the
government was that the issue was a political question and that
the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the case.
xxx
The government said that in a referendum held from January 10
to January 15, the vast majority ratified the draft of the
 Constitution. Note that all members of the Supreme Court were
residents of Manila, but none of them had been notified of any
referendum in their respective places of residence, much less did
they participate in the alleged referendum. None of them saw
any referendum proceeding.
In the Philippines, even local gossips spread like wild fire. So, a
majority of the members of the Court felt that there had been no
referendum.
Second, a referendum cannot substitute for a plebiscite. There is
a big difference between a referendum and a plebiscite. But
another group of justices upheld the defense that the issue was a
political question. Whereupon, they dismissed the case. This is
not the only major case in which the plea of "political question"
was set up. There have been a number of other cases in the past.
x x x The defense of the political question was rejected because
the issue was clearly justiciable.
xxx
x x x When your Committee on the Judiciary began to perform its
functions, it faced the following questions: What is judicial
power? What is a political question?
The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main function:
to settle actual controversies involving conflicts of rights which
are demandable and enforceable. There are rights which are
guaranteed by law but cannot be enforced by a judiciary party.
In a decided case, a husband complained that his wife was
unwilling to perform her duties as a wife. The Court said: "We can
tell your wife what her duties as such are and that she is bound
to comply with them, but we cannot force her physically to
discharge her main marital duty to her husband. There are some
rights guaranteed by law, but they are so personal that to
enforce them by actual compulsion would be highly derogatory
to human dignity."
This is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section I provides
that:
Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable or
enforceable . . .
The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide,
hypothetical questions. In a presidential system of government,
the Supreme Court has, also another important function. The
powers of government are generally considered divided into
three branches: the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary.
Each one is supreme within its own sphere and independent of
the others. Because of that supremacy power to determine
whether a given law is valid or not is vested in courts of justice.
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of
the agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its
officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the
question whether or not a branch of government or any of its
officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction,
or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is
not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters
of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means
that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters
of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political
question.
I have made these extended remarks to the end that the
Commissioners may have an initial food for thought on the
subject of the judiciary.103 (Italics in the original; emphasis
supplied)
During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Chief Justice
Concepcion further clarified the concept of judicial power, thus:
MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term "judicial power" but
judicial power is not vested in the Supreme Court alone but also
in other lower courts as may be created by law.
MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.
MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example?
MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The Gentleman seems
to identify political questions with jurisdictional questions. But
there is a difference.
MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression "judicial power"?
MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to
ordinary cases but where there is a question as to whether the
government had authority or had abused its authority to the
extent of lacking jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction, that is not a
political question. Therefore, the court has the duty to decide.
xxx
FR. BERNAS. Ultimately, therefore, it will always have to be
decided by the Supreme Court according to the new numerical
need for votes.
On another point, is it the intention of Section 1 to do away with
the political question doctrine?
MR. CONCEPCION. No.
FR. BERNAS. It is not.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, because whenever there is an abuse of
discretion, amounting to a lack of jurisdiction. . .
FR. BERNAS. So, I am satisfied with the answer that it is not
intended to do away with the political question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, certainly not.
When this provision was originally drafted, it sought to define
what is judicial power. But the Gentleman will notice it says,
"judicial power includes" and the reason being that the definition
that we might make may not cover all possible areas.
FR. BERNAS. So, this is not an attempt to solve the problems
arising from the political question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. It definitely does not eliminate the fact that
truly political questions are beyond the pale of judicial
power.104 (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a
duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this
creature called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice
Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was
not intended to do away with "truly political questions." From this
clarification it is gathered that there are two species of political
questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly
political questions."
Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for
respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On
the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution,
courts can review questions which are not truly political in nature.
As pointed out by amicus curiae former dean Pacifico Agabin of the UP
College of Law, this Court has in fact in a number of cases taken
jurisdiction over questions which are not truly political following the
effectivity of the present Constitution.
In Marcos v. Manglapus,105 this Court, speaking through Madame
Justice Irene Cortes, held:
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question
doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas
which the Court, under previous constitutions, would have
normally left to the political departments to decide.106 x x x
In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, 107 through Justice
Teodoro Padilla, this Court declared:
The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this
Court must perform under the Constitution. Moreover, as held in
a recent case, "(t)he political question doctrine neither
interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the rival
claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has
been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate that
obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said
provision by no means does away with the applicability of the
 principle in appropriate cases."108 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
And in Daza v. Singson,109 speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, this
Court ruled:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes
even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we
were to assume that the issue presented before us was political
in nature, we would still not be precluded from resolving it under
the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in
proper cases, even the political question.110 x x x (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied.)
Section 1, Article VIII, of the Court does not define what are justiciable
political questions and non-justiciable political questions, however.
Identification of these two species of political questions may be
problematic. There has been no clear standard. The American case
of Baker v. Carr111 attempts to provide some:
x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a
political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department;
or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards
for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion;
or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government; or an unusual need for questioning
adherence to a political decision already made; or
the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one
question.112(Underscoring supplied)
Of these standards, the more reliable have been the first three: (1) a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; (2) the lack of judicially discoverable
and manageable standards for resolving it; and (3) the impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-
judicial discretion. These standards are not separate and distinct
concepts but are interrelated to each in that the presence of one
strengthens the conclusion that the others are also present.
The problem in applying the foregoing standards is that the American
concept of judicial review is radically different from our current concept,
for Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution provides our courts with far
less discretion in determining whether they should pass upon a
constitutional issue.
In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a
non-justiciable political question lies in the answer to the question of
whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions
conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-
bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the
government properly acted within such limits. This Court shall thus now
apply this standard to the present controversy.
These petitions raise five substantial issues:
I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment
complaint constitute valid impeachable offenses under the
Constitution.
II. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in
accordance with Section 3(4), Article XI of the Constitution.
III. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on
Justice into the Judicial Development Fund is an unconstitutional
infringement of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy
of the judiciary.
IV. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on
Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are
unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI
of the Constitution.
V. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under
Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment
complaint over which this Court has no jurisdiction. More
importantly, any discussion of this issue would require this Court to
make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable
offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which
the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation.
 Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission.113
Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six
grounds for impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes and
betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition. In fact, an
examination of the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission shows
that the framers could find no better way to approximate the
boundaries of betrayal of public trust and other high crimes than by
alluding to both positive and negative examples of both, without
arriving at their clear cut definition or even a standard
therefor.114 Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to decide a non-
justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial
power under Section 1, Article VIII.
Lis Mota
It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the
constitutionality of a governmental act should be avoided whenever
possible. Thus, in the case of Sotto v. Commission on Elections,115 this
Court held:
x x x It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon
a constitutional question and decide a law to be
unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the
parties and that when it is raised, if the record also presents
some other ground upon which the court may rest its judgment,
that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will
be left for consideration until a case arises in which a decision
upon such question will be unavoidable.116 [Emphasis and
underscoring supplied]
The same principle was applied in Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform,117 where this Court invalidated Sections 13 and 32 of Republic
Act No. 6657 for being confiscatory and violative of due process, to wit:
It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction
over a constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential
requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first
satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy
involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial
determination, the constitutional question must have been
opportunely raised by the proper party, and the resolution of the
question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case
itself.118 [Emphasis supplied]
Succinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it
is truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the controversy.
As noted earlier, the instant consolidated petitions, while all seeking the
invalidity of the second impeachment complaint, collectively raise
several constitutional issues upon which the outcome of this controversy
could possibly be made to rest. In determining whether one, some or all
of the remaining substantial issues should be passed upon, this Court is
guided by the related cannon of adjudication that "the court should not
form a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise
facts to which it is applied."119
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso, et al. argue that,
among other reasons, the second impeachment complaint is invalid
since it directly resulted from a Resolution120 calling for a legislative
inquiry into the JDF, which Resolution and legislative inquiry petitioners
claim to likewise be unconstitutional for being: (a) a violation of the rules
and jurisprudence on investigations in aid of legislation; (b) an open
breach of the doctrine of separation of powers; (c) a violation of the
constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary; and (d) an
assault on the independence of the judiciary.121
Without going into the merits of petitioners Alfonso, et. al.'s claims, it is
the studied opinion of this Court that the issue of the constitutionality of
the said Resolution and resulting legislative inquiry is too far removed
from the issue of the validity of the second impeachment complaint.
Moreover, the resolution of said issue would, in the Court's opinion,
require it to form a rule of constitutional law touching on the separate
and distinct matter of legislative inquiries in general, which would thus
be broader than is required by the facts of these consolidated cases.
This opinion is further strengthened by the fact that said petitioners have
raised other grounds in support of their petition which would not be
adversely affected by the Court's ruling.
En passant, this Court notes that a standard for the conduct of
legislative inquiries has already been enunciated by this Court
in Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Commttee, 122 viz:
 The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both
houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Thus,
Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its
respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation
in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The
rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall
be respected.
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation is not, therefore absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is
circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution.
Thus, as provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries shall be respected." It follows then that
the right rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be
respected, including the right to due process and the right not
be compelled to testify against one's self.123
In G.R. No. 160262, intervenors Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino
Quadra, while joining the original petition of petitioners Candelaria, et.
al., introduce the new argument that since the second impeachment
complaint was verified and filed only by Representatives Gilberto
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella, the same does not fall under
the provisions of Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution which reads:
Section 3(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of
impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of
the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of
Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
They assert that while at least 81 members of the House of
Representatives signed a Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment, the
same did not satisfy the requisites for the application of the afore-
mentioned section in that the "verified complaint or resolution of
impeachment" was not filed "by at least one-third of all the Members of
the House." With the exception of Representatives Teodoro and
Fuentebella, the signatories to said Resolution are alleged to have
verified the same merely as a "Resolution of Endorsement." Intervenors
point to the "Verification" of the Resolution of Endorsement which states
that:
"We are the proponents/sponsors of the Resolution of
Endorsement of the abovementioned Complaint of
Representatives Gilberto Teodoro and Felix William B.
Fuentebella x x x"124
Intervenors Macalintal and Quadra further claim that what the
Constitution requires in order for said second impeachment complaint
to automatically become the Articles of Impeachment and for trial in
the Senate to begin "forthwith," is that the verified complaint be "filed,"
not merely endorsed, by at least one-third of the Members of the House
of Representatives. Not having complied with this requirement, they
concede that the second impeachment complaint should have been
calendared and referred to the House Committee on Justice under
Section 3(2), Article XI of the Constitution, viz:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed
by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any
citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member
thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within
ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within
three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and
by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the
House within sixty session days from such referral, together with
the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared
for consideration by the House within ten session days from
receipt thereof.
Intervenors' foregoing position is echoed by Justice Maambong who
opined that for Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution to apply, there
should be 76 or more representatives who signed and verified the
second impeachment complaint as complainants, signed and verified
the signatories to a resolution of impeachment. Justice Maambong
likewise asserted that the Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment
signed by at least one-third of the members of the House of
Representatives as endorsers is not the resolution of impeachment
contemplated by the Constitution, such resolution of endorsement
being necessary only from at least one Member whenever a citizen files
a verified impeachment complaint.
While the foregoing issue, as argued by intervenors Macalintal and
Quadra, does indeed limit the scope of the constitutional issues to the
provisions on impeachment, more compelling considerations militate
against its adoption as the lis mota or crux of the present controversy.
Chief among this is the fact that only Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra,
intervenors in G.R. No. 160262, have raised this issue as a ground for
invalidating the second impeachment complaint. Thus, to adopt this
additional ground as the basis for deciding the instant consolidated
petitions would not only render for naught the efforts of the original
petitioners in G.R. No. 160262, but the efforts presented by the other
petitioners as well.
Again, the decision to discard the resolution of this issue as unnecessary
for the determination of the instant cases is made easier by the fact that
said intervenors Macalintal and Quadra have joined in the petition of
Candelaria, et. al., adopting the latter's arguments and issues as their
own. Consequently, they are not unduly prejudiced by this Court's
decision.
In sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues, inextricably linked
as they are, constitute the very lis mota of the instant controversy: (1)
whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules
adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the
provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution; and (2) whether, as
a result thereof, the second impeachment complaint is barred under
Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Judicial Restraint
Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint on the
ground that the Senate, sitting as an impeachment court, has the sole
power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. Again, this Court
reiterates that the power of judicial review includes the power of review
over justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings.
On the other hand, respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. argue that
"[t]here is a moral compulsion for the Court to not assume jurisdiction
over the impeachment because all the Members thereof are subject to
impeachment."125But this argument is very much like saying the
Legislature has a moral compulsion not to pass laws with penalty clauses
because Members of the House of Representatives are subject to them.
The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option
before this Court. Adjudication may not be declined, because this Court
is not legally disqualified. Nor can jurisdiction be renounced as there is
no other tribunal to which the controversy may be
referred."126 Otherwise, this Court would be shirking from its duty vested
under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the Constitution. More than being clothed
with authority thus, this Court is duty-bound to take cognizance of the
instant petitions.127 In the august words of amicus curiae Father Bernas,
"jurisdiction is not just a power; it is a solemn duty which may not be
renounced. To renounce it, even if it is vexatious, would be a dereliction
of duty."
Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under our system
of government cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge
because no other office has the authority to do so.128 On the occasion
that this Court had been an interested party to the controversy before it,
it has acted upon the matter "not with officiousness but in the discharge
of an unavoidable duty and, as always, with detachment and
fairness."129 After all, "by [his] appointment to the office, the public has
laid on [a member of the judiciary] their confidence that [he] is mentally
and morally fit to pass upon the merits of their varied contentions. For
this reason, they expect [him] to be fearless in [his] pursuit to render
justice, to be unafraid to displease any person, interest or power and to
be equipped with a moral fiber strong enough to resist the temptations
lurking in [his] office."130
The duty to exercise the power of adjudication regardless of interest had
already been settled in the case of Abbas v. Senate Electoral
Tribunal.131 In that case, the petitioners filed with the respondent Senate
Electoral Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of the
Senators-Members thereof from the hearing and resolution of SET Case
No. 002-87 on the ground that all of them were interested parties to said
case as respondents therein. This would have reduced the Tribunal's
membership to only its three Justices-Members whose disqualification
was not sought, leaving them to decide the matter. This Court held:
Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the
substitution of any Senator sitting in the Tribunal by any of his
other colleagues in the Senate without inviting the same
objections to the substitute's competence, the proposed mass
disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the
Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that no other
court or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully
discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of
Senators.
To our mind, this is the overriding consideration — that the
Tribunal be not prevented from discharging a duty which it alone
 has the power to perform, the performance of which is in the
highest public interest as evidenced by its being expressly
imposed by no less than the fundamental law.
It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the
framers of the Constitution could not have been unaware of the
possibility of an election contest that would involve all Senators—
elect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in judgment
thereon. Indeed, such possibility might surface again in the wake
of the 1992 elections when once more, but for the last time, all
24 seats in the Senate will be at stake. Yet the Constitution
provides no scheme or mode for settling such unusual situations
or for the substitution of Senators designated to the Tribunal
whose disqualification may be sought. Litigants in such situations
must simply place their trust and hopes of vindication in the
fairness and sense of justice of the Members of the Tribunal.
Justices and Senators, singly and collectively.
Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member
of the Senate Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify himself
from sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal.
Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates,
refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he
sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in
the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What we are
merely saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the Senate
Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its
entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of its
Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the
power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.
More recently in the case of Estrada v. Desierto,132 it was held that:
Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court,
particularly a majority of them, is nothing short of pro
tanto depriving the Court itself of its jurisdiction as established by
the fundamental law. Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation
of his judicial power. And if that judge is the one designated by
the Constitution to exercise the jurisdiction of his court, as is the
case with the Justices of this Court, the deprivation of his or their
judicial power is equivalent to the deprivation of the judicial
power of the court itself. It affects the very heart of judicial
independence. The proposed mass disqualification, if
sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Court no alternative
but to abandon a duty which it cannot lawfully discharge if
shorn of the participation of its entire membership of
Justices.133 (Italics in the original)
Besides, there are specific safeguards already laid down by the Court
when it exercises its power of judicial review.
In Demetria v. Alba,134 this Court, through Justice Marcelo Fernan cited
the "seven pillars" of limitations of the power of judicial review,
enunciated by US Supreme Court Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v.
TVA135 as follows:
1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation
in a friendly, non-adversary proceeding, declining because to
decide such questions 'is legitimate only in the last resort, and as
a necessity in the determination of real, earnest and vital
controversy between individuals. It never was the thought that,
by means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in the legislature
could transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the constitutionality
of the legislative act.'
2. The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional law in
advance of the necessity of deciding it.' . . . 'It is not the habit of
the Court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless
absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.'
3. The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law
broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be
applied.'
4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although
properly presented by the record, if there is also present some
other ground upon which the case may be disposed of. This rule
has found most varied application. Thus, if a case can be
decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional
question, the other a question of statutory construction or
general law, the Court will decide only the latter. Appeals from
the highest court of a state challenging its decision of a question
under the Federal Constitution are frequently dismissed because
the judgment can be sustained on an independent state
ground.
 5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon
complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its
operation. Among the many applications of this rule, none is
more striking than the denial of the right of challenge to one
who lacks a personal or property right. Thus, the challenge by a
public official interested only in the performance of his official
duty will not be entertained . . . In Fairchild v. Hughes, the Court
affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by a citizen who sought to
have the Nineteenth Amendment declared unconstitutional.
In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the challenge of the federal
Maternity Act was not entertained although made by the
Commonwealth on behalf of all its citizens.
6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at
the instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits.
7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in
question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised,
it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether
a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the
question may be avoided (citations omitted).
The foregoing "pillars" of limitation of judicial review, summarized
in Ashwander v. TVA from different decisions of the United States
Supreme Court, can be encapsulated into the following categories:
1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case
2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as
required by the facts of the case
3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground
4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of
the operation of the statute
5. that the parties are not in estoppel
6. that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality.
As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been adopted by this
Court in the exercise of judicial review:
1. actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
power
2. the person challenging the act must have "standing" to
challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in
the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury
as a result of its enforcement
3. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity
4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case.136
Respondents Speaker de Venecia, et. al. raise another argument for
judicial restraint the possibility that "judicial review of impeachments
might also lead to embarrassing conflicts between the Congress and
the [J]udiciary." They stress the need to avoid the appearance of
impropriety or conflicts of interest in judicial hearings, and the scenario
that it would be confusing and humiliating and risk serious political
instability at home and abroad if the judiciary countermanded the vote
of Congress to remove an impeachable official.137 Intervenor Soriano
echoes this argument by alleging that failure of this Court to enforce its
Resolution against Congress would result in the diminution of its judicial
authority and erode public confidence and faith in the judiciary.
Such an argument, however, is specious, to say the least. As correctly
stated by the Solicitor General, the possibility of the occurrence of a
constitutional crisis is not a reason for this Court to refrain from upholding
the Constitution in all impeachment cases. Justices cannot abandon
their constitutional duties just because their action may start, if not
precipitate, a crisis.
Justice Feliciano warned against the dangers when this Court refuses to
act.
x x x Frequently, the fight over a controversial legislative or
executive act is not regarded as settled until the Supreme Court
has passed upon the constitutionality of the act involved, the
judgment has not only juridical effects but also political
consequences. Those political consequences may follow even
where the Court fails to grant the petitioner's prayer to nullify an
act for lack of the necessary number of votes. Frequently, failure
 to act explicitly, one way or the other, itself constitutes a decision
for the respondent and validation, or at least quasi-validation,
follows." 138
Thus, in Javellana v. Executive Secretary139 where this Court was split and
"in the end there were not enough votes either to grant the petitions, or
to sustain respondent's claims,"140 the pre-existing constitutional order
was disrupted which paved the way for the establishment of the martial
law regime.
Such an argument by respondents and intervenor also presumes that
the coordinate branches of the government would behave in a lawless
manner and not do their duty under the law to uphold the Constitution
and obey the laws of the land. Yet there is no reason to believe that any
of the branches of government will behave in a precipitate manner and
risk social upheaval, violence, chaos and anarchy by encouraging
disrespect for the fundamental law of the land.
Substituting the word public officers for judges, this Court is well guided
by the doctrine in People v. Veneracion, to wit:141
Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of
justice. If [public officers], under the guise of religious or political
beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries
within which they are required by law to exercise the duties of
their office, then law becomes meaningless. A government of
laws, not of men excludes the exercise of broad discretionary
powers by those acting under its authority. Under this system,
[public officers] are guided by the Rule of Law, and ought "to
protect and enforce it without fear or favor," resist
encroachments by governments, political parties, or even the
interference of their own personal beliefs.142
Constitutionality of the Rules of Procedure
for Impeachment Proceedings
adopted by the 12th Congress
Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De Venecia,
argues that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment
Rules do not violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of our present Constitution,
contending that the term "initiate" does not mean "to file;" that Section 3
(1) is clear in that it is the House of Representatives, as a collective body,
which has the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment; that
initiate could not possibly mean "to file" because filing can, as Section 3
(2), Article XI of the Constitution provides, only be accomplished in 3
ways, to wit: (1) by a verified complaint for impeachment by any
member of the House of Representatives; or (2) by any citizen upon a
resolution of endorsement by any member; or (3) by at least 1/3 of all
the members of the House. Respondent House of Representatives
concludes that the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of
impeachment proceedings against the same officials could not have
been violated as the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Davide and seven Associate Justices had not been initiated as the
House of Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet to act
on it.
The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the term
"initiate." Resort to statutory construction is, therefore, in order.
That the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of the Constitution,
Commissioner Florenz Regalado, who eventually became an Associate
Justice of this Court, agreed on the meaning of "initiate" as "to file," as
proffered and explained by Constitutional Commissioner Maambong
during the Constitutional Commission proceedings, which he
(Commissioner Regalado) as amicus curiae affirmed during the oral
arguments on the instant petitions held on November 5, 2003 at which
he added that the act of "initiating" included the act of taking initial
action on the complaint, dissipates any doubt that indeed the word
"initiate" as it twice appears in Article XI (3) and (5) of the Constitution
means to file the complaint and take initial action on it.
"Initiate" of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as
dictionaries do, to begin, to commence, or set going. As Webster's Third
New International Dictionary of the English Language concisely puts it, it
means "to perform or facilitate the first action," which jibes with Justice
Regalado's position, and that of Father Bernas, who elucidated during
the oral arguments of the instant petitions on November 5, 2003 in this
wise:
Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a single act. It is
a comlexus of acts consisting of a beginning, a middle and an
end. The end is the transmittal of the articles of impeachment to
the Senate. The middle consists of those deliberative moments
leading to the formulation of the articles of impeachment. The
beginning or the initiation is the filing of the complaint and its
referral to the Committee on Justice.
 Finally, it should be noted that the House Rule relied upon by
Representatives Cojuangco and Fuentebella says that
impeachment is "deemed initiated" when the Justice Committee
votes in favor of impeachment or when the House reverses a
contrary vote of the Committee. Note that the Rule does not say
"impeachment proceedings" are initiated but rather are
"deemed initiated." The language is recognition that initiation
happened earlier, but by legal fiction there is an attempt to
postpone it to a time after actual initiation. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting the Constitution is
looking into the intent of the law. Fortunately, the intent of the framers of
the 1987 Constitution can be pried from its records:
MR. MAAMBONG. With reference to Section 3, regarding the
procedure and the substantive provisions on impeachment, I
understand there have been many proposals and, I think, these
would need some time for Committee action.
However, I would just like to indicate that I submitted to the
Committee a resolution on impeachment proceedings, copies
of which have been furnished the Members of this body. This is
borne out of my experience as a member of the Committee on
Justice, Human Rights and Good Government which took
charge of the last impeachment resolution filed before the First
Batasang Pambansa. For the information of the Committee, the
resolution covers several steps in the impeachment
proceedings starting with initiation, action of the Speaker
committee action, calendaring of report, voting on the report,
transmittal referral to the Senate, trial and judgment by the
Senate.
xxx
MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a
reconsideration of the approval of the amendment submitted
by Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make of record my
thinking that we do not really initiate the filing of the Articles of
Impeachment on the floor. The procedure, as I have pointed out
earlier, was that the initiation starts with the filing of the
complaint. And what is actually done on the floor is that the
committee resolution containing the Articles of Impeachment is
the one approved by the body.
As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the
Committee on Style, it appears that the initiation starts on the
floor. If we only have time, I could cite examples in the case of
the impeachment proceedings of President Richard Nixon
wherein the Committee on the Judiciary submitted the
recommendation, the resolution, and the Articles of
Impeachment to the body, and it was the body who approved
the resolution. It is not the body which initiates it. It only approves
or disapproves the resolution. So, on that score, probably the
Committee on Style could help in rearranging these words
because we have to be very technical about this. I have been
bringing with me The Rules of the House of Representatives of the
U.S. Congress. The Senate Rules are with me. The proceedings on
the case of Richard Nixon are with me. I have submitted my
proposal, but the Committee has already decided.
Nevertheless, I just want to indicate this on record.
xxx
MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration
of the approval of Section 3 (3). My reconsideration will not at all
affect the substance, but it is only in keeping with the exact
formulation of the Rules of the House of Representatives of the
United States regarding impeachment.
I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to
any of this provision, that on page 2, Section 3 (3), from lines 17
to 18, we delete the words which read: "to initiate impeachment
proceedings" and the comma (,) and insert on line 19 after the
word "resolution" the phrase WITH THE ARTICLES, and then
capitalize the letter "i" in "impeachment" and replace the word
"by" with OF, so that the whole section will now read: "A vote of
at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be
necessary either to affirm a resolution WITH THE ARTICLES of
Impeachment OF the Committee or to override its contrary
resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded."
I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as
the House of Representatives of the United States is
concerned, really starts from the filing of the verified
 complaint and every resolution to impeach always carries with it
the Articles of Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the words
"Articles of Impeachment" are mentioned on line 25 in the case
of the direct filing of a verified compliant of one-third of all the
Members of the House. I will mention again, Madam President,
that my amendment will not vary the substance in any way. It is
only in keeping with the uniform procedure of the House of
Representatives of the United States Congress. Thank you,
Madam President.143 (Italics in the original; emphasis and
udnerscoring supplied)
This amendment proposed by Commissioner Maambong was clarified
and accepted by the Committee on the Accountability of Public
Officers.144
It is thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to start with the filing
of the complaint. In his amicus curiae brief, Commissioner Maambong
explained that "the obvious reason in deleting the phrase "to initiate
impeachment proceedings" as contained in the text of the provision of
Section 3 (3) was to settle and make it understood once and for all that
the initiation of impeachment proceedings starts with the filing of the
complaint, and the vote of one-third of the House in a resolution of
impeachment does not initiate the impeachment proceedings which
was already initiated by the filing of a verified complaint under Section
3, paragraph (2), Article XI of the Constitution."145
Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of the same
view as is Father Bernas, who was also a member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, that the word "initiate" as used in Article XI,
Section 3(5) means to file, both adding, however, that the filing must be
accompanied by an action to set the complaint moving.
During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas clarified that
the word "initiate," appearing in the constitutional provision on
impeachment, viz:
Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have the
exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
xxx
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the
same official more than once within a period of one year,
(Emphasis supplied)
refers to two objects, "impeachment case" and "impeachment
proceeding."
Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the common verb is
"to initiate." The object in the first sentence is "impeachment case." The
object in the second sentence is "impeachment proceeding." Following
the principle of reddendo singuala sinuilis, the term "cases" must be
distinguished from the term "proceedings." An impeachment case is the
legal controversy that must be decided by the Senate. Above-quoted
first provision provides that the House, by a vote of one-third of all its
members, can bring a case to the Senate. It is in that sense that the
House has "exclusive power" to initiate all cases of impeachment. No
other body can do it. However, before a decision is made to initiate a
case in the Senate, a "proceeding" must be followed to arrive at a
conclusion. A proceeding must be "initiated." To initiate, which comes
from the Latin word initium, means to begin. On the other hand,
proceeding is a progressive noun. It has a beginning, a middle, and an
end. It takes place not in the Senate but in the House and consists of
several steps: (1) there is the filing of a verified complaint either by a
Member of the House of Representatives or by a private citizen
endorsed by a Member of the House of the Representatives; (2) there is
the processing of this complaint by the proper Committee which may
either reject the complaint or uphold it; (3) whether the resolution of the
Committee rejects or upholds the complaint, the resolution must be
forwarded to the House for further processing; and (4) there is the
processing of the same complaint by the House of Representatives
which either affirms a favorable resolution of the Committee or overrides
a contrary resolution by a vote of one-third of all the members. If at least
one third of all the Members upholds the complaint, Articles of
Impeachment are prepared and transmitted to the Senate. It is at this
point that the House "initiates an impeachment case." It is at this point
that an impeachable public official is successfully impeached. That is,
he or she is successfully charged with an impeachment "case" before
the Senate as impeachment court.
Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment proceeding" is not
initiated when the complaint is transmitted to the Senate for trial
because that is the end of the House proceeding and the beginning of
another proceeding, namely the trial. Neither is the "impeachment
proceeding" initiated when the House deliberates on the resolution
passed on to it by the Committee, because something prior to that has
already been done. The action of the House is already a further step in
the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is
initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the
Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which triggers
the series of steps that follow.
The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary
meaning. Thus when a proposal reached the floor proposing that "A
vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be
necessary… to initiate impeachment proceedings," this was met by a
proposal to delete the line on the ground that the vote of the House
does not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a
complaint does.146 Thus the line was deleted and is not found in the
present Constitution.
Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, "No
impeachment proceeding shall be initiated against the same official
more than once within a period of one year," it means that no second
verified complaint may be accepted and referred to the Committee on
Justice for action. By his explanation, this interpretation is founded on
the common understanding of the meaning of "to initiate" which means
to begin. He reminds that the Constitution is ratified by the people, both
ordinary and sophisticated, as they understand it; and that ordinary
people read ordinary meaning into ordinary words and not abstruse
meaning, they ratify words as they understand it and not as
sophisticated lawyers confuse it.
To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can
initiate impeachment proceedings because Section 3 (1) says "The
House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all
cases of impeachment," This is a misreading of said provision and is
contrary to the principle of reddendo singula singulis by equating
"impeachment cases" with "impeachment proceeding."
From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus
curiae briefs of two former Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a
doubt that the term "to initiate" refers to the filing of the impeachment
complaint coupled with Congress' taking initial action of said complaint.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and
referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House
Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the
members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of
the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear.
Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another
impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official
within a one year period.
Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules,
impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding
by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or
resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or
overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified
complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the
filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of
Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment
by at least 1/3 of the members of the House. These rules clearly
contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the rules give the term
"initiate" a meaning different meaning from filing and referral.
In his amicus curiae brief, Justice Hugo Gutierrez posits that this Court
could not use contemporaneous construction as an aid in the
interpretation of Sec.3 (5) of Article XI, citing Vera v. Avelino147 wherein
this Court stated that "their personal opinions (referring to Justices who
were delegates to the Constitution Convention) on the matter at issue
expressed during this Court's our deliberations stand on a different
footing from the properly recorded utterances of debates and
proceedings." Further citing said case, he states that this Court likened
the former members of the Constitutional Convention to actors who are
so absorbed in their emotional roles that intelligent spectators may know
more about the real meaning because of the latter's balanced
perspectives and disinterestedness.148
Justice Gutierrez's statements have no application in the present
petitions. There are at present only two members of this Court who
participated in the 1986 Constitutional Commission – Chief Justice
Davide and Justice Adolf Azcuna. Chief Justice Davide has not taken
part in these proceedings for obvious reasons. Moreover, this Court has
not simply relied on the personal opinions now given by members of the
Constitutional Commission, but has examined the records of the
deliberations and proceedings thereof.
Respondent House of Representatives counters that under Section 3 (8)
of Article XI, it is clear and unequivocal that it and only it has the power
to make and interpret its rules governing impeachment. Its argument is
premised on the assumption that Congress has absolute power to
promulgate its rules. This assumption, however, is misplaced.
Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that "The Congress shall promulgate its
rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this
section." Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is
limited by the phrase "to effectively carry out the purpose of this
section." Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the
Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry out.
Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides for other specific
limitations on its power to make rules, viz:
Section 3. (1) x x x
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any
Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon
a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall
be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and
referred to the proper Committee within three session days
thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote
of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty
session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration
by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House
shall be necessary to either affirm a favorable resolution with the
Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its
contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is
filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the
same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by
the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the
same official more than once within a period of one year.
It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the
fundamental law. If as alleged Congress had absolute rule making
power, then it would by necessary implication have the power to alter
or amend the meaning of the Constitution without need of referendum.
In Osmeña v. Pendatun,149 this Court held that it is within the province of
either House of Congress to interpret its rules and that it was the best
judge of what constituted "disorderly behavior" of its members. However,
in Paceta v. Secretary of the Commission on Appointments,150 Justice
(later Chief Justice) Enrique Fernando, speaking for this Court and
quoting Justice Brandeis in United States v. Smith,151 declared that where
the construction to be given to a rule affects persons other than
members of the Legislature, the question becomes judicial in nature.
In Arroyo v. De Venecia,152 quoting United States v. Ballin, Joseph &
Co.,153 Justice Vicente Mendoza, speaking for this Court, held that while
the Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of
proceedings, it may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or
violate fundamental rights, and further that there should be a
reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding
established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. It is
only within these limitations that all matters of method are open to the
determination of the Legislature. In the same case of Arroyo v. De
Venecia, Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his Concurring and Dissenting
Opinion, was even more emphatic as he stressed that in the Philippine
setting there is even more reason for courts to inquire into the validity of
the Rules of Congress, viz:
With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the
petitioner are non-justiciable. Nor do I agree that we will trivialize
the principle of separation of power if we assume jurisdiction
over he case at bar. Even in the United States, the principle of
separation of power is no longer an impregnable impediment
against the interposition of judicial power on cases involving
breach of rules of procedure by legislators.
Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v Ballin (144 US 1)
as a window to view the issues before the Court. It is
in Ballin where the US Supreme Court first defined the boundaries
of the power of the judiciary to review congressional rules. It
held:
"x x x
"The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each house
may determine the rules of its proceedings." It appears that in
pursuance of this authority the House had, prior to that day,
passed this as one of its rules:
 Rule XV
3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the
Speaker, the names of members sufficient to make a quorum in
the hall of the House who do not vote shall be noted by the clerk
and recorded in the journal, and reported to the Speaker with
the names of the members voting, and be counted and
announced in determining the presence of a quorum to do
business. (House Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890)
The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The
question, therefore, is as to the validity of this rule, and not what
methods the Speaker may of his own motion resort to for
determining the presence of a quorum, nor what matters the
Speaker or clerk may of their own volition place upon the
journal. Neither do the advantages or disadvantages, the
wisdom or folly, of such a rule present any matters for judicial
consideration. With the courts the question is only one of
power. The Constitution empowers each house to determine its
rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional
restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a
reasonable relation between the mode or method of
proceedings established by the rule and the result which is
sought to be attained. But within these limitations all matters of
method are open to the determination of the House, and it is no
impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be
better, more accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the
validity of a rule that a different one has been prescribed and in
force for a length of time. The power to make rules is not one
which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power,
always subject to be exercised by the House, and within the
limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of
any other body or tribunal."
Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon
the validity of congressional rules, i.e, whether they are
constitutional. Rule XV was examined by the Court and it was
found to satisfy the test: (1) that it did not ignore any
constitutional restraint; (2) it did not violate any fundamental
right; and (3) its method had a reasonable relationship with the
result sought to be attained. By examining Rule XV, the Court did
not allow its jurisdiction to be defeated by the mere invocation
of the principle of separation of powers.154
xxx
In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for
courts to categorically reject the political question defense when
its interposition will cover up abuse of power. For section 1,
Article VIII of our Constitution was intentionally cobbled to
empower courts "x x x to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government." This power is new and was not granted to our
courts in the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions. It was not also xeroxed
from the US Constitution or any foreign state constitution. The
CONCOM granted this enormous power to our courts in view of
our experience under martial law where abusive exercises of
state power were shielded from judicial scrutiny by the misuse of
the political question doctrine. Led by the eminent former Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded and
sharpened the checking powers of the judiciary vis-à-vis the
Executive and the Legislative departments of government.155
xxx
The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this
Court is not a mere power which it can decline to exercise.
Precisely to deter this disinclination, the Constitution imposed it
as a duty of this Court to strike down any act of a branch or
instrumentality of government or any of its officials done with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly, the Constitution has elongated
the checking powers of this Court against the other branches of
government despite their more democratic character, the
President and the legislators being elected by the people.156
xxx
The provision defining judicial power as including the 'duty of the
courts of justice. . . to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government' constitutes the capstone of the efforts of the
Constitutional Commission to upgrade the powers of this court
vis-à-vis the other branches of government. This provision was
dictated by our experience under martial law which taught us
 that a stronger and more independent judiciary is needed to
abort abuses in government. x x x
xxx
In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul
acts of government committed with grave abuse of discretion,
the new Constitution transformed this Court from passivity to
activism. This transformation, dictated by our distinct experience
as nation, is not merely evolutionary but revolutionary.Under the
1935 and the 1973 Constitutions, this Court approached
constitutional violations by initially determining what it cannot
do; under the 1987 Constitution, there is a shift in stress – this
Court is mandated to approach constitutional violations not by
finding out what it should not do but what it must do. The Court
must discharge this solemn duty by not resuscitating a past that
petrifies the present.
I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious
consideration to this new constitutional provision as the case at
bar once more calls us to define the parameters of our power to
review violations of the rules of the House. We will not be true to
our trust as the last bulwark against government abuses if we
refuse to exercise this new power or if we wield it with timidity. To
be sure, it is this exceeding timidity to unsheathe the judicial
sword that has increasingly emboldened other branches of
government to denigrate, if not defy, orders of our
courts. In Tolentino, I endorsed the view of former Senator
Salonga that this novel provision stretching the latitude of judicial
power is distinctly Filipino and its interpretation should not be
depreciated by undue reliance on inapplicable foreign
jurisprudence. In resolving the case at bar, the lessons of our own
history should provide us the light and not the experience of
foreigners.157 (Italics in the original emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Thus, the ruling in Osmena v. Pendatun is not applicable to the instant
petitions. Here, the third parties alleging the violation of private rights
and the Constitution are involved.
Neither may respondent House of Representatives' rely on Nixon v.
US158 as basis for arguing that this Court may not decide on the
constitutionality of Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules.
As already observed, the U.S. Federal Constitution simply provides that
"the House of Representatives shall have the sole power of
impeachment." It adds nothing more. It gives no clue whatsoever as to
how this "sole power" is to be exercised. No limitation whatsoever is
given. Thus, the US Supreme Court concluded that there was a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of a constitutional power to
the House of Representatives. This reasoning does not hold with regard
to impeachment power of the Philippine House of Representatives since
our Constitution, as earlier enumerated, furnishes several provisions
articulating how that "exclusive power" is to be exercised.
The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House
Impeachment Rules which state that impeachment proceedings are
deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on
Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in
substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of
the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution
is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before
the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified
complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the
members of the House thus clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI
as they give the term "initiate" a meaning different from "filing."
Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of
the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on
Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of
Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been
initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the
same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of
the Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by
former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and
referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the
second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on
October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the
initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable
officer within a one-year period.
Conclusion
If there is anything constant about this country, it is that there is always a
phenomenon that takes the center stage of our individual and
collective consciousness as a people with our characteristic flair for
human drama, conflict or tragedy. Of course this is not to demean the
seriousness of the controversy over the Davide impeachment. For many
of us, the past two weeks have proven to be an exasperating, mentally
and emotionally exhausting experience. Both sides have fought bitterly
a dialectical struggle to articulate what they respectively believe to be
the correct position or view on the issues involved. Passions had ran high
as demonstrators, whether for or against the impeachment of the Chief
Justice, took to the streets armed with their familiar slogans and chants
to air their voice on the matter. Various sectors of society - from the
business, retired military, to the academe and denominations of faith –
offered suggestions for a return to a state of normalcy in the official
relations of the governmental branches affected to obviate any
perceived resulting instability upon areas of national life.
Through all these and as early as the time when the Articles of
Impeachment had been constituted, this Court was specifically asked,
told, urged and argued to take no action of any kind and form with
respect to the prosecution by the House of Representatives of the
impeachment complaint against the subject respondent public official.
When the present petitions were knocking so to speak at the doorsteps
of this Court, the same clamor for non-interference was made through
what are now the arguments of "lack of jurisdiction," "non-justiciability,"
and "judicial self-restraint" aimed at halting the Court from any move
that may have a bearing on the impeachment proceedings.
This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as
the question of the constitutionality of initiating the impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Davide is concerned. To reiterate what
has been already explained, the Court found the existence in full of all
the requisite conditions for its exercise of its constitutionally vested power
and duty of judicial review over an issue whose resolution precisely
called for the construction or interpretation of a provision of the
fundamental law of the land. What lies in here is an issue of a genuine
constitutional material which only this Court can properly and
competently address and adjudicate in accordance with the clear-cut
allocation of powers under our system of government. Face-to-face thus
with a matter or problem that squarely falls under the Court's jurisdiction,
no other course of action can be had but for it to pass upon that
problem head on.
The claim, therefore, that this Court by judicially entangling itself with the
process of impeachment has effectively set up a regime of judicial
supremacy, is patently without basis in fact and in law.
This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and
resolved on the merits only the main issue of whether the impeachment
proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the
constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not
go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately
turn justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions. Because it is
not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the
other two great branches of the government. Rather, the raison d'etre
of the judiciary is to complement the discharge by the executive and
legislative of their own powers to bring about ultimately the beneficent
effects of having founded and ordered our society upon the rule of law.
It is suggested that by our taking cognizance of the issue of
constitutionality of the impeachment proceedings against the Chief
Justice, the members of this Court have actually closed ranks to protect
a brethren. That the members' interests in ruling on said issue is as much
at stake as is that of the Chief Justice. Nothing could be farther from the
truth.
The institution that is the Supreme Court together with all other courts
has long held and been entrusted with the judicial power to resolve
conflicting legal rights regardless of the personalities involved in the suits
or actions. This Court has dispensed justice over the course of time,
unaffected by whomsoever stood to benefit or suffer therefrom, unfraid
by whatever imputations or speculations could be made to it, so long as
it rendered judgment according to the law and the facts. Why can it
not now be trusted to wield judicial power in these petitions just
because it is the highest ranking magistrate who is involved when it is an
incontrovertible fact that the fundamental issue is not him but the
validity of a government branch's official act as tested by the limits set
by the Constitution? Of course, there are rules on the inhibition of any
member of the judiciary from taking part in a case in specified
instances. But to disqualify this entire institution now from the suit at bar is
to regard the Supreme Court as likely incapable of impartiality when
one of its members is a party to a case, which is simply a non sequitur.
No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in
any legal system which recognizes equality of all men before the law as
essential to the law's moral authority and that of its agents to secure
respect for and obedience to its commands. Perhaps, there is no other
government branch or instrumentality that is most zealous in protecting
that principle of legal equality other than the Supreme Court which has
discerned its real meaning and ramifications through its application to
numerous cases especially of the high-profile kind in the annals of
jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is not above the law and neither is any
other member of this Court. But just because he is the Chief Justice does
not imply that he gets to have less in law than anybody else. The law is
solicitous of every individual's rights irrespective of his station in life.
The Filipino nation and its democratic institutions have no doubt been
put to test once again by this impeachment case against Chief Justice
Hilario Davide. Accordingly, this Court has resorted to no other than the
Constitution in search for a solution to what many feared would ripen to
a crisis in government. But though it is indeed immensely a blessing for
this Court to have found answers in our bedrock of legal principles, it is
equally important that it went through this crucible of a democratic
process, if only to discover that it can resolve differences without the use
of force and aggression upon each other.
WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in
Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of
Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional.
Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto
C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the
Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003
is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo and Tinga, JJ., see separate opinion.
Puno, and Ynares-Santiago, J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.
Vitug, Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., see
separate concurring opinion.
Quisumbing, J., concurring separate opinion received.
Carpio, J., concur.
Austria-Martinez, J., concur in the majority opinion and in the separate
opinion of J. Vitug.
Corona, J., will write a separate concurring opinion.
Azcuna, J., concur in the separate opinion.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-36409 October 26, 1973
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LORETA GOZO, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General
Jaime M. Lantin and Solicitor Norberto P. Eduardo for plaintiff-appellee.
Jose T. Nery for defendant-appellant.
FERNANDO, J.:
Appellant seeks to set aside a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Zambales, convicting her of a violation of an ordinance of Olongapo,
Zambales, requiring a permit from the municipal mayor for the
construction or erection of a building, as well as any modification,
alteration, repair or demolition thereof. She questions its validity, or at
the very least, its applicability to her, by invoking due process,1 a
contention she would premise on what for her is the teaching of People
v. Fajardo.2 If such a ground were far from being impressed with solidity,
she stands on quicksand when she would deny the applicability of the
ordinance to her, on the pretext that her house was constructed within
the naval base leased to the American armed forces. While yielding to
the well-settled doctrine that it does not thereby cease to be Philippine
territory, she would, in effect, seek to emasculate our sovereign rights by
the assertion that we cannot exercise therein administrative jurisdiction.
To state the proposition is to make patent how much it is tinged with
unorthodoxy. Clearly then, the lower court decision must be affirmed
with the sole modification that she is given thirty days from the finality of
a judgment to obtain a permit, failing which, she is required to demolish
the same.
The facts are undisputed. As set forth in the decision of the lower court:
"The accused bought a house and lot located inside the United States
Naval Reservation within the territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City. She
demolished the house and built another one in its place, without a
building permit from the City Mayor of Olongapo City, because she was
told by one Ernesto Evalle, an assistant in the City Mayor's office, as well
as by her neighbors in the area, that such building permit was not
necessary for the construction of the house. On December 29, 1966,
Juan Malones, a building and lot inspector of the City Engineer's Office,
Olongapo City, together with Patrolman Ramon Macahilas of the
Olongapo City police force apprehended four carpenters working on
the house of the accused and they brought the carpenters to the
Olongapo City police headquarters for interrogation. ... After due
investigation, Loreta Gozo was charged with violation of Municipal
Ordinance No. 14, S. of 1964 with the City Fiscal's Office." 3 The City Court
of Olongapo City found her guilty of violating Municipal Ordinance No.
14, Series of 1964 and sentenced her to an imprisonment of one month
as well as to pay the costs. The Court of Instance of Zambales, on
appeal, found her guilty on the above facts of violating such municipal
ordinance but would sentence her merely to pay a fine of P200.00 and
to demolish the house thus erected. She elevated the case to the Court
of Appeals but in her brief, she would put in issue the validity of such an
ordinance on constitutional ground or at the very least its applicability to
her in view of the location of her dwelling within the naval base.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals, in a resolution of January 29, 1973,
noting the constitutional question raised, certified the case to this Court.
There is, as mentioned in the opening paragraph of this petition, no
support in law for the stand taken by appellant.
1. It would be fruitless for her to assert that local government units are
devoid of authority to require building permits. This Court, from Switzer v.
Municipality of
Cebu,4 decided in 1911, has sanctioned the validity of such measures. It
is much too late in the day to contend that such a requirement cannot
be validly imposed. Even appellant, justifiably concerned about the
unfavorable impression that could be created if she were to deny that
such competence is vested in municipal corporations and chartered
cities, had to concede in her brief: "If, at all; the questioned ordinance
may be predicated under the general welfare clause ... ." 5 Its scope is
wide, well-nigh all embracing, covering every aspect of public health,
public morals, public safety, and the well being and good order of the
community.6
It goes without saying that such a power is subject to limitations.
Certainly, if its exercise is violative of any constitutional right, then its
validity could be impugned, or at the very least, its applicability to the
person adversely affected could be questioned. So much is settled law.
Apparently, appellant has adopted the view that a due process
question may indeed be raised in view of what for her is its oppressive
character. She is led to such a conclusion, relying on People v.
Fajardo.7 A more careful scrutiny of such a decision would not have led
her astray, for that case is easily distinguishable. The facts as set forth in
the opinion follow: "It appears that on August 15, 1950, during the
incumbency of defendant-appellant Juan F. Fajardo as mayor of the
municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, the municipal council passed the
ordinance in question providing as follows: "... 1. Any person or persons
who will construct or repair a building should, before constructing or
repairing, obtain a written permit from the Municipal Mayor. ... 2. A fee
of not less than P2.00 should be charged for each building permit and
P1.00 for each repair permit issued. ... 3. [Penalty]-Any violation of the
provisions of the above, this ordinance, shall make the violator liable to
pay a fine of not less than P25 nor more than P50 or imprisonment of not
less than 12 days nor more than 24 days or both, at the discretion of the
court. If said building destroys the view of the Public Plaza or occupies
any public property, it shall be removed at the expense of the owner of
the building or house. ... ." Four years later, after the term of appellant
Fajardo as mayor had expired, he and his son-in-law, appellant
Babilonia, filed a written request with the incumbent municipal mayor
for a permit to construct a building adjacent to their gasoline station on
a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's name, located along the
national highway and separated from the public plaza by a creek ... .
On January 16, 1954, the request was denied, for the reason among
others that the proposed building would destroy the view or beauty of
the public plaza ... . On January 18, 1954, defendants reiterated their
request for a building permit ..., but again the request was turned down
by the mayor. Whereupon, appellants proceeded with the construction
of the building without a permit, because they needed a place of
residence very badly, their former house having been destroyed by a
typhoon and hitherto they had been living on leased property." 8
Clearly then, the application of such an ordinance to Fajardo was
oppressive. A conviction therefore for a violation thereof both in the
justice of the peace court of Baao, Camarines Sur as well as in the Court
of First Instance could not be sustained. In this case, on the contrary,
appellant never bothered to comply with the ordinance. Perhaps
aware of such a crucial distinction, she would assert in her brief: "The
evidence showed that even if the accused were to secure a permit
from the Mayor, the same would not have been granted. To require the
accused to obtain a permit before constructing her house would be an
exercise in futility. The law will not require anyone to perform an
impossibility, neither in law or in fact: ... ."9 It would be from her own
version, at the very least then, premature to anticipate such an adverse
result, and thus to condemn an ordinance which certainly lends itself to
an interpretation that is neither oppressive, unfair, or unreasonable. That
kind of interpretation suffices to remove any possible question of its
validity, as was expressly announced in Primicias v. Fugoso. 10 So it
appears from this portion of the opinion of Justice Feria, speaking for the
Court: "Said provision is susceptible of two constructions: one is that the
Mayor of the City of Manila is vested with unregulated discretion to
grant or refuse to grant permit for the holding of a lawful assembly or
meeting, parade, or procession in the streets and other public places of
the City of Manila; and the other is that the applicant has the right to a
permit which shall be granted by the Mayor, subject only to the latter's
reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public
places to be used for the purpose, with a view to prevent confusion by
overlapping, to secure convenient use of the streets and public places
by others, and to provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the
risk of disorder. After a mature deliberation, we have arrived at the
conclusion that we must adopt the second construction, that is,
construe the provisions of the said ordinance to mean that it does not
confer upon the Mayor the power to refuse to grant the permit, but only
the discretion, in issuing the permit, to determine or specify the streets or
public places where the parade or procession may pass or the meeting
may be held." 11 If, in a case affecting such a preferred freedom as the
right to assembly, this Court could construe an ordinance of the City of
Manila so as to avoid offending against a constitutional provision, there
is nothing to preclude it from a similar mode of approach in order to
show the lack of merit of an attack against an ordinance requiring a
permit. Appellant cannot therefore take comfort from any broad
statement in the Fajardo opinion, which incidentally is taken out of
context, considering the admitted oppressive application of the
challenged measure in that litigation. So much then for the contention
that she could not have been validly convicted for a violation of such
ordinance. Nor should it be forgotten that she did suffer the same fate
twice, once from the City Court and thereafter from the Court of First
Instance. The reason is obvious.Such ordinance applies to her.
2. Much less is a reversal indicated because of the alleged absence of
the rather novel concept of administrative jurisdiction on the part of
Olongapo City. Nor is novelty the only thing that may be said against it.
Far worse is the assumption at war with controlling and authoritative
doctrines that the mere existence of military or naval bases of a foreign
country cuts deeply into the power to govern. Two leading cases may
be cited to show how offensive is such thinking to the juristic concept of
sovereignty, People v. Acierto, 12 and Reagan v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue. 13 As was so emphatically set forth by Justice Tuason in
Acierto: "By the Agreement, it should be noted, the Philippine
Government merely consents that the United States exercise jurisdiction
in certain cases. The consent was given purely as a matter of comity,
courtesy, or expediency. The Philippine Government has not abdicated
its sovereignty over the bases as part of the Philippine territory or
divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed
therein. Under the terms of the treaty, the United States Government has
prior or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses. The
Philippine Government retains not only jurisdictional rights not granted,
but also all such ceded rights as the United States Military authorities for
reasons of their own decline to make use of. The first proposition is
implied from the fact of Philippine sovereignty over the bases; the
second from the express provisions of the treaty." 14 There was a
reiteration of such a view in Reagan. Thus: "Nothing is better settled than
that the Philippines being independent and sovereign, its authority may
be exercised over its entire domain. There is no portion thereof that is
beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands
paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to whom it applies
must submit to its terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial
and personal. Necessarily, likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it were not
thus, there is a diminution of sovereignty." 15 Then came this paragraph
dealing with the principle of auto-limitation: "It is to be admitted any
state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its
sovereign rights. There may thus be a curtailment of what otherwise is a
power plenary in character. That is the concept of sovereignty as auto-
limitation, which, in the succinct language of Jellinek, "is the property of
a state-force due to which it has the exclusive capacity of legal self-
determination and self-restriction." A state then, if it chooses to, may
refrain from the exercise of what otherwise is illimitable
competence." 16 The opinion was at pains to point out though that even
then, there is at the most diminution of jurisdictional rights, not its
disappearance. The words employed follow: "Its laws may as to some
persons found within its territory no longer control. Nor does the matter
end there. It is not precluded from allowing another power to
participate in the exercise of jurisdictional right over certain portions of
its territory. If it does so, it by no means follows that such areas become
impressed with an alien character. They retain their status as native soil.
They are still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction may be diminished, but
it does not disappear. So it is with the bases under lease to the American
armed forces by virtue of the military bases agreement of 1947. They are
not and cannot be foreign territory." 17
Can there be anything clearer, therefore, than that only a turnabout,
unwarranted and unjustified, from what is settled and orthodox law can
lend the slightest degree of plausibility to the contention of absence of
administrative jurisdiction. If it were otherwise, what was aptly referred to
by Justice Tuason "as a matter of comity, courtesy, or expediency"
becomes one of obeisance and submission. If on a concern purely
domestic in its implications, devoid of any connection with national
security, the Military-Bases Agreement could be thus interpreted, then
sovereignty indeed becomes a mockery and an illusion. Nor does
appellant's thesis rest on less shaky foundation by the mere fact that
Acierto and Reagan dealt with the competence of the national
government, while what is sought to be emasculated in this case is the
so-called administrative jurisdiction of a municipal corporation. Within
the limits of its territory, whatever statutory powers are vested upon it
may be validly exercised. Any residual authority and therein conferred,
whether expressly or impliedly, belongs to the national government, not
to an alien country. What is even more to be deplored in this stand of
appellant is that no such claim is made by the American naval
authorities, not that it would do them any good if it were so asserted. To
quote from Acierto anew: "The carrying out of the provisions of the Bases
Agreement is the concern of the contracting parties alone. Whether,
therefore, a given case which by the treaty comes within the United
States jurisdiction should be transferred to the Philippine authorities is a
matter about which the accused has nothing to do or say. In other
words, the rights granted to the United States by the treaty insure solely
to that country and can not be raised by the offender." 18 If an accused
would suffer from such disability, even if the American armed forces
were the beneficiary of a treaty privilege, what is there for appellant to
take hold of when there is absolutely no showing of any alleged grant of
what is quaintly referred to as administrative jurisdiction? That is all, and it
is more than enough, to make manifest the futility of seeking a reversal.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of November 11, 1969 is affirmed
insofar as it found the accused, Loreta Gozo, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of a violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 14, series of 1964 and
sentencing her to pay a fine of P200.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, and modified insofar as she is required to demolish
the house that is the subject matter of the case, she being given a
period of thirty days from the finality of this decision within which to
obtain the required permit. Only upon her failure to do so will that
portion of the appealed decision requiringdemolition be enforced.
Costs against the accused.
Makalintal, C.J., Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Makasiar, Antonio and
Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., took no part.
Footnotes
1 According to Article III, Section 1, paragraph 1 of the
Constitution: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person
be denied the equal protection of the laws."
2 104 Phil. 443 (1958).
3 Decision, Appendix A to the Brief for the Defendant-
Appellant, 1A-1B.
4 20 Phil. 111. Cf. People v. Cruz, 54 Phil. 25 (1929); Tan
Chat v. Municipality of Iloilo, 60 Phil. 465 (1934); Hipolito v.
City of Manila, 87 Phil. 180 (1950); Uy Matiao and Co. v.
The City of Cebu, 93 Phil. 300 (1953) ; University of the East
v. City of Manila, 96 Phil. 316 (1954); Verzosa v. City of
Baguio, 109 Phil. 571 (1960) ; Lopera v. Vicente, L-18102,
June 30, 1962, 5 SCRA 549; People v. Soria, L-18982,
January 31, 1963, 7 SCRA 242.
5 Brief for the Defendant-Appellant, 10. She would cite
Sec. 2238 of the Revised Administrative Code, but strict
 accuracy would demand that she should refer to the
specific provision in the Olongapo city charter.
6 Cf. United States v. Alexander, 8 Phil. 29 (1907):
Punzalan v. Ferriols, 19 Phil. 214 (1911); United States v.
Espiritusanto, 23 Phil. 610 (1912); United States v. Ten Yu,
24 Phil. 1 (1912); United States v. Abundan, 24 Phil. 165
(1913); Case v. Board of Health, 24 Phil. 250 (1913); United
States v. Hilario, 24 Phil. 392 (1913).; United States v. Chan
Tienco, 25 Phil. 89 (1913); United States v. Joson, 26 Phil. 1
(1913); Rivera v. Campbell, 34 Phil. 348 (1916) ; United
States v. Salaveria, 39 Phil. 103 (1918); Kwong Sing v. City
of Manila, 41 Phil. 103 (1920); Vinco v. Municipality of
Hinigaran, 41 Phil. 790 (1917); People v. Cruz, 54 Phil. 24
(1929); Tan Chat v. Municipality of Iloilo, 60 Phil. 465
(1934); People v. Lardizabal, 61 Phil. 360 (1935); Malabon
Sugar Co. v. Municipality of Malabon, 61 Phil. 717 (1935);
People v. Chan, 65 Phil. 611 (1938); People v. Sabarre, 65
Phil. 684 (1938); People v. Esguerra, 81 Phil. 33 (1948);
Ebona v. Municipality of Daet, 85 Phil. 369 (1950); Manila
Race Horse Trainers Asso. v. De la Fuente, 88 Phil. 60
(1951); Vega v. Municipal Board of the City of Iloilo, 94
Phil. 949 (1954); Co Kiam v. City of Manila, 96 Phil. 649
(1955); Physical Therapy Org. of the Phil. v. Municipal
Board of Manila, 101 Phil. 1142 (1957); Uy Ha v. City
Mayor, 108 Phil. 400 (1960); Gaerlan v. Baguio City
Council, 109 Phil. 1100 (1960); Gerena v. City of Manila
110 Phil. 958 (1961).
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 122156. February 3, 1997]
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, petitioner, vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON
PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE
COUNSEL, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
The Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in the
grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos,[1] is invoked by petitioner in its bid to acquire 51% of the shares
of the Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) which owns the historic Manila
Hotel. Opposing, respondents maintain that the provision is not self-
executing but requires an implementing legislation for its
enforcement. Corollarily, they ask whether the 51% shares form part of
the national economy and patrimony covered by the protective mantle
of the Constitution.
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the
Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December
1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued
and outstanding shares of respondent MHC. The winning bidder, or the
eventual strategic partner, is to provide management expertise and/or
an international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to
strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel.[2] In a
close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders
participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino
corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares
at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-
Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares
at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Pertinent provisions of the bidding rules prepared by respondent
GSIS state -
I. EXECUTION OF THE NECESSARY CONTRACTS WITH GSIS/MHC -
1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set forth below by
October 23, 1995 (reset to November 3, 1995) or the Highest Bidder will
lose the right to purchase the Block of Shares and GSIS will instead offer
the Block of Shares to the other Qualified Bidders:
a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and execute with the GSIS/MHC
the Management Contract, International Marketing/Reservation System
Contract or other type of contract specified by the Highest Bidder in its
strategic plan for the Manila Hotel x x x x
b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock Purchase and Sale
Agreement with GSIS x x x x
K. DECLARATION OF THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER -
The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner
after the following conditions are met:
a. Execution of the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC not later than
October 23, 1995 (reset to November 3, 1995); and
b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC and COP (Committee on
Privatization)/ OGCC (Office of the Government Corporate Counsel)
are obtained.[3]
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning
bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts,
petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28 September 1995
matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong
Berhad.[4] In a subsequent letter dated 10 October 1995 petitioner sent a
managers check issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three Million Pesos
(P33,000,000.00) as Bid Security to match the bid of the Malaysian
Group, Messrs. Renong Berhad x x x x[5] which respondent GSIS refused
to accept.
On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS
has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of
51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and
consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on
prohibition and mandamus. On 18 October 1995 the Court issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from perfecting and
consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm.
On 10 September 1996 the instant case was accepted by the
Court En Banc after it was referred to it by the First Division. The case was
then set for oral arguments with former Chief Justice Enrique M.
Fernando and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., as amici curiae.
In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the
1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified
with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical
monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and
culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who
believed in the nobility and sacredness of independence and its power
and capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people. To all
intents and purposes, it has become a part of the national
patrimony.[6]Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the
MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which is
owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled
corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of the
tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy. Thus,
any transaction involving 51% of the shares of stock of the MHC is clearly
covered by the term national economy, to which Sec. 10, second par.,
Art. XII, 1987 Constitution, applies.[7]
It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is part of the
national patrimony and its business also unquestionably part of the
national economy petitioner should be preferred after it has matched
the bid offer of the Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules mandate that if
for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of
Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have
validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to
match the highest bid in terms of price per share.[8]
Respondents except. They maintain that: First, Sec. 10, second par.,
Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle and
policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing
legislation(s) x x x x Thus, for the said provision to operate, there must be
existing laws to lay down conditions under which business may be
done.[9]
Second, granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel
does not fall under the term national patrimony which only refers to
lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber,
wildlife, flora and fauna and all marine wealth in its territorial sea, and
exclusive marine zone as cited in the first and second paragraphs of
Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution. According to respondents, while
petitioner speaks of the guests who have slept in the hotel and the
events that have transpired therein which make the hotel historic, these
alone do not make the hotel fall under the patrimony of the
nation. What is more, the mandate of the Constitution is addressed to
the State, not to respondent GSIS which possesses a personality of its
own separate and distinct from the Philippines as a State.
Third, granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national
patrimony, the constitutional provision invoked is still inapplicable since
what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the
corporation, not the hotel building nor the land upon which the building
stands. Certainly, 51% of the equity of the MHC cannot be considered
part of the national patrimony.Moreover, if the disposition of the shares
of the MHC is really contrary to the Constitution, petitioner should have
questioned it right from the beginning and not after it had lost in the
bidding.
Fourth, the reliance by petitioner on par. V., subpar. J. 1., of the
bidding rules which provides that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder
cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other
Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these
Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price
per share, is misplaced. Respondents postulate that the privilege of
submitting a matching bid has not yet arisen since it only takes place if
for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of
Shares. Thus the submission by petitioner of a matching bid is premature
since Renong Berhad could still very well be awarded the block of
shares and the condition giving rise to the exercise of the privilege to
submit a matching bid had not yet taken place.
Finally, the prayer for prohibition grounded on grave abuse of
discretion should fail since respondent GSIS did not exercise its discretion
in a capricious, whimsical manner, and if ever it did abuse its discretion it
was not so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Similarly, the
petition for mandamus should fail as petitioner has no clear legal right to
what it demands and respondents do not have an imperative duty to
perform the act required of them by petitioner.
We now resolve. A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for
the governance and administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious,
absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it
emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law
of the nation.[10] It prescribes the permanent framework of a system of
government, assigns to the different departments their respective
powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on which
government is founded. The fundamental conception in other words is
that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in
accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all
public authority administered.[11] Under the doctrine of constitutional
supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution
that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the
executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes
is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the
Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the
nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.
Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies
and principles. Their provisions command the legislature to enact laws
and carry out the purposes of the framers who merely establish an
outline of government providing for the different departments of the
governmental machinery and securing certain fundamental and
inalienable rights of citizens.[12] A provision which lays down a general
principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually
not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and
becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling
legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the
right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.Thus a
constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the
right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution
itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and
construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the
subject is referred to the legislature for action.[13]
As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have
been generally drafted upon a different principle and have often
become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly
upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments,
and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one
more like that of a legislative body.Hence, unless it is expressly provided
that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate,
the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-
executing.If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring
legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the
power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental
law.[14] This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it
has always been, that -
x x x x in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-
executing rather than non-self-executing x x x x Unless the contrary is
clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered
self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to
determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions
would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could
make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed
implementing statute.[15]
Respondents argue that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987
Constitution is clearly not self-executing, as they quote from discussions
on the floor of the 1986 Constitutional Commission -
 MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, I am asking this question as
the Chairman of the Committee on Style. If the wording of
PREFERENCE is given to QUALIFIED FILIPINOS, can it be
understood as a preference to qualified Filipinos vis-a-
vis Filipinos who are not qualified. So, why do we not make
it clear? To qualified Filipinos as against aliens?
THE PRESIDENT. What is the question of Commissioner
Rodrigo? Is it to remove the word QUALIFIED?
MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say definitely TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS
as against whom? As against aliens or over aliens ?
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think that is understood. We
use the word QUALIFIED because the existing laws or
prospective laws will always lay down conditions under
which business may be done. For example, qualifications
on capital, qualifications on the setting up of other
financial structures, et cetera (underscoring supplied by
respondents).
MR. RODRIGO. It is just a matter of style.
MR. NOLLEDO. Yes.[16]
Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such
a way as not to make it appear that it is non-self-executing but simply
for purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded from
enacting further laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long as
the contemplated statute squares with the Constitution. Minor details
may be left to the legislature without impairing the self-executing nature
of constitutional provisions.
In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still
enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by
the constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a
practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy
for the protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or
place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere
fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty
for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not
render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such
legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a
remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication
that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-
executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust
legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony
with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and
make it more available.[17] Subsequent legislation however does not
necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself,
fully enforceable.
Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec.
10, second par., of Art. XII is implied from the tenor of the first and third
paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are not self-
executing.[18] The argument is flawed. If the first and third paragraphs
are not self-executing because Congress is still to enact measures to
encourage the formation and operation of enterprises fully owned by
Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to
regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its
national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the
same logic, the second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does
not by its language require any legislation in order to give preference to
qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony. A constitutional
provision may be self-executing in one part and non-self-executing in
another.[19]
Even the cases cited by respondents holding that certain
constitutional provisions are merely statements of principles and policies,
which are basically not self-executing and only placed in the
Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially
enforceable rights - are simply not in point. Basco v. Philippine
Amusements and Gaming Corporation[20] speaks of constitutional
provisions on personal dignity,[21] the sanctity of family life,[22] the vital
role of the youth in nation-building,[23] the promotion of social
justice,[24] and the values of education.[25]Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance[26] refers to constitutional provisions on social justice and human
rights[27] and on education.[28] Lastly, Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato[29] cites
provisions on the promotion of general welfare,[30] the sanctity of family
life,[31] the vital role of the youth in nation-building[32] and the promotion
of total human liberation and development.[33] A reading of these
provisions indeed clearly shows that they are not judicially enforceable
constitutional rights but merely guidelines for legislation. The very terms
of the provisions manifest that they are only principles upon which
legislations must be based. Res ipsa loquitur.
On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987
Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in
itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules
for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require
any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially
enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of
rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means
just that - qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution
declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action
may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence
of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute
especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right
enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from
which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right
there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
As regards our national patrimony, a member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission[34] explains -
The patrimony of the Nation that should be conserved and
developed refers not only to our rich natural resources but also
to the cultural heritage of our race. It also refers to our
intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. Therefore, we should
develop not only our lands, forests, mines and other natural
resources but also the mental ability or faculty of our people.
We agree. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the
term patrimony pertains to heritage.[35] When the Constitution speaks
of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the
Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the
term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
Manila Hotel has become a landmark - a living testimonial of
Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when it
first opened in 1912, it immediately evolved to be truly Filipino. Formerly
a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various
significant events which have shaped Philippine history. It was called
the Cultural Center of the 1930s. It was the site of the festivities during
the inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth. Dubbed as
the Official Guest House of the Philippine Government it plays host to
dignitaries and official visitors who are accorded the traditional
Philippine hospitality.[36]
The history of the hotel has been chronicled in the book The Manila
Hotel: The Heart and Memory of a City.[37] During World War II the hotel
was converted by the Japanese Military Administration into a military
headquarters. When the American forces returned to recapture Manila
the hotel was selected by the Japanese together with Intramuros as the
two (2) places for their final stand. Thereafter, in the 1950s and 1960s, the
hotel became the center of political activities, playing host to almost
every political convention. In 1970 the hotel reopened after a
renovation and reaped numerous international recognitions, an
acknowledgment of the Filipino talent and ingenuity. In 1986 the hotel
was the site of a failed coup d etat where an aspirant for vice-president
was proclaimed President of the Philippine Republic.
For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute
witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos;
its existence is impressed with public interest; its own historicity
associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and
nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national
economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes
within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the
majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the
51% will have actual control and management of the hotel. In this
instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and
the land on which the hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot
sustain respondents claim that the Filipino First Policy provision is not
applicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares
of the corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land upon which the
building stands.[38]
The argument is pure sophistry. The term qualified Filipinos as used in
our Constitution also includes corporations at least 60% of which is
owned by Filipinos. This is very clear from the proceedings of the 1986
Constitutional Commission -
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. I would like to introduce an amendment to the
Nolledo amendment. And the amendment would consist
in substituting the words QUALIFIED FILIPINOS with the
following: CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES OR CORPORATIONS
OR ASSOCIATIONS WHOSE CAPITAL OR CONTROLLING
STOCK IS WHOLLY OWNED BY SUCH CITIZENS.
xxxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, apparently the proponent is
agreeable, but we have to raise a question. Suppose it is a
corporation that is 80-percent Filipino, do we not give it
preference?
MR. DAVIDE. The Nolledo amendment would refer to an
individual Filipino. What about a corporation wholly owned
by Filipino citizens?
MR. MONSOD. At least 60 percent, Madam President.
MR. DAVIDE. Is that the intention?
MR. MONSOD. Yes, because, in fact, we would be limiting it if
we say that the preference should only be 100-percent
Filipino.
MR. DAVIDE. I want to get that meaning clear because
QUALIFIED FILIPINOS may refer only to individuals and not
to juridical personalities or entities.
MR. MONSOD. We agree, Madam President.[39]
xxxx
MR. RODRIGO. Before we vote, may I request that the
amendment be read again.
MR. NOLLEDO. The amendment will read: IN THE GRANT OF
RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS COVERING THE
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL
GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS. And the word
Filipinos here, as intended by the proponents, will include
not only individual Filipinos but also Filipino-controlled
entities or entities fully-controlled by Filipinos.[40]
The phrase preference to qualified Filipinos was explained thus -
MR. FOZ. Madam President, I would like to request
Commissioner Nolledo to please restate his amendment so
that I can ask a question.
MR. NOLLEDO. IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND
CONCESSIONS COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND
PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO
QUALIFIED FILIPINOS.
MR. FOZ. In connection with that amendment, if a foreign
enterprise is qualified and a Filipino enterprise is also
qualified, will the Filipino enterprise still be given a
preference?
MR. NOLLEDO. Obviously.
MR. FOZ. If the foreigner is more qualified in some aspects than
the Filipino enterprise, will the Filipino still be preferred?
MR. NOLLEDO. The answer is yes.
MR. FOZ. Thank you.[41]
Expounding further on the Filipino First Policy provision Commissioner
Nolledo continues
MR. NOLLEDO. Yes, Madam President. Instead of MUST, it will be
SHALL - THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS. This embodies the so-called Filipino First
policy.That means that Filipinos should be given
preference in the grant of concessions, privileges and
rights covering the national patrimony.[42]
The exchange of views in the sessions of the Constitutional
Commission regarding the subject provision was still further clarified by
Commissioner Nolledo[43] -
Paragraph 2 of Section 10 explicitly mandates the Pro-Filipino bias in all
economic concerns. It is better known as the FILIPINO FIRST Policy x x x
x This provision was never found in previous Constitutions x x x x
The term qualified Filipinos simply means that preference shall be given
to those citizens who can make a viable contribution to the common
good, because of credible competence and efficiency. It certainly
does NOT mandate the pampering and preferential treatment to
Filipino citizens or organizations that are incompetent or inefficient, since
such an indiscriminate preference would be counterproductive and
inimical to the common good.
In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when a
choice has to be made between a qualified foreigner and a qualified
Filipino, the latter shall be chosen over the former.
Lastly, the word qualified is also determinable. Petitioner was so
considered by respondent GSIS and selected as one of the qualified
bidders. It was pre-qualified by respondent GSIS in accordance with its
own guidelines so that the sole inference here is that petitioner has been
found to be possessed of proven management expertise in the hotel
industry, or it has significant equity ownership in another hotel company,
or it has an overall management and marketing proficiency to
successfully operate the Manila Hotel.[44]
 The penchant to try to whittle away the mandate of the
Constitution by arguing that the subject provision is not self-executory
and requires implementing legislation is quite disturbing.The attempt to
violate a clear constitutional provision - by the government itself - is only
too distressing. To adopt such a line of reasoning is to renounce the duty
to ensure faithfulness to the Constitution. For, even some of the
provisions of the Constitution which evidently need implementing
legislation have juridical life of their own and can be the source of a
judicial remedy.We cannot simply afford the government a defense
that arises out of the failure to enact further enabling, implementing or
guiding legislation. In fine, the discourse of Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., on
constitutional government is apt -
The executive department has a constitutional duty to implement laws,
including the Constitution, even before Congress acts - provided that
there are discoverable legal standards for executive action. When the
executive acts, it must be guided by its own understanding of the
constitutional command and of applicable laws. The responsibility for
reading and understanding the Constitution and the laws is not the sole
prerogative of Congress. If it were, the executive would have to ask
Congress, or perhaps the Court, for an interpretation every time the
executive is confronted by a constitutional command. That is not how
constitutional government operates.[45]
Respondents further argue that the constitutional provision is
addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which by itself possesses
a separate and distinct personality. This argument again is at best
specious. It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could only be
carried out with the prior approval of the State acting through
respondent Committee on Privatization. As correctly pointed out by Fr.
Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., this fact alone makes the sale of the assets of
respondents GSIS and MHC a state action. In constitutional
jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from the government are
considered state action covered by the Constitution (1) when the
activity it engages in is a public function; (2) when the government is so
significantly involved with the private actor as to make the government
responsible for his action; and, (3) when the government has approved
or authorized the action. It is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in
selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC comes under the second and
third categories of state action. Without doubt therefore the transaction,
although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the
State and therefore subject to the constitutional command.[46]
When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the
people but also to the government as elements of the State. After all,
government is composed of three (3) divisions of power - legislative,
executive and judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed
to the State is correspondingly directed to the three (3) branches of
government. It is undeniable that in this case the subject constitutional
injunction is addressed among others to the Executive Department and
respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality deriving its authority from
the State.
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher
bid it is not yet the winning bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide
that the highest bidder shall only be declared the winning bidder after it
has negotiated and executed the necessary contracts, and secured
the requisite approvals. Since the Filipino First Policy provision of the
Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos the mere tending
of the highest bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will be
declared the winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to
make the award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into one
with the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee respondents are
mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the
provisions of which are presumed to be known to all the bidders and
other interested parties.
Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject
constitutional provision is, as it should be, impliedly written in the bidding
rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules be nullified for
being violative of the Constitution. It is a basic principle in constitutional
law that all laws and contracts must conform with the fundamental law
of the land.Those which violate the Constitution lose their reason for
being.
Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [i]f for any
reason the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS
may offer this to other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids
provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest
bid in terms of price per share.[47] Certainly, the constitutional mandate
itself is reason enough not to award the block of shares immediately to
the foreign bidder notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or even the
highest, bid. In fact, we cannot conceive of a strongerreason than the
constitutional injunction itself.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a
public bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby
exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will
have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the
Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the
Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First
Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be
expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the
constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it
would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
This Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may
discourage foreign investors. But the Constitution and laws of the
Philippines are understood to be always open to public scrutiny. These
are given factors which investors must consider when venturing into
business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any person therefore desiring to do
business in the Philippines or with any of its agencies or instrumentalities is
presumed to know his rights and obligations under the Constitution and
the laws of the forum.
The argument of respondents that petitioner is now estopped from
questioning the sale to Renong Berhad since petitioner was well aware
from the beginning that a foreigner could participate in the bidding is
meritless. Undoubtedly, Filipinos and foreigners alike were invited to the
bidding. But foreigners may be awarded the sale only if no Filipino
qualifies, or if the qualified Filipino fails to match the highest bid
tendered by the foreign entity. In the case before us, while petitioner
was already preferred at the inception of the bidding because of the
constitutional mandate, petitioner had not yet matched the bid offered
by Renong Berhad. Thus it did not have the right or personality then to
compel respondent GSIS to accept its earlier bid. Rightly, only after it
had matched the bid of the foreign firm and the apparent disregard by
respondent GSIS of petitioners matching bid did the latter have a cause
of action.
Besides, there is no time frame for invoking the constitutional
safeguard unless perhaps the award has been finally made. To insist on
selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino group willing
to match the bid of the foreign group is to insist that government be
treated as any other ordinary market player, and bound by its mistakes
or gross errors of judgment, regardless of the consequences to the
Filipino people. The miscomprehension of the Constitution is
regrettable. Thus we would rather remedy the indiscretion while there is
still an opportunity to do so than let the government develop the habit
of forgetting that the Constitution lays down the basic conditions and
parameters for its actions.
Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by
Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left with
no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC
and to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect
the sale in accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and
procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent
GSIS to execute the corresponding documents with petitioner as
provided in the bidding rules after the latter has matched the bid of the
Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism. It is
embodied in the 1987 Constitution not merely to be used as a guideline
for future legislation but primarily to be enforced; so must it be
enforced. This Court as the ultimate guardian of the Constitution will
never shun, under any reasonable circumstance, the duty of upholding
the majesty of the Constitution which it is tasked to defend. It is worth
emphasizing that it is not the intention of this Court to impede and
diminish, much less undermine, the influx of foreign investments. Far from
it, the Court encourages and welcomes more business opportunities but
avowedly sanctions the preference for Filipinos whenever such
preference is ordained by the Constitution. The position of the Court on
this matter could have not been more appropriately articulated by
Chief Justice Narvasa -
As scrupulously as it has tried to observe that it is not its function to
substitute its judgment for that of the legislature or the executive about
the wisdom and feasibility of legislation economic in nature, the
Supreme Court has not been spared criticism for decisions perceived as
obstacles to economic progress and development x x x x in connection
with a temporary injunction issued by the Courts First Division against the
sale of the Manila Hotel to a Malaysian Firm and its partner, certain
statements were published in a major daily to the effect that that
injunction again demonstrates that the Philippine legal system can be a
major obstacle to doing business here.
Let it be stated for the record once again that while it is no business of
the Court to intervene in contracts of the kind referred to or set itself up
as the judge of whether they are viable or attainable, it is its bounden
duty to make sure that they do not violate the Constitution or the laws,
or are not adopted or implemented with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It will never shirk that duty, no
matter how buffeted by winds of unfair and ill-informed criticism.[48]
 Privatization of a business asset for purposes of enhancing its
business viability and preventing further losses, regardless of the
character of the asset, should not take precedence over non-material
values. A commercial, nay even a budgetary, objective should not be
pursued at the expense of national pride and dignity. For the
Constitution enshrines higher and nobler non-material values. Indeed,
the Court will always defer to the Constitution in the proper governance
of a free society; after all, there is nothing so sacrosanct in any
economic policy as to draw itself beyond judicial review when the
Constitution is involved.[49]
Nationalism is inherent in the very concept of the Philippines being
a democratic and republican state, with sovereignty residing in the
Filipino people and from whom all government authority emanates. In
nationalism, the happiness and welfare of the people must be the
goal. The nation-state can have no higher purpose. Any interpretation
of any constitutional provision must adhere to such basic
concept. Protection of foreign investments, while laudible, is merely a
policy. It cannot override the demands of nationalism.[50]
The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any
commodity to be sold to the highest bidder solely for the sake of
privatization. We are not talking about an ordinary piece of property in
a commercial district. We are talking about a historic relic that has
hosted many of the most important events in the short history of the
Philippines as a nation. We are talking about a hotel where heads of
states would prefer to be housed as a strong manifestation of their
desire to cloak the dignity of the highest state function to their official
visits to the Philippines. Thus the Manila Hotel has played and continues
to play a significant role as an authentic repository of twentieth century
Philippine history and culture. In this sense, it has become truly a
reflection of the Filipino soul - a place with a history of grandeur; a most
historical setting that has played a part in the shaping of a country. [51]
national patrimony is safekept in the hands of a qualified, zealous and
well-meaning Filipino? This is the plain and simple meaning of the Filipino
First Policyprovision of the Philippine Constitution. And this Court,
heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and accepting the duty of
being the elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to respect and
protect the sanctity of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION
and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed
to CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching bid of
petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the
subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per
share and thereafter to execute the necessary agreements and
documents to effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to
do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Kapunan,
Francisco, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ, concur.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), and Melo, J., joins J. Puno in his dissent.
Padilla, J., see concurring opinion.
Vitug, J., see separate concurring opinion
Mendoza, J., see concurring opinion
Torres, J., with separate opinion
Puno, J., see dissent.
Panganiban J., with separate dissenting opinion.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

This Court cannot extract rhyme nor reason from the determined SECOND DIVISION
efforts of respondents to sell the historical landmark - this Grand Old
Dame of hotels in Asia - to a total stranger. For, indeed, the conveyance
of this epic exponent of the Filipino psyche to alien hands cannot be less
than mephistophelian for it is, in whatever manner viewed, a veritable
G.R. No. L-25843 July 25, 1974
alienation of a nations soul for some pieces of foreign silver. And so we
ask: What advantage, which cannot be equally drawn from a qualified
Filipino, can be gained by the Filipinos if Manila Hotel - and all that it MELCHORA CABANAS, plaintiff-appellee,
stands for - is sold to a non-Filipino? How much of national pride will vs.
vanish if the nations cultural heritage is entrusted to a foreign entity? On FRANCISCO PILAPIL, defendant-appellant.
the other hand, how much dignity will be preserved and realized if the
Seno, Mendoza & Associates for plaintiff-appellee. After trial duly had, the lower court in a decision of May 10, 1965,
rendered judgment ordering the defendant to deliver the proceeds of
Emilio Benitez, Jr. for defendant-appellant. the policy in question to plaintiff. Its main reliance was on Articles 320
and 321 of the Civil Code. The former provides: "The father, or in his
absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the property pertaining
to the child under parental authority. If the property is worth more than
two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a bond subject to
FERNANDO, J.:p
the approval of the Court of First Instance." 3 The latter states: "The
property which the unemancipated child has acquired or may acquire
The disputants in this appeal from a question of law from a lower court
with his work or industry, or by any lucrative title, belongs to the child in
decision are the mother and the uncle of a minor beneficiary of the
ownership, and in usufruct to the father or mother under whom he is
proceeds of an insurance policy issued on the life of her deceased
under parental authority and whose company he lives; ...4
father. The dispute centers as to who of them should be entitled to act
as trustee thereof. The lower court applying the appropriate Civil Code
Conformity to such explicit codal norm is apparent in this portion of the
provisions decided in favor of the mother, the plaintiff in this case.
appealed decision: "The insurance proceeds belong to the beneficiary.
Defendant uncle appealed. As noted, the lower court acted the way it
The beneficiary is a minor under the custody and parental authority of
did following the specific mandate of the law. In addition, it must have
the plaintiff, her mother. The said minor lives with plaintiff or lives in the
taken into account the principle that in cases of this nature the welfare
company of the plaintiff. The said minor acquired this property by
of the child is the paramount consideration. It is not an unreasonable
lucrative title. Said property, therefore, belongs to the minor child in
assumption that between a mother and an uncle, the former is likely to
ownership, and in usufruct to the plaintiff, her mother. Since under our
lavish more care on and pay greater attention to her. This is all the more
law the usufructuary is entitled to possession, the plaintiff is entitled to
likely considering that the child is with the mother. There are no
possession of the insurance proceeds. The trust, insofar as it is in conflict
circumstances then that did militate against what conforms to the
with the above quoted provision of law, is pro tanto null and void. In
natural order of things, even if the language of the law were not as
order, however, to protect the rights of the minor, Millian Pilapil, the
clear. It is not to be lost sight of either that the judiciary pursuant to its
plaintiff should file an additional bond in the guardianship proceedings,
role as an agency of the State as parens patriae, with an even greater
Sp. Proc. No. 2418-R of this Court to raise her bond therein to the total
stress on family unity under the present Constitution, did weigh in the
amount of P5,000.00."5
balance the opposing claims and did come to the conclusion that the
welfare of the child called for the mother to be entrusted with such
responsibility. We have to affirm. It is very clear, therefore, considering the above, that unless the
applicability of the two cited Civil Code provisions can be disputed, the
decision must stand. There is no ambiguity in the language employed.
The appealed decision made clear: "There is no controversy as to the
The words are rather clear. Their meaning is unequivocal. Time and time
facts. "1 The insured, Florentino Pilapil had a child, Millian Pilapil, with a
again, this Court has left no doubt that where codal or statutory norms
married woman, the plaintiff, Melchora Cabanas. She was ten years old
are cast in categorical language, the task before it is not one of
at the time the complaint was filed on October 10, 1964. The defendant,
interpretation but of application.6 So it must be in this case. So it was in
Francisco Pilapil, is the brother of the deceased. The deceased insured
the appealed decision.
himself and instituted as beneficiary, his child, with his brother to act as
trustee during her minority. Upon his death, the proceeds were paid to
him. Hence this complaint by the mother, with whom the child is living, 1. It would take more than just two paragraphs as found in the brief for
seeking the delivery of such sum. She filed the bond required by the Civil the defendant-appellant7 to blunt the force of legal commands that
Code. Defendant would justify his claim to the retention of the amount speak so plainly and so unqualifiedly. Even if it were a question of policy,
in question by invoking the terms of the insurance policy.2 the conclusion will remain unaltered. What is paramount, as mentioned
at the outset, is the welfare of the child. It is in consonance with such
primordial end that Articles 320 and 321 have been worded. There is
recognition in the law of the deep ties that bind parent and child. In the
event that there is less than full measure of concern for the offspring, the
protection is supplied by the bond required. With the added
circumstance that the child stays with the mother, not the uncle, without
any evidence of lack of maternal care, the decision arrived at can
stand the test of the strictest scrutiny. It is further fortified by the
assumption, both logical and natural, that infidelity to the trust imposed
by the deceased is much less in the case of a mother than in the case
of an uncle. Manresa, commenting on Article 159 of the Civil Code of
Spain, the source of Article 320 of the Civil Code, was of that view: Thus
"El derecho y la obligacion de administrar el Patrimonio de los hijos es
una consecuencia natural y lógica de la patria potestad y de la
presunción de que nadie cuidará de los bienes de acquéllos con mas
cariño y solicitude que los padres. En nuestro Derecho antiguo puede
decirse que se hallaba reconocida de una manera indirecta aquelia
doctrina, y asi se desprende de la sentencia del Tribunal Supremeo de
30 de diciembre de 1864, que se refiere a la ley 24, tit. XIII de la Partida
5. De la propia suerte aceptan en general dicho principio los Codigos
extranjeros, con las limitaciones y requisitos de que trataremos mis
adelante."8
2. The appealed decision is supported by another cogent consideration.
It is buttressed by its adherence to the concept that the judiciary, as an
agency of the State acting as parens patriae, is called upon whenever
a pending suit of litigation affects one who is a minor to accord priority
to his best interest. It may happen, as it did occur here, that family
relations may press their respective claims. It would be more in
consonance not only with the natural order of things but the tradition of
the country for a parent to be preferred. it could have been different if
the conflict were between father and mother. Such is not the case at
all. It is a mother asserting priority. Certainly the judiciary as the
instrumentality of the State in its role of parens patriae, cannot remain
insensible to the validity of her plea. In a recent case,9 there is this
quotation from an opinion of the United States Supreme Court: "This
prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every
State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in the
legislature, and has no affinity to those arbitrary powers which are
sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarchs to the great detriment of
the people and the destruction of their liberties." What is more, there is
this constitutional provision vitalizing this concept. It reads: "The State
shall strengthen the family as a basic social institution." 10 If, as the
Constitution so wisely dictates, it is the family as a unit that has to be
strengthened, it does not admit of doubt that even if a stronger case
were presented for the uncle, still deference to a constitutional
mandate would have led the lower court to decide as it did.
WHEREFORE, the decision of May 10, 1965 is affirmed. Costs against
defendant-appellant.
Zaldivar (Chairman), Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., took no part.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R No. 187167 August 16, 2011
PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA, AKBAYAN PARTY-LIST REP. RISA
HONTIVEROS, PROF. HARRY C. ROQUE, JR., AND UNIVERSITY OF THE
PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW STUDENTS, ALITHEA BARBARA ACAS,
VOLTAIRE ALFERES, CZARINA MAY ALTEZ, FRANCIS ALVIN ASILO, SHERYL
BALOT, RUBY AMOR BARRACA, JOSE JAVIER BAUTISTA, ROMINA
BERNARDO, VALERIE PAGASA BUENAVENTURA, EDAN MARRI CAÑETE,
VANN ALLEN DELA CRUZ, RENE DELORINO, PAULYN MAY DUMAN,
SHARON ESCOTO, RODRIGO FAJARDO III, GIRLIE FERRER, RAOULLE OSEN
FERRER, CARLA REGINA GREPO, ANNA MARIE CECILIA GO, IRISH KAY
KALAW, MARY ANN JOY LEE, MARIA LUISA MANALAYSAY, MIGUEL RAFAEL
MUSNGI, MICHAEL OCAMPO, JAKLYN HANNA PINEDA, WILLIAM
RAGAMAT, MARICAR RAMOS, ENRIK FORT REVILLAS, JAMES MARK TERRY
RIDON, JOHANN FRANTZ RIVERA IV, CHRISTIAN RIVERO, DIANNE MARIE
ROA, NICHOLAS SANTIZO, MELISSA CHRISTINA SANTOS, CRISTINE MAE
TABING, VANESSA ANNE TORNO, MARIA ESTER VANGUARDIA, and
MARCELINO VELOSO III, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HON. ROLANDO ANDAYA, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, HON. DIONY VENTURA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE NATIONAL MAPPING & RESOURCE INFORMATION
AUTHORITY, and HON. HILARIO DAVIDE, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE Petitioners, professors of law, law students and a legislator, in
PHILIPPINES TO THE UNITED NATIONS,Respondents. their respective capacities as "citizens, taxpayers or x x x legislators," 9 as
the case may be, assail the constitutionality of RA 9522 on two principal
DECISION grounds, namely: (1) RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and
logically, the reach of the Philippine state’s sovereign power, in violation
CARPIO, J.: of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution,10 embodying the terms of the Treaty
of Paris11 and ancillary treaties,12 and (2) RA 9522 opens the country’s
waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and
The Case
aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security,
contravening the country’s nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine
This original action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assails
resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions.13
the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9522 1(RA 9522) adjusting the
country’s archipelagic baselines and classifying the baseline regime of
In addition, petitioners contend that RA 9522’s treatment of the
nearby territories.
KIG as "regime of islands" not only results in the loss of a large maritime
area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.14 To
The Antecedents
buttress their argument of territorial diminution, petitioners facially attack
RA 9522 for what it excluded and included – its failure to reference
In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 (RA either the Treaty of Paris or Sabah and its use of UNCLOS III’s framework
3046)2 demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an of regime of islands to determine the maritime zones of the KIG and the
archipelagic State.3 This law followed the framing of the Convention on Scarborough Shoal.
the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone in 1958 (UNCLOS
I),4 codifying, among others, the sovereign right of States parties over
Commenting on the petition, respondent officials raised
their "territorial sea," the breadth of which, however, was left
threshold issues questioning (1) the petition’s compliance with the case
undetermined. Attempts to fill this void during the second round of
or controversy requirement for judicial review grounded on petitioners’
negotiations in Geneva in 1960 (UNCLOS II) proved futile. Thus,
alleged lack of locus standi and (2) the propriety of the writs of certiorari
domestically, RA 3046 remained unchanged for nearly five decades,
and prohibition to assail the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits,
save for legislation passed in 1968 (Republic Act No. 5446 [RA 5446])
respondents defended RA 9522 as the country’s compliance with the
correcting typographical errors and reserving the drawing of baselines
terms of UNCLOS III, preserving Philippine territory over the KIG or
around Sabah in North Borneo.
Scarborough Shoal. Respondents add that RA 9522 does not undermine
the country’s security, environment and economic interests or relinquish
In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA the Philippines’ claim over Sabah.
9522, the statute now under scrutiny. The change was prompted by the
need to make RA 3046 compliant with the terms of the United Nations
Respondents also question the normative force, under
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III),5 which the Philippines
international law, of petitioners’ assertion that what Spain ceded to the
ratified on 27 February 1984.6 Among others, UNCLOS III prescribes the
United States under the Treaty of Paris were the islands and all the
water-land ratio, length, and contour of baselines of archipelagic States
waters found within the boundaries of the rectangular area drawn
like the Philippines7 and sets the deadline for the filing of application for
under the Treaty of Paris.
the extended continental shelf.8 Complying with these requirements, RA
9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints
We left unacted petitioners’ prayer for an injunctive writ.
around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories,
namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal,
as "regimes of islands" whose islands generate their own applicable The Issues
maritime zones.
The petition raises the following issues:
 1. Preliminarily – judicial or ministerial powers on the part of respondents and resulting
prejudice on the part of petitioners.18
1. Whether petitioners possess locus standi to
bring this suit; and Respondents’ submission holds true in ordinary civil proceedings.
When this Court exercises its constitutional power of judicial review,
2. Whether the writs of certiorari and prohibition however, we have, by tradition, viewed the writs of certiorari and
are the proper remedies to assail the constitutionality of prohibition as proper remedial vehicles to test the constitutionality of
RA 9522. statutes,19 and indeed, of acts of other branches of government.20 Issues
of constitutional import are sometimes crafted out of statutes which,
2. On the merits, whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional. while having no bearing on the personal interests of the petitioners,
carry such relevance in the life of this nation that the Court inevitably
finds itself constrained to take cognizance of the case and pass upon
The Ruling of the Court
the issues raised, non-compliance with the letter of procedural rules
notwithstanding. The statute sought to be reviewed here is one such
On the threshold issues, we hold that (1) petitioners possess locus
law.
standi to bring this suit as citizens and (2) the writs of certiorari and
prohibition are proper remedies to test the constitutionality of RA 9522.
RA 9522 is Not Unconstitutional
On the merits, we find no basis to declare RA 9522 unconstitutional.
RA 9522 is a Statutory Tool
to Demarcate the Country’s
On the Threshold Issues
Maritime Zones and Continental
Petitioners Possess Locus
Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to
Standi as Citizens
Delineate Philippine Territory

Petitioners themselves undermine their assertion of locus

Petitioners submit that RA 9522 "dismembers a large portion of
standi as legislators and taxpayers because the petition alleges neither
the national territory"21 because it discards the pre-UNCLOS III
infringement of legislative prerogative15 nor misuse of public
demarcation of Philippine territory under the Treaty of Paris and related
funds,16 occasioned by the passage and implementation of RA 9522.
treaties, successively encoded in the definition of national territory under
Nonetheless, we recognize petitioners’ locus standi as citizens with
the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Petitioners theorize that this
constitutionally sufficient interest in the resolution of the merits of the
constitutional definition trumps any treaty or statutory provision denying
case which undoubtedly raises issues of national significance
the Philippines sovereign control over waters, beyond the territorial sea
necessitating urgent resolution. Indeed, owing to the peculiar nature of
recognized at the time of the Treaty of Paris, that Spain supposedly
RA 9522, it is understandably difficult to find other litigants possessing "a
ceded to the United States. Petitioners argue that from the Treaty of
more direct and specific interest" to bring the suit, thus satisfying one of
Paris’ technical description, Philippine sovereignty over territorial waters
the requirements for granting citizenship standing.17
extends hundreds of nautical miles around the Philippine archipelago,
embracing the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris.22
The Writs of Certiorari and Prohibition
Are Proper Remedies to Test
Petitioners’ theory fails to persuade us.
the Constitutionality of Statutes
UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of
In praying for the dismissal of the petition on preliminary grounds,
territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating, among others, sea-use rights
respondents seek a strict observance of the offices of the writs of
over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the
certiorari and prohibition, noting that the writs cannot issue absent any
baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines],
showing of grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of judicial, quasi-
exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and
continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits.23 UNCLOS III was the Under traditional international law typology, States acquire (or
culmination of decades-long negotiations among United Nations conversely, lose) territory through occupation, accretion, cession and
members to codify norms regulating the conduct of States in the world’s prescription,25 not by executing multilateral treaties on the regulations of
oceans and submarine areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treaty’s terms to
States’ graduated authority over a limited span of waters and delimit maritime zones and continental shelves. Territorial claims to land
submarine lands along their coasts. features are outside UNCLOS III, and are instead governed by the rules
on general international law.26
On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted
by UNCLOS III States parties to mark-out specific basepoints along their RA 9522’s Use of the Framework
coasts from which baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to of Regime of Islands to Determine the
serve as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the Maritime Zones of the KIG and the
maritime zones and continental shelf. Article 48 of UNCLOS III on Scarborough Shoal, not Inconsistent
archipelagic States like ours could not be any clearer: with the Philippines’ Claim of Sovereignty
Over these Areas
Article 48. Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the
contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental Petitioners next submit that RA 9522’s use of UNCLOS III’s regime
shelf. – The breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the of islands framework to draw the baselines, and to measure the breadth
exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf shall be measured of the applicable maritime zones of the KIG, "weakens our territorial
from archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47. claim" over that area.27Petitioners add that the KIG’s (and Scarborough
(Emphasis supplied) Shoal’s) exclusion from the Philippine archipelagic baselines results in the
loss of "about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters,"
Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for prejudicing the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.28 A comparison of
UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with precision the extent of their the configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522
maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the and the extent of maritime space encompassed by each law, coupled
rest of the international community of the scope of the maritime space with a reading of the text of RA 9522 and its congressional
and submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based deliberations, vis-à-vis the Philippines’ obligations under UNCLOS III, belie
rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article this view.1avvphi1
2), the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation
laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the living The configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA
and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and 9522 shows that RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA
continental shelf (Article 77). 3046, save for at least nine basepoints that RA 9522 skipped to optimize
the location of basepoints and adjust the length of one baseline (and
Even under petitioners’ theory that the Philippine territory thus comply with UNCLOS III’s limitation on the maximum length of
embraces the islands and all the waters within the rectangular area baselines). Under RA 3046, as under RA 9522, the KIG and the
delimited in the Treaty of Paris, the baselines of the Philippines would still Scarborough Shoal lie outside of the baselines drawn around the
have to be drawn in accordance with RA 9522 because this is the only Philippine archipelago. This undeniable cartographic fact takes the
way to draw the baselines in conformity with UNCLOS III. The baselines wind out of petitioners’ argument branding RA 9522 as a statutory
cannot be drawn from the boundaries or other portions of the renunciation of the Philippines’ claim over the KIG, assuming that
rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris, but from the baselines are relevant for this purpose.
"outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago." 24
Petitioners’ assertion of loss of "about 15,000 square nautical
UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the miles of territorial waters" under RA 9522 is similarly unfounded both in
acquisition, enlargement or, as petitioners claim, diminution of territory. fact and law. On the contrary, RA 9522, by optimizing the location of
basepoints, increased the Philippines’ total maritime space (covering its
internal waters, territorial sea and exclusive economic zone) by 145,216
square nautical miles, as shown in the table below:29

Extent of
maritime area using
Extent of
RA 3046, as
maritime area using
amended, taking
RA 9522, taking into
into account the
account UNCLOS III
Treaty of Paris’
(in square nautical
delimitation (in
miles)
square nautical
miles)

Internal
or archipelagic
waters 166,858 171,435

Territorial
Sea 274,136 32,106

Exclusive
Economic Zone 382,669

TOTAL 440,994 586,210

Thus, as the map below shows, the reach of the exclusive

economic zone drawn under RA 9522 even extends way beyond the
waters covered by the rectangular demarcation under the Treaty of
Paris. Of course, where there are overlapping exclusive economic zones
of opposite or adjacent States, there will have to be a delineation of
maritime boundaries in accordance with UNCLOS III.30

Further, petitioners’ argument that the KIG now lies outside

Philippine territory because the baselines that RA 9522 draws do not
enclose the KIG is negated by RA 9522 itself. Section 2 of the law
commits to text the Philippines’ continued claim of sovereignty and
jurisdiction over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal:
 SEC. 2. The baselines in the following areas over which the
Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be
determined as "Regime of Islands" under the Republic of the Philippines
consistent with Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS):
a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under
Presidential Decree No. 1596 and
b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal.
(Emphasis supplied)
Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the Scarborough
Shoal as part of the Philippine archipelago, adverse legal effects would
have ensued. The Philippines would have committed a breach of two
provisions of UNCLOS III. First, Article 47 (3) of UNCLOS III requires that
"[t]he drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable
extent from the general configuration of the archipelago." Second,
Article 47 (2) of UNCLOS III requires that "the length of the baselines shall
not exceed 100 nautical miles," save for three per cent (3%) of the total
number of baselines which can reach up to 125 nautical miles.31
Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty
over the KIG32 and the Scarborough Shoal for several decades, these
outlying areas are located at an appreciable distance from the nearest
shoreline of the Philippine archipelago,33 such that any straight baseline
loped around them from the nearest basepoint will inevitably "depart to
an appreciable extent from the general configuration of the
archipelago."
The principal sponsor of RA 9522 in the Senate, Senator Miriam
Defensor-Santiago, took pains to emphasize the foregoing during the
Senate deliberations:
What we call the Kalayaan Island Group or what the rest of the
world call[] the Spratlys and the Scarborough Shoal are outside our
archipelagic baseline because if we put them inside our baselines we
might be accused of violating the provision of international law which
states: "The drawing of such baseline shall not depart to any
appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago."
So sa loob ng ating baseline, dapat magkalapit ang mga islands. Dahil
malayo ang Scarborough Shoal, hindi natin masasabing malapit sila sa
atin although we are still allowed by international law to claim them as
our own.
This is called contested islands outside our configuration. We see
that our archipelago is defined by the orange line which [we] call[]
archipelagic baseline. Ngayon, tingnan ninyo ang maliit na circle doon
sa itaas, that is Scarborough Shoal, itong malaking circle sa ibaba, that
is Kalayaan Group or the Spratlys. Malayo na sila sa ating archipelago
kaya kung ilihis pa natin ang dating archipelagic baselines para lamang
masama itong dalawang circles, hindi na sila magkalapit at baka hindi
na tatanggapin ng United Nations because of the rule that it should
follow the natural configuration of the archipelago.34 (Emphasis
supplied)
Similarly, the length of one baseline that RA 3046 drew
exceeded UNCLOS III’s limits.1avvphi1 The need to shorten this baseline,
and in addition, to optimize the location of basepoints using current
maps, became imperative as discussed by respondents:
[T]he amendment of the baselines law was necessary to enable
the Philippines to draw the outer limits of its maritime zones including the
extended continental shelf in the manner provided by Article 47 of
[UNCLOS III]. As defined by R.A. 3046, as amended by R.A. 5446, the
baselines suffer from some technical deficiencies, to wit:
1. The length of the baseline across Moro Gulf (from
Middle of 3 Rock Awash to Tongquil Point) is 140.06 nautical miles
x x x. This exceeds the maximum length allowed under Article
47(2) of the [UNCLOS III], which states that "The length of such
baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles, except that up to 3
per cent of the total number of baselines enclosing any
archipelago may exceed that length, up to a maximum length
of 125 nautical miles."
2. The selection of basepoints is not optimal. At least 9
basepoints can be skipped or deleted from the baselines system.
This will enclose an additional 2,195 nautical miles of water.
3. Finally, the basepoints were drawn from maps existing
in 1968, and not established by geodetic survey methods.
Accordingly, some of the points, particularly along the west
coasts of Luzon down to Palawan were later found to be
 located either inland or on water, not on low-water line and
drying reefs as prescribed by Article 47.35
Hence, far from surrendering the Philippines’ claim over the KIG
and the Scarborough Shoal, Congress’ decision to classify the KIG and
the Scarborough Shoal as "‘Regime[s] of Islands’ under the Republic of
the Philippines consistent with Article 121"36 of UNCLOS III manifests the
Philippine State’s responsible observance of its pacta sunt
servanda obligation under UNCLOS III. Under Article 121 of UNCLOS III,
any "naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is
above water at high tide," such as portions of the KIG, qualifies under
the category of "regime of islands," whose islands generate their own
applicable maritime zones.37
Statutory Claim Over Sabah
RA 5446 Retained
Petitioners’ argument for the invalidity of RA 9522 for its failure to
textualize the Philippines’ claim over Sabah in North Borneo is also
untenable. Section 2 of RA 5446, which RA 9522 did not repeal, keeps
open the door for drawing the baselines of Sabah:
Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of
the Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Act is without prejudice to
the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory
of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the
Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty. (Emphasis supplied)
UNCLOS III and RA 9522
Incompatible with the
Delineation of Internal Waters
As their final argument against the validity of RA 9522, petitioners
contend that the law unconstitutionally "converts" internal waters into
archipelagic waters, hence subjecting these waters to the right of
innocent and sea lanes passage under UNCLOS III, including overflight.
Petitioners extrapolate that these passage rights indubitably expose
Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazards, in
violation of the Constitution.38
Whether referred to as Philippine "internal waters" under Article I
of the Constitution39 or as "archipelagic waters" under UNCLOS III (Article
49 [1]), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying
landward of the baselines, including the air space over it and the
submarine areas underneath. UNCLOS III affirms this:
Article 49. Legal status of archipelagic waters, of the air space
over archipelagic waters and of their bed and subsoil. –
1. The sovereignty of an archipelagic State extends to the
waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines drawn in
accordance with article 47, described as archipelagic waters,
regardless of their depth or distance from the coast.
2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the
archipelagic waters, as well as to their bed and subsoil, and the
resources contained therein.
under
xxxx
4. The regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage
established in this Part shall not in other respects affect the status
of the archipelagic waters, including the sea lanes, or the
exercise by the archipelagic State of its sovereignty over such
waters and their air space, bed and subsoil, and the resources
contained therein. (Emphasis supplied)
The fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the
operation of municipal and international law norms subjecting the
territorial sea or archipelagic waters to necessary, if not marginal,
burdens in the interest of maintaining unimpeded, expeditious
not
Constitution’s
international navigation, consistent with the international law principle
of freedom of navigation. Thus, domestically, the political branches of
the Philippine government, in the competent discharge of their
constitutional powers, may pass legislation designating routes within the
archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes
passage.40 Indeed, bills drawing nautical highways for sea lanes
passage are now pending in Congress.41
In the absence of municipal legislation, international law norms,
now codified in UNCLOS III, operate to grant innocent passage rights
over the territorial sea or archipelagic waters, subject to the treaty’s
limitations and conditions for their exercise.42 Significantly, the right of
innocent passage is a customary international law,43 thus automatically
incorporated in the corpus of Philippine law.44 No modern State can
validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that
is exercised in accordance with customary international law without
risking retaliatory measures from the international community.
The fact that for archipelagic States, their archipelagic waters
are subject to both the right of innocent passage and sea lanes
passage45 does not place them in lesser footing vis-à-vis continental
coastal States which are subject, in their territorial sea, to the right of
innocent passage and the right of transit passage through international
straits. The imposition of these passage rights through archipelagic
waters under UNCLOS III was a concession by archipelagic States, in
exchange for their right to claim all the waters landward of their
baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast, as
archipelagic waters subject to their territorial sovereignty. More
importantly, the recognition of archipelagic States’ archipelago and the
waters enclosed by their baselines as one cohesive entity prevents the
treatment of their islands as separate islands under UNCLOS
III.46 Separate islands generate their own maritime zones, placing the
waters between islands separated by more than 24 nautical miles
beyond the States’ territorial sovereignty, subjecting these waters to the
rights of other States under UNCLOS III.47
Petitioners’ invocation of non-executory constitutional provisions
in Article II (Declaration of Principles and State Policies) 48 must also fail.
Our present state of jurisprudence considers the provisions in Article II as
mere legislative guides, which, absent enabling legislation, "do not
embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights x x x."49 Article II
provisions serve as guides in formulating and interpreting implementing
legislation, as well as in interpreting executory provisions of the
Constitution. Although Oposa v. Factoran50 treated the right to a
healthful and balanced ecology under Section 16 of Article II as an
exception, the present petition lacks factual basis to substantiate the
claimed constitutional violation. The other provisions petitioners cite,
relating to the protection of marine wealth (Article XII, Section 2,
paragraph 251 ) and subsistence fishermen (Article XIII, Section 7 52 ), are
not violated by RA 9522.
In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines
to delimit its exclusive economic zone, reserving solely to the Philippines
the exploitation of all living and non-living resources within such zone.
Such a maritime delineation binds the international community since the
delineation is in strict observance of UNCLOS III. If the maritime
delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III, the international community will of
course reject it and will refuse to be bound by it.
UNCLOS III favors States with a long coastline like the Philippines.
UNCLOS III creates a sui generis maritime space – the exclusive
economic zone – in waters previously part of the high seas. UNCLOS III
grants new rights to coastal States to exclusively exploit the resources
found within this zone up to 200 nautical miles.53 UNCLOS III, however,
preserves the traditional freedom of navigation of other States that
attached to this zone beyond the territorial sea before UNCLOS III.
RA 9522 and the Philippines’ Maritime Zones
Petitioners hold the view that, based on the permissive text of
UNCLOS III, Congress was not bound to pass RA 9522.54 We have looked
at the relevant provision of UNCLOS III 55 and we find petitioners’ reading
plausible. Nevertheless, the prerogative of choosing this option belongs
to Congress, not to this Court. Moreover, the luxury of choosing this
option comes at a very steep price. Absent an UNCLOS III compliant
baselines law, an archipelagic State like the Philippines will find itself
devoid of internationally acceptable baselines from where the breadth
of its maritime zones and continental shelf is measured. This is recipe for
a two-fronted disaster: first, it sends an open invitation to the seafaring
powers to freely enter and exploit the resources in the waters and
submarine areas around our archipelago; and second, it weakens the
country’s case in any international dispute over Philippine maritime
space. These are consequences Congress wisely avoided.
The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the
Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522,
allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the
Philippines’ maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a
most vital step on the part of the Philippines in safeguarding its maritime
zones, consistent with the Constitution and our national interest.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
 EN BANC
G.R. No. L-26379 December 27, 1969
WILLIAM C. REAGAN, ETC., petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent.
Quasha, Asperilla, Blanco, Zafra and Tayag for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor
General Felicisimo R. Rosete, Solicitor Lolita O. Gal-lang and Special
Attorney Gamaliel H. Mantolino for respondent.
FERNANDO, J.:
A question novel in character, the answer to which has far-reaching
implications, is raised by petitioner William C. Reagan, at one time a
civilian employee of an American corporation providing technical
assistance to the United States Air Force in the Philippines. He would
dispute the payment of the income tax assessed on him by respondent
Commissioner of Internal Revenue on an amount realized by him on a
sale of his automobile to a member of the United States Marine Corps,
the transaction having taken place at the Clark Field Air Base at
Pampanga. It is his contention, seriously and earnestly expressed, that in
legal contemplation the sale was made outside Philippine territory and
therefore beyond our jurisdictional power to tax.
Such a plea, far-fetched and implausible, on its face betraying no
kinship with reality, he would justify by invoking, mistakenly as will
hereafter be more fully shown an observation to that effect in a 1951
opinion, 1 petitioner ignoring that such utterance was made purely as a
flourish of rhetoric and by way of emphasizing the decision reached,
that the trading firm as purchaser of army goods must respond for the
sales taxes due from an importer, as the American armed forces being
exempt could not be taxed as such under the National Internal
Revenue Code.2 Such an assumption, inspired by the commendable
aim to render unavailing any attempt at tax evasion on the part of such
vendee, found expression anew in a 1962 decision,3 coupled with the
reminder however, to render the truth unmistakable, that "the areas
covered by the United States Military Bases are not foreign territories
both in the political and geographical sense."
As thus clarified, it is manifest that such a view amounts at most to a
legal fiction and is moreover obiter. It certainly cannot control the
resolution of the specific question that confronts us. We declare our
stand in an unequivocal manner. The sale having taken place on what
indisputably is Philippine territory, petitioner's liability for the income tax
due as a result thereof was unavoidable. As the Court of Tax Appeals
reached a similar conclusion, we sustain its decision now before us on
appeal.
In the decision appealed from, the Court of Tax Appeals, after stating
the nature of the case, started the recital of facts thus: "It appears that
petitioner, a citizen of the United States and an employee of Bendix
Radio, Division of Bendix Aviation Corporation, which provides technical
assistance to the United States Air Force, was assigned at Clark Air Base,
Philippines, on or about July 7, 1959 ... . Nine (9) months thereafter and
before his tour of duty expired, petitioner imported on April 22, 1960 a
tax-free 1960 Cadillac car with accessories valued at $6,443.83,
including freight, insurance and other charges." 4 Then came the
following: "On July 11, 1960, more than two (2) months after the 1960
Cadillac car was imported into the Philippines, petitioner requested the
Base Commander, Clark Air Base, for a permit to sell the car, which was
granted provided that the sale was made to a member of the United
States Armed Forces or a citizen of the United States employed in the
U.S. military bases in the Philippines. On the same date, July 11, 1960,
petitioner sold his car for $6,600.00 to a certain Willie Johnson, Jr. (Private
first class), United States Marine Corps, Sangley Point, Cavite, Philippines,
as shown by a Bill of Sale . . . executed at Clark Air Base. On the same
date, Pfc. Willie (William) Johnson, Jr. sold the car to Fred Meneses for
P32,000.00 as evidenced by a deed of sale executed in Manila." 5
As a result of the transaction thus made, respondent Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, after deducting the landed cost of the car as well as
the personal exemption to which petitioner was entitled, fixed as his net
taxable income arising from such transaction the amount of P17,912.34,
rendering him liable for income tax in the sum of P2,979.00. After paying
the sum, he sought a refund from respondent claiming that he was
exempt, but pending action on his request for refund, he filed the case
with the Court of Tax Appeals seeking recovery of the sum of P2,979.00
plus the legal rate of interest.
As noted in the appealed decision: "The only issue submitted for our
resolution is whether or not the said income tax of P2,979.00 was legally
collected by respondent for petitioner."6 After discussing the legal issues
raised, primarily the contention that the Clark Air Base "in legal
contemplation, is a base outside the Philippines" the sale therefore
having taken place on "foreign soil", the Court of Tax Appeals found
nothing objectionable in the assessment and thereafter the payment of
P2,979.00 as income tax and denied the refund on the same. Hence,
this appeal predicated on a legal theory we cannot accept. Petitioner
cannot make out a case for reversal.
1. Resort to fundamentals is unavoidable to place things in their proper
perspective, petitioner apparently feeling justified in his refusal to defer
to basic postulates of constitutional and international law, induced no
doubt by the weight he would accord to the observation made by this
Court in the two opinions earlier referred to. To repeat, scant comfort, if
at all is to be derived from such an obiter dictum, one which is likewise
far from reflecting the fact as it is.
Nothing is better settled than that the Philippines being independent
and sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its entire domain.
There is no portion thereof that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its
decrees are supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws govern therein,
and everyone to whom it applies must submit to its terms. That is the
extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal. Necessarily,
likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it were not thus, there is a diminution of
its sovereignty.
It is to be admitted that any state may, by its consent, express or
implied, submit to a restriction of its sovereign rights. There may thus be a
curtailment of what otherwise is a power plenary in character. That is
the concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation, which, in the succinct
language of Jellinek, "is the property of a state-force due to which it has
the exclusive capacity of legal self-determination and self-restriction."7 A
state then, if it chooses to, may refrain from the exercise of what
otherwise is illimitable competence.
Its laws may as to some persons found within its territory no longer
control. Nor does the matter end there. It is not precluded from allowing
another power to participate in the exercise of jurisdictional right over
certain portions of its territory. If it does so, it by no means follows that
such areas become impressed with an alien character. They retain their
status as native soil. They are still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction
may be diminished, but it does not disappear. So it is with the bases
under lease to the American armed forces by virtue of the military bases
agreement of 1947. They are not and cannot be foreign territory.
Decisions coming from petitioner's native land, penned by jurists of
repute, speak to that effect with impressive unanimity. We start with the
citation from Chief Justice Marshall, announced in the leading case
of Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon,8 an 1812 decision: "The jurisdiction
of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute.
It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon
it, deriving validity from an external source, would imply a diminution of
its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, and an investment of that
sovereignty to the same extent in that power which could impose such
restriction." After which came this paragraph: "All exceptions, therefore,
to the full and complete power of a nation within its own territories, must
be traced up to the consent of the nation itself. They can flow from no
other legitimate source."
Chief Justice Taney, in an 1857 decision,9 affirmed the fundamental
principle of everyone within the territorial domain of a state being
subject to its commands: "For undoubtedly every person who is found
within the limits of a government, whether the temporary purposes or as
a resident, is bound by its laws." It is no exaggeration then for Justice
Brewer to stress that the United States government "is one having
jurisdiction over every foot of soil within its territory, and acting directly
upon each [individual found therein]; . . ." 10
Not too long ago, there was a reiteration of such a view, this time from
the pen of Justice Van Devanter. Thus: "It now is settled in the United
States and recognized elsewhere that the territory subject to its
jurisdiction includes the land areas under its dominion and control the
ports, harbors, bays, and other in closed arms of the sea along its coast,
and a marginal belt of the sea extending from the coast line outward a
marine league, or 3 geographic miles."11 He could cite moreover, in
addition to many American decisions, such eminent treatise-writers as
Kent, Moore, Hyde, Wilson, Westlake, Wheaton and Oppenheim.
As a matter of fact, the eminent commentator Hyde in his three-volume
work on International Law, as interpreted and applied by the United
States, made clear that not even the embassy premises of a foreign
power are to be considered outside the territorial domain of the host
state. Thus: "The ground occupied by an embassy is not in fact the
territory of the foreign State to which the premises belong through
possession or ownership. The lawfulness or unlawfulness of acts there
committed is determined by the territorial sovereign. If an attache
commits an offense within the precincts of an embassy, his immunity
from prosecution is not because he has not violated the local law, but
rather for the reason that the individual is exempt from prosecution. If a
person not so exempt, or whose immunity is waived, similarly commits a
crime therein, the territorial sovereign, if it secures custody of the
offender, may subject him to prosecution, even though its criminal code
normally does not contemplate the punishment of one who commits an
offense outside of the national domain. It is not believed, therefore, that
an ambassador himself possesses the right to exercise jurisdiction,
contrary to the will of the State of his sojourn, even within his embassy
with respect to acts there committed. Nor is there apparent at the
present time any tendency on the part of States to acquiesce in his
exercise of it."12
2. In the light of the above, the first and crucial error imputed to the
Court of Tax Appeals to the effect that it should have held that the Clark
Air Force is foreign soil or territory for purposes of income tax legislation is
clearly without support in law. As thus correctly viewed, petitioner's hope
for the reversal of the decision completely fades away. There is nothing
in the Military Bases Agreement that lends support to such an assertion. It
has not become foreign soil or territory. This country's jurisdictional rights
therein, certainly not excluding the power to tax, have been preserved.
As to certain tax matters, an appropriate exemption was provided for.
Petitioner could not have been unaware that to maintain the contrary
would be to defy reality and would be an affront to the law. While his
first assigned error is thus worded, he would seek to impart plausibility to
his claim by the ostensible invocation of the exemption clause in the
Agreement by virtue of which a "national of the United States serving in
or employed in the Philippines in connection with the construction,
maintenance, operation or defense of the bases and residing in the
Philippines only by reason of such employment" is not to be taxed on his
income unless "derived from Philippine source or sources other than the
United States sources."13 The reliance, to repeat, is more apparent than
real for as noted at the outset of this opinion, petitioner places more
faith not on the language of the provision on exemption but on a
sentiment given expression in a 1951 opinion of this Court, which would
be made to yield such an unwarranted interpretation at war with the
controlling constitutional and international law principles. At any rate,
even if such a contention were more adequately pressed and insisted
upon, it is on its face devoid of merit as the source clearly was Philippine.
In Saura Import and Export Co. v. Meer,14 the case above referred to,
this Court affirmed a decision rendered about seven months
previously,15 holding liable as an importer, within the contemplation of
the National Internal Revenue Code provision, the trading firm that
purchased army goods from a United States government agency in the
Philippines. It is easily understandable why. If it were not thus, tax evasion
would have been facilitated. The United States forces that brought in
such equipment later disposed of as surplus, when no longer needed for
military purposes, was beyond the reach of our tax statutes.
Justice Tuason, who spoke for the Court, adhered to such a rationale,
quoting extensively from the earlier opinion. He could have stopped
there. He chose not to do so. The transaction having occurred in 1946,
not so long after the liberation of the Philippines, he proceeded to
discuss the role of the American military contingent in the Philippines as
a belligerent occupant. In the course of such a dissertion, drawing on his
well-known gift for rhetoric and cognizant that he was making an as
if statement, he did say: "While in army bases or installations within the
Philippines those goods were in contemplation of law on foreign soil."
It is thus evident that the first, and thereafter the controlling, decision as
to the liability for sales taxes as an importer by the purchaser, could
have been reached without any need for such expression as that given
utterance by Justice Tuason. Its value then as an authoritative doctrine
cannot be as much as petitioner would mistakenly attach to it. It was
clearly obiter not being necessary for the resolution of the issue before
this Court.16 It was an opinion "uttered by the way."17 It could not then be
controlling on the question before us now, the liability of the petitioner
for income tax which, as announced at the opening of this opinion, is
squarely raised for the first time.18
On this point, Chief Justice Marshall could again be listened to with
profit. Thus: "It is a maxim, not to be disregarded, that general
expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the
case in which those expressions are used. If they go beyond the case,
they may be respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a
subsequent suit when the very point is presented for decision." 19
Nor did the fact that such utterance of Justice Tuason was cited in Co
Po v. Collector of Internal Revenue,20 a 1962 decision relied upon by
petitioner, put a different complexion on the matter. Again, it was by
way of pure embellishment, there being no need to repeat it, to reach
the conclusion that it was the purchaser of army goods, this time from
military bases, that must respond for the advance sales taxes as
importer. Again, the purpose that animated the reiteration of such a
view was clearly to emphasize that through the employment of such a
fiction, tax evasion is precluded. What is more, how far divorced from
the truth was such statement was emphasized by Justice Barrera, who
penned the Co Po opinion, thus: "It is true that the areas covered by the
United States Military Bases are not foreign territories both in the political
and geographical sense."21
Justice Tuason moreover made explicit that rather than corresponding
with reality, what was said by him was in the way of a legal fiction. Note
his stress on "in contemplation of law." To lend further support to a
conclusion already announced, being at that a confirmation of what
had been arrived at in the earlier case, distinguished by its sound
appreciation of the issue then before this Court and to preclude any tax
evasion, an observation certainly not to be taken literally was thus given
utterance.
This is not to say that it should have been ignored altogether afterwards.
It could be utilized again, as it undoubtedly was, especially so for the
purpose intended, namely to stigmatize as without support in law any
attempt on the part of a taxpayer to escape an obligation incumbent
upon him. So it was quoted with that end in view in the Co Po case. It
certainly does not justify any effort to render futile the collection of a tax
legally due, as here. That was farthest from the thought of Justice
Tuason.
What is more, the statement on its face is, to repeat, a legal fiction. This
is not to discount the uses of a fictio juris in the science of the law. It was
Cardozo who pointed out its value as a device "to advance the ends of
justice" although at times it could be "clumsy" and even
"offensive".22 Certainly, then, while far from objectionable as thus
enunciated, this observation of Justice Tuason could be misused or
misconstrued in a clumsy manner to reach an offensive result. To repeat,
properly used, a legal fiction could be relied upon by the law, as
Frankfurter noted, in the pursuit of legitimate ends.23 Petitioner then
would be well-advised to take to heart such counsel of care and
circumspection before invoking not a legal fiction that would avoid a
mockery of the law by avoiding tax evasion but what clearly is a
misinterpretation thereof, leading to results that would have shocked its
originator.
The conclusion is thus irresistible that the crucial error assigned, the only
one that calls for discussion to the effect that for income tax purposes
the Clark Air Force Base is outside Philippine territory, is utterly without
merit. So we have said earlier.
3. To impute then to the statement of Justice Tuason the meaning that
petitioner would fasten on it is, to paraphrase Frankfurter, to be guilty of
succumbing to the vice of literalness. To so conclude is, whether by
design or inadvertence, to misread it. It certainly is not susceptible of the
mischievous consequences now sought to be fastened on it by
petitioner.
That it would be fraught with such peril to the enforcement of our tax
statutes on the military bases under lease to the American armed forces
could not have been within the contemplation of Justice Tuason. To so
attribute such a bizarre consequence is to be guilty of a grave disservice
to the memory of a great jurist. For his real and genuine sentiment on
the matter in consonance with the imperative mandate of controlling
constitutional and international law concepts was categorically set forth
by him, not as an obiter but as the rationale of the decision, in People v.
Acierto24 thus: "By the [Military Bases] Agreement, it should be noted, the
Philippine Government merely consents that the United States exercise
jurisdiction in certain cases. The consent was given purely as a matter of
comity, courtesy, or expediency over the bases as part of the Philippine
territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses
committed therein."
Nor did he stop there. He did stress further the full extent of our territorial
jurisdiction in words that do not admit of doubt. Thus: "This provision is not
and can not on principle or authority be construed as a limitation upon
the rights of the Philippine Government. If anything, it is an emphatic
recognition and reaffirmation of Philippine sovereignty over the bases
and of the truth that all jurisdictional rights granted to the United States
and not exercised by the latter are reserved by the Philippines for
itself."25
It is in the same spirit that we approach the specific question
confronting us in this litigation. We hold, as announced at the outset,
that petitioner was liable for the income tax arising from a sale of his
automobile in the Clark Field Air Base, which clearly is and cannot
otherwise be other than, within our territorial jurisdiction to tax.
4. With the mist thus lifted from the situation as it truly presents itself, there
is nothing that stands in the way of an affirmance of the Court of Tax
Appeals decision. No useful purpose would be served by discussing the
other assigned errors, petitioner himself being fully aware that if the Clark
Air Force Base is to be considered, as it ought to be and as it is,
Philippine soil or territory, his claim for exemption from the income tax
due was distinguished only by its futility.
There is further satisfaction in finding ourselves unable to indulge
petitioner in his plea for reversal. We thus manifest fealty to a
pronouncement made time and time again that the law does not look
with favor on tax exemptions and that he who would seek to be thus
privileged must justify it by words too plain to be mistaken and too
categorical to be misinterpreted.26 Petitioner had not done so. Petitioner
cannot do so.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals of May 12, 1966
denying the refund of P2,979.00 as the income tax paid by petitioner is
affirmed. With costs against petitioner.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and
Teehankee, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., concurs in the result.
Barredo, J., took no part.
Luis General, Jr. for respondent Aniano David.
Office of the Solicitor General for other respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:p
Petitioners 1 in this appeal by certiorari would have us reverse a
decision of respondent Court of Appeals affirming a lower court
judgment dismissing their complaint to have the Torrens Title 2 of
respondent Aniano David declared null and void. What makes the task
for petitioners quite difficult is that their factual support for their
pretension to ownership of such disputed lot through accretion was
rejected by respondent Court of Appeals. Without such underpinning,
they must perforce rely on a legal theory, which, to put it mildly, is
distinguished by unorthodoxy and is therefore far from persuasive. A
grant by the government through the appropriate public
officials 3 exercising the competence duly vested in them by law is not
to be set at naught on the premise, unexpressed but implied, that land
not otherwise passing into private ownership may not be disposed of by
the state. Such an assumption is at war with settled principles of
constitutional law. It cannot receive our assent. We affirm.

Republic of the Philippines The decision of respondent Court of Appeals following that of
SUPREME COURT the lower court makes clear that there is no legal justification for
Manila nullifying the right of respondent Aniano David to the disputed lot arising
from the grant made in his favor by respondent officials. As noted in the
decision under review, he "acquired lawful title thereby pursuant to his
EN BANC
miscellaneous sales application in accordance with which an order of
award and for issuance of a sales patent was made by the Director of
Lands on June 18, 1958, covering Lot 2892 containing an area of 226
square meters, which is a portion of Lot 2863 of the Naga Cadastre. On
G.R. No. L-30389 December 27, 1972 the basis of the order of award of the Director of Lands the
Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued on August
PEDRO LEE HONG HOK, SIMEON LEE HONG HOK, ROSITA LEE 26, 1959, Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. V-1209 pursuant to which OCT
HONG HOK and LEONCIO LEE HONG HOK, petitioners, No. 510 was issued by the Register of Deeds of Naga City to defendant-
vs. appellee Aniano David on October 21, 1959. According to the
ANIANO DAVID, THE HON. SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL Stipulation of Facts, since the filing of the sales application of Aniano
RESOURCES, THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS and COURT OF David and during all the proceedings in connection with said
APPEALS, respondents. application, up to the actual issuance of the sales patent in his favor,
the plaintiffs-appellants did not put up any opposition or adverse claim
Augusto A. Pardalis for petitioners. thereto. This is fatal to them because after the registration and issuance
of the certificate and duplicate certificate of title based on a public
land patent, the land covered thereby automatically comes under the
operation of Republic Act 496 subject to all the safeguards provided
therein.... Under Section 38 of Act 496 any question concerning the
validity of the certificate of title based on fraud should be raised within
one year from the date of the issuance of the patent. Thereafter the
certificate of title based thereon becomes indefeasible.... In this case
the land in question is not a private property as the Director of Lands
and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources have always
sustained the public character thereof for having been formed by
reclamation.... The only remedy therefore, available to the appellants is
an action for reconveyance on the ground of fraud. In this case we do
not see any fraud committed by defendant-appellant Aniano David in
applying for the purchase of the land involved through his
Miscellaneous Sales Application No. MSA-V-26747, entered in the
records of the Bureau of Lands [Miscellaneous Sales] Entry No. V-9033,
because everything was done in the open. The notices regarding the
auction sale of the land were published, the actual sale and award
thereof to Aniano David were not clandestine but open and public
official acts of an officer of the Government. The application was
merely a renewal of his deceased wife's application, and the said
deceased occupied the land since 1938." 4
On such finding of facts, the attempt of petitioners to elicit a
different conclusion is likely to be attended with frustration. The first error
assigned predicated an accretion having taken place, notwithstanding
its rejection by respondent Court of Appeals, would seek to disregard
what was accepted by respondent Court as to how the disputed lot
came into being, namely by reclamation. It does not therefore call for
any further consideration. Neither of the other two errors imputed to
respondent Court, as to its holding that authoritative doctrines preclude
a party other than the government to dispute the validity of a grant and
the recognition of the indefeasible character of a public land patent
after one year, is possessed of merit. Consequently, as set forth at the
outset, there is no justification for reversal.
1. More specifically, the shaft of criticism was let loose by
petitioner aimed at this legal proposition set forth in the exhaustive
opinion of then Justice Salvador Esguerra of the Court of Appeals, now
a member of this Court: "There is, furthermore, a fatal defect of parties to
this action. Only the Government, represented by the Director of Lands,
or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, can bring an
action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a void
patent (Lucas vs. Durian, 102 Phil. 1157; Director of Lands vs. Heirs of
Ciriaco Carlo, G.R. No. L-12485, July 31, 1959). This was not done by said
officers but by private parties like the plaintiffs, who cannot claim that
the patent and title issued for the land involved are void since they are
not the registered owners thereof nor had they been declared as
owners in the cadastral proceedings of Naga Cadastre after claiming it
as their private property. The cases cited by appellants are not in point
as they refer to private registered lands or public lands over which
vested rights have been acquired but notwithstanding such fact the
Land Department subsequently granted patents to public land
applicants."5 Petitioner ought to have known better. The above excerpt
is invulnerable to attack. It is a restatement of a principle that dates
back to Maninang v. Consolacion, 6 a 1908 decision. As was there
categorically stated: "The fact that the grant was made by the
government is undisputed. Whether the grant was in conformity with the
law or not is a question which the government may raise, but until it is
raised by the government and set aside, the defendant can not
question it. The legality of the grant is a question between the grantee
and the government."7 The above citation was repeated ipsissimis
verbis in Salazar v. Court of Appeals.8 Bereft as petitioners were of the
right of ownership in accordance with the findings of the Court of
Appeals, they cannot, in the language of Reyes v. Rodriguez, 9 "question
the [title] legally issued." 10 The second assignment of error is thus
disposed of.
2. As there are overtones indicative of skepticism, if not of
outright rejection, of the well-known distinction in public law between
the government authority possessed by the state which is appropriately
embraced in the concept of sovereignty, and its capacity to own or
acquire property, it is not inappropriate to pursue the matter further. The
former comes under the heading of imperium and the latter
of dominium. The use of this term is appropriate with reference to lands
held by the state in its proprietary character. In such capacity, it may
provide for the exploitation and use of lands and other natural
resources, including their disposition, except as limited by the
Constitution. Dean Pound did speak of the confusion that existed during
the medieval era between such two concepts, but did note the
existence of res publicae as a corollary to dominium." 11 As far as the
Philippines was concerned, there was a recognition by Justice Holmes
in Cariño v. Insular Government, 12 a case of Philippine origin, that "Spain
in its earlier decrees embodied the universal feudal theory that all lands
were held from the Crown...." 13 That was a manifestation of the
concept of jura regalia, 14 which was adopted by the present
Constitution, ownership however being vested in the state as such rather
than the head thereof. What was stated by Holmes served to confirm a
much more extensive discussion of the matter in the leading case
of Valenton v. Murciano, 15 decided in 1904. One of the royal decrees
cited was incorporated in the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias 16 in
these words: "We having acquired full sovereignty over the Indies and all
lands, territories, and possessions not heretofore ceded away by our
royal predecessors, or by us, or in our name, still pertaining to the royal
crown and patrimony, it is our will that all lands which are held without
proper and true deeds of grant be restored to us according as they
belong to us, in order that after reserving before all what to us or to our
viceroys audiences, and governors may seem necessary for public
squares, ways, pastures, and commons in those places which are
peopled, taking into consideration not only their present condition, but
also their future and their probable increase, and after distributing to the
natives what may be necessary for tillage and pasturage, confirming
them in what they now have and giving them more if necessary, all the
rest of said lands may remain free and unencumbered for us to dispose
of as we may wish." 17
It could therefore be affirmed in Montano v. Insular
Government" 18 that "as to the unappropriated public lands constituting
the public domain the sole power of legislation is vested in Congress,
..." 19 They continue to possess that character until severed therefrom by
state grant. 20 Where, as in this case, it was found by the Court of
Appeals that the disputed lot was the result of reclamation, its being
correctly categorized as public land is undeniable. 21What was held in
Heirs of Datu Pendatun v. Director of Lands 22 finds application. Thus:
"There being no evidence whatever that the property in question was
ever acquired by the applicants or their ancestors either by composition
title from the Spanish Government or by possessory information title or by
any other means for the acquisition of public lands, the property must
be held to be public domain." 23 For it is well-settled "that no public land
can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or
implied, from the government." 24 It is indispensable then that there be a
showing of a title from the state or any other mode of acquisition
recognized by law. 25 The most recent restatement of the doctrine,
found in an opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes, follows: 26 "The applicant,
having failed to establish his right or title over the northern portion of Lot
No. 463 involved in the present controversy, and there being no showing
that the same has been acquired by any private person from the
Government, either by purchase or by grant, the property is and
remains part of the public domain." 27 To repeat, the second assignment
of error is devoid of merit.
3. The last error assigned would take issue with this portion of the
opinion of Justice Esguerra: "According to the Stipulation of Facts, since
the filing of the sales application of Aniano David and during all the
proceedings in connection with said application, up to the actual
issuance of the sales patent in his favor, the
plaintiffs-appellants did not put up any opposition or adverse claim
thereto. This is fatal to them because after the registration and issuance
of the certificate and duplicate certificate of title based on a public
land patent, the land covered thereby automatically comes under the
operation of Republic Act 496 subject to all the safeguards provided
therein ... Under Section 38 of Act 496 any question concerning the
validity of the certificate of title based on fraud should be raised within
one year from the date of the issuance of the patent. Thereafter the
certificate of title based thereon becomes indefeasible ..." 28 Petitioners
cannot reconcile themselves to the view that respondent David's title is
impressed with the quality of indefeasibility. In thus manifesting such an
attitude, they railed to accord deference to controlling precedents. As
far back as 1919, in Aquino v. Director of
Lands, 29 Justice Malcolm, speaking for the Court, stated: "The
proceedings under the Land Registration Law and under the provisions
of Chapter VI of the Public Land Law are the same in that both are
against the whole world, both take the nature of judicial proceedings,
and for both the decree of registration issued is conclusive and
final." 30Such a view has been followed since then. 31 The latest case in
point is Cabacug v. Lao. 32 There is this revealing excerpt appearing in
that decision: "It is said, and with reason, that a holder of a land
acquired under a free patent is more favorably situated than that of an
owner of registered property. Not only does a free patent have a force
and effect of a Torrens Title, but in addition the person to whom it is
granted has likewise in his favor the right to repurchase within a period
of five years." 33 It is quite apparent, therefore, that petitioners' stand is
legally indefensible.
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals of
January 31, 1969 and its resolution of March 14, 1969 are affirmed. With
costs against petitioners-appellants.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee
Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines deceased by his second marriage with Irene Ondez; c)
SUPREME COURT the properties left by the deceased were all the conjugal
Manila properties of the latter and his first wife, Felisa Espiras, and
no properties were acquired by the deceased during his
EN BANC second marriage; d) if there was any partition to be
made, those conjugal properties should first be
A.M. No. 133-J May 31, 1982 partitioned into two parts, and one part is to be
adjudicated solely to defendant it being the share of the
latter's deceased mother, Felisa Espiras, and the other
BERNARDITA R. MACARIOLA, complainant,
half which is the share of the deceased Francisco Reyes
vs.
was to be divided equally among his children by his two
HONORABLE ELIAS B. ASUNCION, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
marriages.
Leyte, respondent.

On June 8, 1963, a decision was rendered by

respondent Judge Asuncion in Civil Case 3010, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
MAKASIAR, J:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING
In a verified complaint dated August 6, 1968 Bernardita R.
CONSIDERATIONS, the Court, upon a
Macariola charged respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion of the Court of
preponderance of evidence, finds and so
First Instance of Leyte, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals,
holds, and hereby renders judgment (1)
with "acts unbecoming a judge."
Declaring the plaintiffs Luz R. Bakunawa,
Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela
The factual setting of the case is stated in the report dated May Reyes and Priscilla Reyes as the only
27, 1971 of then Associate Justice Cecilia Muñoz Palma of the Court of children legitimated by the subsequent
Appeals now retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, to whom marriage of Francisco Reyes Diaz to Irene
this case was referred on October 28, 1968 for investigation, thus: Ondez; (2) Declaring the plaintiff Sinforosa
R. Bales to have been an illegitimate child
Civil Case No. 3010 of the Court of First Instance of of Francisco Reyes Diaz; (3) Declaring Lots
Leyte was a complaint for partition filed by Sinforosa R. Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892, 5265, 4803, 4581,
Bales, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, 4506 and 1/4 of Lot 1145 as belonging to
Adela Reyes, and Priscilla Reyes, plaintiffs, against the conjugal partnership of the spouses
Bernardita R. Macariola, defendant, concerning the Francisco Reyes Diaz and Felisa Espiras; (4)
properties left by the deceased Francisco Reyes, the Declaring Lot No. 2304 and 1/4 of Lot No.
common father of the plaintiff and defendant. 3416 as belonging to the spouses
Francisco Reyes Diaz and Irene Ondez in
In her defenses to the complaint for partition, Mrs. common partnership; (5) Declaring that
Macariola alleged among other things that; a) plaintiff 1/2 of Lot No. 1184 as belonging
Sinforosa R. Bales was not a daughter of the deceased exclusively to the deceased Francisco
Francisco Reyes; b) the only legal heirs of the deceased Reyes Diaz; (6) Declaring the defendant
were defendant Macariola, she being the only offspring Bernardita R. Macariola, being the only
of the first marriage of Francisco Reyes with Felisa Espiras, legal and forced heir of her mother Felisa
and the remaining plaintiffs who were the children of the Espiras, as the exclusive owner of one-half
of each of Lots Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892, 5265,
4803, 4581, 4506; and the remaining one-
half (1/2) of each of said Lots Nos. 4474,
4475, 4892, 5265, 4803, 4581, 4506 and
one-half (1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No.
1154 as belonging to the estate of
Francisco Reyes Diaz; (7) Declaring Irene
Ondez to be the exclusive owner of one-
half (1/2) of Lot No. 2304 and one-half
(1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 3416;
the remaining one-half (1/2) of Lot 2304
and the remaining one-half (1/2) of one-
fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 3416 as belonging to
the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz; (8)
Directing the division or partition of the
estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz in such a
manner as to give or grant to Irene Ondez,
as surviving widow of Francisco Reyes
Diaz, a hereditary share of. one-twelfth
(1/12) of the whole estate of Francisco
Reyes Diaz (Art. 996 in relation to Art. 892,
par 2, New Civil Code), and the remaining
portion of the estate to be divided among
the plaintiffs Sinforosa R. Bales, Luz R.
Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto
Reyes, Adela Reyes, Priscilla Reyes and
defendant Bernardita R. Macariola, in
such a way that the extent of the total
share of plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales in the
hereditary estate shall not exceed the
equivalent of two-fifth (2/5) of the total
share of any or each of the other plaintiffs
and the defendant (Art. 983, New Civil
Code), each of the latter to receive equal
shares from the hereditary estate, (Ramirez
vs. Bautista, 14 Phil. 528; Diancin vs. Bishop
of Jaro, O.G. [3rd Ed.] p. 33); (9) Directing
the parties, within thirty days after this
judgment shall have become final to
submit to this court, for approval a project
of partition of the hereditary estate in the
proportion above indicated, and in such
manner as the parties may, by
agreement, deemed convenient and
equitable to them taking into
consideration the location, kind, quality,
nature and value of the properties
involved; (10) Directing the plaintiff
Sinforosa R. Bales and defendant
Bernardita R. Macariola to pay the costs of
this suit, in the proportion of one-third (1/3)
by the first named and two-thirds (2/3) by
the second named; and (I 1) Dismissing all
other claims of the parties [pp 27-29 of
Exh. C].
The decision in civil case 3010 became final for
lack of an appeal, and on October 16, 1963, a project of
partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion which is
marked Exh. A. Notwithstanding the fact that the project
of partition was not signed by the parties themselves but
only by the respective counsel of plaintiffs and
defendant, Judge Asuncion approved it in his Order
dated October 23, 1963, which for convenience is
quoted hereunder in full:
The parties, through their
respective counsels, presented to this
Court for approval the following project of
partition:
COMES NOW, the plaintiffs and the
defendant in the above-entitled case, to
this Honorable Court respectfully submit
the following Project of Partition:
l. The whole of Lots Nos. 1154, 2304
and 4506 shall belong exclusively to
Bernardita Reyes Macariola;
2. A portion of Lot No. 3416
consisting of 2,373.49 square meters along
the eastern part of the lot shall be
awarded likewise to Bernardita R.
Macariola;
 3. Lots Nos. 4803, 4892 and 5265
shall be awarded to Sinforosa Reyes Bales;
4. A portion of Lot No. 3416
consisting of 1,834.55 square meters along
the western part of the lot shall likewise be
awarded to Sinforosa Reyes-Bales;
5. Lots Nos. 4474 and 4475 shall be
divided equally among Luz Reyes
Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto
Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla Reyes in
equal shares;
6. Lot No. 1184 and the remaining
portion of Lot No. 3416 after taking the
portions awarded under item (2) and (4)
above shall be awarded to Luz Reyes
Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto
Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla Reyes in
equal shares, provided, however that the
remaining portion of Lot No. 3416 shall
belong exclusively to Priscilla Reyes.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully
prayed that the Project of Partition
indicated above which is made in
accordance with the decision of the
Honorable Court be approved.
Tacloban City, October 16, 1963.
(SGD) BONIFACIO RAMO Atty. for
the Defendant Tacloban City
(SGD) ZOTICO A. TOLETE Atty. for
the Plaintiff Tacloban City
While the Court thought it more
desirable for all the parties to have signed
this Project of Partition, nevertheless, upon
assurance of both counsels of the
respective parties to this Court that the
Project of Partition, as above- quoted,
had been made after a conference and
agreement of the plaintiffs and the
defendant approving the above Project
of Partition, and that both lawyers had
represented to the Court that they are
given full authority to sign by themselves
the Project of Partition, the Court,
therefore, finding the above-quoted
Project of Partition to be in accordance
with law, hereby approves the same. The
parties, therefore, are directed to execute
such papers, documents or instrument
sufficient in form and substance for the
vesting of the rights, interests and
participations which were adjudicated to
the respective parties, as outlined in the
Project of Partition and the delivery of the
respective properties adjudicated to each
one in view of said Project of Partition, and
to perform such other acts as are legal
and necessary to effectuate the said
Project of Partition.
SO ORDERED.
Given in Tacloban City, this 23rd
day of October, 1963.
(SGD) ELIAS B. ASUNCION Judge
EXH. B.
The above Order of October 23, 1963, was
amended on November 11, 1963, only for the purpose of
giving authority to the Register of Deeds of the Province
of Leyte to issue the corresponding transfer certificates of
title to the respective adjudicatees in conformity with the
project of partition (see Exh. U).
One of the properties mentioned in the project of
partition was Lot 1184 or rather one-half thereof with an
 area of 15,162.5 sq. meters. This lot, which according to
the decision was the exclusive property of the deceased
Francisco Reyes, was adjudicated in said project of
partition to the plaintiffs Luz, Anacorita Ruperto, Adela,
and Priscilla all surnamed Reyes in equal shares, and
when the project of partition was approved by the trial
court the adjudicatees caused Lot 1184 to be subdivided
into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E
inclusive (Exh. V).
Lot 1184-D was conveyed to Enriqueta D. Anota,
a stenographer in Judge Asuncion's court (Exhs. F, F-1
and V-1), while Lot 1184-E which had an area of
2,172.5556 sq. meters was sold on July 31, 1964 to Dr.
Arcadio Galapon (Exh. 2) who was issued transfer
certificate of title No. 2338 of the Register of Deeds of the
city of Tacloban (Exh. 12).
On March 6, 1965, Dr. Arcadio Galapon and his
wife Sold a portion of Lot 1184-E with an area of around
1,306 sq. meters to Judge Asuncion and his wife, Victoria
S. Asuncion (Exh. 11), which particular portion was
declared by the latter for taxation purposes (Exh. F).
On August 31, 1966, spouses Asuncion and
spouses Galapon conveyed their respective shares and
interest in Lot 1184-E to "The Traders Manufacturing and
Fishing Industries Inc." (Exit 15 & 16). At the time of said
sale the stockholders of the corporation were Dominador
Arigpa Tan, Humilia Jalandoni Tan, Jaime Arigpa Tan,
Judge Asuncion, and the latter's wife, Victoria S.
Asuncion, with Judge Asuncion as the President and Mrs.
Asuncion as the secretary (Exhs. E-4 to E-7). The Articles of
Incorporation of "The Traders Manufacturing and Fishing
Industries, Inc." which we shall henceforth refer to as
"TRADERS" were registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission only on January 9, 1967 (Exh. E)
[pp. 378-385, rec.].
Complainant Bernardita R. Macariola filed on August 9, 1968 the
instant complaint dated August 6, 1968 alleging four causes of action,
to wit: [1] that respondent Judge Asuncion violated Article 1491,
paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion
of Lot No. 1184-E which was one of those properties involved in Civil
Case No. 3010 decided by him; [2] that he likewise violated Article 14,
paragraphs I and 5 of the Code of Commerce, Section 3, paragraph H,
of R.A. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, and Canon 25 of the
Canons of Judicial Ethics, by associating himself with the Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., as a stockholder and a
ranking officer while he was a judge of the Court of First Instance of
Leyte; [3] that respondent was guilty of coddling an impostor and acted
in disregard of judicial decorum by closely fraternizing with a certain
Dominador Arigpa Tan who openly and publicly advertised himself as a
practising attorney when in truth and in fact his name does not appear
in the Rolls of Attorneys and is not a member of the Philippine Bar; and
[4] that there was a culpable defiance of the law and utter disregard for
ethics by respondent Judge (pp. 1-7, rec.).
Respondent Judge Asuncion filed on September 24, 1968 his
answer to which a reply was filed on October 16, 1968 by herein
complainant. In Our resolution of October 28, 1968, We referred this
case to then Justice Cecilia Muñoz Palma of the Court of Appeals, for
investigation, report and recommendation. After hearing, the said
Investigating Justice submitted her report dated May 27, 1971
recommending that respondent Judge should be reprimanded or
warned in connection with the first cause of action alleged in the
complaint, and for the second cause of action, respondent should be
warned in case of a finding that he is prohibited under the law to
engage in business. On the third and fourth causes of action, Justice
Palma recommended that respondent Judge be exonerated.
The records also reveal that on or about November 9 or 11, 1968
(pp. 481, 477, rec.), complainant herein instituted an action before the
Court of First Instance of Leyte, entitled "Bernardita R. Macariola,
plaintiff, versus Sinforosa R. Bales, et al., defendants," which was
docketed as Civil Case No. 4235, seeking the annulment of the project
of partition made pursuant to the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 and
the two orders issued by respondent Judge approving the same, as well
as the partition of the estate and the subsequent conveyances with
damages. It appears, however, that some defendants were dropped
from the civil case. For one, the case against Dr. Arcadio Galapon was
dismissed because he was no longer a real party in interest when Civil
Case No. 4234 was filed, having already conveyed on March 6, 1965 a
portion of lot 1184-E to respondent Judge and on August 31, 1966 the
remainder was sold to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries,
Inc. Similarly, the case against defendant Victoria Asuncion was (c) the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND
dismissed on the ground that she was no longer a real party in interest at PESOS [P50,000.00] for nominal damages;
the time the aforesaid Civil Case No. 4234 was filed as the portion of Lot and
1184 acquired by her and respondent Judge from Dr. Arcadio Galapon
was already sold on August 31, 1966 to the Traders Manufacturing and (d) he sum of TEN THOUSAND
Fishing industries, Inc. Likewise, the cases against defendants Serafin P. PESOS [PI0,000.00] for Attorney's Fees.
Ramento, Catalina Cabus, Ben Barraza Go, Jesus Perez, Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., Alfredo R. Celestial and Pilar B. IN THE CASE AGAINST THE
P. Celestial, Leopoldo Petilla and Remedios Petilla, Salvador Anota and DEFENDANT MARIQUITA VILLASIN, FOR
Enriqueta Anota and Atty. Zotico A. Tolete were dismissed with the HERSELF AND FOR THE HEIRS OF THE
conformity of complainant herein, plaintiff therein, and her counsel. DECEASED GERARDO VILLASIN —

On November 2, 1970, Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno of the Court (1) Dismissing the complaint against the
of First Instance of Leyte, who was directed and authorized on June 2, defendants Mariquita Villasin and the heirs of the
1969 by the then Secretary (now Minister) of Justice and now Minister of deceased Gerardo Villasin;
National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile to hear and decide Civil Case No.
4234, rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as
(2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendants
follows:
Mariquita Villasin and the heirs of Gerardo Villasin the
cost of the suit.
A. IN THE CASE AGAINST JUDGE ELIAS B.
ASUNCION
C. IN THE CASE AGAINST THE
DEFENDANT SINFOROSA R. BALES, ET AL.,
(1) declaring that only Branch IV of the Court of WHO WERE PLAINTIFFS IN CIVIL CASE NO.
First Instance of Leyte has jurisdiction to take cognizance 3010 —
of the issue of the legality and validity of the Project of
Partition [Exhibit "B"] and the two Orders [Exhibits "C" and
(1) Dismissing the complaint against defendants
"C- 3"] approving the partition;
Sinforosa R. Bales, Adela R. Herrer, Priscilla R. Solis, Luz R.
Bakunawa, Anacorita R. Eng and Ruperto O. Reyes.
(2) dismissing the complaint against Judge Elias B.
Asuncion;
D. IN THE CASE AGAINST
DEFENDANT BONIFACIO RAMO —
(3) adjudging the plaintiff, Mrs. Bernardita R.
Macariola to pay defendant Judge Elias B. Asuncion,
(1) Dismissing the complaint against Bonifacio
Ramo;
(a) the sum of FOUR HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS [P400,000.00] for moral
(2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendant
damages;
Bonifacio Ramo the cost of the suit.

(b) the sum of TWO HUNDRED

SO ORDERED [pp. 531-533, rec.]
THOUSAND PESOS [P200,000.001 for
exemplary damages;
 It is further disclosed by the record that the aforesaid decision period; hence, the lot in question was no longer subject of the litigation.
was elevated to the Court of Appeals upon perfection of the appeal on Moreover, at the time of the sale on March 6, 1965, respondent's order
February 22, 1971. dated October 23, 1963 and the amended order dated November 11,
1963 approving the October 16, 1963 project of partition made pursuant
I to the June 8, 1963 decision, had long become final for there was no
appeal from said orders.
WE find that there is no merit in the contention of complainant
Bernardita R. Macariola, under her first cause of action, that respondent Furthermore, respondent Judge did not buy the lot in question
Judge Elias B. Asuncion violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New on March 6, 1965 directly from the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but
Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot No. 1184-E which from Dr. Arcadio Galapon who earlier purchased on July 31, 1964 Lot
was one of those properties involved in Civil Case No. 3010. 'That Article 1184-E from three of the plaintiffs, namely, Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes,
provides: and Luz R. Bakunawa after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No.
3010. It may be recalled that Lot 1184 or more specifically one-half
Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire thereof was adjudicated in equal shares to Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes,
by purchase, even at a public or judicial action, either in Luz Bakunawa, Ruperto Reyes and Anacorita Reyes in the project of
person or through the mediation of another: partition, and the same was subdivided into five lots denominated as
Lot 1184-A to 1184-E. As aforestated, Lot 1184-E was sold on July 31, 1964
to Dr. Galapon for which he was issued TCT No. 2338 by the Register of
xxx xxx xxx
Deeds of Tacloban City, and on March 6, 1965 he sold a portion of said
lot to respondent Judge and his wife who declared the same for
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks
taxation purposes only. The subsequent sale on August 31, 1966 by
of superior and inferior courts, and other officers and
spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon of their respective shares and
employees connected with the administration of justice,
interest in said Lot 1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing
the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an
Industries, Inc., in which respondent was the president and his wife was
execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or
the secretary, took place long after the finality of the decision in Civil
territory they exercise their respective functions; this
Case No. 3010 and of the subsequent two aforesaid orders therein
prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment
approving the project of partition.
and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property
and rights which may be the object of any litigation in
While it appears that complainant herein filed on or
which they may take part by virtue of their profession
about November 9 or 11, 1968 an action before the Court of First
[emphasis supplied].
Instance of Leyte docketed as Civil Case No. 4234, seeking to annul the
project of partition and the two orders approving the same, as well as
The prohibition in the aforesaid Article applies only to the sale or
the partition of the estate and the subsequent conveyances, the same,
assignment of the property which is the subject of litigation to the
however, is of no moment.
persons disqualified therein. WE have already ruled that "... for the
prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment of the property must take
The fact remains that respondent Judge purchased on March 6,
place during the pendency of the litigation involving the property" (The
1965 a portion of Lot 1184-E from Dr. Arcadio Galapon; hence, after the
Director of Lands vs. Ababa et al., 88 SCRA 513, 519 [1979], Rosario vda.
finality of the decision which he rendered on June 8, 1963 in Civil Case
de Laig vs. Court of Appeals, 86 SCRA 641, 646 [1978]).
No. 3010 and his two questioned orders dated October 23, 1963 and
November 11, 1963. Therefore, the property was no longer subject of
In the case at bar, when the respondent Judge purchased
litigation.
on March 6, 1965 a portion of Lot 1184-E, the decision in Civil Case No.
3010 which he rendered on June 8, 1963 was already final because
none of the parties therein filed an appeal within the reglementary
 The subsequent filing on November 9, or 11, 1968 of Civil Case
No. 4234 can no longer alter, change or affect the aforesaid facts —
that the questioned sale to respondent Judge, now Court of Appeals
Justice, was effected and consummated long after the finality of the
aforesaid decision or orders.
Consequently, the sale of a portion of Lot 1184-E to respondent
Judge having taken place over one year after the finality of the
decision in Civil Case No. 3010 as well as the two orders approving the
project of partition, and not during the pendency of the litigation, there
was no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code.
It is also argued by complainant herein that the sale on July 31,
1964 of Lot 1184-E to Dr. Arcadio Galapon by Priscilla Reyes, Adela
Reyes and Luz R. Bakunawa was only a mere scheme to conceal the
illegal and unethical transfer of said lot to respondent Judge as a
consideration for the approval of the project of partition. In this
connection, We agree with the findings of the Investigating Justice thus:
And so we are now confronted with this all-
important question whether or not the acquisition by
respondent of a portion of Lot 1184-E and the subsequent
transfer of the whole lot to "TRADERS" of which
respondent was the President and his wife the Secretary,
was intimately related to the Order of respondent
approving the project of partition, Exh. A.
Respondent vehemently denies any interest or
participation in the transactions between the Reyeses
and the Galapons concerning Lot 1184-E, and he insists
that there is no evidence whatsoever to show that Dr.
Galapon had acted, in the purchase of Lot 1184-E, in
mediation for him and his wife. (See p. 14 of Respondent's
Memorandum).
xxx xxx xxx
On this point, I agree with respondent that there is
no evidence in the record showing that Dr. Arcadio
Galapon acted as a mere "dummy" of respondent in
acquiring Lot 1184-E from the Reyeses. Dr. Galapon
appeared to this investigator as a respectable citizen,
credible and sincere, and I believe him when he testified
that he bought Lot 1184-E in good faith and for valuable
consideration from the Reyeses without any intervention
of, or previous understanding with Judge Asuncion (pp.
391- 394, rec.).
On the contention of complainant herein that respondent Judge
acted illegally in approving the project of partition although it was not
signed by the parties, We quote with approval the findings of the
Investigating Justice, as follows:
1. I agree with complainant that respondent
should have required the signature of the parties more
particularly that of Mrs. Macariola on the project of
partition submitted to him for approval; however,
whatever error was committed by respondent in that
respect was done in good faith as according to Judge
Asuncion he was assured by Atty. Bonifacio Ramo, the
counsel of record of Mrs. Macariola, That he was
authorized by his client to submit said project of partition,
(See Exh. B and tsn p. 24, January 20, 1969). While it is true
that such written authority if there was any, was not
presented by respondent in evidence, nor did Atty.
Ramo appear to corroborate the statement of
respondent, his affidavit being the only one that was
presented as respondent's Exh. 10, certain actuations of
Mrs. Macariola lead this investigator to believe that she
knew the contents of the project of partition, Exh. A, and
that she gave her conformity thereto. I refer to the
following documents:
1) Exh. 9 — Certified true copy of OCT No. 19520
covering Lot 1154 of the Tacloban Cadastral Survey in
which the deceased Francisco Reyes holds a "1/4 share"
(Exh. 9-a). On tills certificate of title the Order dated
November 11, 1963, (Exh. U) approving the project of
partition was duly entered and registered on November
26, 1963 (Exh. 9-D);
2) Exh. 7 — Certified copy of a deed of absolute
sale executed by Bernardita Reyes Macariola
on October 22, 1963, conveying to Dr. Hector Decena
the one-fourth share of the late Francisco Reyes-Diaz in
Lot 1154. In this deed of sale the vendee stated that she
was the absolute owner of said one-fourth share, the
same having been adjudicated to her as her share in the
estate of her father Francisco Reyes Diaz as per decision
of the Court of First Instance of Leyte under case No. 3010
(Exh. 7-A). The deed of sale was duly registered and
annotated at the back of OCT 19520 on December 3,
1963 (see Exh. 9-e).
In connection with the abovementioned
documents it is to be noted that in the project of partition
dated October 16, 1963, which was approved by
respondent on October 23, 1963, followed by an
amending Order on November 11, 1963, Lot 1154 or
rather 1/4 thereof was adjudicated to Mrs. Macariola. It is
this 1/4 share in Lot 1154 which complainant sold to Dr.
Decena on October 22, 1963, several days after the
preparation of the project of partition.
Counsel for complainant stresses the view,
however, that the latter sold her one-fourth share in Lot
1154 by virtue of the decision in Civil Case 3010 and not
because of the project of partition, Exh. A. Such
contention is absurd because from the decision, Exh. C, it
is clear that one-half of one- fourth of Lot 1154 belonged
to the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz while the other half
of said one-fourth was the share of complainant's
mother, Felisa Espiras; in other words, the decision did not
adjudicate the whole of the one-fourth of Lot 1154 to the
herein complainant (see Exhs. C-3 & C-4). Complainant
became the owner of the entire one-fourth of Lot 1154
only by means of the project of partition, Exh. A.
Therefore, if Mrs. Macariola sold Lot 1154 on October 22,
1963, it was for no other reason than that she was wen
aware of the distribution of the properties of her
deceased father as per Exhs. A and B. It is also significant
at this point to state that Mrs. Macariola admitted during
the cross-examination that she went to Tacloban City in
connection with the sale of Lot 1154 to Dr. Decena (tsn p.
92, November 28, 1968) from which we can deduce that
she could not have been kept ignorant of the
proceedings in civil case 3010 relative to the project of
partition.
Complainant also assails the project of partition
because according to her the properties adjudicated to
her were insignificant lots and the least valuable.
Complainant, however, did not present any direct and
positive evidence to prove the alleged gross inequalities
in the choice and distribution of the real properties when
she could have easily done so by presenting evidence
on the area, location, kind, the assessed and market
value of said properties. Without such evidence there is
nothing in the record to show that there were inequalities
in the distribution of the properties of complainant's
father (pp. 386389, rec.).
Finally, while it is. true that respondent Judge did not violate
paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code in acquiring by
purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E which was in litigation in his court, it
was, however, improper for him to have acquired the same. He should
be reminded of Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which requires
that: "A judge's official conduct should be free from the appearance of
impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in
the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should
be beyond reproach." And as aptly observed by the Investigating
Justice: "... it was unwise and indiscreet on the part of respondent to
have purchased or acquired a portion of a piece of property that was
or had been in litigation in his court and caused it to be transferred to a
corporation of which he and his wife were ranking officers at the time of
such transfer. One who occupies an exalted position in the judiciary has
the duty and responsibility of maintaining the faith and trust of the
citizenry in the courts of justice, so that not only must he be truly honest
and just, but his actuations must be such as not give cause for doubt
and mistrust in the uprightness of his administration of justice. In this
particular case of respondent, he cannot deny that the transactions
over Lot 1184-E are damaging and render his actuations open to
suspicion and distrust. Even if respondent honestly believed that Lot
1184-E was no longer in litigation in his court and that he was purchasing
it from a third person and not from the parties to the litigation, he should
nonetheless have refrained from buying it for himself and transferring it
to a corporation in which he and his wife were financially involved, to
avoid possible suspicion that his acquisition was related in one way or
another to his official actuations in civil case 3010. The conduct of
respondent gave cause for the litigants in civil case 3010, the lawyers
practising in his court, and the public in general to doubt the honesty
and fairness of his actuations and the integrity of our courts of justice"
(pp. 395396, rec.).
II
With respect to the second cause of action, the complainant
alleged that respondent Judge violated paragraphs 1 and 5, Article 14
of the Code of Commerce when he associated himself with the Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. as a stockholder and a
ranking officer, said corporation having been organized to engage in
business. Said Article provides that:
Article 14 — The following cannot engage in
commerce, either in person or by proxy, nor can they
hold any office or have any direct, administrative, or
financial intervention in commercial or industrial
companies within the limits of the districts, provinces, or
towns in which they discharge their duties:
1. Justices of the Supreme Court, judges and
officials of the department of public prosecution in active
service. This provision shall not be applicable to mayors,
municipal judges, and municipal prosecuting attorneys
nor to those who by chance are temporarily discharging
the functions of judge or prosecuting attorney.
xxx xxx xxx
5. Those who by virtue of laws or special provisions
may not engage in commerce in a determinate territory.
It is Our considered view that although the aforestated provision
is incorporated in the Code of Commerce which is part of the
commercial laws of the Philippines, it, however, partakes of the nature
of a political law as it regulates the relationship between the
government and certain public officers and employees, like justices and
judges.
Political Law has been defined as that branch of public law
which deals with the organization and operation of the governmental
organs of the State and define the relations of the state with the
inhabitants of its territory (People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]). It
may be recalled that political law embraces constitutional law, law of
public corporations, administrative law including the law on public
officers and elections. Specifically, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce
partakes more of the nature of an administrative law because it
regulates the conduct of certain public officers and employees with
respect to engaging in business: hence, political in essence.
It is significant to note that the present Code of Commerce is the
Spanish Code of Commerce of 1885, with some modifications made by
the "Commission de Codificacion de las Provincias de Ultramar," which
was extended to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of August 6, 1888,
and took effect as law in this jurisdiction on December 1, 1888.
Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States
and later on from the United States to the Republic of the Philippines,
Article 14 of this Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been
abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty, the political
laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of
the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are
expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign.
Thus, We held in Roa vs. Collector of Customs (23 Phil. 315, 330,
311 [1912]) that:
By well-settled public law, upon the cession of
territory by one nation to another, either following a
conquest or otherwise, ... those laws which are political in
their nature and pertain to the prerogatives of the former
government immediately cease upon the transfer of
sovereignty. (Opinion, Atty. Gen., July 10, 1899).
While municipal laws of the newly acquired
territory not in conflict with the, laws of the new sovereign
continue in force without the express assent or affirmative
act of the conqueror, the political laws do not. (Halleck's
Int. Law, chap. 34, par. 14). However, such political laws
of the prior sovereignty as are not in conflict with the
constitution or institutions of the new sovereign, may be
continued in force if the conqueror shall so declare by
affirmative act of the commander-in-chief during the
war, or by Congress in time of peace. (Ely's Administrator
vs. United States, 171 U.S. 220, 43 L. Ed. 142). In the case of
American and Ocean Ins. Cos. vs. 356 Bales of Cotton (1
 Pet. [26 U.S.] 511, 542, 7 L. Ed. 242), Chief Justice Marshall
said:
On such transfer (by cession) of
territory, it has never been held that the
relations of the inhabitants with each
other undergo any change. Their relations
with their former sovereign are dissolved,
and new relations are created between
them and the government which has
acquired their territory. The same act
which transfers their country, transfers the
allegiance of those who remain in it; and
the law which may be denominated
political, is necessarily changed, although
that which regulates the intercourse and
general conduct of individuals, remains in
force, until altered by the newly- created
power of the State.
Likewise, in People vs. Perfecto (43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]), this
Court stated that: "It is a general principle of the public law that on
acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the ceded region
are totally abrogated. "
There appears no enabling or affirmative act that continued the
effectivity of the aforestated provision of the Code of Commerce after
the change of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and then to
the Republic of the Philippines. Consequently, Article 14 of the Code of
Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to the
respondent, then Judge of the Court of First Instance, now Associate
Justice of the Court of Appeals.
It is also argued by complainant herein that respondent Judge
violated paragraph H, Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which provides that:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In
addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute
corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(h) Directly or indirectly having
financial or pecuniary interest in any
business, contract or transaction in
connection with which he intervenes or
takes part in his official capacity, or in
which he is prohibited by the Constitution
or by any Iaw from having any interest.
Respondent Judge cannot be held liable under the aforestated
paragraph because there is no showing that respondent participated or
intervened in his official capacity in the business or transactions of the
Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. In the case at bar, the
business of the corporation in which respondent participated has
obviously no relation or connection with his judicial office. The business
of said corporation is not that kind where respondent intervenes or takes
part in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance. As was held
in one case involving the application of Article 216 of the Revised Penal
Code which has a similar prohibition on public officers against directly or
indirectly becoming interested in any contract or business in which it is
his official duty to intervene, "(I)t is not enough to be a public official to
be subject to this crime; it is necessary that by reason of his office, he
has to intervene in said contracts or transactions; and, hence, the
official who intervenes in contracts or transactions which have no
relation to his office cannot commit this crime.' (People vs. Meneses,
C.A. 40 O.G. 11th Supp. 134, cited by Justice Ramon C. Aquino; Revised
Penal Code, p. 1174, Vol. 11 [1976]).
It does not appear also from the records that the aforesaid
corporation gained any undue advantage in its business operations by
reason of respondent's financial involvement in it, or that the
corporation benefited in one way or another in any case filed by or
against it in court. It is undisputed that there was no case filed in the
different branches of the Court of First Instance of Leyte in which the
corporation was either party plaintiff or defendant except Civil Case No.
4234 entitled "Bernardita R. Macariola, plaintiff, versus Sinforosa O. Bales,
et al.," wherein the complainant herein sought to recover Lot 1184-E
from the aforesaid corporation. It must be noted, however, that Civil
Case No. 4234 was filed only on November 9 or 11, 1968 and decided
on November 2, 1970 by CFI Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno when
respondent Judge was no longer connected with the corporation,
having disposed of his interest therein on January 31, 1967.
 Furthermore, respondent is not liable under the same paragraph
because there is no provision in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions of
the Philippines, nor is there an existing law expressly prohibiting members
of the Judiciary from engaging or having interest in any lawful business.
It may be pointed out that Republic Act No. 296, as amended,
also known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, does not contain any
prohibition to that effect. As a matter of fact, under Section 77 of said
law, municipal judges may engage in teaching or other vocation not
involving the practice of law after office hours but with the permission of
the district judge concerned.
Likewise, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce which prohibits
judges from engaging in commerce is, as heretofore stated, deemed
abrogated automatically upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to
America, because it is political in nature.
Moreover, the prohibition in paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New
Civil Code against the purchase by judges of a property in litigation
before the court within whose jurisdiction they perform their duties,
cannot apply to respondent Judge because the sale of the lot in
question to him took place after the finality of his decision in Civil Case
No. 3010 as well as his two orders approving the project of partition;
hence, the property was no longer subject of litigation.
In addition, although Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service
Rules made pursuant to the Civil Service Act of 1959 prohibits an officer
or employee in the civil service from engaging in any private business,
vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit,
agricultural or industrial undertaking without a written permission from
the head of department, the same, however, may not fall within the
purview of paragraph h, Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act because the last portion of said paragraph speaks of a
prohibition by the Constitution or law on any public officer from having
any interest in any business and not by a mere administrative rule or
regulation. Thus, a violation of the aforesaid rule by any officer or
employee in the civil service, that is, engaging in private business
without a written permission from the Department Head may not
constitute graft and corrupt practice as defined by law.
On the contention of complainant that respondent Judge
violated Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, We hold that the
Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260) and the Civil Service Rules
promulgated thereunder, particularly Section 12 of Rule XVIII, do not
apply to the members of the Judiciary. Under said Section 12: "No officer
or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or
profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or
industrial undertaking without a written permission from the Head of
Department ..."
It must be emphasized at the outset that respondent, being a
member of the Judiciary, is covered by Republic Act No. 296, as
amended, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948 and by Section
7, Article X, 1973 Constitution.
Under Section 67 of said law, the power to remove or dismiss
judges was then vested in the President of the Philippines, not in the
Commissioner of Civil Service, and only on two grounds, namely, serious
misconduct and inefficiency, and upon the recommendation of the
Supreme Court, which alone is authorized, upon its own motion, or upon
information of the Secretary (now Minister) of Justice to conduct the
corresponding investigation. Clearly, the aforesaid section defines the
grounds and prescribes the special procedure for the discipline of
judges.
And under Sections 5, 6 and 7, Article X of the 1973 Constitution,
only the Supreme Court can discipline judges of inferior courts as well as
other personnel of the Judiciary.
It is true that under Section 33 of the Civil Service Act of 1959:
"The Commissioner may, for ... violation of the existing Civil Service Law
and rules or of reasonable office regulations, or in the interest of the
service, remove any subordinate officer or employee from the service,
demote him in rank, suspend him for not more than one year without
pay or fine him in an amount not exceeding six months' salary." Thus, a
violation of Section 12 of Rule XVIII is a ground for disciplinary action
against civil service officers and employees.
However, judges cannot be considered as subordinate civil
service officers or employees subject to the disciplinary authority of the
Commissioner of Civil Service; for, certainly, the Commissioner is not the
head of the Judicial Department to which they belong. The Revised
Administrative Code (Section 89) and the Civil Service Law itself state
that the Chief Justice is the department head of the Supreme Court
(Sec. 20, R.A. No. 2260) [1959]); and under the 1973 Constitution, the
Judiciary is the only other or second branch of the government (Sec. 1,
Art. X, 1973 Constitution). Besides, a violation of Section 12, Rule XVIII
cannot be considered as a ground for disciplinary action against judges
because to recognize the same as applicable to them, would be
adding another ground for the discipline of judges and, as aforestated,
Section 67 of the Judiciary Act recognizes only two grounds for their
removal, namely, serious misconduct and inefficiency.
Moreover, under Section 16(i) of the Civil Service Act of 1959, it is
the Commissioner of Civil Service who has original and exclusive
jurisdiction "(T)o decide, within one hundred twenty days, after
submission to it, all administrative cases against permanent officers and
employees in the competitive service, and, except as provided by law,
to have final authority to pass upon their removal, separation, and
suspension and upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline, and
efficiency of such officers and employees; and prescribe standards,
guidelines and regulations governing the administration of discipline"
(emphasis supplied). There is no question that a judge belong to the
non-competitive or unclassified service of the government as a
Presidential appointee and is therefore not covered by the aforesaid
provision. WE have already ruled that "... in interpreting Section 16(i) of
Republic Act No. 2260, we emphasized that only permanent officers
and employees who belong to the classified service come under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil Service" (Villaluz vs.
Zaldivar, 15 SCRA 710,713 [1965], Ang-Angco vs. Castillo, 9 SCRA 619
[1963]).
Although the actuation of respondent Judge in engaging in
private business by joining the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing
Industries, Inc. as a stockholder and a ranking officer, is not violative of
the provissions of Article 14 of the Code of Commerce and Section 3(h)
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act as well as Section 12, Rule
XVIII of the Civil Service Rules promulgated pursuant to the Civil Service
Act of 1959, the impropriety of the same is clearly unquestionable
because Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics expressly declares
that:
A judge should abstain from making personal
investments in enterprises which are apt to be involved in
litigation in his court; and, after his accession to the
bench, he should not retain such investments previously
made, longer than a period sufficient to enable him to
dispose of them without serious loss. It is desirable that he
should, so far as reasonably possible, refrain from all
relations which would normally tend to arouse the
suspicion that such relations warp or bias his judgment, or
prevent his impartial attitude of mind in the
administration of his judicial duties. ...
WE are not, however, unmindful of the fact that respondent
Judge and his wife had withdrawn on January 31, 1967 from the
aforesaid corporation and sold their respective shares to third parties,
and it appears also that the aforesaid corporation did not in anyway
benefit in any case filed by or against it in court as there was no case
filed in the different branches of the Court of First Instance of Leyte from
the time of the drafting of the Articles of Incorporation of the
corporation on March 12, 1966, up to its incorporation on January 9,
1967, and the eventual withdrawal of respondent on January 31, 1967
from said corporation. Such disposal or sale by respondent and his wife
of their shares in the corporation only 22 days after the incorporation of
the corporation, indicates that respondent realized that early that their
interest in the corporation contravenes the aforesaid Canon 25.
Respondent Judge and his wife therefore deserve the commendation
for their immediate withdrawal from the firm after its incorporation and
before it became involved in any court litigation
III
With respect to the third and fourth causes of action,
complainant alleged that respondent was guilty of coddling an
impostor and acted in disregard of judicial decorum, and that there
was culpable defiance of the law and utter disregard for ethics. WE
agree, however, with the recommendation of the Investigating Justice
that respondent Judge be exonerated because the aforesaid causes of
action are groundless, and WE quote the pertinent portion of her report
which reads as follows:
The basis for complainant's third cause of action is
the claim that respondent associated and closely
fraternized with Dominador Arigpa Tan who openly and
publicly advertised himself as a practising attorney (see
Exhs. I, I-1 and J) when in truth and in fact said
Dominador Arigpa Tan does not appear in the Roll of
Attorneys and is not a member of the Philippine Bar as
certified to in Exh. K.
 The "respondent denies knowing that Dominador incumbency as judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, he should
Arigpa Tan was an "impostor" and claims that all the time be reminded to be more discreet in his private and business activities,
he believed that the latter was a bona fide member of because his conduct as a member of the Judiciary must not only be
the bar. I see no reason for disbelieving this assertion of characterized with propriety but must always be above suspicion.
respondent. It has been shown by complainant that
Dominador Arigpa Tan represented himself publicly as an WHEREFORE, THE RESPONDENT ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE COURT
attorney-at-law to the extent of putting up a signboard OF APPEALS IS HEREBY REMINDED TO BE MORE DISCREET IN HIS PRIVATE
with his name and the words "Attorney-at Law" (Exh. I and AND BUSINESS ACTIVITIES.
1- 1) to indicate his office, and it was but natural for
respondent and any person for that matter to have SO ORDERED.
accepted that statement on its face value. "Now with
respect to the allegation of complainant that respondent
Teehankee, Guerrero, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Plana,
is guilty of fraternizing with Dominador Arigpa Tan to the
Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
extent of permitting his wife to be a godmother of Mr.
Tan's child at baptism (Exh. M & M-1), that fact even if
Concepcion Jr., J., is on leave.
true did not render respondent guilty of violating any
canon of judicial ethics as long as his friendly relations
with Dominador A. Tan and family did not influence his Fernando, C.J., Abad Santos and Esolin JJ., took no part.
official actuations as a judge where said persons were
concerned. There is no tangible convincing proof that
herein respondent gave any undue privileges in his court
to Dominador Arigpa Tan or that the latter benefitted in
his practice of law from his personal relations with
respondent, or that he used his influence, if he had any,
on the Judges of the other branches of the Court to favor
said Dominador Tan.

Of course it is highly desirable for a member of the

judiciary to refrain as much as possible from maintaining
close friendly relations with practising attorneys and
litigants in his court so as to avoid suspicion 'that his social
or business relations or friendship constitute an element in
determining his judicial course" (par. 30, Canons of
Judicial Ethics), but if a Judge does have social relations,
that in itself would not constitute a ground for disciplinary
action unless it be clearly shown that his social relations
be clouded his official actuations with bias and partiality
in favor of his friends (pp. 403-405, rec.).

In conclusion, while respondent Judge Asuncion, now Associate

Justice of the Court of Appeals, did not violate any law in acquiring by
purchase a parcel of land which was in litigation in his court and in
engaging in business by joining a private corporation during his