Democracy in
Latin America
Surviving Conflict and Crisis?
GEORGE PHILIP
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Contents
Ackonlements
Aabrevionons
lreroduction: Democray and ts Disontant in Latin Americs
| Democratic Non-Consoiion In Latin America
2 Untlaned Preside, Weak Lier
Enforcement and Pola Contstation
3 Athoraran Legacies and the Pots of Appohiment
4 Chaitans, te Miltary and Democrat Tanson in
South America
5 nternationa leences and Democratic Consakéton
6 Demoeacy, Maret Reform an Development Falurs
7. The Peles of Cris inthe 1990".A Comparative
Perspective
18 Chiver and the Cris inthe Panto Fo Sytem in
Veretela
9 Non-Consldtion and Sen-Authorarsnisms
Fujinoris Pers
10. Mexico: Techrocratie Governance snd Democratization
a
a
13
34
160
vsAuthoritarian Legacies
and the Politics
of Appointment
‘Another vay in ehich we can se clear continuity benween pre
‘Semocratic and democratic Latin Ameria i n the semporimonil
character o it ple adminisation- Market reform has not ely
‘hanged this ect in etain spec amas for empl where state
sets have hewn privatized. Democratization did ot realy change it
ther excep in a small aunber of countries (Such 2s Uruguay) that
‘id undertake serious reform of the systems of public acnonistation,
Enpiraly there sno doubt that cen ptrmanat brett
practices have proved very resistant fo reform. This discussion accepts
the argument, pt forward by Geddes and others (Ges 1959, that
thers f 3 calsiveaten problem foeing reform, because thse ho
Senet fom the esting aus gu are eet voit Iie the cane
that democratic consoldation requires the existence of a Weberanrule-
cenforcing buresuracy (Line and Sepa 1986, p13), then the ical
tins of reforming somt-ptrnonalt systems of pocal appointment
bear direty upon the lane of democrat covaliaton
“The reform of state agencios has become an important part of the
Jnmernationa god governance’ agenda. However, ofc charged
‘with encnaging stich reforms have tended to report pesimisicly
Shout their experiences. For example, Gotrey Shepherd, then a Worl
bank oficial, canted in 1989 of cv service reform progremmes|
that results have been satistactory inthe cose of late reforms fn
particular areas, but poor it the ce of process snd ol een
{Shepherd 198). Sindaety, Peer Spink (1990) quotes Garald Calder’
(0991 conclasion tht
he sot npn ft aboot Lata Ame ove the ps or decdes
‘Slo estes ny ales end Uaappoiena Ply Rowers
Aorta pic Peso Agama °
in he word have 0 many governments ncn Dol, inaghnate
‘orm pen achieves en patice (Caden 1, p26:
Bons)
Wonka enforcement sa ational problem with form attemp.
For ecample in seport om adminsbatve reform on Bolivia, the
‘Wold Baal complaina tht,
Wether ar sven waysto hance the inl weakness
is lve pi sector cnet we find most sel tat of
‘nlrmaiy Te prion a rma xs whe hia i
‘an tp bebe ea ona’ Bhavan paler pnb
instr tormal nto (avs, abderganzonal ems)
(the ons band nd seal eur pers a etain, CNSTE
Bak 3 pied ec Sumy)
In es antiseptic words, administrative behaviour at he higher lvls
‘fgovernment not mich comseainod bylaws We hve aeady noted
that indepenent aw enforcement sgenarally weak in the ein In
the wesc of pal ental, the power of sppoitment and prom
tion becomes even sore inant Civen the Hlathood hat poll
‘Gans and seair politically appointed burexsrats wil form symbiotic
Testioashigs, a weak egal sytem makes it very difcal to deat with
problems caused by patmoniaisn,
"The chapler Ie nly partly aboot face of bureaucratic perfor
snance I's focused mainly onthe wider sue of democratic consl-
Uaton, Poor policy performance & certainly revant fo this though
tere are other asp as well The ince th prospect of increas
Ing returns to power, Other things being eqal one would expect
eidertil power be enhuncod in case where the incumbent
president had many thousands of bureacratc postions st hs dis
Dosa A slate buesucray tat i composed ery lage of pollcal
Eppointece and st to ile o no nopendentdacpine fom the
iwi aly tobe based toward incumbents. However, the pelical
‘onseuence f such station might nevertheless bo moze ca
thanone mightsuppcce, The endeney fore slate to actor he beet
of incumtents might be ofset by the atcpated reaction effect
tenoned in the lst chapter. nother words, poll behaviour
Sind insitionsl mechanies might be adapted to lit the pala
‘onsen of state ap af IANA the emergence of hyper
Prosicndaiare, The soll might bea kind of rotated Bypor
Dresiteniaim instead