A Marine Forensics Analysis of HMS Hood and DKM Bismarck, 2001

SNAME Transactions, Vol. 1 IO, 2002, pp.
115-l 53
A Marine Forensic Analysis of HMS Hoodand

DKM Bismarck
William Jurens, Assocate Member, Consultant, William H. Garzke, Jr., Member, Consultant, Robert 0.
Dulin, Jr., Visitor, Consultant, John Roberts, Visitor, Consultant, and Richard Fiske, Member
ABSTRACT
The wrecks of the British battle cruiser HMS Hood and German battleship DKM Bismarck were explored
during July 2001. Bill Jurens, a member of Panel SD-7 was aboard the expedition ship and provided an
analysis. This 2001 visit to Bismarck has clartfied many details of damage and construction missed in the
I989 Ballard expedition. Comprehensive and systematic video coverage should eventually enable
researchers to compile a complete survey of shell and torpedo damage to the exterior of the main hull and
superstructure. A number of new items were discovered in the debris field including one additional main
turret and almost the entire forward superstructure. A subsequent and related visit to the wreck of HMS
Hood provided the first opportunity to investigate the damage caused by the explosion that tore this battle
cruiser apart during her engagement with Bismarck on 24 May 1941. The wreck reveals the severity of that
firestorm, and also exhibits signtficant implosion damage unlike that seen in the wrecks of Bismarck,
Titanic, Yorktown, and Derbyshire. The unusual debris field of Hood also presents a number of interesting
and mysterious characteristics that may eventually yield signtficant knowledge regarding the sequence of
breakup as the ship approached the bottom. A concluding section provides an introduction to upcoming
research, and some perspective regarding the state of marine forensics at the current time.
INTRODUCTION Fleet, who by then felt that design emphasis should

be re-directed towards the production of vessels
This paper presents the authors’ findings on capable of engaging the 30-knot battle cruisers then
the design of these two famous warships, provides a believed to be building in Germany. Design effort
brief description of how each met its fate, and thereafter focused on vessels with much higher
presents preliminary analyses and descriptions of speed and greatly decreased armor. Orders for three
the condition of their wreckage and its distribution ships of the ‘“Admiral” class were placed in April of
on the bottom of the sea. The paper also discusses 1916, with a fourth being added in July. This
proposed research into the effects of implosion and design, with an overall length of 262.1 meters, a
explosion on ship structures, the hydrodynamics of beam of 3 1.7 meters and a full load displacement of
sinking, and the creation of debris fields. In approximately 36,300 long tons, formed the original
addition, a discussion of “lessons learned” can be basis for the design of Hood. The ships were to
used to guide the work of future expeditions. mount a main armament of eight 38 1 mm and
sixteen 140mm guns. Speed was projected at 32
BRIEF HISTORY of HMS HOOD and knots on 144,000 shaft horse power. The ships
DKM BZSMARCE were designed around a relatively shallow draft of
7.77 meters at normal displacement, increasing to
Design rationale and operational chronology - about 8.84 meters at full load. The original design
HMS Hood. In 1915, the Director of Naval was relatively lightly armored, with a 203 mm main
Construction was asked to investigate the design of side belt and mostly 25mm deck armor.
a new battleship based on the 24-knot Queen
Elizabeth Class then just completing, incorporating The Battle of Jutland, which took place on
the latest ideas in underwater protection and with a 3 1 May 1916, saw the destruction of three lightly-
greatly reduced draft. Several designs were armored British battle cruisers due to magazine
submitted along these lines, which were, in the end, explosions under gunfire attack.’ Inadequate armor
rejected by the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand was seen to be a major culprit in this unexpected
115
and embarrassing disaster. Construction on Hood, torpedo tubes were removed in 1938, and her
which had just begun, was stopped, and the ship 140mm secondary armament was replaced with
was subjected to a major redesign effort which additional anti-aircraft installations in 1940. A
increased the displacement some 4,900 long tons major reconstruction was scheduled for 1942 during
with a related increase in the draft from 8.84 m to which her machinery would have been replaced,
9.60 meters. The major component of that increase aircraft facilities added, and her deck armor
was the addition of 3,500 long tons of armor. The protection augmented to match that provided to the
thickness of the main side belt armor was increased King George V class battleships.
from 203mm to 305mm, and the armor was sloped
I 1.5 degrees, making it equivalent to about 3 50mm As completed, the ship carried two
of vertical plate. Although the deck protection was underwater and four above-water torpedo tubes.
also increased significantly, it still was distributed These were neither popular nor very useful, and the
rather inefficiently (by World War II standards), underwater tubes were removed just before the war.
and some doubts remained regarding its adequacy.
Pressure from various sources to increase the Hood was the premier warship in the Royal
thickness and distribution of armor was relentless. Navy from her commissioning until her loss in May
1941. A number of changes were made to her
In July 1918, when the ship’s hull was before and during World War II, but none involved
nearly complete, firing trials with 38 1 mm bullets her armor protection. Most of these involved
were carried out against a full-scale replica of the changes to armament, fire control gear, directors,
Hood’s armor system. As a result of these tests, ammunition arrangements, and the addition of
some additional 76mm laminated deck protection radar. The ship, her draft relentlessly increased by
was added around the magazines. In accordance weight additions during construction and afterward,
with standard British practice of the time, the remained notoriously “wet”, even in moderate seas,
magazines were located above the shell rooms, an throughout her career. She was the flagship of Force
arrangement that was, incidentally, duplicated in H and then the Battle Cruiser Squadron of the
Bismarck. Although the addition of even more Home Fleet. She saw action against the French
armor would have been desirable, nothing more Fleet at Mers El Kebir and participated in the search
could be done - the ship, whose dimensions had not for the German battle cruisers Gneisenau and
changed since the original design in 19 15, had Scharnhorst in the winter of 194 1. General
simply exhausted her displacement. She just arrangement plans of Hood are given on Figures 1
couldn’t take another ton.. . and 2. Figure 3 gives a midship section.
Hood was launched in August of 19 18. By Design rationale and operational chronology -
the time she was commissioned in May 1920 she Bismarck. Bismarck and her near-sister-ship
was not only the largest warship in the world - a Tirpitz were the first battleships delivered to the
record she held for all or most of her lifetime - but German Navy in over 25 years. An agreement
one of the most heavily protected ships in the Navy. reached in 1934 allowed the Germans to build to
Events had overtaken the three other ships in her battleships with a standard displacement of 35,000
class, which were all cancelled and scrapped on the long tons; various “escalator” clauses had, with
ways in 1918. In 1927 the Director of Naval complete legality, increased this limit to 45,000
Construction proposed adding additional armor to long tons by 1941. Conceptual development on a
her decks in order to further protect her from the 35,000 long-ton vessel armed with a 305mm main
threat of bombing attacks. However (and it must be battery commenced in 1932. This armament was
remembered that ships, like men, tend to get heavier considered inadequate and, in anticipation of future
as they get older) Hood was then so near her restraints being lifted, the Germans commenced
displacement limits -- and so engaged in ‘showing development and testing of 380mm and 400mm
the flag’ -- that the proposal was deferred, as it guns in 1934. Detail design on what would
transpired, indefinitely. Some armor protection eventually become the Bismarck class began in
was provided to the above-water torpedo tubes 1935. A requirement to pass through the Kiel Canal
during a 1929- 193 1 overhaul. Hood’s underwater restricted the maximum draft to 11 m while docking
116 A Marine Forensic Analysis of HMS Hood and DKM Bismarck

*
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I
A Marine Forensic Analysis of HMS Hood and DKM Bismarck 117

. . . . . . . . _ .-......_........_ .- . . .
8 ’
H.M.S.HOOD -FED6 -lo ---2O _ -3O’

MIDSHIP SECTION SCALE I t I
I .. I I I I- I I 8I.- I
SCALE 1: 120
2 4 6 _- FlG(,JRE’.:3 METERS 0
W. JURENS Cl619
and construction constraints limited the length and commissioning -- was kept a strict secret.
beam to 250 meters and 38 meters respectively. “Battleship F” (Bismarck) was laid down on 1 July
The Standard Displacement’ was then estimated at 1936. The ship was launched on 14 February 1939
approximately 43,900 long tons. The displacement and commissioned on 24 August 1940. She was not
was somewhat increased by the German Navy’s really war-ready until May 1941. General
reluctance to use triple or quadruple turrets for their arrangement plans of Bismarck are shown on
main armament. Although some documents, Figures 4 and 5. Figure 6 gives a midship section.
including an official U.S. Navy study produced in
1942, suggest that Bismarck and Tirpitz were TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS of
essentially derivatives of the BadenlBayern design HOOD and BISMARCK
of World War I, other naval architects feel that the
arrangements of their armor, armament, and Tables 1 and 2 summarize the major
propulsion plants were really quite different. characteristics of these two famous warships. Table
Certainly the ships incorporated all of the latest 2 clearly shows that weight saved in Bismarck’s
technology. machinery installation was invested in supplemental
armor.
Their true displacement, technically illegal
at the time of design -- but not at the time of
Table 1
Principal Characteristics of DKM Bismarck and HMS Hood (1941)
Bismarck Hood
Standard Displacement 41,881 tonnes 42,3 11 tonnes
Full Load Displacement 49,406 tonnes 46,9 I3 tonnes
Maximum Displacement 50,405 tonnes 49,13 6 tonnes
Waterline Length 24 1.5 5 meters 246.89 meters
Waterline Beam 36.00 meters 3 1.70 meters
Draft (design) 9.30 meters 8.84 meters
Armament 8 - 380mm in Twin Turrets 8 - 381mm in Twin Turrets
12 - 150mm in Twin Turrets 14 - 102mm in Twin Mounts
16 - 105mm in Twin Mounts 24 - 40mm porn-poms in Octuple
I6 - 37mm Twin Machine Guns Mounts
12 - 20mm Single Machine 16 - 0.5” Machine Guns in Quad
Guns Mounts
4 Arado-I 96 Floatplanes 5 “‘Unrotated Projectile”
(i.e. rocket) Mounts
4 Torpedo Tubes
Shaft Horsepower 138,000 mhp 145,998 mhp
Speed 30.12 Knots 3 1.OOKnots3
Endurance 9,280 n.m. @ 16 Knots 7500 n.m. @ 14 Knots
Fuel 8,294 tonnes 4,064 tonnes
Protection 320mm - Main Side Belt 305mm - Main Side Belt
95mm - Deck (Magazines) 20-76mm- Deck
80mm - Deck (Machinery)
Complement 2100 1400
NARRATIVE of DENMARK STRAIT Bismarck, later joined by heavy cruiser

BATTLE AND LOSS of HMS HOOD Prinz Eugen, left Gotenhafen (now Gdynia, in
Poland) on 19 May 1941 for a commerce-raiding

mission against Allied merchant shipping in the accompanied by battleship Prince of Wales,
North Atlantic. The Royal Navy soon became moved to intercept.
aware of this activity but lacked details regarding
the exact routes the Germans were planning.
British cruiser Sufilk, on patrol in the Denmark
Strait between Greenland and Iceland, detected
the German ships on 23 May. Hood,
Table 2
Weight Breakdowns of DKM Bismarck and HMS Hood (1941)
(Figures in tons)
Adapted from figures in Roberts and Koop & Schmolke
Weight Group Hood % Bismarck % Hood/Bismarck

Hull 15,636 34.0 12,700 27.1 1.26
Machinery 5,969 13.0 4,400 94 1.39
Armament 5,302 11.5 5,600 11.9 0.97
Armor 13,650 29.7 18,700 39’8
. 0.75
Equipment 913 20. 900 19. 1.04
Fuel 3,895 85. 4,000 85. 0.99
Reserve Feed Water 572 12. 530 11. 1.10
Aircraft 0 00. 100 02. 0.00
Total 45,937 100.0 46,93 0 100.0 1.oo
A
The Germans detected the approach of leaving only three survivors in the water. The
Hood and Prince of Wales at 05 15 on 24 May 194 1. Germans immediately shifted fire to Prince of
At 0535, Hood and Prince of Wales sighted the Wales, hit her seven times in quick succession, and
masts of the German ships. Both battle groups forced her to retreat in heavily damaged condition.
were proceeding at a speed of approximately 28
knots. The two British ships opened fire at a range Bismarck was also hit during the
of approximately 27,500 meters at 0553. Hood engagement. One 356mm projectile from Prince of
initially fired at Prinz Eugen, while Prince of Wales Wales shell tore a one-meter diameter path through
engaged Bismarck. We believe that Hood shifted the bow, flooding two compartments and
fire to Bismarck shortly thereafter. The two contaminating about 1,000 tonnes of fuel oil.
German ships returned fire against Hood, which Another shell from Prince of Wales fell short and
was then leading the British formation, at 0554. At hit Bismarck underwater in way of the forward
approximately 0557 Prinz Eugen hit Hood with a boiler room on the port side flooding several wing
203mm shell that started a fire in some light steel tanks and an auxiliary machinery room. These hits
ready service lockers on the shelter deck. This fire caused a 9-degree list to port and l-meter trim by
burned until the ship was lost. At 0557, at a range the bow. A third hit was inconsequential.
of about 16,650 meters an 800 kg 380mm armor-
piercing projectile from Bismarck struck Hood After the battle, the Germans continued
slightly aft of amidships just as she was south into the Atlantic, with the British in hot,
commencing a 20.degree turn to port. A though cautious, pursuit. A general plan of the
spectacular explosion ensued, which tore the old action is given in Figure 7.
battle cruiser apart. Hood sank within three minutes,

UPPER VIEW
PLAN AT 2Nc) PLATFORM

fT-?j FiRERROOM ’
ENGlNEROQM
m AUX MACHJNEW SPACE

MAGAZINE .
INBOARD PROFILE
GENERAL ARRANGEMENT OF BISMARCK

SCAlE 3 :1200
FIGURE 5
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SUN AT 0800 GMT.
ELATION 18’
---M-d’06 10
PRtNZ
EUGEbl
?
SCALE 1 :ZOOOOO
YARDS (x 1000)
. .I*21-w
I.-,..‘WI
0 2 4 8 10 \
0600
HOOD EXPLOaES
0 2 4 6 B 10
MEIERS (x 1000)
HOOD/BlSMARCK ACTION
24 MAY 1941
SCALE 3 : 200000
’ FIGURE 7
W. JURENS/CI 611

NARRATIVE of SINKING of DKM BISMARCK Norfolk and Dorsetshire (each with 8 - 203mm
guns). In a bad-weather action that lasted from
Later on 24 May, Bismarck was hit by a 0852 until 103 1, the British ships fired 2,876 shells
shallow-running aircraft torpedo that struck the 320 from 133mm to 406mm at Bismarck, scoring more
mm thick face-hardened side-armor belt amidships than 400 hits. Twenty-three torpedoes were also
on the starboard side. This resulted in a slight launched at the unfortunate battleship as she
displacement of the belt and failure of a welded pitched, yawed, and rolled violently in a Force 9
seam in that belt. No significant flooding occurred storm. The shell hits devastated the German ship,
in the area of this hit, although it did cause leakage since most of the shellfire was from relatively close
through temporary patches installed in the port ranges, down to 3,000 meters. Unlike Hood,
forward boiler room. destroyed cleanly at a range of 16,000 meters,
Bismarck suffered the proverbial “Death of a
On 26 May, aircraft from the carrier Ark Thousand Cuts”.
Royal hit Bismarck with three aerial torpedoes.
These torpedoes, set for a depth of 10.4 meters, Although Bismarck’s main and secondary
were equipped with contact fuzes and an explosive armament was in essentially perfect condition at the
charge of 204 kg of TNT. One struck abreast of the beginning of the action, her gunfire control systems
after superstructure to starboard, one exploded in on were destroyed very early in the engagement and
the same area to port, and a third hit further aft on she scored no effective hits on her enemies. The
the port side just aft of the 70mm armored bulkhead next hour and a half saw the ship gradually battered
of the steering gear room. The first two hits were into submission by a hail of incoming gunfire that
relatively harmless, causing some flooding in the killed hundreds of her crew. Short of fuel and
wing tanks on the port side and slow flooding in the unable to sink his giant target by gunfIre alone, at
port engine room. 1022 Admiral Sir John Tovey ordered cruiser
Dorsetshire to sink the Bismarck with torpedoes.
The torpedo hit aft, however, doomed the Dorsetshire hit Bismarck with three 533 mm
German battleship, since it jammed her rudders torpedoes, each armed with 340 kg of TNT and set
while Bismarck was executing a sharp port turn. to run at a depth of about 4.75 meters. Two of these
According to the senior surviving officer, the rudder torpedoes hit on the port side and one hit to
indicator locked at 12 degrees to port after the hit. starboard. As Bismarck was beginning to capsize
As is typical when hits take place near the bow or slowly to port when this attack occurred, it appears
stern, the ship experienced a rather severe transient that one of these torpedoes may have exploded
whipping response that damaged equipment not against Bismarck’s port side superstructure at about
designed to resist such forces. The most severe 103 1. (This was not a unique event; similar torpedo
damage was to the stern overhang structure. Tears hits on the superstructure were received by USS
were opened in the side shell and bulkheads Oklahoma as she capsized during the Pearl Harbor
adjacent to the damaged area and the smoke-screen attack.)
generating plant was completely destroyed. The
propellers, also quite near the blast, were Nine minutes later, at about 1040, the
undamaged. Judicious use of these permitted the wrecked and flaming battleship capsized to port and
ship to maintain headway, but little else. Unable to sank stern first. There are anecdotal reports,
steer, Bismarck could no longer avoid interception including one from the senior surviving engineering
by her vastly superior fleet of pursuers. officer, that the Germans assisted in the sinking of
Bismarck by firing demolition charges in the
Early on the morning of 27 May 1941, 4
engineering spaces shortly before she sank.
&smack, outgunned, damaged by torpedo and shell Although many hundreds of men successfully
hits, unable to maneuver and manned by a abandoned the sinking ship, as it turned out only
somewhat demoralized crew who knew exactly 115 men were actually pulled from the water. A
what was in store for them, was engaged by British general plan of the action is given in Figure 8.
battleships King George V (10 - 356mm guns) and
Rodney (9 - 406mm guns), and heavy cruisers,

t-
---w---w---- KING GEORGE V Ad- ,k&/ /
--I’-- NORFOLK
------- DORSETSH IRE
BlSMARCK
-s’
~-- J 0902
0950
: -9
1000
/ --Y . h
SCALE 1 i20oaoo
YARDS
- d' (x 1000)
MEERS (x 1000)
7,
FIGURE 8
W, JURENS/C1612
TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT USED IN THE pilots working from a portable operations-control
SURVEY van mounted on the deck of a support vessel. This
fiber-optic multiplex system and sensor suite passes
Description of MV Northern Horizon the video image and data from the ocean floor
through an 1 l,OOO-meter fiber-optic umbilical to the
MV Northern Horizon was first built as a control van. On this particular mission, the vehicle
deep-sea freezer trawler, and later converted to a was equipped with a very high quality video camera
deep seismic survey ship and hydro-acoustic and for survey purposes, another video camera which
ROV (Remote Operated Vehicle) survey ship. was used primarily for navigation and self-
Northern Horizon is 74.88 meters in overall length, inspection of the ROV, and a high-quality digital
displaces approximately 2,028 long tons, and has still camera, all of which were mounted on
accommodation for approximately 50 persons. The remotely-controlled pan/tilt heads. The ROV was
vessel is equipped with two 1,600 hp diesel engines also equipped with a very advanced lighting system
yielding a top speed of 14 knots. In addition to the that usually provided good quality video out to a
regular suite of navigational equipment appropriate range of at least 30 meters.
to a vessel of this size, Northern Horizon is
equipped with a DP (Dynamic Positioning) system Guided by its sensors and controls, this
and two athwart ship tunnel thrusters that enable it ROV is maneuvered by a 25 horsepower electro-
to establish (and -- in reasonable weather - hydraulic power unit, which supplies the hydraulic
maintain) its position to within less than ten meters fluid at 207 mPa to its seven thrusters and several
in navigable waters virtually anywhere on the globe. five and seven-function manipulators, which can
grasp and lift up to 90 kg. at a range of one-meter.
Description of Magellan 725 The top underwater speed of the vehicle is in the
vicinity of I .5 to 2 knots in deep water.
Note:
The authors regret that the original presentation of The 9150 meter long umbilical cable, about
this paper contained an incorrect description of the 17mm in diameter, is stored on a take-up reel which
Magellan vehicle. The following paragraphs have feeds through a 907-kilogram line pull traction
been modified to reflect corrected information. winch and through an overboard sheave. When
ascending or descending, cable is typically paid-out
The Magellan 725 is a dual-manipulator electro- at a rate of approximately 0.5 meters per second. In
hydraulic Remote Operated Vehicle capable of practice, the umbilical cable is usually led nearly
operating in depths to 8,000 meters. This capability, straight down from the survey ship to a heavy
which far exceeds the requirements of most “depressor” containing a transfer gear which is in
commercial applications, is relatively rare. The unit turn attached to a relatively light “roving” tether
itself is 3.2 meters in length, 1.4 meters in width, about 100 meters long leading to the ROV itself.
and 2.4 meters in height with a weight in air of 2 This “roving” cable is supported by floats that bring
tonnes. It is propelled by two axial, three vertical, it to nearly neutral buoyancy. On this expedition the
and two lateral thrusters powered via a cable ROV was equipped with a 3-chip broadcast-quality
extending from the survey ship, meaning that (in the camera that could deliver 850 lines of resolution
absence of breakdown) underwater endurance is and 1,200 watts of HMI lighting.
essentially unlimited. The vehicle, which represents
the state-of-the-art in unmanned submersible Designed for worldwide operations, the
technology, has been used for a wide variety of Magellan 725 is air/sea/ground transportable in 20-
deep-water intervention tasks including the 1998 foot IS0 containers and easily mobilized onboard
exploration of the RMS Titanic, the recovery of various ships of opportunity. The Magellan 725
Liberty Bell 7, and the unsuccessful search for USS system comes with spare equipment, a workshop
Indianapolis (CA 35) in 1999. container, and in this case at least, a very skilled and
dedicated crew.
The Magellan 725 is controlled via a fiber-
optic/electromechanical cable and is guided by

Navigation and Recording Procedures videotape. Although the PAL/SECAM system is
well established in Europe, many potential
In practical terms, it can be of little use to interpreters and researchers are equipped only to
be able to establish the position of the base vessel - handle the NTSC videotape system primarily
in this case Northern Horizon - to within a few employed in North America. As duplication of the
meters when the ROV itself, “dangling” as it were master videotapes from one system to another is
at the end of two or three thousand meters of cable both cumbersome and expensive, many of these
subjected to unpredictable and often changing NTSC-equipped researchers remain, so far,
intermediate currents, can in fact be in quite a effectively cut-off from effective access to the
different, and often indeterminate, location. videotapes.
The expedition did not deploy a transponder The expedition produced over four hundred
grid, which would have greatly assisted the ROV hours of videotape in total, but much of this
operators and researchers to reliably and repeatedly represents interviews with participants, in-transit
locate the ROV with respect to the wreckage below. images of mud flats obtained during relocations of
Especially when primary exploration of a the ROV, and general views which - while
previously unknown site with few recognizable necessary to produce a high quality commercial
landmarks is the goal, establishing a transponder production - are of relatively little value to
grid should always be considered. engineers. Although a complete inventory remains
to be complied, it is estimated that the expedition
In one notable incident, a minor “jump” in obtained approximately 80 hours of useful
location of thirty-odd meters across the main hull of videotape of the Hood and Bismarck wreck sites,
Bismarck (necessitated by the ROV temporarily combined. This represents about 50% of the total
reaching the end of its roving tether), required time spent on the bottom.
relocating the survey ship as well. This fairly
routine repositioning, which required temporarily Adherence to requests by several
losing visual contact with the wreck, resulted in the sponsoring and supporting groups has meant that
total loss of the main hull for a period of three or the exact positions of the wreck sites of Bismarck
four hours. This was unusual, but in many cases and Hood have not been released. This is of little
some frustration was experienced at being unable to consequence to researchers, who - as they are
return to a previously visited site because it simply almost always interested only in details of the
could not be reliably relocated. wrecks themselves and perhaps the relative location
of various artifacts on the bottom - need no
When the sensors on the ROV have absolute positions to complete their studies.
relatively short range, as was particularly true on Although much has been made of “secret” wreck
the Bismarck site due to the irregular bottom, site positions, in reality, the concept of a very
exploring in the absence of a transponder net can be precise wreck position per se is somewhat
somewhat akin to mapping a department store by misleading, as the very nature of most wreck sites
match light. somewhat precludes precise and non-arbitrary
definition. It’s a bit like asking for the precise
That being said, a case can be made that position of Montana. In practical terms, the
establishing and maintaining a transponder network location of both wreck sites would probably be
on a relatively temporary site represents a easily recoverable by expeditions equipped with the
considerable expenditure of both time and money necessary equipment to reach and explore a bottom
which might be better spent on direct, though at three or four thousand meters. Our expedition
relatively unguided, observation. It can be a very found Bismarck on the very first dive.
tough judgment call. Our navigator did an
outstanding job without one. Expeditions to the Bismarck site are now
becoming routine. It is unlikely that many more
As it transpired, the survey ship was expeditions to the Hood site, in a much more remote
equipped only to handle PALSECAM formatted

location, and much less visually interesting, will be
made. General Operations and Observations at the
Bismarck Site
Research Goals
Narrative of dives: Three dives were made on
Two individuals were specifically selected Bismarck during July 2001. The first of these,
to accompany the television and survey teams in which extended from 0048, 8 July through 1930, 8
order to provide technical expertise and place July, came down right on the wreck site, but located
expedition findings in an historical context. These only scattered debris. The second dive, which
were Dr. Eric Grove of the University of Hull, lasted from 1343, 9 July through 0206, 10 July
tasked with providing background on historical and located and allowed fairly detailed observations of
to some extent tactical issues, and this author the mainmast, one gun turret, and the forward
(Jurens), who represented both SNAME Panel SD-7 superstructure. The third dive, from 0448, 11 July
(Marine Forensics) and the technical journal through 1206, 12 July, located and explored the
Warship International published by the International main hull. Fortuitously, the ROV came upon the
Naval Research Organization (INRO). Jurens’ main hull of Bismarck exactly at the stern break.
major tasks were to ensure that good scientific and This enabled this area, along with the fatal torpedo
technical data was obtained, to analyze that data, to damage to the rudder(s), to be examined in great -
provide guidance to the television crews, and to almost excruciating - detail. After commercial
support historical and tactical analysis. Prior to television commitments were satisfied and a plaque
departure, he set his primary scientific and historical was laid to commemorate those lost, the expedition
goals as follows: leader and the sponsor generously provided
approximately six hours of dive time which could
a) To examine of the wrecks of both Hood and be specifically devoted to the completion of a
Bismarck in order to assess weapons effects complete and systematic survey of the entire main
and, if possible, develop methods to hull, including all vertical surfaces. It is anticipated
differentiate these effects from those caused by that close examination of this videotape will result
their descents to the bottom. in the first complete survey of hits on the Bismarck
b) To examine the wrecks of both Hood and wreck. Time did not permit investigation of a large
Bismarck to determine the source and nearby target, which was believed to represent the
magnitude of differences in deterioration funnel.
occurring underwater.
c) To examine the debris fields formed by the The debris field of the Bismarck wreck is,
wrecks in order to assist in the assessment in general, rather unremarkable. The forward
and/or evaluation of debris fields formed by command tower, the mainmast, and turret Caesar
other wrecks. are located in relatively close proximity, which
d) To conduct small-scale experiments implies that they detached from the main hull at
regarding the nature of pressure-induced approximately the same time, presumably shortly
implosions. after the ship capsized. The location of a second
turret far south of the main hull, however, suggests
Of these four, only item d) remained that this arrangement may be simply fortuitous.
unaccomplished. The main hull of the ship created a considerable
crater upon impact, thereafter sliding approximately
NARRATIVE OF TRIP 1,200 meters down a 14,degree slope to its final
resting place. Unfortunately, damage to the shell
Northern Horizon departed Cork, Ireland at plating done during this slide, much of which took
midnight on 1 July 2001, arriving at the Bismarck place over a fairly rocky bottom covered in a few
site late on 3 July. A Force 6 gale and mechanical meters of soft mud, appears to have erased or at
delays delayed the first dives somewhat, and the least obscured much of the hull damage done by
wreck of Bismarck’s main hull was not located until British torpedoes. The site is bisected by an east-
6 July. west telecommunications cable that at times is in

actual contact with minor pieces of wreckage. This
provided a convenient, and at times very welcome, Analysis of torpedo damage. Bismarck was hit
point of reference for exploration. by as many as nine torpedoes during her voyage.
The most serious of these, at least from an
The water at the wreck site proved to be operational viewpoint, struck on the port side of the
remarkably clear, and - although there was one ship at the aft end of the steering compartment. A
lighting failure - the resultant photography was quick analysis suggests that the torpedo detonated
excellent. Currents at the site are typically small, near the port rudder, about 1 or 2 meters aft of the
estimated at about a half-knot or less. Net sediment aft armored bulkhead of the steering gear room.
deposition in the sixty years since the sinking The port rudder is visible above the sediments,
appears to be inconsequential, and is often absent pushed forward somewhat and turned
entirely, amounting in most cases to a few approximately 15 degrees. The rudder blade
millimeters of fine unconsolidated mud which was appears relatively undamaged, but the rudder shaft
easily - in fact usually accidentally -- blown away itself has distorted the hull at the entry point. Some
by the propulsors on the ROV. The edges of the of the damage to the rudder may have been caused
slide scar remain exceedingly sharp and fresh by the slide along the bottom. The propellers are in
looking, as if they were, literally, made yesterday. excellent shape, with visible portions apparently
Some evidence of previous visits by a MIR unaffected by the torpedo explosion and the slide
expedition team, which visited the site shortly along the bottom.
before we arrived, was also seen on the bottom. A
memorial plaque had been placed on the after There is a large hole in the portside
weather deck of Bismarck, and several gouges, superstructure in way of the amidships catapult.
identified by our ROV operators as skid marks Although this hole is much smaller than that usually
caused when the MIR exploratory submarines associated with a torpedo hit, there remains a good
apparently bottomed from time to time, were also possibility that it was caused by one of the
observed on the sea-bed. A memorial plaque was torpedoes launched by the cruiser Dorsetshire late
placed by this expedition as well. in the action. If this torpedo, set for a depth of 4.9
meters happened to be running near the surface
The general condition of the Bismarck when it arrived, it is quite possible that it struck the
wreck is good. A substantial amount of paint superstructure of Bismarck as the ship capsized.
adheres to various structures, although - as in the Alternative possibilities remain to be fully
case of USS Yorktown - corrosion is heavy where investigated.
fires have remove :d or damaged this protective
coating. As fires were extensive, these corroded Sediments covered most of the areas where
areas are extensive as well. The w reck is covered other torpedoes are reported to have hit. Damage to
with large numbers of small circular or near-circular the shell caused by the 1,200-meter post-impact
corrosion foci ranging from about 20mm to 250mm slide of the main hull appears to have erased,
in diameter. In most cases it is difficult to tell obscured, or otherwise modified much of the
whether these originate from age-related failures of damage that may have been caused by additional
the protective coating due to normal application torpedo hits from Norfolk, Rodney and Ark Royal.
variances or are due to localized damage due to the Although these torpedoes certainly damaged
impact of shell fragments. “Rustsicle” formation is Bismarck, they did not play a major role in her
minimal. No significant pollution arising from fuel sinking.
oil or any other contaminant was observed, and the
marine ecosystem in the vicinity appeared entirely Analysis of stern break. The most remarkable
unaffected by the wreck. The main hull itself lies at feature on the Bismarck wreck is the area where the
a depth of approximately 4,700 meters. stern end separated from the ship. First observed in
the 1989 expedition by Dr. Robert Ballard, there is
A simplified plan of the debris field is given a clean break in the steel and wooden planking,
in Figure 9. A general plan of the main wreck itself about 200 mm aft of the aft armored bulkhead. The
is given in Figure IO. 2001 Expedition approached within one meter of

W. JURENS Cl6228
MAJOR PIECE
OF STERN # ( IMPAtiT \
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SKRN MISSING TORPEDO HOLE (?)
Dl34tL OF SUPERSTRUCTURE
INVERTED ON BOll-OM
MISSING SUPERSfRUCTURE
L ANTI-AIRCRAFr ARMAMENT
C0MPLETEk.Y DESTROYED
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SUPERSTRUCTURE MISSING
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STERN MISSING :
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\ AREA OF DAMAGED/MISSING L PROBABLE -TORPEDO DAMAGE

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BATTLESHIP BISMARCK 0 SMALL C~tfi3ER SHELL km (SWE~MIC

* MAJOR CALIBER SHELL HITS (SCMEMATJC
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CONDITION ON BOTTOM - OBSERVED SHELL, ENTRY (NP)
- I- _.--. __ --. __-
SCALE: 1: 1200 0 10 20 30 40 50
SCALC(M~ERS) -I-------- -..._

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FIGURE
- IO
this hull failure, and examined the broken edge in cranes, searchlights, masts, and rangefinders.
detail. The break is remarkably straight and clean, (Some of these may have separated from the wreck
and appears almost flame-cut in its precision. after it capsized.) Relatively few major-caliber
Preliminary analysis suggests that this failure shell hits were observed in the side armor, although
probably took place along the heat-affected zone of the 145mm thick upper belt was hit - though rarely
a main erection weld. The torpedo hit in the stern penetrated - by large numbers of 152mm and
probably started cracks in the welds in this area, 203mm projectiles, many of which produced a
which propagated due to unusual, heavy, and “splash” mark indicative of impact. Relatively few
repetitive loads caused by the free motion of water shells appear to have struck the 320mm thick main
in and out of the stern as Bismarck pitched and belt, and almost none of these penetrated. This belt
heaved in the heavy seas. Survivor testimony was designed to be proof at all ranges to shells
suggests that the stern was attached when the ship under 356mm caliber in any case. In most cases
left the surface. It therefore appears probable that incoming trajectories were nearly horizontal,
the stern detached as the ship sank through the indicating that the range from firing ship to target
water column, although it is also possible that the was relatively short. The small number of hits on
stern detached upon impact with the sea bed or the waterline belt may be indicative of a gunnery
during Bismarck’s subsequent slide along the concentration on the superstructure, or may stem
bottom. The stern was not found in the debris field, from the inability of the British to actually get a
which suggests that it lies in a relatively remote clear shot at the main belt in the high seas in which
location, which in turn implies that the separation of the engagement took place. Rather than
the stern took place rather close to the surface. The experiencing large numbers of aggravating “shorts”
after bulkhead at the break line is nearly complete, which would only ricochet wildly past the target
and previously published illustrations showing and obscure the field of view with huge splashes,
overhanging decks extending beyond the break line the British may have deliberately chosen to aim
are incorrect. high. If so, this was unfortunate for Bismarck’s
crew, who would have thus been subjected to very
Hit census and analysis/description of gunfire heavy concentrations of gun fire, which - because it
damage. Bismarck was heavily pounded before she would have arrived high in the ship - would not
sank. It is estimated that the ship absorbed some have hastened her sinking. More historical research
300-400 hits during the 94-minute gunfire phase of may be able to clarify this issue.
the Battle of 27 May. These projectiles arrived
from all virtually all points of the compass, many One of the main rangefinders found on the
from very close range. bottom shows a rather spectacular large-caliber
shell track, which passed transversly through the
The entry and exit holes in the bow from rangefinder near the back. This unusual track
the 24 May hit by Prince of Wales, of great interest indicates that the rangefinder was perpendicular to
to historians, could not be located. In most areas, the line of incoming fire when it was hit. This
the mud line around the Bismarck wreck is would suggest that the hit took place late in the
approximately at the load water line. It appears that action when it was no longer capable of being
the main hull slid more-or-less bow first after trained on potential targets, that the rangefind .er was
impact, in the process creating a substantial “bow trained on one target while another firing ship was
wave” of mud that appears to have covered the area engaging from 90 degrees, or that the rangefi nder
of interest. While Bismarck’s stem is almost buried, was engaged in finding a cross-lev ,el when it was
l .
her stern is almost clear. hit.
Considerable gunfire damage to the Damage to the 150mm gun houses

superstructure and some gunfire damage to the hull surrounding the secondary armament is remarkable.
was visible above the mudline. Incoming Only a few of these were hit more than once,
projectiles appear to have damaged or carried away suggesting that each of these mounts was, in effect,
virtually every exposed piece of equipment above surgically “neutralized” by a single hit, and was
the weather decks including gun mounts, aircraft thereafter neglected. In some cases, escape hatches

to these gun hou .ses were open indicating that at
9 through-connections at the break point - which was
least some of the occupants had tried to escape. In also noted at the stern break -- suggests that the
others, the hatches remained closed, indicating that detached area of the superstructure was probably
the men inside had been killed or disabled almost installed as a sub-assembly.
instantly. The positions of most gun houses and the
general layout of major gunfire damage are clearly The upper superstructure, found inverted on
and quite accurately illustrated in several of Dr. the bottom, had been heavily riddled with light and
Ballard’s easily accessible books, papers, and heavy gunfire, and showed very extensive fragment
articles. The expedition found that one secondary damage. The adjoining “bottom” of the
gun house was oriented differently from the Ballard superstructure also showed little distress or
illustrations. Anecdotal (and as yet unconfirmed) deformation along the attachment point. It appears
evidence indicates that this mount was not in fact to have simply broken at the welds. Light interior
properly imaged during the Ballard expedition, and bulkheads in the superstructure were essentially still
that its orientation was therefore “made up” by in place at the break point.
subsequent illustrators.
It must be remembered that welding was in
There is evidence of two 356mm or 406mm its infancy when Bismarck was constructed. In that
hits on the exposed barbette of Turret Dora. Neither context, the failure of welds in the superstructure
of these were complete penetrations. The forward and stern most probably reflect inexperience rather
conning tower, protected by 3 50mm plating, was hit than incompetence on the part of those who
by several heavy shells traveling nearly horizontally designed and built her.
which, though they appear not to have fully
penetrated, must have inflicted severe damage to the As the main hull was almost completely
interior. There is also evidence of a large shell hit filled with water before the descent to the seabed
in the barbette of Turret Bruno. One main turret started, damage from implosion/explosion forces
was found, inverted, with guns complete but buried appears to have been minimal. No such damage is
in the mud, and with a large mass of superstructure apparent on the visible portions of the hull.
plating wrapped around the faceplate. The ‘“tail-
hatch” was open, suggesting that at least some of No evidence to support (or refute) anecdotal
the crew successfully escaped. The main turret reports regarding the employment of scuttling
found by Dr. Ballard in 1989 was not relocated. charges could be observed on the wreck. This is not
surprising, as the relevant areas of shell plating are
Structural damage at break up/sinking. Bismarck deeply buried in the mud, and, in any case, probably
apparently rotated approximately 13 5 degrees to have been heavily damaged during the slide down
port before her plunge to the bottom began. Her the bottom.
main battery turrets, and many other heavy rotating
structures, were apparently held in place only by Summary of new findings: The 2001 Expedition to
gravity, and therefore slid free of the hull as it Bismarck largely confirmed previous observations.
inverted. The light plating wrapped around the The side armor of Bismarck, previously poorly
faceplate of the turret located on this expedition imaged, showed few penetrations. The upper
suggests that it intercepted part of the superstructure portion of the forward command tower was found,
during its descent. and the break between the superstructure and the
remaining hull was found to be remarkably clean
The upper bridge tower separated from the and undistorted. The torpedo damage to the rudder
main hull sometime during the trip to the bottom. and the stern was imaged and inspected in detail for
This rather substantial piece of superstructure the first time.
separated very cleanly from the main hull, with the
approximately 15mm thick deck on which it sat General Operations and Observations and
remaining flat, clean, and marked only by some Observations at the Hood Site
weld scars which preserved the plan of light interior
partitions. The lack of significant structural

,
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W, JURENS/C1618B
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f--- WATER TIGHT BULGE COMPARTMENT (P/S)
ODT = OfL DRAIN TMK
RFW mRESERVE FEED WATER TANK
BUOYANCY SPACE
D ISOLATED SMALL IMPLOSION

DEFEGT’S SCMTEREO OVER
I WKOM (SCHEMATIC ONLY)
II I IAll I I!
AREA OF SEVERE
MPLOSION DAMAGE (P/S)
H.M.S. HOOD
IMPLOSION DAMAGE TO Boll-OM
SCALE I:500 FIGURE 13
Narrative of dives: Northern Horizon arrived at the right side up. This huge hull section, about 140
Hood site on 17 July, and located the wreck at about meters long, exhibits truly remarkable damage due
0330 19 July. Four dives were made on Hood to the forces of both implosion and explosion. As
between 20 and 25 July 2001. The first dive, which shown on figure 13, the implosion damage to this
extended from OS1 1, 20 July through 0015, 21 July, section is characterized by long parallel more-or-
located the inverted midsection of the hull and less continuous longitudinal trough-like depressions
explored the debris field extending some 500 meters in the 25mm thick bottom plating. A number of
to the northwest. The second dive, from 0940 21 relatively small irregular and/or ellipsoidal
July through 11:25, 23 July, began at the main hull implosion failures are scattered about the bottom as
and proceeded northward about 850 meters, well. Although it has not yet been possible to
thereafter turning westward. This dive located the correlate these smaller failures with interior
stem, the bow, one 38 lmm gun turret and a pair of structure, the large longitudinal trenches can easily
propellers. The third dive, from 1440, 24 July be correlated with normally void spaces in the
through 0211, 25 July, located the conning tower ship’s side protection system.
about 1,400 meters northwest of the midship section
and explored a number of other large pieces of The shell plating covering these depressed
debris. The forth and final dive located one longitudinal troughs exhibited remarkable ductility
additional gun turret, and returned once again to the before failure. Some preliminary measurements of
bow section where a memorial plaque was laid by these depressions suggest that the elongation at
Mr. Ted Briggs, the last living survivor of H.M.S. failure was probably in the vicinity of 35-40
Hood. percent, suggesting that the steel was well into the
plastic stage. Due to contractual agreements and
Debrisfield The Hood wreck lies on a fairly flat respect for the site, it was not possible to recover
bottom, at a depth of approximately 2,700 meters. steel for metallurgical and physical analyses, so the
The site is unusual in that it exhibits evidence of reduction of area associated with this quite
two clearly separate and substantial debris fields remarkable stretching cannot be directly
instead of one. The distribution of material in these ascertained.
debris fields, and to some degree even their extent,
is difficult to analyze; it is often difficult for even Clearly, there are no indications that
skilled observers to separate the sonar echoes and excessively brittle steel in any way contributed to
images created by underwater geology from similar the loss of Hood, or that the design of the hull was
echoes caused by wreckage. In the absence of in any way structurally deficient. In general, plate
detailed examination, which remains to be done, it margins marking the edge of the after failure exhibit
seems most plausible to assume that one of these intact lines of intact rivet holes which suggest that
debris fields may be associated with the explosion when stressed to the limit the structure failed - as it
that tore the ship apart, while the other is related to should have - via shearing and “popping” of the
the break in the hull forward, which was most fasteners rather than through tearing of the plate.
probably caused by implosion. Initial investigation Although occasional plate edges do exhibit the
did not permit small items in the debris fields to be straight-line sharp edge pattern common to so-
correlated with specific points of origin on the ship. called “brittle” failures, in general these failures
The Hood debris fields, in an illustration adapted appear to reflect the presence of high strain rates
from Meams and White, are shown in figure 11. rather than low ductility. This observation applies
to the margins of the forward hull failure as well.
Description of midsection: The midsection of the The middle section of Hood is well-separated from
ship, shown in figures 12 and 13, lies inverted on the remainder of the wreckage, suggesting that it
the bottom and extends from an implosion-induced sank rather slowly, its inversion probably due to
separation just forward of “A” turret aft to the after residual buoyancy remaining in double bottom
bulkhead of the forward engine room at voids which successively imploded as the main hull
approximately frame 2 17. This inverted orientation descended.
is quite unusual, as the main hulls of most wrecks
sunk in deep water - over 90% - end up bottoming

The upper decks in the forward area of the fatal shell or shells arrived. There is no large
main hull are depressed some three or four meters, a impact crater associated with the stern.
situation which initially led Mr. Jurens to tentatively
identify “A” turret barbette at the front of the break Description of bow. The bow section, lying on
as the barbette of the forward “high” turret, “B”. its port side, terminates in a highly irregular failure
This led to an associated misidentification of “B” slightly forward of “A” turret. Unlike the midship
turret as the forward surface of the conning tower. section, which characteristically exhibits trench like
Subsequent location of the conning tower in another depressions and localized implosion punctures, the
area of. the debris field revealed that this initial bow exhibits unperforated depressions and
assessment was in error. The bulkhead of the stern distortions on a much larger scale. Although no
break is covered in cabling which apparently formal measurements have yet been made, the
originated in the winch rooms that housed the visual impression of these defects suggests that they
cabling sheaves serving the hoists on the mainmast. are, in some cases, tens of meters in their greatest
A good deal of shell plating is missing from the dimension, with central depressions perhaps one or
starboard side aft. A very large number of so-called two meters in depth. These distortions suggest that
“crushing tubes” from the side protection system very large external forces were at work before the
are widely scattered throughout the debris fields. bow was fully and completely flooded. The
Many of these were observed floating in the water structure forward, near the anchors, does not appear
shortly after the ship sank. They are indicative of to exhibit the same degree of distortion observed in
extremely severe trauma to the main hull. way of tankage further aft. This is probably due to
the quick flooding of the chain lockers, which
The breaks at the boundaries of the three prevented subsequent implosion at that point. The
main hull sections of HMS Hood were quite lack of implosion-induced puncture failures appears
regular, essentially amounting to ragged transverse to indicate that the framing system failed before the
cuts through the structure, in each case bounded by shell did. A web-like tangle of anchor chains
a main bulkhead or barbette. The impact crater extends for some distance around the bow. No
associated with the midship section is extremely associated anchors were located, although not all
large, with pronounced stellate boundaries. chains were followed to their terminus. There is no
significant impact crater associated with the bow.
Description of stern The stern section of Hood
sits with the keel line perpendicular to the bottom, Description of other items: Hood’s forward
with the stern up and the forward bulkhead of the superstructure and conning tower are located some
break, now horizontal, buried in the mud. It shows distance away from the main debris field. As it has
no significant signs of implosion damage. Large been as yet impossible to determine the exact point
hatches in the weather deck have been either opened in the debris fields over where the ship actually
or blown away. A large “flap” of weather deck exploded and sank, it is difficult to ascribe a cause
plating and planking almost the whole beam of the to this substantial separation, except to note that it
ship and about 15 meters long has been bent implies that the conning tower and associated
forward and upward at an angle of 90 degrees to the superstructure separated from the main hull
keel, placing its lower side flat on the bottom. This relatively early in the descent. The failure at the
flap extends to the after margin of “Y” turrets’ base of the 600-ton heavily armored conning tower,
barbette. which lies inverted on the bottom, is remarkably
clean, with light interior partitions right at the break
The inboard (after) propellers are intact in point being almost entirely undistorted. As the main
the mud, with their streamlined tail cones crushed hull is inverted, the associated attachment point on
by implosion pressures. The remains of the outer the hull itself is buried in the mud and cannot be
shafts and shaft struts were located elsewhere in the observed.
debris field. The rudder is clearly visible, canted
approximately 30 degrees to port. This clears up a In addition to the material already
minor historical mystery by confirming that Hood descri bed, the debris fields contain a number of
had actually commenced her final turn when the rather irregularly shaped heavily traumatized

bungalow-sized pieces of main hull that evidently detailed analysis has not yet been made, these
represent the remains of main machinery and “free” turrets probably represent the two after units,
magazine spaces. One contained an entire turbine “X” and “Y”, which were certainly unseated during
set. These mangled remains were passed over the explosion of the after magazines.
rather quickly, and a detailed analysis of the
resulting videotapes remains to be done. The debris fields are littered with hundreds
of 102mm cartridge cases, the majority of which are
The after end of one torpedo was found. oriented vertically, with the heavy closed end down.
Although it appears most likely that this torpedo Although reliable reference works state that the
was bisected by implosion damage or simply ammunition for these guns was “fixed”, i.e. that the
represents the remains of a spare after body, the projectile and cartridge case were stored and
possibility remains that that the loss of the forward transported in pre-assembled form, none of these
section was in fact due to the explosion of its contained a projectile. Many were heavily
warhead. Detailed imagery of this break was deformed, and contained dents to the upper rim.
obtained which should enable ordnance experts to Close examination of some of these cases failed to
accurately evaluate this possibility in the future. determine if there was propellant remaining inside.
The expedition also located and imaged one of the
A good deal of wreckage, which can be ship’s two main bells.
associated with the after superstructure, including
the mainmast and at least one 102mm anti-aircraft In general, the water surrounding the Hood
mount, was located and imaged. Corrosion damage wreck did not appear to be as clear as that
on the wreck, while not substantial, made it surrounding the wreck of the Bismarck. The sea
impossible to establish flame propagation paths or bottom around the wreck of the Hood is typically
to accurately discriminate plate failures and very soft, and quickly creates clouds of underwater
distortions caused by the blast itself from similar “dust” at the slightest disturbance, including the
failures caused by structural breakup of the hull and reversal of currents. Currents at the Hood site are
superstructure as they sank. large - at times perhaps exceeding two knots - and
remained quite unpredictable during the dive
The general condition of all the located sequences. These current, apparently tidal in nature,
wreckage of Hood was good, and many areas - sometimes made the ROV exceptionally hard to
particularly in the interior - show large areas of control and navigate, and at times precluded the
virtually undamaged paintwork. There is, of course, investigation and re-examination of areas of
evidence of corrosion at work, but this expedition considerable interest. No significant pollution
located few, if any rustsicles. The area where Hood arising from fuel oil or any other contaminant was
sank has long been used as a fishing area, and it was observed. Effects on the marine biota in the vicinity
expected that at least some of the wreck would be appeared to be nil.
entangled in fishing nets which had been abandoned
and/or lost near the surface. None were found. Analysis of the sinking. The Royal Navy conducted
two inquiries after the loss of Hood. These reports,
Three of Hood’s four main gun turrets were which will be more completely analyzed in
located and examined by the survey team. “A” subsequent papers, concluded that Hood was most
turret, less its gun house armor, remains in place probably lost due a magazine explosion caused by
inside “A” barbette, mashed into the mud at the the detonation of a 380mm armor-piercing
front of the midsection. (This indicates that the projectile from the Bismarck which penetrated her
turrets, like many of those in the U.S. Navy, were after magazines. Nothing was found at the wreck
almost certainly vertically restrained, unlike those site that would suggest that this analysis was
in the Bismarck.) It appears likely that that close substantively in error.
investigation of the videotapes will reveal that “B”
turret is in place in its barbette as well. Two Examination of the wreck site did, however,
additional turrets and at least one complete 38 lmm reveal additional information about the loss that
gun were found free in the debris field. Although a could not have been known by the Board(s). These

observations enable researchers to tentatively of the bow was due to a secondary explosion in the
confirm some earlier suppositions, and rule out forward magazines. These conclusions, apparently
others. based upon a very selective misreading of isolated
eyewitness testimony and local observations of
It was, for the first time, possible to some outwardly-bent plating near the margin of the
measure the precise extent of the damage caused by forward hull break, are believed to be erroneous.
the initial explosion and break-up of Hood. As The forward magazine group, in fact, lies entirely
shown on figures 14, 15, and 16, the after explosion aft of the point of separation. (Although drawings
apparently involved the entire after magazine group, of the ship ofien locate a set of forward underwater
and completely destroyed an area approximately 85 torpedo rooms at the break point, these torpedo
meters long. In 1987, Jurens prepared a diagram tubes and the associated warheads had been
illustrating the probable sequence of events during removed during modifications made in 1938.
the explosion itself. This diagram, appended here as Although this modification was accompanied by
figure 17, retains its validity today. As might be increased internal subdivision which should have
expected, after the initial explosion, the engineering strengthened the hull in this area, there remains
spaces must have flooded quite rapidly, causing the some possibility that structural discontinuities
forward section of the ship to trim violently by the created during these modifications may have
stern. Eventually, as Hood’s speed decreased and actually weakened some of the surrounding
hydrodynamic effects supporting the forward structure, exacerbating the high loads placed on this
section diminished, the rapidly flooding engineering area during the vertical rotation.) Considering the
spaces pulled the still dry bow to a nearly vertical extreme violence which must have accompanied the
attitude, “like the spire of a giant cathedral”, one total separation of the bow, the local configuration
German observer noted. It appears from eyewitness of plate boundaries at the separation point -- which
reports that this rotation took place about an axis reflects the direction in which the plates last moved,
near the bridge, and that the ship initially assumed a and not necessarily the direction in which they first
near-vertical position with a waterline located in the moved -- cannot be considered as highly indicative
immediate vicinity of “B” turret or perhaps slightly of an explosion-induced origin. 5
farther aft.
The authors have not yet completed their
The area forward of “A” turret, though dry, studies surrounding the precise dynamics of the
was probably subjected to very considerable and explosion that destroyed Hood. It does appear
unusual stresses as it was lifted bodily from the clear, however, that the explosion, which appears to
water during this transition. This forward section, have consumed no less that 120 tonnes of cordite,
which in the vertical position would have had did contain elements of both deflagration - i.e. very
relatively little water plane area, appears to have rapid burning - and detonation. It is certain that
been rapidly pulled down by the by then more-or- detonations of gun type propellants, though
less completely flooded stern. During this rapid relatively rare, have occurred in the past. Maximum
descent, the hull, already subjected to considerable pressures and pressure gradients inside the fireball
stress at the “hard point” just forward of “A” turret remain to be calculated, although the observation of
where the forward armor belt wrapped athwart entire main turrets in the air would indicate that
ships, and perhaps heavily loaded from flooded local internal pressures did, at least for a short time,
chain lockers forward as well, apparently imploded considerably exceed the 4.2 kg/cm* (60 p.s.i.) that
at a point slightly forward of “A” turret. This was probably required to lift one of Hood’s main
implosion, which probably took place at a depth of turrets from its barbette against its holding clips.
about 30 meters, effectively destroyed the hull
girder, permitting the now separated bow to proceed The burning rate of gun propellant is
essentially independently to the bottom. exponentially related to the ambient pressure, and
such propellants therefore require uninterrupted
The authors regret that they cannot at this confinement, either mechanical or inertial, in order
time support the supposition raised in recent media to continue to combust.
reports and television programs that the separation

Z
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Combustion of burning propellants in the USS Princeton (CC 59) after a mine
typically ceases almost instantaneously after explosion in the 1991 Gulf War. Although there is
pressure is released, i.e. after the propellant destroys no evidence to lead the authors to conclude that
or otherwise vents from its initial container. The such a feature was in any way related to the loss of
absence of unburned or partially burnt propellant on Hood, we believe that such a hull configuration
the bottom, which has been found in the vicinity of should be avoided in favor a flush deck ship
other wrecks where magazines exploded, suggests - whenever possible.
but by no means proves -- that the fatal burn was
rather complete in nature, that is, that a substantial NEW RESEARCH
amount of the propellant had already been
consumed before the explosion vented to the open It is evident that a great deal could be
atmosphere and “quenched”. Some very recently learned, and the interpretation of the wrecks of
received information seems to indicate that after a sunken ships greatly enhanced, by a greater
certain critical radius is reached, the boundary of appreciation of the dynamics of sinking. Although
the expanding fireball created in a propellant burn a good deal is often known about the ship on the
becomes unstable, thereafter creating tongues of surface and the (often dismembered) wreck on the
flame which may follow capricious and somewhat seabed, relatively little is usually known regarding
unpredictable paths. Eye-witness evidence, not the dynamics of a ship’s last voyage to the bottom.
reproduced here, suggests that the explosion began In that regard, the authors would be most grateful
at the most forward “star” shown on Figure 15 for any additional information readers may be able
thereafter proceeding rapidly aft in “cigarette burn” to supply regarding the sinking dynamics of full-
fashion to “Y” magazine, shown by the aftermost sized ships. A preliminary survey suggests that
star. Figure 17 illustrates the first portion of this model experiments, though not entirely useless in
sequence in slightly different form. this regard, may be of relatively little benefit. It is
hoped that some military research, thus far
A detailed reconstruction of the action classified, may be located and released in support of
leading to the loss of the Hood, including a this work.
complete analysis of the probable path of the
projectile, which led to her destruction, is now in The authors were very surprised to learn
progress, and should be completed by the end of that there appear to be few or no items in the non-
this year. A reanalysis of armor penetration classified literature regarding the creation of debris
calculations first done in 1987 has so far found no fields. In the absence of systematic experiments to
evidence that would indicate that the previous determine how the shape, size, and density of
computations were substantively in error. This various items actually affects their distribution on
analysis, and the geometry of the protection system the bottom, it is feared that many interpretations of
as shown in figure 18, suggests that the fatal debris fields, may, in fact, have more in common
penetration occurred through the upper deck with the interpretation of tea leaves than with
through the after engine room or slightly aft of the science or engineering. One of the authors is now
after engine room on the starboard side, in an area in the process of organizing and sponsoring a set of
where a small section of 75mm laminated armor experiments to systematically create debris fields in
deck plating had been omitted in order to save order to establish the magnitude -- and in some
weight. This is entirely in accordance with the cases even the existence -- of coefficients and
findings of the original Admiralty Boards of Inquiry variables which would enable mathematical
that investigated the loss in 1941 .6 It does not modeling and analysis to begin. This would,
appear probable that the after above-water torpedo apparently for the first time, enable researchers to
tubes were in any way involved in the loss. establish and apply equations to justify (and perhaps
refute) their intuition. The authors are very early in
Hood was a raised forecastle ship, like this process - roughly at the proverbial stage of
many present-day American destroyers and cruisers. Galileo dropping cannon balls from the Tower of
This structural discontinuity may represent a source Pisa - but we are on our way.
of weakness when such hull is damaged as occurred

\-AREA OF VULNERABILIIY
L-- 12” ARMOR

/
/ 7” ARMOR
5” ARMOR
H.M.S. HOOD
CONFIGURATION AT BEGINNING OF FINAL TURN
ANGLE OF FALL = 12 DEG TARGET ANGLE” = 53 DEG
W. 3URENS Cl6IOA FIGUREm..
18-
-- .. - - ._.-
__ _ - .._ - - _-I - -...- - - --.. - - .-
- .so ---
The difficulties in interpreting the condition small pattern of punctures and tears caused by the
of wrecks on the bottom are very formidable iceberg, located in any case below the mud line,
indeed. Very often, particularly with older wrecks, would probably have never been observed at all,
forensic researchers have no “black boxes” to go and - if found - would have almost certainly been
bY. seen as a side effect of the main hull hitting the
bottom. And the actual cause of the sinking, well
One need only to look at the (now relatively hidden, might never have been discovered.
well-known) wreck site of Titanic to illustrate how
confusing things can really be. Had there been no This does not mean that marine forensics
survivors to reveal the actual sequence of events represents a futile endeavor. But it does suggest
which led to the loss, it is difficult to escape the that until considerably more expertise has been
conclusion that engineers arriving on the wreck site accumulated, the accurate interpretation of wrecks
some sixty years later would not have ascribed the must be recognized as a very slippery and tricky
severed hull to some astonishing catastrophe in the process indeed. Experience counts. The members
engine rooms. Had a close examination of the of Panel SD-7 continue to lead the way into this
wreckage suggested that the structural failure dark and often confusing engineering thicket,
amidships was probably unrelated to an explosive undeterred.
event, researchers would have quite reasonably
concluded that it most probably stemmed from ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
simple structura .l inadequacy or poor workmanship.
The authors wish to thank Eur Ing David K. Brown
Had anyone suggested that the ship did in RCNC for his assistance in the preparation of this
fact hit an iceberg, this hypothesis would probably paper. His insights into the mechanics of magazine
have been more or less immediately rejected by a explosions and his intimate knowledge of British
close inspection of the bow - which remains warship design, both freely shared, proved to be
essentially - almost eerily - intact. The relatively invaluable.
REFERENCES
a) Mearns, David, and White, Rob: “Hood and Bismarck” Channel 4 Books, 2001, London. A very
readable popular account of the entire Hood/Bismarck expedition, written by the expedition leader and a
Channel 4 producer and journalist.
b) Roberts, John: Anatomy of the Ship - The Battle Cruiser Hood: 1982, 2001, Conway Maritime Press.
Without doubt, THE reference source on the detailed construction of Hood. Many of Robert’s other works
deal, though more peripherally, with the design and construction of Hood as well. At least six copies of
Anatomy of the Ship - Hood were taken on the expedition.
c) Koop, Gerhard, and Schmolke, Klaus-Peter: Battleships of the Bismarck CZass: 1998 Greenhill Books,
London. An excellent and easily accessible source, though not as comprehensive as Garzke & Dulin.
d) National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, England: Various original builders’ plans of HMS Hood. The
authors wish to thank Bob Todd and his staff for providing these.
e) Gerrnan Military Archives: Various original builders’ plans of DKM Bismarck.
f) Garzke, William H., Jr. and Dulin, Robert O., Jr.: “The Bismarck’s Final Battle”, Warship International
No. 2, 1994. A comprehensive description surrounding the last action of the Bismarck.

g) Jurens, William: “The Loss of HMS Hood - A Re-examination”, Warship International, No. 2, 1987. A
complete technical analysis of the loss of Hood. This paper is still available from the International Naval
Research Organization, and has been reprinted at a number of sites on the Internet.
h) Garzke, William H., Jr., and Dulin, Robert 0.: Battleships - Axis and Neutral Battleships in World War
II. 1985, U.S. Naval Institute Press. The most reliable and comprehensive description and analysis of
Bismarck available in English.
i) Preliminary Design Branch, Bureau of Ships, United States Navy: “Study of Bismarck-“, 1942. A Secret
study of Bismarck based on captured official drawings.
j) Garzke, William, H, Jr.; Jurens, William; and Dulin, Robert O., Jr.,” “Bismarck Encounter” - an
unpublished book manuscript containing a detailed marine forensic, technical, and operational analysis of
the Bismarck operation from both German and British viewpoints.
k) Brown, David K., The Explosion at Jutland and its Relevance to Hood. Unpublished manuscript
scheduled for publication in Warship International.
’ In a story perhaps too good to be true, a high-ranking British officer upon learning of the explosions is reported to
have summed up the situation with the statement “Something seems to be wrong with our bloody ships today!”
2 The so-called “Standard Displacement”, artificially contrived to facilitate comparisons between ships and ensure
compliance with inter-war treaty restrictions was officially defined as “ . . .the ship, complete, fully manned, engined,
and equipped ready for sea including all armament and ammunition, equipment, outfit, provisions and fresh water for
crew, miscellaneous stores and implements of every description that are intended to be carried in war, but without fuel
or reserve feed water on board.”
3 It is unlikely that Hood, due to be re-engined in only a few years, could have made this speed in 1941.
4 This has led to a lingering debate as to who really sank the Bismarck. The condition of the wreck means
that it is unlikely that the true situation will ever be known with certainty. The debate is moot in any case
because by the time these charges are alleged to have been fired, Bismarck was already in a sinking , and
probably irretrievable, condition.
5 The authors have read the entire testimony of the witnesses called to the British boards of inquiry, and of a number of
German eyewitnesses as well. Few of these suggest a forward explosion of any significance, and none can support an
explosion of the forward magazines. One need only review the very extensive testimony revolving around an analysis
of the plate margins in the hull of the old battleship Maine, sunk in Havana harbor in 1898, to see how easily an
examination of localized plate failures can mislead even experienced observers.
6 Mr. Nathan Okun was, so far as we know, the first to suggest and support the possibility of a penetration through the
after engine room. Mr. John Roberts first mentioned the area of omitted plating to the other authors of this paper.

Discussion
George Elder, Member There seems to be quite a lot of “depressed longitudinal

trenches,” mainly in the bottom shell plating it seems. It re-
William Jurens and his co-authors have completed an minded me of the upside down stem section of mild steel DB
overview of the recent information gleaned from the July 2001 spaces over the engine room spaces of Derbyshire. The web
visit to the Hood and Bis~nnrck wreck sites. First of all, there
plate stiffening there is so strong that the continuous plating
is no evidence of overly political, and categorical stances that stretches over it plastically in deep nearly circular membrane
we often see in these kinds of reviews, and this is very refreshing. depressions up to about 115th of the span between the plate
Objectivity is more of an idea than a feasible reality, but I feel longitudinals. This gives about 10% elongation, at an implo-
this paper is one of the best that I have seen in this regard con- sion pressure of around 8000 kNm2 equivalent to about 800 m
sidering the emotional nature of the subject matter. Indeed, I find
water depth during sinking- the inner bottom or the end plate
it most refreshing. As for details, the Bismarck’s modular stem
frames being the first to give way and the void space(s) ex-
section notion is mentioned in the paper, and this is certainly plode. However, this is a long way short of the 35-45% elon-
consistent with the shell plating plans that I found in the Na- gation mentioned on page 12-evidence of very good quality
tional Archives. However, we are not sure how much of that steel even at 1 inch thickness. It is possible this difference may
joint was welded quite yet. It would be interesting to note if be that for Derbyshire the stretching would be essentially mem-
any tears along the rivet lines we see in the shell plating plans brane yield, whereas for the thicker plating in Hood, yielding
are evident on the wreck. Welding had been used since the will also include rather more bending over the plate longitudi-
early 19OOs, but not nearly to the extent that we see in World nals.
War II designs. The Italians began using welding rather exten-
Elsewhere, the main implosion-explosion action seems to
sively beginning in 1920, and we can see reviews of techniques
be just forward of A turret. If the authors’ estimate of 30 m
in the Naval Institute Proceedings going back to 1915.
implosion depth is correct, then, assuming only minor dam-
I do agree with the text’s theme that welding flaws may have
age to the WT compartments just forward of frame 69, my
existed in the Bismarck. It seems that few if any nations got it estimates suggest a maximum explosion energy following the
right, as my trip to the archives showed. The T-2 tankers and implosion of about 0.74 GJoules which is only equivalent to
Liberty ships come to mind here, but there are also lots of U.S. about 0.25 tons of TNT. Trivial though this may seem, it could
NPG reports on bulkhead problems as late as 1945. There are have been enough to have caused the forward break in the
a number of welding-related difficulties to consider, including
hull at or near frame 69, where I understand the side armor belt
“stored” stress, metallurgical changes that are wrought by heat-
also ends. This is based on my estimated total enclosed vol-
ing, and unwanted inclusions. ume of about 2450 m3 estimated from the drawings, the unit
Exactly when the stem section separated is still a mystery. definition that 1 Joule = 1 Nm and the derived approximation
It is not with the wreck, which would indicate that it separated that the maximum possible potential energy of the explosion
when the ship hit the bottom or came off on the way down. I is =pV the implosion pressure x compartment volume.
strongly suspect that going back to the beginning of the “skid”
Incidentally, it is quite usual with plating stiffened by rolled
trail would help answer this question. sections for the framing systems to fail well before the shell
The low number of hits observed on the hull proper is in- plating. So, it was no surprise to me to read that central im-
teresting, as are the relatively few intact penetrations of the side plosion-induced deformations of about 1 m to 2 m appeared in
an-nor. This is unexpected, although the burying of the bow in
panels “tens of meters” in size. This rather suggested my esti-
the mud prevents a thorough survey. Perhaps some “ground
mates in the previous paragraph should be scaled up pro-rata
sensing sonar” devices may be helpful here. The superstruc-
with a more realistic total volume.
ture seems to have been well per>Dered-but I was surmised
Other brief comments, not related to implosion actions are:
that the same was not true of the’ u$er citadel armor versis 203
mm and larger shells. Of course, the 145 mm plating is sharply .
The separation of the conning tower and associated super-
angled forward and aft, up to 34 deg, with the main belt armor structure from the main hull (p. 13); this is clearly a heavy
also being inclined over 50% of its length. This incline makes
structure, and I wonder if some hull whipping action might
intact penetrations more problematic.
have fractured its supports during the explosions near the
With regard to the large hole by the catapults, the possibil-
aft turrets.
ity is mentioned of a torpedo hit. However, the Bismarck also .
1 side with the authors in believing the bow did not separate
carried depth charges and aircraft munitions, and one wonders
due to a secondary explosion in the forward magazines (p.
if these might have been stored in the superstructure area above
14); implosion-explosion is much more likely, as above.
the upper deck. This is just a possibility.
The 380-mm armor-piercing “bullet” should presumably be
The Hood’s wreck is chaotic and here we enter into a dis- l
“shell” (p. 14).
cussion about structural discontinuities within the hull girder .
The fatal penetration of the armor-piercing shell (p. 15) seems
that has modem implications. The ship is so badly torn up that
to have occurred through the upper deck where a small sec-
the authors must paint with broad strokes in terms of examin-
tion of armor plate had been omitted to save weight; this
ing where the conflagration started and how it spread. That
was presumably restricted by the then treaty requiremments,
being said, evidence is provided to support the major themes.
but as these relaxed later (which clearly benefited the Bis-
But rather than read a potted review, it would be best to down-
rnnrck), why didn’t the Admiralty protect that local weakness
load the paper, keep it in your files, and ponder its implications.
with heavy armor?
Once again, it is refreshing to see a piece that approaches this .
While I admire the authors’ determination (bottom of p. 15)
subject from a neutral stance.
to examine the sinking dynamics of wreck pieces, our im-
pression from the Derbyshire was that the physics of the prob-
Douglas Faulkner, Member
lem for the lower weight/volume (or area) pieces was made
The authors are to be complimented on their very interest- much more difficult by the varying drag and lift forces as
ing and thorough paper; the following comments relate only those pieces gyrate in a somewhat chaotic fashion to the
to HMS Hood. seabed.

l The conclusions from the Titanic (p. 16) that without sur-
vivors’ evidence the cause might never have been discovered,
is in my view likely to be true of the vast majority of wrecks.
It was certainly true for Derbyshire where it was impossible
to deterrnine the cause of the loss; for this reason I disagreeed
with Lord Donaldson and Robin Williams on spending &2
million on a final survey, although I concede it did demon-
strate that high quality surveys were now achievable and it
enabled the popular frame 65 break to be ruled out.
I hope some of these remarks may be helpful.
Authors’ Closure
We welcome the comments of Dr. George EEder, who pro-
vided us with a copy of the official shell expansion plan that
included details of Bismarck’s stem. A representative of Blohm
and Voss, builders of Bismarck, has confirmed that the stem
was built as a modular unit and attached to the main hull by a
combination of welding and bolting. Dr. Elder’s drawings show
that the stem failure probably occurred along the heat-affected
zone of a main erection weld about 300 mm aft of the armored
bulkhead of the steering gear room at a transition from 90 mm
armor and 35 mm shell plating to 12 mm thick shell plating.
This standard connection detail was used in many German cruis-
ers and battleships of the period, and also contributed to fail-
ures in Liitzow and Prinz Eugen when these ships sustained
torpedo hits in the stem. This weakness, noted in a correspon-
dence received some time ago from Dr. Erwin Strohbusch, was
partially corrected in Tirpitz, Scharnhorst, Prinz Eugen, Admi-
ral Hipper, Liitzow, and Admiral Scheer.
We are also most grateful for the comments provided by
ProJ: Faulkner. As he suggested, constructive work regarding
the creation of debris fields has proven difficult, and little
progress has yet been made. The question as to why Hood’s
armor was not upgraded to plug the tiny lacuna that may have
led to her destruction lies within the priorities set by the Ad-
miralty. Hood was both overweight and busy during most of
her career, and the Admiralty never found the time, money,
and weight allowance to do the necessary modifications. Hood
was indeed scheduled for a major overhaul-which would have
significantly upgraded her armor protection-just as the war
broke out, but the requirements of war service thereafter pre-
vented it.
The authors regret that we inadvertently included statistics
for the Magellan 825 ROV in our report rather than the Ma-
gellan 725 that was actually used on the 2001 expedition. The
original text of the paper has been changed to incorporate the
correct figures for this vehicle. Although the Magellan 725
was not, in fact, used in the search for the wreck of USS Ziz-
dianapoEis (CA-35), it was used in expeditions to the Titanic
and in the recovery of the Liberty BeZZ7 spacecraft.
A reliable correspondent has noted that the currents at the
Hood wreck site were in the vicinity of 0.5-0.75 knots rather
than the somewhat higher value we quoted.
The publication of this paper on the Internet in the summer
of 2002 resulted in a number of lively discussions and analy-
ses on a variety of websites. Lesser questions aside, the ma-
jority of these discussions revolved around the validity of the
hypothesis, widely circulated in the popular media, that the
explosion of Hood’s after magazines resulted in a coupled ex-
plosion of the ship’s forward magazines as well. It is believed
that the vast majority of these correspondents-some of whom
asked very probing and interesting questions indeed-now ac-
cept the position of Panel SD-7 that the forward hull separa-
tion was implosively, rather than explosively, induced.
During the summer of 2002, Mr. Jurens was able both to
review in more detail some “highlight” tapes provided to him

attachments of the conning tower were damaged by large tran- we believe that the separation of the bow of Ho& was due to
sient “whipping” forces caused by the explosion of the after a combination of causes most probably involving initial im-
magazines, and that the conning tower subsequently separated plosive activity near the surface which caused sufficiently se-
from the ship when the main hull inverted on its way to the vere structural damage to induce a hydrodynamic separation
bottom. Observations of the base of the conning tower, which of the bow during Hood’s long plunge to the bottom.
still has light internal bulkheads in place, appear incompatible Others have pointed to eyewitness accounts to support the
with an explosive separation. Even if the impulse of an explo- idea of a forward explosion. Of the many witnesses to the sink-
sion were in a continuously-positive radial direction, our hy- ing of the Hood only a very few reported what might be in-
drodynamic instincts tell us that such forces would have been terpreted as evidence of a catastrophic event in the bow struc-
unlikely to push the conning tower any significant distance un- ture as it sank. Our careful rereading of their testimony suggests
derwater. Even supersonic streamlined projectiles rarely travel to us that the witnesses reporting a hull break forward-there
more than a hundred feet or so underwater without having their were only one or two -were probably mistaken. Although a
velocity extinguished. Further, the normal impulsive mode of few witnesses did report isolated observations of flame for-
a large underwater explosion is not positive and radial but rec- ward-which might well have been expected due to the nature
iprocal, involving successive rapid over-expansions and con- of the loss itself-none of these are compatible with a forward
tractions of a gas bubble which migrates slowly upward. This explosion of any significance. Further, we contend that the two
cyclical back and forth motion quite often causes debris from Boards of Inquiry would have taken, or suggested, strong cor-
an underwater explosion to have a net outward translation near rective action had they detected any significant evidence of a
zero. coupling of forward and after magazine explosions aboard
Based upon comments provided by highly qualified and ex- Hood. They did not. There are, as noted in the main body of
perienced individuals, we now suspect that the implosion which the paper, no actual magazines in the area where the hull sep-
caused the separation of the bow of Hood may have taken aration occurred.
place at a greater depth than was originally given in the paper. Some discussions addressed our analysis of the hole in the
That estimate was based on an assumption that failure would amidships port superstructure of Bismarck, which is smaller
probably occur at a hydrostatic load about twice that to which than that usually associated with a torpedo. There are very re-
the major transverse bulkheads were tested, i.e., that the bulk- liable reports that Dorsetshire achieved a torpedo hit in about
heads were designed with a safety factor in the vicinity of 2: 1. this position very late in the action, when parts of the main deck
The exact depth at failure cannot as yet be determined with of Bismarck were already awash. According to seaman Josef
certainty. Statz, who escaped by jumping from the port-forward 150 mm
Hc&, as did most ships of her era, incorporated fairly se- gun house, Bismarck was then listing to port at an angle of about
vere structural discontinuities near the heavy transverse bulk- 15 degrees with 12-15 meter high seas rolling into her port side.
heads that marked the ends of the armored citadel. Figure 16 Mr. Statz-trained in damage control-examined the conditions
clearly reveals that a number of longitudinal structural and tor- on the port side before leaping into the sea, noting that the
pedo bulkheads ended in this vicinity, and that the main ar- main deck and superstructure were cluttered with debris. We
mored transverse bulkhead extended only part way to the keel, know that the mainmast was knocked down and that the port
ending above a pump room. As noted above, poor detail de- boat/airplane crane was destroyed before the ship sank. We
sign almost certainly contributed to structural failures of the therefore believe it is possible that the rather small hole reported
stem of Bismarck as well. In 1938 Hood’s forward torpedo tubes in this area may be due to a torpedo from Dorsetshire which
were removed from the space just forward of “A” turret. It is actually exploded upon striking debris then somewhat separated
not yet known to what degree structural compensation was made from the main hull. This evidence is not conclusive, and fur-
to that area after their removal. In any case, we believe that ther investigation is required.
the whipping response from the explosion of the after maga- A few correspondents wanted to know if our observations
zines may well have strained the riveted connections in that area might shed further light on exactly how many torpedoes Bis-
of the hull. This already weakened structure, located at or near marck absorbed before she sank. Although further inspection
a forward armored bulkhead which rested on soft structure, will be required to separate damage caused by the impact of
was subsequently subjected to heavy bending forces as the for- the hull on the bottom, damage due to the subsequent slide down
ward hull lifted clear of the water and substantive compres- the seamount, and damage caused by torpedoes, our analysis
sive forces as the hull reached a near-vertical position. These of torpedo hits currently suggests that ten hits occurred, as fol-
would have been followed by large tensile forces as the main lows:
hull dragged down the still-buoyant bow and significant com-
pressive forces due to hydrostatic loads and the weight of wa- Victorious aircraft (24 May 194 1) 1 hit
ter which would have entered the chain lockers as the bow Ark Royal aircraft (26 May 1941) 3 hits
submerged. Further, if the hull were not exactly vertical as it British destroyers (27 May 1941) 0 hits
sank, the areas forward of the forward magazines, which were Rodney (27 May 1941) 1 hit
still dry, would have exerted severe hogging and/or sagging Norfolk (27 May 1941) 2 hits
stresses on the hull girder, depending upon the hull’s exact Dorsetshire (27 May 1941) 3 hits
orientation. This combination of forces may well have been
more severe than those experienced by Titanic when she We would like to thank the discussers for their interesting
dragged her stem down during her final plunge. In summary, and constructive comments.

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SNAME Transactions, Vol. 1 IO, 2002, pp.

A Marine Forensic Analysis of HMS Hoodand

INTRODUCTION Fleet, who by then felt that design emphasis should

116 A Marine Forensic Analysis of HMS Hood and DKM Bismarck

A Marine Forensic Analysis of HMS Hood and DKM Bismarck 117

H.M.S.HOOD -FED6 -lo ---2O _ -3O’

NARRATIVE of DENMARK STRAIT Bismarck, later joined by heavy cruiser

120 A Marine Forensic Analysis of HMS Hood and DKM Bismarck

Weight Group Hood % Bismarck % Hood/Bismarck

A Marine Forensic Analysis of HMS Hood and DKM Bismarck 121

PLAN AT 2Nc) PLATFORM

m AUX MACHJNEW SPACE

GENERAL ARRANGEMENT OF BISMARCK

124 A Marine Forensic Analysis of HMS Hood and DKM Bismarck

A Marine Forensic Analysis of HMS Hood and DKM Bismarck 125

126 A Marine Forensic Analysis of HMS Hood and DKM Bismarck

128 A Marine Forensic Analysis of HMS Hood and DKM Bismarck

A Marine Forensic Analysis of HMS Hood and DKM Bismarck 129

130 A Marine Forensic Analysis of HMS Hood and DKM Bismarck

A Marine Forensic Analysis of HMS Hood and DKM Bismarck 131

ffWNS-ATIANTIC COMMUNlCATIONS CABLE

BRIDGE & SUPER

rfl UNEXPLORED DEBRIS FIELD

HULL BURIED IN MUD

\ AREA OF DAMAGED/MISSING L PROBABLE -TORPEDO DAMAGE

BATTLESHIP BISMARCK 0 SMALL C~tfi3ER SHELL km (SWE~MIC

SCALC(M~ERS) -I-------- -..._

her stern is almost clear. hit.

Considerable gunfire damage to the Damage to the 150mm gun houses

134 A Marine Forensic Analysis of HMS Hood and DKM Bismarck

A Marine Forensic Analysis of HMS Hood and DKM Bismarck 135

136 A Marine Forensic Analysis of HMS Hood and DKM Bismarck

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FO = FUEL OIL TANK

D ISOLATED SMALL IMPLOSION

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140 A Marine Forensic Analysis of HMS Hood and DKM Bismarck

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142 A Marine Forensic Analysis of HMS Hood and DKM Bismarck

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A Marine Forensic Analysis of HMS Hood and DKM Bismarck

15” POWDER TANKS (?YML.)7

146 A Marine Forensic Analysis of HMS Hood and DKM Bismarck

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L-- 12” ARMOR

e) Gerrnan Military Archives: Various original builders’ plans of DKM Bismarck.

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150 A Marine Forensic Analysis of HMS Hood and DKM Bismarck

George Elder, Member There seems to be quite a lot of “depressed longitudinal

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152 A Marine Forensic Analysis of HMS Hood and DKM Bismarck

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