G.R. No.

174689 October 22, 2007

ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them male and female. (Genesis 5:1-2)
Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices coming from inside the bamboo. "Oh
North Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!," the voices said. She pecked the reed once, then twice. All of a sudden, the
bamboo cracked and slit open. Out came two human beings; one was a male and the other was a female. Amihan named
the man "Malakas" (Strong) and the woman "Maganda" (Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas and Maganda)

When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law recognize the changes made by a
physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with regard to a person’s sex? May a person successfully petition for a change of
name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery?
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex
in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207, impleaded
the civil registrar of Manila as respondent.
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino
Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth
certificate). His sex was registered as "male."
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female" and that he had
always identified himself with girls since childhood. 1 Feeling trapped in a man’s body, he consulted several doctors in the United
States. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself
to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery 2 in Bangkok, Thailand. He was
thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a
medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in his
birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female."
An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the People’s Journal Tonight, a newspaper of general circulation in
Metro Manila, for three consecutive weeks.3 Copies of the order were sent to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil
registrar of Manila.
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No opposition to the petition was made.
During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his American fiancé, Richard P. Edel, as
witnesses.
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision4 in favor of petitioner. Its relevant portions read:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive
but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present sex.
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in consonance with the principles of justice and
equity. With his sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has always felt, thought and acted like a woman, now possesses
the physique of a female. Petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not his own doing and should not be in
any way taken against him.
Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to anybody or the community in granting the
petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the much-awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and
her [fiancé] and the realization of their dreams.
Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the present petition despite due notice and
publication thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG] has not seen fit to interpose any [o]pposition.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and ordering the Civil Registrar of Manila to change
the entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner, specifically for petitioner’s first name from "Rommel Jacinto"
to MELY and petitioner’s gender from "Male" to FEMALE. 5
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of
Appeals.6 It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.
On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals 7 rendered a decision8 in favor of the Republic. It ruled that the trial court’s decision
lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of sex
reassignment through surgery. Thus, the Court of Appeals granted the Republic’s petition, set aside the decision of the trial court
and ordered the dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied. 9 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the
Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.10
The petition lacks merit.
A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of name and sex. As found by the trial court:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive
but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present sex. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he became entitled to the civil registry changes
sought. We disagree.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification.11 A change of name is a
privilege, not a right.12 Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes. 13 In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code
provides:

ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1 of RA 9048 provides:
 SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname. – No entry in a
civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change
of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul
general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.

RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.14 It vests the power and authority to entertain petitions for change of first
name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for
change of first name is now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to
exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries
in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and
subsequently denied.15 It likewise lays down the corresponding venue, 16 form17 and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the
proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.

RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:

SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The petition for change of first name or nickname may be
allowed in any of the following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly
known by that first name or nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.

Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended to make his first name
compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter one’s
legal capacity or civil status.18 RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than
avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil
registry and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason
justifying such change.19 In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. 20 In this case,
he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s first name was not within that court’s primary
jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was
an improper remedy because the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the
wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More
importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court
of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioner’s petition in so far as the change of his first name was concerned.
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex Reassignment
The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the statutes.21 In this
connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors are
involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for
a judicial order. In effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. 22 Rule
108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register. 23
Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in writing,
copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled
name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can
be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or records: Provided, however, That
no correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a
substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in
Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:24

ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages
void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11)
loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.

The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that occur after
birth.25 However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground
of sex reassignment.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from" while to change means "to replace
something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute."26 The birth certificate of petitioner
contained no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is
necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such as legitimations, acknowledgments of
illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as births, marriages, naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as
legal separations, annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of
citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of name). These acts, events and judicial decrees
produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly
sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it
recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.

"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and incapacities) of a person in
view of his age, nationality and his family membership. 27

The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not
ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not. The
comprehensive term status… include such matters as the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have rights in
general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce,
and sometimes even succession.28 (emphasis supplied)

A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person’s legal capacity and civil status. In this
connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to petitioner’s cause.

Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:

SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. – The declaration of the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or,
in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in
the civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar
not later than thirty days after the birth, by the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either parent of the
newborn child.
In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and
nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of parents or, in case the father is not known, of the mother alone;
(d) civil status of parents; (e) place where the infant was born; and (f) such other data as may be required in the
regulations to be issued.
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)

Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of
birth.29 Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining
the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex
made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error,30 is immutable.31

When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary meaning in the absence of a
contrary legislative intent. The words "sex," "male" and "female" as used in the Civil Register Law and laws concerning the civil
registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative
intent to the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as "the sum of peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male
from a female"32 or "the distinction between male and female." 33 Female is "the sex that produces ova or bears young"34 and male
is "the sex that has organs to produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova." 35 Thus, the words "male" and "female" in everyday
understanding do not include persons who have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are employed in a statute
which had at the time a well-known meaning are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context compels to the
contrary."36 Since the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it
cannot be argued that the term "sex" as used then is something alterable through surgery or something that allows a post-operative
male-to-female transsexual to be included in the category "female."
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the intervention of modern
surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his
petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed on the Ground of Equity

The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. It believed
that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is wrong.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy consequences. First, even the trial
court itself found that the petition was but petitioner’s first step towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé. However,
marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman.37 One
of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female.38 To grant the changes
sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union
of a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are
various laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women, 39 certain
felonies under the Revised Penal Code40 and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of
Court,41 among others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if
petitioner’s petition were to be granted.

It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of
the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of
the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it.
In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what guidelines should govern the
recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes particularly important in this case where
the claims asserted are statute-based.
To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction or change of entries in the civil
registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof must be presented and what procedures shall be
observed. If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name
and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment
of that privilege.
It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be recognized as having successfully
changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion a law on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact
a law where no law exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of government, Congress.
Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and [the] realization of their dreams."
No argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the
commonly recognized parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies
petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

[G.R. No. 166676, September 12, 2008]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising purely questions of law and seeking a reversal of the
Decision[1] dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, which granted the Petition for
Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate filed by Jennifer B. Cagandahan and ordered the following changes of entries in
Cagandahan's birth certificate: (1) the name "Jennifer Cagandahan" changed to "Jeff Cagandahan" and (2) gender from "female" to
"male."

The facts are as follows.

On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate [2] before the
RTC, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna.

In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth
but while growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia
(CAH) which is a condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. She further alleged that she
was diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy in her early years and at age six, underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered that
she has small ovaries. At age thirteen, tests revealed that her ovarian structures had minimized, she has stopped growing and she
has no breast or menstrual development. She then alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion,
she has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from
female to male and her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.

The petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation for three (3) consecutive weeks and was posted in conspicuous
places by the sheriff of the court. The Solicitor General entered his appearance and authorized the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
to appear in his behalf.

To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry,
University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital. Dr. Sionzon issued a medical certificate stating that respondent's
condition is known as CAH. He explained that genetically respondent is female but because her body secretes male hormones, her
female organs did not develop normally and she has two sex organs - female and male. He testified that this condition is very rare,
that respondent's uterus is not fully developed because of lack of female hormones, and that she has no monthly period. He further
testified that respondent's condition is permanent and recommended the change of gender because respondent has made up her
mind, adjusted to her chosen role as male, and the gender change would be advantageous to her.

The RTC granted respondent's petition in a Decision dated January 12, 2005 which reads:
The Court is convinced that petitioner has satisfactorily shown that he is entitled to the reliefs prayed [for]. Petitioner has adequately
presented to the Court very clear and convincing proofs for the granting of his petition. It was medically proven that petitioner's
body produces male hormones, and first his body as well as his action and feelings are that of a male. He has chosen to be male.
He is a normal person and wants to be acknowledged and identified as a male.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Civil Register of Pakil, Laguna is hereby ordered to make the following corrections in the
birth [c]ertificate of Jennifer Cagandahan upon payment of the prescribed fees:

a) By changing the name from Jennifer Cagandahan to JEFF CAGANDAHAN; and

b) By changing the gender from female to MALE.

It is likewise ordered that petitioner's school records, voter's registry, baptismal certificate, and other pertinent records are hereby
amended to conform with the foregoing corrected data.

SO ORDERED.[3]
Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking a reversal of the abovementioned ruling.

The issues raised by petitioner are:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION CONSIDERING THAT:
I.

THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULES 103 AND 108 OF THE RULES OF COURT HAVE NOT BEEN COMPLIED WITH; AND,

II.

CORRECTION OF ENTRY UNDER RULE 108 DOES NOT ALLOW CHANGE OF "SEX" OR "GENDER" IN THE BIRTH
CERTIFICATE, WHILE RESPONDENT'S MEDICAL CONDITION, i.e., CONGENITAL ADRENAL HYPERPLASIA DOES NOT
MAKE HER A "MALE."[4]
Simply stated, the issue is whether the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate of respondent to
change her sex or gender, from female to male, on the ground of her medical condition known as CAH, and her name from
"Jennifer" to "Jeff," under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.

The OSG contends that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court
because while the local civil registrar is an indispensable party in a petition for cancellation or correction of entries under Section 3,
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, respondent's petition before the court a quo did not implead the local civil registrar.[5] The OSG
further contends respondent's petition is fatally defective since it failed to state that respondent is a bona fide resident of the
province where the petition was filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing as mandated under Section 2(b), Rule
103 of the Rules of Court.[6] The OSG argues that Rule 108 does not allow change of sex or gender in the birth certificate and
respondent's claimed medical condition known as CAH does not make her a male.[7]

On the other hand, respondent counters that although the Local Civil Registrar of Pakil, Laguna was not formally named a party in
the Petition for Correction of Birth Certificate, nonetheless the Local Civil Registrar was furnished a copy of the Petition, the Order
to publish on December 16, 2003 and all pleadings, orders or processes in the course of the proceedings, [8] respondent is actually
a male person and hence his birth certificate has to be corrected to reflect his true sex/gender,[9] change of sex or gender is allowed
under Rule 108,[10] and respondent substantially complied with the requirements of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court. [11]

Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court provide:

Rule 103
CHANGE OF NAME

SECTION 1. Venue. - A person desiring to change his name shall present the petition to the Regional Trial Court of the province in
which he resides, [or, in the City of Manila, to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court].

SEC. 2. Contents of petition. - A petition for change of name shall be signed and verified by the person desiring his name changed,
or some other person on his behalf, and shall set forth:

(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is filed for at least three (3) years prior to the
date of such filing;

(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is sought;

(c) The name asked for.

SEC. 3. Order for hearing. - If the petition filed is sufficient in form and substance, the court, by an order reciting the purpose of the
petition, shall fix a date and place for the hearing thereof, and shall direct that a copy of the order be published before the hearing
at least once a week for three (3) successive weeks in some newspaper of general circulation published in the province, as the
court shall deem best. The date set for the hearing shall not be within thirty (30) days prior to an election nor within four (4) months
after the last publication of the notice.

SEC. 4. Hearing. - Any interested person may appear at the hearing and oppose the petition. The Solicitor General or the proper
provincial or city fiscal shall appear on behalf of the Government of the Republic.
SEC. 5. Judgment. - Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date fixed in the order that such order has been published as
directed and that the allegations of the petition are true, the court shall, if proper and reasonable cause appears for changing the
name of the petitioner, adjudge that such name be changed in accordance with the prayer of the petition.

SEC. 6. Service of judgment. - Judgments or orders rendered in connection with this rule shall be furnished the civil registrar of the
municipality or city where the court issuing the same is situated, who shall forthwith enter the same in the civil register.

Rule 108
CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES
IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY

SECTION 1. Who may file petition. - Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons
which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating
thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.

SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. - Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may
be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j)
naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.

SEC. 3. Parties. - When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who
have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.

SEC. 4. Notice and publication. - Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of
the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the
order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.

SEC. 5. Opposition. - The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or
correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file
his opposition thereto.

SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. - The court in which the proceedings is brought may make orders expediting the proceedings, and
may also grant preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings.

SEC. 7. Order. - After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the cancellation or correction
prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the
same in his record.
The OSG argues that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court
because respondent's petition did not implead the local civil registrar. Section 3, Rule 108 provides that the civil registrar and all
persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceedings. Likewise, the
local civil registrar is required to be made a party in a proceeding for the correction of name in the civil registry. He is an
indispensable party without whom no final determination of the case can be had.[12]Unless all possible indispensable parties were
duly notified of the proceedings, the same shall be considered as falling much too short of the requirements of the rules. [13] The
corresponding petition should also implead as respondents the civil registrar and all other persons who may have or may claim to
have any interest that would be affected thereby. [14] Respondent, however, invokes Section 6,[15] Rule 1 of the Rules of Court which
states that courts shall construe the Rules liberally to promote their objectives of securing to the parties a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of the matters brought before it. We agree that there is substantial compliance with Rule 108 when
respondent furnished a copy of the petition to the local civil registrar.

The determination of a person's sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the statutes. In this
connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376[16] of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by Republic Act No. 9048 [17] in so far as clerical or
typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made through administrative proceedings
and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the
correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register. [18]

Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It
is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. [19]

The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in
Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.

ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from
the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12)
recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16)
changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that occur after birth.[20]

Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or "inappropriate" appearance of male characteristics. A
person, like respondent, with this condition produces too much androgen, a male hormone. A newborn who has XX chromosomes
coupled with CAH usually has a (1) swollen clitoris with the urethral opening at the base, an ambiguous genitalia often appearing
more male than female; (2) normal internal structures of the female reproductive tract such as the ovaries, uterus and fallopian
tubes; as the child grows older, some features start to appear male, such as deepening of the voice, facial hair, and failure to
menstruate at puberty. About 1 in 10,000 to 18,000 children are born with CAH.

CAH is one of many conditions[21] that involve intersex anatomy. During the twentieth century, medicine adopted the term
"intersexuality" to apply to human beings who cannot be classified as either male or female. [22] The term is now of widespread use.
According to Wikipedia, intersexuality "is the state of a living thing of a gonochoristic species whose sex chromosomes, genitalia,
and/or secondary sex characteristics are determined to be neither exclusively male nor female. An organism with intersex may
have biological characteristics of both male and female sexes."

Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by different cultures. In most societies, intersex individuals have been expected to
conform to either a male or female gender role. [23] Since the rise of modern medical science in Western societies, some intersex
people with ambiguous external genitalia have had their genitalia surgically modified to resemble either male or female
genitals.[24] More commonly, an intersex individual is considered as suffering from a "disorder" which is almost always
recommended to be treated, whether by surgery and/or by taking lifetime medication in order to mold the individual as neatly as
possible into the category of either male or female.

In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations which
should not be subject to outright denial. "It has been suggested that there is some middle ground between the sexes, a `no-man's
land' for those individuals who are neither truly `male' nor truly `female'." [25] The current state of Philippine statutes apparently
compels that a person be classified either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere appearances when
nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid classification.

In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female, then there is no basis for a change in the birth certificate entry for
gender. But if we determine, based on medical testimony and scientific development showing the respondent to be other than
female, then a change in the

subject's birth certificate entry is in order.

Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither consistently and categorically female nor consistently and
categorically male) composition. Respondent has female (XX) chromosomes. However, respondent's body system naturally
produces high levels of male hormones (androgen). As a result, respondent has ambiguous genitalia and the phenotypic features
of a male.

Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender
classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her
sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen)
there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons
makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.

Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with what he was
born with. And accordingly, he has already ordered his life to that of a male. Respondent could have undergone treatment and
taken steps, like taking lifelong medication,[26] to force his body into the categorical mold of a female but he did not. He chose not to
do so. Nature has instead taken its due course in respondent's development to reveal more fully his male characteristics.

In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent concerning a matter so innately private as one's
sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to
CAH. The Court will not consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or remain as
a female. Neither will the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as
society commonly currently knows this gender of the human species. Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex
anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial
choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that
respondent is an "incompetent"[27] and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other
members of society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the respondent's
position and his personal judgment of being a male.

In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an individual deals with what nature has
handed out. In other words, we respect respondent's congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already
difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot but respect how respondent deals with his unordinary state and thus help make his life
easier, considering the unique circumstances in this case.

As for respondent's change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of name is not a matter of right but of
judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow. [28] The trial court's
grant of respondent's change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name. Considering
the consequence that respondent's change of name merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in respondent's change
of name. Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from female to male.

WHEREFORE, the Republic's petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of
Siniloan, Laguna, is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. L-30061 February 27, 1974

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellees,

vs.
JOSE JABINAL Y CARMEN, defendant-appellant.

Appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas (provincial capital), Batangas, in Criminal Case No. 889, finding the
accused guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty
ranging from one (1) year and one (1) day to two (2) years imprisonment, with the accessories provided by law, which raises in
issue the validity of his conviction based on a retroactive application of Our ruling in People v. Mapa. 1

The complaint filed against the accused reads:

That on or about 9:00 o'clock, p.m., the 5th day of September, 1964, in the poblacion, Municipality of Batangas,
Province of Batangas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
a person not authorized by law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously keep in his possession,
custody and direct control a revolver Cal. .22, RG8 German Made with one (1) live ammunition and four (4)
empty shells without first securing the necessary permit or license to possess the same.

At the arraignment on September 11, 1964, the accused entered a plea of not guilty, after which trial was accordingly held.The
accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the revolver and the ammunition described in the complaint,
without the requisite license or permit. He, however, claimed to be entitled to exoneration because, although he had no license or
permit, he had an appointment as Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment as Confidential
Agent from the PC Provincial Commander, and the said appointments expressly carried with them the authority to possess and
carry the firearm in question.

Indeed, the accused had appointments from the above-mentioned officials as claimed by him. His appointment from Governor
Feliciano Leviste, dated December 10, 1962, reads:

Reposing special trust and confidence in your civic spirit, and trusting that you will be an effective agent in the
detection of crimes and in the preservation of peace and order in the province of Batangas, especially with
respect to the suppression of trafficking in explosives, jueteng, illegal cockfighting, cattle rustling, robbery and the
detection of unlicensed firearms, you are hereby appointed a SECRET AGENT of the undersigned, the
appointment to take effect immediately, or as soon as you have qualified for the position. As such Secret Agent,
your duties shall be those generally of a peace officer and particularly to help in the preservation of peace and
order in this province and to make reports thereon to me once or twice a month. It should be clearly understood
that any abuse of authority on your part shall be considered sufficient ground for the automatic cancellation of
your appointment and immediate separation from the service. In accordance with the decision of the Supreme
Court in G.R. No. L-12088 dated December 23, 1959, you will have the right to bear a firearm, particularly
described below, for use in connection with the performance of your duties.

By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon the performance of your duties by taking your oath of office and
filing the original thereof with us.

On March 15, 1964, the accused was also appointed by the PC Provincial Commander of Batangas as Confidential Agent with
duties to furnish information regarding smuggling activities, wanted persons, loose firearms, subversives and other similar subjects
that might affect the peace and order condition in Batangas province, and in connection with these duties he was temporarily
authorized to possess a ROHM revolver, Cal. .22 RG-8 SN-64, for his personal protection while in the performance of his duties.

The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his above-mentioned appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential
Agent, with authority to possess the firearm subject matter of the prosecution, he was entitled to acquittal on the basis of the
Supreme Court's decision in People vs. Macarandang 2 and People vs. Lucero. 3 The trial court, while conceding on the basis of the
evidence of record the accused had really been appointed Secret Agent and Confidential Agent by the Provincial Governor and the
PC Provincial Commander of Batangas, respectively, with authority to possess and carry the firearm described in the complaint,
nevertheless held the accused in its decision dated December 27, 1968, criminally liable for illegal possession of a firearm and
ammunition on the ground that the rulings of the Supreme Court in the cases of Macarandang and Lucero were reversed and
abandoned in People vs. Mapa, supra. The court considered as mitigating circumstances the appointments of the accused as
Secret Agent and Confidential Agent.

Let us advert to Our decisions in People v. Macarandang, supra, People v. Lucero, supra, and People v. Mapa, supra.
In Macarandang, We reversed the trial court's judgment of conviction against the accused because it was shown that at the time he
was found to possess a certain firearm and ammunition without license or permit, he had an appointment from the Provincial
Governor as Secret Agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order and in the detection of crimes, with authority to hold and
carry the said firearm and ammunition. We therefore held that while it is true that the Governor has no authority to issue any firearm
license or permit, nevertheless, section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that "peace officers" are exempted from
the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms; and Macarandang's appointment as Secret Agent to assist
in the maintenance of peace and order and detection of crimes, sufficiently placed him in the category of a "peace officer"
equivalent even to a member of the municipal police who under section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code are exempted from
the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms. In Lucero, We held that under the circumstances of the
case, the granting of the temporary use of the firearm to the accused was a necessary means to carry out the lawful purpose of the
batallion commander to effect the capture of a Huk leader. In Mapa, expressly abandoning the doctrine in Macarandang, and by
implication, that in Lucero, We sustained the judgment of conviction on the following ground:

The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to ... possess
any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended
to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition." (Sec. 878, as amended by Republic
Act No. 4, Revised Administrative Code.) The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and
lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine
Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors,
lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial
prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants
for use in the performance of their official duties." (Sec. 879, Revised Administrative Code.)

The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not exempt. ... .

It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent by the Provincial Government in 1962, and Confidential Agent by
the Provincial Commander in 1964, the prevailing doctrine on the matter was that laid down by Us in People v.
Macarandang (1959) and People v. Lucero (1958). Our decision in People v. Mapa reversing the aforesaid doctrine came only in
1967. The sole question in this appeal is: Should appellant be acquitted on the basis of Our rulings in Macarandang and Lucero, or
should his conviction stand in view of the complete reversal of the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa? The Solicitor
General is of the first view, and he accordingly recommends reversal of the appealed judgment.

Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, and this is the reason
why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part
of the legal system ... ." The interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date that law
originally passed, since this Court's construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that law thus construed
intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of legal maxim "legis interpretatio legis
vim obtinet" — the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The doctrine laid down
in Lucero andMacarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence of the law, of the land, at the time appellant was found in
possession of the firearm in question and when he arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in
the Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be
applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. This is
especially true in the construction and application of criminal laws, where it is necessary that the punishability of an act be
reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.

It follows, therefore, that considering that appellant conferred his appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent and
authorized to possess a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated in Macarandang andLucero, under which no criminal
liability would attach to his possession of said firearm in spite of the absence of a license and permit therefor, appellant must be
absolved. Certainly, appellant may not be punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not to be punishable.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and appellant is acquitted, with costs de oficio.

G.R. No. L-22301 August 30, 1967

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG, defendant-appellant.

The sole question in this appeal from a judgment of conviction by the lower court is whether or not the appointment to and holding
of the position of a secret agent to the provincial governor would constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for the crime of
illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. We hold that it does not.

The accused in this case was indicted for the above offense in an information dated August 14, 1962 reading as follows: "The
undersized accuses MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG of a violation of Section 878 in connection with Section 2692 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and as further amended by Republic Act No. 4, committed as
follows: That on or about the 13th day of August, 1962, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there
wilfully and unlawfully have in his possession and under his custody and control one home-made revolver (Paltik), Cal. 22, without
serial number, with six (6) rounds of ammunition, without first having secured the necessary license or permit therefor from the
corresponding authorities. Contrary to law."

When the case was called for hearing on September 3, 1963, the lower court at the outset asked the counsel for the accused: "May
counsel stipulate that the accused was found in possession of the gun involved in this case, that he has neither a permit or license
to possess the same and that we can submit the same on a question of law whether or not an agent of the governor can hold a
firearm without a permit issued by the Philippine Constabulary." After counsel sought from the fiscal an assurance that he would not
question the authenticity of his exhibits, the understanding being that only a question of law would be submitted for decision, he
explicitly specified such question to be "whether or not a secret agent is not required to get a license for his firearm."

Upon the lower court stating that the fiscal should examine the document so that he could pass on their authenticity, the fiscal
asked the following question: "Does the accused admit that this pistol cal. 22 revolver with six rounds of ammunition mentioned in
the information was found in his possession on August 13, 1962, in the City of Manila without first having secured the necessary
license or permit thereof from the corresponding authority?" The accused, now the appellant, answered categorically: "Yes, Your
Honor." Upon which, the lower court made a statement: "The accused admits, Yes, and his counsel Atty. Cabigao also affirms that
the accused admits."

Forthwith, the fiscal announced that he was "willing to submit the same for decision." Counsel for the accused on his part presented
four (4) exhibits consisting of his appointment "as secret agent of the Hon. Feliciano Leviste," then Governor of Batangas, dated
June 2, 1962;1 another document likewise issued by Gov. Leviste also addressed to the accused directing him to proceed to
Manila, Pasay and Quezon City on a confidential mission; 2the oath of office of the accused as such secret agent, 3 a certificate
dated March 11, 1963, to the effect that the accused "is a secret agent" of Gov. Leviste. 4 Counsel for the accused then stated that
with the presentation of the above exhibits he was "willing to submit the case on the question of whether or not a secret agent duly
appointed and qualified as such of the provincial governor is exempt from the requirement of having a license of firearm." The
exhibits were admitted and the parties were given time to file their respective memoranda.1äwphï1.ñët

Thereafter on November 27, 1963, the lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused "of the crime of illegal possession of
firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one year and one day to two years and to pay the costs. The firearm
and ammunition confiscated from him are forfeited in favor of the Government."

The only question being one of law, the appeal was taken to this Court. The decision must be affirmed.

The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to . . . possess any firearm,
detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture
of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition."5 The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully
issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the
employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal
treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in possession
of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties."6

The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not exempt. Our task is equally clear. The
first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. "Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated
that application is impossible or inadequate without them."7 The conviction of the accused must stand. It cannot be set aside.

Accused however would rely on People v. Macarandang,8 where a secret agent was acquitted on appeal on the assumption that
the appointment "of the accused as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of
crimes, sufficiently put him within the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly
covered by section 879." Such reliance is misplaced. It is not within the power of this Court to set aside the clear and explicit
mandate of a statutory provision. To the extent therefore that this decision conflicts with what was held in People v. Macarandang, it
no longer speaks with authority.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.

G.R. No. L-12088 December 23, 1959

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MORO SUMAGUINA MACARANDANG, defendant-appellant.

Moro Sumaguina Macarandang was accused an, after trial, convicted of the crime of illegal possesion of fire-arms in the Court of
First Instance of Lanao under the following information:

That on or about June 8, 1954, in the Municipality of Marantao, Province of Lanao, Republic of the Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
keep and have his custody and control one Riot Gun, Winchester, 12 GA. SN-924131 and (8) rounds of ammunitions,
without firs having obtained in proper license or permit therefore from competent authority.

In the present appeal the accused, admitting the ownership and of the firearm and ammunitions in question, invokes as his legal
excuse or authority therefor, the appointment issued him by Governor Dimakuta as secret agent on October 1, 1953, which reads
as follows:1awphi1.net

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

For having shown good faith by previously surrending to this Office a firearm, Datu Sumaguina Macarandang of Kamalig,
Marantao, Lanao, has been appointed SECRET AGENT of peace and order campaigns and detention of crimes.
Accordingly, he is hereby authorized to hold and carry in his possession one (1) Riot Winchester Shotgun, 12 GA. Serial
No. 942131 with twenty(20) rounds of ammunitions for the successful execution of his hazardous mission.

Datu Sumaguina Macarandang shall personally report to me from time to time all activities and whereabouts of lawless
and wanted elements roaming in the Municipal District of Marantoa, as well as all matters affecting tranquility therein
existing.lawphi1.net

It may be true that, as held by the trial court, the Governor has no authority to issue any firearm license or permit; but section 879 of
the Revise Administrative Code provides, as shown at lease by the subject matter therefor, that "peace officers" are exempted from
the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms. The appointment of the accused as secret agent to the
assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detention of crimes, sufficiently put him within the category of a
"peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by section 879.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed and accused acquitted, with costs de officio. So ordered.

G.R. No. 129783 December 22, 1997

MARCELINO C. LIBANAN, petitioner,

vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and JOSE T. RAMIREZ, respondents.

The 28th May 1997 decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal ("HRET"), which affirmed the proclamation of
herein private respondent Jose Tan Ramirez declaring him to be the duly elected Representative of Eastern Samar for having
obtained the plurality of votes over petitioner Marcelino Libanan, and the 20th June 1997 resolution of the HRET, which denied with
finality petitioner's motion for reconsideration, are sought to be annulled in this special civil action for certiorari.

Petitioner Marcelino Libanan and private respondent Jose Ramirez were among the candidates for the lone congressional seat of
Eastern Samar in the May 1995 elections. After the canvass of the returns was made on 13 May 1995, the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Eastern Samar proclaimed respondent Ramirez to have been duly elected Representative of the District with a total
of forty-one thousand five hundred twenty-three (41,523) votes, compared to petitioner's forty thousand eight hundred sixty-nine
(40,869) votes, or a margin of six hundred fifty-four(654) votes over those of petitioner.

Petitioner Libanan seasonably filed an election protest before the HRET claiming, among other things, that the 08th May 1995
elections in Eastern Samar were marred by massive electoral irregularities perpetrated or instigated by respondent Ramirez, as
well as his leaders and followers, in the twenty-three (23) municipalities of the lone district of Eastern Samar with the aid, in various
instances, of peace officers supposedly charged with maintaining an orderly and honest election. Petitioner contested seventy-nine
(79) precincts in five (5) municipalities. He also maintained that the election returns and/or ballots in certain precincts were
tampered with, substituted, or systematically marked in favor of respondent Ramirez. Libanan prayed that, after due proceedings,
the HRET should issue an order to annul the election and proclamation of Ramirez and to thereafter so proclaim petitioner as the
duly elected Representative of the Lone District of Eastern Samar.

In his answer and counter-protest, with a petition for preliminary hearing on the special and affirmative defenses, respondent
Ramirez denied the charges. He counter-protested the results of the elections in certain precincts where, he claimed, Libanan
engaged in massive vote buying, lansadera, terrorism and tearing of the list of voters to disenfranchise voters therein listed.
Accordingly, he prayed, inter alia, for the dismissal of the protest and the confirmation of his election as the duly elected
representative of the Lone District of Eastern Samar.
After some peripheral issues were settled by the HRET, the revision of ballots in the protested precincts commenced on 20
February 1996. The HRET noted that Libanan contested a total of seventy-nine (79) precincts. It was noted during the revision,
however, that six (6) of the contested precincts, namely, Precincts Nos. 14, 15, 16, 18, 19 and 20 of Arteche, were found to have
been merged during the 08 May 1995 elections into three (3) precincts, i.e., Precincts Nos. 14 and 19, Precincts Nos. 15 and 16
and Precincts Nos. 18 and 20. Thus, only seventy-six (76) ballot boxes were actually opened for revision, one of which, Precinct
No. 4-1 of Guiuan, did not contain any ballot.

On 22 February 1996, while the revision of the counter-protested precincts was being held, Ramirez filed an "Urgent Motion to
Withdraw/Abandon Counter-Protest in Specific Municipalities/Precincts" praying that he be granted leave to withdraw and abandon
partially his counter-protest in certain precincts. 1 Libanan filed an opposition thereto but the motion was eventually granted by the
Chairman of the HRET and subsequently confirmed in a resolution by the tribunal.

On 21 March 1996, the HRET designated a Hearing Commissioner and a Deputy Hearing Commissioner for the reception of
evidence. Following that reception, the respective memoranda of Libanan and Ramirez were filed.

The evidence and the issues submitted by the parties for consideration by the HRET related mainly to the proper appreciation of
the ballots objected to, or claimed by, the parties during the revision. No evidence was presented in support of the other allegations
of the protest (like the alleged tampering of election returns) and of the counter-protest (such as the alleged tearing of some of the
pages of the computerized list of voters to disenfranchise legitimate voters and the use of goons to terrorize and compel voters to
vote for Libanan), nor were these issues discussed in the memoranda of the parties. The HRET thus concentrated, such as can be
rightly expected, its attention to the basic appreciation of ballots. 2

The particular matter focused in this petition deals with what petitioner claims to be spurious ballots; on this score, the HRET has
explained:

No spurious ballot was found in this case. For a ballot to be rejected for being spurious, the ballot must not have any of the
following authenticating marks: a) the COMELEC watermark; b) the signatures or initial of the BEI Chairman at the back of
the ballot; and c) red and blue fibers. In the present case, all the ballots examined by the Tribunal had COMELEC
watermarks.

The Tribunal did not adopt protestant's submission in his Memorandum that the absence of thumbmark or BEI Chairman's
signature at the back of the ballot rendered the ballot spurious. The applicable law on this issue is Sec. 24, R.A. 7166. It
reads:

In every case before delivering an official ballot to the voter, the Chairman of the Board of Election
Inspectors shall, in the presence of the voter, affix his signature at the back thereof. Failure to so
authenticate shall be noted in the minutes of the board of election offense punishable under Section 263
and 264 of the Omnibus Election Code.

As may be gleaned above, unlike the provision of Section 210 of the Omnibus Election Code where the BEI Chairman was
required to affix his right thumbmark at the back of the ballot immediately after it was counted, the present law no longer
requires the same.

Anent the BEI Chairman's signature, while Section 24 of R.A. 7166 provides that failure to authenticate the ballot shall
constitute an election offense, there is nothing in the said law which provides that ballots not so authenticated shall be
considered invalid. In fact, the members of the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms agreed during their
deliberation on the subject that the absence of the BEI Chairman's signature at the back of the ballot will not per se make
a ballot spurious.

Moreover, while Rep. Palacol, then Chairman of the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, mentioned during his
sponsorship speech that one of the salient features of the bill filed was "to require the chairman of the Board of Election
Inspectors to authenticate a ballot given to a voter by affixing his signature on (sic) the back thereof and to consider any
ballot as spurious," R.A. 7166, as approved, does not contain any provision to that effect. Clearly, therefore, the Congress
as a whole (House of Representatives and Senate) failed to adopt the proposal of Rep. Palacol that ballots without the BEI
Chairman's signature at the back will be declared spurious. What is clearly provided under the said law is the sanction
imposable upon an erring Chairman of the BEI, and not the disenfranchisement of the voter. 3

In its assailed decision, the HRET ruled in favor of respondent Ramirez; it concluded:

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the Tribunal Resolved to DISMISS the instant election protest, including the
parties' mutual claims for damages and attorney's fee; AFFIRM the proclamation of Protestee Jose Tan Ramirez; and
DECLARE him to be the duly elected Representative of the Lone District of Eastern Samar, for having obtained a plurality
of 143 votes over second placer Protestant Marcelino Libanan. 4

Petitioner Libanan moved for a reconsideration of the decision of the HRET arguing, among other grounds, 5 that the absence of
the BEI Chairman's signature at the back of the ballots could not but indicate that the ballots were not those issued to the voters
during the elections. He averred that the law would require the Chairman of the BEI to authenticate or sign the ballot before issuing
it to the voter. Acting on the petitioner's motion for reconsideration, the HRET credited petitioner Libanan with thirty (30) votes
because of the error in the computation of the base figure and rejected twelve (12) ballots for respondent Ramirez. Respondent
Ramirez, nevertheless, remained to be the winner with a lead of ninety-nine (99) votes in his favor. As regards the absence of BEI
Chairman's signature at the back of the ballots, the HRET stressed:

Fraud is not presumed. It must be sufficiently established. Moreover, Section 211 of the Omnibus Election Code provides
in part that "in the reading and appreciation of ballots, every ballot shall be presumed to be valid unless there is clear and
good reason to justify its rejection." In the instant case, there is no evidence to support protestant's allegation that the
ballots he enumerated in his Motion for Reconsideration are substitute ballots. The absence of the BEI Chairman's
signature at the back of the ballot cannot be an indication of ballot switching or substitution. At best, such absence of BEI
Chairman's signature is a prima facie evidence that the BEI Chairmen concerned were derelict in their duty of
authenticating the ballots. Such omission, as stated in the Decision, is not fatal to the validity of the ballots. 6

Thus, the present recourse.

A perusal of the grounds raised by petitioner to annul the HRET decision and resolution boils down to the issue of whether or not
the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the absence of the signature of the Chairman of the BEI in the ballots
did not render the ballots spurious.

Petitioner Libanan contends that the three hundred eleven (311) ballots (265 of which have been for private respondent Ramirez)
without the signature of the Chairman of the BEI, but which had the COMELEC water-marks and/or colored fibers, should be
invalidated. It is the position of petitioner that the purpose of the law in requiring the BEI Chairman to affix his signature at the back
of the ballot when he issues it to the voter is "to authenticate" the ballot and, absent that signature, the ballot must be considered
spurious.

Prefatorily, the Court touches base on its jurisdiction to review and pass upon decisions or resolutions of the electoral tribunals.

The Constitutions mandates that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall each,
respectively, be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective
members. 7 In Lazatin vs. HRET , 8 the Court has observed that —

The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred. The exercise of the power by
the Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been described as "intended to be as complete and
unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature." Earlier this grant of power to the legislature was
characterized by Justice Malcolm as "full, clear and complete." Under the amended 1935 Constitution, the power was
unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal and it remained as full, clear and complete as that previously granted the
Legislature and the Electoral Commission. The same may be said with regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals
under the 1987 Constitution. 9

The Court has stressed that ". . . so long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives, any final action taken by the HRET on a
matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court . . . the power granted to the Electoral Tribunal . . .
excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same."

The Court did recognize, of course, its power of judicial review in exceptional cases. In Robles vs. HRET , 10 the Court has
explained that while the judgments of the Tribunal are beyond judicial interference, the Court may do so, however, but only, "in the
exercise of this Court's so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon a determination that the Tribunal's decision or resolution was
rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or paraphrasing Morrero, upon a clear showing of
such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a
demonstration of a very clear unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such grave abuse of discretion that there has to be remedy
for such abuse."

In the old, but still relevant, case of Morrero vs. Bocar, 11 the Court has ruled that the power of the Electoral Commission "is beyond
judicial interference except, in any event, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of power as will constitute a
denial of due process." The Court does not, to paraphrase it in Co vs.HRET, 12 venture into the perilous area of the correcting
perceived errors of independent branches of the Government; it comes in only when it has to vindicate a denial of due process or
correct an abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the Constitution itself calls for remedial action.

In the instant controversy, it would appear that the HRET "reviewed and passed upon the validity of all the ballots in the protested
and counter-protested precincts, including those not contested and claimed by the parties." 13The Tribunal, added, that "(t)his
course of action was adopted not only to give effect to the intent of each and every voter, but also to rectify any mistake in
appreciation, deliberate or otherwise, committed at the precinct level and overlooked during the revision stage of this case." 14 In
holding that the absence of the signature of the Chairman of the BEI at the back of the ballot does not invalidate it, the HRET has
ratiocinated in this wise:

No spurious ballot was found in this case. For a ballot to be rejected for being spurious, the ballot must not have any of the
following authenticating marks: a) the COMELEC watermark; b) the signatures or initial of the BEI Chairman at the back of
the ballot; and c) red and blue fibers. In the present case, all the ballots examined by the Tribunal had COMELEC
watermarks.

xxx xxx xxx

 Anent the BEI Chairman's signature, while Section 24 of R.A. 7166 provides that failure to authenticate the ballot shall
constitute an election offense, there is nothing in the said law which provides that ballots not so authenticated shall be
considered invalid. In fact, the members of the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms agreed during their
deliberation on the subject that the absence of the BEI Chairman's signature at the back of the ballot will not per se make
a ballot spurious.

Moreover, while Rep. Palacol, then Chairman of the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, mentioned during his
sponsorship speech that one of the salient features of the bill filed was "to require the chairman of the Board of Election
Inspectors to authenticate a ballot given to a voter by affixing his signature on (sic) the back thereof and to consider any
ballot as spurious," R.A. 7166, as approved, does not contain any provision to that effect. Clearly, therefore, the Congress
as a whole (House of Representatives and Senate) failed to adopt the proposal of Rep. Palacol that ballots without the BEI
Chairman's signature at the back will be declared spurious. What is clearly provided under the said law is the sanction
imposable upon an erring Chairman of the BEI, and not the disenfranchisement of the voter. 15

The pertinent provision of the law, Section 24 of R.A. No. 7166, provides:

Sec. 24. Signature of Chairman at the back of Every Ballot. — In every case before delivering an official ballot to the voter,
the Chairman of the Board of Election Inspector shall, in the presence of the voter, affix his signature at the back thereof.
Failure to authenticate shall be noted in the minutes of the Board of Election Inspectors and shall constitute an election
offense punishable under Section 263 and 264 of the Omnibus Election Code.

There is really nothing in the above law to the effect that a ballot which is not so authenticated shall thereby be deemed spurious.
The law merely renders the BEI Chairman accountable for such failure. The courts may not, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge
the scope of a statute and embrace situations neither provided nor intended by the lawmakers. Where the words and phrases of a
statute are not obscure and ambiguous, the meaning and intention of the legislature should be determined from the language
employed, and where there is no ambiguity in the words, there should be no room for construction. 16

As so aptly observed by the Solicitor-General, House Bill ("HB") No. 34811 (which later become R.A. No. 7166), approved by the
House of Representatives on third reading, was a consolidation of different bills. Two of the bills consolidated and considered in
drafting H.B. No. 34811 were H.B. 34639 and H.B. No. 34660. Section 22 of the two latter bills provided that:

In every case before delivering an official ballot to the voter, the chairman of the Board of Election Inspectors shall, in the
presence of the voter, affix his signature at the back thereof. Any ballot which is not so authenticated shall be deemed
spurious. Failure to so authenticate shall constitute an election offense. 17

During the deliberation of the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, held on 08 August 1991, the members agreed to
delete the phrase "Any ballot which is not so authenticated shall be deemed spurious." Pertinent portions of the transcript of
stenographic notes ("TSN") taken during the Meeting of the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms read:

THE CHAIRMAN. Yes, Congressman Mercado.

HON. MERCADO. I, think, Section 22, we go to the intent of the provision. I think the intent here is to sanction the
inspector so I would propose a compromise. The ballot should not be deemed as spurious. However, it would rather be
failure of the inspector to, or the chairman to affix his signature would rather be a circumstance which would aggravate the
crime, which would aggravate the election offense, on the part of the inspector, but not to disenfranchise the voter.
Because the intention here is to punish the election inspector for not affixing the signature. Why should we punish the
voter? So I think the compromise here. . .

THE CHAIRMAN. A serious election offense.

HON. MERCADO. Yes, it should be a serious election offense on the part of the chairman for not affixing the signature,
but not to make the ballot spurious.

HON. RONO. Mr. Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN. Yes, Congressman Rono.

HON. RONO. One thing that we have to guard against is when we deal with the ballot and the right to suffrage, we should
not really make law that would prevent the flexibility of the Commission on Elections, and the Supreme Court from getting
other extraneous efforts to confirm authenticity or the spuriousness of the ballot, by making a provision that by that single
mistake or inadvertence of the chairman we make the ballot automatically spurious is dangerous. It should be . . . what I'm
saying is that the Commission or the proper bodies by which this matter will be taken up may consider it as one of the
evidences of spuriousness but notper se or ipso facto it becomes; it should look for other extraneous evidence. So what I
am suggesting is let us give them this kind of flexibility before we determine or before we say that this ballot is spurious,
we give the COMELEC some flexibility in the determination of other extraneous evidence.

HON. GARCIA. May I offer a suggestion?

 THE CHAIRMAN. Yes, Congressman Garcia.

HON. GARCIA. That the fact that a ballot does not contain the signature, I think, initial will not be
sufficient, the signature of the Chairman should be noted in the minutes. Noted in the minutes. So that in
case of protest, there is basis.

HON. RONO. OO, may basis na. Iyon lang. I think that would solve our problem.

THE CHAIRMAN. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

MR. MONSOD. Your honor, we're willing to accept that amendment. Take out that sentence spurious,
with the introduction of the proposed measure . . . 18

The TSN of the proceedings of the Bicameral conference Committee on Election Law, held on 29 October 1991, in turn, would
show these exchanges;

CHAIRMAN GONZALEZ: Are there anything more?

HON. ROCO. There is a section in the Senate version about the ballot being signed at the
back.

CHAIRMAN GONZALEZ. Counter side.

HON. ROCO. If it is not signed then it is being spurious which is a very dangerous, I (think) (it)
is a very dangerous provision and so . . .

MR. MONSOD. We agree with the House version that anyway when chairman of BEI doesn't
sign subject to an election offense. But it should not be a basis for disenfranchisement of the
voter. So, we believe we set this in the hearings in the House that we should strike out that
sentence that says that this ballot is automatically spurious. 19

Thus the final draft, which was later to become R.A. No. 7166, no longer included the provision "Any ballot not so
authenticated shall be deemed spurious." The intention of the legislature even then was quite evident.

The reliance on Bautista vs. Castro 20 by petitioner, is misdirected. It must be stressed that B.P. Blg. 222, 21otherwise
known as the "Barangay Election Act of 1982," approved on 25 March 1982, itself categorically expresses that it shall only
be "applicable to the election of barangay officials." Section 14 of B.P. Blg. 222 and its implementing rule in Section 36 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 1539 have both provided:

Section 14 of B.P. 222:

Sec. 14. Official barangay ballots. — The official barangay ballots shall be provided by the city or municipality
concerned of a size and color to be prescribed by the Commission on Elections.

Such official ballot shall, before it is handed to the voter at the voting center, be authenticated in the presence of
the voter, the other Tellers, and the watchers present by the Chairman of the Board of Election Tellers who shall
affix his signature at the back thereof.

Section 36 of COMELEC Resolution No. 1539:

Sec. 36. Procedure in the casting of votes. — . . .

b. Delivery of ballot. — Before delivering the ballot to the voter, the chairman shall, in the presence of the voter,
the other members of the board and the watchers present, affix his signature at the back thereof and write the
serial number of the ballot in the space provided in the ballot, beginning with No. "1" for the first ballot issued, and
so on consecutively for the succeeding ballots, which serial number shall be entered in the corresponding space
of the voting record. He shall the fold the ballot once, and without removing the detachable coupon, deliver it to
the voter, together with a ball pen.

xxx xxx xxx

e. Returning the ballot. (1) In the presence of all the members of the Board, the voter shall affix his right hand
thumbmark on the corresponding space in the detachable coupon, and shall give the folded ballot to the
chairman. (2) The chairman shall without unfolding the ballot or looking at its contents, and in the presence of the
voter and all the members of the Board, verify if it bears his signature and the same serial number recorded in the
voting record. (3) If the ballot is found to be authentic, the voter shall then be required to imprint his right hand
thumbmark on the proper space in the voting record. (4) The chairman shall then detach the coupon and shall
 deposit the folded ballot in the compartment for valid ballot and the coupon in the compartment for spoiled
ballots. (5) The voter shall then leave the voting center.

f. When ballot may be considered spoiled. Any ballot returned to the chairman with its coupon already detached,
or which does not bear the signature of the chairman, or any ballot with a serial number that does not tally with
the serial number of the ballot delivered to the voter as recorded in the voting record, shall be considered as
spoiled and shall be marked and signed by the members of the board and shall not be
counted. 22

The difference in the rules may not be too difficult to discern. The stringent requirements in B.P. Blg. 222 should be
justifiable considering that the official barangay ballots would be provided by the city or municipality concerned with the
COMELEC merely prescribing their size and color. Thus, the official ballots in B.P. Blg. 222, being supplied and furnished
by the local government themselves, the possibility of the ballots being easily counterfeited might not have been
discounted. The absence of authenticating marks prescribed by law, i.e., the signature of the chairman of the Board of
Election Tellers at the back of the ballot, could have well been really thought of to be fatal to the validity of the ballot.

Section 24 of R.A. No. 7166, upon the other hand, contains no similar stringent provisions such as that seen in Section
36(f) of COMELEC Resolution No. 1539. The pertinent part in Resolution No. 2676 on the requirement of the signature of
the chairman is found in Section 73 thereof which merely provides:

Sec. 73. Signature of chairman at the back of every ballot. — In every case, the chairman of the board shall, in
the presence of the voter, authenticate every ballot by affixing his signature at the back thereof before delivering
it to the voter. FAILURE TO SO AUTHENTICATE SHALL BE NOTED IN THE MINUTES OF THE BOARD AND
SHALL CONSTITUTE AN ELECTION OFFENSE.

Again, in Resolution No. 2738, 23 promulgated by the COMELEC on 03 January 1995, 24 which implemented, among other
election laws, R.A. No. 7166 (that governed the election for Members of the House of Representatives held on 08 May
1995), the relevant provision is in Section 13 which itself has only stated:

Sec. 13. Authentication of the ballot. — Before delivering a ballot to the voter, the chairman of the board shall, in
the presence of the voter, affix his signature at the back thereof.

It would appear evident that the ruling in Bautista vs. Castro was prompted because of the express declaration in Section
36(f) of COMELEC Resolution No. 1539, implementing Section 14 of B.P. Blg. 222, that: "Any ballot returned to the
chairman . . . which does not bear the signature of the chairman . . . shall be considered as spoiled . . . and shall not be
counted." This Court thus stated in Bautista:

The law (Sec 14 of B.P. Blg. 222,) and the rules implementing it (Sec. 36 of Comelec Res. No. 1539) leave no
room for interpretation. The absence of the signature of the Chairman of the Board of Election Tellers in the ballot
given to a voter as a required by law and the rules as proof of the authenticity of said ballot is fatal. This
requirement is mandatory for the validity of the said ballot.

It should be noteworthy that in an unsigned 03rd April 1990 resolution, in "Jolly Fernandez vs. COMELEC,"25 the Court en
banc had the opportunity to debunk the argument that all ballots not signed at the back thereof by the Chairman and the
Poll Clerk were to be considered spurious for non-compliance with Section 15 of R.A. No. 6646, 26 i.e., "The Electoral
Reforms Law of 1987," reading as follows:

Sec. 15. — Signature of Chairman and Poll Clerk at the Back of Every Ballot. — In addition to the preliminary
acts before the voting as enumerated in Section 191 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, the chairman and the poll
clerk of the board of election inspector shall affix their signatures at the back of each and every official ballot to be
used during the voting. A certification to that effect must be entered in the minutes of the voting.

The Court declared:

The cardinal objective in the appreciation of the ballots is to discover and give effect to the intention of the voter.
That intention would be nullified by the strict interpretation of the said section as suggested by the petitioner for it
would result in the invalidation of the ballot even if duly accomplished by the voter, and simply because of an
omission not imputable to him but to the election officials. The citizen cannot be deprived of his constitutional
right of suffrage on the specious ground that other persons were negligent in performing their own duty, which in
the case at bar was purely ministerial and technical, by no means mandatory but a mere antecedent measure
intended to authenticate the ballot. A contrary ruling would place a premium on official ineptness
and make it possible for a small group of functionaries, by their negligence — or, worse, their deliberate inaction
— to frustrate the will of the electorate. 27

Petitioner Libanan suggests that the Court might apply the "ruling" of respondent HRET in the case of Yap
vs. Calalay (HRET Case No. 95-026). He states that "it is the HRET itself, ironically, that deals the coup de grace to its
ruling HRET Case No. 95-020." The "ruling" cited by petitioner is actually a "Confidential Memorandum," 28 dated 28 April
1997, from a certain Atty. Emmanuel Mapili addressed to "PA Committees in HRET Case No. 95-026 (Yap vs. Calalay)"
 which has for its subject "(n)ew rulings to be followed in the appreciation of ballots in HRET Case No. 95-026 (Yap vs.
Calalay) and other concerns." Petitioner Libanan quotes the pertinent portion of the said Memorandum, viz:

WHEREFORE, the Tribunal Resolved that the following rules and guidelines on the appreciation of ballots shall
be given effect in the resolution of this case and shall be applied prospectively to other pending cases:

1. The absence of the signature of the BEI Chairman at the back of the ballot shall nullify the
same and all the votes therein shall not be counted in favor of any candidate. 29

Reliance by petitioner on this alleged "ruling", obviously deserves scant consideration. What should, instead, be given
weight is the consistent rule laid down by the HRET that a ballot is considered valid and genuine for as long as it bears
any one of these authenticating marks, to wit: (a) the COMELEC watermark, or (b) the signature or initials, or thumbprint
of the Chairman of the BEI; and, (c) in those cases where the COMELEC watermarks are blurred or not readily apparent
to the naked eye, the presence of red and blue fibers in the ballots. 30 It is only when none of these marks appears extant
that the ballot can be considered spurious and subject to rejection.

It is quite clear, in the opinion of the Court, that no grave abuse of discretion has been committed by respondent House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal in its issuance of the assailed decision and resolution.

On other important point. Regarding the membership of certain Justices of this Court in the HRET and their participation in
the resolution of the instant petition, the Court sees no conflict at all, and it, therefore, rejects the offer of inhibition by each
of the concerned justices. As early as Vera vs. Avelino, 31 this Court, confronted with a like situation, has said
unequivocally:

. . . Mulling over this, we experience no qualmish feelings about coincidence. Their designation to the electoral
tribunals deducted not a whit from their functions as members of this Supreme Court, and did not disqualify them
in this litigation. Nor will their deliverances hereat on a given question operate to prevent them from voting in the
electoral forum on identical questions; because the Constitution, establishing no incompatibility between the two
roles, naturally did not contemplate, nor want, justices opining one way here, and thereafter holding
otherwise, pari materia, in the electoral tribunal, or vice-versa. 32

Such has thus been, and so it is to be in this petition, as well as in the cases that may yet come before the Court.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED.

[G.R. No. 142261. June 29, 2000]

GOVERNOR MANUEL M. LAPID, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, FACT-FINDING INTELLIGENCE BUREAU (FFIB) of the Office of the
Ombudsman, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, respondents.

RESOLUTION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

Before us are the Motions for Reconsideration filed by the National Bureau of Investigation and the Department of the Interior
and Local Government, represented by the Office of the Solicitor-General, and the Office of the Ombudsman of our 5 April 2000
Resolution.[1] In this resolution, we ordered the immediate reinstatement of petitioner Manuel Lapid to the position of Governor of
Pampanga as the respondents failed to establish the existence of a law mandating the immediate execution of a decision of the
Office of the Ombudsman in an administrative case where the penalty imposed is suspension for one year.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
On the basis of an unsigned letter dated July 20, 1998, allegedly originating from the “Mga Mamamayan ng Lalawigan ng
Pampanga,” addressed to the National Bureau of Investigation, the latter initiated an “open probe” on the alleged illegal quarrying in
Pampanga & exaction of exorbitant fees purportedly perpetrated by unscrupulous individuals with the connivance of high-ranking
government officials. The NBI Report was endorsed to the respondent Ombudsman and was docketed as OMB-1-98-2067.
On Oct. 26, 1998, a complaint was filed charging petitioner Gov. Manuel M. Lapid, Vice-Governor Clayton Olalia, Provincial
Administrator Enrico Quiambao, Provincial Treasurer Jovito Sabado, Mabalacat Municipal Mayor Marino Morales and Senior Police
Officer 4 Nestor Tadeo with alleged “Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service” for
allegedly “having conspired between and among themselves in demanding and collecting from various quarrying operators in
Pampanga a control fee, control slip, or monitoring fee of P120.00 per truckload of sand, gravel, or other quarry material, without a
duly enacted provincial ordinance authorizing the collection thereof and without issuing receipts for its collection. They were also
accused of giving unwarranted benefits to Nestor Tadeo, Rodrigo “Rudy” Fernandez & Conrado Pangilinan who are neither
officials/employees of the Provincial Government. of Pampanga nor quarry operators by allowing them to collect the said amount
which was over and above the P40.00 prescribed under the present provincial ordinance and in allowing Tadeo, Fernandez and
Pangilinan to sell and deliver to various quarry operators booklets of official receipts which were pre-stamped with “SAND FEE
P40.00.”[2]
The Ombudsman issued an Order dated January 13, 1999 preventively suspending petitioner Lapid, Olalia, Quiambao,
Sabado, Morales and Tadeo for a period of six (6) months without pay pursuant to Sec. 24 of RA 6770. On Jan. 19, 1999, the
Department of the Interior and Local Government (hereinafter the “DILG”) implemented the suspension of petitioner Lapid [3].
On November 22, 1999 the Ombudsman rendered a decision[4] in the administrative case finding the petitioner
administratively liable for misconduct thus:

“Wherefore, premises considered, respondent Manuel M. Lapid, Clayton A. Olalia, Jovito S. Sabado and Nestor C. Tadeo are
hereby found guilty of misconduct for which they are meted out the penalty of one (1) year suspension without pay pursuant to
section 25 (2) of R.A. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989). Respondent Marino P. Morales is hereby exonerated from the same
administrative charge for insufficiency of evidence. The complaint against respondent Enrico P. Quiambao, who resigned effective
June 30, 1998 was dismissed on March 12, 1999, without prejudice to the outcome of the criminal case.”[5]

The copy of the said decision was received by counsel for the petitioner on November 25, 1999 and a motion for
reconsideration was filed on November 29, 1999. The Office of the Ombudsman, in an Order [6] dated 12 January 2000, denied the
motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals on January 18, 2000 praying for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order to enjoin the Ombudsman from enforcing the questioned decision. The temporary restraining order was
issued by the appellate court on January 19, 2000.[7]
When the 60-day lifetime of the temporary restraining order lapsed on March 19, 2000 without the Court of Appeals resolving
the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, a petition [8] for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus was filed with this
Court on March 20, 2000. The petition asked for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin the respondents from
enforcing the assailed decision of the Ombudsman and prayed that “after due proceedings, judgment be rendered reversing and
setting aside the questioned decision (of the Ombudsman) dated November 22, 1999 and the order dated January 12, 2000.” [9]
On March 22, 2000 the Third Division of this Court issued a Resolution requiring the respondents to comment on the petition.
That same day, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution [10]denying the petitioner’s prayer for injunctive relief. The following day, or
on March 23, 2000, the DILG implemented the assailed decision of the Ombudsman and the highest ranking Provincial Board
Member of Pampanga, Edna David, took her oath of office as O.I.C.- Governor of the Province of Pampanga.
On March 24, 2000 a Motion for Leave to File Supplement to the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus[11] and the
Supplement to the Petition[12] itself were filed in view of the resolution of the Court of Appeals denying the petitioner’s prayer for
preliminary injunction. In addition to the arguments raised in the main petition, the petitioner likewise raised in issue the apparent
pre-judgment of the case on the merits by the Court of Appeals in its resolution denying the prayer for preliminary injunction. In so
doing, petitioner argued that the respondent court exceeded the bounds of its jurisdiction. Proceeding from the premise that the
decision of the Ombudsman had not yet become final, the petitioner argued that the writs of prohibition andmandamus may be
issued against the respondent DILG for prematurely implementing the assailed decision. Finally, the petitioner prayed for the
setting aside of the resolution issued by the Court of Appeals dated March 22, 2000 and for the issuance of a new one enjoining the
respondents from enforcing the said decision or, if it has already been implemented, to withdraw any action already taken until the
issue of whether or not the said decision of the Ombudsman is immediately executory has been settled.
The Solicitor-General and the Office of the Ombudsman filed their respective comments[13]to the petition praying for the
dismissal thereof. Regarding the issue of the immediate enforcement of the decision of the Ombudsman, the Solicitor-General
maintains that the said decision is governed by Section 12, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court and is therefore, immediately executory.
For its part, the Office of the Ombudsman maintains that the Ombudsman Law and its implementing rules are silent as to the
execution of decisions rendered by the Ombudsman considering that the portion of the said law cited by petitioner pertains to the
finality of the decision but not to its enforcement pending appeal. The Office of the Ombudsman also stated that it has uniformly
adopted the provisions in the Local Government Code and Administrative Code that decisions in administrative disciplinary cases
are immediately executory.
The Solicitor-General filed an additional comment[14] alleging that the petitioner did not question the executory character of
the decision of the Ombudsman and that he is presenting this argument for the first time before the Supreme Court. The appellate
court should be given an opportunity to review the case from this standpoint before asking the Supreme Court to review the
resolutions of the Court of Appeals. The petitioner filed a consolidated Reply[15] to the Comments of the respondents.
After oral arguments before the Third Division of this Court on 5 April 2000, the Resolution [16] subject of the instant Motions for
Reconsideration was issued. The Resolution provides as follows:

“From the pleadings filed by the parties and after oral arguments held on April 5, 2000, the petitioner represented by Atty. Augusto
G. Panlilio, the respondent Ombudsman represented by its Chief Legal Counsel, and the National Bureau of Investigation and the
Department of the Interior and Local Government represented by the Solicitor General, and after due deliberation, the Court finds
that the respondents failed to establish the existence of a law mandating the immediate execution of a decision of the Ombudsman
in an administrative case where the penalty imposed is suspension for one year. The immediate implementation of the decision of
the Ombudsman against petitioner is thus premature.
WHEREFORE, the respondents are ordered to reinstate effective immediately the petitioner to the position of Governor of the
Province of Pampanga. This case is hereby remanded to the Court of Appeals for resolution of the appeal in CA-GR. SP No.
564744 on the merits. Said court is hereby directed to resolve the same with utmost deliberate dispatch.

This is without prejudice to the promulgation of an extended decision.”

From this 5 April 2000 Resolution, the Offices of the Solicitor-General and the Ombudsman filed the instant motions for
reconsideration.
The sole issue addressed by our 5 April 2000 Resolution is whether or not the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman
finding herein petitioner administratively liable for misconduct and imposing upon him a penalty of one (1) year suspension without
pay is immediately executory pending appeal.
Petitioner was administratively charged for misconduct under the provisions of R.A. 6770, the Ombudsman Act of
1989. Section 27 of the said Act provides as follows:
“Section 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. – All provisionary orders of the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective
and executory.

A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days
after receipt of written notice and shall be entertained only on the following grounds:

XXX
Findings of fact of the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. Any order, directive or
decision imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month’s salary shall be final and
unappealable.

In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the
Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or
decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.”

The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman [17] likewise contain a similar provision. Section 7, Rule III of the said
Rules provides as follows:

“Sec. 7. Finality of Decision – where the respondent is absolved of the charge and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed
is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one month salary, the decision
shall be final and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision shall become final after the expiration of ten (10) days from receipt
thereof by the respondent, unless a motion for reconsideration or petition for certiorari, shall have been filed by him as prescribed in
Section 27 of R.A. 6770.”

It is clear from the above provisions that the punishment imposed upon petitioner, i.e. suspension without pay for one year, is
not among those listed as final and unappealable, hence, immediately executory. Section 27 states that all provisionary orders of
the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory; and that any order, directive or decision of the said Office
imposing the penalty of censure or reprimand or suspension of not more than one month’s salary is final and unappealable. As
such the legal maxim “inclusion unius est exclusio alterus” finds application. The express mention of the things included excludes
those that are not included. The clear import of these statements taken together is that all other decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman which impose penalties that are not enumerated in the said section 27 are not final, unappealable and immediately
executory. An appeal timely filed, such as the one filed in the instant case, will stay the immediate implementation of the decision.
This finds support in the Rules of Procedure issued by the Ombudsman itself which states that “(I)n all other cases, the decision
shall become final after the expiration of ten (10) days from receipt thereof by the respondent, unless a motion for reconsideration
or petition for certiorari (should now be petition for review under Rule 43) shall have been filed by him as prescribed in Section 27 of
R.A. 6770.”
The Office of the Solicitor General insists however that the case of Fabian vs. Desierto [18] has voided Section 27 of R.A. 6770
and Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07. As such, the review of decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases
is now governed by Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which mandates, under Section 12[19] thereof, the immediately
executory character of the decision or order appealed from.
The contention of the Solicitor General is not well-taken. Our ruling in the case of Fabian vs. Desierto invalidated Section 27
of Republic Act No. 6770 and Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No.07 and any other provision of law implementing the
aforesaid Act only insofar as they provide for appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the
Supreme Court. The only provision affected by the Fabian ruling is the designation of the Court of Appeals as the proper forum and
of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court as the proper mode of appeal. All other matters included in said section 27, including the finality or
non-finality of decisions, are not affected and still stand.
Neither can respondents find support in Section 12, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which provides as follows:

“Section 12. Effect of Appeal. The appeal shall not stay the award, judgment, final order or resolution sought to be reviewed unless
the Court of Appeals shall direct otherwise upon such terms as it may deem just.”
 On this point, respondents contend that considering the silence of the Ombudsman Act on the matter of execution pending
appeal, the above-quoted provision of the Rules of Court, which allegedly mandates the immediate execution of all decisions
rendered by administrative and quasi-judicial agencies, should apply suppletorily to the provisions of the Ombudsman Act. We do
not agree.
A judgment becomes “final and executory” by operation of law. [20] Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act provides that any order,
directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman imposing a penalty of public censure or reprimand, or suspension of not more
than one month’s salary shall be final and unappealable. In all other cases, the respondent therein has the right to appeal to the
Court of Appeals within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision. In all these other cases
therefore, the judgment imposed therein will become final after the lapse of the reglementary period of appeal if no appeal is
perfected[21] or, an appeal therefrom having been taken, the judgment in the appellate tribunal becomes final. It is this final
judgment which is then correctly categorized as a “final and executory judgment” in respect to which execution shall issue as a
matter of right.[22] In other words, the fact that the Ombudsman Act gives parties the right to appeal from its decisions should
generally carry with it the stay of these decisions pending appeal. Otherwise, the essential nature of these judgments as being
appealable would be rendered nugatory.
The general rule is that judgments by lower courts or tribunals become executory only after it has become final and
executory,[23] execution pending appeal being an exception to this general rule. It is the contention of respondents however that
with respect to decisions of quasi-judicial agencies and administrative bodies, the opposite is true. It is argued that the general rule
with respect to quasi-judicial and administrative agencies is that the decisions of such bodies are immediately executory even
pending appeal.
The contention of respondents is misplaced. There is no general legal principle that mandates that all decisions of quasi-
judicial agencies are immediately executory. Decisions rendered by the Securities and Exchange Commission[24] and the Civil
Aeronautics Board,[25] for example, are not immediately executory and are stayed when an appeal is filed before the Court of
Appeals. On the other hand, the decisions of the Civil Service Commission, under the Administrative Code [26], and the Office of the
President under the Local Government Code [27], which respondents cite, are immediately executory even pending appeal because
the pertinent laws under which the decisions were rendered mandate them to be so. The provisions of the last two cited laws
expressly provide for the execution pending appeal of their final orders or decisions. The Local Government Code, under Section
68 thereof provides as follows:

“Section 68. Execution Pending Appeal. – An appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final and executory. The
respondent shall be considered as having been placed under preventive suspension during the pendency of an appeal in the event
he wins such appeal. In the event the appeal results in an exoneration, he shall be paid his salary and such other emoluments
during the pendency of the appeal.”

Similarly, Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 6, Section 47, par. (4) of the Administrative Code of 1987 provides:

“(4) An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory, and in case the penalty is suspension or removal, the respondent
shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension during the pendency of the appeal in the event he wins an
appeal.”

Where the legislature has seen fit to declare that the decision of the quasi-judicial agency is immediately final and executory
pending appeal, the law expressly so provides.
Section 12 of Rule 43 should therefore be interpreted as mandating that the appeal will not stay the award, judgment, final
order or resolution unless the law directs otherwise.
Petitioner was charged administratively before the Ombudsman and accordingly the provisions of the Ombudsman Act
should apply in his case. Section 68 of the Local Government Code only applies to administrative decisions rendered by the Office
of the President or the appropriate Sanggunian against elective local government officials. Similarly, the provision in the
Administrative Code of 1987 mandating execution pending review applies specifically to administrative decisions of the Civil
Service Commission involving members of the Civil Service.
There is no basis in law for the proposition that the provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987 and the Local Government
Code on execution pending review should be applied suppletorily to the provisions of the Ombudsman Act as there is nothing in the
Ombudsman Act which provides for such suppletory application. Courts may not, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of
a statute and include therein situations not provided or intended by the lawmakers. An omission at the time of enactment, whether
careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied however later wisdom may recommend the inclusion. [28]
And while in one respect, the Ombudsman Law, the Administrative Code of 1987 and the Local Government Code are in pari
materia insofar as the three laws relate or deal with public officers, the similarity ends there. It is a principle in statutory construction
that where there are two statutes that apply to a particular case, that which was specially designed for the said case must prevail
over the other.[29] In the instant case, the acts attributed to petitioner could have been the subject of administrative disciplinary
proceedings before the Office of the President under the Local Government Code or before the Office of the Ombudsman under the
Ombudsman Act. Considering however, that petitioner was charged under the Ombudsman Act, it is this law alone which should
govern his case.
Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argue that the ruling against execution pending review of the
Ombudsman’s decision grants a one-sided protection to the offender found guilty of misconduct in office and nothing at all to the
government as the aggrieved party. The offender, according to respondents, can just let the case drag on until the expiration of his
office or his reelection as by then, the case against him shall become academic and his offense, obliterated. As such, respondents
conclude, the government is left without further remedy and is left helpless in its own fight against graft and corruption.
 We find this argument much too speculative to warrant serious consideration. If it perceived that the fight against graft and
corruption is hampered by the inadequacy of the provisions of the Ombudsman Act, the remedy lies not with this Court but by
legislative amendment.
As regards the contention of the Office of the Ombudsman that under Sec. 13(8), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the
Office of the Ombudsman is empowered to “(p)romulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such
functions or duties as may be provided by law,” suffice it to note that the Ombudsman rules of procedure, Administrative Order No.
07, mandate that decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman where the penalty imposed is other than public censure or reprimand,
suspension of not more than one month salary or fine equivalent to one month salary are still appealable and hence, not final and
executory. Under these rules, which were admittedly promulgated by virtue of the rule-making power of the Office of the
Ombudsman, the decision imposing a penalty of one year suspension without pay on petitioner Lapid is not immediately executory.
WHEREFORE, the Motions for Reconsideration filed by the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the Ombudsman
are hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO F.
SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

[G.R. No. 118745. July 5, 1996]

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, represented by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO F. SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET AL., respondents.

RESOLUTION
FRANCISCO, J.:

Consequent to the denial of their petitions for review on certiorari by this Court on October 6, 1995[1], petitioners Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), filed their respective motions for reconsideration contending
mainly that, contrary to the Court's conclusion, the opening of trust accounts in favor of the rejecting landowners is sufficient
compliance with the mandate of Republic Act 6657. Moreover, it is argued that there is no legal basis for allowing the withdrawal of
the money deposited in trust for the rejecting landowners pending the determination of the final valuation of their properties.
Petitioner DAR maintains that "the deposit contemplated by Section 16(e) of Republic Act 6657, absent any specific
indication, may either be general or special, regular or irregular, voluntary or involuntary (necessary) or other forms known in law,
and any thereof should be, as it is the general rule, deemed complying." [2]
We reject this contention. Section 16(e) of Republic Act 6657 was very specific in limiting the type of deposit to be made as
compensation for the rejecting landowners, that is in "cash" or in "LBP bonds", to wit:

"Sec. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands —

xxx xxx xxx

(e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon
the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this
Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. x x x" (Italics supplied)

The provision is very clear and unambiguous, foreclosing any doubt as to allow an expanded construction that would include
the opening of "trust accounts" within the coverage of term "deposit.” Accordingly, we must adhere to the well-settled rule that when
the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation or construction, but only for
application.[3] Thus, recourse to any rule which allows the opening of trust accounts as a mode of deposit under Section 16(e) of
R.A. 6657 goes beyond the scope of the said provision and is therefore impermissible. As we have previously declared, the rule-
making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceedings to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted,
and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the
statute.[4] Administrative regulations must always be in harmony with the provisions of the law because any resulting discrepancy
between the two will always be resolved in favor of the basic law.[5]
The validity of constituting trust accounts for the benefit of the rejecting landowners and withholding immediate payment to
them is further premised on the latter's refusal to accept the offered compensation thereby making it necessary that the amount
remains in the custody of the LBP for safekeeping and in trust for eventual payment to the landowners. [6] Additionally, it is argued
that the release of the amount deposited in trust prior to the final determination of the just compensation would be premature and
expose the government to unnecessary risks and disadvantages, citing the possibility that the government may subsequently
decide to abandon or withdraw from the coverage of the CARP certain portions of the properties that it has already acquired,
through supervening administrative determination that the subject land falls under the exempt category, or by subsequent
legislation allowing additional exemptions from the coverage, or even the total scrapping of the program itself. Force majeure is
also contemplated in view of the devastation suffered by Central Luzon de to lahar. Petitioner DAR maintains that under these
conditions, the government will be forced to institute numerous actions for the recovery of the amounts that it has already paid in
advance to the rejecting landowners.[7]
We are not persuaded. As an exercise of police power, the expropriation of private property under the CARP puts the
landowner, and not the government, in a situation where the odds are already stacked against his favor. He has no recourse but to
allow it. His only consolation is that he can negotiate for the amount of compensation to be paid for the expropriated property. As
expected, the landowner will exercise this right to the hilt, but subject however to the limitation that he can only be entitled to a "just
compensation." Clearly therefore, by rejecting and disputing the valuation of the DAR, the landowner is merely exercising his right
to seek just compensation. If we are to affirm the withholding of the release of the offered compensation despite depriving the
landowner of the possession and use of his property, we are in effect penalizing the latter for simply exercising a right afforded to
him by law.
Obviously, this would render the right to seek a fair and just compensation illusory as it would discourage owners of private
lands from contesting the offered valuation of the DAR even if they find it unacceptable, for fear of the hardships that could result
from long delays in the resolution of their cases. This is contrary to the rules of fair play because the concept of just compensation
embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the payment of the land
within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" for the property
owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more
before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss. [8] It is significant to note that despite petitioner's objections to
the immediate release of the rejected compensation, petitioner LBP, taking into account the plight of the rejecting landowners, has
nevertheless allowed partial withdrawal through LBP Executive Order No. 003, [9] limited to fifty (50) per cent of the net cash
proceeds. This is a clear confirmation that petitioners themselves realize the overriding need of the landowners' immediate access
to the offered compensation despite rejecting its valuation. But the effort, though laudable, still falls short because the release of the
amount was unexplainably limited to only fifty per cent instead of the total amount of the rejected offer, notwithstanding that the
rejecting landowner's property is taken in its entirety. The apprehension against the total release of the rejected compensation is
discounted since the government's interest is amply protected under the aforementioned payment scheme because among the
conditions already imposed is that the landowner must execute a Deed of Conditional Transfer for the subject property. [10]
Anent the aforecited risks and disadvantages to which the government allegedly will be unnecessarily exposed if immediate
withdrawal of the rejected compensation is allowed, suffice it to say that in the absence of any substantial evidence to support the
same, the contemplated scenarios are at the moment nothing but speculations. To allow the taking of the landowners' properties,
and in the meantime leave them empty handed by withholding payment of compensation while the government speculates on
whether or not it will pursue expropriation, or worse for government to subsequently decide to abandon the property and return it to
the landowner when it has already been rendered useless by force majeure, is undoubtedly an oppressive exercise of eminent
domain that must never be sanctioned. Legislations in pursuit of the agrarian reform program are not mere overnight creations but
were the result of long exhaustive studies and even heated debates. In implementation of the program, much is therefore expected
from the government. Unduly burdening the property owners from the resulting flaws in the implementation of the CARP which was
supposed to have been a carefully crafted legislation is plainly unfair and unacceptable.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, petitioners' motions for reconsideration are hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-26100 February 28, 1969

CITY OF BAGUlO, REFORESTATION ADMINISTRATION,

FRANCISCO G. JOAQUIN, SR., FRANCISCO G. JOAQUIN, JR., and TERESITA J. BUCHHOLZ petitioners,
vs.
HON. PIO R. MARCOS, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Baguio,
BELONG LUTES, and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

SANCHEZ, J.:

Petitioners attack the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Baguio to reopen cadastral proceedings under Republic Act
931. Private petitioner's specifically question the ruling of the Court of Appeals that they have no personality to oppose reopening.
The three-pronged contentions of all the petitioners are: (1) the reopening petition was filed outside the 40-year period next
preceding the approval of Republic Act 931; (2) said petition was not published; and (3) private petitioners, as lessees of the public
land in question, have court standing under Republic Act 931. The facts follow:

On April 12, 1912, the cadastral proceedings sought to be reopened, Civil Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record No. 211,
Baguio Townsite, were instituted by the Director of Lands in the Court of First Instance of Baguio. It is not disputed that the land
here involved (described in Plan Psu-186187) was amongst those declared public lands by final decision rendered in that case
on November 13, 1922.

On July 25, 1961, respondent Belong Lutes petitioned the cadastral court to reopen said Civil Reservation Case No. 1 as to
the parcel of land he claims. His prayer was that the land be registered in his name upon the grounds that: (1) he and his
predecessors have been in actual, open, adverse, peaceful and continuous possession and cultivation of the land since Spanish
times, or before July 26, 1894, paying the taxes thereon; and (2) his predecessors were illiterate Igorots without personal notice of
the cadastral proceedings aforestated and were not able to file their claim to the land in question within the statutory period.

On December 18, 1961, private petitioners Francisco G. Joaquin, Sr., Francisco G. Joaquin, Jr., and Teresita J. Buchholz
registered opposition to the reopening. Ground: They are tree farm lessees upon agreements executed by the Bureau of Forestry in
their favor for 15,395.65 square meters on March. 16, 1959, for 12,108 square meters on July 24, 1959, and for 14,771 square
meters on July 17, 1959, respectively.

On May 5, 1962, the City of Baguio likewise opposed reopening.

On May 8, 1962, upon Lutes' opposition, the cadastral court denied private petitioners' right to intervene in the case because
of a final declaratory relief judgment dated March 9, 1962 in Yaranon vs. Castrillo [Civil Case 946, Court of First Instance of Baguio]
which declared that such tree farm leases were null and void.

On May 18, 1962, private petitioners moved to reconsider. They averred that said declaratory relief judgment did not bind
them, for they were not parties to that action.

On September 14, 1962, the cadastral court reversed its own ruling of May 8, 1962, allowed petitioners to cross-examine the
witnesses of respondent Lutes.

On October 16, 1962, Lutes replied to and moved to dismiss private petitioners' opposition to his reopening petition. On
October 25, 1962, private petitioners' rejoinder was filed.

On August 5, 1963, the cadastral court dismissed private petitioners' opposition to the reopening. A motion to reconsider was
rejected by the court on November 5, 1963.

On January 6, 1964, it was the turn of the City of Baguio to lodge a motion to dismiss the petition to reopen. This motion was
adopted as its own by the Reforestation Administration. They maintained the position that the declaratory judgment in Civil Case
946 was not binding on those not parties thereto. Respondent Lutes opposed on February 24, 1964. On April 6, 1964, private
petitioners reiterated their motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds.

On September 17, 1964, the court denied for lack of merit the City's motion as well as the April 6, 1964 motion to dismiss
made by private petitioners.

On November 13, 1964, all the petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with
preliminary injunction. 1 They then questioned the cadastral court's jurisdiction over the petition to reopen and the latter's order of
August 5, 1963 dismissing private petitioners' opposition. The appellate court issued a writ of preliminary injunction upon a P500-
bond.

Then came the judgment of the Court of Appeals of September 30, 1965. The court held that petitioners were not bound by
the declaratory judgment heretofore hated. Nevertheless, the appellate court ruled that as lessees, private petitioners had no right
to oppose the reopening of the cadastral case. Petitioners moved to reconsider. It was thwarted on May 6, 1966.

Petitioners now seek redress from this Court. On July 6, 1966, respondents moved to dismiss the petition before us. On
August 5, 1966, petitioners opposed. On August 12, 1966, we gave due course.

1. Do private petitioners have personality to appear in the reopening proceedings?

First, to the controlling statute, Republic Act 931, effective June 20, 1953.

The title of the Act reads —

AN ACT TO AUTHORIZE THE FILING IN THE PROPER COURT, UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS, OF CERTAIN CLAIMS OF
TITLE TO PARCELS OF LAND THAT HAVE BEEN DECLARED PUBLIC LAND, BY VIRTUE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS
RENDERED WITHIN THE FORTY YEARS NEXT PRECEDING THE APPROVAL OF THIS ACT.

Section 1 thereof provides —

SECTION 1. All persons claiming title to parcels of land that have been the object of cadastral proceedings, who at
the time of the survey were in actual possession of the same, but for some justifiable reason had been unable to file their
claim in the proper court during the time limit established by law, in case such parcels of land, on account of their failure to
file such claims, have been, or are about to be declared land of the public domain by virtue of judicial proceedings
instituted within the forty years next preceding the approval of this Act, are hereby granted the right within five years 2 after
the date on which this Act shall take effect, to petition for a reopening of the judicial proceedings under the provisions of
Act Numbered Twenty-two hundred and fifty-nine, as amended, only with respect to such of said parcels of land as
have not been alienated, reserved, leased, granted, or otherwise provisionally or permanently disposed of by the
Government, and the competent Court of First Instance, upon receiving such petition, shall notify the Government through
 the Solicitor General, and if after hearing the parties, said court shall find that all conditions herein established have been
complied with, and that all taxes, interests and penalties thereof have been paid from the time when land tax should have
been collected until the day when the motion is presented, it shall order said judicial proceedings reopened as if no action
has been taken on such parcels.3

We concede that in Leyva vs. Jandoc, L-16965, February 28, 1962, a land registration case where oppositors were
"foreshore lessees of public land", a principle was hammered out that although Section 34, Land Registration Act, 4 "apparently
authorizes any person claiming any kind of interest to file an opposition to an application for registration, ... nevertheless ... the
opposition must be based on a right of dominion or some other real right independent of, and not at all subordinate to, the rights of
the Government."5 The opposition, according to the Leyva decision, "must necessarily be predicated upon the property in question
being part of the public domain." Leyva thus pronounced that "it is incumbent upon the duly authorized representatives of the
Government to represent its interests as well as private claims intrinsically dependent upon it."

But the Leyva case concerned an ordinary land registration proceeding under the provisions of the Land Registration Act.
Normally and logically, lessees cannot there present issues of ownership. The case at bar, however, stands on a different footing. It
involves a special statute R.A. 931, which allows a petition for reopening on lands "about to be declared" or already "declared land
of the public domain" by virtue of judicial proceedings. Such right, however, is made to cover limited cases, i.e., "only with respect
to such of said parcels of land as have not been alienated, reserved, leased, granted, or
otherwise provisionally or permanently disposed of by the Government." 6 The lessee's right is thus impliedly recognized by R.A.
931. This statutory phrase steers the present case clear from the impact of the precept forged by Leyva. So it is, that if the land
subject of a petition to reopen has already been leased by the government, that petition can no longer prosper.

This was the holding in Director of Land vs. Benitez, L-21368, March 31, 1966. The reopening petition there filed was
opposed by the Director of Lands in behalf of 62 lessees of public land holding revocable permits issued by the government. We
struck down the petition in that Case because the public land, subject-matter of the suit,had already been leased by the
government to private persons.

Of course, the Benitez ruling came about not by representations of the lessees alone, but through the Director of Lands. But
we may well scale the heights of injustice or abet violations of R.A. 931 if we entertain the view that only the Director of Lands 7 can
here properly oppose the reopening petition. Suppose the lands office fails to do so? Will legitimate lessees be left at the mercy of
government officials? Should the cadastral court close its eyes to the fact of lease that may be proved by the lessees themselves,
and which is enough to bar the reopening petition? R.A. 931 could not have intended that this situation should happen. The point is
that, with the fact of lease, no question of ownership need be inquired into pursuant to R.A. 931. From this standpoint, lessees have
sufficient legal interest in the proceedings.

The right of private petitioners to oppose a reopening petition here becomes the more patent when we take stock of their
averment that they have introduced improvements on the land affected. It would seem to us that lessees insofar as R.A. 931 is
concerned, come within the purview of those who, according to the Rules of Court, 8may intervene in an action. For, they are
persons who have "legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties." 9 In the event herein private
petitioners are able to show that they are legitimate lessees, then their lease will continue. And this because it is sufficient that it be
proven that the land is leased to withdraw it from the operation of Republic Act 931 and place it beyond the reach of a petition for
reopening. 10

In line with the Court of Appeals' conclusion, not disputed by respondent Lutes herein, the cadastral court should have ruled
on the validity of private petitioners 'tree farm leases — on the merits. Because there is need for Lutes' right to reopen and
petitioners' right to continue as lessees to be threshed out in that court.

We, accordingly, hold that private petitioners, who aver that they are lessees, have the necessary personality to intervene in
and oppose respondent Lutes' petition for reopening.

2. Petitioners next contend that the reopening petition below, filed under R.A. 931, should have been published in
accordance with the Cadastral Act.

To resolve this contention, we need but refer to a very recent decision of this Court in De Castro vs. Marcos, supra, involving
exactly the same set of facts bearing upon the question. We there held, after a discussion of law and jurisprudence, that: "In sum,
the subject matter of the petition for reopening — a parcel of land claimed by respondent Akia — was already embraced in the
cadastral proceedings filed by the Director of Lands. Consequently, the Baguio cadastral court already acquired jurisdiction over
the said property. The petition, therefore, need not be published." We find no reason to break away from such conclusion.

Respondent Lutes attached to the record a certified true copy of the November 13, 1922 decision in the Baguio Townsite
Reservation case to show, amongst others, that the land here involved was part of that case. Petitioners do not take issue with
respondent Lutes on this point of fact.

We here reiterate our ruling in De Castro, supra, that the power of the cadastral court below over petitions to reopen, as in
this case, is not jurisdictionally tainted by want of publication.

3. A question of transcendental importance is this: Does the cadastral court have power to reopen the cadastral proceedings
upon the application of respondent Lutes?
 The facts are: The cadastral proceedings sought to be reopened were instituted on April 12, 1912. Final decision was
rendered on November 13, 1922. Lutes filed the petition to reopen on July 25, 1961.

It will be noted that the title of R.A. 931, heretofore transcribed, authorizes "the filing in the proper court, under certain
conditions, of certain claims of title to parcels of land that have been declared public land, by virtue of judicial decisions
rendered within the forty years next preceding the approval of this Act." The body of the statute, however, in its Section 1, speaks of
parcels of land that "have been, or are about to be declared land of the public domain, by virtue of judicial proceedings instituted
within the forty years next preceding the approval of this Act." There thus appears to be a seeming inconsistency between title and
body.

It must be stressed at this point that R.A. 931 is not under siege on constitutional grounds. No charge has been made hero or
in the courts below that the statute offends the constitutional injunction that the subject of legislation must be expressed in the title
thereof. Well-entrenched in constitutional law is the precept that constitutional questions will not be entertained by courts unless
they are "specifically raised, insisted upon and adequately argued." 11 At any rate it cannot be seriously disputed that the subject of
R.A. 931 is expressed in its title.

This narrows our problem down to one of legal hermeneutics.

Many are the principles evolved in the interpretation of laws. It is thus not difficult to stray away from the true path of
construction, unless we constantly bear in mind the goal we seek. The office of statutory interpretation, let us not for a moment
forget, is to determine legislative intent. In the words of a well-known authority, "[t]he true object of all interpretation is to ascertain
the meaning and will of the law-making body, to the end that it may be enforced." 12 In varying language, "the, purpose of all rules
or maxims" in interpretation "is to discover the true intention of the law." 13 They "are only valuable when they subserve this
purpose." 14 In fact, "the spirit or intention of a statute prevails over the letter thereof." 15 A statute "should be construed according to
its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary, the letter of the law." 16 By this, we do not "correct the act of the Legislature,
but rather ... carry out and give due course to" its true intent. 17

It should be certain by now that when engaged in the task of construing an obscure expression in the law 18or where exact or
literal rendering of the words would not carry out the legislative intent, 19 the title thereof may be resorted to in the ascertainment of
congressional will. Reason therefor is that the title of the law may properly be regarded as an index of or clue or guide to legislative
intention. 20 This is especially true in this jurisdiction. For the reason that by specific constitutional precept, "[n]o bill which may be
enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill." 21 In such case, courts "are
compelled by the Constitution to consider both the body and the title in order to arrive at the legislative intention." 22

With the foregoing guideposts on hand, let us go back to the situation that confronts us. We take another look at the title of
R.A. 931, viz: "AN ACT TO AUTHORIZE THE FILING IN THE PROPER COURT, UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS, OF CERTAIN
CLAIMS OF TITLE TO PARCELS OF LAND THAT HAVE BEEN DECLARED PUBLIC LAND, BY VIRTUE OF JUDICIAL
DECISIONS RENDERED WITHIN THE FORTY YEARS NEXT PRECEDING THE APPROVAL OF THIS ACT." Readily to be noted
is that the title is not merely composed of catchwords. 23 It expresses in language clear the very substance of the law itself. From
this, it is easy to see that Congress intended to give some effect to the title of R.A. 931.

To be carefully noted is that the same imperfection in the language of R.A. 931 aforesaid — from which surfaces a seeming
inconsistency between the title and the body — attended Commonwealth Act 276, the present statute's predecessor. That prior law
used the very same language in the body thereof and in its title. We attach meaning to this circumstance. Had the legislature meant
to shake off any legal effects that the title of the statute might have, it had a chance to do so in the reenactment of the law.
Congress could have altered with great facility the wording of the title of R.A. 931. The fact is that it did not.

It has been observed that "in modern practice the title is adopted by the Legislature, more thoroughly read than the act itself,
and in many states is the subject of constitutional regulation." 24 The constitutional in jurisdiction that the subject of the statute must
be expressed in the title of the bill, breathes the spirit of command because "the Constitution does not exact of Congress the
obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the bill." 25 Reliance, therefore, may be placed on the title of a bill, which,
while not an enacting part, no doubt "is in some sort a part of the act, although only a formal part." 26 These considerations are all
the more valid here because R.A. 931 was passed without benefit of congressional debate in the House from which it originated as
House Bill 1410, 27 and in the Senate. 28

The title now under scrutiny possesses the strength of clarity and positiveness. It recites that it authorizes court proceedings
of claims to parcels of land declared public land "by virtue of judicial decisions rendered within the forty years next preceding the
approval of this Act." That title is written "in capital letters" — by Congress itself; such kind of a title then "is not to be classed with
words or titles used by compilers of statutes" because "it is the legislature speaking." 29 Accordingly, it is not hard to come to a
deduction that the phrase last quoted from R.A. 931 — "by virtue of judicial decisions rendered" — was but inadvertently omitted
from the body. Parting from this premise, there is, at bottom, no contradiction between title and body. In line with views herein
stated, the title belongs to that type of titles which; should be regarded as part of the rules or provisions expressed in the body. 30At
the very least, the words "by virtue of judicial decisions rendered" in the title of the law stand in equal importance to the phrase in
Section 1 thereof, "by virtue of judicial proceedings instituted."

Given the fact then that there are two phrases to consider the choice of construction we must give to the statute does not
need such reflection. We lean towards a liberal view. And this, because of the principle long accepted that remedial legislation
should receive the blessings of liberal construction. 31 And, there should be no quibbling as to the fact that R.A. 931 is a piece of
remedial legislation. In essence, it provides a mode of relief to landowners who, before the Act, had no legal means of perfecting
their titles. This is plainly evident from the explanatory note thereof, which reads:
 This bill is intended to give an opportunity to any person or claimant who has any interest in any parcel of land which
has been declared as public land in cadastral proceeding for failure of said person or claimant to present his claim within
the time prescribed by law.

There are many meritorious cases wherein claimants to certain parcels of land have not had the opportunity to
answer or appear at the hearing of cases affecting their claims in the corresponding cadastral proceedings for lack of
sufficient notice or for other reasons and circumstances which are beyond their control. Under C.A. No. 276, said persons
or claimants have no more legal remedy as the effectivity of said Act expired in 1940.

This measure seeks to remedy the lack of any existing law within said persons or claimants with meritorious claims
or interests in parcels of land may seek justice and protection. This bill proposes to give said persons or claimants their
day in court. Approval of this bill is earnestly requested.

In fine, we say that lingual imperfections in the drafting of a statute should never be permitted to hamstring judicial search for
legislative intent, which can otherwise be discovered. Legal technicalities should not abort the beneficent effects intended by
legislation.

The sum of all the foregoing is that, as we now view Republic Act 931, claims of title that may be filed thereunder embrace
those parcels of land that have been declared public land "by virtue of judicial decisions rendered within the forty years next
preceding the approval of this Act." Therefore, by that statute, the July 25, 1961 petition of respondent Belong Lutes to reopen Civil
Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record No. 211 of the cadastral court of Baguio, the decision on which was rendered on November
13, 1922, comes within the 40-year period.lawphi1.nêt

FOR THE REASONS GIVEN, the petition for certiorari is hereby granted; the cadastral court's orders of August 5, 1963,
November 5, 1963 and September 17, 1964 are hereby declared null and void and the cadastral court is hereby directed to admit
petitioners' oppositions and proceed accordingly. No costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-6355-56 August 31, 1953

PASTOR M. ENDENCIA and FERNANDO JUGO, plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
SATURNINO DAVID, as Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellant.

This is a joint appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila declaring section 13 of Republic Act No. 590
unconstitutional, and ordering the appellant Saturnino David as Collector of Internal Revenue to re-fund to Justice Pastor M.
Endencia the sum of P1,744.45, representing the income tax collected on his salary as Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals in
1951, and to Justice Fernando Jugo the amount of P2,345.46, representing the income tax collected on his salary from January
1,1950 to October 19, 1950, as Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals, and from October 20, 1950 to December 31,1950, as
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, without special pronouncement as to costs.

Because of the similarity of the two cases, involving as they do the same question of law, they were jointly submitted for
determination in the lower court. Judge Higinio B. Macadaeg presiding, in a rather exhaustive and well considered decision found
and held that under the doctrine laid down by this Court in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, 85 Phil., 552, the collection of income
taxes from the salaries of Justice Jugo and Justice Endencia was a diminution of their compensation and therefore was in violation
of the Constitution of the Philippines, and so ordered the refund of said taxes.

We see no profit and necessity in again discussing and considering the proposition and the arguments pro and cons involved in the
case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, which are raised, brought up and presented here. In that case, we have held despite the ruling
enunciated by the United States Federal Supreme Court in the case of O 'Malley vs. Woodrought 307 U. S., 277, that taxing the
salary of a judicial officer in the Philippines is a diminution of such salary and so violates the Constitution. We shall now confine our-
selves to a discussion and determination of the remaining question of whether or not Republic Act No. 590, particularly section 13,
can justify and legalize the collection of income tax on the salary of judicial officers.

According to the brief of the Solicitor General on behalf of appellant Collector of Internal Revenue, our decision in the case of
Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, was not received favorably by Congress, because immediately after its promulgation, Congress enacted
Republic Act No. 590. To bring home his point, the Solicitor General reproduced what he considers the pertinent discussion in the
Lower House of House Bill No. 1127 which became Republic Act No. 590.

For purposes of reference, we are reproducing section 9, Article VIII of our Constitution:.

SEC. 9. The members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts shall hold office during good behavior, until
they reach the age of seventy years, or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. They shall receive
such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. Until the
Congress shall provide otherwise, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall receive an annual compensation of sixteen
thousand pesos, and each Associate Justice, fifteen thousand pesos.

As already stated construing and applying the above constitutional provision, we held in the Perfecto case that judicial officers are
exempt from the payment of income tax on their salaries, because the collection thereof by the Government was a decrease or
diminution of their salaries during their continuance in office, a thing which is expressly prohibited by the Constitution. Thereafter,
according to the Solicitor General, because Congress did not favorably receive the decision in the Perfecto case, Congress
promulgated Republic Act No. 590, if not to counteract the ruling in that decision, at least now to authorize and legalize the
collection of income tax on the salaries of judicial officers. We quote section 13 of Republic Act No. 590:

SEC 13. No salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be considered as
exempt from the income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be dimunition of his compensation fixed by the
Constitution or by law.

So we have this situation. The Supreme Court in a decision interpreting the Constitution, particularly section 9, Article VIII, has held
that judicial officers are exempt from payment of income tax on their salaries, because the collection thereof was a diminution of
such salaries, specifically prohibited by the Constitution. Now comes the Legislature and in section 13, Republic Act No. 590, says
that "no salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic (naturally including a judicial officer) shall be considered as
exempt from the income tax," and proceeds to declare that payment of said income tax is not a diminution of his compensation.
Can the Legislature validly do this? May the Legislature lawfully declare the collection of income tax on the salary of a public
official, specially a judicial officer, not a decrease of his salary, after the Supreme Court has found and decided otherwise? To
determine this question, we shall have to go back to the fundamental principles regarding separation of powers.

Under our system of constitutional government, the Legislative department is assigned the power to make and enact laws. The
Executive department is charged with the execution of carrying out of the provisions of said laws. But the interpretation and
application of said laws belong exclusively to the Judicial department. And this authority to interpret and apply the laws extends to
the Constitution. Before the courts can determine whether a law is constitutional or not, it will have to interpret and ascertain the
meaning not only of said law, but also of the pertinent portion of the Constitution in order to decide whether there is a conflict
between the two, because if there is, then the law will have to give way and has to be declared invalid and unconstitutional.

Defining and interpreting the law is a judicial function and the legislative branch may not limit or restrict the power granted
to the courts by the Constitution. (Bandy vs. Mickelson et al., 44N. W., 2nd 341, 342.)

When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested in the legislature by the Constitution, it is the duty of the
courts to declare the act unconstitutional because they cannot shrink from it without violating their oaths of office. This duty
of the courts to maintain the Constitution as the fundamental law of the state is imperative and unceasing; and, as Chief
Justice Marshall said, whenever a statute is in violation of the fundamental law, the courts must so adjudge and thereby
give effect to the Constitution. Any other course would lead to the destruction of the Constitution. Since the question as to
the constitutionality of a statute is a judicial matter, the courts will not decline the exercise of jurisdiction upon the
suggestion that action might be taken by political agencies in disregard of the judgment of the judicial tribunals. (11 Am.
Jur., 714-715.)

Under the American system of constitutional government, among the most important functions in trusted to the judiciary
are the interpreting of Constitutions and, as a closely connected power, the determination of whether laws and acts of the
legislature are or are not contrary to the provisions of the Federal and State Constitutions. (11 Am. Jur., 905.).

By legislative fiat as enunciated in section 13, Republic Act NO. 590, Congress says that taxing the salary of a judicial officer is not
a decrease of compensation. This is a clear example of interpretation or ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase "which shall
not be diminished during their continuance in office," found in section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of
judicial officers. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and
established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary.

The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or act declaratory of what the law
was before its passage, so as to give it any binding weight with the courts. A legislative definition of a word as used in a
statute is not conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature would be usurping a judicial function
in defining a term. (11 Am. Jur., 914, emphasis supplied)

The legislature cannot, upon passing a law which violates a constitutional provision, validate it so as to prevent an attack
thereon in the courts, by a declaration that it shall be so construed as not to violate the constitutional inhibition. (11 Am.
Jur., 919, emphasis supplied)

We have already said that the Legislature under our form of government is assigned the task and the power to make and enact
laws, but not to interpret them. This is more true with regard to the interpretation of the basic law, the Constitution, which is not
within the sphere of the Legislative department. If the Legislature may declare what a law means, or what a specific portion of the
Constitution means, especially after the courts have in actual case ascertain its meaning by interpretation and applied it in a
decision, this would surely cause confusion and instability in judicial processes and court decisions. Under such a system, a final
court determination of a case based on a judicial interpretation of the law of the Constitution may be undermined or even annulled
by a subsequent and different interpretation of the law or of the Constitution by the Legislative department. That would be neither
wise nor desirable, besides being clearly violative of the fundamental, principles of our constitutional system of government,
particularly those governing the separation of powers.

So much for the constitutional aspect of the case. Considering the practical side thereof, we believe that the collection of income
tax on a salary is an actual and evident diminution thereof. Under the old system where the in-come tax was paid at the end of the
year or sometime thereafter, the decrease may not be so apparent and clear. All that the official who had previously received his
full salary was called upon to do, was to fulfill his obligation and to exercise his privilege of paying his income tax on his salary. His
salary fixed by law was received by him in the amount of said tax comes from his other sources of income, he may not fully realize
the fact that his salary had been decreased in the amount of said income tax. But under the present system of withholding the
income tax at the source, where the full amount of the income tax corresponding to his salary is computed in advance and divided
into equal portions corresponding to the number of pay-days during the year and actually deducted from his salary corresponding to
each payday, said official actually does not receive his salary in full, because the income tax is deducted therefrom every payday,
that is to say, twice a month. Let us take the case of Justice Endencia. As Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, his salary is
fixed at p12,000 a year, that is to say, he should receive P1,000 a month or P500 every payday, — fifteenth and end of month. In
the present case, the amount collected by the Collector of Internal Revenue on said salary is P1,744.45 for one year. Divided by
twelve (months) we shall have P145.37 a month. And further dividing it by two paydays will bring it down to P72.685, which is the
income tax deducted form the collected on his salary each half month. So, if Justice Endencia's salary as a judicial officer were not
exempt from payment of the income tax, instead of receiving P500 every payday, he would be actually receiving P427.31 only, and
instead of receiving P12,000 a year, he would be receiving but P10,255.55. Is it not therefor clear that every payday, his salary is
actually decreased by P72.685 and every year is decreased by P1,744.45?

Reading the discussion in the lower House in connection with House Bill No. 1127, which became Republic Act No. 590, it would
seem that one of the main reasons behind the enactment of the law was the feeling among certain legislators that members of the
Supreme Court should not enjoy any exemption and that as citizens, out of patriotism and love for their country, they should pay
income tax on their salaries. It might be stated in this connection that the exemption is not enjoyed by the members of the Supreme
Court alone but also by all judicial officers including Justices of the Court of Appeals and judges of inferior courts. The exemption
also extends to other constitutional officers, like the President of the Republic, the Auditor General, the members of the
Commission on Elections, and possibly members of the Board of Tax Appeals, commissioners of the Public Service Commission,
and judges of the Court of Industrial Relations. Compares to the number of all these officials, that of the Supreme Court Justices is
relatively insignificant. There are more than 990 other judicial officers enjoying the exemption, including 15 Justices of the Court of
Appeals, about 107 Judges of First Instance, 38 Municipal Judges and about 830 Justices of the Peace. The reason behind the
exemption in the Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Federal Supreme Court and this Court, is to preserve the
independence of the Judiciary, not only of this High Tribunal but of the other courts, whose present membership number more than
990 judicial officials.

The exemption was not primarily intended to benefit judicial officers, but was grounded on public policy. As said by Justice Van
Devanter of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Evans vs. Gore (253 U. S., 245):

The primary purpose of the prohibition against diminution was not to benefit the judges, but, like the clause in respect of
tenure, to attract good and competent men to the bench and to promote that independence of action and judgment which
is essential to the maintenance of the guaranties, limitations and pervading principles of the Constitution and to the
administration of justice without respect to person and with equal concern for the poor and the rich. Such being its
purpose, it is to be construed, not as a private grant, but as a limitation imposed in the public interest; in other words, not
restrictively, but in accord with its spirit and the principle on which it proceeds.

Having in mind the limited number of judicial officers in the Philippines enjoying this exemption, especially when the great bulk
thereof are justices of the peace, many of them receiving as low as P200 a month, and considering further the other exemptions
allowed by the income tax law, such as P3,000 for a married person and P600 for each dependent, the amount of national revenue
to be derived from income tax on the salaries of judicial officers, were if not for the constitutional exemption, could not be large or
substantial. But even if it were otherwise, it should not affect, much less outweigh the purpose and the considerations that
prompted the establishment of the constitutional exemption. In the same case of Evans vs. Gore, supra, the Federal Supreme
Court declared "that they (fathers of the Constitution) regarded the independence of the judges as far as greater importance than
any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries.

When a judicial officer assumed office, he does not exactly ask for exemption from payment of income tax on his salary, as a
privilege . It is already attached to his office, provided and secured by the fundamental law, not primarily for his benefit, but based
on public interest, to secure and preserve his independence of judicial thought and action. When we come to the members of the
Supreme Court, this excemption to them is relatively of short duration. Because of the limited membership in this High Tribunal,
eleven, and due to the high standards of experience, practice and training required, one generally enters its portals and comes to
join its membership quite late in life, on the aver-age, around his sixtieth year, and being required to retire at seventy, assuming that
he does not die or become incapacitated earlier, naturally he is not in a position to receive the benefit of exemption for long. It is
rather to the justices of the peace that the exemption can give more benefit. They are relatively more numerous, and because of
the meager salary they receive, they can less afford to pay the income tax on it and its diminution by the amount of the income tax
if paid would be real, substantial and onerous.

Considering exemption in the abstract, there is nothing unusual or abhorrent in it, as long as it is based on public policy or public
interest. While all other citizens are subject to arrest when charged with the commission of a crime, members of the Senate and
House of Representatives except in cases of treason, felony and breach of the peace are exempt from arrest, during their
attendance in the session of the Legislature; and while all other citizens are generally liable for any speech, remark or statement,
oral or written, tending to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt of a natural or juridical person or to blacken the memory of one
who is dead, Senators and Congressmen in making such statements during their sessions are extended immunity and exemption.

And as to tax exemption, there are not a few citizens who enjoy this exemption. Persons, natural and juridical, are exempt from
taxes on their lands, buildings and improvements thereon when used exclusively for educational purposes, even if they derive
income therefrom. (Art. VI, Sec. 22 [3].) Holders of government bonds are exempted from the payment of taxes on the income or
interest they receive therefrom (sec. 29 (b) [4], National Internal Revenue Code as amended by Republic Act No. 566). Payments
or income received by any person residing in the Philippines under the laws of the United States administered by the United States
Veterans Administration are exempt from taxation. (Republic Act No. 360). Funds received by officers and enlisted men of the
Philippine Army who served in the Armed Forces of the United States, allowances earned by virtue of such services corresponding
to the taxable years 1942 to 1945, inclusive, are exempted from income tax. (Republic Act No. 210). The payment of wages and
allowances of officers and enlisted men of the Army Forces of the Philippines sent to Korea are also exempted from taxation.
(Republic Act No. 35). In other words, for reasons of public policy and public interest, a citizen may justifiably by constitutional
provision or statute be exempted from his ordinary obligation of paying taxes on his income. Under the same public policy and
perhaps for the same it not higher considerations, the framers of the Constitution deemed it wise and necessary to exempt judicial
officers from paying taxes on their salaries so as not to decrease their compensation, thereby insuring the independence of the
Judiciary.

In conclusion we reiterate the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, to the effect that the collection of income
tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution. We further hold that the interpretation
and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the Judicial department, and
that in enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a
Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute, specially when the
interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation already given in a case by the highest
court of the land.

In the views of the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with no pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. L-2348 February 27, 1950

GREGORIO PERFECTO, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
BIBIANO MEER, Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellant.

In April, 1947 the Collector of Internal Revenue required Mr. Justice Gregorio Perfecto to pay income tax upon his salary as
member of this Court during the year 1946. After paying the amount (P802), he instituted this action in the Manila Court of First
Instance contending that the assessment was illegal, his salary not being taxable for the reason that imposition of taxes thereon
would reduce it in violation of the Constitution.

The Manila judge upheld his contention, and required the refund of the amount collected. The defendant appealed.

The death of Mr. Justice Perfecto has freed us from the embarrassment of passing upon the claim of a colleague. Still, as the
outcome indirectly affects all the members of the Court, consideration of the matter is not without its vexing feature. Yet
adjudication may not be declined, because (a) we are not legally disqualified; (b) jurisdiction may not be renounced, ad it is the
defendant who appeals to this Court, and there is no other tribunal to which the controversy may be referred; (c) supreme courts in
the United States have decided similar disputes relating to themselves; (d) the question touches all the members of the judiciary
from top to bottom; and (e) the issue involves the right of other constitutional officers whose compensation is equally protected by
the Constitution, for instance, the President, the Auditor-General and the members of the Commission on Elections. Anyway the
subject has been thoroughly discussed in many American lawsuits and opinions, and we shall hardly do nothing more than to
borrow therefrom and to compare their conclusions to local conditions. There shall be little occasion to formulate new propositions,
for the situation is not unprecedented.

Our Constitution provides in its Article VIII, section 9, that the members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts "shall
receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office." It also
provides that "until Congress shall provide otherwise, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall receive an annual compensation
of sixteen thousand pesos". When in 1945 Mr. Justice Perfecto assumed office, Congress had not "provided otherwise", by fixing a
different salary for associate justices. He received salary at the rate provided by the Constitution, i.e., fifteen thousand pesos a
year.

Now, does the imposition of an income tax upon this salary in 1946 amount to a diminution thereof?.

A note found at page 534 of volume 11 of the American Law Reports answers the question in the affirmative. It says:

Where the Constitution of a state provides that the salaries of its judicial officers shall not be dismissed during their
continuance in office, it had been held that the state legislature cannot impose a tax upon the compensation paid to the
judges of its court. New Orleans v. Lea (1859) 14 La. Ann. 194; Opinion of Attorney-General if N. C. (1856) 48 N. C. (3
Jones, L.) Appx. 1; Re Taxation of Salaries of Judges (1902) 131 N. C. 692, 42 S. E. 970; Com. ex. rel. Hepburn v. Mann
(1843) 5 Watts & S,. (Pa.) 403 [but see to the contrary the earlier and much criticized case of Northumberland county v.
Chapman (1829) 2 Rawle (Pa.) 73]*

A different rule prevails in Wisconsin, according to the same annotation. Another state holding the contrary view is Missouri.

The Constitution of the United States, likes ours, forbids the diminution of the compensation of Judges of the Supreme Court and of
inferior courts. The Federal Governments has an income tax law. Does it embrace the salaries of federal judges? In answering this
question, we should consider four periods:

First period. No attempts was made to tax the compensation of Federal judges up to 1862 1.
Second period. 1862-1918. In July, 1862, a statute was passed subjecting the salaries of "civil officers of the United States" to an
income tax of three per cent. Revenue officers, construed it as including the compensation of all judges; but Chief Justice Taney,
speaking for the judiciary, wrote to the Secretary of the Treasury a letter of protest saying, among other things:

The act in question, as you interpret it, diminishes the compensation of every judge 3 per cent, and if it can be diminished
to that extent by the name of a tax, it may, in the same way, be reduced from time to time, at the pleasure of the
legislature.

The judiciary is one of the three great departments of the government, created and established by the Constitution. Its
duties and powers are specifically set forth, and are of a character that requires it to be perfectly independent of the two
other departments, and in order to place it beyond the reach and above even the suspicion of any such influence, the
power to reduce their compensation is expressly withheld from Congress, and excepted from their powers of legislation.

Language could not be more plain than that used in the Constitution. It is, moreover, one of its most important and
essential provisions. For the articles which limits the powers of the legislative and executive branches of the government,
and those which provide safeguards for the protection of the citizen in his person and property, would be of little value
without a judiciary to uphold and maintain them, which was free from every influence, direct and indirect, that might by
possibility in times of political excitement warp their judgments.

Upon these grounds I regard an act of Congress retaining in the Treasury a portion of the Compensation of the judges, as
unconstitutional and void2.

The protest was unheeded, although it apparently bore the approval of the whole Supreme Court, that ordered it printed among its
records. But in 1869 Attorney-General Hoar upon the request of the Secretary of the Treasury rendered an opinion agreeing with
the Chief Justice. The collection of the tax was consequently discontinued and the amounts theretofore received were all refunded.
For half a century thereafter judges' salaries were not taxed as income.3

Third period. 1919-1938. The Federal Income Tax Act of February 24, 1919 expressly provided that taxable income shall include
"the compensation of the judges of the Supreme Court and inferior courts of the United States". Under such Act, Walter Evans,
United States judge since 1899, paid income tax on his salary; and maintaining that the impost reduced his compensation, he sued
to recover the money he had delivered under protest. He was upheld in 1920 by the Supreme Court in an epoch-making decision.*,
explaining the purpose, history and meaning of the Constitutional provision forbidding impairment of judicial salaries and the effect
of an income tax upon the salary of a judge.

With what purpose does the Constitution provide that the compensation of the judges "shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office"? Is it primarily to benefit the judges, or rather to promote the public weal by giving them that
independence which makes for an impartial and courageous discharge of the judicial function? Does the provision merely
forbid direct diminution, such as expressly reducing the compensation from a greater to a less sum per year, and thereby
leave the way open for indirect, yet effective, diminution, such as withholding or calling back a part as tax on the whole?
Or does it mean that the judge shall have a sure and continuing right to the compensation, whereon he confidently may
rely for his support during his continuance in office, so that he need have no apprehension lest his situation in this regard
may be changed to his disadvantage?

The Constitution was framed on the fundamental theory that a larger measure of liberty and justice would be assured by
vesting the three powers — the legislative, the executive, and the judicial — in separate departments, each relatively
independent of the others and it was recognized that without this independence — if it was not made both real and
enduring — the separation would fail of its purpose. all agreed that restraints and checks must be imposed to secure the
requisite measure of independence; for otherwise the legislative department, inherently the strongest, might encroach on
or even come to dominate the others, and the judicial, naturally the weakest, might be dwarf or swayed by the other two,
especially by the legislative.

The particular need for making the judiciary independent was elaborately pointed our by Alexander Hamilton in the
Federalist, No. 78, from which we excerpt the following:

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At a later period John Marshall, whose rich experience as lawyer, legislator, and chief justice enable him to speak as no
one else could, tersely said (debates Va. Gonv. 1829-1831, pp. 616, 619): . . . Our courts are the balance wheel of our
whole constitutional system; and our is the only constitutional system so balanced and controlled. Other constitutional
systems lacks complete poise and certainly of operation because they lack the support and interpretation of authoritative,
undisputable courts of law. It is clear beyond all need of exposition that for the definite maintenance of constitutional
understandings it is indispensable, alike for the preservation of the liberty of the individual and for the preservation of the
integrity of the powers of the government, that there should be some nonpolitical forum in which those understandings can
be impartially debated and determined. That forum our courts supply. There the individual may assert his rights; there the
government must accept definition of its authority. There the individual may challenge the legality of governmental action
and have it adjudged by the test of fundamental principles, and that test the government must abide; there the government
can check the too aggressive self-assertion of the individual and establish its power upon lines which all can comprehend
and heed. The constitutional powers of the courts constitute the ultimate safeguard alike of individual privilege and of
governmental prerogative. It is in this sense that our judiciary is the balance wheel of our entire system; it is meant to
 maintain that nice adjustment between individual rights and governmental powers which constitutes political liberty.
Constitutional government in the United States, pp. 17, 142.

Conscious in the nature and scope of the power being vested in the national courts, recognizing that they would be charge
with responsibilities more delicate and important than any ever before confide to judicial tribunals, and appreciating that
they were to be, in the words of George Washington, "the keystone of our political fabric", the convention with unusual
accord incorporated in the Constitution the provision that the judges "shall hold their offices during good behavior, and
shall at stated times receive for their services a compensation which shall not be diminished during their continuance in
office." Can there be any doubt that the two things thus coupled in place — the clause in respect of tenure during good
behaviour and that in respect of an undiminishable compensation-were equally coupled in purpose? And is it not plain that
their purposes was to invest the judges with an independence in keeping with the delicacy and importance of their task,
and with the imperative need for its impartial and fearless performance? Mr. Hamilton said in explanation and support of
the provision (Federalist No. 79): "Next to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the independence of the
judges than a fixed provision for their support. . . . In the general course of human nature, a power over a man's
subsistence amounts to a power over his will.

xxx xxx xxx

These considerations make it very plain, as we think, that the primary purpose of the prohibition against diminution was
not to benefit the judges, but, like the clause in respect of tenure, to attract good and competent men to the bench, and to
promote that independence of action and judgment which is essential to the maintenance of the guaranties, limitations,
and pervading principles of the constitution, and to the admiration of justice without respect to persons, and with equal
concern for the poor and the rich.

xxx xxx xxx

But it is urged that what plaintiff was made to pay back was an income tax, and that a like tax was exacted of others
engaged in private employment.

If the tax in respect of his compensation be prohibited, it can find no justification in the taxation of other income as to which
there is no prohibition, for, of course, doing what the Constitution permits gives no license to do what it prohibits.

The prohibition is general, contains no excepting words, and appears to be directed against all diminution, whether for one
purpose or another; and the reason for its adoption, as publicly assigned at the time and commonly accepted ever since,
make with impelling force for the conclusion that the fathers of the Constitution intended to prohibit diminution by taxation
as well as otherwise, that they regarded the independence of the judges as of far greater importance than any revenue
that could come from taxing their salaries. (American law Reports, annotated, Vol. 11, pp. 522-25; Evans vs. Gore, supra.)

In September 1, 1919, Samuel J. Graham assumed office as judge of the Unites States court of claims. His salary was taxed by
virtue of the same time income tax of February 24, 1919. At the time he qualified, a statute fixed his salary at P7,500. He filed
action for reimbursement, submitting the same theory on which Evans v. Gore had been decided. The Supreme Court of the United
States in 1925 reaffirmed that decision. It overruled the distinction offered by Solicitor-General Beck that Judge Graham took office
after the income tax had been levied on judicial salaries, (Evans qualified before), and that Congress had power "to impose taxes
which should apply to the salaries of Federal judges appointed after the enactment of the taxing statute." (The law had made no
distinction as to judges appointed before or after its passage)

Fourth period. 1939 — Foiled in their previous attempts, the Revenue men persisted, and succeeded in inserting in the United
States Revenue Act of June, 1932 the modified proviso that "gross income" on which taxes were payable included the
compensation "of judges of courts of the United States taking office after June 6, 1932". Joseph W. Woodrough qualified as United
States circuit judge on May 1, 1933. His salary as judge was taxed, and before the Supreme Court of the United States the issue of
decrease of remuneration again came up. That court, however, ruled against him, declaring (in 1939) that Congress had the power
to adopt the law. It said:

The question immediately before us is whether Congress exceeded its constitutional power in providing that United States
judges appointed after the Revenue Act of 1932 shall not enjoy immunity from the incidence of taxation to which everyone
else within the defined classes of income is subjected. Thereby, of course, Congress has committed itself to the position
that a non-discriminatory tax laid generally on net income is not, when applied to the income of federal judge, a diminution
of his salary within the prohibition of Article 3, Sec. 1 of the Constitution. To suggest that it makes inroads upon the
independence of judges who took office after the Congress has thus charged them with the common duties of citizenship,
by making them bear their aliquot share of the cost of maintaining the Government, is to trivialize the great historic
experience on which the framers based the safeguards of Article 3, Sec. 1. To subject them to a general tax is merely to
recognize that judges also are citizens, and that their particular function in government does not generate an immunity
from sharing with their fellow citizens the material burden of the government whose Constitution and laws they are
charged with administering. (O'Malley vs. Woodrough, 59 S. Ct. 838, A. L. R. 1379.)

Now, the case for the defendant-appellant Collector of Internal Revenue is premised mainly on this decision (Note A). He claims it
holds "that federal judges are subject to the payment of income taxes without violating the constitutional prohibition against the
reduction of their salaries during their continuance in office", and that it "is a complete repudiation of the ratio decidenci of Evans vs.
Gore". To grasp the full import of the O'Malley precedent, we should bear in mind that:
1. It does not entirely overturn Miles vs. Graham. "To the extent that what the Court now says is inconsistent with what said in Miles
vs. Graham, the latter can not survive", Justice Frankfurter announced.

2. It does not expressly touch nor amend the doctrine in Evans vs, Gore, although it indicates that the Congressional Act in dispute
avoided in part the consequences of that case.

Carefully analyzing the three cases (Evans, Miles and O'Malley) and piecing them together, the logical conclusion may be reached
that although Congress may validly declare by law that salaries of judges appointed thereaftershall be taxed as income (O'Malley
vs. Woodrough) it may not tax the salaries of those judges already in office at the time of such declaration because such taxation
would diminish their salaries (Evans vs. Gore; Miles vs. Graham). In this manner the rationalizing principle that will harmonize the
allegedly discordant decision may be condensed.

By the way, Justice Frankfurter, writing the O'Malley decision, says the Evans precedent met with disfavor from legal scholarship
opinion. Examining the issues of Harvard Law review at the time of Evans vs. Gore (Frankfurter is a Harvard graduate and
professor), we found that such school publication criticized it. Believing this to be the "inarticulate consideration that may have
influenced the grounds on which the case went off"4, we looked into the criticism, and discovered that it was predicated on the
position that the 16th Amendment empowered Congress "to collect taxes on incomes from whatever source derived" admitting of
no exception. Said the Harvard Law Journal:

In the recent case of Evans vs. Gore the Supreme Court of the United States decided that by taxing the salary of a federal
judge as a part of his income, Congress was in effect reducing his salary and thus violating Art. III, sec. 1, of the
Constitution. Admitting for the present purpose that such a tax really is a reduction of salary, even so it would seem that
the words of the amendment giving power to tax 'incomes, from whatever source derived', are sufficiently strong to
overrule pro tanto the provisions of Art. III, sec. 1. But, two years ago, the court had already suggested that the
amendment in no way extended the subjects open to federal taxation. The decision in Evans vs. Gore affirms that view,
and virtually strikes from the amendment the words "from whatever source derived". (Harvard law Review, vol. 34, p. 70)

The Unites States Court's shift of position5 might be attributed to the above detraction which, without appearing on the surface, led
to Frankfurter's sweeping expression about judges being also citizens liable to income tax. But it must be remembered that
undisclosed factor — the 16th Amendment — has no counterpart in the Philippine legal system. Our Constitution does not repeat it.
Wherefore, as the underlying influence and the unuttered reason has no validity in this jurisdiction, the broad generality loses much
of its force.

Anyhow the O'Malley case declares no more than that Congress may validly enact a law taxing the salaries of judges appointed
after its passage. Here in the Philippines no such law has been approved.

Besides, it is markworthy that, as Judge Woodrough had qualified after the express legislative declaration taxing salaries, he could
not very well complain. The United States Supreme Court probably had in mind what in other cases was maintained, namely, that
the tax levied on the salary in effect decreased the emoluments of the office and therefore the judge qualified with such reduced
emoluments.6

The O'Malley ruling does not cover the situation in which judges already in office are made to pay tax by executive interpretation,
without express legislative declaration. That state of affairs is controlled by the administrative and judicial standards herein-before
described in the "second period" of the Federal Government, namely, the views of Chief Justice Taney and of Attorney-General
Hoar and the constant practice from 1869 to 1938, i.e., when the Income Tax Law merely taxes "income" in general, it does not
include salaries of judges protected from diminution.

In this connection the respondent would make capital of the circumstance that the Act of 1932, upheld in the O'Malley case, has
subsequently been amended by making it applicable even to judges who took office before1932. This shows, the appellant argues,
that Congress interprets the O'Malley ruling to permit legislative taxation of the salary of judges whether appointed before the tax or
after. The answer to this is that the Federal Supreme Court expressly withheld opinion on that amendment in the O'Malley case.
Which is significant. Anyway, and again, there is here no congressional directive taxing judges' salaries.

Wherefore, unless and until our Legislature approves an amendment to the Income Tax Law expressly taxing "that salaries of
judges thereafter appointed", the O'Malley case is not relevant. As in the United States during the second period, we must hold that
salaries of judges are not included in the word "income" taxed by the Income Tax Law. Two paramount circumstances may
additionally be indicated, to wit: First, when the Income Tax Law was first applied to the Philippines 1913, taxable "income" did not
include salaries of judicial officers when these are protected from diminution. That was the prevailing official belief in the United
States, which must be deemed to have been transplanted here; 7 and second, when the Philippine Constitutional Convention
approved (in 1935) the prohibition against diminution off the judges' compensation, the Federal principle was known that income
tax on judicial salaries really impairs them. Evans vs. Gore and Miles vs. Graham were then outstanding doctrines; and the
inference is not illogical that in restraining the impairment of judicial compensation the Fathers of the Constitution intended to
preclude taxation of the same.8

It seems that prior to the O'Malley decision the Philippine Government did not collect income tax on salaries of judges. This may be
gleaned from General Circular No. 449 of the Department of Finance dated March 4, 1940, which says in part:

xxx xxx xxx

 The question of whether or not the salaries of judges should be taken into account in computing additional residence taxes
is closely linked with the liability of judges to income tax on their salaries, in fact, whatever resolution is adopted with
respect to either of said taxes be followed with respect to the other. The opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States
in the case of O'Malley v. Woodrough, 59 S. Ct. 838, to which the attention of this department has been drawn, appears to
have enunciated a new doctrine regarding the liability of judges to income tax upon their salaries. In view of the fact that
the question is of great significance, the matter was taken up in the Council of State, and the Honorable, the Secretary of
Justice was requested to give an opinion on whether or not, having in mind the said decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States in the case of O'Malley v. Woodrough, there is justification in reversing our present ruling to the effect that
judges are not liable to tax on their salaries. After going over the opinion of the court in the said case, the Honorable, the
Secretary of Justice, stated that although the ruling of the Supreme Court of the United States is not binding in the
Philippines, the doctrine therein enunciated has resolved the issue of the taxability of judges' salaries into a question of
policy. Forthwith, His Excellency the President decided that the best policy to adopt would be to collect income and
additional residence taxes from the President of the Philippines, the members of the Judiciary, and the Auditor General,
and the undersigned was authorized to act accordingly.

In view of the foregoing, income and additional residence taxes should be levied on the salaries received by the President
of the Philippines, members of the Judiciary, and the Auditor General during the calendar year 1939 and thereafter. . . . .
(Emphasis ours.)

Of course, the Secretary of Justice correctly opined that the O'Malley decision "resolved the issue of taxability of judges'
salaries into a question of policy." But that policy must be enunciated by Congressional enactment, as was done in the O'Malley
case, not by Executive Fiat or interpretation.

This is not proclaiming a general tax immunity for men on the bench. These pay taxes. Upon buying gasoline, or other
commodities, they pay the corresponding duties. Owning real property, they pay taxes thereon. And on incomes other than their
judicial salary, assessments are levied. It is only when the tax is charged directly on their salary and the effect of the tax is to
diminish their official stipend — that the taxation must be resisted as an infringement of the fundamental charter.

Judges would indeed be hapless guardians of the Constitution if they did not perceive and block encroachments upon their
prerogatives in whatever form. The undiminishable character of judicial salaries is not a mere privilege of judges — personal and
therefore waivable — but a basic limitation upon legislative or executive action imposed in the public interest. (Evans vs. Gore)

Indeed the exemption of the judicial salary from reduction by taxation is not really a gratuity or privilege. Let the highest court of
Maryland speak:

The exemption of the judicial compensation from reduction is not in any true sense a gratuity, privilege or exemption. It is
essentially and primarily compensation based upon valuable consideration. The covenant on the part of the government is
a guaranty whose fulfillment is as much as part of the consideration agreed as is the money salary. The undertaking has
its own particular value to the citizens in securing the independence of the judiciary in crises; and in the establishment of
the compensation upon a permanent foundation whereby judicial preferment may be prudently accepted by those who are
qualified by talent, knowledge, integrity and capacity, but are not possessed of such a private fortune as to make an
assured salary an object of personal concern. On the other hand, the members of the judiciary relinquish their position at
the bar, with all its professional emoluments, sever their connection with their clients, and dedicate themselves exclusively
to the discharge of the onerous duties of their high office. So, it is irrefutable that they guaranty against a reduction of
salary by the imposition of a tax is not an exemption from taxation in the sense of freedom from a burden or service to
which others are liable. The exemption for a public purpose or a valid consideration is merely a nominal exemption, since
the valid and full consideration or the public purpose promoted is received in the place of the tax. Theory and Practice of
Taxation (1900), D. A. Wells, p. 541. (Gordy vs. Dennis (Md.) 1939, 5 Atl. Rep. 2d Series, p. 80)

It is hard to see, appellants asserts, how the imposition of the income tax may imperil the independence of the judicial department.
The danger may be demonstrated. Suppose there is power to tax the salary of judges, and the judiciary incurs the displeasure of
the Legislature and the Executive. In retaliation the income tax law is amended so as to levy a 30 per cent on all salaries of
government officials on the level of judges. This naturally reduces the salary of the judges by 30 per cent, but they may not grumble
because the tax is general on all receiving the same amount of earning, and affects the Executive and the Legislative branches in
equal measure. However, means are provided thereafter in other laws, for the increase of salaries of the Executive and the
Legislative branches, or their perquisites such as allowances, per diems, quarters, etc. that actually compensate for the 30 per cent
reduction on their salaries. Result: Judges compensation is thereby diminished during their incumbency thanks to the income tax
law. Consequence: Judges must "toe the line" or else. Second consequence: Some few judges might falter; the great majority will
not. But knowing the frailty of human nature, and this chink in the judicial armor, will the parties losing their cases against the
Executive or the Congress believe that the judicature has not yielded to their pressure?

Respondent asserts in argumentation that by executive order the President has subjected his salary to the income tax law. In our
opinion this shows obviously that, without such voluntary act of the President, his salary would not be taxable, because of
constitutional protection against diminution. To argue from this executive gesture that the judiciary could, and should act in like
manner is to assume that, in the matter of compensation and power and need of security, the judiciary is on a par with the
Executive. Such assumption certainly ignores the prevailing state of affairs.

The judgment will be affirmed. So ordered.