GONZALES VS MACARAIG (November 19, 1990)

Nature Petition for Prohibition/ Mandamus, with a prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Restraining Order
Parties Gonzales et. al., as members and ex-officio members of the Committee on Finance of the Senate and as "substantial taxpayers,
petitioners
Macaraig et. al, members of the Cabinet tasked with the implementation of the General Appropriations Act of 1989 and 1990,
respondents
Disputed Matter Constitutionality of the Veto by the President of Special and General Provisions, particularly
 Section 55, of the HBN 19186 or the General Appropriation Bill (GAB) of 1989
 Section 16, of the HBN 26934 or the GAB of 1990
Antecedents [Note: Authority of the President to submit a budget to the Congress as basis for the GAB is found in VII(22)]

1. GAB of 1989; signed into law as RA No. 6688

- The President vetoing: a) 7 special provisions and b) Sec. 55, a general provision
- Sec. 55 reads. No item of appropriation recommended by the President in the Budget submitted to Congress…
which has been disapproved or reduced in this Act shall be restored or increased by the use of appropriations
authorized for other purposes by augmentation. An item of appropriation for any purpose recommended by the
President in the Budget shall be deemed to have been disapproved by Congress if no corresponding appropriation
for the specific purpose is provided in this Act.
- Reason for veto. The provision violates Section 25 (5) of Article VI of the Constitution. If allowed, this Section would
nullify not only the constitutional and statutory authority of the President, but also that of the President of the
Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and Heads of
Constitutional Commissions, to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices
from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

2. GAB of 1989; signed into law as RA No. 6831

- The President vetoing Sec. 16, a general provision
- Sec. 16 reads. Use of Savings. — The President of the Philippines, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Heads of Constitutional Commissions under
Article IX of the Constitution and the Ombudsman are hereby authorized to augment any item in this Act for their
respective offices from savings in other items of their appropriations: PROVIDED, THAT NO ITEM OF
APPROPRIATION… [same provision as Sec. 55 of the GAB of 1989]
- Reason for veto. Same reason for vetoing Sec. 55 of the GAB of 1989 with additional reference to Sections 44 and 45
of P.D. No. 1177 as amended by R.A. No. 6670 which authorizes the President to use savings to augment any item
of appropriations in the Executive Branch of the Government.

Petitioners question the validity of the veto as:

a. The line-veto power of the President in appropriations bill pertain to items, not provisions
b. The President cannot veto a provision of an appropriations bill without vetoing the whole bill
 c. The line-veto power does not authorize the President to strike out restrictions or conditions as it will be tantamount to
legislation in transgression of the doctrine of separation of powers
d. The power of augmentation has to be provided by law, thus the Congress may impose restrictions upon it as it deems
necessary

Issues Decision Doctrine

I. PROCEDURAL: Requisites of Judicial Review
a. Is there an actual case or Yes. Where the legislature or the executive acts
controversy? 1. There is an actual controversy between the beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it
Senate and the Executive department, the becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what
former in maintaining the charge of the other branches of the government had
unconstitutionality of the President’s veto assumed to do as void
of said provisions
2. There is a need for definitive ruling. The
reiteration of the assailed provisions in the
GAB of 1989 and GAB of 1990
underscores the need for judicial
determination for the guidance of the
departments.
b. Do petitioners have locus Yes.
standi? 1. As taxpayers. The Court enjoys discretion
in entertaining suits brought by taxpayers.
2. As Senate members. They have the
requisite personality to raise questions of
Constitutionality.
c. Is the matter a political The Court will settle controversies otherwise
question? political to delimit constitutional boundaries in
accordance with the duty imposed upon it by the
Constitution.
II. SUBSTANTIVE: Propriety of the Exercise of the President’s Line-veto Power
a. Does the President have the power to Yes. Notwithstanding the elimination in Article VI, Comparing paragraphs 1 and 2 of Sec. 27 of the
veto provisions (vis-à-vis items) in an Section 27 (2) of the 1987 Constitution of any Article VI of the 1987 Constitution:
appropriations bill? reference to the veto of a provision, the extent of - (1) refers to the general veto power of the
the President's veto power as previously defined by President and if exercised would result in
the 1935 Constitution has not changed. This is the veto of the entire bill, as a general rule.
because the eliminated proviso merely pronounces Paragraph
the basic principle that a distinct and severable - (2) is what is referred to as the item-veto
part of a bill may be the subject of a separate veto. power or the line-veto power. It allows the
exercise of the veto over a particular item or
Issues
b. Are the assailed provisions
appropriate?
4. Are the conditions/restrictions
provided by Congress appropriate?
Decision
(analogous to the elimination of the service
contract provision in La Bugal)
No. The assailed provisions are not provisions in
the budgetary sense of the term. They are
inappropriate provisions that should be treated as appropriation therein and that any such provision
items for the purpose of the President's veto
power.
1. They do not relate to any particular or
distinctive appropriation as they generally
apply to all items disapproved or reduced
by Congress in the Bill;
2. The disapproved or reduced items are
nowhere to be found on the face of the Bill.
One has to resort the original budget
submitted by the President to find them.
And some may not even appear on the face
of the Bill as they have been eliminated;
3. They are expressions of Congressional
policy in respect of augmentation.
No. The criteria set in the questioned GABs are
inappropriate conditions. They are actually
general law measures more appropriate for
substantive and, therefore, separate legislation. A itself to stand. However, for the rule to apply,
general provision of law, which happens to be put
in an appropriation bill.
Doctrine
items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff
bill.
The veto under par. 2 pertains to an item, the
President cannot veto a portion of an item and
approve the rest.
An item in an appropriation bill refers to the
particulars, the details, the distinct and severable
parts . . . of the bill. It is an indivisible sum of
money dedicated to a stated purpose. It is a
specific appropriation of money, not some
general provision of law, which happens to be
put into an appropriation bill.
Any provision in the general appropriations bill
shall relate specifically to some particular
shall be limited in its operation to the
appropriation to which it relates
A settled rule is that the Executive is not allowed
to veto a condition or proviso of an
appropriation while allowing the appropriation
restrictions should be such in the real sense of the
term, not some matters which are more properly
dealt with in a separate legislation. Restrictions or
Issues
5. Does the President (and other
officials mentioned in Sec. 25(5) of
Art. VI) have the power to augment
from savings granted that it must be
made by law?
6. Is the doctrine of separation of
powers endangered by said
augmentation?
7. Did the President properly veto the
assailed sections?
8. Do the enactments of Sec. 55 (1989)
and Sec. 16 of questioned GAAs
operate as implied repeal of PD No.
1177?
9. Did the Congress undertake the
proper remedy in this case?
Decision Doctrine
conditions in an Appropriations Bill must exhibit
a connection with money items in a budgetary
sense in the schedule of expenditures.
Yes. The statutory authority of the President to The power to augment from savings lies dormant
augment any appropriation of the executive until authorized by law.
department in the General Appropriations Act
from savings was specifically provided in existing
laws:
1. PD No. 1177 or the Budget Reform
Decree of 1977 (as amended), Sec. 44
2. GAA of 1989, Sec. 12
No. The transfer is made within a department
(branch), and not from one department (branch) to
another.
Yes. These provisions nullify the constitutional
authority of the Chief Executive and heads of
different branches of government to augment any
item in the General Appropriations Law for their
respective offices from savings in other items of
their respective appropriations, as guaranteed by
Article VI, Section 25 (5) of the Constitution.
No. Implied repeals are not favored. If it is indeed
a repeal, all the more reason that they should be in
a separate enactment, not in an appropriations bill.
PD No. 1177 likewise is not repealed by the 1987
Constitution. The transitory provisions provided
for the continuance of laws, decrees, etc., until
repealed, amended or revoked.
No. A Presidential veto may be overridden by the
votes of two-thirds of members of Congress.