Republic of The Philippines vs. Sandiganbayan 407 SCRA 10 (July 21,2003)

University of Santo Tomas Cases in Special Proceedings
3B (2016-2017) Dean Lope E. Feble
SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE
A. Extra-Judicial Settlement
Maximina Oyod De Garces, et al. v. Esmeralda Broce, et al.

G.R. No. L-23758, May 20, 1968 (Reyes, J.B.L.)
Oral extra-judicial settlement can be enforced between heirs.
FACTS:
Maximina Oyod de Garces, Gregorio Oyod and Pio V. Garces sought the termination of a lease and annulment of sale, in favor of
defendants Tranquilino Broce and Esmeralda Broce, and the return by the latter, of a parcel of land described as Lot No. 228-D of the
subdivision of Lot No. 228 of San Carlos, Negros Occidental, that plaintiffs claimed to be their property pro-indiviso.
At the pre-trial hearing of the case, the parties stipulated that the original owners of Lot No. 228 were Severo Oyod and Bonifacia
Mahinay, that the said registered owners had four children namely — Fortunata, Eugenia, Gregorio and Maxima Oyod, that Eugenia
died sometime in 1950 after the death of Severo Oyod; that Maxima Oyod is married to Pio V. Garces; and that Fortunate Oyod, married
Pedro Barbon and their children are Melecia, Narciso, Leopoldo, Carlos, Margarita, Leonardo, Lilia and Ildefonso Barbon, that in 1930
the heirs of Severo Oyod executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial partition, the heirs of Severo Oyod executed a Deed of Extra-judicial
Settlement, Fortunata Oyod executed a lease agreement in favor of Tranquilino Broce and the heirs of Fortunata Oyod Barbon executed
an Extra-Judicial Settlement and Sale in favor of Esmeralda P. Broce.
After due hearing, the trial court upheld the due execution and validity of the 1930 extrajudicial partition by the heirs of Severo Oyod
and Bonifacia Mahinay of Lot No. 228, and of the sale in 1962 to Esmeralda Broce of Lot No. 228-D by the heirs of Fortunata Oyod. And,
finding that the heirs of the deceased Severo Oyod contracted an obligation with the Philippine National Bank prior to the sale of the
lot, to pay the outstanding taxes on the entire Lot 228, the court ruled that lien was thus created and attached to the land. Esmeralda
Broce was then ordered to pay to plaintiffs the sum of P780.00 or 1/5 of the said obligation.
Both parties appealed. Plaintiffs excepting from the ruling that sustains the validity of the extrajudicial partition of 1930 and the order
to Esmeralda Broce to pay only the sum of P780.00 instead of P2,392.00, whereas, defendant Esmeralda Broce prays for her total
exculpation from any liability.
ISSUE:
Whether the extra-judicial settlement of 1930 should prevail over the extra-judicial settlement of the same estate in 1951
RULING:
YES. The requirement that a partition be put in a public document and registered has, for its purpose the protection of creditors and at
the same time the protection of the heirs themselves against tardy claims. The Court ruled that there is nothing on record to indicate
that when the first partition agreement was entered into, there existed any claim against the estate of the deceased or that prejudice
was thereby caused to any third party.
Considering that a voluntary division of the estate of the deceased, by the heirs among themselves, is conclusive and confers upon said
heirs exclusive ownership of the respective portions assigned to them, the extrajudicial partition made by the heirs of Severo Oyod in
1930 could not have been cancelled or subtituted by the execution, by some of these heirs, of another extrajudicial settlement of the
same estate in 1951 even if the latter document be registered, particularly since one of the co-signers of the 1930 agreement, Eugenia
Oyod, had died on January 8, 1950, before the second extrajudicial settlement was made. The lower court, therefore, committed no
error in holding that the sale to defendant-appellee Esmeralda Broce of Lot 228-D in 1962 did not suffer from any infirmity. Second
reason is that it is not shown that appellee Broce had notice or knowledge of the second partition of 1951. As the 1930 partition was
operative to vest title in Fortunata Oyod to the lot allotted to her, even if the agreement was unrecorded, Broce had reason to rely
thereon.
However, there is no basis to the lower court's order to defendant-appellant, Esmeralda Broce, to assume a proportionate share of the
indebtedness contracted by the surviving heirs of the deceased Severo Oyod with the Philippine National Bank. The fact alone that the
property in dispute originally formed part of the estate of said deceased person and that the obligation was contracted prior to its
purchase by herein defendant-appellant, to pay the taxes due on the estate of the deceased, does not render the vendee answerable
therefor.
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Jose McMicking v. Benito Sy Conbieng

G.R. No. L-6871, January 15, 1912 (Moreland, J.)
Resort to extra-judicial partition can be made even during judicial settlement.
FACTS:
Margarita Jose (Margarita) died and Engracio Palanca (Palanca) was appointed administrator with Mariano Ocampo Lao Sempco
(Sempco) as one of his sureties. Sempco died. A new bond was filed with new sureties. Doroteo Velasco (Doroteo) was appointed
administrator for the estate of Sempco with Pio dela Guardia Barretto (Pio) as one of the sureties. An instrument signed by all interested
persons in the estate of Sempco agreed to partition among themselves without proceedings in court, at the same time assuming the
payment of all obligations against the estate. No committee had been appointed and no notice had been published to creditors. Jose
McMicking (McMicking) replaced Palanca and made an application for the appointment of commissioners. The commission having
been appointed and qualified, a claim was presented by McMicking based upon Palanca’s defalcation which directed Doroteo to pay.
Pio died and left a will admitted to probate and Benito Sy Conbieng (Conbieng) was appointed administrator. All of the claims against
the estate of Sempco were fully paid and satisfied at the time of partition, except the alleged claim arising by virtue of his having been
a surety of Palanca.
ISSUE:
Whether the partition was proper despite the alleged claim arising when Sempco was Palanca’s surety which had not been satisfied
RULING:
YES. Sections 596 and 597 of the Code of Civil Procedure are at the head of the law of administration of these Islands. The purpose
which underlies them is to put into one's hands the property which belongs to him not only at the earliest possible moment but also
with the least possible expense. By permitting the partition and division without proceedings in court no time is lost and substantially
all expense and waste are saved. This is as it should be. The State fails wretchedly in its duty to its citizens if the machinery furnished
by it for the division and distribution of the property of a decedent is so cumbersome, unwidely and expensive that a considerable
portion of the estate is absorbed in the process of such division. Where administration is necessary, it ought to be accomplished quickly
and at very small expense; and a system which consumes any considerable portion of the property which it was designed to distribute
is a failure. It being undoubted that the removal of property from the possession of its owner and its deposit in the hands of another
for administration is a suspension of some of its most important rights of property and is attended with an expense sometimes entirely
useless and unnecessary, such procedure should be avoided whenever and wherever possible.
In the case at bar, under the broad and liberal policy which we must adopt in the interpretation and application of the provisions
referred to, the division of the property of Sempco, in the form, in the manner and for the purposes expressed, falls within the provisions
of said sections and may be termed, therefore, and we hold it to be, a partition of the property of a decedent without legal proceedings.
The fact of the prior appointment of an administrator and the filing of an inventory before such partition is of no consequence so far as
the right of the owners to partition is concerned. The only requisite for such petition prescribed by the law is that "there are no debts . . .
or all the debts have been paid by the heirs." When the condition is fulfilled the partition can take place, no matter what stage the
administration may have reached. By this it is, of course, not meant that the partition after the appointment of an administrator will
interfere with the rights acquired by third person dealing with said administrator within the limits of his authority and prior to the
partition; nor that the administrator can be deprived of the property of which he is legally in possession without proper proceedings
and the consent of the court.
Furthermore, the mere fact, therefore, that a creditor was not paid before the partition took place furnishes no ground for a revocation
of the partition. It simply provides a fact which he may urge as a reason for the appointment and the consequent administration of so
much of the estate as may be necessary to pay the debt discovered.
In order that it be a reason for such appointment and administration, the claim must be presented within two years from the date of the
partition and distribution. But the consequent failure to present a claim before partition, is of no consequence in so far as the validity of
the partition is concerned. The same effect goes when there were debts outstanding and unpaid at the time the partition took place.
The fact that the claim in the case at bar was, during a certain period, a contingent one is of no importance.
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The creditor himself is not without duties. Here, it was five years after the petition before the alleged creditor made any attempt
whatsoever to "discover" or present his claim. He knew of the death of Sempco very soon after it occurred. He knew that it was among
the possibilities that Sempco's estate might be called upon to respond for the failure of Palanca to perform his duty as administrator.
It was his duty to see to it that he would be protected in that event. Nevertheless he permitted the estate of Sempco to be partitioned
and distributed without protest and without the presentation of his contingent claim, and sat quiet and passive for nearly five years
thereafter knowing that it was very probable that the property of the estate was being consumed, incumbered, and transferred by the
persons among whom it had been distributed. The judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed, without special finding as to costs.
Notes:
After the partition and division provided for in sections 596 and 597 have been fully consummated, no further administration of the
estate can be had unless there occur the following requisites:
1. There must have been discovered a claim against the estate "within two years after such settlement and distribution of estate."
2. The creditor holding the claim must be the person who moves the court for the appointment of an administrator.
If those requisites are lacking, there can be no administration. When one fails the right too such administration does not arise and any
person interested in the estate may oppose any effort to administer under such circumstances. These requisites combined are that and
that alone which give to the administrator when appointed the right to recover the assets from the persons who received them on the
partition. Indeed, if these requisites are lacking no administrator can lawfully be appointed, and, if improperly appointed, he fails of
legal power to maintain an action to recover the assets in the hands of those among whom they have partitioned; in other words, he is
powerless to administer.
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Spouses Maria Butiong and Francisco Villafria v. Ma. Gracia Riñoza Plazo and Ma. Fe Riñoza Alaras
G.R. No. 187524, August 05, 2015 (Peralta, J.)
It is true that some of respondents' causes of action pertaining to the properties left behind by the decedent Pedro may fall under an
action for settlement of estate. However, a complete reading of the complaint would readily show that, based on the nature of the suit,
the allegations therein, and the relief’s prayed for, the action, is clearly one for judicial partition with annulment of title and recovery of
possession.
FACTS:
On November 16, 1989, Pedro L. Rifioza died intestate, leaving several heirs, including his children with his first wife, respondents Ma.
Gracia R. Plazo and Ma. Fe Alaras, as well as several properties including a resort and a family home, both located in Nasugbu, Batangas.
In their Amended Complaint for Judicial Partition with Annulment of Title and Recovery of Possession dated September 15, 1993,
respondents alleged that sometime in March 1991, they discovered that their co-heirs, Pedro’s second wife, Benita Tenorio and other
children, had sold the subject properties to petitioners, spouses Francisco Villafria and Maria Butiong, who are now deceased and
substituted by their son, Dr. Ruel B. Villafria, without their knowledge and consent.
When confronted about the sale, Benita acknowledged the same, showing respondents a document she believed evidenced receipt of
her share in the sale, which, however, did not refer to any sort of sale but to a previous loan obtained by Pedro and Benita from a bank.
The document actually evidenced receipt from Banco Silangan of the amount of P87, 352.62 releasing her and her late husband’s
indebtedness therefrom. Upon inquiry, the Register of Deeds of Nasugbu informed respondents that he has no record of any transaction
involving the subject properties, giving them certified true copies of the titles to the same.
When respondents went to the subject properties, they discovered that 4 out of the 8 cottages in the resort had been demolished. They
were not, however, able to enter as the premises were padlocked.
Subsequently, respondents learned that on July 18, 1991, a notice of an extra-judicial settlement of estate of their late father was
published in a tabloid called Balita.
Because of this, they caused the annotation of their adverse claims over the subject properties before the Register of Deeds of Nasugbu
and filed their complaint praying, among others, for the annulment of all documents conveying the subject properties to the petitioners
and certificates of title issued pursuant thereto.
In their Answer, petitioners denied the allegations of the complaint on the ground of lack of personal knowledge and good faith in
acquiring the subject properties.
In the course of his testimony during trial, petitioner further contended that what they purchased was only the resort. He also
presented an Extra-Judicial Settlement with Renunciation, Repudiations and Waiver of Rights and Sale which provides, among others,
that respondents' co-heirs sold the family home to the spouses Rolando and Ma. Cecilia Bondoc for Pl million as well as a Deed of Sale
whereby Benita sold the resort to petitioners for P650, 000.00.
The trial court rules in favor of the respondents and nullified the transfer of the subject Properties to petitioners and spouses Bondoc
due to irregularities in the Documents of conveyance offered by petitioners as well as the circumstances surrounding the execution of
the same.
Specifically, the Extra-Judicial Settlement was notarized by a notary public that was not duly commissioned as such on the date it was
executed. The Deed of Sale was undated, the date of the acknowledgment therein was left blank, and the typewritten name "Pedro
Rifioza, Husband" on the left side of the document was not signed.
The trial court also observed that both documents were never presented to the Office of the Register of Deeds for registration and that
the titles to the subject properties were still in the names of Pedro and His second wife Benita
On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court’s Judgment
The Complaining Heirs insist that the settlement/family home and the resort deed are void, as their signatures thereon are forgeries
as opposed to the petitioners who profess the deeds' enforceability. After the Complaining Heirs presented proofs in support of their
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claim that their signatures were forged, the burden then fell upon the petitioners to disprove the same or conversely, to prove the
authenticity and due execution of the said deeds. The petitioners failed in this regard.
Aggrieved, petitioners, substituted by their son Ruel Villafria, filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 24, 2006 raising the
trial court’s lack of jurisdiction.
It was alleged that when the Complaint for Judicial Partition with Annulment of Title and Recovery of Possession was filed, there was
yet no settlement of Pedro's estate, determination as to the nature thereof, nor was there an identification of the number of legitimate
heirs.
As such, the trial court ruled on the settlement of the intestate estate of Pedro in its ordinary· jurisdiction when the action filed was for
Judidal Partition.
Considering that the instant action is really one for settlement of intestate estate, the trial court, sitting merely in its probate
jurisdiction, exceeded its jurisdiction when it ruled upon the issues of forgery and ownership. Thus, petitioner argued that said ruling
is void and has no effect for having been rendered without jurisdiction.
The Motion for Reconsideration was, however, denied by the appellate court on February 26, 2007.
On appeal, this Court denied on June 20, 2007, petitioner's Petition for Review on Certiorari
On November 27, 2008, the RTC issued an Order, issuing a Part Writ of Execution of its October 1, 2001 Decision with respect to the
portions disposing of petitioner's claims as affirmed by the CA.
The foregoing notwithstanding, petitioner filed, on February 11, 200 a Petition for Annulment of Judgment and· Order before the CA
assailing October 1, 2001 Decision as well as the November 27, 2008 Order of the RTC on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction.
In Decision dated March 13, 2009, however, the CA dismissed the petition a affirmed the rulings of the trial court.
Petitioner also reiterates the arguments raised before the appellate court that since the finding of forgery relates only to the signature
of respondents and not to their co-heirs, who assented to the conveyance, the transaction should be considered valid as to them.
Petitioner also denies the indings of the courts below that his parents are builders in bad faith for they only took possession of the
subject properties after the execution of the transfer documents and after they paid the consideration on the sale.
ISSUE:
Whether the respondent’s complaint is one of settlement of estate and not of judicial partition
RULING:
NO. The petition is bereft of merit. Petitioner maintains that since respondents’ complaint alleged the following causes of action, the
same is actually one for settlement of estate and not of judicial partition:
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
1. That Pedro L. Rifioza, Filipino and resident of Nasugbu, Batangas at the time of his death, died intestate on November 16, 1989. Copy
of his death certificate is hereto attached as Annex "A";
2. That Plaintiffs together with the Defendants enumerated from paragraph 2-A to 2-J are the only known heirs of the above-mentioned
decedent. The plaintiffs and the Defendants Rolando, Rafael, Antonio, Angelita, Loma all surnamed Rifioza, and Myrna R. Limon or
Myrna R. Rogador, Epifania Belo and Ma. Theresa R. Demafelix are the decedent’s legitimate children with his first wife, while Benita
Tenorio Rifioza, is the decedent’s widow and Bernadette Rifioza, the decedent's daughter with said widow. As such, said parties are co-
owners by virtue of an intestate inheritance from the decedent, of the properties enumerated in the succeeding paragraph; ‘
3. That the decedent left the following real properties all located in Nasugbu, Batangas:
xxxx
16. That the estate of decedent Pedro L. Rifioza has no known legal indebtedness;
17. That said estate remains undivided up to this date and it will be to the best interest of all heirs that it be partitioned judicially. .
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Petitioner is mistaken. It is true that some of respondents' causes of action pertaining to the properties left behind by the decedent
Pedro, his known heirs, and the nature and extent of their interests thereon may fall under an action for settlement of estate. However,
a complete reading of the complaint would readily show that, based on the nature of the suit, the allegations therein, and the relief’s
prayed for, the action, is clearly one for judicial partition with annulment of title and recovery of possession.
RULE 74: Summary Settlement of Estate
Section 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. - If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all
of age or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may
without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument
filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there
is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filled in the office of the register of
deeds. The parties to an Extrajudicial settlement, whether by public instrument or by stipulation in a pending action for
partition, or the sole heir who adjudicates the entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit shall file, simultaneously with
and as a condition precedent to the filing of the public instrument, or stipulation in the action for partition, or of the affidavit
in the office of the register of deeds, a bond with the said register of deeds, in an amount equivalent to the value of the personal
property involved as certified to under oath by the parties concerned and conditioned upon the payment of any just claim that
may be filed under section 4 of this rule. It shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition for
letters of administration within two (2) years after the death of the decedent.
The fact of the Extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be Published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner
provided in the next succeeding section; but no Extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated
therein or had no notice thereof.
In this relation, Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate. - A person having the right to compel the partition of real estate may
do so as provided in this Rule, setting forth in his complaint the nature and extent of his title and an adequate description of
the real estate of which partition is demanded and joining as defendants all other persons interested in the property.
As can be gleaned from the foregoing provisions, the allegations of respondents in their complaint are but customary, in fact,
mandatory, to a complaint for partition of real estate. Particularly, the complaint alleged: (1) that Pedro died intestate; (2) that
respondents, together with their co-heirs, are all of legal age, with the exception of one who is represented by a judicial representative
duly authorized for the purpose; (3) that the heirs enumerated are the only known heirs of Pedro; (4) that there is an account and
description of all real properties left by Pedro; (5) that Pedro's estate has no known indebtedness; and (6) that respondents, as rightful
heirs to the decedent’s estate, pray for the partition of the same in accordance with the laws of intestacy. It is clear, therefore, that
based on the allegations of the complaint, the case is one for judicial partition. That the complaint alleged causes of action identifying
the heirs of the decedent, properties of the estate, and their rights thereto, does not perforce make it an action for settlement of estate.
It must be recalled that the general rule is that when a person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to name an executor in his will or the
executor o named is incompetent, or refuses the trust, or. Fails to furnish the bond equipped by the Rules of Court, then the decedent's
estate shall be judicially administered and the competent court shall appoint a qualified administrator the order established in Section
6 of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. An exception to this rule, however, is found in the aforequoted Section 1 of Rule 4 wherein the heirs
of a decedent, who left no will and no debts due from is estate, may divide the estate either extrajudicially or in an ordinary action or
partition without submitting the same for judicial administration nor applying for the appointment of an administrator by the
court. The reasons that where the deceased dies without pending obligations, there is no necessity for the appointment of an
administrator to administer the. Estate for hem and to deprive the real owners of their possession to which they are immediately
entitled.
In this case, it was expressly alleged in the complaint, and was not disputed, that Pedro died without a will, leaving his estate without
any ending obligations. Thus, contrary to petitioner’s contention, respondents were under no legal obligation to submit the subject
properties of the estate of a special proceeding for settlement of intestate estate
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B. Probate Proceedings
Reynaldo P. Bascara v. Sheriff Rolando G. Javier and Evangeline Pangilinan

G.R. No. 188069, June 17, 2015 (Peralta, J.)
Donation mortis causa must be probated.
FACTS:
Pangilinan fraudulently acquired the property. Bascara tried to prevent her from selling the same. But Bascara was merely a successor
in interest since he acquired it by donation mortis causa to which he never probated.
Evangeline Pangilinan (Pangilinan) filed an ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession alleging the following:
- That Rosalina Pardo (Pardo) executed a Real Estate Mortgage as a security for a loan to which she failed to pay.
- This prompted Pangilinan to foreclose the mortgage and became the highest bidder and that the 1-year redemption period
has already expired.
- Despite such facts, Pardo refused to vacate the premises despite several demands.
- The RTC granted petition to vacate and surrender the possession of the property which would be issued by Sheriff Javier
(Sheriff). However, during such period Reynaldo Bascara (Bascara) filed a 3rd party claim and writ of possession as the true
lawful owner of such land.
Prior to such petition, Pangilinan filed a petition to cancel the adverse claim of Bascara and Pardo.
In his defense Bascara claimed the following:

- That such land was donated to him by Pardo through a duly notarized deed of Donation Mortis Causa , and after the death of
Pardo he and his family lived up until the case at hand.
- Due to financial difficulties, Pardo leased parts of the land to a certain Evangeline Cacalda (Cacalda).
- After sometime, Bascara trusted Calcalda and gave her the duplicate TCT and P135,000. Calcada made Bascara believe that
such were to be used to register the property in his name and to pay taxes; Calcada never returned.
- Bascara found out that his land was entrusted to Pangilinan with a special power of atty to extrajudicially sell the same
allegedly signed by Pardo. He then filed a case of estafa against Calcada and filed to intervene in the case at hand.
RTC/CA found truth with the facts presented by Bascara, and that the SPA was fake. Nevertheless, both courts sided with Pangilinan
since the issues of the regularity and the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale as well as the consequent cancellation for the writ
of possession, is to be determined in a subsequent proceeding, and that the following cannot be used as a justification to oppose the
issuance of the ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession.
ISSUE:
Whether Bascara is the owner of the subject property and has the right to possess the same
RULING:
NO. It is not disputed that he has possession of property, however it cannot be said that he has the right to possess the same as a co-
owner, agricultural tenant, usufructuary or analogous to the foregoing situation.
What is clear is that he allegedly acquired the property from Pardo by reason of a donation mortis causa. He is, therefore, a transferee
or successor-in-interest who merely stepped into the shoes of his aunt. He cannot assert that his right of possession is adverse to that
of Pardo as he has no independent right of possession. Consequently, under legal contemplation, he cannot be considered as a "third
party who is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor."
The trial court had the ministerial duty to issue, as it did issue, the possessory writ in favor of respondent Pangilinan. As it appeared,
there was no reason for it to order the recall of the writ already issued.
Moreover, it is not amiss to point that the execution of Pardo of donation mortis causa in favor of petitioner does not immediately
transfer title to the property to the latter. Considering that the alleged donation is one of mortis causa, the same partake of the nature
of testamentary provision. As such, said deed must be executed in accordance with the requisites on solemnities of wills and testaments
under Articles 805 and 806 of the New Civil Code; otherwise, the donation is void and would produce no effect. Unless and until the
alleged donation is probated, i.e., proved and allowed in the proper court, no right to the subject property has been transmitted to
petitioner.
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In Re: In The Matter of the Petition to Approve the Will of Ruperta Palaganas
G.R. No. 169144, January 26, 2011 (Abad, J.)
Wills executed abroad can be probated for the first time in the Philippines.
FACTS:
Ruperta C. Palaganas, a Filipino who became a naturalized United States citizen, died single and childless. In the last will and testament
she executed in California, she designated her brother, Sergio C. Palaganas, as the executor of her will for she had left properties in
the Philippines and in the U.S.
Thereafter, respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas, another brother of Ruperta, filed with the RTC, a petition for the probate of Ruperta’s will
and for his appointment as special administrator of her estate. Subsequently, petitioners Manuel Palaganas and Benjamin Palaganas,
nephews of Ruperta, opposed the petition on the ground that Ruperta’s will should be probated in the in the U.S. where she executed
it. Manuel and Benjamin added that, assuming Ruperta’s will could be probated in the Philippines, it is invalid nonetheless for having
been executed under duress and without the testator’s full understanding of the consequences of such act. Ernesto, they claimed, is
also not qualified to act as administrator of the estate.
The RTC ruled in favor of Ernesto. Petitioner nephews Manuel and Benjamin appealed to CA, arguing that an unprobated will executed
by a foreigner cannot be probated for the first time in the Philippines. The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in the Philippines although it has not been previously probated and
allowed in the country where it was executed
RULING:
YES. The will may be probated in the Philippines. Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad
although the same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A foreign will can be given legal
effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in
the Philippines if made in accordance with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or according to the
formalities observed in his country.
In this connection, Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if the decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the RTC of the province where he has an estate may take cognizance of the settlement of such estate. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule
76 further state that the executor, devisee, or legatee named in the will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time
after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in his possession or
not, or is lost or destroyed.
Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must show, so far as known to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional
facts; (b) the names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator or decedent; (c) the probable value and
character of the property of the estate; (d) the name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the will has not been delivered
to the court, the name of the person having custody of it. Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of the decedent, his residence at
the time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left
in such province. The rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already been allowed and probated in the country of its
execution.
In insisting that Ruperta’s will should have been first probated and allowed by the court of California, petitioners Manuel and Benjamin
obviously have in mind the procedure for the reprobate of will before admitting it here. But, reprobate or re-authentication of a will
already probated and allowed in a foreign country is different from that probate where the will is presented for the first time before a
competent court. Reprobate is specifically governed by Rule 77 of the Rules of Court. Contrary to petitioners’ stance, since this latter
rule applies only to reprobate of a will, it cannot be made to apply to the present case. In reprobate, the local court acknowledges as
binding the findings of the foreign probate court provided its jurisdiction over the matter can be established.
Besides, petitioners stand is fraught with impractically. If the instituted heirs do not have the means to go abroad for the probate of the
will, it is as good as depriving them outright of their inheritance, since our law requires that no will shall pass either real or personal
property unless the will has been proved and allowed by the proper court.
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Antonio B. Baltazar, et al. v. Lorenzo Laxa

G.R. No. 174489, April 11, 2012 (Del Castillo, J.)
A testator is presumed to be of sound mind at the time of the execution of the will and the burden to prove otherwise lies on the oppositor.
FACTS:
Paciencia was a 78 y/o spinster when she made her last will and testament entitled Tauli Nang Bilin o Testamento Miss Paciencia Regala
in the Pampango dialect on Sept. 13, 1981. The will, executed in the house of retired Judge Limpin, was read to Paciencia twice. After
which, Paciencia expressed in the presence of the instrumental witnesses that the document is her last will and testament. She
thereafter affixed her signature at the end of the said document on page 3 and then on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof.
Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her properties to her nephew, Lorenzo Laxa and his wife
Corazon Laxa and their children Luna and Katherine. Paciencia treated Lorenzo as her own son. Conversely, Lorenzo came to know
and treated Paciencia as his own mother.
Six days after the execution of the Will (Sept. 19, 1981), Paciencia left for USA. There, she resided with Lorenzo and his family until her
death on Jan. 4, 1996. In the interim, the Will remained in the custody of Judge Limpin.
More than 4 years after the death of Paciencia or on Apr. 27, 2000, Lorenzo filed a petition with the RTC for the probate of the Will of
Paciencia and for the issuance of Letters of Administration in his favor.
On Jun 23, 2000 one of petitioners, Antonio Baltazar filed an opposition to Lorenzo’s petition. Antonio averred that the properties
subject of Paciencia’s Will belong to Nicomeda Mangalindan, his predecessor-in-interest; hence, Paciencia had no right to bequeath
them to Lorenzo. Also, one of the petitioners, Rosie Mateo testified that Paciencia is in the state of being “mangulyan” or forgetful
making her unfit for executing a will and that the execution of the will had been procured by undue and improper pressure and
influence.
Petitioners also opposed the issuance of the Letters of Administration in Lorenzo’s favor arguing that Lorenzo was disqualified to be
appointed as such, he being a citizen and resident of the USA. Petitioners prayed that Letters of Administration be instead issued in
favor of Antonio.
RTC denies the petition for probate of the will and concluded that when Paciencia signed the will, she was no longer possessed of the
sufficient reason or strength of mind to have the testamentary capacity. On appeal, CA reversed the decision of the RTC and granted
the probate of the will. The petitioner went up to SC for a petition for review on Certiorari.
The CA reversed the RTC Decision and granted the probate of the Will of Paciencia. The appellate court did not agree with the RTCs
conclusion that Paciencia was of unsound mind when she executed the Will. It ratiocinated that the state of being magulyan does not
make a person mentally unsound so [as] to render [Paciencia] unfit for executing a Will. Moreover, the oppositors in the probate
proceedings were not able to overcome the presumption that every person is of sound mind. Further, no concrete circumstances or
events were given to prove the allegation that Paciencia was tricked or forced into signing the Will.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated August 31, 2006.
ISSUE:
Whether the authenticity and due execution of the will was sufficiently established to warrant its allowance for probate
RULING:
YES. The state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to execute a
Will. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind. Besides, Article 799 of the New Civil Code states:
Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his
mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or other cause.
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It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper
objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act.
In this case, apart from the testimony of Rosie pertaining to Paciencias forgetfulness, there is no substantial evidence, medical or
otherwise, that would show that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the Will. On the other hand, the witness’
testimony (Dra. Limpin) as to the soundness of mind of Paciencia when the latter went to Judge Limpin’s house and voluntarily
executed the Will must be given more credence. The testimony of subscribing witnesses to a Will concerning the testator’s mental
condition is entitled to great weight where they are truthful and intelligent. More importantly, a testator is presumed to be of sound
mind at the time of the execution of the Will and the burden to prove otherwise lies on the oppositor. Article 800 of the New Civil Code
states:
Art. 800. The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary.
The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of making his dispositions is on the person who opposes the
probate of the will; but if the testator, one month, or less, before making his will was publicly known to be insane, the person who
maintains the validity of the will must prove that the testator made it during a lucid interval.
Here, there was no showing that Paciencia was publicly known to be insane one month or less before the making of the Will. Clearly,
thus, the burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind lies upon the shoulders of petitioners. However and as earlier mentioned,
no substantial evidence was presented by them to prove the same, thereby warranting the CA’s finding that petitioners failed to
discharge such burden.
Furthermore, Paciencia was aware of the nature of her estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of her bounty and the character of
the testamentary act.
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Felix Balanay, Jr. v. Hon. Antonio M. Martinez, et al.

G.R. No. L-39247 June 27, 1975 (Aquino, J.)
Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon the court should meet the issue.
FACTS:
Leodegaria Julian died on February 12, 1973 in Davao City at the age of 67. She was survived by her husband, Felix Balanay, Sr., and 6
legitimate children: Felix Balanay, Jr., Avelina B. Antonio, Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob, Delia B. Lanaban and Emilia B.
Pabaonon. Felix Jr. filed in the lower court for the probate of his mother's notarial will where Leodegaria Julian declared (a) she was
the owner of the "southern half of 9 conjugal lots (b) she was the absolute owner of 2 parcels of land which she inherited from her
father (c) it was her desire that her properties should NOT be divided among her heirs during her husband's lifetime and that their
legitimes should be satisfied out of the fruits of her properties (d) after her husband's death (age of 82 in 1973) her paraphernal lands
and all the conjugal lands should be divided and distributed in the manner set forth in that part of her will. She devised and partitioned
the conjugal lands as if they were all owned by her.
Although initially opposing, Felix Sr. signed a Conformation of Division and Renunciation of Hereditary Rights manifesting that out of
respect for his wife's will he waived and renounced his hereditary rights in her estate in favor of their 6 children. In that same
instrument he confirmed the agreement, which he and his wife had perfected before her death, that their conjugal properties would be
partitioned in the manner indicated in her will. Avelina B. Antonio, an oppositor, in her rejoinder contended that the affidavit and
conformation of Felix Sr. were void for illegally claiming the conjugal lands.
David O. Montaña, Sr., claiming to be the lawyer of Felix Jr., et. al., filed a motion for leave of court to withdraw probate of the will and
requesting authority to proceed by intestate estate proceeding also referring to the provisions relating to the conjugal assets as
compromising the future legitimes. The Trial Court declared the will void and converted to intestate proceedings. Felix Jr., through a
new counsel asked for the reconsideration which was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will
RULING:
NO. In view of certain unusual provisions of the will, which are of dubious legality, and because of the motion to withdraw the petition
for probate (which the lower court assumed to have been filed with the petitioner's authorization), the trial court acted correctly in
passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been established. The probate of a will might become an
idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the
will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue. But the probate court erred in declaring, in its order
of February 28, 1974 that the will was void and in converting the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding notwithstanding the
fact that in its order of June 18, 1973 , it gave effect to the surviving husband's conformity to the will and to his renunciation of his
hereditary rights which presumably included his one-half share of the conjugal estate.
The rule is that "the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does not result in the invalidity of the other dispositions,
unless it is to be presumed that the testator would not have made such other dispositions if the first invalid disposition had not been
made" (Art. 792, Civil Code). "Where some of the provisions of a will are valid and others invalid, the valid parts will be upheld if they
can be separated from the invalid without defeating the intention of the testator or interfering with the general testamentary scheme,
or doing injustice to the beneficiaries"
The instant case is different from the Nuguid case, where the testatrix instituted as heir her sister and preterited her parents. Her will
was intrinsically void because it preterited her compulsory heirs in the direct line. Article 854 of the Civil Code provides that "the
preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the
will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies, shall be valid insofar as they
are not inofficious." Since the preterition of the parents annulled the institution of the sister of the testatrix and there were no legacies
and devises, total intestacy resulted (Art. 960[2], Civil Code).
In the instant case, the preterited heir was the surviving spouse. His preterition did not produce intestacy. Moreover, he signified his
conformity to his wife's will and renounced his hereditary rights. .
It results that the lower court erred in not proceeding with the probate of the will as contemplated in its uncancelled order of June 18,
1973. Save in an extreme case where the will on its face is intrinsically void, it is the probate court's duty to pass first upon the formal
validity of the will. Generally, the probate of the will is mandatory.
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Amelia Garcia-Quiazon, et al. v. Ma. Lourdes Belen

G.R. No. 189121, July 31, 2013 (Perez, J.)
Recording of death certificate in another place does not change actual residence of the decedent.
FACTS:
Elise Quiazon is the daughter of Eliseo Quiazon and his common-law wife Ma. Lourdes Belen. When Eliseo died intestate, Elise
represented by her mother, Lourdes, filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the RTC of Las Piñas City in order to preserve
the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its value. She likewise sought her appointment as administratrix of her late father’s
estate.
Amelia Quiazon, to whom Eliseo was married, together with her two children, filed an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss on the ground of
improper venue asserting that Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City. In addition to their claim of improper
venue, the petitioners averred that there are no factual and legal bases for Elise to be appointed administratix of Eliseo’s estate.
RTC rendered a decision directing the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary bond. On appeal, the
decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals. In validating the findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held
that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as husband and wife by establishing a common residence at No. 26
Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City, from 1975 up to the time of Eliseo’s death in 1992. For purposes of fixing the
venue of the settlement of Eliseo’s estate, the Court of Appeals upheld the conclusion reached by the RTC that the decedent was a
resident of Las Piñas City.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Las Pinas City was the proper venue
2. Whether Elise is qualified to be administrator of the estate
RULING:
1. YES. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of a decedent should
be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides at the time of his death:
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. – If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of
his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate
settled, in the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court in the province in which he resides at the time of his
death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court of any
province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on
the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding,
except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term
"resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of
the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised
Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant factor.13 Even where the statute uses word
"domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction
between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and
convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant."
In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat.
Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning. As thus defined, "residence,"
in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a person’s actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides
therein with continuity and consistency.
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Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming the ruling of the RTC that the
venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las Piñas City. It is evident from the records that during
his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For this reason, the venue for the
settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city.
2. YES. Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution of Eliseo’s estate, is deemed to be an interested
party. With the overwhelming evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners’ pounding
on her lack of interest in the administration of the decedent’s estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse
the findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good
grounds. It is founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled to her legitimate after the debts of the
estate are satisfied. Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseo’s estate as one of his natural children, Elise can rightfully
be considered as an interested party within the purview of the law.
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Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. v. Court of Appeals and Edgardo S. Silverio

G.R. No. 109979, March 11, 1999 (Purisima, J.)
The appointment of a special administrator in a probate case lies in the sound discretion of the court, and he may be removed without
reference to section 653 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, the court is not vested with the power to order the special administrator
to sell real properties of the estate pending determination of the validity of the regular administrator's appointment.
FACTS:
Beatriz Silverio died intestate, survived by her husband, Ricardo Silverio; sons, Edmundo, Edgardo and Ricardo, Jr., and daughters,
Nelia and Ligaya. Edgardo filed a Petition for Letters of Administration and Urgent Petition for Appointment of Special Administrator
which the trial court granted in his favor.
Ricardo, Sr. opposed the Petition for Letters of Administration, but he was declared to have waived his right to present evidence when
he failed to appear and adduce evidence during the dates scheduled for its reception, hence, Edgardo was appointed as regular
Administrator. His motion for reconsideration having been denied, Ricardo, Sr. filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals
which dismissed the same for lack of merit.
Before the Supreme Court, Ricardo, Sr. contended that:

1. he was denied due process of law when the respondent judge considered his failure to be present on the dates scheduled for
reception of evidence on his behalf as a waiver of his right to adduce the same;
2. CA erred in its interpretation that section 6,Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court does not provide for an order of preference
in the appointment of the administrator;
3. Edgardo Silverio has not satisfactorily established, at least an iota of proof that he is qualified and competent to act as
administrator; and
4. Respondent judge has no power to authorize Edgardo Silverio to sell the conjugal partnership properties and even real
properties of the estate.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the appointment of Edgardo Silverio as administrator is proper
2. Whether the probate is vested with the power to order the special administrator to sell real properties of the estate pending
determination of the validity of the regular administrator's appointment
RULING:
1. YES. The order of preference in the appointment of an administrator depends on the attendant facts and circumstances. In the
case under consideration, the appointment of Edgardo S. Silverio as administrator is proper.
The determination of a person’s suitability for the office of administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the
court exercising the power of appointment and such judgment will not be interfered with on appeal unless it appears
affirmatively that the court below was an error. Unsuitableness for appointment as administrator may consist in adverse
interest of some kind or hostility to those immediately interested in the estate.
If the administrator was appointed by the trial court for the estate in accordance with Rule 79, section 6 of the Rules of Court,
the trial court had discretion to issue the letters of administration to any of the persons mentioned in said section, and unless
there has been an abuse of discretion, which does not appear to have been committed in the present case, appointment shall
not be revoked on appeal. Discerning no ground to disregard the finding of the respondent judge and the respondent court on
the competence of the decedent’s son, Edgardo S. Silverio, to act as administrator, his appointment as special, and later, as the
regular administrator is sanctioned by law.
2. NO. The respondent court is not vested with the power to order the special administrator to sell real properties of the estate
pending determination of the validity of the regular administrator's appointment, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 80 of the Revised
Rules of Court, which provides:
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Powers and duties of special administrator. Such special administrator shall take possession and charge of the goods,
chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased and preserve the same for the executor or administrator
afterwards appointed, and for that purpose may commence and maintain suits as administrator. He may sell only
such perishable and other property as the court orders sold. A special administrator shall not be liable to pay any
debt of the deceased unless so ordered by the court.
In the case of Tecla Arganda v. Velez et al., the Court found, that:
Under the title "Sale of Estate" in Chapter XXXVI of the Code of the Civil Procedure, and the provisions which it
comprises, from Section 714 to 724, the Code treats of and designates the powers of the Court of First Instance in
testamentary and intestate proceedings, in connection with the sale of property belonging to the Estate. By virtue of
the authority conferred by sections 714 to 724, the court may grant permission or authority for the sale of said
property upon previous petition of the executor or administrator, provided the legal requirements are complied with,
and the grounds required by the law in each case provided for in the above-mentioned sections are shown. The
executor or administrator must comply with the rules established by section 722 of the Code. Of course in exercising
its powers, when the court is convinced that a sufficient valid reason exists, it may order the executor or
administrator to request permission or authority to sell property; but it cannot directly order its sale, because that
would be neglecting to comply with the rules which must be observed before granting the said permission or
authority. Section 722 requires that satisfactory proof be adduced and that the rules established in the first
paragraphs be complied with, before granting the permission or authority to the executor or administrator. (Baun v.
Heirs of Baun, 53 Phil., 654)
With the exception of the case provided for in section 717 regarding the sale of the entire personality or part thereof
for the purpose of preserving the other property of the deceased, and of that provided for in section 720 with
reference to the sale of realty acquired by the executor or administrator by virtue of the execution of a judgment or
the foreclosure of a mortgage the legal provisions above referred to, only recognize as a ground for the court to
authorize the sale of the estate of a deceased person subject to administration, the application of its proceeds to the
payment of the debts or expenses of administration or the settlement of any legacy
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Falcatan v. Sanchez
101 PHIL 1238 (1957)
Generally, the jurisdiction of the probate court relates only to matters having to do with the estate and probate of a will, and does not
include the determination of questions of ownership that arise during proceedings. However, that is only true if the title is disputed by a
third party, not by the surviving spouse or heirs of the deceased, as successors of the latter.
FACTS:
Petitioner appealed the decision of the CFI Zamboanga providing for the summary settlement of the estate of the late Patricio
Sanchez which includes a parcel of land. She contends that the court had no jurisdiction to pass upon the question of title to real
property and then decide on how the lot is to be divided.
ISSUE:
Whether the probate court cannot pass upon the question of ownership that arose during the present case for summary settlement
RULING:
The Supreme Court has ruled in the negative. Generally, the jurisdiction of the probate court relates only to matters having to do with
the estate and probate of a will, and does not include the determination of questions of ownership that arise during proceedings.
However, that is only true if the title is disputed by a third party, not by the surviving spouse or heirs of the deceased, as successors of
the latter. As long the heirs agree to submit the question for determination by the court and the interests of third parties are not
prejudiced, or that the purpose is to determine whether or not certain properties should be included in the inventory, then the probate
court may decide prima facie on the ownership of the property. But such determination is only provisional, not conclusive, and is
without prejudice to the right of interested parties to ventilate the question in a separate action. In the present case, the two conjugal
properties involved were correctly ruled to equally share ownership over the parcel of land. Petition was denied.
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Rosalina Cunanan v. Rafael Amparo

G.R. No. L-1313, February 16, 1948 (Tuason, J.)
With the consent of the parties matters affecting property under judicial administration may be taken cognizance of by the court in the
course of the intestate proceeding provided the interests of third persons are not prejudiced.
FACTS:
Soriano, one of the present respondents, filed a money claim against the decedent's estate. Petitioner, in her capacity as administratix
asked the court for authority to negotiate a loan in such amount or to sell so much of the property described in the inventory as might
be sufficient to satisfy the obligation, which was granted. She later manifested to the court that she had tendered to Soriano in March
of that year P880 but that Soriano refused to accept it. She prayed that the creditor be ordered to accept the amount tendered, to
execute the necessary deed of cancellation, and to return the possession of two parcels of land which had been conveyed to him.
On June 15, 1944, the Honorable Quintin Paredes, Jr., authorized the administratix to deposit with the clerk of court P880 in full
payment of the obligation in favor of Soriano and ordered him to deliver the property in his possession to the administratix. This order
was not appealed nor was any motion for its reconsideration filed, so far as the pleadings would reveal. On July 17, 1944, the
administratix filed a complaint against Soriano for contempt of court, alleging that Soriano disobeyed that part of it which commanded
him to return the two parcels of land to the estate of Isaac Cunanan and Candida Joaquin. After hearing, Soriano was found not guilty
of contempt but he was ordered to deliver the property in question to the administratix Rosalina Cunanan for the benefit of the Intestate
Estate. Soriano filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of August 4, 1944, that is, the last order of Judge Paredes. Soriano stated
as grounds of his motion, first, that the title to those lots had been consolidated in his and his wife's names by virtue of a deed of sale
in their favor by Isaac Cunanan and Rosalina Cunanan on April 7, 1938.
On August 16, 1946, the Honorable Rafael Amparo, who now was presiding over the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, in a lengthy
order granted Soriano's motion. The petitioner sought a review of the orders of the respondent Judge.
ISSUE:
Whether the court has jurisdiction to order the delivery of the possession of the lots to the estate.
RULING:
YES. The Supreme Court did not agree with the respondents that the court lacked jurisdiction to order the delivery of the possession
of the lots to the estate. This power is a mere consequence of the power to approve Soriano's claim; a power which the court
undoubtedly had and which Soriano himself invoked with full knowledge of the facts. As a general rule, with the consent of the parties
matters affecting property under judicial administration may be taken cognizance of by the court in the course of the intestate
proceeding provided the interests of third persons are not prejudiced. Determination of title to property is within the jurisdiction of
Courts of First Instance.
The respondent’s objection relates exclusively to the procedure, which is distinct from jurisdiction. It affects only personal rights to a
mode of practice which may be waived. Certainly, there is waiver where, as here, the party who raises the objection was the one who
set the court in motion, and who, by failing to disclose the existence of a sale under pacto de retro, suppressed jurisdictional facts that
might be in the way of his claim’s success.
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Pompillo Valera and Eumelia Valera Cabado v. Hon. Judge Sancho Y. Inserto and Manuel R. Fabiana
G.R. No. L-56504, May 7, 1987 (Narvasa, J.)
A Probate Court, exercises but limited jurisdiction, and thus has no power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of title to
property claimed by a third person adversely to the decedent, unless the claimant and all the Other parties having legal interest in the
property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the question to the Probate Court for adjudgment, or the interests of third
persons are not thereby prejudiced
FACTS:
In the proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of the decedent spouses, Rafael Valera and Consolacion Sarrosa — in which
Eumelia Cabado and Pompiro Valera had been appointed administrators — the heirs of a deceased daughter of the spouses, Teresa
Garin, filed a motion asking that the Administratrix, Cabado, be declared in contempt for her failure to render an accounting of her
administration. Cabado replied that no accounting could be submitted unless Jose Garin, Teresa's husband and the movant heirs'
father, delivered to the administrator an 18-hectare fishpond belonging to the estate and she in turn moved for the return thereof to
the estate, so that it might be partitioned among the decedents' heirs. Jose Garin opposed the plea for the fishpond's return to the estate,
asserting that the property was owned by his children and this was why it had never been included in any inventory of the estate.
The Court, presided over by Hon. Judge Midpantao Adil, viewed the Garin Heirs' motion for contempt, as well as Cabado's prayer for
the fishpond's return to the estate, as having given rise to a claim for the recovery of an asset of the estate within the purview of Section
6, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court.
Judge Adil ruled that an implied trust had been created, obligating Teresa Garin's heirs to restore the property to the Valera Spouses'
Estate, in accordance with Articles 1453 and 1455 of the Civil Code. It made clear however that the hearing on the matter was meant
"merely to determine whether or not the fishpond should be included as part of the estate and whether or not the person holding it
should be made to deliver and/or return ** (it) to the estate. And so it was emphasized in another Order that:
**(i)t is never the intendment of this court to write a finish to the issue of ownership of the fishpond in dispute. The movants may
pursue their claim of ownership over the same in an ordinary civil action. Meanwhile, however, it is the finding of this probate court
that the fishpond must be delivered to the estate.
Clearly, there is no incompatibility between the exercise of the power of this probate court under Section 6 in relation to Section 7,
both of Rule 87, and the contention of the movants that the proper forum to settle the issue of ownership should be in a court of general
jurisdiction.
Judge Adil afterwards granted the administrators' motion for execution of the order pending appeal, and directed the sheriff to enforce
the direction for the Garin Heirs to reconvey the fishpond to the estate. The corresponding writ was served on Manuel Fabiana, the
supposed encargado or caretaker. Voicing no objection to the writ, and declaring to the sheriff that he was a mere lessee, Fabiana
voluntarily relinquished possession of the fishpond to the sheriff. The latter, in turn, delivered it to the administrators.
Later however, Fabiana filed a complaint-in-intervention with the Probate Court seeking vindication of his right to the possession of
the fishpond, based on a contract of lease between himself, as lessee, and Jose Garin, as lessor. But Judge Adil dismissed his complaint.
Fabiana thereupon instituted a separate action for injunction and damages, with application for a preliminary injunction. Judge Inserto
(presiding judge) issued a temporary restraining order enjoining estate administrators from disturbing Fabiana in the possession of
the fishpond, as lessee.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the probate court has jurisdiction to decide the ownership of the fishpond.
2. Who has the primary jurisdiction to decide the issue of ownership
RULINGS:
1. NO. Settled is the rule that a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court), acting as a Probate Court, exercises but limited
jurisdiction, and thus has no power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property claimed by a third person
adversely to the decedent, unless the claimant and all the Other parties having legal interest in the property consent, expressly
18 | P a g e
or impliedly, to the submission of the question to the Probate Court for adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are not
thereby prejudiced. The reason for the exception being that the question of whether or not a particular matter should be
resolved by the Court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court (e.g., probate,
land registration, etc., is in reality not a jurisdictional but in essence of procedural one, involving a mode of practice which
may be waived.
The facts obtaining in this case, however, do not call for the application of the exception to the rule. As already earlier stressed,
it was at all times clear to the Court as well as to the parties that if cognizance was being taken of the question of title over the
fishpond, it was not for the purpose of settling the issue definitely and permanently, and writing "finis" thereto, the question
being explicitly left for determination "in an ordinary civil action," but merely to determine whether it should or should not
be included in the inventory. This function of resolving whether or not property should be included in the estate inventory is,
to be sure, one clearly within the Probate Court's competence, although the Court's determination is only provisional in
character, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action that may be instituted by the parties.
The same norm governs the situation contemplated in Section 6, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, expressly invoked by the
Probate Court in justification of its holding a hearing on the issue arising from the parties' conflicting claims over the fishpond.
The examination provided in the cited section is intended merely to elicit evidence relevant to property of the decedent from
persons suspected of having possession or knowledge thereof, or of having concealed, embezzled, or conveyed away the same.
Of course, if the latter lays no claim to the property and manifests willingness to tum it over to the estate, no difficulty arises;
the Probate Court simply issues the appropriate direction for the delivery of the property to the estate. On the other hand, if
the third person asserts a right to the property contrary to the decedent's, the Probate Court would have no authority to
resolve the issue; a separate action must be instituted by the administrator to recover the property.
Parenthetically, in the light of the foregoing principles, the Probate Court could have admitted and taken cognizance of
Fabiana's complaint in intervention after obtaining the consent of all interested parties to its assumption of jurisdiction over
the question of title to the fishpond, or ascertaining the absence of objection thereto. But it did not. It dismissed the complaint
in intervention instead. And all this is now water under the bridge.
2. Since, too, both the Probate Court and the estate administrators are one in the recognition of the proposition that title to the
fishpond could in the premises only be appropriately determined in a separate action, the actual firing of such a separate
action should have been anticipated, and should not therefore have come as a surprise, to the latter. And since moreover,
implicit in that recognition is also the acknowledge judgment of the superiority of the authority of the court in which the
separate action is filed over the issue of title, the estate administrators may not now be heard to complain that in such a
separate action, the court should have issued orders necessarily involved in or flowing from the assumption of that
jurisdiction. Those orders cannot in any sense be considered as undue interference with the jurisdiction of the Probate Court.
Resulting from the exercise of primary jurisdiction over the question of ownership involving estate property claimed by the
estate, they must be deemed superior to otherwise contrary orders issued by the Probate Court in the exercise of what may
be, regarded as merely secondary, or provisional, jurisdiction over the same question.
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WT Construction, Inc. v. Hon. Ulric R. Caete and the Estate of Alberto Cabahug
G.R. No. 157287, February 12, 2008 (Azcuna, J.)
A probate court has jurisdiction to determine the rights and obligations of the parties in a contract.
FACTS:
Juliana vda. De Cabahug filed a case for the settlement of the estate of her deceased husband, Alberto Cabahug, before the RTC, presided
by public respondent, Judge Ulric R. Cañete. Ciriaco Cabahug, the administrator of the estate and heir of Alberto, was granted the
authority to sell one of the properties of the estate to defray the expenses for the payment of taxes due from the estate. The property
to be sold was the parcel of land subject of the petition.
Ciriaco entered into an Agreement for Sale of Land with Downpayment with petitioner. In accordance with the agreement, petitioner
made a down payment of the purchase price and the balance to be paid immediately after the land is free from all
occupants/obstructions.The contract likewise stipulated that the seller shall undertake the clearing of the land herein sold of its
present occupants and/or eject the squatters therein within a period of one (1) year reckoned from the receipt of the advance payment.
However, if the buyer will be the one to handle the clearing or ejectment of occupants, all the expenses incurred thereto shall be charged
to and be deducted from the remaining balance payable.
Moreover, there was also a stipulation that upon receipt of the 50% advance payment, the buyer shall be authorized to enter the
property, utilize the same and introduce improvements. Subsequently, petitioner took steps in clearing the property of its occupants
by filing a complaint for ejectment. It was later discovered that Ciriaco did not inform his co-heirs of the sale. He appropriated the
amount paid by petitioner, so public respondent issued an Order relieving Ciriaco of his functions as administrator and directing him
to render an accounting of all the properties and assets of the estate.
Consequently, Administrator Linda Cabahug-Antigue, along with her co-heirs, demanded from petitioner the payment of the balance
of the purchase price. Public respondent then issued an order stating that petitioner must manifest If It wanted to have the contract
rescinded and that failure to manifest would make W.T. to pay the estate of Alberto Cabahug the amount of P4,259,400.00 less expenses
incurred in the ejectment case and failure to do so will prompt issuance of a writ of execution. A writ of execution was then issued and
the Motion to Quash the execution was denied along with the Motion for reconsideration. An appeal was made before the CA and the
same was also denied. Hence, this petition primarily contending that the very writ of execution sought to be quashed by petitioner is
not one of those allowed to be issued by probate courts.
ISSUE:
Whether a probate court has the jurisdiction to determine the rights and obligations of the parties in a contract, one of which is a
private corporation
RULING:
YES. As to petitioner’s argument that the probate/estate court cannot adjudicate the rights and obligations of the parties under the
deed of sale, the CA rightly found that this was a new issue not raised in the probate/estate court. Furthermore, the deed of sale in
question is the sale of the property of the estate to pay for taxes, a matter definitely within the power of the probate/estate court to
order.
It is but logical that probate/estate courts can enforce obligations under such a deed of sale. Otherwise, they would not be able to
secure the proceeds to pay for the taxes and this would defeat the purpose of the proceedings to settle the estate. Stated otherwise, the
power to enforce obligations under the deed of sale of a property ordered sold to pay debts of the estate is but a necessary incident of
the power of a probate/estate court to order and effect such sale in the first place
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C. Appointment of Executor/Administrator
Serafin Medina and Rosalia M. Del Carmen v. Court of Appeals, Court of First Instance and Beda Gonzales
G.R. No. L-34760, September 28, 1973 (Teehankee, J.)
An administrator is deemed unsuitable and should be removed where his personal interests conflict with his official duties.
FACTS:
This is a review by certiorari of the resolution dismissing the petition challenging the lower court’s orders appointing Gonzales (private
respondent) as special administrator of the intestate estate of the decedent Agustin Medina.
Gonzales had been interfering in the possession and enjoyment of the harvests of the property known as “Bitukang Manok” by
petitioner Del Carmen to whom the property had been sold, and full payment therefor received by the estate through Gonzales’
predecessor with the approval of the lower court, which overruled Gonzales’ opposition thereto as an assignee of some heirs of the
estate, and as one personally interested in the purchase of the property for himself.
ISSUE:
Whether Gonzales, the special administrator, should be disqualified
RULING:
YES. The special administrator is disqualified and must be excluded.
It is an established doctrine that as administrator is deemed unsuitable and should be removed where his personal interests conflict
with his official duties, by virtue of the equally established principle that an administrator is a quasi-trustee, disqualified from acquiring
properties of the estate, and who should be indifferent between the estate and claimants of the property except to preserve it for due
administration and who should be removed when his interest conflict with such right and duty.
Respondent, whose appeal of the lower court’s order of approval of the sale to the CA is pending, cannot be at the same time an
appellant in his personal capacity opposing the sale of the property and an appellee representing the estate and upholding the same
sale as made by the estate through Gonzales’ predecessor as special administrator. Since the estate proceedings have been pending for
over 13 years now without the lower court once having appointed a regular administrator, the said court is directed to name a suitable
person.
While the provisions of the Rules of Court may be deemed directory in nature, "the speedy settlement of the estates of deceased persons
for the benefit of creditors and those entitled to residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts and expenses of administration
have been paid, is the ruling spirit of our probate law" and "courts of first instance should exert themselves to close up estate within
twelve months from the time they are presented, and they may refuse to allow any compensation to executors and administrators who
do not actively labor to that end, and they may even adopt harsher measures."
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Bayani Vasquez v. Judge Severo Malvar

A.M. No. 884-CFI, August 3, 1978 (Makasiar, J.)
The trial judge should first determine who are the interstate heirs of the decedent before approving the amicable settlement.
FACTS:
This is a complaint filed against respondent Judge Malvar for serious misconduct in handling a special proceedings action. First, he
gave verbal orders to the personnel of a rural bank to allow withdrawals from the decedent’s savings account, without notice to the
adverse parties in the special proceedings and without any motion for withdrawal filed by any of the litigants.
Also, despite motions of the parties for appointment of a regular administrator, he allowed his clerk of court to continue as a special
administrator despite the ruling of the Supreme Court in a case disallowing this kind of action. Most of all, knowing that the parties-
litigants in the special proceedings are not related to the deceased within the fifth degree of relationship in the collateral line, he
approved the amicable settlement without notifying the Provincial Fiscal or the Solicitor General to intervene in the case for the State,
much less determine who the intestate heirs were. For these acts, the respondent judge was sought to be sanctioned.
ISSUE:
Whether the judge erred in not notifying the State where parties-litigant are not related to the deceased
RULING:
YES. Where the party-litigants in special proceedings involving the estate of the deceased are not related to the decedent and the so-
called heirs are not within the fifth degree of relationship in the collateral line from the decedent, the trial judge should notify the
Provincial Fiscal or the Solicitor General to intervene in the case for the State, for the State could be the only interstate heir with respect
to one-half of the estate left by the deceased.
The trial judge should first determine who are the interstate heirs of the decedent before approving the amicable settlement. This is
his clear duty in order to protect the interest of the State regarding the payment of inheritance and estate taxes as well as a possible
heir in intestacy. This will avoid multiplicity of suits, expenses and delay.
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Emilio A.M. Suntay III v. Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay

G.R. No. 183053, October 10, 2012 (Perez, J.)
Hostility does not warrant appointment as co-administrator.
FACTS:
Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay died intestate on June 4, 1990. Cristina was survived by her spouse, Dr. Federico Suntay and 5 grandchildren:
3 legitimate grandchildren, including Isabel (respondent); and 2 illegitimate grandchildren, including Emilio III (petitioner), all by
Federico’s and Cristina’s only child, Emilio A. Suntay (Emilio I), who predeceased his parents.
The illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita, were both reared from infancy by their grandparents while the legitimate
grandchildren, Isabel and her siblings, Margarita and Emilio II, lived with their mother Isabel Cojuangco, following separation with
their father.
Isabel’s parents, along with her paternal grandparents, were involved in domestic relations cases, including a case for parricide filed
by Isabel Cojuangco against Emilio I. Emilio I was eventually acquitted. Emilio I then filed a complaint for legal separation against his
wife, charging her among others with infidelity. The trial court then declared as null and void and of no effect the marriage of Emilio I
and Isabel Cojuangco.
Intent on maintaining a relationship with their grandchildren, Federico and Isabel filed a complaint for visitation rights to spend time
with their legitimate grandchildren. The Juvenile Domestic Relations Court in Quezon City (JDRC-QC) granted their prayer but visitation
ultimately stopped, because of respondent Isabel’s testimony that her grandparents’ visits caused her and her siblings stress and
anxiety.
On 27 September 1993, Federico adopted his illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita.
On 26 October 1995, respondent Isabel, filed before the RTC a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over Cristina’s
estate. Federico, opposed the petition. Federico filed a Motion to Dismiss Isabel’s petition for letters of administration on the ground
that Isabel had no right of representation to the estate of Cristina, she being an illegitimate grandchild of the latter as a result of Isabel’s
parents’ marriage being declared null and void. However, in Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay, the Court declared that Isabel and her siblings,
having been born of a voidable marriage as opposed to a void marriage based on paragraph 3, Article 85 of the Civil Code, were
legitimate children of Emilio I, who can all represent him in the estate of their legitimate grandmother, the decedent, Cristina.
Federico nominated Emilio III to administer the decedent’s estate on his behalf in the event letters of administration issues to Federico.
Consequently, Emilio III filed an Opposition-In-Intervention, echoing the allegations in his grandfather’s opposition, alleging that
Federico, or in his stead, Emilio III, was better equipped than respondent to administer and manage the estate of the decedent, Cristina.
On 13 November 2000, Federico died.
RTC DECISION: RTC rendered a decision appointing Emilio III as administrator of decedent Cristina’s intestate estate.
CA DECISION: On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC, revoked the Letters of Administration issued to Emilio
III, and appointed Isabel as administratrix of the subject estate.
INITIAL SC DECISION: On appeal by certiorari, the SC reversed and set aside the ruling of the CA. SC decided to include Emilio III as co-
administrator of Cristina’s estate, giving weight to his interest in Federico’s estate.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: Isabel pleads for total affirmance of the CA Decision in favor of her sole administratorship based on her
status as a legitimate grandchild of Cristina. Isabel contends that the explicit provisions of Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court on
the order of preference for the issuance of letters of administration cannot be ignored and that Article 992 of the Civil Code must be
followed. Isabel further asserts that Emilio III had demonstrated adverse interests and disloyalty to the estate, thus, he does not deserve
to become a co-administrator thereof.
Specifically, Isabel bewails that: (1) Emilio III is an illegitimate grandchild and therefore, not an heir of the decedent; (2) corollary
thereto, Emilio III, not being a "next of kin" of the decedent, has no interest in the estate to justify his appointment as administrator
thereof; (3) Emilio III’s actuations since his appointment as administrator by the RTC on 9 November 2001 emphatically demonstrate
the validity and wisdom of the order of preference in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court; and (4) there is no basis for joint
administration as there are no "opposing parties or factions to be represented.”
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ISSUE:
Who among Emilio I and Isabel should solely administer the decedent’s estate
RULING:
Letters of Administration over the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall solely issue to respondent Isabel
Cojuangco-Suntay.
Hostility does not warrant appointment as co-administrator.
The general rule in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a decedent is laid down in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court.
The rule lists a sequence to be observed, an order of preference, in the appointment of an administrator. This order of preference,
which categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the creditors in the appointment of an administrator, has been
reinforced in jurisprudence.
It is to this requirement of observation of the order of preference in the appointment of administrator of a decedent’s estate, that the
appointment of co-administrators has been allowed, but as an exception.
The collected teaching is that mere demonstration of interest in the estate to be settled does not ipso facto entitle an interested person
to co-administration thereof. Neither does squabbling among the heirs nor adverse interests necessitate the discounting of the order
of preference set forth in Section 6, Rule 78. Indeed, in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the principal
consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one to be appointed as administrator. Given Isabel’s unassailable
interest in the estate as one of the decedent’s legitimate grandchildren and undoubted nearest "next of kin," the appointment
of Emilio III as co-administrator of the same estate, cannot be a demandable right. It is a matter left entirely to the sound
discretion of the Court and depends on the facts and the attendant circumstances of the case.
Thus, we proceed to scrutinize the attendant facts and circumstances of this case even as we reiterate Isabel’s and her sibling’s apparent
greater interest in the estate of Cristina.
These considerations do not warrant the setting aside of the order of preference mapped out in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court.
They compel that a choice be made of one over the other.
1. The bitter estrangement and long-standing animosity between Isabel, on the one hand, and Emilio III, on the other, traced back from
the time their paternal grandparents were alive, which can be characterized as adverse interest of some kind by, or hostility of, Emilio
III to Isabel who is immediately interested in the estate;
2. Corollary thereto, the seeming impossibility of Isabel and Emilio III working harmoniously as co-administrators may result in
prejudice to the decedent’s estate, ultimately delaying settlement thereof; and
3. Emilio III, for all his claims of knowledge in the management of Cristina’s estate, has not looked after the estate’s welfare and has
acted to the damage and prejudice thereof.
Contrary to the assumption made in the Decision that Emilio III’s demonstrable interest in the estate makes him a suitable co-
administrator thereof, the evidence reveals that Emilio III has turned out to be an unsuitable administrator of the estate. Respondent
Isabel points out that after Emilio III’s appointment as administrator of the subject estate in 2001, he has not looked after the welfare
of the subject estate and has actually acted to the damage and prejudice thereof.
In this case, palpable from the evidence on record, the pleadings, and the protracted litigation, is the inescapable fact that Emilio III
and respondent Isabel have a deep aversion for each other. To our mind, it becomes highly impractical, nay, improbable, for the
two to work as co-administrators of their grandmother’s estate. The allegations of Emilio III, the testimony of Federico and
the other witnesses for Federico and Emilio III that Isabel and her siblings were estranged from their grandparents further
drive home the point that Emilio III bears hostility towards Isabel. More importantly, it appears detrimental to the decedent’s
estate to appoint a co-administrator (Emilio III) who has shown an adverse interest of some kind or hostility to those, such as
herein respondent Isabel, immediately interested in the said estate.
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Diosdado S. Manungas v. Margarita Avila Loreto and Florencia Avila Parreo

G.R. No. 193161, August 22, 2011 (Velasco, Jr., J.)
Being an heir does not ipso facto entitle a person to be appointed as Special Administrator.
FACTS:
 This case is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
 Engracia Manugas was the wife of Florentino Manugas. They had no children which led them to adopted Samuel David Avila
(Avila).
o Florentino died intestate while Avila predeceased his adoptive mother. Avila was survived by his wife Sarah Abarte
Vda. De Manugas.
 Engracia filed a Motion for Partition of Estate in the intestate estate proceedings of Florentino. There she stated that there
were no other legal and compulsory heirs of Florentino except herself, Avila and Ramon Manugas whom she acknowledged
as the natural son of Florentino. Avila’s widow executed a waiver of rights and participation renouncing her rights over the
property of her husband in favor of Engracia.
 Consequently, a Decree of Final Distribution was issued in the intestate estate of Florentino distributing the properties to
Engracia and Ramon. (TAKE NOTE: At this point, the intestate estate proceedings as regards Florentino’s properties were
already terminated)
 Thereafter, the RTC of Panabo City appointed Parreño, the niece of Engracia as the Judicial Guardian of the properties and
person of her incompetent aunt.
 Through Parreño, Engracia instituted a civil case against the Spouses Diosdado Salinas Manugas(Diosdado) and Milagros
Pacifico for illegal detainer and damages. MTC issued a summary judgment in favor of Engracia due to the failure of
Diosdado to file an answer.
 After sometime, Diosdado instituted a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over Engracia’s Estate in his favor
before the RTC of Tagum. He alleged that he, being an illegitimate son of Florentino, is an heir of Engracia.
 The petition was opposed by Margarita Avila Loreto(Loreto) and Parreño alleging that Diosdado was incompetent as an
administrator:
o He was not a Manugas
o He was a debtor of the estate
 RTC-Appointed Parreño as administrator
 Upon MR, the RTC reversed it’s ruling while appointing Diosdado as Special Administrator.
 CA- RTC acted with Grave abuse of discretion and reinstated Parreño as the administrator of the estate. Thus this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Did the CA err in disregarding jurisprudence which held that certiorari cannot be a substitute for an appeal where the latter
remedy is available
2. Did the CA err in denying petitioner’s MR which grossly violated the rule that once a decision or order is final and executor,
it becomes immutable and unalterable.
3. Did the CA err when it ruled to annul the appointment of Diosdado herein petitioner as judicial administrator and
reinstating the appointment of Parreño
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RULING:
1. & 2. NO. RTC order is an interlocutory order and as such certiorari under Rule 65 was the proper remedy.
 The first two issues raised by Diosdado revolve around the issue of whether the RTC is an interlocutory order. He
alleged that certiorari cannot be the substitute for a lost appeal. Further alleging that Parreño should have appealed
the RTC order to the CA through Rule 45 and having failed to file within the reglementary period, the order cannot be
the subject of review by this court.
 The Court has considered an appointment of a special administrator as an interlocutory or preliminary order to the
main case for the grant of letters of administration in a testate or intestate proceeding
 Ocampo v. Ocampo: “The appointment or removal of special administrators, being discretionary, is thus
interlocutory and may be assailed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.”
 Section 1(c) of Rule 41
“Section 1. Subject of appeal. An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of
the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:

(c) An interlocutory order;
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an
appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.”
 Further, there was no necessity to file for MR

o GR: MR is required before appeal via Rule 65.
o EXP: (there are several but in this case the court only cited one): Where the issue raised is one purely of law
or where public interest is involved.
o This case is purely one of law.
3. NO. The RTC acted with Grave abuse of discretion (CA did not err in reversing RTC’s order)
 The fact that Diosdado is an heir to the estate of Florentino Manungas does not mean that he is entitled or even qualified
to become the special administrator of the Estate of Engracia.
 Jurisprudence provides that the appointment of a special administrator lies within the discretion of the court.
 Heirs of Belinda Dahlia A. Castillo v. Lacuata-Gabriel:
“It is well settled that the statutory provisions as to the prior or preferred right of certain persons to the appointment
of administrator under Section 1, Rule 81, as well as the statutory provisions as to causes for removal of an executor
or administrator under section 653 of Act No. 190, now Section 2, Rule 83, do not apply to the selection or removal of
special administrator. x x x As the law does not say who shall be appointed as special administrator and the
qualifications the appointee must have, the judge or court has discretion in the selection of the person to be appointed,
discretion which must be sound, that is, not whimsical or contrary to reason, justice or equity.”
 Reiterated in Ocampo
“While the RTC considered that respondents were the nearest of kin to their deceased parents in their appointment as
joint special administrators, this is not a mandatory requirement for the appointment. It has long been settled that the
selection or removal of special administrators is not governed by the rules regarding the selection or removal of regular
administrators. The probate court may appoint or remove special administrators based on grounds other than those
enumerated in the Rules at its discretion, such that the need to first pass upon and resolve the issues of fitness or
unfitness and the application of the order of preference under Section 6 of Rule 78, as would be proper in the case of a
regular administrator, do not obtain. As long as the discretion is exercised without grave abuse, and is based on reason,
equity, justice, and legal principles, interference by higher courts is unwarranted.”
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 While the trial court has the discretion to appoint anyone as a special administrator of the estate, such discretion must
be exercised with reason, guided by the directives of equity, justice and legal principles. It may, therefore, not be remiss
to reiterate that the role of a special administrator is to preserve the estate until a regular administrator is appointed
as stated in Section 2 Rule 80 of the Rules of court.
o There is no logical reason to appoint a person who is a debtor of the estate and otherwise a stranger to the
deceased.
 Diosdado is a stranger to Engracia while Parreño is the latter’s relative.

o evidence on record shows that Diosdado is not related to the late Engracia and so he is not interested in
preserving the latter’s estate
o Parreño is a former Judicial guardian of Engracia when she was still alive and who is also the niece of the
latter, is interested in protecting and preserving the estate of her late aunt Engracia, as by doing so she would
reap the benefit of a wise administration of the decedent’s estate
 It must be remembered that the estate of Florentino Manungas was already the subject of intestate proceedings that
have long been terminated with the proceeds distributed to the heirs with the issuance of a Decree of Final Distribution.
With the termination of the intestate estate proceedings of Florentino Manungas, Diosdado, as an illegitimate heir of
Florentino Manungas, is still not an heir of Engracia Manungas and is not entitled to receive any part of the Estate of
Manungas.
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D. Powers/Restrictions on Executor/Administrator
Leo C. Romero and David Amando C. Romero v. Court Of Appeals, Aurora C. Romero and Vittorio C. Romero
G.R. No. 188921, April 18, 2012 (Sereno, J.)
Only the probate court can competently rule on whether the properties are conjugal and form part of the estate.
FACTS:
Upon the death of the petitioners’ father on 18 October 1974, their mother, respondent Aurora Romero, was appointed as legal
guardian who held several real and personal properties in trust for her children. Since that year until the present, she continues to be
the administrator of the properties, businesses, and investments comprising the estate of her late husband.
Sometime in 2006, petitioners Leo and Amando discovered that several Deeds of Sale were registered over parcels of land that are
purportedly conjugal properties of their parents.
Petitioners claim that sometime in August of 2005, their brother Vittorio through fraud, misrepresentation and duress succeeded in
registering the above-mentioned properties in his name through of Deeds of Sale executed by their mother, Aurora. Vittorio allegedly
employed force and threat upon her, and even administered drugs that rendered her weak and vulnerable. Thus, Aurora signed the
Deeds of Sale without reading or knowing their contents.
Petitioners filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale, Nullification of Title, and Conveyance of Title (Amended) against private
respondents Aurora C. Romero and Vittorio C. Romero.
Petitioners’ Contention:
1. the probate court may rule on issues pertaining to title over property only in a provisional capacity
2. they, as heirs, are allowed to exercise their option of filing a separate civil action in order to protect their interests.
Respondents’ Contention:
1. the properties were acquired long after the death of their father, hence, they cannot be considered conjugal
RTC Ruling: The RTC dismissed petitioners’ complaint. It stated that the contending claims of plaintiffs and defendants in this case
could not be adjudicated nor passed upon by this Court without first getting a definitive pronouncement from the intestate court as to
the share of each of the heirs of the late Dante Y. Romero in his estate.
CA Ruling: The CA dismissed the Petition, ruling that the properties involved in this case are part of the estate left to the heirs of Judge
Romero, the partition of which is already subject of an intestate proceeding filed on 6 January 1976 in the then CFI.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners may file a separate civil action for annulment of sale and reconveyance of title, despite the pendency of the
settlement proceedings for the estate of the late Judge Dante Y. Romero
RULING:
NO. Only the probate court can competently rule on whether the properties are conjugal and form part of the estate. It is only the
probate court that can liquidate the conjugal partnership and distribute the same to the heirs, after the debts of the estate have been
paid.
Section 3, Rule 87 bars petitioners from filing the present action.

Sec. 3. Heir may not sue until share assigned. When an executor or administrator is appointed and assumes the trust, no action to recover
the title or possession of lands or for damages done to such lands shall be maintained against him by an heir or devisee until there is
an order of the court assigning such lands to such heir or devisee or until the time allowed for paying debts has expired.
Even if we assume the property to be conjugal and thus, part of the estate, Aurora’s acts as the administrator of the estate are subject
to the sole jurisdiction of the probate court. This issue can only be properly threshed out by the probate court.
Thus, the validity of the sales made by Aurora, allegedly orchestrated by petitioners’ co-heir, Vittorio, can only be determined by the
probate court, because it is the probate court which is empowered to identify the nature of the property, and that has jurisdiction over
Auroras actions and dispositions as administrator.
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Thelma M. Aranas v. Teresita V. Mercado, et al.

G.R. No. 156407, January 15, 2014 (Bersamin, J.)
The determination of which properties should be excluded from or included in the inventory of estate properties was well within the
authority and discretion of the RTC as an intestate court.
FACTS:
Emigdio Mercado died intestate and survived by his second wife, Teresita, and their five children, and his two children by his first
marriage, namely: Franklin and Thelma M. Aranas.
Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties during his lifetime. He owned corporate shares in Mervir Realty and Cebu Emerson. He
assigned his real properties in exchange for corporate stocks of Mervir Realty, and sold his real property to Mervir Realty.
Teresita was appointed as administrator of Emigdio's estate. Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate of Emigdio for the
consideration and approval by the RTC.
She indicated in the inventory that at the time of his death, Emigdio had “left no real properties but only personal properties” worth
P6,675,435.25 in including 44,806 shares of stock of Mervir Realty worth P6,585,585.80; and 30 shares of stock of Cebu Emerson worth
P22,708.25.
Claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties that were excluded from the inventory, Thelma moved that the RTC direct Teresita
to amend the inventory, and to be examined regarding it.
RTC granted Thelma’s motion through an order.
Teresita filed a compliance with the order supporting her inventory with copies of three certificates of stocks covering the 44,806
Mervir Realty shares of stock; the deed of assignment executed by Emigdio involving real properties with the market value of
P4,440,651.10 in exchange for 44,407 Mervir Realty shares of stock with total par value of P4,440,700.00; and the certificate of stock
issued for 300 shares of stock of Cebu Emerson worth P30,000.00.
Thelma opposed the approval of the inventory, and asked for leave of court to examine Teresita on the inventory. With the parties
agreeing to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the court on the issue of what properties should be included in or excluded from
the inventory, the RTC set dates for the hearing on that issue.
RTC Ruling: The RTC issued an order finding and holding that the inventory submitted by Teresita had excluded properties that should
be included.
CTA Ruling: CA reversed the RTC decision with regard to the inclusion of the property sold to Mervir Realty and affirmed in alll other
respects.
Petitioners Contention: Thelma claimed that the inventory did not contain certain properties of the decedent which should have been
included.
Respondents Contention: Teresita stated that one of the real properties affected had already been sold to Mervir Realty and the in the
possession and registered in the name of Mervir Realty.
ISSUES:
1. Whether certiorari was the proper recourse to assail the questioned orders of the RTC
2. Whether the properties shall be included in the estate of the decedent
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RULING:
1. YES. The propriety of the special civil action for certiorari as a remedy depended on whether the assailed orders of the RTC
were final or interlocutory in nature.
The assailed order of March 14, 2001 denying Teresita’s motion for the approval of the inventory and the order dated May 18,
2001 denying her motion for reconsideration were interlocutory. This is because the inclusion of the properties in the
inventory was not yet a final determination of their ownership. Hence, the approval of the inventory and the concomitant
determination of the ownership as basis for inclusion or exclusion from the inventory were provisional and subject to revision
at anytime during the course of the administration proceedings.
The prevailing rule is that for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the
inventory, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto but such determination is not conclusive and is subject
to the final decision in a separate action regarding ownership which may be instituted by the parties.
The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65,
provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Then
is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be resorted to.
2. YES. Yes. Under Section 6(a), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the letters of administration may be granted at the discretion of the
court to the surviving spouse, who is competent and willing to serve when the person dies intestate. Upon issuing the letters
of administration to the surviving spouse, the RTC becomes duty–bound to direct the preparation and submission of the
inventory of the properties of the estate, and the surviving spouse, as the administrator, has the duty and responsibility to
submit the inventory within three months from the issuance of letters of administration pursuant to Rule 83 of the Rules of
Court, viz:
Section 1. Inventory and appraisal to be returned within three months. – Within three (3) months after his appointment
every executor or administrator shall return to the court a true inventory and appraisal of all the real and
personal estate of the deceased which has come into his possession or knowledge. In the appraisement of such
estate, the court may order one or more of the inheritance tax appraisers to give his or their assistance.
The usage of the word all in Section 1 demands the inclusion of all the real and personal properties of the decedent in the
inventory. However, the word all is qualified by the phrase which has come into his possession or knowledge, which signifies
that the properties must be known to the administrator to belong to the decedent or are in her possession as the administrator.
Section 1 allows no exception, for the phrase true inventory implies that no properties appearing to belong to the decedent
can be excluded from the inventory, regardless of their being in the possession of another person or entity.
The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the inventory and appraisal of the estate of the decedent is “to aid the court in
revising the accounts and determining the liabilities of the executor or the administrator, and in making a final and equitable
distribution (partition) of the estate and otherwise to facilitate the administration of the estate.” Hence, the RTC that presides
over the administration of an estate is vested with wide discretion on the question of what properties should be included in
the inventory.
There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is special and limited. The trial court cannot
adjudicate title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate but are claimed to belong to third parties by title adverse to
that of the decedent and the estate, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the decedent. All that the trial court can do
regarding said properties is to determine whether or not they should be included in the inventory of properties to be
administered by the administrator. Such determination is provisional and may be still revised.
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Felix Uy Chua, et al. v. Court of Appeals and Sofia O. Sanchez

G.R. No. 121438, October 23, 2000, (Quisumbing, J.)
Once the court approved the sale of estate property and the order becomes final, the court can no longer rescind the sale.
FACTS:
Fernando B. Morada owned a lot located in Cebu City. His only heirs were his wife, Aida N. Morada, and two minor children. After his
death, the probate court appointed Aida as administratrix of her husband's estate. The probate court, presided by Judge Leoncio P.
Abarquez, also allowed the sale of the lot for P200,000.00 to the spouses Enriquez. Later, the spouses and Aida agreed to rescind the
said sale. Thereafter, the probate court again issued an order allowing the re-sale of said lot, the proceeds of which shall be used to pay
the P200,000.00 already paid by the Enriquez spouses. Subsequently, a Deed of Absolute Sale thereof was executed in favor of Sofia
Sanchez for P1,000,000.00 payable with a down payment of P500,000.00 and the balance to be paid after the lot was cleared of
squatters. The court approved the sale to Sanchez.
After more than two months from the date of approval of the sale, Intervenor Morelos, filed a motion for reconsideration opposing the
sale alleging that the sale was prejudicial to the minor heirs of Fernando. During the conference, Atty. Cabilao (another intervenor who
represented undisclosed clients interested to purchase the land) revealed that he offered P2 million pesos for the lot with the seller
undertaking the eviction of the present occupants, or P1.5 million with the buyer shouldering the expenses to clear the lot of its present
occupants. Atty. Cabilao filed his Proposal to Purchase the Property. In her comment and opposition, Aida Morada said that the court's
order approving the sale to Sofia Sanchez had already become final and executory, and that she had bought the land from the
administratrix in good faith and for value.
Judge Abarquez issued an order revoking his approval of the sale and declared void and without effect the deed of absolute sale he had
earlier approved finding that the Administratrix and Sanchez are both guilty of misrepresentation. Judge Abarquez also approved the
proposal of Atty. Cabilao to purchase the property for P1.5 million.
Sanchez filed a motion for reconsideration and made a counter-offer of P1.6 million. The motion was denied. As it turned out, the
property was bought by the Chuas, the clients of Atty. Cabilao.
Sanchez filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. CA granted the petition in favor of Sanchez and the Deed of Absolute
Sale in her favor was affirmed and reinstated. Reconsideration was denied. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Is the sale to Sanchez, which was previously approved by the probate court, final and consummated
RULING:
YES. It is final and consummated.
The order of the Probate Court authorizing, or subsequently approving, the absolute sale of property of the estate in favor of a specified
buyer undoubtedly constitutes a final determination of the rights not only of the buyer and the estate but also of any heir or party
claiming to be prejudiced by the sale. For obviously, once the sale is consummated and approved by the Court, the buyer will acquire
title to the property to the exclusion of the estate and the heirs or other party participating or otherwise involved in the proceedings
for settlement of the estate, unless the authority to sell or the approval of the sale by the Court be reversed seasonably and by the
proper adjective mode. After its approval of the sale, nothing is left to be done by the Probate Court with respect to the merits thereof;
and it is thus in this sense, a final order 'subject to appeal' pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
It will be recalled that the probate court declared the sale to Sanchez, null and void due to fraud and misrepresentation, then it
entertained the offer of Atty. Cabilao to purchase the property at a higher price. The Court of Appeals ruled that the sale of the property
to Atty. Cabilao was void because the court was already without jurisdiction to enter the same after the sale to Sanchez, which was
previously approved by the same court, was consummated and the intervenors failed to seasonably appeal therefrom.
Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules of Court provides that an interested person may appeal from an order or judgment rendered by the
probate court where such order constitutes the settlement of the estate of a deceased person. In the case at bar, the probate court
approved the Deed of Sale in favor of Sanchez on May 3, 1991. In special proceedings under Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and in other
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cases where multiple appeals are allowed, the period of appeal is thirty days. A record on appeal is required. Recall that Morelos did
not appeal but filed a motion for reconsideration only on July 16, 1991, while Atty. Cabilao intervened and offered to buy the property
on August 6, 1991. By then, the sale of the property to Sanchez was already consummated and final. When the probate court allowed
Atty. Cabilao to propose to buy the land and allowed the sale to the latter, the probate court, at this juncture, had clearly gravely abused
its discretion. All other proceedings thereafter were conducted by the probate court without jurisdiction including the erroneous
nullification of the sale to Sanchez and the subsequent sale to petitioners.
Additionally, the belated proposal to buy the property was filed by an offeror, Atty. Cabilao, who had no legal personality to impugn
the validity of the sale between the administratrix and Sanchez. It is well settled that for a person to be able to intervene in an
administration proceeding concerning the estate of a deceased person, it is necessary for him to have an interest in such estate. An
interested party in the estate of a decedent has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who
has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. Atty. Cabilao was neither a creditor nor an heir of the decedent. He had no right to
intervene in the probate hearings nor in the settlement of the succession.
The questioned orders of the probate court nullifying the sale to Sanchez after it approved the sale and after its order of approval had
become final and executory amount to oppressive exercise of judicial authority, a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. Further orders stemming therefrom are also null and without effect.
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E. Money Claims v. Estate
Alan Joseph A. Sheker v. Estate of Alice O. Sheker, Victoria S. Medina-Administratrix

G.R. No. 157912, December 13, 2007 (Austria-Martinez, J.)
Money claim is not an initiatory pleading nor non-payment of docket fees warrants its dismissal.
FACTS:
The RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice O. Sheker and thereafter issued an order for all the creditors to file their
respective claims against the estate. In compliance therewith, petitioner filed on October 7, 2002 a contingent claim for agent’s
commission due him amounting to approximately P206,250.00 in the event of the sale of certain parcels of land belonging to the estate,
and the amount of P275,000.00, as reimbursement for expenses incurred and/or to be incurred by petitioner in the course of
negotiating the sale of said realties.
The executrix of the Estate of Alice O. Sheker (respondent) moved for the dismissal of said money claim against the estate on the
grounds that (1) the requisite docket fee, as prescribed in Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, had not been paid; (2) petitioner
failed to attach a certification against non-forum shopping; and (3) petitioner failed to attach a written explanation why the money
claim was not filed and served personally.
On January 15, 2003, the RTC issued the assailed Order dismissing without prejudice the money claim based on the grounds advanced
by respondent. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied per Omnibus Order dated April 9, 2003. Petitioner maintains that
the RTC erred in strictly applying to a probate proceeding the rules requiring a certification of non-forum shopping, a written
explanation for non-personal filing, and the payment of docket fees upon filing of the claim. He insists that Section 2, Rule 72 of the
Rules of Court provides that rules in ordinary actions are applicable to special proceedings only in a suppletory manner.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC erred in dismissing the petitioner’s contingent money claim against respondent estate for failure of the petitioner
to attach in his motion a certification against non- forum shopping
RULING:
YES. Section 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court provides that in the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions
shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings. Stated differently, special provisions under Part II of the Rules of Court
govern special proceedings; but in the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in Part I of the Rules governing ordinary
civil actions shall be applicable to special proceedings, as far as practicable.
The word practicable is defined as: possible to practice or perform; capable of being put into practice, done or accomplished. This
means that in the absence of special provisions, rules in ordinary actions may be applied in special proceedings as much as possible
and where doing so would not pose an obstacle to said proceedings. Nowhere in the Rules of Court does it categorically say that rules
in ordinary actions are inapplicable or merely suppletory to special proceedings. Provisions of the Rules of Court requiring a
certification of non-forum shopping for complaints and initiatory pleadings, a written explanation for non-personal service and filing,
and the payment of filing fees for money claims against an estate would not in any way obstruct probate proceedings, thus, they are
applicable to special proceedings such as the settlement of the estate of a deceased person as in the present case.
The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for complaints and other initiatory pleadings. The RTC erred in ruling that a
contingent money claim against the estate of a decedent is an initiatory pleading. In the present case, the whole probate proceeding
was initiated upon the filing of the petition for allowance of the decedent's will. Under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court,
after granting letters of testamentary or of administration, all persons having money claims against the decedent are mandated to file
or notify the court and the estate administrator of their respective money claims; otherwise, they would be barred, subject to certain
exceptions.
Such being the case, a money claim against an estate is more akin to a motion for creditors' claims to be recognized and taken into
consideration in the proper disposition of the properties of the estate.
A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main action for the settlement of the decedent's estate; more so if the claim is
contingent since the claimant cannot even institute a separate action for a mere contingent claim. Hence, herein petitioner's contingent
money claim, not being an initiatory pleading, does not require a certification against non-forum shopping.
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Alfredo Hilado, et al. v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 164108; May 8, 2009 (Tinga, J.)
Claim based on torts entitles claimant to notice but cannot intervene in the settlement proceedings.
FACTS:
The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate on 15 May 2000. He was survived by his wife, private respondent
Julita Campos Benedicto (administratrix Benedicto), and his only daughter, Francisca Benedicto-Paulino. At the time of his death, there
were two pending civil cases against Benedicto involving the petitioners. The first, Civil Case No. 95-9137, was then pending with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitioner Alfredo Hilado as one of the plaintiffs therein. The second, Civil
Case No. 11178, was then pending with the RTC of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitioners Lopez Sugar Corporation and First Farmers
Holding Corporation as one of the plaintiffs therein. On 2 August 2000, the Manila RTC issued an order appointing private respondent
as administrator of the estate of her deceased husband, and issuing letters of administration in her favor. In January 2001, private
respondent submitted an Inventory of the Estate, Lists of Personal and Real Properties, and Liabilities of the Estate of her deceased
husband. In the List of Liabilities attached to the inventory, private respondent included as among the liabilities, the above-mentioned
two pending claims then being litigated before the Bacolod City courts. Private respondent stated that the amounts of liability
corresponding to the two cases as P136,045,772.50 for Civil Case No. 95-9137 and P35,198,697.40 for Civil Case No. 11178.
On 24 September 2001, petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela, praying that they be
furnished with copies of all processes and orders pertaining to the intestate proceedings. Private respondent opposed the
manifestation/motion, disputing the personality of petitioners to intervene in the intestate proceedings of her husband. Even before
the Manila RTC acted on the manifestation/motion, petitioners filed an omnibus motion praying that the Manila RTC set a deadline for
the submission by private respondent of the required inventory of the decedent’s estate. Petitioners also filed other pleadings or
motions with the Manila RTC, alleging lapses on the part of private respondent in her administration of the estate, and assailing the
inventory that had been submitted thus far as unverified, incomplete and inaccurate.
On 2 January 2002, the Manila RTC issued an order denying the manifestation/motion, on the ground that petitioners are not interested
parties within the contemplation of the Rules of Court to intervene in the intestate proceedings. After the Manila RTC had denied
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, a petition for certiorari was filed with the Court of Appeals. The petition argued in general that
petitioners had the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the latter being the defendant in the civil cases
they lodged with the Bacolod RTC.
CA RULING: CA dismissed the petition and declaring that the Manila RTC did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow petitioners to
intervene in the intestate proceedings. The allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene, according to the appellate court, is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court. The Court of Appeals cited the fact that the claims of petitioners against the decedent
were in fact contingent or expectant, as these were still pending litigation in separate proceedings before other courts.
ISSUE:
Whether the lower courts erred in denying petitioners the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of the estate of Roberto
Benedicto.
RULING:
NO. Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an intervenor "has a legal interest in the matter in litigation,
or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or
other disposition of property in the custody of the court x x x" While the language of Section 1, Rule 19 does not literally preclude
petitioners from intervening in the intestate proceedings, case law has consistently held that the legal interest required of an intervenor
"must be actual and material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent and expectant."
We can readily conclude that notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as set forth under Rule 19 does not extend to creditors
of a decedent whose credit is based on a contingent claim. The definition of "intervention" under Rule 19 simply does not accommodate
contingent claims.
Had the claims of petitioners against Benedicto been based on contract, whether express or implied, then they should have filed their
claim, even if contingent, under the aegis of the notice to creditors to be issued by the court immediately after granting letters of
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administration and published by the administrator immediately after the issuance of such notice. However, it appears that the claims
against Benedicto were based on tort, as they arose from his actions in connection with Philsucom, Nasutra and Traders Royal Bank.
Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict do not fall within the class of claims to be filed under the notice to creditors required under Rule
86. These actions, being as they are civil, survive the death of the decedent and may be commenced against the administrator pursuant
to Section 1, Rule 87. Indeed, the records indicate that the intestate estate of Benedicto, as represented by its administrator, was
successfully impleaded in Civil Case No. 11178, whereas the other civil case was already pending review before this Court at the time
of Benedicto’s death.
We now turn to the remaining reliefs sought by petitioners; that a deadline be set for the submission by administratrix Benedicto to
submit a verified and complete inventory of the estate, and upon submission thereof: the inheritance tax appraisers of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue be required to assist in the appraisal of the fair market value of the same; and that the intestate court set a deadline
for the submission by the administratrix of her verified annual account, and, upon submission thereof, set the date for her examination
under oath with respect thereto, with due notice to them and other parties interested in the collation, preservation and disposition of
the estate. We cannot grant said reliefs.
Section 1 of Rule 83 requires the administrator to return to the court a true inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate
of the deceased within three (3) months from appointment, while Section 8 of Rule 85 requires the administrator to render an account
of his administration within one (1) year from receipt of the letters testamentary or of administration. We do not doubt that there are
reliefs available to compel an administrator to perform either duty, but a person whose claim against the estate is still contingent is
not the party entitled to do so. Still, even if the administrator did delay in the performance of these duties in the context of dissipating
the assets of the estate, there are protections enforced and available under Rule 88 to protect the interests of those with contingent
claims against the estate.
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Purita Alipio v. Court Of Appeals and Romeo G. Jaring

G.R. No. 134100, September 29, 2000 (Mendoza J.)
After the death of either of the spouses, no complaint for the collection of indebtedness chargeable against the conjugal partnership can
be brought against the surviving spouse. Instead, the claim must be made in the proceedings for the liquidation and settlement of the
conjugal property.
FACTS:
Respondent Romeo Jaring was the lessee of a 14.5 hectare fishpond in Barito, Mabuco, Hermosa, Bataan. The lease was for a period of
five years, he then subleased the fishpond to the spouses Alipio and spouses Manuel in which the rent was payable for in two
installments. The first installment was paid but the second installment was partially satisfied and repeated demands by the respondent
for its payment was not complied. Respondent filed a case against the spouses and for the rescission of the contract.
Petitioner Alipio filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that her husband, Placido Alipio, had passed away She based her action on
Rule 3, 21 of the 1964 Rules of Court which then provided that "when the action is for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon, and
the defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially
provided in these rules.
The trial court denied petitioner's motion on the ground that since petitioner was herself a party to the sublease contract, she could be
independently impleaded in the suit together with the Manuel spouses and that the death of her husband merely resulted in his
exclusion from the case. Spouses Manuel was rendered in default. The RTC rendered decision ordering the petitioner and Spouses
Manuel to pay the balance. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals but it was dismissed, The CA opined that the rule that an action
for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon must be dismissed when the defendant dies before final judgment in the regional trial
court, does not apply where there are other defendants against whom the action should be maintained, thus recourse to the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent can file a case against the petitioner
RULING:
NO. The petition is meritorious. We hold that a creditor cannot sue the surviving spouse of a decedent in an ordinary proceeding for
the collection of a sum of money chargeable against the conjugal partnership and that the proper remedy is for him to file a claim in
the settlement of estate of the decedent.
Petitioner's husband died on December 1, 1988, more than ten months before private respondent filed the collection suit in the trial
court on October 13, 1989. This case thus falls outside of the ambit of Rule 3, 21 which deals with dismissals of collection suits because
of the death of the defendant during the pendency of the case and the subsequent procedure to be undertaken by the plaintiff, i.e., the
filing of claim in the proceeding for the settlement of the decedent's estate. As already noted, Rule 3, 20 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure now provides that the case will be allowed to continue until entry of final judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by the
plaintiff therein will then be enforced in the manner especially provided in the Rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of a
deceased person. When petitioner's husband died, their conjugal partnership was automatically dissolved and debts chargeable against
it are to be paid in the settlement of estate proceedings in accordance with Rule 73, 2 which states:
Where estate settled upon dissolution of marriage. When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the community
property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof paid, in the testate or intestate proceedings of the
deceased spouse. If both spouses have died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either.
As held in Calma v. Taedo after the death of either of the spouses, no complaint for the collection of indebtedness chargeable against
the conjugal partnership can be brought against the surviving spouse. Instead, the claim must be made in the proceedings for the
liquidation and settlement of the conjugal property. The reason for this is that upon the death of one spouse, the powers of
administration of the surviving spouse ceases and is passed to the administrator appointed by the court having jurisdiction over the
settlement of estate proceedings.
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It must be noted that for marriages governed by the rules of conjugal partnership of gains, an obligation entered into by the husband
and wife is chargeable against their conjugal partnership and it is the partnership which is primarily bound for its repayment Thus,
when the spouses are sued for the enforcement of an obligation entered into by them, they are being impleaded in their capacity as
representatives of the conjugal partnership and not as independent debtors such that the concept of joint or solidary liability, as
between them, does not apply.
It is clear that private respondent cannot maintain the present suit against petitioner. Rather, his remedy is to file a claim against the
Alipios in the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of petitioner's husband or, if none has been commenced, he can file a petition
either for the issuance of letters of administration or for the allowance of will, depending on whether petitioner's husband died
intestate or testate.
The trial court ordered petitioner and the Manuel spouses to pay private respondent the unpaid balance of the agreed rent in the
amount of P50,600.00 without specifying whether the amount is to be paid by them jointly or solidarily. In connection with this, Art.
1207 of the Civil Code provides:
The concurrence of two or more creditors or of two or more debtors in one and the same obligation does not imply that each one of the
former has a right to demand, or that each one of the latter is bound to render, entire compliance with the prestations. There is a solidary
liability only when the obligation expressly so estates, or when the law or the nature of the obligation requires solidarity.
Indeed, if from the law or the nature or the wording of the obligation the contrary does not appear, an obligation is presumed to be
only joint, i.e., the debt is divided into as many equal shares as there are debtors, each debt being considered distinct from one another.
Private respondent does not cite any provision of law which provides that when there are two or more lessees, or in this case,
sublessees, the latter's obligation to pay the rent is solidary. Clearly, the liability of the sublessees is merely joint.
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Social Security Commission and Apolonio Lamboso v. Far S. Alba

G.R. No. 165482, July 23, 2008, (Tinga, J)
An action for remittance of SS monthly contributions is not a type of money claim which needs to be filed against the estate proceedings.
FACTS:
In 1991, petitioner Lamboso filed a claim for retirement benefit before the SSS. However, his claim was denied on the ground that he
could not qualify for monthly pension under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1161 (the Social Security Act of 1954) as he then had only thirty-
nine (39) paid contributions. On 11 December 1996, Lamboso appealed the denial of his claim by filing a petition before the
Commission wherein he alleged that he should be entitled to monthly retirement pension.
In 2001, the Commission rendered its resolution declaring:
The failure on the part of respondent Far Alba to file his responsive pleading to the petition filed by
petitioner Apolonio Lamboso strongly indicates lack or absence of evidence, by way of rebuttal, to the positive assertion of
the petitioner regarding his employment with the former from 1960 to April 1973. Besides, defrauding respondent Far Alba
reported Apolonio Lamboso to the SSS for coverage effective April 1, 1970 and this act of reporting is already an
incontrovertible proof of employment.The SSS Commission ordered respondent Far Alba to pay to the SSS the delinquent
monthly contributions of Lamboso.
The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside both the resolution and the order of the Commission. It held that Far Alba cannot be
considered as an employer of Lamboso prior to 1970 because as administrator of the family-owned hacienda, he is not an employer
under Section 8(c) of the Social Security Act of 1954.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the term employer under the Social Security Act of 1954 may be applied to Far Alba, the administrator-son of the
owner, Arturo Alba, Sr., who is directly and actively involved in the operation of the agricultural undertaking.
2. Whether a petition for the payment of SS contributions and SS retirement benefits may be filed before the estate proceedings
of the deceased employer.
RULING:
1. YES. Far Alba had indeed served as Lambosos employer from 1965 to 1970 or, at the very least, he had served as
the haciendas administrator before 1970. First, the Court observes that Far Alba was no ordinary administrator. He was no
less than the son of the haciendas owner and as such he was an owner-in-waiting prior to his father’s death. He was a member
of the owners family assigned to actively manage the operations of the hacienda. As he stood to benefit from
the haciendas successful operation, he ineluctably took his job and his father’s wishes to heart. Second, nomenclature aside,
Far Alba was not merely an administrator of the hacienda. Applying the control test which is used to determine the existence
of employer-employee relationship for purposes of compulsory coverage under the SSS law, Far Alba is
technically Lambosos employer. Third, not to be forgotten is the definition of an employer under Article 167(f) of the Labor
Code which deals with employees’ compensation and state insurance fund. Plainly, Far Alba, as the hacienda administrator,
acts as the legal representative of the employer and is thus an employer within the meaning of the law liable to pay the SS
contributions.
2. YES. The Court agreed with the Commissions assertion that an action for remittance of SS monthly contributions is not a type
of money claim which needs to be filed against the estate proceedings. In the case of Vera, et al. v. Judge Fernandez, the Court
declared that claims by the government for unpaid taxes are not covered by the statute of non-claims as these are monetary
obligations created by law. Even after the distribution of the estate, claims for taxes may be enforced against the distributees in
proportion to their shares in the inheritance. Similarly, employers are required to remit the contributions to the SSS by
mandate of law. As such, actions of this type should be treated in much the same way as taxes that they are not required to be
filed against the estate and that they be claimed against the heirs of the errant decedent.
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F. Prescription against Heir with respect to Extra-Judicial Partition
Maria Elena Rodriguez Pedrosa v. Court Of Appeals, et al.

G.R. No. 118680, March 5, 2001 (Quisumbing, J.)
The 2-year period does not apply to heirs who had no knowledge of and consent to EJP and where partition is sought to be annulled on
the grounds of Fraud.
FACTS:
Spouses Miguel and Rosalina de Rodriguez adopted Maria Elena Rodriguez Pedrosa. Years later, Miguel died intestate. Private
respondents filed an action to annul the adoption of Maria Elena.
The RTC upheld the validity of the adoption. While the case is pending on appeal in the Court of Appeals, the Rodriguezes entered into
a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition with respondent Rosalina for the partition of the estate of Miguel and of another sister,
Pilar. Rosalina acted as the representative of the heirs of Miguel Rodriguez.
New TCTs under the name of the respondents were subsequently issued. Maria Elena then sent her daughter to claim their share of
the properties from the Rodriguezes. The latter refused saying that Maria Elena and Loreto were not heirs since they were not their
blood relatives. Maria Elena filed a complaint to annul the partition.
ISSUE:
Whether the action to annul the partition has prescribed
RULING:
NO. Section 4, Rule 74 provides for a two year prescriptive period (1) to persons who have participated or taken part or had notice of
the extrajudicial partition, and in addition (2) when the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with, i.e., that all
the persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by themselves or through guardians.
Petitioner, as the records confirm, did not participate in the extrajudicial partition. Patently then, the two-year prescriptive period is
not applicable in her case.
The applicable prescriptive period here is four (4) years as provided in Gerona vs. De Guzman, 11 SCRA 153 (1964), which held that:
[The action to annul] a deed of "extrajudicial settlement" upon the ground of fraud...may be filed within four years from the
discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken place when said instrument was filed with the Register of
Deeds and new certificates of title were issued in the name of respondents exclusively.
Considering that the complaint of the petitioner was filed on January 28, 1987, or three years and ten months after the questioned
extrajudicial settlement dated March 11, 1983, was executed, we hold that her action against the respondents on the basis of fraud has
not yet prescribed.
Also, Section 1 of Rule 74 provides that “The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of
general circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any
person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.”
Lastly, it cannot be argued that Maria Elena was represented by Rosalina in the extrajudicial settlement because at that time, Maria
Elena was no longer a minor. Hence, Rosalina only represented herself during the settlement.
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G. Action vs. Estate
Spouses Rodolfo Berot and Lilia Berot v. Felipe C. Siapno

G.R. No. 188944, July 9, 2014 (Sereno, C.J.)
Estate can be impleaded as defendant if there is no objection.
FACTS:
On May 23, 2002, Macaria Berot and Spouses Rodolfo and Lilia P. Berot obtained a loan from Felipe C. Siapno in the sum of P250,000.00,
payable within one year together with interest thereon at the rate of 2% per annum from that date until fully paid. As security for the
loan, Macaria, Rodolfo and Lilia mortgaged to Felipe a portion, consisting of 147 square meters, of that parcel of land with an area of
718 square meters, situated in Banaoang, Calasiao, Pangasinan and covered by Tax Declaration No. 1123 in the names of Macaria and
her husband Pedro Berot, deceased. On June 23, 2003, Macaria died.
Because of the mortgagors’ default, Felipe filed an action against them for foreclosure of mortgage and damages in the Regional Trial
Court of Dagupan City. The action was anchored on the averment that the mortgagors failed and refused to pay the sum of P250,000.00
plus the stipulated interest of 2% per month despite lapse of one year. Spouses Berot alleged that the contested property was the
inheritance from Rodolfo's deceased father, Pedro; that on said property is their family home; that the mortgage is void as it was
constituted over the family home without the consent of their children, who are the beneficiaries thereof; that their obligation is only
joint; and that the lower court has no jurisdiction over Macaria for the reason that no summons was served on her as she was already
dead.
With leave of court, the complaint was amended by substituting the estate of Macaria in her stead. Thus, the defendants named in the
amended complaint are now the "ESTATE OF MACARIA BEROT, represented by Rodolfo A. Berot, RODOLFO A. BEROT and LILIA P.
BEROT".
The lower court rendered a decision allowing the foreclosure of the subject mortgage. On appeal, Rodolfo contends that the substitution
of the estate of Macaria for her is improper as the estate has no legal personality to sue and be sued. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether the estate of Macaria Berot has legal personality to sue and be sued
RULING:
NO. A deceased person does not have such legal entity as is necessary to bring action so much so that a motion to substitute cannot lie
and should be denied by the court. However, Petitioners failed to object to the trial court's exercise of jurisdiction over the estate of
Macaria when the latter was impleaded by respondents by amending the original complaint. Hence, they have deemed to have waive
any objection on the personality of the estate of Macaria.
An action begun by a decedent's estate cannot be said to have been begun by a legal person, since an estate is not a legal entity such an
action is a nullity and a motion to amend the party plaintiff will not lie, there being nothing before the court to amend. A decedent does
not have the capacity to be sued and may not be named a party defendant in court action.
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People of the Philippines v. Gerry Lipata

G.R. No. 200302, April 20, 2016. (Carpio, J.)
Where the civil liability survives, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and
subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended.
FACTS:
Lipata was charged with the crime of Murder of one Ronaldo Cuenco. The trial court convicted him and ordered him to pay the heirs
of Rolando Cueno the following amounts: (a) Php 50,000.00 representing civil indemnity ex delicto of the accused; (b) Php 120,550.00
representing the actual damages incurred by the heirs of Rolando Cueno; (c) Php 50,000.00 as moral damages; and (d) Php 25,000.00
as exemplary damages.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. The appellant, through the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) filed
a notice of appeal on 10 June 2011. The Court of Appeals ordered the immediate elevation of the records to the Supreme Court in its
30 June 2011 Resolution.
While appeal to the Supreme Court is pending, the Quezon City Jail Warden, in a letter dated 22 October 2012, informed the High Court
that appellant passed away on 13 February 2011. The Supreme Court required the parties to submit their supplemental briefs on the
civil aspect of the case if they so desire.
The PAO manifested that, considering that the civil liability in the instant case arose from and is based solely on the act complained of,
i.e. murder, the same does not survive the death of the deceased appellant. Thus, in line with the ruling in the case of People v. Jaime
Ayochok, citing People v. Rogelio Bayotas, the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguished his criminal liability
as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. This being so, it is respectfully submitted that the necessity to substitute the legal
representatives of the estate of the deceased as party does not arise.
On 9 July 2014, the Court issued a Resolution which declared that "the PAO shall continue as the legal representative of the estate of
the deceased appellant for purposes of representing the estate in the civil aspect of this case."
ISSUE:
Whether the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes not only his criminal liability but also his civil liability
RULING:
YES. The criminal and civil liabilities ex delicto of appellant Gerry Lipata y Ortiza are declared EXTINGUISHED by his death prior to
final judgment.
The Court summarized its ruling in Bayotas as follows:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon.
As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only
the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of
obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may
arise as a result of the same act or omission: a) Law; b) Contracts; c) Quasi-contracts; d) Quasi-delicts.
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of
filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil
action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon
which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where
during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil
action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case,
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conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible deprivation of right
by prescription.
The Court ruled in this case that contrary to the PAO’s Manifestation, Cueno died because of appellant’s fault. Appellant caused damage
to Cueno through deliberate acts. Appellant’s civil liability ex quasi delicto may now be pursued because appellant’s death on 13
February 2011, before the promulgation of final judgment, extinguished both his criminal liability and civil liability ex delicto.
Nevertheless, pursuant to the rules enunciated in the case of Bayotas, the private offended party, or his heirs, in this case, are required
to institute a separate civil action to pursue their claims against the estate of the deceased appellant. The independent civil actions
other than delict, are not deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed separately by the offended party even without
reservation.
Upon examination of the submitted pleadings however, the Court found that there was no separate civil case instituted prior to the
criminal case. Neither was there any reservation for filing a separate civil case for the cause of action arising from quasi-delict. Under
the present Rules, the heirs of Cueno should file a separate civil case in order to obtain financial retribution for their loss. The lack of a
separate civil case for the cause of action arising from quasi-delict leads to the conclusion that, a decade after Cueno’s death, his heirs
cannot recover even a centavo from the amounts awarded by the Court of Appeals.
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Philippine National Bank v. Honorable Elias B. Asuncion, et al.

G.R. No. L-46095, November 23, 1977 (Makasiar, J.)
In case of the death of one of the solidary debtors, the creditor may, if he so chooses, proceed against the surviving solidary debtors
without necessity of filing a claim in the estate of the deceased debtors.
FACTS:
PNB extended credit accommodations in favour of private respondent FABAR, Inc which are secured by the joint and several signatures
of the private respondents and one Manuel H. Barredo. For failure of private respondents to pay their obligations notwithstanding
repeated demands, petitioner instituted a case for collection against all private respondents and Manuel H. Barredo in a complaint
dated October 31, 1972, and which was filed before the sala of the Honorable Elias B. Asuncion.
Barredo died while the case was pending before Hon. Asuncion’s court. The respondent court issued an order of dismissal which states
that:
In view of the death of defendant Manuel Barredo, the Court hereby dismisses this case since the present suit is for a money
claim which does not survive the death of said defendant.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:
Where the obligation of the decedent is solidary with another debtor, the claim shall be filed against the decedent as if he
were the only debtor, without prejudice to the right of the estate to recover contribution from the other debtor the claim of
plaintiff may be filed with the estate proceedings of the decedent.
PNB alleged that the respondent Court erred in dismissing the case against all the defendants, instead of dismissing the case only as
against the deceased defendant and thereafter proceeding with the hearing as against the other defendants, private respondents
herein.
ISSUE:
Whether PNB, creditor, may proceed against the private respondents as surviving solidary debtors
RULING:
YES. A cursory perusal of Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court reveals that nothing therein prevents a creditor from
proceeding against the surviving solidary debtors. Said provision merely sets up the procedure in enforcing collection in case a creditor
chooses to pursue his claim against the estate of the deceased solidary debtor. The rule has been set forth that a creditor (in a solidary
obligation) has the option whether to file or not to file a claim against the estate of the solidary debtor. In construing Section 6, Rule 87
of the old Rules of Court, which is the precursor of Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court, this Court said, in the case of Manila
Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Villarama, et al. (107 Phil. 891) that:
It is evident from the foregoing that Section 6 of Rule 87 (of the Old Rules of Court) provides the procedure should the creditor
desire to go against the deceased debtor, but there is certainly nothing in the said provision making compliance with such
procedure a condition precedent before an ordinary action against the surviving debtors, should the creditor choose to
demand payment from the latter, could be entertained to the extent that failure to observe the same would deprive the court
jurisdiction to 'take cognizance of the action against the surviving debtors. Upon the other hand, the Civil Code expressly allow
the creditor to proceed against any one of the solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously.
It is crystal clear that Article 1216 of the New Civil Code is the applicable provision in this matter. Said provision gives the creditor the
night to "proceed against anyone of the solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously. ”The choice is undoubtedly left to the
solidary creditor to determine against whom he will enforce collection. In case of the death of one of the solidary debtors, he (the
creditor) may, if he so chooses, proceed against the surviving solidary debtors without necessity of filing a claim in the estate of the
deceased debtors. It is not mandatory for him to have the case dismissed as against the surviving debtors and file its claim against the
estate of the deceased solidary debtor, as was made apparent in the aforequoted decision. For to require the creditor to proceed against
the estate, making it a condition precedent for any collection action against the surviving debtors to prosper, would deprive him of his
substantive rights provided by Article 1216 of the New Civil Code.
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Boston Equity Resources, Inc. v. Court Of Appeals and Lolita G. Toledo

G.R. NO. 173946, June 19, 2013 (Perez, J.)
In case of the death of one of the solidary debtors, the creditor may, if he so chooses, proceed against the surviving solidary debtors
without necessity of filing a claim in the estate of the deceased debtors.
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against the spouses
Manuel and Lolita Toledo. Private respondent alleged that her co-defendant husband is already dead. Petitioner then required the
respondent to disclose all the heirs of Manuel, to which private respondent complied. Petitioner prayed that Manuel be substituted by
his heirs.
The private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, citing the following as grounds:
(1) that the complaint failed to implead an indispensable party or a real party in interest; hence, the case must be dismissed for
failure to state a cause of action;
(2) that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Manuel pursuant to Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules
of Court;
(3) that the trial court erred in ordering the substitution of the deceased Manuel by his heirs; and
(4) that the court must also dismiss the case against Lolita Toledo in accordance with Section 6, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the motion to dismiss should be granted
RULING:
NO. Applying the foregoing pronouncements to the case at bar, it is clear that the estate of Manuel is not an indispensable party to the
collection case, for the simple reason that the obligation of Manuel and his wife, respondent herein, is solidary.
The contract between petitioner, on the one hand and respondent and respondent’s husband, on the other, states:
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, I/We jointly and severally (in solemn) promise to pay BOSTON EQUITY RESOURCES, INC. x x x the sum of
PESOS: [ONE MILLION FOUR HUNDRED (P1,400,000.00)] x x x
The provisions and stipulations of the contract were then followed by the respective signatures of respondent as "MAKER" and her
husband as "CO-MAKER." Thus, pursuant to Article 1216 of the Civil Code, petitioner may collect the entire amount of the obligation
from respondent only. The aforementioned provision states: "The creditor may proceed against any one of the solidary debtors or
some or all of them simultaneously. The demand made against one of them shall not be an obstacle to those which may subsequently
be directed against the others, so long as the debt has not been fully collected."
In other words, the collection case can proceed and the demands of petitioner can be satisfied by respondent only, even without
impleading the estate of Manuel. Consequently, the estate of Manuel is not an indispensable party to petitioner’s complaint for sum of
money.
However, the Court of Appeals, agreeing with the contention of respondent, held that the claim of petitioner should have been filed
against the estate of Manuel in accordance with Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.
The Court of Appeals erred in its interpretation of the above-quoted provisions.
In construing Section 6, Rule 87 of the old Rules of Court, the precursor of Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court, which latter
provision has been retained in the present Rules of Court without any revisions, the Supreme Court, in the case of Manila Surety &
Fidelity Co., Inc. v. Villarama, et. al., held:
Construing Section 698 of the Code of Civil Procedure from whence [Section 6, Rule 87] was taken, this Court held that where two
persons are bound in solidum for the same debt and one of them dies, the whole indebtedness can be proved against the estate of the
latter, the decedent’s liability being absolute and primary; x x x. It is evident from the foregoing that Section 6 of Rule 87 provides the
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procedure should the creditor desire to go against the deceased debtor, but there is certainly nothing in the said provision making
compliance with such procedure a condition precedent before an ordinary action against the surviving solidary debtors, should the
creditor choose to demand payment from the latter, could be entertained to the extent that failure to observe the same would deprive
the court jurisdiction to take cognizance of the action against the surviving debtors. Upon the other hand, the Civil Code expressly
allows the creditor to proceed against any one of the solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously. There is, therefore, nothing
improper in the creditor’s filing of an action against the surviving solidary debtors alone, instead of instituting a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased debtor wherein his claim could be filed.
The foregoing ruling was reiterated and expounded in the later case of Philippine National Bank v. Asuncion where the Supreme Court
pronounced:
A cursory perusal of Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court reveals that nothing therein prevents a creditor from proceeding
against the surviving solidary debtors. Said provision merely sets up the procedure in enforcing collection in case a creditor chooses
to pursue his claim against the estate of the deceased solidary debtor. The rule has been set forth that a creditor (in a solidary
obligation) has the option whether to file or not to file a claim against the estate of the solidary debtor.
It is crystal clear that Article 1216 of the New Civil Code is the applicable provision in this matter. Said provision gives the creditor the
right to "proceed against anyone of the solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously." The choice is undoubtedly left to the
solidary creditor to determine against whom he will enforce collection. In case of the death of one of the solidary debtors, he (the
creditor) may, if he so chooses, proceed against the surviving solidary debtors without necessity of filing a claim in the estate of the
deceased debtors. It is not mandatory for him to have the case dismissed as against the surviving debtors and file its claim against the
estate of the deceased solidary debtor, x x x. For to require the creditor to proceed against the estate, making it a condition precedent
for any collection action against the surviving debtors to prosper, would deprive him of his substantive rights provided by Article 1216
of the New Civil Code.
As correctly argued by petitioner, if Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court were applied literally, Article 1216 of the New Civil
Code would, in effect, be repealed since under the Rules of Court, petitioner has no choice but to proceed against the estate of [the
deceased debtor] only. Obviously, this provision diminishes the [creditor’s] right under the New Civil Code to proceed against any one,
some or all of the solidary debtors. Such a construction is not sanctioned by principle, which is too well settled to require citation, that
a substantive law cannot be amended by a procedural rule. Otherwise stated, Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court cannot
be made to prevail over Article 1216 of the New Civil Code, the former being merely procedural, while the latter, substantive.
Based on the foregoing, the estate of Manuel is not an indispensable party and the case can proceed as against respondent only. That
petitioner opted to collect from respondent and not from the estate of Manuel is evidenced by its opposition to respondent’s motion to
dismiss asserting that the case, as against her, should be dismissed so that petitioner can proceed against the estate of Manuel.
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ESCHEAT
In the matter of escheat proceedings of the estate of the deceased Anne Fallon Murphy and Tomas Fallon married to Julia
Fallon v. Ignatius Henry Bezore, et al.
G.R. No. L-14157, October 26, 1960 (Labrador, J.)
These are escheat proceedings instituted by the Municipalities of Magallon, La Castellana and Isabela, Province of Negros Occidental,
in the CFI, praying that the estates of the deceased Anne Fallon Murphy and Thomas Fallon the latter married to Julia Fallon, consisting
of agricultural lands and residential lots, as well as accrued rentals deposited with the Warner, Barnes and Co., Ltd., be escheated in
favor of the above-named municipalities, respectively, wherever the real estates are situated. Finding that the petition was in order,
the judge of the court ordered the publication of the petition and set the same for hearing before itself on October 9, 1957.
The evidence shows that the properties sought to be escheated originally to Charles J. Fallon, an American citizen, married to Rosario
Santaromana. Fallon died in Manila on March 25, 1935, so his wife acquired by inheritance one-half of the said properties as owner,
and the other half as usufructuary. The value of the properties of Charles J. Fallon in 1936 is estimated at P46l,105.41 (Exhibit "H"). His
wife Rosario Santaromana died in 1943, and thereupon the properties which she held in usufruct were transmitted to the brother and
sister of her deceased husband, namely, Thomas Fallon and Anne Fallon Murphy. The value of the estate belonging to both Thomas
Fallon and Anne Fallon Murphy were residents of the United States and as nothing was known about them from their relatives in the
United States, the petitioning municipalities believed that they had died without heirs. Hence the petition for escheat.
At the hearing of the petition, evidence was submitted that Anne Fallon Murphy died on March 12, 1936 in San Francisco, California
(ROA p. 21), while Thomas Fallon, died on May 26, 1936, also in San Francisco, California (ROA p. 25). Julia Fallon, on the other hand,
died in San Francisco, California on December 2, 1944 (ROA p. 26).
Opposition to the petition for escheat was filed by Ignatius Bezore. Elwood Knickerbocker and Mary Irene Fallon McCormick Henry
Bezore claims that he is the a nephew of the decedents because his mother was their sister. Elwood Knickerbocker also claims to be
the sole legatee of his wife Loreta Knickerbocker, who in turn, was the residuary legatee of Anne Fallon Murphy. Mary Irene Murphy
McCormick likewise claims that she is the niece of the decedents as her father was a brother of said decedents. Conformably to their
petitions, all the oppositors pray that the petition for escheat be dismissed and that the properties of the decedents be disturbed among
them.
The court, after hearing, found that Anne Fallon Murphy died in San Francisco on March 12, 1936 and Thomas Fallon, also in the same
city on May 26, 1936; that Thomas Fallon was survived by his wife Julia Fallon, who in turn, died in San Francisco on December 22,
1944; that Ane Fallon Murphy executed a will on February 7, 1935, which was admitted to probate on May 7, 1937. Considering these
facts the court denied the petition for escheat of the properties of the deceased Anne Fallon Murphy and Thomas Fallon, for the reason
that Thomas Fallon died with an heir his wife Julia Fallon, and Anne Fallon Murphy, for her part, died leaving a will, in which she
disposed of all her properties.
As to prayers contained in the opposition asking that the oppositors be declared heirs of the deceased Thomas Fallon and Anne Fallon
Murphy, the court declared that the evidence submitted was not competent or sufficient to sustain the claim of the oppositors and,
therefore denied said prayers.
The petitioning municipalities presented no appeal, but the oppositors did appeal, claiming that the lower court erred in not rendering
judgment in their favor and in not declaring them heirs of the decedents Anne Fallon Murphy and Thomas Fallon.
This appeal cannot be entertained. While it is possible for the estates of the deceased Anne Fallon Murphy and Thomas Fallon, who at
the time of their death were residents of San Francisco, California, to be settled here, or more especially in Negros Occidental where
they had properties, these proceedings were instituted as escheat proceedings and not for the settlement of the estate of deceased
persons. The court acquired jurisdiction to hear the petition for escheat by virtue of the publication of the petition for escheat. The
jurisdiction acquired cannot be converted into one for the distribution of the properties of the said decedents. For such proceedings
(for the distribution of the estate of the decedents) to be instituted, the proper parties must be presented and the proceedings should
comply with the requirements of the Rule. Hence, the court of First Instance did not have the power to order, or to proceed with, the
distribution of the estates of the decedents in these escheat proceedings, and adjudicate the properties to the oppositors.
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GUARDIANSHIP
Heirs of Jose Sy Bang, et al. v. Rolando Sy, Rosalino Sy, et al.

G.R. No. 114217, October 13, 2009 (Nachura, J.)
The guardianship court exercising special and limited jurisdiction cannot actually order the delivery of the property of the ward found to
be embezzled, concealed or conveyed.
FACTS:
Deceased Sy Bang died intestate leaving behind real and personal properties including several businesses.
Respondents Rolando, Rosalino, Enrique, Lucio, Rosauro, Bartolome, Julieta, Lourdes, Florencita Sy, are the children of Sy Bang by his
second marriage to respondent Rosita Sya, while petitioners Jose, Julian and Oscar Sy are the children of Sy Bang from his first marriage
to Ba Nga and petitioners Zanaida Tan and Ma. Emma Sy are the children of spouses Jose Sy and Illuminada Tan.
Respondent filed a Complaint for Partition against Petitioners. During an out-of-court conference between the parties, it was agreed
that the management, supervision or administration of the common properties and/or the entire estate of the deceased shall be placed
temporarily in the hands of Jose Sy Bang. They also agreed that the income of the three cinema houses shall exclusively pertain to
respondents for their support and sustenance, pending the termination of the Civil Case for Judicial Partition, and the income from vast
parts of the entire estate and other businesses of their common father, to pertain exclusively to petitioners.
While the case was pending, Rosita (the second wife) filed a Motion for Payment of Widow’s Allowance. She alleged that her deceased
husband left an extensive estate. The properties of the estate were found by the trial court to be the conjugal properties. From the time
of Sy Bang’s death until the filing of the motion, Rosita was not given any widow’s allowance as provided in Section 3 Rule 83 of the
Rules of Court by the parties in possession and control of her husband’s estate, or her shares in the conjugal partnership.
The Court granted the Motion for Payment of Widow’s allowance and ordered petitioners jointly and severally to pay Rosita 25, 000
as the widow’s allowance to be taken from the estate of SY Bang until the estate is finally setteled or until further orders from the Court.
Meanwhile, respondents filed a Joint Petition for the Guardianship of the Incompetent Rosita before the RTC; Rosauro Sy, who sought
to be named as the special guardian, filed before the guardianship court a Motion to Order Court Deposit of Widow’s Allowance Ordered
by the Supreme Court.
The guardianship court issued an order directing the respondents to deposit before such court certain amount representing the
widow’s allowance of the incompetent Rosita. Respondent became her guardian and the Petitioners questioned the order granting the
court deposit of the widow’s allowance and alleged that the guardianship court’s jurisdiction is limited to determining whether Rosita
was incompetent and the guardianship court had no authority to enforce the payment of widow’s allowance.
ISSUE:
Whether the guardianship court has the authority to enforce the payment of widow’s allowance.
RULING:
NO. The guardianship court exercising special and limited jurisdiction cannot actually order the delivery of the property of the ward
found to be embezzled, concealed or conveyed. It is the court hearing the settlement of the estate that should effect the payment of the
widow’s allowance considering that the properties of the estate are within its jurisdiction.
SECTION 3, RULE 83 of the Rules of Court states: Allowance to widow and family- The widow and minor or incapacitated children of a
deceased person, during the settlement of the estate, shall receive therefrom, under the direction of the court, such allowance as are
provided by law.
Correlatively, ARTICLE 188 of the Civil Code states: From the common mass of property support shall be given to the surviving spouse
and to the children during the liquidation of the inventoried property and until what belongs to them is delivered; but from this shall
be deducted that amount received for support which exceeds the fruits or rents pertaining to them.
Obviously, “the court” referred to in SECTION 3, RULE 83 of the Rules of Court is the court hearing the settlement of the estate. Also,
crystal clear is the provision of the law that the widow’s allowance is to be taken from the common mass of property forming part of
the estate of the decedent.
Thus, evident from the foregoing provisions, it is the court hearing the settlement of the estate that should effect the payment of
widow’s allowance considering that the properties of the estate are within its jurisdiction, to the exclusion of all other courts. The
guardianship court exercising special and limited jurisdiction cannot actually order the delivery of the property of the ward found to
be embezzled, concealed or conveyed.
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GUARDIANSHIP
Salvador Guerrero v. Leopoldo Teran

G.R. No. L-4898, March 19, 1909 (Johnson, J.)
The guardian must be within the jurisdiction of the court.
FACTS:
The defendant Leopoldo Teran was appointed as administrator of the estate of Antonio Sanchez Muñoz. The CFI of the Province of
Albay then appointed Maria Muñoz y Gomez as guardian of Maria Manuela and Maria del Carmen Sanchez Muñoz.
The defendant continued to act as the administrator of said estate after the appointment of the said guardian, however Maria Muñoz
was the actual representative of the minor in the administration of their interests in the estate of Antonio Sanchez Muñoz, and thus
was responsible for the property belonging to said minors.
Subsequently, the CFI, for the reason that Maria Muñoz was not a resident of the Philippine Islands at the time for her appointment
removed her as such guardian and appointed Felix Samson as provisional guardian.
From the order of the judge annulling the appointment of the said Maria Muñoz, her lawyers appealed to the Supreme Court, which
appeal was subsequently withdrawn. The order therefore revoking the appointment of Maria Muñoz became final.
On March 18, 1908, the plaintiff Guerrero commenced an action against the defendant Teran to recover the sum of P4,129.56 and cost,
based on the theory that the defendant had been the administrator of the estate of Antonio Sanchez Muñoz from 1901 till 1906. The
defendant admitted that he owed the plaintiff P188.39 but claimed that the latter owed him the sum of P482.14, and therefore, the
plaintiff still owed him the difference between P188.39 and P482.14.
The lower court found that the defendant, as administrator of the estate of Antonio Sanchez Muñoz, or that part of the said estate
belonging to the plaintiff, owed the plaintiff the sum of P3,447.46, with interest at 6 per cent until the same amount should be fully
paid.
The defendant appealed, claiming that the court erred in holding that the defendant managed and administered the estate of Sanchez
Muñoz as a judicial administrator and executor, and in holding that the defendant was responsible to the plaintiffs for the loans made
to different persons for different accounts, and for credits against the persons mentioned in the complaint.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the defendant Teran was liable for the money claims filed against him by the plaintiff.
2. Whether the removal of Maria Muñoz as guardian was proper.
RULING:
1. NO. In the claim presented by the plaintiff against the defendant no dates are given showing the time of the particular loss
and losses occasioned by the defendant. The defendant was liable for losses only during the time that he was acting as the
legal representative of the said minors in the management of their estate, from the time he was appointed up to the time that
he was superseded by Maria Muñoz. There is no proof showing that any of the losses constituting the amount which the
plaintiff claims occurred within this period. However, the defendant acknowledged that of the amount claimed by the plaintiff,
he owes the sum of P188.39. There is no claim of any loss or that the estate has not been properly managed since the
appointment of the said Felix Samson.
2. YES. Doña Maria Muñoz y Gomez was removed upon the theory that her appointment was void because she did not reside in
the Philippine Islands. There is nothing in the law which requires the courts to appoint residents only as administrators or
guardians. However, notwithstanding the fact that there are no statutory requirements upon this question, the courts, charged
with the responsibilities of protecting the estates of deceased persons, wards of the estate, etc., will find much difficulty in
complying with this duty by appointing administrators and guardians who are not personally subject to their jurisdiction.
Notwithstanding that there is no statutory requirement, the courts should not consent to the appointment of persons as
administrators and guardians who are not personally subject to the jurisdiction of our courts here.
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GUARDIANSHIP
Jose Uy, et al. v. Court of Appeals and Teodoro L. Jardeleza

G.R. No. 109557. November 29, 2000 (Pardo, J.)
A spouse who desires to sell real property as such administrator of the conjugal property must observe the procedure for the sale of the
wards estate required of judicial guardians under Rule 95, 1964 Revised Rules of Court, not the summary judicial proceedings under the
Family Code.
FACTS:
Dr. Ernesto Jardelaza suffered stroke that rendered him comatose. Gilda, wife of the latter, filed a petition in RTC Iloilo to be allowed
as sole administrator of their conjugal property and be authorized to sell the same as her husband is physically incapacitated to
discharge his functions. She further contest that such illness of the husband necessitated expenses that would require her to sell their
property in Lot 4291 and its improvement to meet such necessities. RTC ruled in favor of Gilda contending that such decision is
pursuant to Article 124 of FC and that the proceedings thereon are governed by the rules on summary proceedings.
The son of the spouses, Teodoro, filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the petition made by her mother was essentially a
petition for guardianship of the person and properties of his father. As such it cannot be prosecuted in accordance with the provisions
on summary proceedings instead it should follows the ruled governing special proceedings in the Revised Rules of Court requiring
procedural due process particularly the need for notice and a hearing on the merits. He further reiterated that Chapter 2 of the FC
comes under the heading on “Separation in Fact Between Husband and Wife” contemplating a situation where both spouses are of
disposing mind. Hence, he argued that this should not be applied in their case.
During the pendency of the motion, Gilda sold the property to her daughter and son in law. Upon the appeal by Teodoro, CA reversed
the decision of the lower court.
ISSUE:
Whether Gilda as the wife of a husband who suffered stroke, a cerebrovascular accident rendering him comatose, without motor and
mental faculties, may assume sole powers of administration of the conjugal property and dispose a parcel of land with improvements
RULING:
NO. SC ruled in favor of Teodoro. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration
of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration.
These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the
transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as
a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or
both offerors.
In regular manner, the rules on summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code govern the proceedings under Article 124 of the
Family Code. The situation contemplated is one where the spouse is absent, or separated in fact or has abandoned the other or consent
is withheld or cannot be obtained. Such rules do not apply to cases where the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent
to give consent. In this case, the trial court found that the subject spouse "is an incompetent" who was in comatose or semi-comatose
condition, a victim of stroke, cerebrovascular accident, without motor and mental faculties, and with a diagnosis of brain stem infarct. In
such case, the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceedings under Rule 93 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court.
Hence, the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court. The law provides that wife who
assumes sole powers of administration has the same powers and duties as a guardian. Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real
property as administrator of the conjugal property, must observe the procedure for the sale of the ward’s estate required of judicial
guardians, and not the summary judicial proceedings under FC. SC further held that such incapacity of the trial court to provide for an
opportunity to be heard is null and void on the ground of lack of due process.
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GUARDIANSHIP
Corazon Catalan, et al. v. Jose Basa, Manuel Basa, et al.

G.R. No. 159567, July 31, 2007 (Puno, C.J.)
Competency and freedom from undue influence, shown to have existed in the other acts done or contracts executed, are presumed to
continue until the contrary is shown.
FACTS:
On October 20, 1948, Feliciano Catalan was discharged from active military service. The Board of Medical Officers of the Department
of Veteran Affairs found that he was unfit to render military service due to his mental disorder (schizophrenia). On September 28,
1949, Feliciano married Corazon Cerezo. On June 16, 1951, Feliciano allegedly donated to his sister Mercedes one-half of the real
property through the execution of a document, titled, “Absolute deed of Donation”. On December 11,
1953, People’s Bank and Trust Company filed Special Proceedings to declare Feliciano incompetent. On December 22, 1953, the trial
court issued its Order of Adjudication of Incompetency for Appointing Guardian for the Estate and Fixing Allowance of Feliciano. Thus,
Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), which is formerly the People’s Bank and Trust Company, was appointed to be his guardian by the
trial court. On March 26, 1979, Mercedes sold the property donated by Feliciano to her in issue in her children Delia and Jesus Basa.
On April 1, 1997, BPI, acting as Feliciano’s guardian filed a case for Declaration of Nullity of Documents, Recovery of Possession and
Ownership, as well as damages against herein respondents. BPI alleged that the Deed of Absolute Donation of Mercedes was void ab
initio, as Feliciano never donated the property to Mercedes.
In addition, BPI averred that even if Feliciano had truly intended to give the property to her, the donation would still be void, as he was
not of sound mind and was therefore incapable of giving valid consent. On August 14, 1997, Feliciano passed away. Both the lower
court and Court of Appeals dismissed the case because of insufficient evidence presented by the complainants to overcome the
presumption that Feliciano was sane and competent at the time he executed the deed of donation in favor of Mercedes Catalan.
ISSUE:
Whether Feliciano has the capacity to execute the donation
RULING:
YES. A donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously a thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it. Like
any other contract, an agreement of the parties is essential. Consent in contracts presupposes the following requisites: (1) it should be
intelligent or with an exact notion of the matter to which it refers; (2) it should be free; and (3) it should be spontaneous. The parties’
intention must be clear and the attendance of a vice of consent, like any contract, renders the donation voidable.
A study of the nature of schizophrenia will show that Feliciano could still be presumed capable of attending to his property
rights. Schizophrenia was brought to the attention of the public when, in the late 1800s, Emil Kraepelin, a German psychiatrist,
combined hebrephrenia and catatonia with certain paranoid states and called the condition dementia praecox. Eugene Bleuler, a Swiss
psychiatrist, modified Kraepelins conception in the early 1900s to include cases with a better outlook and in 1911 renamed the
condition schizophrenia. According to medical references, in persons with schizophrenia, there is a gradual onset of symptoms, with
symptoms becoming increasingly bizarre as the disease progresses. The condition improves (remission or residual stage) and worsens
(relapses) in cycles. Sometimes, sufferers may appear relatively normal, while other patients in remission may appear strange because
they speak in a monotone, have odd speech habits, appear to have no emotional feelings and are prone to have ideas of reference. The
latter refers to the idea that random social behaviors are directed against the sufferers. It has been proven that the administration of
the correct medicine helps the patient. Antipsychotic medications help bring biochemical imbalances closer to normal in a
schizophrenic. Medications reduce delusions, hallucinations and incoherent thoughts and reduce or eliminate chances of
relapse. Schizophrenia can result in a dementing illness similar in many aspects to Alzheimers disease. However, the illness will wax
and wane over many years, with only very slow deterioration of intellect.
A person suffering from schizophrenia does not necessarily lose his competence to intelligently dispose his property. By merely alleging
the existing of schizophrenia, petitioners failed to show substantial proof that at the date of the donation, June 16, 1951, Feliciano
Catalan had lost total control of his mental facilities. Thus, the lower court correctly held that Feliciano was of sound mind at that time
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and this condition continued to exist until proof to the contrary was adduced. Sufficient proof of his infirmity to give consent to
contracts was only established when the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan declared him an incompetent on December 22, 1953.
It is interesting to note that the petitioners questioned Feliciano’s capacity at the time he donated the property, yet did not see fit to
question his mental competence when he entered into a contract of marriage with Corazon Cerezo or when he executed deeds of
donation of his other properties in their favor. The presumption that Feliciano remained competent to execute contracts, despite his
illness, is bolstered by the existence of these other contracts. Competency and freedom from undue influence, shown to have existed
in the other acts done or contracts executed, are presumed to continue until the contrary is shown.
Since the donation was valid. Mercedes has the right to sell the property to whomever she chose. Not a shred of evidence has been
presented to prove the claim that Mercedes’ sale of property to her children was tainted with fraud or falsehood. Thus, the property in
question belongs to Delia and Jesus Basa. The Supreme Court notes the issue of prescription and laches for the first time on appeal
before the court. It is sufficient for the Supreme Court to note that even if it prospered, the deed of donation was still a voidable, not a
void, contract. As such, it remained binding as it was not annulled in a proper action in court within four years.
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ADOPTION
In The Matter of The Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia

G.R. No 148311, 31 March 2005 (Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.)
The use of surname of the biological mother as middle name of the adopted child is allowed.
FACTS:
Honorato Catindig, petitioner, filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga-Garcia. He alleged therein,
among others, that Stephanie has been using her mothers middle name and surname. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name
Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mother’s surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname.
Trial Court rendered a decision granting the petition for adoption and declaring the name of the adoptee as STEPHANIE NATHY
CATINDIG, without including the mother’s surname as the child’s middle name.
Petition filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her
natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name. Trial Court denied the motion holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an
adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his middle name.
ISSUE:
Whether an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name
RULING:
YES. There is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother’
s surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, (An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of
Their Father) is silent as to what middle name a child may use. Article 365 of the CC merely provides that “an adopted child shall bear
the surname of the adopter.” Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the matter.
Republic Act No. 8552, (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998), an illegitimate child by virtue of her adoption, Stephanie is entitled to all the
rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father
and her mother.
Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanie’s continued use of her mother’s surname as her middle name will maintain
her maternal lineage. It is to be noted that Art. 189(3) of the FC and Sec. 18 of RA 8552 provide that the adoptee remains an intestate
heir of his/her biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can well assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the future.
LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION OF ADOPTION STATUTES IN FAVOR OF ADOPTION
It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes
of adoption. The interests and welfare of the adopted child are of primary and paramount consideration, hence every reasonable
intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.
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HABEAS CORPUS
In The Matter of The Petition For Habeas Corpus of Datukan Malang Salibo, Datukan Malang Salibo v. Warden, Quezon City
Jail
G.R. No. 197597, April 08, 2015 (Leonen, J.)
A person detained but has proof that he is not the person charged in the information can avail the writ of habeas corpus.
FACTS:
Salibo went to Saudi Arabia for the Hajj Pilgrimage. When he returned to the Philippines, he learned that police officers of Datu Hofer
Police Station in Maguindanao suspected him to be Butukan S. Malang. Butukan S. Malang was one of the 197 accused of 57 counts of
murder for allegedly participating in the Maguindanao Massacre. He had a pending warrant of arrest issued by the trial court in People
of the Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan.
Salibo presented himself before the police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station to clear his name. To support his allegations, Salibo
presented to the police pertinent portions of his passport, boarding passes and other documents tending to prove that a certain
Datukan Malang Salibo was in Saudi Arabia on the day the said massacre occurred. The police officers initially assured Salibo that they
would not arrest him.
However, the police officers apprehended Salibo and tore off page two of his passport that evidenced his departure for Saudi Arabia.
They then detained Salibo at the Datu Hofer Police Station for about 3 days. The police officers transferred Salibo in Cotabato City,
where he was detained for another 10 days. While in Cotabato City, the Criminal Investigation and Detention Group allegedly made
him sign and affix his thumbprint on documents.Thereafter, he was finally transferred to the Quezon City Jail.
Salibo filed before the Court of Appeals the Urgent Petition for Habeas Corpus16 questioning the legality of his detention and
deprivation of his liberty. CA issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus, making the Writ returnable to the Second Vice Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Pasig City. CA ordered the Warden of the Quezon City Jail Annex to file a Return of the Writ one day before the
scheduled hearing and produce the person of Salibo at the hearing.
Assistant Solicitors argued that Salibo’s Petition for Habeas Corpus should be dismissed. Since Salibo was charged under a valid
Information and Warrant of Arrest, a petition for habeas corpus was no longer availing.
RTC: Salibo was not "judicially charged" under any resolution, information, or amended information. The Resolution, Information, and
Amended Information presented in court did not charge Datukan Malang Salibo as an accused. He was also not validly arrested as there
was no Warrant of Arrest or Alias Warrant of Arrest against Datukan Malang Salibo.
CA: REVERSED and set aside the decision of RTC.
Salibo filed before this court the Petition for Review in SC (With Urgent Application for a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction).
Respondent Warden maintains that Salibo was duly charged in court. Even assuming that he is not the Butukan S. Malang named in the
Alias Warrant of Arrest, Salibo should have pursued the ordinary remedy of a Motion to Quash Information, not a Petition for Habeas
Corpus.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Decision of the RTC on Salibo’s Petition for Habeas Corpus was appealable to the Court of Appeals
2. Whether petitioner Salibo’s proper remedy is to file a Petition for Habeas Corpus.
RULING:
3. YES. An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be made through a petition filed before RTC, CA or SC. The court or judge
grants the writ and requires the officer or person having custody of the person allegedly restrained of liberty to file a return
of the writ. A hearing on the return of the writ is then conducted allegedly restrained of liberty to file a return of the writ.53 A
hearing on the return of the writ is then conducted.
The return of the writ may be heard by a court apart from that which issued the writ. Should the court issuing the writ
designate a lower court to which the writ is made returnable, the lower court shall proceed to decide the petition of habeas
corpus. By virtue of the designation, the lower court "acquires the power and authority to determine the merits of the petition
53 | P a g e
for habeas corpus.Therefore, the decision on the petition is a decision appealable to the court that has appellate jurisdiction
over decisions of the lower court.
Here, Salibo filed his Petition for Habeas Corpus before the CA.p which issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus, making it returnable
to the RTC Branch 153, Pasig City. RTC then heard respondent Warden on his Return and decided the Petition on the merits.
RTC acquired the power and authority to determine the merits of petitioner Salibo’s Petition. The decision on the Petition for
Habeas Corpus, therefore, was the decision of the trial court, not of the Court of Appeals. Since the Court of Appeals is the court
with appellate jurisdiction over decisions of trial courts, respondent Warden correctly filed the appeal before the Court of
Appeals.
4. YES. It is true that a writ of habeas corpus may no longer be issued if the person allegedly deprived of liberty is restrained
under a lawful process or order of the court. The restraint then has become legal, and the remedy of habeas corpus is rendered
moot and academic.
Rule 102, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.—If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his
liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of
a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the
order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be
discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule
be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a
person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.
But this does not apply in this case. Salibo was not arrested by virtue of any warrant charging him of an offense. He was not
restrained under a lawful process or an order of a court. He was illegally deprived of his liberty, and, therefore, correctly
availed himself of a Petition for Habeas Corpus.
It is undisputed that Salibo presented himself before the Datu Hofer Police Station to clear his name and to prove that he is
not the accused Butukan S. Malang. When petitioner Salibo was in the presence of the police officers of Datu Hofer Police
Station, he was neither committing nor attempting to commit an offense. The police officers had no personal knowledge of
any offense that he might have committed. Petitioner Salibo was also not an escapee prisoner. The police officers, therefore,
had no probable cause to arrest petitioner Salibo without a warrant. They deprived him of his right to liberty without due
process of law, for which a petition for habeas corpus may be issued.
Petitioner Salibo’s proper remedy is not a Motion to Quash Information and/or Warrant of Arrest. None of the grounds for
filing a Motion to Quash Information apply to him.
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WRIT OF AMPARO
Edgardo Navia, et al. v. Virginia Pardico

G.R. No. 184467, June 19, 2012 (Del Castillo, J.)
For the protective writ of amparo to issue in enforced disappearance cases, allegation and proof that the persons subject thereof are
missing are not enough. It must also be shown by the required quantum of proof that their disappearance was carried out by, or with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of, the government or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the same or
give information on the fate or whereabouts of said missing persons.
FACTS:
Enrique Lapore (Bong) and Benhur Pardico (Ben) were invited to the security office of Asian Land Strategies Corporation because a
complaint was lodged against them for theft of electric wires and street lamps in their subdivision. They both came there with their
mother, Lolita Lapore. They were eventually allowed to go home except for Ben. Bong was asked to sign a statement in the logbook to
the effect that the guards released him without inflicting any harm or injury to him. Lolita was also asked to sign in the logbook three
times as a witness that the guards already released Ben but since she has poor eyesight, she still signed and believed the guards when
told that it only pertains to Bong’s release.
The following morning, Virginia, Ben’s wife, went to the Asian Land security office to visit her husband Ben, but only to be told that
petitioners had already released him together with Bong the night before. She then looked for Ben, asked around, and went to the
barangay. Since she could not still find her husband, Virginia reported the matter to the police. The last time Ben was seen was Lolita
and Bong left him in petitioners’ custody at the security office.
Exasperated with the mysterious disappearance of her husband, Virginia filed a Petition for Writ of Amparo before the RTC of Malolos
City. Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the Amparo Court issued an Order directing the issuance of a Writ of Amparo
and the production of the body of Ben.
ISSUE:
Whether the Writ of Amparo may be issued against the Asian Land security officers
RULING:
NO. In an Amparo Petition, proof of disappearance alone is not enough. It is likewise essential to establish that such disappearance was
carried out with the direct or indirect authorization, support or acquiescence of the government. This indispensable element of State
participation is not present in this case. The petition does not contain any allegation of State complicity and none of the evidence
presented tend to show that the government or any of its agents orchestrated Ben’s disappearance. In fact, none of its agents, officials,
or employees were impleaded or implicated in Virginia’s Amparo petition whether as responsible or accountable persons.
Thus, in the absence of an allegation or proof that the government or its agents had a hand in Ben’s disappearance or that they failed
to exercise extraordinary diligence in investigating his case, the Court will definitely not hold the government or its agents either as
responsible or accountable persons.
Even if the person sought to be held accountable or responsible in an Amparo petition is a private individual or entity, still, government
involvement in the disappearance remains an indispensable element.
Here, petitioners are mere security guards at Grand Royale Subdivision in Brgy. Lugam, Malolos City and their principal, the Asian
Land, is a private entity. They do not work for the government and nothing has been presented that would link or connect them to
some covert police, military or governmental operation. In order to fall within the ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in relation to RA No.
9851, the disappearance must be attended by some governmental involvement. This hallmark of State participation differentiates an
enforced disappearance case from an ordinary case of a missing person.
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WRIT OF AMPARO
Julian Yusa Y Caram V. Marijoy D. Segui, et al.

G.R. No. 193652, August 5, 2014, (Villarama, Jr., J.)
Writ of amparo is confined only to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.
FACTS:
Petitioner Ma. Christina Yusay Caram (Christina) had an amorous relationship with Marcelino Gicano Constantino III (Marcelino) and
eventually became pregnant with the latter’s child without the benefit of marriage. After getting pregnant, Christina mislead Marcelino
into believing that she had an abortion when in fact she proceeded to complete the term of her pregnancy. During this time, she
intended to have the child adopted through Sun and Moon Home for Children (Sun and Moon) in Parañaque City to avoid placing her
family in a potentially embarrassing situation for having a second illegitimate son.
On July 26, 2009, Christina gave birth to Baby Julian at Amang Rodriguez Memorial Medical Center, Marikina City. Sun and Moon
shouldered all the hospital and medical expenses. On August 13, 2009, Christina voluntarily surrendered Baby Julian by way of a Deed
of Voluntary Commitment to the DSWD.
On November 26, 2009, Marcelino suffered a heart attack and died without knowing about the birth of his son. Thereafter, during the
wake, Christina disclosed to Marcelino’s family that she and the deceased had a son that she gave up for adoption due to financial
distress and initial embarrassment. Marcelino’s family was taken aback by the revelation and sympathized with Christina. After the
emotional revelation, they vowed to help her recover and raise the baby.
On November 27, 2009, the DSWD, through Secretary Esperanza I. Cabral issued a certificate declaring Baby Julian as "Legally Available
for Adoption." A local matching conference was held on January 27, 2010 and on February 5, 2010, Baby Julian was "matched" with the
spouses Vergel and Filomina Medina (Medina Spouses) of the Kaisahang Bahay Foundation. Supervised trial custody then commenced.
On May 5, 2010, Christina who had changed her mind about the adoption, wrote a letter to the DSWDasking for the suspension of Baby
Julian’s adoption proceedings. She also said she wanted her family back together.
On May 28, 2010, the DSWD, through respondent Atty. Marijoy D. Segui, sent a Memorandum to DSWD Assistant Secretary Vilma B.
Cabrera informing her that the certificate declaring Baby Julian legally available for adoption had attained finality on November 13,
2009, or three months after Christina signed the Deed of Voluntary Commitment which terminated her parental authority and
effectively made Baby Julian a ward of the State. The said Memorandum was noted by respondent Atty. Sally D. Escutin, Director IV of
the Legal Service, DSWD.
On July 12, 2010, Noel Gicano Constantino, Marcelino’s brother, sent a letter to Atty. Escutin informing her that a DNA testing was
scheduled on July 16, 2010 at the DNA Analysis Laboratory at the University of the Philippines.
On July 16, 2010, Assistant Secretary Cabrera sent a letter to Noel Constantino stating that it would not allow Baby Julian to undergo
DNA testing. Assistant Secretary Cabrera informed Noel Constantino that the procedures followed relative to the certification on the
availability of the child for adoption and the child’s subsequent placement to prospective adoptive parents were proper, and that the
DSWD was no longer in the position to stop the adoption process. Assistant Secretary Cabrera further stated that should Christina wish
to reacquire her parental authority over Baby Julian or halt the adoption process, she may bring the matter to the regular courts as the
reglementary period for her to regain her parental rights had already lapsed under Section 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9523
On July 27, 2010, Christina filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo before the RTC of Quezon City seeking to obtain custody
of Baby Julian from Atty. Segui, Atty. Escutin, Assistant Secretary Cabrera and Acting Secretary Celia C. Yangco, all of the DSWD.
In her petition, Christina accused respondents of "blackmailing" her into surrendering custody of her child to the DSWD utilizing what
she claims to be an invalid certificate of availability for adoption which respondents allegedly used as basis to misrepresent that all
legal requisites for adoption of the minor child had been complied with.
Christina argued that by making these misrepresentations, the respondents had acted beyond the scope of their legal authority thereby
causing the enforced disappearance of the said child and depriving her of her custodial rights and parental authority over him.
ISSUE:
Whether a petition for a writ of amparo is the proper recourse for obtaining parental authority and custody of a minor child
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RULING:
NO. The Court held that the availment of the remedy of writ of amparo is not proper as there was no enforced disappearance in this
case.
As to what constitutes “enforced disappearance,” the Court in Navia v. Pardico enumerated the elements constituting “enforced
disappearances” as the term is statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 9851 to wit:
1. That there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
2. That it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization;
3. That it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or
whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and,
4. That the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.
The Court held that there was no enforced disappearance because the respondent DSWD officers never concealed Baby Julian’s
whereabouts. In fact, Christina obtained a copy of the DSWD’s Memorandum explicitly stating that Baby Julian was in the custody of
the Medina Spouses when she filed her petition before the RTC. Besides, she even admitted in her petition that the respondent DSWD
officers presented Baby Julian before the RTC during the hearing. There is therefore, no “enforced disappearance” as used in the context
of the Amparo rule as the third and fourth elements are missing.
Christina’s directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from her child and placing the latter up for adoption, supposedly
without complying with the necessary legal requisites to qualify the child for adoption, clearly indicates that she is not searching for a
lost child but asserting her parental authority over the child and contesting custody over him.
Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue of child custody and the exercise of parental rights over a
child, who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally considered a ward of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be properly applied.
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WRIT OF AMPARO
Rodolfo Noel Lozada, et al., v. President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, et al.

G.R. No. 184379-80, April 24, 2012 (Sereno, J.)
Writ of amparo is confined only to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.
FACTS:
The instant Petition stems from the alleged corruption scandal precipitated by a transaction between the Philippine government,
represented by the National Broadband Network (NBN), and ZTE Corporation, a Chinese manufacturer of telecommunications
equipment. Former NEDA Secretary Neri sought the services of Lozada as an unofficial consultant in the ZTE-NBN deal. The latter avers
that during the course of his engagement, he discovered several anomalies in the said transaction involving certain public officials.
These events impelled the Senate of the Philippines Blue Ribbon Committee to conduct an investigation thereon, for which it issued a
subpoena directing Lozada to appear and testify on 30 January 2008.
Lozada did not appear at the Blue Ribbon Committee. DENR Sec. Atienza announced that Lozada was in an official trip to London.
Because of this, Senate issued an order (1) citing Lozada in contempt; (2) ordering his arrest and detention; (3) directing the sergeant-
at-arms to implement such order and make a return.
Lozada asked Sec. Atienza if he can go back to the Philippines. Upon approval, he informed his family that he would be arriving in
Manila, Feb 5 at 4 pm.
In his petition, Lozada claims that upon disembarking, several men held his arms and took his bag. He allegedly insisted on joining his
family but realized that it would be wiser to go with the men when he heard them say in their handheld radio ‘[H]wag kayong dumaan
diyan sir nandyan ang mga taga senado.’
Lozada asked to go to the comfort room and while there, called his brother, Arturo and informed him of his situation. He observed that
there were several cars tailing their car. Sec. Atienza called him and assured him that he was with government people and that Sec.
Atienza would confer with ES and Ma’m. Lozada surmised them to be ES Ermita and the President. He was also told to pacify his wife,
Violeta, who was making public statements asking for her husband’s return. Along the way, the men asked Lozada to draft an antedated
letter requesting police protection. Lozada asked to be brought to his home in Pasig, but was refused due to security risks. They stopped
at Outback restaurant to meet with Atty. Antonio Bautista and Col. Mascarinas, Lozada claimed that he was made to fill in the blanks
of an affidavit. He was then brought to LSGH per his request. He observed that policemen, purportedly restraining his liberty and
threatening the security of his, his family and the LS brothers, guarded the perimeter of LSGH.
On Feb 6, Col. Mascarinas supposedly brought Lozada to the office of Atty. Bautista to finalize and sign an affidavit. On the same day his
wife petitioned for Habeas Corpus and his brother petitioned for a Writ of Amparo with the Supreme Court, and prayed for the issuance
of (a) the writ of amparo; (b) a Temporary Protection Order (TPO); and (c) Inspection and Production Orders as regards documents
related to the authority ordering custody over Lozada, as well as any other document that would show responsibility for his alleged
abduction.
Lozada alleged that he was made to sign a letter requesting police protection. On 7 February 2008, Lozada decided to hold a press
conference and contact the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms, who served the warrant of arrest on him. He claimed that after his press
conference and testimony in the Senate, he and his family were since then harassed, stalked and threatened.
Respondents: Lozada had knowledge and control of what happened from the time of his arrival, he voluntarily entrusted himself to
their company and was never deprived of his liberty and that since Feb 8, Lozada has been in the custody of the Senate.
CA’s decisions:
1. Habeas Corpus case moot.
2. Denied issuance of Subpoena Ad Testificandum and Presentation of Hostile Witnesses and Adverse Parties – irrelevant to
Amparo Case, to require them to testify would be a fishing expedition.
3. Dropped Pres. Arroyo as a respondent because she enjoys immunity from suit as president.
4. Dismissed Writ of Amparo. – Petitioners unable to prove through substantial evidence that respondents violated Lozada’s
right to life, liberty and security.
ISSUE:
Whether the circumstances are adequately alleged and proven by petitioner Lozada to entitle him to the protection of the writ of
amparo
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RULING:
NO. The writ of amparo is an independent and summary remedy that provides rapid judicial relief to protect the people’s right to life,
liberty and security. Having been originally intended as a response to the alarming cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances in the country, it serves both preventive and curative roles to address the said human rights violations. It is preventive
in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses, and it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent
punishment of perpetrators by inevitably leading to subsequent investigation and action.
As it stands, the writ of amparo is confined only to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, or to threats thereof.
Considering that this remedy is aimed at addressing these serious violations of or threats to the right to life, liberty and security, it
cannot be issued on amorphous and uncertain grounds, or in cases where the alleged threat has ceased and is no longer imminent or
continuing. Instead, it must be granted judiciously so as not to dilute the extraordinary and remedial character of the writ, thus: The
privilege of the writ of amparo is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the rights to life, liberty, and security of persons, free
from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of this life. It is an extraordinary writ conceptualized and adopted in light of and in
response to the prevalence of extra-legal killings and enforced disappearances. Accordingly, the remedy ought to be resorted to and
granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by the indiscriminate filing of amparo
petitions for purposes less than the desire to secure amparo reliefs and protection and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations.
In cases where the violation of the right to life, liberty or security has already ceased, it is necessary for the petitioner in an amparo
action to prove the existence of a continuing threat.
In the present case, the totality of the evidence adduced by petitioners failed to meet the threshold of substantial evidence.
Sifting through all the evidence and allegations presented, the crux of the case boils down to assessing the veracity and credibility of
the parties’ diverging claims as to what actually transpired on 5-6 February 2008. In this regard, this Court is in agreement with the
factual findings of the CA to the extent that Lozada was not illegally deprived of his liberty from the point when he disembarked from
the aircraft up to the time he was led to the departure area of the airport, as he voluntarily submitted himself to the custody of
respondents.
 He was able to go to the men’s bathroom and call his brother
 He was avoiding the people from the Office of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms, detour appears to explain why they did not get
out at the arrival area, where [Lozada] could have passed through immigration so that his passport could be properly stamped
 No evidence on record that Lozada struggled or made an outcry for help
 He testified that nobody held, shouted, or was hostile to him
 He knew and agreed with the plan that he would be fetched at the airport because at that time, it was his decision not to testify
before the Senate
 it must be emphasized that if Lozada had in fact been illegally restrained, so much so that his right to liberty and security had
been violated, the acts that manifested this restraint had already ceased and has consequently rendered the grant of the
privilege of the writ ofamparo moot.
 The supposed announcement of General Razon over the radio that [Lozada] was in the custody of the PNP can neither be
construed as a threat to [Lozada’s] life, liberty and security. Certainly, no person in his right mind would make that kind of
media announcement if his intent was indeed to threaten somebody’s life, liberty and security
 Presence of armed men riding in motorcycle passing outside the LSGH premises where he and his family are staying and by
alleged threats of armed men around him at places where he went to. Again, these alleged threats were not proven by any
evidence at all, as having originated from any of the respondents
 Installation of the surveillance camera at the De La Salle and at St. Scholastica as indirect threat to his right to life, liberty and
security. He claims that these are spy cameras. However, save for [Lozada’s] self-serving claim, he simply failed to prove that
they were installed or ordered installed by the respondents for the purpose of threatening his right to life, liberty and security
 No evidence on record that the bomb threats were made by the respondents or done upon their instigation.
 He did not ascertain from the Bureau of Immigration whether his name was actually in the official watch list of the Bureau
 [Lozada] himself testified that he does not know whether the respondents or any of the respondents ordered the filing of these
‘frivolous’ cases against him. In any event, said purported cases are to be determined based on their own merits and are clearly
beyond the realm of the instant amparo petition filed against the respondents
 The failure to establish that the public official observed extraordinary diligence in the performance of duty does not result in
the automatic grant of the privilege of the amparo writ. It does not relieve the petitioner from establishing his or her claim by
substantial evidence (Yano v. Sanchez)
Sec. 22 of the Amparo Rule proscribes the filing of an amparo petition should a criminal action have, in the meanwhile, been
commenced.
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Sec. 23, on the other hand, provides that when the criminal suit is filed subsequent to a petition for amparo, the petition shall
be consolidated with the criminal action where the Amparo Rule shall nonetheless govern the disposition of the relief under
the Rule.
In Rubrico v. Arroyo the Court interprets the above sections as follows: (1) the consolidation of the probe and fact-finding aspects of
the instant petition with the investigation of the criminal complaint before the OMB; and (2) the incorporation in the same criminal
complaint of the allegations in this petition bearing on the threats to the right to security. Withal, the OMB should be furnished copies
of the investigation reports to aid that body in its own investigation and eventual resolution of OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E. Then, too, the
OMB shall be given easy access to all pertinent documents and evidence, if any, adduced before the CA. Necessarily, Lourdes, as
complainant in OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E, should be allowed, if so minded, to amend her basic criminal complaint if the consolidation of
cases is to be fully effective.
If the Complaint filed before the DOJ had already progressed into a criminal case, then the latter action can more adequately dispose
of the allegations made by petitioners. After all, one of the ultimate objectives of the writ of amparo as a curative remedy is to facilitate
the subsequent punishment of perpetrators. On the other hand, if there is no actual criminal case lodged before the courts, then the
denial of the Petition is without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate administrative, civil or criminal case, if applicable, against
those individuals whom Lozada deems to have unduly restrained his liberty.
No basis for interim reliefs since writ of amparo denied

In Yano v. Sanchez, this court declined to grant the prayer for the issuance of a TPO, as well as Inspection and Production Orders, upon
a finding that the implicated public officials were not accountable for the disappearance subject of that case. Analogously, it would be
incongruous to grant herein petitioners’ prayer for a TPO and Inspection and Production Orders and at the same time rule that there
no longer exists any imminent or continuing threat to Lozada’s right to life, liberty and security. Thus, there is no basis on which a
prayer for the issuance of these interim reliefs can be anchored.
Denial of the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum proper - for a subpoena to issue, it must first appear that the person or documents
sought to be presented are prima facie relevant to the issue subject of the controversy
CA correctly denied petitioners’ Motion for the Issuance of Subpoena Ad Testificandum on the ground that the testimonies of the
witnesses sought to be presented during trial were prima facie irrelevant to the issues of the case. The court has repeatedly reminded
the parties, in the course of the proceedings, that the instant Amparo Petition does not involve the investigation of the ZTE-NBN
contract.
President Arroyo was not proven to be involved in the alleged violation of life, liberty and security of Lozada
President Arroyo’s term as president has ended, therefore she no longer enjoys immunity, but an examination of Petitioner’s evidence
reveals their failure to sufficiently establish any unlawful act or omission on her part that violated, or threatened with violation, the
right to life, liberty and security of Lozada. Except for the bare claims that: (a) Sec. Atienza mentioned a certain “Ma’[a]m,” whom Lozada
speculated to have referred to her, and (b) Sec. Defensor told Lozada that “the President was ‘hurting’ from all the media frenzy,” there
is nothing in the records that would sufficiently establish the link of former President Arroyo to the events that transpired on 5-6
February 2010, as well as to the subsequent threats that Lozada and his family purportedly received.
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CHANGE OF NAME/CORRECTION OF ENTRIES
Benjamin H. Cabañez, v. Marie Josephine Cordero Solano A.K.A. Ma. Josephine S. Cabañez
G.R. No. 200180, June 06, 2016 (Peralta, J.)
Correction of name and status cannot be made in a petition for correction of TCT under Sec. 108, PD 1529
FACTS:
Respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City a "Petition for Correction of the Name and Marital Status of
the Registered Owner of Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) No[s.] 154626 and 154627 of the Registry of Deeds for Muntinlupa City.
The RTC held that from the evidence presented by herein respondent, it has been satisfactorily established that the subject properties
should indeed be in respondent's name and that her status should be "single".
Petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Annulment of Judgment6 assailing the above Decision of the RTC on the ground that the said
trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case because respondent's petition was not published in a
newspaper of general circulation and that petitioner and other persons who may have interest in the subject properties were not
served summons. the CA agreed with respondent and ruled that PD 1529 is the governing law and that there is nothing under the
pertinent provisions of the said law which states that publication is a requirement for the RTC to acquire jurisdiction over respondent's
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether correction of name and status can be made in a petition for correction of TCT under Sec 108 of PD 1529
RULING:
NO. Under settled jurisprudence, the enumerated instances for amendment or alteration of a certificate of title under Section 108 of
PD 1529 are non-controversial in nature. They are limited to issues so patently insubstantial as not to be genuine issues. The
proceedings thereunder are summary in nature, contemplating insertions of mistakes, which are only clerical, but certainly not
controversial issues. In the present case, it is now apparent that before the trial court can alter the description of the civil status of
respondent in the transfer certificates of title in question, it will have to receive evidence of and determine respondent's civil status.
This requires a full dress trial rendering the summary proceedings envisaged in Section 108 of PD 1529 inadequate.
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APPEALS IN SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
Nilo V. Chipongian v. Victoria Benitez-Lirio, et al.

G.R. No. 162692, August 26, 2015 (Bersamin, J.)
An order dismissing a motion for intervention in settlement proceedings is final and therefore appealable.
FACTS:
The late Vicente Benitez was married to Isabel Chipongian, the petitioner's sister. Isabel had predeceased Vicente. The couple had no
offspring. After the death of Isabel, Vicente and the petitioner had executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement respecting the estate of
Isabel, whereby the latter waived all his rights to the estate of Isabel in favor of Vicente. According to the petitioner, however, Vicente
executed an affidavit on the same date whereby he affirmed that the waiver did not extend to the paraphernal properties of Isabel.
Upon the death of Vicente, Victoria Benitez Lirio (Victoria), a sister of Vicente, and Feodor Benitez Aguilar (Feodor), a nephew of
Vicente, initiated proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Vicente in the Regional Trial Court. Feodor was appointed as the
administrator of Vicente's estate.
The petitioner intervened in Special Proceedings. He sought the partial revocation of the May 13, 1994 order in order to exclude the
paraphernal properties of Isabel from inclusion in the estate of Vicente. He cited the affidavit of Vicente in support of the partial
revocation.
On June 8, 1994, the petitioner specifically moved for the exclusion of the paraphernal properties of Isabel from Vicente's estate.
However, he withdrew the motion even before the RTC could rule on it. Instead, he filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit
Complaint-in-Intervention.
The RTC granted the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Complaint-in-Intervention, but it later dismissed the complaint-in-
intervention because the estate of the late Isabel Chipongian was extra-judicially settled by and between Vicente O. Benitez and Nilo V.
Chipongian and was published in the BAYANIHAN Weekly News. The herein intervenor actively participated in the execution of the
extra-judicial settlement of his sister's estate. Petitioner also agreed to quitclaim and waive all his rights to the estate in favor of my
brother-in-law Vicente O. Benitez.
Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules, provides for a limitation of 2 years after the settlement and distribution of an estate in accordance with
either Section 1 or Section 2 of the same Rule, within which an heir or other person deprived of his lawful participation in the estate
may compel the settlement of the said estate in the Courts for the purpose of satisfying such lawful participation. The intervenor took
part and had knowledge of the extra-judicial settlement of the estate and is therefore bound thereby. If he was indeed deprived of his
lawful share or right in his sister's estate, it comes as a surprise why it took him more than 12 years assert the purported affidavit
allegedly executed in his favor by Vicente.
The petitioner moved for the reconsideration but was denied Thus, a notice of appeal was filed which was denied due course for
having been filed beyond the reglementary period. Petitioner filed a MR vis-a-vis the order denying due course to his notice of appeal.
The RTC issued its order whereby it conceded that the petitioner had timely filed the notice of appeal, but still denied the MR on the
ground that he had not perfected his appeal because of his failure to pay the appellate court docket fees.
A Motion to Set Aside the order denying his MR was filed which was still denied. The petitioner instituted a petition for certiorari in the
CA which was dismissed affirming the RTC’s decision. Hence, this appeal.
Respondents Victoria and Feodor seek the denial of the petition for review because the petitioner did not file a record on appeal, as
mandated under Section 2(a) Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner contends that the appeal was from the decision of the trial court to dismiss petitioner's complaint-in-intervention and not
'the final order or judgment rendered in the case', obviously referring to the main case, that is, the intestate estate case. Since the
intervention was not an independent proceeding but only ancillary or supplemental to the main case, the rule on multiple appeals does
not apply and the filing of a record on appeal is not a pre-requisite to the acceptance and consideration of the appeal by the appellate
court.
ISSUE:
Whether the petition for review should be denied for failure to file a record in appeal.
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RULING:
Intervention is "a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a litigant therein to enable him,
her or it to protect or preserve a right or interest which may be affected by such proceedings." If an intervention makes a third party a
litigant in the main proceedings, his pleading-in-intervention should form part of the main case. Accordingly, when the petitioner
intervened in Special Proceedings, his complaint-in-intervention, once admitted by the RTC, became part of the main case, rendering
any final disposition thereof subject to the rules specifically applicable to special proceedings, including Rule 109 of the Rules of
Court, which deals with appeals in special proceedings.
Section 1 of Rule 41 enunciates the final judgment rule by providing that an appeal "may be taken from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable." In the context of
the final judgment rule, Section 1 of Rule 109 does not limit the appealable orders and judgments in special proceedings to the final
order or judgment rendered in the main case, but extends the remedy of appeal to other orders or dispositions that completely
determine a particular matter in the case.
The dismissal of the petitioner's intervention constituted "a final determination in the lower court of the rights of the party appealing,"
that is, his right in the paraphernal properties of his deceased sister. As such, it fell under paragraph (c) of Section 1, supra, because it
had the effect of disallowing his claim against the estate of Vicente, as well as under paragraph (e) of Section 1, supra, because it was a
final determination in the trial court of his intervention. Conformably with either or both paragraphs, which are boldly underscored
above for easier reference, the dismissal was the proper subject of an appeal in due course by virtue of its nature of completely
disposing of his intervention.
The proper mode of appealing a judgment or final order in special proceedings is by notice of appeal and record on appeal. This is
pursuant to Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
Under Section 3 of Rule 41, a party who wants to appeal a judgment or final order in special proceedings has 30 days from notice of
the judgment or final order within which to perfect an appeal because he will be filing not only a notice of appeal but also a record on
appeal that will require the approval of the trial court with notice to the adverse party.
For the petitioner, therefore, the period for perfecting the appeal by record on appeal was 30 days from notice of the final order
dismissing the intervention. The start of the period of 30 days happened on September 18, 1998, the date when his counsel received
the decision dismissing his intervention. However, the entire time from the filing of his Motion for Reconsideration on October 2, 1998
until his receipt of the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration on March 18, 1999 should be deducted from the reckoning of the period
to perfect his appeal.
The ostensible reason for requiring a record on appeal instead of only a notice of appeal is the multipart nature of nearly all special
proceedings, with each part susceptible of being finally determined and terminated independently of the other parts. An appeal by
notice of appeal is a mode that envisions the elevation of the original records to the appellate court as to thereby obstruct the trial
court in its further proceedings regarding the other parts of the case. In contrast, the record on appeal enables the trial court to continue
with the rest of the case because the original records remain with the trial court even as it affords to the appellate court the full
opportunity to review and decide the appealed matter.
Considering that the petitioner did not submit a record on appeal in accordance with Section 3 of Rule 41, he did not perfect his appeal
of the judgment dismissing his intervention. As a result, the dismissal became final and immutable. He now has no one to blame but
himself. The right to appeal, being statutory in nature, required strict compliance with the rules regulating the exercise of the right. As
such, his perfection of his appeal within the prescribed period was mandatory and jurisdictional, and his failure to perfect the appeal
within the prescribed time rendered the judgment final and beyond review on appeal.
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Atty. Ricardo B. Bermudo v. Fermina Tayag-Roxas

G.R. No. 172879, February 2, 2011 (Abad, J.)
An order computing attorney’s fees to administrator to implement a decision is not appealable under Rule 109. The remedy is certiorari.
FACTS:
Atty. Ricardo Bermudo (Atty. Bermudo), as executor, filed a petition for his appointment as administrator of the estate of Artemio
Hilario (Hilario) and for the allowance and probate of the latter’s will before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City. The RTC
rendered a decision, allowing the will and recognizing Roxas as Hilario’s sole heir.
When the decision constituting Roxas as the sole heir became final, Atty. Bermudo who also served as counsel for her in the actions
concerning her inheritance filed a motion to fix his legal fees and to constitute a charging lien against the estate for the legal services
he rendered.
RTC granted him fees equivalent to 20% of the estate and constituted the same as lien on the estate’s property. Roxas appealed the
order to the CA in CA-G.R. CV 53143, which adjusted the lawyer’s fees to 20% of the value of the land belonging to the estate. Atty.
Bermudo subsequently filed a motion with the RTC for execution and appraisal of the estate on which his 20% compensation would
be based.
The RTC granted the motion and ordered Roxas to pay Atty. Bermudo P12,644,300.00 as attorney’s fees with interest at the rate of 6%
per annum. Roxas challenged the order before the CA through a petition for certiorari.
On December 19, 2005, using a different valuation of the land of the estate, the CA ordered Roxas to pay Atty. Bermudo a reduced
amount of P4,234,770.00 as attorney's fees with interest at 6% per annum.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the CA erred in not dismissing Roxas’ special civil action of certiorari when her remedy should have been an appeal
from the settlement of his account as administrator;
2. Whether the CA erred in holding that Atty. Bermudo, as administrator, is entitled to collect attorney’s fees; and
3. Whether the CA erred in reducing Atty. Bermudo’s attorney’s fees from P12,644,300.00 to P4,234,770.00.
RULING:
1. Atty. Bermudo points out that Roxas’ remedy for contesting the RTC order of execution against her should be an ordinary
appeal to the CA. He invokes Section 1, Rule 109 of the Revised Rules of Court which enumerates the orders or judgments in
special proceedings from which parties may appeal. One of these is an order or judgment which settles the account of an
executor or administrator. The rationale behind this multi-appeal mode is to enable the rest of the case to proceed in the
event that a separate and distinct issue is resolved by the court and held to be final.
But the earlier award in Atty. Bermudo’s favor did not settle his account as administrator. Rather, it fixed his attorney’s fees
for the legal services he rendered in the suit contesting Roxas’ right as sole heir. Consequently, Section 1 (d) of Rule 109 does
not apply.
Actually, the CA decided with finality the award of attorney’s fees in Atty. Bermudo’s favor in CA-G.R. CV 53143 when it fixed
such fees at 20% of the value of the estate’s lands. On remand of the case to the RTC, Atty. Bermudo filed a motion for
execution of the award in his favor which could be carried out only after the RTC shall have determined what represented
20% of the value of the estate’s lands. The fixing of such value at P12,644,300.00 was not appealable since it did not constitute
a new judgment but an implementation of a final one. Indeed, an order of execution is not appealable.[3] Consequently, Roxas’
remedy in contesting the RTC’s exercise of discretion in ascertaining what constitutes 20% of the value of the estate’s lands is
a special civil action of certiorari.
2. Roxas asserts that Atty. Bermudo is not entitled to attorney’s fees but only to compensation as administrator in accordance
with Section 7, Rule 85 of the Rules of Court.
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But Atty. Bermudo did not only serve as administrator of the estate. He also served as Roxas’ counsel in the suit that assailed
her right as sole heir. Atty. Bermudo brought the contest all the way up to this Court to defend her rights to her uncle’s estate.
And Atty. Bermudo succeeded. Acting as counsel in that suit for Roxas was not part of his duties as administrator of the estate.
Consequently, it was but just that he is paid his attorney’s fees.
Besides, Atty. Bermudo’s right to attorney’s fees had been settled with finality in CA-G.R. CV 53143. This Court can no longer
entertain Roxas’ lament that he is not entitled to those fees.
3. Atty. Bermudo assails the CA’s reduction of his attorney’s fees from P12,644,300.00 to P4,234,770.00. In fixing the higher
amount, the RTC relied on the advice of an amicus curiae regarding the value of the lands belonging to the estate. But the CA
found such procedure unwarranted, set aside the RTC’s valuation, and used the values established by the Angeles City
Assessor for computing the lawyer’s fees of Atty. Bermudo. The Court finds no compelling reason to deviate from the CA’s
ruling. Given their wide experience and the official nature of their work, the city assessors’ opinions deserve great weight and
reliability.
Thus, the Court must sustain the CA’s computation based on the market values reflected on the schedule proposed by the
Angeles City Assessor.
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Antonio Ambrosio v. Intermediate Appellate Court and Commissioner of Internal Revenue

G.R. No. 75663. January 17, 1990 (Narvasa, J.)
A petition for review instead of a record on appeal timely filed, which comply the requirements of a record on appeal is permitted. It was
also held that the 30 day period can be extended.
FACTS:
CIR presented a formal claim against the estate of Juliana Vda. de Gabriel in the probate and settlement of estate proceedings before
the CFI. CIR alleged that the decedent has a tax deficiency liability of P318,223.93 for the year 1978.
Ambrosio, the Auditor-Tax consultant of the estate, opposed CIR’s claim and argued that:
1. there had been no proper service of any assessment on the deceased; and
2. the claim of the Bureau of Internal Revenue was barred by prescription.
The probate court denied CIR’s claim.
The CIR elevated the case before the IAC:

1. notice of appeal was filed before the probate court; and
2. 3 motions for 30 day extension to file a petition for review were filed before the IAC:
a. First motion – granted
b. Second motion – granted
c. Third motion – On June 9, 1986, IAC pointed out that the proper remedy is an ordinary appeal, and accordingly
directed that the CIR’s appeal be assigned by the Raffle Committee to any of the Civil Divisions of the Court.
On July 2, 1986, the CIR filed his petition for review.
Ambrosio filed a motion to dismiss contending that the CIR’s right to appeal had been lost:
1. the CIR’s remedy was an ordinary appeal, which should have been taken within 30 days; and
2. this period had lapsed without the corresponding record on appeal
IAC considered the petition for review as the record on appeal itself as it states the errors upon which review is sought
ISSUE:
Whether the IAC erred in treating the petition for review filed as a record on appeal, constituting sufficient compliance with the
requirement of B.P. Blg. 129 in relation to Rule 109 of the Rules of Court 1
RULING:
NO. The petition will have to be dismissed for lack of merit. To grant it would be to place too high a value on technicality and disregard
without sufficient cause the desideratum of deciding cases on their merits whenever possible.
The CIR filed his notice of appeal timely, within 30 days from notice of order denying his claim. It cannot be disputed that a Trial Court
has discretion to grant extension of the same 30-day period for the presentation of the requisite record on appeal, just as the CA has
discretion to concede extensions for the filing of a petition for review. Nor is there any issue raised about the propriety of the grant of
extensions by the CA to the respondent Commissioner. Except therefore, for the CIR’s unfortunate misapprehension of the rule for
taking an appeal, of relatively recent effectivity at the time, the motion for extension could very well have been sought from the Probate
Court in relation to a record on appeal, instead of from the CA with reference to a petition for review.
It is clear that the estate represented by Ambrosio had suffered no real injury to its rights and interests by reason of the imperfection
in the mode of taking the appeal. As already pointed out, strict adherence to technical adjective rules should never be unexceptionally
required, especially in the context of facts from which substantial compliance with the rules may be reasonably inferred; a contrary
precept would result in a failure to decide cases on their merits. It should be the function of Courts to afford parties-litigants the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just determination of their causes, free from the constraint of technicalities.
In the disposition of controversies, reasonable and justifiable liberality in the application of procedural rules should be the guiding
principle, where otherwise substantial justice would be jeopardized; inadequacies and errors of form should be overlooked when they
would defeat rather than help in arriving at a just and fair result as to the essential merits of any case.
1 CIR is required to file (1) a notice of appeal, and a (2) record on appeal, within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order sought to be appealed
66 | P a g e

Republic of The Philippines vs. Sandiganbayan 407 SCRA 10 (July 21,2003)

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Republic of The Philippines vs. Sandiganbayan 407 SCRA 10 (July 21,2003)

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University of Santo Tomas Cases in Special Proceedings

3B (2016-2017) Dean Lope E. Feble

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Oral extra-judicial settlement can be enforced between heirs.

Jose McMicking v. Benito Sy Conbieng

Resort to extra-judicial partition can be made even during judicial settlement.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court’s Judgment

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

RULE 74: Summary Settlement of Estate

In this relation, Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court provides:

Reynaldo P. Bascara v. Sheriff Rolando G. Javier and Evangeline Pangilinan

Donation mortis causa must be probated.

In his defense Bascara claimed the following:

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Felix Balanay, Jr. v. Hon. Antonio M. Martinez, et al.

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1. Whether Las Pinas City was the proper venue

2. Whether Elise is qualified to be administrator of the estate

Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. v. Court of Appeals and Edgardo S. Silverio

Before the Supreme Court, Ricardo, Sr. contended that:

1. Whether the appointment of Edgardo Silverio as administrator is proper

Rosalina Cunanan v. Rafael Amparo

2. Who has the primary jurisdiction to decide the issue of ownership

Whether Gonzales, the special administrator, should be disqualified

YES. The special administrator is disqualified and must be excluded.

Bayani Vasquez v. Judge Severo Malvar

Emilio A.M. Suntay III v. Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay

Hostility does not warrant appointment as co-administrator.

Hostility does not warrant appointment as co-administrator.

Diosdado S. Manungas v. Margarita Avila Loreto and Florencia Avila Parreo

 This case is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.

 RTC-Appointed Parreño as administrator

 Section 1(c) of Rule 41

No appeal may be taken from:

 Further, there was no necessity to file for MR

 Heirs of Belinda Dahlia A. Castillo v. Lacuata-Gabriel:

 Diosdado is a stranger to Engracia while Parreño is the latter’s relative.

Section 3, Rule 87 bars petitioners from filing the present action.

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RTC granted Thelma’s motion through an order.

2. Whether the properties shall be included in the estate of the decedent

Felix Uy Chua, et al. v. Court of Appeals and Sofia O. Sanchez

YES. It is final and consummated.

Alan Joseph A. Sheker v. Estate of Alice O. Sheker, Victoria S. Medina-Administratrix

Alfredo Hilado, et al. v. Court of Appeals

Purita Alipio v. Court Of Appeals and Romeo G. Jaring

Social Security Commission and Apolonio Lamboso v. Far S. Alba

In 2001, the Commission rendered its resolution declaring:

Maria Elena Rodriguez Pedrosa v. Court Of Appeals, et al.

Whether the action to annul the partition has prescribed

Spouses Rodolfo Berot and Lilia Berot v. Felipe C. Siapno

Estate can be impleaded as defendant if there is no objection.

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Whether the motion to dismiss should be granted

The Court of Appeals erred in its interpretation of the above-quoted provisions.

Heirs of Jose Sy Bang, et al. v. Rolando Sy, Rosalino Sy, et al.

Salvador Guerrero v. Leopoldo Teran

The guardian must be within the jurisdiction of the court.

2. Whether the removal of Maria Muñoz as guardian was proper.

Jose Uy, et al. v. Court of Appeals and Teodoro L. Jardeleza