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 Contents
Features
6 The Black Prince &
Medieval Warfare
The Black Prince wins two of the mightiest battles of
the Middle Ages.
by David Higgins
20 The Arab Legion
One of the hardest fighting forces in the Middle East.
by William Stroock
38 The Central Powers Strike: Caporetto, 1917
The Central Powers win a great victory by using revolu-
tionary tactics.
by John Burtt
44 Rommel at Caporetto, 1917
Erwin Rommel makes his military debut.
by Kelly Bell
48 Data File: Military Revolution—
Thirty Years’ War Combat Formations
Tercios march against regiments on the battlefield of
Europe.
by David Higgins
Editor: Joseph Miranda
Assistant Editor: Ty Bomba
Design • Graphics • Layout:
Callie Cummins & Chris Cummins
Copy Editors: Ty Bomba, Jason Burnett, Eric
Harvey and Dav Vandenbroucke.
Map Graphics: Meridian Mapping
Publisher: Christopher Cummins
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 Contents
Departments
19 on design Number 260
The Black Prince Jan/Feb 2010
by Joseph Miranda

30 Work in Progress

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The Black Prince:
Battles of Crecy & Navarette
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ST 260 Issue.indd 5 11/9/09 12:39:00 PM

 The Black Prince
&
Medieval Warfare
By David Higgins

6 #260

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 W
hen French King Charles IV died heirless in
1328, the House of Capet ended with him.
Though the teenage Edward III of England
probably had the most legitimate claim to fill the royal
void, the French nobility rejected him due to his being
a foreigner. Instead, they chose Charles’s cousin, Philip
of Valois, who soon interfered in both Aquitaine and
Scotland, to England’s detriment. When Philip confis-
cated much of the former in 1337, war broke out. Three
years later Edward formally claimed the French crown.
He also attempted to gain support from the wealthy,
independent-minded French fief of Flanders.
In early 1346, Edward positioned elements of his
army to watch his Scottish border. He then moved to
secure his rights in France with converging moves on
ST 260 Issue.indd 7
Paris from bases in Normandy and Flanders. His main
force was initially scheduled to make an amphibious
landing in mid-March, but bad weather kept the English
fleet at Plymouth for four months. Finally, on 12 July
more than 700 ships of all sizes landed uncontested
off the Cotentin peninsula at Saint-Vaast-la-Hougue.
Philip’s fleet hadn’t yet recovered from its defeat at
the Battle of Sluys, six years earlier and, even with
additional Genoese vessels, he couldn’t adequately
monitor the Channel’s southern coast. Over the next
six days roughly 20,000 English men-at-arms, archers
and spearmen disembarked while several high-ranking
participants were knighted, including his son: Edward,
Prince of Wales, who in later generations would be given
the nickname of “Black Prince.”
strategy & tactics 7
11/9/09 12:39:06 PM
 Philip expected Edward’s focus to be in Aquitaine,
and had therefore positioned most of his forces there.
Thus, the English surprised the French defenders in
Normandy, and they mostly retired into nearby castles
or simply left, as did 500 Genoese mercenaries whose
pay was in arrears. English columns followed-up with a
chevauchée, or raid, 30 miles along the coast to gather
supplies and—more importantly—to create a path of
destruction. That is, the raid would demonstrate Philip’s
inability to protect his subjects and perhaps bait him into
a confrontation before he raised sufficient numbers of
troops.
Philip was indeed puzzled by Edward’s eastward
move through St. Lo and Caen, not knowing its ulti-
mate objective. Until French reinforcements arrived
in sufficient numbers, though, he resigned himself to
shadowing the enemy army as it moved past Rouen, the
capital of Normandy, and along the Seine River toward
Paris.
To the east, Henry of Flanders set out on 2 August
with 600 English archers and men-at-arms and some
militia as Edward’s second prong. Over the next week,
while the French army grew in numbers, the English
became weaker due to dwindling supplies and deser-
tions over the long march. Edward would soon have to
turn back from his approach to the French capital and
go north to secure his sea-based logistics.
While the French shuffled among different locations
around Paris in anticipation of an attack, Edward ex-
ploited the confusion by repairing the bridge at Poissy
and withdrawing over the Seine on the 16th. After four
days of forced marches, the English reached the Somme
River near Amiens, confident they’d given the French
the slip and would soon rendezvous with Henry. Edward
was therefore understandably shocked when many of
Philip’s mounted men-at-arms were found to be already
in the area. With no suitable ports in the vicinity, and the
Knightly days: chivalry engage in hand to hand combat.
8 #260
ST 260 Issue.indd 8
Somme crossings effectively blocked between Amiens
and Abbeville, the English were hemmed-in as the rest
of Philip’s force moved up from behind. Their only
option was to cross the Somme’s wide floodplain and
make for the safety of Flanders.
Edward was made aware of the narrow causeway at
Blanquetaque that, though risky, would have to do. At
dawn the English army quickly crossed at low tide only
to run into a contingent of Genoese crossbowmen and
local levies sent to block them on the eastern side. With
the water waist-deep and rising, English longbowmen
rushed to the front and helped brush aside resistance.
As Edward’s army exited the flooded terrain, Philip had
to halt his pursuit and work back to Abbeville the long
way.
Crecy
On the 25th Edward received news his Flemish allies
had been driven back after an unsuccessful siege of
Bethuné, and that his chances for success were therefore
poor if he remained on the move. The English marshals
found a suitable location to await battle atop a hill
some 55 yards above the Vallée aux Clercs, between
Crécy-en-Ponthieu and Vadicourt. Crecy Wood and
the Maye Stream offered protection on the right flank,
while rough and marshy terrain anchored the left. With
forage plentiful and considerable stores just captured
at Noyelles-sur-Somme and le Crotoy, the English
capitalized on the lull to reinforce their position, rest
and prepare for battle.
Unsure if the French would accept battle, Edward
deployed his army into three sections or “battles.” His
vanguard under the Prince of Wales took its position of
honor at the front-right, with the Duke of Northampton’s
forces to the left and slightly back. Expanding on tac-
tics proven successful in Scotland and elsewhere, the
English longbowmen extended from the battles’ flanks
at inward angles to enfilade and funnel the enemy into
the dismounted men-at-arms. The archers also used the
hill’s ancient geological terraces as staggered, stable
firing platforms, which also provided a hindrance to
an attacker. Behind them Welsh spearmen could step
forward to defend against mounted attack with their
weapons forming bristling hedgehogs.
Because the dismounted men-at-arms and archers
couldn’t cover the entire line in adequate numbers, they
deployed on opposite sides of a stretch of impassible
terrain to their front, leaving gaps between the army and
the two flanking towns. Numerous holes were dug to the
archers’ front to trip enemy horses. Since the English
were dismounted, their own horses and baggage were
protected in a rearward leaguer surrounded by wagons
and carts with a single entrance.
When all was ready, Edward, atop a white horse,
rode out with his marshals to review and encourage his
men. With no sign of the enemy by late morning, the
English soldiers marked their spots using their helmets
11/9/09 12:39:08 PM
 Battle of Crécy, 26 August 1346 Kingdom of France (28,000)
Commander: Philip VI (Valois), King of France
Weather: sunny, humid, intermittent thunderstorms
Strength: 9,300 men-at-arms; 4,700 crossbowmen;
Temperature: 55-73°F
14,000 levies and militia
Sunrise: 5:58 a.m.
Sunset: 7:49 p.m. Casualties: 1,200 knights; 1,500 men-at-arms; 2,300
Result: decisive English victory Genoese KIA
Kingdom of England (9,000) Vanguard (6,000)
Commander: Edward III (Plantagenet), Edward of 4,700 crossbowmen (elite) (Ottone Doria; Carlo Grimaldi)
England (Genoa, northern Italy)
Strength: 2,100 men-at-arms; 1,500 spearmen; 5,400 300 mounted men-at-arms (Johann von Luxemburg,
archers King of Bohemia; Huart d’Autel (Marshal)) (Bohemia,
Luxemburg)
Casualties: 300 men-at-arms + some archers KIA
1,000 men-at-arms (Louis, d’Savoy) (Savoy)
Vanguard (4,100)
Battle
Edward of Woodstock (later “The Black Prince”)
Charles II d’Alençon
1,100 longbowmen
2,000 mounted men-at-arms (Louis I d’Flanders)
500 spearmen
Battle
900 men-at-arms (Thomas d’Beauchamp, Earl of Warwick
(Marshal); Godfrey d’Harcourt (Marshal); John Chandos; 2,000 mounted men-at-arms (Louis II d’Blois)
John d’Vere, VII Earl of Oxford) Battle
500 spearmen (Wales) Philip VI, King of France
1,100 longbowmen 4,000 mounted men-at-arms (James I, King of Majorca;
several English cannon Karl, King of the Romans; Jean d’Hainault) (Bohemia,
Battle (2,200) Luxemburg)
William d’Bohun, Earl of Northampton (Constable) Rearguard
600 longbowmen 14,000 common foot and large town militia contingents
250 spearmen (Wales) Baggage
500 men-at-arms (Richard Fitz Alan, Earl of Arundel)
250 spearmen (Wales)
600 longbowmen
Rearguard (2,700)
Edward III
1,000 longbowmen
700 men-at-arms
1,000 longbowmen
Baggage camp
strategy & tactics 9

ST 260 Issue.indd 9 11/9/09 12:39:09 PM

 Biographies
Edward of Woodstock, Prince of Wales (15 June 1330—8
June 1376). As the eldest son of the king of England,
Edward III, the Prince of Wales was raised in an envi-
ronment that stressed strength of arms at a time when
nationalism was slowly replacing feudalism. That meant
being an Englishman was becoming more important
than one’s station in society. Though born with poor
health, the prince grew into a robust and athletic youth
who also excelled in academics, including French,
Greek, Latin and theology. Edward, like his peers, was
an adherent of chivalry and was contemptuous of the
lower classes. He had no qualms, though, over breaking
knightly codes when a pragmatic approach was needed.
In battle he built on the combined-arms tactics that had
already proved effective in Scotland and Wales. They
integrated dismounted men-at-arms and longbowmen
in a fire-and-melee combination, and stressed flank at-
tack. From 1362 he was Prince of Aquitaine (an English
holding in France), but after a lengthy and increasingly
debilitating illness he died before his father, never having
become king. Though now known as the “Black Prince,”
he wasn’t given that nickname until nearly two centuries
after his death. There is historical debate about why he
was given it. One interpretation is that it was owing to a
black coat he wore over his armor. Another is that it was a
reflection of the long-held negative French attitude toward
his continental conquests. It also helped differentiate him
from the later Yorkist king, Edward IV.
Pedro I, King of Castile & León (30 August 1334—23 March
1369). When teenaged Pedro ascended the Castilian throne,
he was already an accomplished archer, horseman and
swordsman, but not particularly devout. Because of
his youth, this last ruler of the House of Burgundy’s
main branch was initially under the control of
his mother and her ladies. Once in power, he
instituted successful judicial reforms, resisted
Papal intervention, and increased the prosper-
ity of the merchant class, which included Jews.
That placed him at odds with the Church and
nobility, who felt threatened by any disruption
to the political status quo. Known to have few
qualms about killing for political ends, including
his ambitious half-brothers, he soon garnered the
moniker “the Cruel,” a title much promoted by
his detractors. During his reign, Pedro struggled
with Castilian lords who controlled much of the
kingdom. He nearly married the daughter of Edward
III, but that was prevented by her death from the plague.
Throughout the inconclusive War of the Two Pedros
(1356-1375), in which Castile fought Aragon, he showed
limited military skill.
and broke into groups for food and conversation. On
returning to their places, the soldiers rested and awaited
the coming battle. Around 4:00 p.m. the lead French units
were seen approaching from the south. Their unfurled
battle banners declared they would give no quarter.
As the English came to attention, a heavy rain passed
over and the longbowmen unstrung their weapons and
placed the strings protectively in their helmets, lest they
become wet and stretch.
10 #260
ST 260 Issue.indd 10
Philip VI, King of France (1293—22 August 1350). The
first king of France from the House of Valois,
Philip was a devout Christian and a patron
of the Pope. Politically he wielded power
through his possession of the majority
of the Kingdom of France, along with
strong alliances with Sicily, Bohemia and
Scotland. But he hadn’t been groomed
for the kingship, and he often made
questionable decisions. He promoted
relatives or those of low social standing
over the French nobility, and he also planned
an abortive crusade to Palestine with Edward
III in 1332. Philip attempted to centralize the
government and gain firm control of the army. He enjoyed
the pomp and ceremony of military arrays, but was never
a skilled commander. To support his wars he was forced
to raise taxes, and in doing so made concessions to the
nobility, the emerging middle-class and the Church. The
plague of 1347 exacerbated France’s dismal situation by
crippling the supply of labor and raising inflation. When
he died, France was internally divided by social unrest,
and the kingdom’s prosperity was severely degraded by
the years of conflict.
Enrique II of Trastámara (13 January 1334—29 May 1379).
Enrique came to notoriety as a mercenary captain
who repeatedly tried, and finally succeeded,
in overthrowing his half-brother, Pedro
the King of Castile (1366-1367 & 1369-
1379). A strong supporter of the French,
Enrique received financial and military
help for his Iberian exploits that aided
France during its wars with England.
He was an experienced, courageous
and forceful commander, but politically
he was inept and his popularity as ruler
suffered accordingly. His anti-Jewish
and anti-Muslim propaganda against
Pedro resulted in riots and pogroms that
damaged the peaceful co-existence between
those groups and Catholic Spain. In 1368 he signed the
Treaty of Toledo with France, which named him king of
Castile. Because of the kingdom’s poor economy due to
years of warfare, Enrique repaid the Castilian nobility with
territory, gaining him the nickname “he of the favors.”
After killing Pedro to regain the Castilian crown, Enrique
attempted to undo or alter to his benefit many of his old
adversary’s political accomplishments.
Philip had expected the enemy to continue moving
north, and was surprised when he received word of their
proximity and battle readiness. Because of the lateness
of the day and the tired condition of his army, which
had marched 18 miles since dawn, he ordered a halt to
reorganize for an attack to be conducted on the following
morning. Consideration was given to making camp to
the north to keep the emplaced English blocked, but the
French mounted men-at-arms around Estrées-lès-Crécy
11/9/09 12:39:11 PM
 wouldn’t be restrained. Their bravado and contempt for
their predominantly common opponents pushed them
into the battle zone. They weerre unable to form a line
that would favor their superior numbers because of a
lengthy four-yard-high ridge running parallel between
the armies.
As the French knights crowded through the level
ground along the river to prepare a mounted attack, the
6,000-strong French vanguard, mostly elite Genoese
crossbowmen, were ordered to soften up the foe. In
the rush there was no opportunity for Ottone Doria’s
men to get their large shields or additional ammunition
from the baggage train, which was still to the rear and
behind the jostling throng of mounted nobles. Tired,
unprepared and unsupported, the Italian professionals
marched into the glare of the afternoon sun.
The French vanguard crossed the Vallée aux Clercs
in front of the Prince of Wales’s “battle” with some dif-
ficulty, as the rain had made the ground muddy and slick.
At 165 yards the Genoese tried to estimate the proper
trajectory, squinted at the silhouetted enemy and fired,
but all the bolts fell short as their weapons’ strings were
wet and loose. The crossbow’s design didn’t allow quick
unstringing and replacement. The English longbowmen
then responded with showers of arrows that inundated
the Genoese who, without shields, were exposed to
thousands of missiles arcing into their ranks. A handful
of small, stone-firing English bombards (primitive can-
non) added to the confusion as they belched smoke and
ST 260 Issue.indd 11
noise the likes of which were unknown and alarming to
the crossbowmen. Seeing little point in continuing the
one-sided struggle, they dissolved their formation and
headed back.
That apparent lack of resolve convinced Philip and
Alençon of treachery and, as their mounted men-at-arms
made for the Prince of Wales’s battle, they rode down
many of the Genoese. Making things worse was the
fact the French formations were without an experienced
commander, as the constable of France had been previ-
ously captured at Caen.
So the knights stumbled across terrain littered with
dead and dying. When those to the rear of the mounted
groups heard the cries of the Genoese, they believed them
to be the sounds of the English in defeat; so they pushed
forward to get into the fight before it was over.
As the closest wave of French horse approached
the Prince of Wales’s battle, the longbowmen turned
their fire on them. The Earl of Arundel’s men-at-arms
joined the fight, and together they drove off the initial
French charge as well as the follow-up under d’Blois.
The French knights were pummeled by longbow fire,
and though they were well protected their mounts were
less so and suffered terrible losses. Dead and wounded
horses blocked those moving up from behind and crushed
otherwise uninjured knights. French and Genoese ca-
sualties piled up at the base of the hill, but Edward’s
men-at-arms remained in position and didn’t advance
to deliver a coup de grace or take prisoners for ransom.
strategy & tactics 11
11/9/09 12:39:12 PM
 They were ordered not to break ranks in the face of such
a superior force, a wise decision considering the French
knights made over a dozen charges that day.
Philip’s knights crashed into the Prince of Wales’s
battle, and the longbowmen withdrew behind the
protection of the Welsh spearmen. The English van-
guard absorbed the initial shock, but several French
knights penetrated the line, including John of Hainault.
Northampton, positioned along a steeper part of the hill,
hadn’t received the enemy’s focus and so moved to bol-
ster the prince’s left flank as men-at-arms fought, broke
and rallied. Fearing the vanguard’s collapse, a request
for reinforcement was sent to the king at his windmill
command post atop the hill’s highest point, but it was
refused. Edward desired that, if his son weren’t killed,
he should win on his own. The hard-pressed vanguard
responded by redoubling its efforts and soon stabilized
the situation.
As the afternoon progressed, the French assaults
lessened in intensity and numbers while the English
were able to retake their original position. During the
battle King John of Bohemia, serving alongside the
French and blind in one eye, made a desperate attempt
to stave off defeat by having his mount tied to those of
his vassals and sent into combat. He was killed in ac-
tion after striking down several foes. When the Prince
of Wales later approached the body, he took the king’s
three ostrich feathers to use as his own seal.
Then it was time for the English to mop up. Those
who were considered valuable were taken prisoner for
ransom, but the vast majority of Philip’s wounded were
killed where they lay. Fighting continued into the night,
but by then a wounded Philip had left the field and his
army returned the way it had come. Surprised by his
success and hampered by darkness, Edward didn’t pursue
and kept his men in place throughout the night. The next
Tactical defense, strategic victory: English longbowmen
engage armored knights.
12 #260
ST 260 Issue.indd 12
morning the Duke of Lorraine arrived and, in ignorance
of the previous day’s struggle, made an abortive attack
on the English that accomplished nothing.
Crecy was the only battle of the Hundred Years
War that involved a direct fight between the kings of
England and France. The latter, as leader of the greatest
power in Christendom, suffered a humiliating defeat
and his reputation as a military leader was destroyed.
Though the battle didn’t topple the French monarchy,
its people’s loss of confidence was considerable and the
long-standing belief in the nobility’s martial prowess
was brought into question by the success of Edward’s
largely infantry (commoner) army. The victory left
Edward free to march on Calais, with its large port,
which he captured the following August after a siege.
Crecy was the battle that opened what eventually
became known as the Hundred Years War. Of course,
many more battles were fought before the war ended
in 1453.
Iberia
Despite the great victory at Crecy, Edward never
entered Paris. As the war dragged on, the Prince of
Wales had to take the field again. On 19 September 1356
he won a decisive victory at Poitiers, capturing King
John and throwing France into turmoil. The Prince’s
reputation as a skilled commander was secure, and
England had regained much of its continental author-
ity. France, temporarily unable to support a long-term
military strategy and beset by social unrest bordering on
civil war, signed the Treaty of Brétigny in 1360 to end
the fighting and what was later coined the “Edwardian
phase” (1337-1360) of the war.
England negotiated from a position of power to gain
sovereignty over Guyenne (their new name for Aqui-
taine), several bordering territories, and Calais—this
time without the previously required homage and its
implication of English inferiority to France. In exchange,
Edward III renounced his claim to the French throne and
several areas in northwest France, including Normandy,
Brittany and Flanders. With old political issues settled,
at least for the time being, both kingdoms used the calm
to retool for the next war.
With the peace, thousands of suddenly unemployed
soldiers found work in “free companies,” where their
skills could be put to extorting and terrorizing the gen-
eral population. When the Castilian Civil War (1366-
1369) flared up in the Iberian peninsula, France’s King
Charles V saw a chance to rid his kingdom of those
roving bands by employing them to fight for his inter-
ests across the Pyrenees. Mercenary captains such as
Bertrand du Guesclin were brought in as recruiters to
supply Enrique (Henry) of Trastámara with professional
soldiers in his bid to usurp the Castilian crown from his
half-brother, Pedro (Peter) I. Additional support came
from the Kingdom of Aragon as well as Pope Urban V,
who called for a crusade against Pedro’s army because
of its Jewish and Muslim elements.
11/9/09 12:39:14 PM
 Unable to regain the Castilian crown, Pedro enlisted
the help of his cousin Edward, Prince of Wales. On 23
September 1366 an agreement was finalized. Edward
would provide military support for six months, for which
he would be financially reimbursed and England would
be given considerable properties, including the coastal
province of Vizcaya (Biscay), with its shipbuilding and
mercantile industries. On receiving his father’s approval,
the prince rapidly mobilized an army during the win-
ter of 1367. Edward’s brother, the Duke of Lancaster,
brought knights and archers from England while free
companies, English mercenaries who left Enrique’s
service, and various ruffians gathered for employment
in the Anglo-Castilian army. Edward had to turn away
many, as he could see he’d already spent more than what
he was likely to get back from Pedro. It was a bad omen
for the expedition’s financial and political prospects.
In February, Edward moved his army south to Dax
where it joined with a larger force before moving to
confront Enrique’s army beyond the Pyrenees. With
Charles II of Navarre pre-paid for passage across his
kingdom, Edward’s army trudged through the Ron-
cevaux pass on the 14th and along a mountainous path
made even more treacherous by terrible winter weather.
Nearly a week later the Anglo-Castilians descended to
the more hospitable terrain around Pamplona, pillaging
as they went. Charles II, having previously made a deal
with Enrique to contain Edward’s force at the Pyrenees,
removed himself from the situation by arranging to be
temporarily “kidnapped.” Don Martín Enríquez de la
Carra took his place and, along with 300 Navarrian
lancers, joined the English.
While at the Navarrian capital, Edward reorganized
his forces and considered the best route to move on the
Castilian capital, Burgos, some 125 miles west. The
easier path through Logroño was longer, but it was likely
held by Enrique. Edward therefore led the majority of his
army down the rugged path toward Vitoria and sent an
English detachment under the Seneschal of Aquitaine,
Sir Thomas Felton, along the other. That mounted group
of 160 men-at-arms and 300 longbowmen crossed the
Ebro River and reconnoitered the enemy from Navarette
while keeping their king supplied with excellent intel-
ligence.
As Edward moved west from Pamplona, Enrique
debated on how best to defeat him while also protecting
Burgos. Charles V had seen the longbow’s destructive
power at Poitiers, and he stressed avoiding battle in favor
of bottling the English in the barren Alava Mountains.
The Castilian advisors, however, favored an attack.
Defections within Enrique’s army were increasing, and
he needed a victory. To counter Edward’s movement,
Enrique broke camp near Santo Domingo de la Calzada,
crossed the Ebro and headed north to block him in the
narrow mountain pass beyond Vitoria. The English,
however, were already in the area; so the Franco-Cas-
tilians withdrew to Añastro, only to be shadowed and
ST 260 Issue.indd 13
The Black Prince strikes: the Battle of Crecy.
harassed by Felton’s detachment as it ended its circuitous
maneuver and regained friendly lines.
Between 20 and 26 March, both sides remained
prepared for battle, often in formation, but neither was
willing to initiate contact. The English advance on the
plains of Salvatierra was blocked by the Franco-Castil-
ians’ strong position in the hills to the south. Enrique’s
advisors favored driving behind their enemy to remove
his escape route, but the king remained idle. Breaking
the standoff, Don Tello Alfonso de Castilla led 6,000
mounted men-at-arms on a successful pre-dawn raid
against Calveley’s outlying forces before being thrown
back by the Duke of Lancaster’s vanguard. On the return
journey past Ariñez, Tello surrounded Felton’s group
atop a hill, but the proud defenders refused to yield and
instead dismounted and formed a hedgehog of lances.
The formation resisted repeated assaults, but without
reinforcement they were eventually doomed by the
overwhelming numbers of dismounted enemy men-at-
arms.
On the night of the 26th, Edward quietly disengaged
from Vitoria and slipped south on a two day, 30 mile
forced march through the Laguardia pass and across
the Ebro at Logroño, a town still loyal to Pedro. When
Enrique re-established contact on the 30th, he re-crossed
the river upstream at San Vicente to take up another
blocking position on the Pamplona-Burgos Road at
Nájera. With Edward’s camp some 15 miles to the east
at Navarette, Enrique wanted to keep the small but fast-
flowing Najarilla River to his front as added protection.
His light horse, however, were designed for speed and
better suited to the flat, treeless terrain beyond the Ebro’s
tributary. On 2 April, Enrique disregarded de Guesclin’s
advice to withdraw to more favorable positions and
instead crossed the narrow bridge over the Najarilla to
strategy & tactics 13
11/9/09 12:39:15 PM
 Weapons Systems
Mounted Knights
Throughout the 14th century in Europe, mounted forma-
tions represented an army’s elite, as they had for centuries.
Because of the high cost of maintaining armored horsemen,
the military elite came from the wealthy and noble landowners.
They could afford to outfit themselves with arms, armor and
horses as well as bring along an armed following. They were
also accustomed to privilege and adhered to a code of chivalry
that promoted aggression, a continual need to demonstrate
their honor among their peers, and a general contempt for
commoners and those otherwise outside their class.
Because of their combat effectiveness and social stand-
ing, the knights comprised the most prominent formations
within an army. When mounted they were used to disrupt and
crush an enemy’s forward line and pursue a defeated enemy.
Charges were carried out using lances as the primary weapon.
They had long wooden shafts, hand-guards and pointed iron
heads. On the run-up to impact, they were carried vertically,
due to their length. Formations advanced at a slow pace to
retain cohesion and, just prior to contact, the riders increased
speed to a canter, emitted a war cry and leveled their lances.
Following the crush of contact, the lances would be cast aside
in favor of swords or daggers. Less commonly war hammers,
maces or battle-axes would also be swung.
During the subsequent close-combat, the men-at-arms
on their chargers were supported by their retinue of mounted
squires and armed attendants, usually a swordsmen and a
pair of mounted archers, who together constituted a “lance”
or basic tactical unit.
14 #260
ST 260 Issue.indd 14
Both knights and their attendant men-at-arms wore
chainmail coats for protection, but the former could afford
an additional breastplate, arm and leg plates and elbow sec-
tions. Though that additional armor could weigh up to 88
lbs., it provided considerable protection. Great helmets were
being phased out in favor of muzzle-like visored bascinets.
The English wore surcoats with the owner’s emblazoned
arms and an ornate girdle over their armor. The French used
leather aprons. After the year 1300, warhorses (“chargers”),
were increasingly protected with plate, such as head-covering
chamfron.
Light horse formations developed in the Iberian peninsula
as a response to Moorish tactics that favored maneuver. They
were used for a variety of roles including raiding, scout-
ing, skirmishing and pursuit. Those men-at-arms tended to
comprise squires and lesser knights who were less-skilled in
horsemanship. They usually carried some javelins and were
unlikely to fight on foot.
Dismounted Knights
Men-at-arms on foot, while less maneuverable, provided
a solid, steady core around which an army could form. Their
formations comprised an extended line, crescent, circle or solid
mass that also protected their horses. Their swords, usually
with a wide blade and two-handed hilt, were designed for
thrusting and piercing heavy armor. (Close-quarter combat
was common, and slashing wasn’t generally effective.) War
hammers and maces could also be used to batter down a foe.
A thin, thrusting dagger was used to administer the coup de
grâce to a wounded or incapacitated enemy through the chinks
in his armor.
deploy on its eastern side. His spontaneous personal-
ity, desire to stop defections, and need to retain public
support outweighed other concerns as the Castilians
prepared to fight.
Navarette
Around midnight, trumpets signaled both armies to
prepare for battle. Many of the English soldiers wore red
St. George crosses on their white surcoats and shields,
while the Castilians sported red sashes.
Enrique expected an attack along the main road,
and positioned his army to meet it head-on. With the
Talde River to his front and open terrain favoring his
light horse, that tactic had proved successful against
Moorish enemies; so Enrique was confident.
While the Franco-Castilians waited in the traditional
arrangement of three battles, the English, in a similar
arrangement, advanced west to meet them. In the
pre-dawn light, Edward moved along a mountainous
path to the north of the Pamplona-Burgos Road for six
miles before turning south. Still undetected, Edward
maneuvered around the north side of a large hill and
11/9/09 12:39:16 PM
 Archers
By the 1300s the longbow had become a dominant battle-
field weapon as part of the English style of combined-arms
combat. When Henry III introduced those weapons the majority
of archers were Welsh, but within a few decades the ranks were
mainly English. The two-yard-long bow had a draw weight of
up to 175 lbs., which required considerable training to pull.
In the hands of a skilled archer, it could achieve an average
10 shots per minute. Because of its high trajectory and heavy
arrow a maximum range of 328 yards was possible, but that
would only be effective against a mass of unarmored targets.
As an enemy got closer, the archers’ fire would become more
aimed, which increased the chance of hitting a secondary target
if the primary was missed. Chainmail could be penetrated out
to 110 yards, but against plate, only within 20 to 30 yards.
Longbowmen usually carried two-dozen arrows to their
firing position. They were of narrow “bodkin” and wider
“broadhead” varieties, designed to pierce and tear, respectively.
For easy access they were generally stuck into the ground
point down. The weapon’s vertical firing position enabled
longbowmen to stand closer together than their crossbowmen
counterparts, so the rear ranks could also contribute to the fire.
Daggers were commonly carried for personal protection and
dispatching enemy wounded. Occasionally swords and maces
provided secondary armament. Armor, if used, amounted to
little more than a steel cap and padded tunic.
Slingers
The sling was an ancient but still useful weapon that
could hurl a projectile out to 200 yards. A hooking trajectory
was common, especially with rougher-edged missiles, which
made it a relatively close-range device. The swinging motion
also required the user keep an appreciable distance from his
neighbor.
Crossbowmen
Like the longbow, the crossbow was feared due to its
striking power and accuracy up to 200 yards. It required less
training and strength to operate, being loaded by either a
rack-and-pinion or pulley system. Rate of fire depended on
the loading mechanism, but averaged between two and eight
rounds per minute. Though bolts were the traditional missile,
stones or lead balls could also be fired. The crossbow was best
suited to defensive or static (siege) situations, and its users
correspondingly wore more armor than longbowmen.
Because crossbowmen were vulnerable between firings,
they tended to operate in three-man teams protected by 1.6
yard-high self-supporting shields. Each member would fire
from behind the shield and then withdraw to reload while
another took his turn.
Levies & Militia
To increase an army’s size, commoners were mobilized via
national levies to serve as foot soldiers. Those unorganized,
inconsistently disciplined forces would be paid a sustenance
wage as part of a contract or annual retainer. Booty and
ransoms tended to be divided unequally among the lord, the
captains and the men. Their battlefield armament could be
anything from staff weapons, such as the pole-axe, to farming
implements. Daggers were also common and, in the case of
spearmen, long wooden pikes with iron points were typically
used in phalanx formations as a defensive counter to enemy
assault. Armor, if any, consisted of a padded coat, gauntlets,
helmet, leg armor and perhaps a small buckler.

surprised Enrique with an oblique attack on his left.

With his horses kept to the rear, Edward’s determined
army pressed in as Enrique tried to readjust his facing.
The Franco-Castilian vanguard successfully turned, but
the others were less disciplined and slower, some even
defecting to the other side.
Du Guesclin felt he needed to act to keep the situation
under control; so he left his secure defensive position
to clash with the Duke of Lancaster. As the vanguards
closed, French slingers and crossbowmen pelted the
enemy, but Edward’s longbowmen then replied with
devastating firepower. Desperate close combat forced
the English archers to either focus on the enemy flanks
or join the melee. Initially the central English mass was
pushed back, but the rallying of their lords stabilized
the situation. Chandos was thrown from his mount
and nearly killed, but managed to gather himself and
run headlong back into the fight as an example to his
men. The English rear formed on a hillock to the left
and contested Denia. Units under Percy and de Clisson
moved up on Lancaster’s left while Edward’s center
reinforced his vanguard to add support. The Castilian
strategy & tactics 15

ST 260 Issue.indd 15 11/9/09 12:39:17 PM

 Battle of Navarette, 3 April 1367
(War of Castilian Succession)
Weather: sunny, dry, light dusty wind
Temperature: 46-57°F
Sunrise: 6:49 a.m.
Sunset: 7:40 p.m.
Result: decisive Anglo-Castilian victory
Anglo-Castilians (26,000)
Commanders: Edward of Woodstock (Plantagenet), Prince
of Wales (later “the Black Prince”); Pedro (Peter) I of
Castile and León
Strength: 14,000 men-at-arms; 12,000 archers
Casualties: light
Vanguard (6,000)
John of Gaunt (Ghent), 1st Duke of Lancaster
1,500 longbowmen with a mix of javelinmen, merce-
nary crossbowmen, and light foot (Gascony)
1,200 “free companies” (veteran) (John Chandos [Con-
stable])
1,800 men-at-arms (Stephen d’Cossington [Marshal]);
Guichard d’Angle (Marshal))
1,500 longbowmen with a mix of javelinmen, merce-
nary crossbowmen, and light foot (Gascony)
Battle (14,000)
Left (4,000)
Thomas Percy
1,000 longbowmen with a mix of javelinmen, merce-
nary crossbowmen, and light foot (Gascony)
2,000 men-at-arms (Thomas Percy; Olivier V (“the
Butcher”) d’Clisson; Walter Hewett) (Brittany)
1,000 longbowmen with a mix of javelinmen, merce-
nary crossbowmen, and light foot (Gascony)
Center (6,000)
Edward of Woodstock
1,000 longbowmen with a mix of javelinmen, merce-
nary crossbowmen, and light foot (Gascony)
4,000 “free companies” (John Devereaux; Eustache
d’Aubrechicourt) (Gascony)
16 #260
ST 260 Issue.indd 16
1,000 longbowmen with a mix of javelinmen, mercenary
crossbowmen, and light foot (Gascony)
Right (4,000)
Captal d’Buch
1,000 longbowmen with a mix of javelinmen, mercenary
crossbowmen, and light foot (Gascony)
2,000 men-at-arms (Jean III d’Grailly; Captal d’Buch;
Martin de la Carra, Regent of Navarre) 
1,000 longbowmen with a mix of javelinmen, mercenary
crossbowmen, and light foot (Gascony)
Rearguard (6,000)
Hugh Calverley; Jean I d’Armagnac; James I, King of
Majorca
1,500 longbowmen with a mix of javelinmen, mercenary
crossbowmen, and light foot (Gascony)
1,500 “free companies” (Hugh Calverley) (Brittany)
1,500 “free companies” (Bernard d’Albret) (Gascony)
1,500 longbowmen with a mix of javelinmen, mercenary
crossbowmen, and light foot (Gascony)
Franco-Castilians (35,500)
Commanders: Enrique (Henry) II, King of Castile (for-
merly Count of Trastámara)
Strength: 6,000 men-at-arms; 4,000 light cavalry; 5,500
archers; 20,000 levies
Casualties: 8,000 KIA; 2,000 captured
Vanguard (4,000)
Bertrand du Guesclin, (Constable); Arnoul d’Audrehem,
Viscount of Aragon (Marshal)
750 crossbowmen, slingers, and javelinmen
2,000 dismounted “free companies” (France, Brittany,
Aragon) (Bertrand du Guesclin; Marshal d’Audrehem)
500 dismounted knights of the Order of the Sash (elite)
(Sancho; Gonzalo Mejía, Grand Master of Santiago)
(Castile)
750 crossbowmen, slingers, and javelinmen
Battle (11,500)
Left (4,000)
Tello; Raymond Berenger, Grand Master of the
Knights Hospitaller
1,000 crossbowmen, slingers, and javelinmen
2,000 light cavalry
1,000 mounted men-at-arms (Castile)
Center (3,500)
Enrique
1,000 crossbowmen, slingers, and javelinmen
1,500 mounted men-at-arms (Castile)
1,000 crossbowmen, slingers, and javelinmen 
Right (4,000)
High Chamberlain Gómez Carillo de Quintana;
Alfonso de Villena, Count of Denia
1,000 mounted men-at-arms (Castile, Aragon)
2,000 light cavalry
1,000 crossbowmen, slingers, and javelinmen
Rearguard (20,000)
20,000 mixed local foot levies
11/9/09 12:39:18 PM
 men-at-arms were forced to lengthen their lines and
were unable to break the English center.
The forces under the Captal de Buch, d’Albret, and
de la Carra pushed to the English right and into the
notoriously unreliable Tello. While Gómez Carillo’s
men pushed forward on the right to use their javelins to
harass and disperse the enemy, Tello and his men fled
the battle prior to contact. The Castilian left followed
suit and collapsed, and though some of the English right
set off in pursuit, most wheeled into the center or rear
while the flanking archers faced outward for a Castilian
counterattack that never materialized. Enrique’s right
charged three times, but his slingers and javelinmen
were no match for the English longbowmen. Calverley,
initially on the English left-rear, moved to the center as
the Franco-Castilian core remained fighting. Enrique’s
center was by then nearly surrounded, and he couldn’t
muster a fourth charge.
By mid-afternoon, Enrique had left his soldiers to
their fate and fled to Aragon and eventually France. King Edward III and the Black Prince some years after
Those Franco-Castilians not worth a ransom were killed the Battle of Creçy.
as what remained of their army fled westward. Some The Castilian War contributed to the renewal of the
of the English men-at-arms remounted and set off in war in France, which eventually turned to favor the
pursuit, with many of the enemy dying in the crush to French. Distraught Gascons appealed to Charles V,
get over the small bridge at Nájera or drowning in the who saw the opportunity to gain their support. Edward
Najarilla River. Those lucky enough to make it to the then threatened to attack Paris. In 1369 the Gascons
town were soon forced out as Edward’s men swept in rebelled, and Enrique and du Guesclin capitalized on
to search for food and bounty. Seeking revenge, Pedro the turmoil to lead another rebellion in Castile that
had several enemy commanders executed, an action ended in Pedro’s defeat and execution at the Battle of
Edward soon stopped as no ransom could be collected Montiel. With the tide of war turned against them, the
for dead men. Only when the English had trapped and English were steadily pushed from continental France,
killed many more Castilians against the Ebro River did and within a few decades would possess only an enclave
the slaughter cease. around Calais.
Aftermath
As at Crécy and Poitiers, Prince Edward had secured
a great victory against the odds. The longbow continued
to be a battle-winning weapon that, when combined
with dismounted men-at-arms, gave England the power
and flexibility needed to win. Politically, however, the
Anglo-Castilian victory was short-lived. Though Pedro
was quickly returned to power at Burgos, he reneged on
paying Edward for his campaign support. Not even the
2,000 post-battle ransoms would cover the cost of the
war. Financially strapped and in poor health, Edward Selected Sources
returned with his army to Bordeaux in September, where Ayton, Andrew. Preston, Sir Philip. The Battle of Crécy. London:
he raised taxes for the residents of Gascony, much to Boydell Press, 2007.
their resentment. Barber, Richard. Life and Campaigns of the Black Prince. New York:
Boydell Press, 1979.
Curry, Anne & Michael Hughes, eds. Arms, Armies and Fortifica-
tions in the Hundred Years War. New York: Boydell Press, 1994.
Fortescue, Sir John William. A History of the British Army: Volume
1: From the Earliest Times to 1713. London: Helion and Com-
pany Ltd., 2004.
Froissart, Sir John & Thomas Johnes. Chronicles of England,
France, Spain, and the Adjoining Countries. London: Henry G.
Bohn, 1857.
United States Military Academy Hundred Years War Staff Ride, June
2008.

strategy & tactics 17

ST 260 Issue.indd 17 11/9/09 12:39:19 PM

 Command the Black Prince’s Army!

The Black Prince: Crecy & Navarette

The diversity of doctrines, weapons, training methods
and leadership in medieval armies was a function of the
geographic and cultural diversity in which those armies
originated. Consequently, many military systems devel-
oped along divergent lines until the time of the widespread
use of gunpowder, which dominated Renaissance warfare.
The Black Prince: Crecy & Navarette (BP) reflects that
diversity by simulating two battles, both of which repre-
sented a clash of distinct weapons and tactics.
At Crecy, in 1346, the French knights in Philip’s army
were the elite of the country, and felt themselves to be
the epitome of chivalry. That led them to treat the foot
soldiers of both sides with contempt. Thus, when charg-
ing, only English knights were worthy of their attention.
The scales here are 80 yards per hex, 400 to 500 men per
standard counter, 1,200 per double-length counter, and
40 minutes per game turn.
Navarette is a simulation of the conflict between
English and Castilian forces and their French allies near
the Spanish village of Najera on 3 April 1347, during the
Hundred Years War. The battle marked the culmination
of the Black Prince’s campaign to overthrow the usurper
Henry the Bastard and regain the throne of Castille for
the rightful king, Pedro the Cruel. The scales are 50 yards
per hex, 500 men per standard counter, 1,500 per double-
length counter, and 20 minutes per game turn.

To purchase the game that covers the battles featured in

this issue send your name and address along with:
$26 US Customers
$31 Canadian Customers All prices include postage for first class or airmail shipping.
$33 Overseas Customers CA residents add $1.75 sales tax. Send to:
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PO Box 21598
Bakersfield CA 93390
18 #260

ST 260 Issue.indd 18 11/9/09 12:39:21 PM

 On Design
One of the issues in designing tacti-
cal wargames on pre-modern topics is showing
the interaction among different weapons systems:
cavalry versus infantry, shock versus fire, formed units
versus skirmishers, etc. The Black Prince games meet
that challenge in several ways. One is the different-sized
playing pieces. Certain units are depicted using large
rectangular counters, while others are shown by smaller
square pieces. The shapes of the counters represent the
difference between large and small formations. The larger
units have more restrictions on how they can move,
representing the space they take up on the battlefield.
The smaller units are easier to maneuver, but are often
less cohesive in battle.
There’s also the asymmetry of combat. Both players’
units fire at each other simultaneously; however, melee
attacks are first executed by the attacker, then the de-
Many of the battles in this era were decided when
fender. That shows the impact of getting in the first blow.
one side or the other became demoralized and fled the
Military writers from ancient times often commented
field in panic. Players should therefore view combat as
on the importance of being the first to strike into the
not being so much about destroying individual enemy
opposing line, and this system simply and realistically
units as it is about destroying the enemy’s overall morale.
shows how that works.
This means the side that can stand and fight longer will
Another way the system models pre-modern warfare have the edge, even if outnumbered.
is by using qualitative, rather than quantitative, ratings
There’s no stacking of combat units (more than one
for units. For example, defensive power isn’t repre-
unit per hexagon) in the game. That gives a better sense
sented by numerical defense factors, as is standard in
of the linear deployment of medieval armies, further
most wargames, but by the type of armor (plate, mail,
portraying the command psychology of the era. It also
etc.). Morale, since it’s another non-material factor, is
allows you to see your forces fully arrayed, which is what
also represented in non-quantitative ratings. Of course,
commanders would have sought to do historically.
it can be argued such ratings ultimately translate into
numbers on the various combat and morale tables. Even The battles included in this issue of S&T, Crecy and
given that, however, the alphabetic ratings give a better Navarette, have additional interest because they saw the
sense of commanding a medieval army than would a English system pitted against two different foes. The
numeric approach. After all, commanders in that age English made much use of the longbow in an early form
were warriors, not bean counters. of combined arms warfare, with fire and melee troops
working together. They tended to dismount their heavy
The combat results tables aren’t so much a matter
cavalry and use them as infantry to back up the longbow
of piling on more combat factors to get optimal odds;
men. That contrasted with the otherwise standard medi-
rather, they’re about maximizing fire and shock capa-
eval practice of using cavalry for shock effect. Edward
bilities to rout enemy units, thereby contributing to the
also had much better control of his army than did Philip.
disintegration of the enemy army as a whole. The usual
The latter let his side of the battle degenerate into a
interpretation of pre-gunpowder battles is the winning
series of uncontrolled attacks, while Edward kept his
side took (on average) less than 10 percent casualties,
forces in hand—another example of command-control
while the losing side took most of its (much higher)
being a crucial factor on the battlefield.
losses after it lost cohesion and began to rout, thereby
making it easier for the other side to slaughter them as The game also includes some minor tactical details,
they fled. such as lances. Indeed, you can actually “break a lance”
in combat. The lance rule represents, aside from the
tendency of such weapons to break on initial impact,
the advantages of committing new units into the fray.
It’s all part of running a medieval army.

strategy & tactics 19

ST 260 Issue.indd 19 11/9/09 12:39:22 PM

 The Arab Legion
By William Stroock

20 #260

ST 260 Issue.indd 20 11/9/09 12:39:29 PM

 T
he Arab Legion enjoyed a varied and prestigious
history. Originally founded as a constabulary,
the Legion was transformed over the course
of the 20th century into the hardest fighting force in
the Arab world. During the Second World War, the
Legion became a professional field force and, later, the
toughest adversary of the fledgling Israeli Army. After
the Israeli War of Independence, the Arab Legion was
reconstituted as the Royal Jordanian Army and went on
to repel Syrian incursions and destroy PLO enclaves.
Today the Jordanian Army is a quiet ally of the US in
the War on Terror.
The Kingdom of Jordan, known as Trans-Jordan until
1946, was created in the aftermath of the First World War
as a British mandate under the rule of King Abdullah I.
Most of the new nation was desert, inhabited by Bedouin
tribes. In 1920, Capt. F.G. Peake was sent by the British
to help Abdullah raise a constabulary. He was a good
choice, since he’d commanded the Egyptian Camel
Corps and served with Lawrence of Arabia in World
War I. Peake recruited men from the Bedouin tribes,
and by 1921 the newly named “Arab Legion” numbered
1,000 men organized into two infantry companies, two
cavalry squadrons, an artillery battery and a signals
troop. It was during that year the Legion fought its first
battle. Ambushed in the northern mountains near Aljul
by an intransigent tribe, Peake led his men in a feigned
retreat that tricked the enemy out of their positions. He
then turned their flank and took their village without a
fight.
For the better part of a generation, the Arab Legion
was occupied with the internal policing of the Trans-
Jordan and the suppression of cross-border tribal warfare.
To that end, in 1931 a “Desert Patrol” sub-unit was
established under the command of Peake’s number two
man, John Bagot Glubb. Glubb had fought in France
during the Great War and went on to serve in Iraq, during
which time he traveled widely in the region. He spoke
fluent Arabic and was familiar with Bedouin customs.
His challenge was to gain the assistance of the tribes
within Trans-Jordan against the Ikhwan tribe across the
border in Saudi Arabia. To start, he had four trucks, 20
men and some machineguns.
Glubb described his recruits as eager, professional,
close and disciplined, but reluctant to perform manual
labor. Patrols consisted of several machinegun-armed
trucks, looking in on locals, keeping watch over familiar
trails and following the paths of camel-borne raiders
to their origin. With his small force, Glubb patrolled
the border, ran off Ikhwan raiding parties, and gradu-
ally gained the trust of the local tribes, even taking the
sons of their chiefs into the Desert Patrol’s ranks. After
about three months of patrolling, the cross-border raids
stopped. The Desert Patrol then performed the same
mission in the north along the Syrian border, putting
an end to cross-border raiding there as well. Remarked
Glubb: “In Trans-Jordan, raiding, which had been
ST 260 Issue.indd 21
practiced for centuries, was abolished in a few months
without inflicting a single casualty.”
During its initial decade of existence, Legion officers
looked to Arab villagers for recruits; however, when
Glubb arrived in 1930 he began recruiting from the
Bedouin. That move greatly benefited the Legion. Since
the Bedouin were born and raised in the desert, traveling
across and fighting in it came naturally to them. Due to
their completely different lifestyles, though, there was
also friction between villager and Bedouin. Eventually
a system was put into place by which the two groups
were segregated in separate battalions. As the Legion
began making its presence felt, and cross-border raid-
ing stopped, its reputation grew. In a few years Peake
and Glubb were receiving the sons of tribal sheiks into
their ranks. That development had important long-term
consequences, as it cemented the loyalty of the Bedouin
tribes, something that would be crucial to the monarchy
during the tumultuous post war years.
In 1939, Peake retired and turned command over to
Glubb.
Iraq & Syria
When the Second World War began, King Abdullah
pledged support to Great Britain. When pro-German
forces seized control of Iraq in the spring of 1941, the
Arab Legion accompanied a small British expeditionary
force into that country, acting as scouts and long-range
desert raiders. The Legion did some damage to Iraqi
communications in the process, as well as gaining the
support of the local tribesmen.
The Legion played much the same role in the suc-
cessful invasion of Vichy French Syria later that year.
The British government was deeply concerned Axis
intrigues there might undermine the Allied position
across the entire Middle East. Those concerns were
confirmed during the British invasion of Iraq, when
Axis aircraft refueled at Vichy Syrian airstrips. It was
also learned Vichy authorities had sent ammunition to
pro-Axis forces in Baghdad. The fall of Crete in 1941,
to a German airborne assault, opened up the real pos-
sibility of German troops in Syria. With those fears in
mind, Churchill resolved to invade Syria in June.
While one British column would advance up the
Lebanese coast headed for Beirut, a second would drive
for Damascus. A third column, composed of troops from
Iraq, would advance west. On orders from London,
prior to the invasion the Legion made contact with
Druze tribesmen living in the mountains near the Syr-
ian/Trans-Jordan frontier. The Legion force consisted of
350 men divided into nine troops and supported by three
armored cars. During the opening days of the invasion,
the Legion patrolled the border against raids by Syrian
tribesmen taking advantage of the conflict to harass
their counterparts on the other side of the border.
The Legion marched to H2, an oil terminal in Iraq,
without incident. There it linked up with Hab Force,
a British unit. After waiting there for three days, Hab
strategy & tactics 21
11/9/09 12:39:31 PM
 Force crossed the border into Vichy Syria and split into
three columns. One column (HQ, Royal Essex Regiment
and the Legion) made for H3, an oil pumping station
near the border, while two others (4th Cavalry Brigade
and the Royal Wiltshire Yeomanry) drove on Palmyra, an
oasis at the foot of the Druze Mountains some 15 miles
west of H3. Both columns encountered stiff resistance.
Hab Force was met at H3 by the French Camel Corps,
which occupied concrete pillboxes impervious to the
column’s 25-lb. guns. At the same time, Palmyra was
garrisoned by the French 3rd Light Desert Company. H3
was isolated by a troop of infantry and the rest of the
column moved west to support the attack on Palmyra.
Operations around Palmyra didn’t go well for the
British. The French had air superiority, and used it to
constantly harass British forces. The squadron cover-
ing H3 was attacked and destroyed by French troops
there, while British supply convoys were constantly
attacked by a company from the French Camel Corps,
the 3rd Light Desert Company. The problem of French
air superiority was solved by the timely reinforcement
of a squadron of Australian P-40 fighters. The Legion
then took care of the raiding problem.
Believing the French raiders were coming out a gap
in the Druze Mountains at the village of Sukhna, Glubb
took the Legion north to intercept them and occupy that
locale. On 28 June they easily overran a French outpost
to the south of the village, and the next day occupied
22 #260
ST 260 Issue.indd 22
Sukhna. From there Glubb sent out several patrols, but
they didn’t make contact with the enemy. On 1 July,
Glubb deployed a troop in a blocking position to the
road north of town and bivouacked the rest of the Le-
gion to the southwest. At 7:30 a.m. his scouts spotted
a column approaching from the north: French 3rd Light
Desert Company. Legion armored cars turned to face
the column and brought it under fire. French infantry
dismounted and returned fire.
Glubb got behind the wheel of a truck and drove to
the bivouac to summon the rest of the Legion to battle.
With a small convoy in tow, he raced past the roadblock
in an effort to get behind the French. Seeing Glubb try
to outflank them, the French remounted and retreated
back the way they’d come. It became a race between
the Legion and the French 2nd Desert Cavalry, moving
parallel to each other with Glubb’s column gradually
closing. The chase finally ended as the French tried to
drive off the road and into the mountains. Glubb’s troops
caught up and the French had to dismount to fight again.
In addition to the 11 Frenchmen killed, the Legion took
80 prisoners.
The most important result of the Battle of Sukhna,
though, actually occurred at Palmyra, which surrendered
upon learning the fate of the other French force. From
there Hab Force could advance on Homs. All of Vichy
Syria surrendered on 11 July, which secured the British
strategic rear area in the Middle East. That development
11/9/09 12:39:32 PM
 Modern raiders: Arab Legionaries man a machinegun.
came just in time to allow them to switch strategic
emphasis to deal with Rommel’s advance from Libya
toward Egypt.
Despite performing well in two campaigns, the Legion
spent the rest of the war in garrison duty. Glubb noted
with pride that a contingent from the Legion participated
in the London Victory Day march held in 1946, and
passed in review before the king to the shout of “Well
done, Arab Legion!”
A few years later, the Legion would be in the forefront
of the Middle East’s next great conflict.
First Arab-Israeli War
With the end of the Second World War, Trans-Jordan
was granted independence from Britain and took the
name of “Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan,” after the rul-
ing dynasty. As it was during most of the Second World
War, the Arab Legion’s primary duty remained guarding
installations throughout the kingdom, and garrisoning
Judea and Samaria on the Jordan River’s West Bank.
By late 1947 the British were preparing to withdraw
from Palestine, while a UN plan called for it to be divided
into separate Jewish and Palestinian states. That led to
skirmishing between the emerging Israeli armed forces
and Palestinian militia. Meanwhile the governments of
Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Lebanon prepared to invade upon
the official end of the British mandate in May 1948.
During the first half of 1948, as the Israelis made
preparations for war and battled scattered Arab guer-
rillas, the Legion remained mostly on the sidelines.
With the official Israeli declaration of independence,
the First Arab-Israeli War began in earnest. The Israe-
lis possessed several well-trained and well-organized
ST 260 Issue.indd 23
paramilitary groups that served as the basis for their
new national army. The Haganah, or defense force,
numbered about 49,000 reserves and militia of various
quality. That included the Palmach, or strike force, of
about 4,500 fully mobilized regulars. There were also
some paramilitary forces that weren’t under Hagannah
control. There were as many as 4,000 in the Irgun and
about 500 more in the Stern Gang, the latter a terrorist
organization plain and simple.
At the time the Legion numbered 6,000 men, with
4,500 of them deployed along the Jordan River. They
were divided into two brigades, each of two regiments.
(Each “regiment” was actually the rough equivalent of
a US battalion.) On 14 May the Legion, on orders from
the British, withdrew to the east bank of the Jordan
River. The west bank was to become the responsibility
of whatever government the Palestinians put together.
Still commander of the Legion, Glubb was still
also, at least technically, a commissioned officer in His
Majesty’s armed forces; so the political changes going
on across the region made his situation unusual. Since
he was “contracted” to the Legion by King Abdullah,
rather than having been posted there officially by the
British Army,however, Glubb was no longer in any
way acting under the authority or auspices of London.
Given the aura of “Lawrence of Arabia” that still hung
over British views of the Mid-East, and what was then
a decidedly pro-Arab bent within London’s governing
elite, Glubb’s participation in the Arab-Israeli War was
uncontroversial in Britain.
Realizing formal war would break out as soon as
the British mandate ended on the 15th, Glubb deployed
his men near the Allenby Bridge in order to allow for
strategy & tactics 23
11/9/09 12:39:33 PM
 a rapid move back into Judea and Samaria. Western
Jerusalem was almost entirely in Israeli hands, while
within the eastern part of the city (the Old City) the
Jewish Quarter was held by several hundred members
of the Palmach and Irgun. Israeli forces also held the
town of Shaikh Jarrah, just north of the city, blocking
the road to Ramallah.
When the British Mandate ended on 15 May, Glubb
led the Legion across the Jordan River. The 1st Brigade
took up positions in the area of Nablus, while the 2nd
Brigade deployed around Ramallah, north of Jerusalem.
Glubb also deployed two companies atop the Mount
24 #260
ST 260 Issue.indd 24
of Olives, east of Jerusalem. As Palmach elements
fought to relieve the besieged Jewish Quarter, Glubb
watched and waited for orders. That order came on 17
May, when the Jordanian king sent a communiqué that
read in part: “His Majesty the King orders an advance
toward Jerusalem from the direction of Ramallah.”
Accordingly, Glubb executed a bold and swift ad-
vance. On the 18th he brought one infantry company
from the Mount of Olives and deployed it to the Old
City’s northern and eastern walls. At the same time, a
column consisting of one infantry company, an armored
car squadron, four 25-lb. guns, and four 3-inch mortars,
11/9/09 12:39:34 PM
 came down from Ramallah. In the early hours of the
19th, the column fought its way through Palmach de-
fenses in Shaikh Jarrah and burst through the Damascus
Gate into the city. Together the Ramallah and Mount
of Olives columns then drove the Palmach out of the
Old City. While East Jerusalem was being secured, 2nd
Brigade’s 4th Regiment advanced and occupied Latrun.
In one operation, Glubb had secured the Old City except
for the Jewish quarter, and had cut off West Jerusalem’s
defenders by taking the fort at Latrun, which overlooked
the Israeli line of communication to the west.
Glubb then set about consolidating his hold on the
area. On the 21st he moved the 3rd Regiment out of Nablus
and brought it to Jerusalem. On the 23rd that regiment
launched an attack on Israeli forces holding the Notre On patrol: the Arab Legion.
Dame Cathedral overlooking the Old City. During the
day and into the night, the 3rd Regiment worked its way First Arab-Israeli War Orders of Battle
Arab Legion Order of Battle, 1948
through the narrow streets to the Cathedral, and its 4th
Divisional Headquarters
Company managed to fight its way onto the grounds
1st Brigade
and inside some of the buildings. The Israelis fought
1st Regiment
doggedly, however, and as casualties mounted, half
One battalion (four companies per battalion)
of 4th Company was soon dead or wounded. Glubb
3rd Regiment
therefore abandoned the attack, turning his attention
One battalion
to the Israeli outpost on Radar Hill, about five miles
1 battery of four 25 pound guns
northwest of Jerusalem. It was a position from which
2nd Brigade
the Israelis could threaten the road between Ramallah 2nd Regiment
and Jerusalem and between Jerusalem and Latrun. The One battalion
hill was held by two reinforced Israeli platoons. 4th Regiment
In the early morning hours of the 26th, one company One battalion
of the 1st Regiment assaulted the hill, cut their way 1 x battery of four 25 pound guns
through the wire and fortifications and defeated the 7 x garrison companies
Israeli defenders after vicious hand-to-hand combat. 50 x Marmon-Herrington MK IV armored cars
More success was to follow. After a week of fighting, 16 x 3-inch mortars
the Palmach in the Jewish Quarter surrendered, which
meant all the Old City was in the hands of the Legion. Israeli Army Order of Battle, 15 May 1947
During the following days the Israelis launched North Jerusalem
several assaults on Latrun, putting the Legion to its Yiftach Brigade Etzioni Brigade
greatest test yet. As mentioned above, the 4th Regiment Golani Brigade Harel Brigade
was occupying Latrun. Situated on what Glubb described Carmeli Brigade Seven Brigade
as a mountain spur, Latrun overlooked the main road Center South
Alexandroni brigade Negev Brigade
to Jerusalem, which the Israelis couldn’t use as long as
the Jordanians held the fortress. Keeping Latrun also Kiryati Brigade
enabled the Legion to prevent an Israeli thrust toward Givati Brigade
Ramallah to the north.
The first Israeli attack, Operation Bin Nun, was
launched on 25 May by two battalions of the Haganah
7th Brigade (one of them newly formed with recent im-
migrants). Planned to start at midnight, the attack was
delayed until 4:00 a.m., by which time the Legion was
alerted. The Israeli frontal assault was met by a wall of
fire that routed it with heavy casualties.
A second attack was launched on the 30th by one
battalion of the 7th Brigade and one battalion of the
Givati Brigade. The Givati battalion attacked from the
south, took a village behind Latrun, and advanced on the
fortress from there, but was then also beaten back by the
Legion. The battalion of the 7th Brigade pressed in from Desert striker: Legion armored car.
strategy & tactics 25

ST 260 Issue.indd 25 11/9/09 12:39:35 PM

 the west, unaware their comrades had withdrawn, and
suffered devastating concentrated fire from the Legion
before pulling back.
A third attack was tried by a Palmach brigade on 9
June, but it went in without heavy weapons support, took
heavy fire, and also had to withdraw. In his memoirs,
Glubb recounted how his men counted more than 200
Israeli bodies left in the field after each of the three at-
tacks. The first truce began the next day, leaving Latrun
in Legion hands for the time being. Upon hearing the
news, Glubb shouted: “Hurrah! Hurrah!”
Operation Danny
The truce lasted only until 10 July, when hostili-
ties were renewed. By that time, Glubb had spread the
Legion over Judea and Samaria. All of the 4th Regiment
and part of the 2nd were at Latrun, while a pair of gar-
rison companies occupied the Arab towns of Lydda and
Ramle, threatening Tel Aviv and adding another layer of
defense for the Israelis to fight through. Two companies
of the 2nd Regiment were stationed about five miles to
the northeast, guarding the flank at Beit Sira. Further
north, the 1st Regiment occupied Beit Nabala. To the
rear at Radar Hill was one garrison company of the
improvised 5th Regiment. Those dispositions covered
the road to Ramallah and East Jerusalem, which was
held by 3rd Regiment.
26 #260
ST 260 Issue.indd 26
The Israelis launched a grand offensive, called Op-
eration Danny, to carve out and secure a viable state.
One of the main targets of Danny was the Latrun area
and the towns of Lydda and Ramle. In preparation for
the renewed assault on Latrun, on 10 July the Israelis
attacked behind Lydda and Ramle, cutting off those
places from Latrun. The next day, two brigades of the
Palmach attacked from the east. Seeing the hopelessness
of the situation, Glubb pulled out his troops, allowing
the two towns to fall to the Israelis on the 12th.
With the way open, the Israelis got ready to hit Latrun
once more. The attack was to begin on 15 July. While
one battalion of the Harel Brigade made a diversionary
attack on Radar Hill, the Yiftach Brigade attacked from
the west while a tank battalion of the 7th Brigade came
from the south. Though they pressed the assault for two
days, neither the Yiftach Brigade nor the tank battalion
were able to take their objectives. Yet another attack
was launched at midnight on 17 July, by elements of the
Yiftach and 8th Brigades, but it was stopped cold when
Latrun’s 25-pounders took out several Israeli armored
cars.
While the Israelis were assaulting Latrun’s defenses,
several diversionary attacks by the Legion were launched
to the north. At Deir Tarif, the 1st Regiment skirmished
with Palmach units. At the same time, though, 2nd Regi-
ment came under heavy Israeli pressure at Beit Suba and
Beit Nuba. On 15 July, Palmach forces took the town of
11/9/09 12:39:36 PM
 Battle of Karameh
One of the consequences of Israel’s victory in 1967’s Six
Day War and subsequent conquest of Judea and Samaria (the
West Bank) was an influx of Palestinian refugees to Jordan.
By 1968, Yassir Arafat’s Palestinian Liberation Organization
(PLO) had established a strong base in the Jordanian town of
Karameh, from where they launched terrorist attacks against
Israel. In response to those PLO attacks, on 21 March 1968
the Israeli’s launched a three-pronged assault against Karameh
with an armored brigade, an infantry brigade, a battalion of
paratroopers and five battalions of artillery. They crossed into
Jordan at the Damiya Bridge in the north and the Allenby
Bridge in the south, pinned the PLO forces against the river
and annihilated them, killing or wounding 200 and capturing
150 more.
The Jordanian Army wasn’t idle during that violation of
their nation’s territory. The 1st Infantry Division was stationed
in the area and mounted a vigorous defense. At dawn the Is-
raeli parachute battalion was helicoptered behind Karameh,
where it became heavily engaged by both PLO and Jordanian
forces. At the same time, the northern Israeli thrust across the
Damiya Bridge was stalled by one of the division’s brigades
and was unable to hit Karameh. In the south, after crossing
the Allenby Bridge, Israeli forces drove south, east and north.
The southern and eastern drives were stopped cold by the 1st
Infantry Division and were prevented from advancing farther.
The northern thrust fought its way through heavy Jordanian
resistance, where it finally linked up with the parachute bat-
talion.
After several hours of fighting, the Israelis pulled back
across the Jordan, leaving over 30 dead, 100 wounded and
35 tanks and armored vehicles in exchange for 61 Jordanian
dead, 108 eight wounded, and over 50 tanks and armored
vehicles.

Ready for action: Legion NCO.

If not a victory for the Jordanians—after all, the Israelis

accomplished their objective of routing Arafat and his PLO
terrorists out of Karameh—the battle wasn’t a defeat either.
They engaged Israeli forces on several fronts and, while
taking casualties themselves, held their ground and inflicted
heavy losses on the Israelis, despite the latter having total air
superiority.

Order of Battle, Karameh

Israelis:
1 battalion, Paratrooper Brigade
1 battalion, 7th Armored Brigade
1 battalion, 60th Armored Brigade
80th Infantry Brigade
Jordanians:
1st Infantry Division (three brigades)

strategy & tactics 27

ST 260 Issue.indd 27 11/9/09 12:39:37 PM


Baghdad or Damascus? Arab
Legion column in 1941
Al Burj, to the east of 2nd Regiment. Seeing that could
be used as a springboard against his position, on the 16th
the 2nd Regiment’s commander launched a counterattack.
With a squadron of armored cars leading the way, the
regiment’s 2nd and 3rd Companies fought their way into
town and drove out the Palmach before withdrawing
back to their positions. The Palmach renewed their at-
tack on the 18th, this time hitting Beit Sira. During that
attack, a company of the 1st Regiment happened to be
moving south from Deir Tarif, hitting the Palmach in the
flank and driving them off. The fight for Beit Sira was
the last major action for the Legion before the second
truce took hold on 19 July. Division, the 5th Royal Armored Division, and the 12th
Al-Jeish Al-Arabi
The Arab Legion fought its last major battle of the
war on 28 October outside the village of Beit Jibron.
There an Israeli force consisting of the Harel Brigade
and a battalion of the Givati Brigade moved south from
the Judean hills toward the Samarian town of Hebron.
The Israelis had about 30 armored cars and tracked ve-
hicles. Outside of Beit Jirbon, that column encountered
a reconnaissance in force, consisting of seven armored
cars, led by Maj. Locket. Despite being outnumbered,
Locket elected to fight, and deployed his armored cars
in a “V” before a small rise. As the Israeli vehicles
drove through the village and topped the rise, Locket
opened fire. “All the guns cashed into life,” he recalled.
“Jewish armored cars were racing in every direction,
all over the landscape, vainly trying to escape the fire
of the Arab guns.”
28 #260
ST 260 Issue.indd 28
As his men shouted “Al-Jeish, Al-Arabi!” (“The
Arab Army [is here]”), the Israelis retreated before the
onslaught, many taking shelter inside the village. Locket
advanced and cleared out the village before withdraw-
ing himself. He lost one armored car and three dead in
exchange for six Israeli vehicles and 40 dead.
When the armistice took effect, the Legion occupied
Palestinian areas of the Jordan River’s West Bank. Even
with the ceasefire there were constant skirmishes, raids
and reprisals between the Israelis, refugee Palestinians
and the Legion.
Glubb, who had by then gained the title of Pasha,
remained in command of the Legion until 1956, when
he was dismissed by King Hussein (the son of Abdullah,
who’d been assassinated in 1951). In doing so, Hussein
was responding to pressure from other Arab govern-
ments that resented a British officer commanding an
Arab force.
The Arab Legion earned reputation for skill, bravery
and toughness. That reputation was made in the deserts
of Arabia and purchased with blood in the streets of Je-
rusalem and in the fortifications of Latrun. Its successor,
the Jordanian Army bloodied their Israeli counterparts
in the later Arab-Israeli Wars, and also proved adept at
counterinsurgency against Yasser Arafat’s forces.
Today the Jordanian Army has four divisions: the
3rd Royal Armored Division, the 4th Royal Mechanized
Royal Mechanized Division. Three of those divisions, the
4th, 5th and 12th, are oriented toward the north, northeast
and northwest, so as to defend against incursions from
Iraq and Syria. The 3rd Division acts as strategic reserve.
There’s also a Royal Guard Brigade deployed in Am-
man, and a Special Operations Command composed of
the 71st and 101st Special Forces Battalions and the 81st
and 91st Paratroop Battalions. The official list of the
chiefs of staff of the Jordanian Army still begins with
John Peake and J.B. Glubb.
Sources
Dupuy, Trevor. Elusive Victory. Dubuque: Kendall Hunt, 1992.
Glubb, John. The Story of the Arab Legion. London: Hoddon &
Stroughton, 1948.
Glubb, John. A Soldier With the Arabs. New York: Harper &
Brothers, 1957.
Herzon, Chaim. The Arab-Israeli Wars. New York: Random
House, 1982
11/9/09 12:39:38 PM
 Black September
As the Palestinians became ensconced in Jordan, Yasser
Arafat openly challenged Hussein’s rule, establishing road-
blocks, collecting taxes and forming a PLO police force and
army. PLO paramilitaries often clashed with Jordanian mili-
tary and police forces. Arafat had established a headquarters
in Amman, bases in the northern towns of Jarash and Irbid,
and set up several autonomous refugee camps. By September
1970, King Hussein had enough of Palestinian intransigence
and ordered the army to root out the terrorists from Amman
and other areas. A task force organized around the 60th Ar-
mored Brigade attacked PLO headquarters in Amman, while
the 1st infantry Division hit PLO camps in four surrounding
towns. Designed to be a “48 hour Blitzkrieg,” in the words
of Jordanian high command, the campaign turned into a hard
slog, as the Palestinians fought for every inch of territory,
bogging down Jordanian troops and vehicles in the narrow
streets of the capital. In the north, Palestinian guerillas struck Arafat in Damascus, 1978.
the 40th Armored Brigade and the 2nd Infantry Division as
they massed for an attack on positions in and around Jarash,
With the Jordanians gradually reasserting control, in Janu-
stalling Jordanian operations there.
ary 1971 the leaders of the Popular Front for the Liberation
While the Jordanian Army was locked in struggle with the of Palestine attempted to overthrow Hussein. In response
PLO, the Syrians attempted to intervene on Arafat’s behalf. the Jordanian Army cleared Palestinian positions along the
On 20 September a Syrian armored brigade crossed the border highway linking Amman with their base in Jarash. Then, in
near Ramtha and took that town after skirmishing with local March, the 2nd Infantry Division began squeezing the PLO
Jordanian forces. On the 21st a larger Syrian force, consisting out of Irbid, completing the process in April. Finally, in July,
of elements of their 5th Infantry Division, 9th and 88th Armored Jordanian forces consisting of the 99th Armored Brigade, 4th
Brigades, 67th Mechanized Brigade and a ranger battalion, and 36th Infantry Brigades attacked Palestinian positions in
came across the border. A major battle was fought south of Jaresh and the surrounding area, clearing them after several
Ramtha the next day, with the Jordanian 40th Armored Brigade days of fighting, killing 600 and capturing 2,300.
absorbing the Syrian attack and inflicting heavy casualties
The Jordanian victory over the PLO became known as
before withdrawing south to an escarpment where the 25th
“Black September” among the Palestinians. It also led to a
Infantry Brigade was deployed. When the Syrians launched
new terrorist group of that same name being formed.
an attack on the two joined Jordanian brigades on the 22nd,
their armor was pinned down and blasted from the air by
the Royal Jordanian Air Force. Nearly half the Syrian tanks
were soon destroyed. The Syrians retreated, leaving behind
more than 100 vehicles and 600 dead. A ceasefire between
Jordan and the PLO was agreed to on the 27th, but it was only
temporary.

King Abdullah II
By any measure, King Abdullah II is a remarkable man. The king was
educated at England’s elite St. Edmunds School, and later the Eaglebrook
School and the Deerfield Academy in Massachusetts. From there he enrolled
at Sandhurst and, after graduating, was commissioned as second lieutenant
in 13/18th Royal Hussars Regiment. There he lead a reconnaissance troop in
the UK and Germany. Abdullah is even now honorary colonel-in-chief of the
13th/18th Descendent Regiment, the Light Dragoons, a high honor.
In 1985 he returned to Jordan where he was posted to the 3rd Royal Mecha-
nized Division, serving as a platoon and company commander in the 91st Tank
Brigade, and as battalion executive officer in the 17th Battalion, 2nd Royal Guards
Brigade. In 1992 he took command of the 2nd Armored Car Regiment, 40th
Armored Brigade. After that he became deputy commander of the Jordanian
Special Forces, and later went on to command the newly organized Special
Operations Command. Abdullah also spent time as an instructor with the Cobra
Helicopter Wing, and took several staff and command courses in the United
States and Great Britain, including a stint at the Armor School at Fort Knox.
He has also qualified as a frogman, pilot and parachutist. He had risen to the
rank of major general when his father King Hussein died on 7 February 1999.
Soon after, Abdullah became King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

strategy & tactics 29

ST 260 Issue.indd 29 11/9/09 12:39:39 PM

 Work In Progress
Coming in Strategy & Tactics
No. 262—Frederick’s War:
War of the Austrian Sucession,
1741-48

Frederick’s War: War of the Austrian Suc-

cession (FW), is a wargame of intermediate
complexity simulating the struggle for power
in Europe during the highpoint of the Enlight-
enment, 1741-48. It was the era of soldier-
kings and enlightened monarchs, when powerful states
maneuvered professional armies and fought to gain rich
provinces. FW is primarily intended as a multi-player
game. It can be played by two, three or four, with each
player representing a different major power: Prussia,
Austria, France or Britain. Other states are represented
as minor powers. Each player has a variety of military
and diplomatic instruments with which he can attempt
to make his mark on history.
FW’s system is based on our earlier-published 1066
and Hannibal’s War games; however, there have been
changes to the rules to reflect the differences in scale
as well as the era being covered.
The square-grid map shows Europe from London
to East Prussia and south to the Balkans and central
Italy. Off-map areas are handled using holding boxes.
Each game turn represents one year. Each military unit
represents 2,500 to 10,000 men. Each square represents
50 miles (81 km) across from side to opposite side.
Rules cover such things as: the balance of power,
negotiations, mobilization, fog of war, honors of war,
fortresses, sieges, forced march, ambush, delaying ac-
tions, pillage, leaders, veteran and guard units, fleets,
fieldworks, minor powers, declaring war, the Holy Ro-
man Empire, prisoners of war and much more. Designed
by Joseph Miranda.

S&T Upcoming Features

#261 Kaiser’s War: World War I, 1918 with an option to take the fighting into 1919.
#262 Frederick’s War: multiplayer War of the Austrian Succession using the 1066 system.
#263 Cold War Battles 2: Soviets seize Kabul and a US Pentomic corps fights the Red Army at Wurzburg.
#264 Shiloh: Ulysses S. Grant turns the tide in the West, 1862.
#265 Jubilee: a solitaire game of the 1942 Allied raid on Dieppe.
#266 Reconquista: Several centuries of warfare in Spain against the Muslims.

Visit www.StrategyAndTacticsPress.com for previews of these issues.

30 #260

ST 260 Issue.indd 30 11/9/09 12:39:40 PM


Did You Know?
• A recent addition to the collec-
tion of anonymously generated,
soldier-level military axioms
collectively known as “Murphy’s
Laws” (“If something can go
wrong, it already has,” etc.),
comes from the US involve-
ment in the Iraq War. To wit: “If
you find yourself in a fair fight,
someone screwed up.”
• It’s estimated that in all the
aircraft vs. aircraft aerial combat
fought since World War I, about
four percent of all the involved
pilots have accounted for about
40 percent of all the shoot-
downs.
• The best evidence available
at present as to what gener-
ally keeps soldiers motivated to
fight, gathered from surveys and
testimony of those who’ve been
in combat, indicates it’s due to
the following six factors, from
greatest to least: 1) to ensure
personal survival; 2) to ensure
the survival of their immediate
comrades; 3) to maintain their
standing in the eyes of those
comrades; 4) fear of reprisal
from one’s superiors; 5) belief
in the broader cause of the war
in which they’re fighting; and 6)
hatred of the enemy.
• Among all US military personnel
who’ve served in Iraq, women
have suffered post-traumatic
stress disorder (PTSD) at a rate
twice that of men.
• The integration of robots into
US ground combat forces is pro-
gressing. Five combat roles have
now been identified for them. In
no particular order, they’re as
follows: static observation, anti-
sniper patrolling, mobile sector
reconnaissance, diversionary
movement, and breaching static
enemy positions. Breaching is
proving particularly significant,
as about 60 percent of all US
combat casualties currently be-
ing suffered in Iraq and Afghani-
stan take place during initial
entry into enemy positions.
ST 260 Issue.indd 31
F o r Yo u r I n f o r m a t i o n
• US Congressman and frontiers-
man Davy Crockett famously
died fighting at the Alamo. Had
he not met that violent end, he
would likely have still gone into
history—though probably not so
prominently—as an important
figure in the linguistic develop-
ment of American-English. That
is, Crockett was one of the main
proponents of an American
cultural movement then known
as “tall talk.” The tall talkers
advocated the official adoption,
teaching, and literary use of such
Americanisms as: “skedaddle,”
“hunky dory” and “splendifer-
ous.”
• Linguists still argue over the
origin of the term “OK,” which
all agree is the single-most used
word around the globe today.
The most accepted explana-
tion has “OK” migrating into
English from the language of the
Choctaw Indians, whose word
“okeh” meant “it is so.” During
the 1815 campaign for New
Orleans, those Indians were al-
lies of US Gen. Andrew Jackson.
He liked the efficient sound of it
and began using it himself, with
his accent changing the “eh” to a
long-a. From there it spread into
common use, which American
sailors then spread around the
globe.
• It’s estimated Genghis Khan kept
as many as 12,000 concubines
over the course of his life (1162-
1227). A recent DNA study has
revealed, as the result of his
sexual profligacy, about eight
percent of those living today
within the area congruent to the
boundaries of his vanished em-
pire are his direct descendents.
• In American public school
classrooms, the Shoshone Indian
woman Sacagawea is almost
always presented as having made
an invaluable contribution to the
Lewis and Clark expedition as a
“guide.” In fact, she did little or
no guiding. Her truly invaluable
contribution to the expedition
came from the simple fact of
her going along. That is, in the
cultures of the Indians through
whose territories the expedition
moved, no woman would ever
accompany a war party. Sa-
cagawea’s presence at the head
of the column therefore signaled
the tribes that the white men
meant no threat, thus prevent-
ing what otherwise would likely
have been a lot of combat.
• During the summer of 1945,
it cost families in the US and
Canada approximately three
dollars ($34.22 in today’s USD)
to purchase and mail 1,000 ciga-
rettes to their soldier-relatives on
occupation duty in northwest Eu-
rope. Once those smokes arrived
at their destination, the soldiers
receiving them could sell them
(illegally) on the black market
for about USD $400 ($4,563.16).
Attention S&T readers: We’re al-
ways looking for authors for FYI for
Strategy & Tactics and the new World
at War magazine. If you’d like to try
your hand at writing short (under 2,000
words), pithy articles for this column,
on virtually any aspect of military his-
tory, contact Ty Bomba, FYI editor, at:
WhiteRook@att.net.
strategy & tactics 31
11/9/09 12:39:41 PM
 F o r Yo u r I n f o r m a t i o n
Early Efforts at Aerial Decapitation:
US Bombing of Libya & Iraq
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, One example of how the US
US air war planners emphasized new mated its new smart bombs with de-
technologies, including precision- capitation strategy is provided by the
guided munitions (or “smart bombs”), air strike against Libya in 1986. On
improved sensors, and stealth technol- 14 April of that year, specially modi-
ogies. They were originally designed fied F-111 Aardvark fighter-bombers
to defeat and destroy Warsaw Pact took off from Britain on a mission
air defenses but, with the collapse of to attack Libyan dictator Moamar
the USSR, they could be used in po- Qaddafi. The objective was to coerce
litically charged confrontations with him into ending his sponsorship of
third world states. international terrorism. Joining planes
US planners moved away from Sixth Fleet, the F-111s struck
from traditional strategic bombing Tripoli during the night using special
doctrines toward the development sensors and precision-guided muni-
of operations specifically intended tions. The strike narrowly missed Qa-
to exploit the pinpoint accuracy of ddafi in his residence. Though there is
emerging aerial technologies. Instead evidence the bombing didn’t stop the
of relying on armadas of conventional Libyans from sponsoring specific acts
aircraft to destroy enemy industrial of terrorism, the air attack did work to
and transportation infrastructure, reduce Qaddafi’s profile on the world
a new tactic of “decapitation” was stage, making him hesitant to openly
advocated. It called for using small support terrorism as he had before the
contingents of highly specialized bombing.
aircraft such as the F-117A Night A larger example of the aerial
Hawk stealth fighter and B-2 Spirit decapitation strategy took place five
stealth bomber. They could perform years later, during the first major
precision strikes against enemy lead- international crisis in the post-Cold
ers and disrupt hostile communication War era. On 2 August 1990, Iraqi
networks. dictator Saddam Hussein ordered his
forces to overrun Kuwait. As Kuwaiti
resistance crumbled, the UN Security
Council acted in rare concert, impos-
ing immediate economic sanctions
on Iraq and approving the use of “all
necessary measures” to expel Iraqi
forces from the country. The deadline
for withdrawal was 15 January 1991.
“The biggest obstacle to the By the time of that November
proliferation of [robots] in Security Council vote, the buildup
of US and Coalition forces for the
combat is a cultural one. Some defense of Saudi Arabia, under the
codename Operation Desert Shield,
decision-makers in the military was well advanced. The forces so
world do not seem to be able deployed were dubbed the UN Coali-
tion Force. UNCF was placed under
to get past a negative, knee- the command of US Gen. H. Norman
jerk reaction when presented Schwarzkopf, who asked for and re-
ceived full military commitment from
with an armed, tele-operated, Congress. By then some 540,000
unmanned vehicle” uniformed Americans were in the
theater of operations, supported by a
—Gen. John M. Riggs, further 260,000 Coalition troops and
US Army (ret.), 2009 an impressive array of air and naval
forces. They were opposed by Sad-
32 #260
ST 260 Issue.indd 32
dam Hussein’s 300,000 men, 3,500
tanks and 2,500 artillery pieces.
Though UNCF prepared for the
possibility of a ground war with
Iraq, Schwarzkopf also ordered his
air commanders to design strategies
for an air-only campaign. The result
incorporated two competing, but
not mutually exclusive, strategies.
The first, Operation Instant Thunder,
aimed to win with a six-day strate-
gic air operation. The plan was to
target Saddam Hussein and leading
members of his regime, rendering
it incapable of governing Iraq or
commanding and controlling military
forces. Many senior air force leaders
believed Instant Thunder could force
Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait without
a ground offensive.
The primary objective of Instant
Thunder was to induce the Iraqis
to withdraw all their forces from
Kuwait, while simultaneously fatally
destabilizing Hussein’s regime. The
Gulf War Air Power Survey agreed
Instant Thunder would likely not just
neutralize the government, but change
it by inducing a coup or revolt that
would result in a new regime more
amenable to the Coalition. In the
words of US Air Force Col. John A.
Warden III, the chief architect of the
plan, the “Saddam Hussein regime is
our target—not the Iraqi people.”
To accomplish those objectives,
Instant Thunder called for attacking
84 targets in six days, simultaneously
hitting all the main target groups.
The sequencing of the air campaign
owed much to the lessons of previous
wars. First, Coalition airpower would
establish and maintain air superiority
by denying the enemy all use of the
air, then it would destroy the enemy
air force, missile sites and weapons
of mass destruction. Second, aircraft
armed with precision-guided muni-
tions would attack the regime directly
by striking key leadership facilities
(presidential residences and VIP
bunkers), telecommunications (tele-
phone exchanges and television and
radio stations), and internal security
11/9/09 12:39:41 PM

installations (secret police headquar-
ters and government ministries).
Finally, airpower would employ a
limited civilian punishment strategy,
hitting Iraq’s economic infrastructure
(electric power, oil facilities, railroads
and bridges), in order to undermine
the ability of the country to support
the war. The civilian population itself
wouldn’t be a target.
In case the decapitation cam-
paigned failed, commanders also
designed an aerial denial campaign
to support a major Coalition ground
offensive. The objective of that aerial
strategy was described by the Chair-
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen.
Colin Powell, in a Pentagon press
conference: “Our strategy to go after
this [Iraqi] army is very, very simple.
First we’re going to cut it off, and
then we’re going to kill it.”
The denial campaign was built
around the “hammer and anvil”
concept. First, airpower would fix
the Iraqi ground forces in position,
preventing them from retreating
from, or redeploying within, Kuwait.
Then airpower would seek out and
destroy Iraqi armor and bunkers while
interdicting the approaches to the
theater of operations. All of which
was in preparation for a Coalition
ground offensive. To accomplish that
mission, UNCF deployed over 2,000
fixed-wing aircraft and hundreds of
helicopters, outnumbering their Iraqi
opponents more than four to one in
the air.
On 17 January 1991, two days af-
ter the UN ultimatum expired, Opera-
tion Desert Shield turned into Desert
Storm. Operation Instant Thunder
began at 2:45 a.m., Persian Gulf
time. Downtown Baghdad was lit up
with tracer fire as Iraqi anti-aircraft
artillery (AAA) gunners attempted to
shoot down stealthy intruders. Radar
resistant F-117s struck sensitive Iraqi
command, control and communica-
tions, as specially outfitted electronic
warfare aircraft such as the EF-111A
Raven, EA-6B Prowler and F-4G
Wild Weasel jammed and destroyed
Iraqi anti-aircraft radar sites. Fol-
low-on attacks by those specialized
aircraft continued to suppress Iraqi
AAA as precision ground-attack
ST 260 Issue.indd 33
F o r Yo u r I n f o r m a t i o n
aircraft, such as the F-111F, A-6 by B-52 carpet-bombing for days,
Intruder and F-15E Strike Eagle, went surrendered in the tens of thousands.
after bridges, presidential residences, In Kuwait, Coalition airpower caught
command bunkers and economic Iraqi convoys retreating north, bomb-
infrastructure. ing and strafing between Kuwait
Six days of that intensive de- City and Basra, and creating what
capitation campaign didn’t have the television commentators called the
desired outcome: Instant Thunder “highway of death.” After 100 hours,
failed to kill Saddam Hussein or over- President Bush ordered Schwarzkopf
throw his regime. Though most of the to halt offensive operations and allow
84 strategic targets designated by the the mangled Iraqi Army to withdraw
planners were destroyed or damaged, from Kuwait. A formal armistice was
all of the top 43 Iraqi political and reached on 4 March.
military leaders were still alive on 1 Over the 43-day air and ground
March. Further, the aerial campaign war, Coalition warplanes flew more
failed to precipitate a coup within the than 109,000 sorties, of which 27,000
government or a revolt from below. were combat missions. The results of
Even so, Instant Thunder’s destruc- the aerial campaign were significant.
tion of Iraqi command, control and By immobilizing enemy mobile units,
communications did isolate Saddam denying frontline troops desperately
from his battlefield commanders, needed supplies (especially water),
blinding and confusing the Iraqi Army and destroying large amounts of
in the first days of Desert Storm. equipment in place, Coalition airpow-
When it became clear Instant er unhinged the Iraqi military. Post-
Thunder had failed to decapitate the war surveys indicate some 20 percent
Iraqi government, Coalition air com- of all Iraqi heavy military equipment
manders initiated the denial campaign was destroyed in the aerial phase of
on 23 January. For 43 days, Coali- Desert Storm, paving the way for the
tion air forces pounded Iraqi targets, successful liberation of Kuwait.
gradually shifting from strategic mis-
sions to interdicting supply lines, then ~Brian Todd Carey
tactical attacks on enemy forward
positions in Kuwait. Precision muni-
tions were directed against bridges
in an attempt to cut off Kuwait from
reinforcements, while non-laser
designated aircraft, such as the F-16
Fighting Falcon, A/F-18 Hornet, and
A-10 Thunderbolt joined the vener-
able B-52 in attacks against Iraqi
ground forces.
At 4:00 a.m. on 28 February, the
UNCF ground offensive began. Ac-
companied by part of a US Army ar-
mored division, elements of the US 1st
and 2nd Marine Divisions struck north
into eastern Kuwait, followed by
Coalition Arab forces. In the Persian
Gulf, UNCF warships bombarded
enemy coastal positions as part of a
deception operation, tying down nine
Iraqi divisions who were expecting an
amphibious invasion. Meanwhile the
Coalition main assault took place far
inland against the Iraqi right. Coali-
tion forces sliced into Saddam’s army,
enveloping the front-line troops who,
having been pounded mercilessly
strategy & tactics 33
11/9/09 12:39:43 PM
 F o r Yo u r I n f o r m a t i o n
The Irish in Afghanistan
Ireland has never been considered
a military powerhouse, despite a long
and illustrious military history. Of
course, much of that military history
was written by Irishmen serving in
the armed forces of other nations. The
British Empire would no doubt have
been smaller without the large num-
ber of Irish regiments and Anglo-Irish
officers who fought and died for the
Union Jack. The Irish regiments and
Irish officers who fought for France
had an amazingly distinguished
combat record. The US has had
Irish units, like the Irish regiments
from New York, epitomized by the
“Fighting 69th.” Mexico had the San
Patricio Battalion in the Mexican-
American War, formed from Irish
deserters from the US Army.
Today Ireland has an army com-
posed of a Permanent Defence Force
(PDF) and a Reserve Defence Force
(RDF). The PDF has three brigades,
the 1st, 2nd and 4th, with a total of
8,500 personnel, while the RDF
likewise has three brigades, the 3rd, 5th
and 6th, with nearly 12,000.
Historically, World War II saw the
largest expansion of the Irish Army,
approaching nearly 40,000 troops
supported by a local volunteer force
of approximately 100,000. In the ad-
vent of invasion, by either the Allies
or the Germans, the volunteers were
to have been directly controlled by
the Army. Drastic reductions followed
Irish soldiers at headquarters of ISAF, Kabul, Afghanistan.
34 #260
ST 260 Issue.indd 34
the war, and Ireland today maintains
only a small armed force.
On joining the United Nations in
1955, Ireland sought to assume its
share of the internationalist burden by
providing military forces for duty as
peacekeepers. Their first mission was
the provision of military observers
for duty in Lebanon in 1958. Their
first major deployment was sending
an infantry battalion as part of the UN
mission to the Congo. That mission
still remains the costliest deployment
of the modern Irish Army: of the
6,000 who served in the Congo from
1960 to 1964, 26 were killed. In one
of the largest engagements during that
conflict, 150 Irish soldiers ferociously
battled a larger Katangan force,
fighting on even after they ran out
of ammunition and inflicting heavy
casualties on the attackers.
Additional deployments followed;
to Cyprus in 1964, to the Sinai in
1973, to Lebanon in 1976, to the
border between Iran and Iraq in 1988,
to Somalia in 1993, to East Timor
in 1999, to Eritrea in 2001, and to
Liberia in 2003. Today Irish units are
deployed on UN missions to Lebanon
and Cyprus.
Ireland has also participated
in non-UN international missions,
though many of those missions also
have UN approval or support. Partici-
pation in SFOR/EUFOR in Bosnia
and KFOR in Kosovo, beginning in
the 1990s and continuing today, are
carried out under the auspices of the
European Union. The recent battal-
ion-sized deployment of approximate-
ly 450 Irish soldiers to Chad (part of
the Darfur humanitarian effort) is also
a EUFOR mission.
In July 2002, Ireland deployed
seven soldiers to Afghanistan as part
of the International Security As-
sistance Force (ISAF). That deploy-
ment was made under the authority
of UN Security Council Resolution
(UNSCR) 1386, which placed NATO
forces “for operational purposes
under the command of US Central
Command.”
Afghanistan is the first combat
deployment of Irish troops abroad
not directly under the UN or EU
aegis. That hasn’t sat well with some
in Ireland, who have valued Irish
neutrality and separation from the
politics of the great powers. While a
few Irish military personnel have long
been stationed at NATO headquarters
as observers, and others have recently
seen foreign service with nations such
as Britain and France, Irish soldiers
have never deployed into combat as
part of NATO forces subordinate to
US operational direction.
Despite the small size of their
commitment, then, it still represents a
large political step for Ireland. Ireland
has continued to maintain its ISAF
contribution, as there are seven Irish
soldiers in Kabul today, with rotations
being made on a six-month basis. All
of them are explosive ordnance spe-
cialists, and the deployment is set to
continue as long as the ISAF remains
in Afghanistan.
~Vernie Liebl
11/9/09 12:39:45 PM
 The Long Tradition:
Mr. Woodruff’s Curious Gun
It is a stock theme for a Civil War story. A lone
inventor develops a new and revolutionary weapon.
Presenting it to the Union military, the weapon is
rejected by a hidebound bureaucracy blind to its
merits. The inventor then takes the weapon to Abra-
ham Lincoln. The president appreciates the genius of
the weapon, and forces the Army to buy and deploy
it. Union victories follow.
There are historical precedents for that narrative.
Certainly the introduction of the Sharps repeating
rifle followed that script. It could be argued the
Gatling Gun followed a similar path, and the Moni-
tor ironclad provides a naval version of the story. Yet
a story following that plot could go awry—some-
times badly. One example is the checkered history of
the Woodruff Gun.
James Woodruff was a 19th century manufac-
turer and inventor. Born in Connecticut in 1821, he
learned carriage making in his teens. He moved to
Quincy, Illinois, in 1842. In 1850 he was a lumber
merchant. Still later he returned to building car-
riages. When the Civil War started, he liquidated
his business to start a new one, manufacturing
equipment for the Army: knapsacks, haversacks and
ambulances.
Those items weren’t martial enough for Wood-
ruff, though, who was a strong supporter of the
Union cause. He wanted to manufacture weapons of
his own invention and, more than anything else, saw
the need for a “galloper gun”—a field piece light
enough to accompany cavalry on raids. The resultant
weapons’ barrel was three feet long, weighed 256
lbs., and had a 2-1/8 inch bore. It was a smoothbore
muzzleloader, but could be rifled if desired.
While described in Army records as a “steel
gun,” the barrel was actually welded iron. The gun
fired a conical two lb. lead round, shaped like a
minié ball. Thus the same ammunition could be used
in either the rifled or smoothbore versions. Alterna-
tively, the gun could be loaded with cased one-ounce
lead balls.
Mounted on its limber, it could be pulled at a
gallop by a two-horse team. The barrel was also
small and light enough to be packed on a horse, if
necessary, as could the other individual components:
limber, ammunition box and tools.
Woodruff proudly offered the gun to the Army
in October 1861, promising to deliver 20 per week,
complete with limber, ammunition chests and firing
equipment for only $285 per gun. (That’s $6,752 in
today’s dollars.)
The Army’s Ordnance Board rejected the offer,
and it had several reasons for doing so. The Wood-
ruff Gun, as shown, was a smoothbore muzzleloader,
a configuration then widely seen to be approaching
ST 260 Issue.indd 35
50 issues ago, S&T 209:
Indochina. The first war in Vietnam, the
French taking on the Viet Minh in South-
east Asia; a Joe Miranda design empha-
sizing political and military operations.
Related articles include Gary Valenza on
communist mastermind Giap, and tactics
of Indochinese armies. Carl Schuster
writes about strategic bombing in World
War I, and John Burtt writes on Greene’s
southern campaign in the American Revo-
lution.
100 Issues Ago, S&T 159:
Zeppelin. Aerial combat over Britain dur-
ing the early years of World War I, when
German airships took to the skies. Design
by Eric and Jane Lawson, article by Wil-
liam Koff. S&T did another game on a
related topic the 1917-18 German bomber
campaign, in S&T 255. S&T Editor Joe
Miranda did an article on tactics of the Ro-
man Civil War to accompany his Ancient
Wars series. James Werbaneth analyzed the
Iraqi army, plus Tactical Notebook.
150 Issues Ago, S&T 109:
Target Libya. David Ritchie’s design,
a “what if” of the 1980s, a US invasion
of Libya. Then some traditional military
history with Richard Berg at the Battle of
Trevilian Station, and Dave Martin at Ger-
mantown. Plus Berg’s Review of Games,
Doug Niles on the state of wargame art,
and John Prados’s tournament rules for
SPI’s Warsaw Rising, including a display
for the city’s sewers.
200 Issues Ago, S&T 59:
Plot to Assassinate Hitler. One
of the more unusual games to ever appear
in S&T, with players taking the roles of the
conspirators against Hitler and the SS. It
included pioneering rules for its political
aspects, and just about every major person-
age of the Third Reich—and who could
not be amazed at the map’s “SS Inter-
rogation Cell”? Design by Jim Dunnigan,
colorful graphics by Redmond Simonsen,
article by Virginia Mulholland. Then
Sterling Hart went to the far east with the
Russo-Japanese War. Plus the usual Brief-
ings and For Your Eyes Only.
strategy & tactics 35
11/9/09 12:39:47 PM
 F o r Yo u r I n f o r m a t i o n
obsolescence. It fired a light round
and had a short range. Woodruff said
it could fire a solid shot 2,200 yards,
but its effective range was 700 yards.
The ammunition was non-stan-
dard lead, rather than the more typical
iron. Even if it had been made of
cheaper iron, it was a new size that
was incompatible with other Union
artillery. Finally, it was less effective
than the model 1841 mountain how-
itzer, a brass piece that weighed 220
lbs. and fired a standard 12 lb. ball. It
had a 970 yard effective range, and
could fire shell as well as solid shot.
Woodruff was undeterred. Active
in Illinois Republican politics before
the war, he called in some political
favors. Illinois Gov. Richard Yates
recommended Woodruff appeal the
decision directly to Abraham Lincoln.
Woodruff went to Washington
in October 1861, where he met with
Lincoln. Lincoln was sympathetic,
viewing Woodruff as a loyal Illinois
Republican with an idea that could
help the Union cause. He therefore
sent Woodruff to see Gen. Winfield
Scott, the head of the Army. Wood-
ruff, stopped by Scott’s staff, was
only allowed to send a written appeal.
Scott upheld the original rejection.
Woodruff again saw Lincoln. This
time Lincoln sent him to the Ord-
nance Department with a personal
note.
At the same time, Illinois was
raising a cavalry regiment. It had the
necessary men and horses, but lacked
weapons. Woodruff had meanwhile
located 9,000 Belgian sabers, 1,500
Colt revolvers and 1,500 carbines—
enough for a cavalry brigade. He
offered all that to Ripley, along with
the Woodruff Gun, in a package deal.
36 #260
ST 260 Issue.indd 36
Ripley agreed to purchase a few
of the cannon, signing a contract for
30 of them on 15 November. Both
parties understood the guns were on
trial. Woodruff had enough confi-
dence in his invention to believe the
guns would prove so effective he
would soon be mass-producing them.
Ripley viewed the trial order as a
small price to pay for quickly secur-
ing the needed carbines, pistols and
sabers.
The guns were soon being manu-
factured. The barrels were produced
by the Greenleaf Foundry, and the
carriages by Battel and Boyd. They
were delivered on 1 February 1862,
and Woodruff received payment in
March: $8,500 ($201,356) for 30
guns, fully equipped. Six more were
then ordered by the city of Quincy
for local defense. That purchase was
almost certainly motivated by local
pride, as the value of light guns in
fixed positions was limited, and it’s
hard to imagine any mobile municipal
defenses were going to be required in
northern Illinois.
The operational history of the
Woodruff Gun wasn’t as dismal as
had been feared by Ripley, though
even its most ardent supporter
wouldn’t have described it as a war-
winning weapon. The few actually
fielded were used by state cavalry
units in the west.
Four to six served with the 2nd
Missouri State Militia Cavalry in
1862. Another Missouri militia unit
received four, purchased by the unit’s
leader. A section of Woodruff Guns
was attached to the 4th Iowa Cavalry.
Six went to the 1st Illinois Volunteer
Light Artillery. Finally, six were sent
to the 10th Illinois Volunteer Cavalry.
In all cases, they were either request-
ed or accepted solely due to the lack
of anything better being available.
When there was no enemy artil-
lery in the field, the Woodruff Guns
didn’t hurt and sometimes helped.
When the Confederates had artillery
present, however, the Woodruff Guns
proved inadequate.
The first instance in which they
were deployed in combat was at
Clark’s Mill, Missouri, on 10 Novem-
ber 1862. There the 10th Illinois Vol-
unteer Cavalry found them outclassed
by the six-pounders accompanying
their Confederate cavalry opponents.
The 10th Illinois’s six guns ended up
in Fort Davidson at Pilot Knob, Mis-
souri, where they were captured when
the Confederates took that place on
25 September 1864.
The Woodruffs assigned to the 4th
Iowa gave similarly mixed service.
Some soldiers swore by them, claim-
ing the guns could hit a man-sized
target at 440 yards. Others, including
William Forse Scott, who published
a memoir of his service in that unit,
stated they were “utterly useless.”
Woodruff Guns proved unequivo-
cally useful only during Grierson’s
Raid. That operation, through Missis-
sippi in April and May 1863 (fiction-
alized in the 1959 John Wayne movie,
The Horse Soldiers), was intended to
distract Confederate attention while
Grant moved south of Vicksburg.
Col. Benjamin Grierson started in
Lagrange, Tennessee, and ended up
in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, with two
of the three regiments with which
he’d started. The third he’d sent back
to Lagrange to divert the pursuing
Confederates.
Grierson took with him a battery
of six Woodruff Guns. They proved
well suited to his fast raiding tactics.
They could be moved quickly and
didn’t get bogged down in rough ter-
rain. At one point, when the going got
too muddy for the carriages, the guns
were packed on horseback.
Grierson detached individual guns
with two of the diversionary units he
spun off during the raid. The officers
of those columns used them to con-
fuse the pursuers as to their strength.
11/9/09 12:39:48 PM
 The Long Tradition:
Company M’s Woodruff Gun replica at an
Auburn, Illinois, event.
Rolling a single gun over the same patch of ground
multiple times, they gave the impression they had an
entire battery with them.
At the only pitched battle fought during the
raid, near Oskya, the Woodruffs proved invaluable.
Grierson’s advance guard had been ambushed by
Confederate militia while crossing a bridge. Those
cavalrymen were pinned down until Grierson commit-
ted his artillery—four Woodruffs. The guns drove off
the Confederates.
Even so, the little guns’ successes during Grier-
son’s Raid were largely due to their being unopposed
by enemy artillery. Such occasions were too infre-
quent to salvage their reputation. There were no fol-
low-on orders after the first batch was manufactured,
and the Woodruff guns slid into obscurity as the war
progressed.
Woodruff himself became too busy with other
activities to push further production. In October 1862
he was made assistant provost marshal for the War
Department at Quincy. Later, he was named provost
marshal of the Fourth Congressional District in Il-
linois. Following the war, he teamed with Frederick
Boyd (of Battel and Boyd) to manufacture carriages.
Today only three Woodruff Guns are still known
to exist. Two are in West Point’s artillery collection.
One is a monument gun in an Illinois town. Given the
small number manufactured, and their military insig-
nificance, that’s actually a remarkable survival rate.
~Mark N. Lardas
ST 260 Issue.indd 37
50 issues ago, S&T 210:
Belisarius. The Byzantine empire
strikes—Joseph Miranda’s design is
your chance to follow in the footsteps
of one of the greatest generals of the
Dark Ages. Gary Romano article on
Justinian’s Empire, Ben Hull on the
Wars of Religion, and Bruce Costello
on US war plans for a place called
Vietnam.
100 Issues Ago, S&T 160:
Medwar. John Schettler introduces air
and naval power into his World War II
Mediterranean theater campaign series,
with Kirk Schlesinger updating the
rules. Then the S&T editor provides an
analysis of the Iranian revolution with
implications for today’s Gulf Wars.
Plus Tactical Notebook.
150 Issues Ago, S&T 110:
Hastings 1066. Richard Berg heads
on out to Senlac Hill for the Battle of
Hastings, 1066 (we covered the entire
campaign in S&T 240). Richard also
penned the lead article on that year of
decision. David J. Ritchie took a look
at Germany’s plans for war with the
USSR, and from the largest land cam-
paign in history S&T went to a Splen-
did Little War by James Meldrum. Plus
articles by James Dingeman, Rich-
ard Jupa and John Prados, the usual
MOVES gaming, and John Prados on
micro-level tactics.
200 Issues Ago, S&T 60:
Road to Richmond. The Penin-
sula Campaign of 1862 by Joe Angio-
lillo and Redmond Simonsen. Then
Oktay Oztunali takes S&T to the bomb
shelters for a look at a possible post
nuclear war America, tied in to SPI’s
After the Holocaust. Outgoing mail
had a frank discussion of SPI financ-
es—a wargame budget in those days
might have been anything from $500
to $3,500.
strategy & tactics 37
11/9/09 12:39:51 PM
 The Central Powers Strike:
Caporetto, 1917
by John D. Burtt
Central Powers units are in italics; Allied are in plaintext.
T
hough allied with the Central Powers since
1882, Italy declared neutrality when World
War I began in August 1914. In the intervening
years the Italians had become dependent on Allied trade
and embroiled in a dispute with Austria-Hungary over
what was termed the Italia Irredenta, or Unredeemed
Italy. That region, which included Trentino and terri-
tories near the headwaters of the Adriatic, was part of
the Austro-Hungarian Empire, but it was also home to
about 750,000 Italian-speaking residents. Italian politi-
cians therefore came to ever more loudly proclaim any
war policy would have to be centered on the pursuit of
Italy’s “natural boundaries.”
Throughout the first months of World War I, the Italian
government negotiated with both the Central Powers and
the Allies over the price of declaring the war. Their goal
was to gain as much territory as possible. The Allies won
38 #260
ST 260 Issue.indd 38
the bidding war by, not surprisingly, offering more terri-
tory from Austria-Hungary than the Dual Monarchy was
willing to cede. The secret Treaty of London, signed in
April 1915, promised Italy the Trentino, Cisalpine Tirol,
Trieste, Istria, Dalmatia, Valona and the islands of the
Dodecanese. They were generous promises insofar as
the Allies were in no position to give those lands to the
Italians at the time. Also overlooked in the agreement
were the 600,000 Slavs and 230,000 Germans in those
areas who were to become unwilling Italian citizens.
Italy declared war on Austria-Hungary on 23 May
1915. Over the next year Italian troops launched five
offensives around the Isonzo River in the Julian Moun-
tains. By breaking through there and capturing the city
of Trieste on the Adriatic coast, the Italians believed
they would then be able to move into the surrounding
territories.
11/9/09 12:39:54 PM
 Despite being outnumbered, the Austro-Hungar-
ians held the high ground in strong entrenchments and
enjoyed an advantage in artillery. Italian Chief of Staff
Gen. Luigi Cadorna, who believed in victory through
attrition, ordered tactics like those used on the Western
Front: massive artillery bombardment followed by even
more massive infantry frontal assaults. The result was
inevitable: massive casualties. Italy lost over a quarter-
million men to push the enemy four miles east.
In May 1916 the Austro-Hungarians struck back from
the Trentino area, trying to isolate the Italian armies
on the Isonzo. The Italians noticed the buildup two
months before the attack began, but their First Army
commander, Gen. Brusati, disobeyed Cadorna’s order to
set up a defense in depth. The initial Austro-Hungarian
barrage was therefore able to destroy Brusati’s frontline
and allow the attackers to penetrate almost 12 miles
before Italian reinforcements stopped them. When the
Austro-Hungarians then withdrew, Cadorna redeployed
his troops by rail, launched a surprise attack, and took
ST 260 Issue.indd 39
the city of Gorizia in the Sixth Battle of the Isonzo. Four
more bloody battles followed with little to show for it
by either side.
In August and September 1917 the Italians, in the
11th Battle of the Isonzo, finally succeeded in breaking
through the last of the enemy prepared positions on the
Carso and Biansizza plateaus. Worried another Italian
offensive would shatter the front completely, Vienna
appealed to Berlin for help. To keep their main ally in
the war, Gen. Erich Ludendorff, officially First Quar-
termaster General of the German Army, but by then
actually its overall commander, agreed to assist. He
committed his small strategic reserve of six divisions
to the front for a limited offensive.
Preparation
For the new offensive, the Central Powers created
Fourteenth Army, a combined organization of 15 Ger-
man and Austro-Hungarian divisions, commanded by
German Gen. Otto von Below. Most of those divisions
strategy & tactics 39
11/9/09 12:39:56 PM
 The new warriors: German stormtroopers assemble for Caporetto.
were specially trained, equipped and experienced in
mountain warfare. The new formation was moved into
place between the Austro-Hungarian 5th and 10th Armies.
The focal point of the attack was to be on the upper
Isonzo between Plezzo and Tolmino, near the village of
Caporetto, and it was planned for 24 October 1917.
Ludendorff wanted to limit the offensive to push-
ing back the Italians to the Tagliamento River, just
far enough to provide the Austro-Hungarians better
defensive positions and keep them in the war. Baron
Franz Conrad von Hotzendorff, the former Austrian
Chief of Staff, disagreed with that limited goal. He
wanted an offensive that would knock Italy out of the
war. Accordingly, he requested reinforcements for his
own sector of the front. His idea was to push south in
coordination with Below’s attack. Ironically, he’d called
for an identical two-pronged attack in January 1917 in
exactly the same place, with exactly the same result:
he was turned down.
Below’s plan called for four “groups” (corps-sized
formations) to break through the Italian front and pen-
etrate into the Friuli and Venetian plains. The attacking
columns were to push along mountain crests, isolating
outposts and leaving the valley roads available for the
movement of supplies and artillery. The key to the attack
was Below’s order to “move forward without hesita-
tion.” His plan called for utilizing the new infiltration
tactics that had worked so well for the Germans at Riga
a month earlier. Though they have been called “Hutier
tactics,” after Gen. Oskar von Hutier, who used them
at Riga, they were actually the result of two years of
development. Instead of the usual mass attack, they in-
stead called for a surprise concentration of assault troops
and a brief, intense artillery bombardment using a mix
of high explosive and gas shells. Then infantry assault
40 #260
ST 260 Issue.indd 40
teams would move forward, bypass strongpoints, and
penetrate into the enemy rear area. The objective was
to gain possession of the enemy lines of communication
and exploit gaps in the line, thereby causing the front to
collapse and allow a general breakthrough to occur.
A significant feature of the tactics involved a surprise
bombardment on troop concentrations and artillery
positions using gas. Achieving surprise was aided by
precluding normal ranging rounds, which would quickly
give away the location of an attack, and instead develop
a fire plan based on aerial surveys. In addition to the
Fourteenth Army’s own 2,200 guns, Below also planned
to use Pioneer Battalion 36, specialists in gas bombard-
ment. By 23 October the battalion had emplaced 894
rifled gas projectors, each capable of firing an 80 lb. gas
projectile between 1,600 and 5,000 yards.
Situation Bad but Satisfactory
On the other side of the lines the Italians were feeling
restless. Their last battle had been more successful than
the one before it, but at a cost of 150,000 casualties.
Overall, a half-million Italian troops had been lost, with
Trieste still not captured. There were shortages of coal,
metal, grain and food throughout the country. Support
for the war was evaporating, with people referring to
the “accursed war,” and opposition party politicians pro-
claiming “next winter not another man in the trenches.”
Discontent and strikes were spreading. Ironically, one
such strike among munitions workers in Turin ended
with the strikers being drafted and sent to the front—at
Caporetto.
In the field, conditions were worse. Troop morale
had deteriorated, with insubordination, desertions and
courts martial on the rise. Cadorna imposed harsh
discipline to maintain order, including decimation, the
11/9/09 12:39:57 PM
 execution of one of every 10 men in units accused of
cowardice. Rations were reduced and home leave was
limited. To make matters worse, officers continued to
receive privileges denied their men, leading to further
resentment in the ranks. Unfortunately, the Italian com-
mand didn’t recognize what was happening on the front.
Cadorna reported morale as “satisfactory” on the eve
of the battle.
Still, the Italians weren’t ignorant of what was hap-
pening. While preparing for their next battle, they’d be-
came aware of the coming Central Powers’ offensive. On
18 September 1917, Cadorna was sufficiently alarmed
so as to cancel preparations for his attack; however,
that had an unintended impact on the Allied situation.
Cadorna had promised the Allies an offensive, and had
received British and French artillery support in return.
In response to the cancellation, the Allies withdrew their
batteries, weakening the front.
Italian intelligence indicated the Isonzo would be
the focus of the Central Powers’ attack. The Italians had
two armies on that front, Second Army on the northern
wing and Third Army to its south. Second Army, com-
manded by Gen. Luigi Capello, was a huge formation
of 25 divisions and 2,200 guns. The smaller Third Army
had nine divisions. Cadorna chose to believe the main
attack would hit Third Army, given the rough terrain
Second Army held; so he assigned 60 of his 99 reserve
The defenders: Italians rally around a banner.
battalions to it. Italian troop strength in all divisions was
reduced due to casualties, illness and leave. There were
conserve ammunition and not fire without explicit orders.
regiments in the line at 33 percent normal strength.
The source of that order is still in question today. Com-
The Italian front line nominally had three positions. pounding the Italian confusion was Capello’s illness;
The first was a hastily constructed line at the farthest he’d been bedridden with influenza since 4 October.
point of their last advance. The second was better placed
As the offensive unfolded, it became apparent the
for defense, but hadn’t yet been completed. The third
Austro-German attack was aimed directly at the Tol-
was less a defense line than a storage depot for supplies
mino region, not Third Army as Cadorna had expected.
to support the next offensive. Italian defensive tactics
Detailed information came in from Austro-Hungarian
were rudimentary. Troops received little training in
deserters, who also disclosed gas was to be used. Unfor-
defensive warfare, as the Italians had generally been on
tunately, Cadorna continued to believe any attack near
the attack. Originally, defensive doctrine called for no
Tolmino could be “checked without difficulty,” and he
retreat, with any enemy attack to be met and defeated at
refused to shift his reserve. Because of Cadorna’s deploy-
the front. Most commanders adhered to that doctrine.
ments, the main attack, by 168 full-strength Fourteenth
Cadorna wanted a static defense in depth, using Army battalions, was met by only 113 depleted Italian
massed firepower to destroy the attackers, and counter- battalions.
attacking when necessary. Second Army’s commander,
Gen. Capello, favored a massive counter-offensive Battle
into the enemy flank. Of course, that required a differ- Below opened the attack at 2:00 a.m. on 24 October
ent deployment of troops and artillery than Cadorna 1917 with a massive gas bombardment against Italian
wanted. headquarters, artillery positions and reserve concentra-
On 10 October the Italian Chief of Staff finally issued tions. The bombardment with chlorasine and diphos-
orders for the defense. He required the front line be held gene gases proved effective, in no small part due to the
lightly, with only mobile guns forward. In particular, inadequacy of Italian gas masks
most of XXVII Corps was ordered to withdraw across At 6:00 a.m. the Austro-German guns opened up
the Isonzo. Italian artillery was to initiate immediate again, this time with high explosives onto the Italian
counter-preparation fire against the attackers. frontline positions. That bombardment destroyed en-
Those orders were in the process of being implemented trenchments as well as all telephone communications.
when the Central Powers’ launched their attack. At that At 8:00 a.m., two huge pre-positioned mines filled with
moment, someone ordered XXVII Corps artillery to explosives were detonated under the Italian positions
strategy & tactics 41

ST 260 Issue.indd 41 11/9/09 12:39:58 PM

 at Monte Rosso and Monte Mrzli, completing what
the artillery had begun. Following those explosions,
Fourteenth Army infantry moved forward through rain,
snow, mist and Italian bullets. Krauss and Stein (see the
order of battle sidebar) pushed their groups out of Plezzo
and Tolmino, respectively, in a double envelopment of
Capello’s IV Corps. Berrer’s and Scotti’s groups pushed
into the passes near Selo to outflank the Italian XXVII
Corps.
Stein’s 12th Division penetrated five miles against
weak, scattered resistance before wheeling behind the
Italian 43rd and 46th Divisions, routing them both. Then
the 12th struck into the rear area of the 19th Division,
a large four-brigade unit, just as it was being attacked
frontally by the Austro-Hungarian 50th Division. With
his division routing around him, the 19th Division com-
mander committed suicide. By mid-afternoon, Krauss
and Stein’s troops had converged on Caporetto, creating
a 15-mile-wide gap in the Italian front.
With communications destroyed, Italian response to
the assault was slow and uncertain. Word of the main
breach didn’t reach Italian headquarters in Undine for
six hours. Meanwhile Austro-Hungarian and German
units streamed west. Italian mountain outposts were
isolated and cut off. What artillery had survived the gas
attack waited for orders. Capello’s reserve VII Corps,
which had been assigned to counterattack any enemy
breakthrough, ended up defending in place due to com-
mand paralysis. Finally, Cadorna ordered six divisions,
two each from the reserve, Third Army and First Army,
to move toward the break.
On 25 October, an ill Capello reported to Cadorna
that IV Corps was gone and all positions east of the
Isonzo had been lost. He recommended withdrawal
In the air: Italian aviators prepare for a mission.
42 #260
ST 260 Issue.indd 42
of all Italian forces to the Tagliamento River. He then
turned over Second Army to Gen. Montuori. Cadorna
ordered defenses prepared at the Tagliamento River and
instructed Third Army to be prepared to move. He was
hesitant to order the actual withdrawal, though, because
he didn’t want to abandon territory that had been won
through so much hardship and loss of blood.
Despite limited knowledge of the situation, Montuori
advised continued resistance; so Cadorna chose to try to
build a defensive line from Mount Maggiore to Mount
Santo. Italian reinforcements continued to be sent for-
ward piecemeal. Most got lost, or were ambushed or cut
off, by fast moving Austro-German troops and ended
up surrendering. Lt. Erwin Rommel, commander of a
detachment of the Wurttemberg Mountain Battalion
attached to the Stein’s Alpine Corps, captured some
9,000 Italian troops in five full regiments at a cost of
36 of his own men as casualties in one day.
On 26 October, Mount Maggiore fell, fully exposing
the flank of the Italian line. Cadorna ordered Third Army
to fall back to the Tagliamento at 1:30 a.m. that night.
By the 29th, Third Army was back across the Isonzo
and moving to the new defensive line. The retreat was
hampered by 750,000 stragglers and refugees along
with a total lack of traffic control.
Farther north, Second Army was also in trouble.
Berrer’s 200th Division pushed through and took Undine
only hours after Cadorna’s headquarters had evacuated
that town. That exploit cost Gen. Berrer his life when he
was shot by a sniper, but Second Army was cut in half
and in full rout. With the withdrawal of the Italians to
the Tagliamento, Ludendorff’s goal had been achieved.
The question facing the Central Powers’ high command
was: “Where to next?”
Onward?
The speed of the Austro-German victory brought
the offensive’s objectives back into question. Stopping
the attack was still attractive to the Germans. Luden-
dorff needed the German units on the Western Front
in France and Belgium. The pursuit of the Italians was
starting to slow due to troop fatigue, road wear, supply
problems and Italian demolitions. At times, fast moving
Central Powers’ columns interfered with each other as
commanders tried to direct operations independently.
The time to halt and consolidate seemed at hand, but
the chance to inflict a decisive defeat on Italy appeared
possible to the Austro-German commanders.
While both high commands debated the future of
the campaign, the offensive continued. By 30 October
the Italians were crossing the Tagliamento, closely
pursued by Below’s troops. Three bridges at Codroipo
were prematurely blown up, seemingly trapping over
12,000 Third Army troops on the wrong side. By the
next day, though, most of them were across the river
and attempting to hold the line.
continues on page 45
11/9/09 12:39:59 PM
 Orders of Battle
Central Powers
Fourteenth Army (Gen. Otto von Below)
total: 15 Divisions, 168 battalions,
2,213 artillery
Krauss Group (Gen. Alfred Krauss)
3rd “Edelweiss” Division (Austro-Hungarian)
22nd Division (Austro-Hungarian)
55th Division (Austro-Hungarian)
Jaeger Division (German)
Stein Group (Lt. Gen. Freiherr von Stein)
50th Division (Austro-Hungarian)
12th Division (German)
Alpenkorps (German)
117th Division (German)
Berrer Group (Lt. Gen. von Berrer)
26th Division (German)
200th Division (German)
Scotti Group (Field Marshall Scotti)
1st Division (Austro-Hungarian)
5th Division (German)
Reserve
4th Division (German)
26th Division (German)
33rd Division (Austro-Hungarian)

Italian
Second Army (Lt. Gen. Luigi Capello)
total: 25 Divisions, 346 battalions,
2,200 artillery
IV Corps (Gen. Cavaciocchi)
50th Division
43rd Division
46th Division
34th Division
XXVII Corps (Gen. Badoglio)
19th Division
Alpini group
65th Division
22nd Division
64th Division
VII Corps (Gen. Bongiovanni)
3rd Division
62nd Division
XXIV Corps (Gen. Caviglia)
10th Division
49th Division VIII Corps (Gen. Graziola)
68th Division 48th Division
II Corps (Gen. Albricci) 59th Division
8th Division 7th Division
44th Division XIV Corps
67th Division 25th Division
VI Corps (Gen. Lombardi) 30th Division
24th Division XXVIII Corps
66th Division 23rd Division
47th Division

strategy & tactics 43

ST 260 Issue.indd 43 11/9/09 12:40:01 PM

 Rommel At Caporetto
by Kelly Bell
The Slovenian town is now called Kobarid, but it was
once known as Caporetto. In 1917, it was the scene of one
of the worst defeats in Italian military history. To this day in
Italy the old name of the town is synonymous with debacle.
Fascist dictator Benito Mussolini later referred to the socialist
strike of 1922 (which failed miserably) as the “Caporetto of
Italian Socialism.”
Among the others affected by the trauma of Caporetto
was young Ernest Hemingway, who served as an ambulance
driver for the Allies there, hauling the dead and dying away
from the fighting, and that experience inspired him to write A
Farewell to Arms. There was yet another notable at Caporetto,
one who would later to go on to become one of the most
famous generals of the 20th century—Erwin Rommel.
From 1915 to 1917 the Italian Army engaged in a seem-
ingly endless string of Isonzo offensives, gradually clawing
its way into the South Tyrol region which Italy had ceded to
Austria in 1866 and now hoped to retrieve. They managed
to secure a strategic plateau by capturing the city of Gorizia.
Alarmed by the Allies’ progress, the Austrians mobilized for a
counteroffensive supported by their German Allies. The Ger-
man contingent included the Wurttemberg Mountain Battalion
of the elite Alpenkorps. In command of that battalion was
25-year-old Capt. Erwin Rommel. He quickly demonstrated
his tactical acumen.
Born in Heidenheim, Germany, Rommel’s father, Erwin
senior, steered his son toward the military. The younger
Rommel joined the 124th Wurttemberg Infantry Regiment as
an officer cadet in 1910 and attended the military school in
Danzig. He graduated in November 1911 and was commis-
sioned an officer in January 1912.
On the outbreak of the First World War in 1914,
Rommel initially fought in France, then later in
Romania and Italy. He gained a reputation for
making correct tactical decisions on the spur of
the moment, instantly exploiting any confusion
or indecision on the part of the enemy. During
the first three years of the war he suffered three
wounds and earned the Iron Cross first and
second class. For his frontline leader-
ship in the mountains of western
Slovenia during the battles of the
Isonzo, he was awarded Prussia’s
highest decoration, the Pour le
Merite.
Late on the night of
24 October 1917, a German
barrage of high explosive and
poison gas rounds provided
cover for assault troops who
slipped through gaps between
Italian units along the front.
Lacking mobile reserves, the
Italians were thrown into dis-
order by those infiltration tactics.
44 #260
ST 260 Issue.indd 44
Twenty-four hours later the Germans
were in Caporetto, guarding 10,000
Italian prisoners and cutting
telephone lines while the
Austro-Hungarian army
poured through the breach
opened by Rommel’s com-
mand.
With their communi-
cations down, confusion
and chaos prevailed on
the Allied side. The high
command took three days
to fully comprehend the
magnitude of the disaster. One million Italian troops began a
mass retreat toward Venice. The territory they’d seized during
two years of costly advances was abandoned to the enemy. The
Italians suffered 11,000 killed, 20,000 wounded and 275,000
captured. Rommel had been the spear point of the massive
offensive, and he proved that in mobile warfare impatience
is a virtue.
After the offensive’s initial advance, a Bavarian officer
ordered Rommel to halt and await a follow-on outfit. After
briefly arguing, Rommel left the scene and simply resumed
his unit’s forward movement. On 25 October he outflanked the
Italians ahead of him, capturing Mt. Matajur, Kolovrat Ridge
and several hundred surprised prisoners without firing a shot.
He then wheeled his force behind an Italian counterattack, as-
saulted it from the rear and took another 500 POWs, including
12 officers. That brought his prisoner tally to 1,200. Leaving
a few of his older men to guard them, Rommel then pushed
his battalion two miles farther into enemy territory and cut
the Italian supply line. Leaving the bulk of his men to guard
the area they’d just secured, he took 150 troops farther south
to surprise an enemy brigade of over 2,000 men who quickly
surrendered. They believed Rommel had to be followed by
a larger Central Powers’ force, and Rommel didn’t disabuse
them of that misconception. He then doubled back to capture
the town of Jevszek and yet another 1,000 POWs, bringing
his total to 5,000. There were more to follow.
Rommel advanced on Mrzli Mountain, where he got an
idea. Walking alone toward the Italian perimeter, he waved
a white handkerchief and shouted to the defenders that his
small unit was the vanguard of a big push. Thinking they
were about to be overwhelmed, 1,500 Italians dropped their
weapons, lifted the youthful German to their shoulders and
shouted: “Evviva Germania!” (Long live Germany!”)
The Wurttemberg Battalion, spearheaded by the 150
troops with Rommel, had already captured 6,500 prisoners,
while their main objective, Mount Matajur, still lay ahead of
them.
Rommel’s commanding officer, a Maj. Sprosser, mistakenly
thought Mount Matajur was already secured, and ordered Rom-
mel to move off in another direction. That directive came to most
of the battalion before it came to Rommel, and the main body
11/9/09 12:40:02 PM
 On the line: Central Powers infantry around a light machinegun.
of the unit pulled back. Rommel, however, correctly deduced
Sprosser was ignorant of the fact Mount Matajur hadn’t yet
actually been taken. He therefore disobeyed the order despite
having only 100 men and six heavy machineguns with him.
He had his machinegunners open fire on the Italian posi-
tions at the peak’s base. Following that he again pulled out
his handkerchief and approached the enemy entrenchments
alone. Another 1,200 enemy troops immediately threw up
their hands. Rommel then rushed his men to the mountain’s
summit, where he had his gunners fire on the remaining Italian
positions on the slopes. At 11:40 a.m. on 26 October 1917, he
accepted the surrender of the last 120 Italian soldiers in the
sector. During further fighting, Rommel pushed his battalion
south until they captured the city of Longarone.
Rommel led by example a unit originally trained as a
ski battalion, but he got it to fight flawlessly in the snowless
highlands of northern Italy. Learning (and improvising) in-
filtration tactics as they advanced, the Wurttemberg Battalion
was a large factor in the Central Powers’ great victory on the
Italian front.

On his own volition, Below ordered his troops to
force a crossing. On 2 November the Austro-Hungarian
55th Division captured a damaged bridge at Cornino, and
his men fought their way across the river. A few miles
south, at Pinzano, the German 12th Division followed suit.
In the breakthrough, the Italian 36th and 63rd Divisions
were cut off and surrendered. With the Tagliamento line
flanked, Cadorna faced losing Third Army as well as
having Fourth Army cut off to the north. He therefore
issued orders to both armies to withdraw to the Piave
River.
Ludendorff also issued new orders: to continue the
offensive to the Piave. He then also reinforced the Aus-
tro-Hungarian formations to the north for an advance
south. Had those orders come sooner, as Conrad had
suggested months earlier, three Italian armies could
have been cut off and destroyed.
By 11 November 1917 the Italians had withdrawn
behind the Piave, while two British and four French
divisions arrived to provide reinforcements. Cadorna was
relieved of command and replaced by Gen. Armando
Diaz. The situation seemed to be stabilizing. Below con-
tinued the pursuit and occasionally scored a significant
victory. Rommel’s regiment captured 10,000 Fourth
Army troops at Langerone on 9 November. Reaching the
Piave, the Central Powers stopped, since Below didn’t
have the strength or equipment to push across the river
in the face of the solidifying Allied defense. The battle
drew to a close.
Behind the Debacle
Caporetto was a major disaster for the Italians.
The Central Powers inflicted at least 30,000 killed and
wounded and, more significantly, took 296,000 prisoners.
They also captured an enormous amount of materiel,
including 3,000 guns. In addition, the entire Second
Army had disintegrated. In three weeks of fighting,
everything the Italians had accomplished in two years
of bloodshed had been lost.
For Ludendorff and Below the battle was an amaz-
ing tactical victory, but a limited strategic success.
The Austro-Hungarians gained significant territory in
northeastern Italy; the threat to Trieste was ended, and
the Italian nation was shaken. Had the Central Powers
committed more resources, Italy might have been forced
out of the war.
strategy & tactics 45

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 Recriminations for the disaster started immediately
among the Allies. Capello blamed Cadorna’s passive
defense plan and the lack of priority for the area where
the offensive had begun. Cadorna responded that Capello
had badly prepared Second Army to meet a numerically
inferior foe. Historians have continued the argument
ever since.
Austro-German infiltration tactics succeeded at Ca-
poretto. Italian strongpoints were isolated and cut off,
and their command and communications were disrupted.
Italian artillery lost its coordination, and reinforcements
were delayed or destroyed piecemeal. Reserve posi-
tions were unprepared to withstand attack, especially
those coming from the flank or rear. Decisions, such
as Cadorna’s orders to try to hold at Mount Maggiore,
were made with limited or no intelligence.
Infiltration tactics weren’t new to the Italian Front.
They’d been used by the Austro-Hungarians during
their Trentino offensive in May 1916. The Italians also
had some experience using them. Cadorna’s orders of
10 October specifically mentioned short bombardments
and the need for defense in depth against infiltration.
Unfortunately, the Italian General Staff didn’t dissemi-
nate information or conduct sufficient training to prepare
their forces for the coming offensive.
Italian morale was also critical. Second Army
was plagued by massive desertions; however, Third
and Fourth Armies withdrew in good order without
wholesale desertions despite the confusion and shock.
In addition, the Italians held firm at the Piave without
immediate Allied support. War weariness was a world-
wide phenomenon in 1917, as witnessed by the French
Army mutinies and the Russian Revolution. So, while
certainly a factor in the Italian defeat, particularly for
Second Army, which bore the brunt of the attack, morale
deficiencies aren’t the sole reason for the debacle.
Italian defensive tactics and leadership—or rather,
the lack thereof—were the most significant factors in the
disaster. Cadorna, in his preparations for the impending
attack, broke with doctrine and issued orders for a defense
in depth, but those orders were a month late. Further, he
didn’t follow up to ensure the carrying out of his order.
The same problem had occurred earlier in May 1916,
when preparing for the Austro-Hungarian assault out of
the Trentino. Cadorna had ordered a defense in depth,
but his First Army commander disobeyed and kept his
troops concentrated at the front where the initial enemy
bombardment pounded them. At Caporetto, Capello and
his successor Montouri did much the same thing. Though
three fortified lines existed, too many troops were kept
up front. The opening bombardment destroyed those
units, allowing the Austro-German assault troops to
move through the gaps and attack other positions from
behind.
Cadorna made still other mistakes. His assessment
of the enemy’s intentions was faulty. He expected an
attack farther south, despite intelligence to the contrary.
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 He also assumed his artillery would devastate any attack.
In practice, his loss of communications, combined with
the amazing order to XXVII Corps artillery to conserve
ammunition, unhinged his defensive plan. In short, the
Italian high command didn’t expect the enemy to at-
tack where he did, and they also failed to prepare for
his expected tactics.
Unsuitable tactics, poor morale and badly deployed
defensive positions all combined to create the Italian
disaster at Caporetto. Below and the Austro-German
army had a good plan and used effective tactics. Infil-
tration worked well when combined with the defensive
errors and low morale of the Italian Second Army.
Ludendorff and his Austro-Hungarian allies achieved
the goals they’d set for the offensive, but they missed
the larger strategic opportunity. A concurrent assault
by Conrad could have completely destroyed the Italian
Third and Fourth Armies, as well as Second Army, and Marching back: Italian infantry.
forced Italy out of the war.
Ironically, the offensive also had two adverse impacts
on the Central Powers. The first was a resurgence of
Italian morale. Once they were back fighting on their
own soil, Italian troops rallied and popular support for Sources
the war soared. The resurgent Italians would attack Asprey, Robert B. The German High Command at War: Hindenburg and Luden-
and defeat the Austro-Hungarians at Vittorio Veneto a dorff Conduct World War I. New York: William Morrow, 1991.
year later, knocking the Dual Monarchy out of the war. Burgwyn, H. James. The Legend of the Mutilated Victory: Italy, the Great War,
Second, the Allies learned that better cooperation was and the Paris Peace Conference, 1915-1919. Westport, CT: Greenwood
Press, 1993.
required among them. A Supreme War Council was set
Cruttwell, C.R.M.F. A History of the Great War, 1914-1918. Oxford: Clarendon
up and convened at Rapallo, Italy, in November 1917. Press, 1934.
In all, then, even while achieving a spectacular tactical Edmunds, J. E. History of the Great War: Military Operations Italy, 1915-1919.
victory, the Central Powers actually took a big step London: HMSO, 1949.
toward losing the war at Caporetto. Falls, Cyril. Caporetto, 1917. London: Wiedenfeld & Nicolson, 1965.
Gudmundsson, Bruce. Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in the German Army,
1914-1918. New York: Praeger, 1989.
Haber, L. F. The Poisonous Cloud: Chemical Warfare in the First World War.
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986.
McEntee, Girard L., Italy’s Part in Winning the World War, Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1934
Paschall, Rod. The Defeat of Imperial Germany, 1917-1918. New York: De
Capo Press, 1994.
Rommel, Erwin. Infantry Attacks. Washington, DC: Combat Forces Press,
1956.

strategy & tactics 47

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 DATA FILE: Military Revolution
Thirty Years’ War Combat Formations
by David R. Higgins
Square on the field: Tercios deployed in battle from a contemporary engraving
T
hroughout the 16 century, European armies saw a
th
transformation from their feudal origins into ever-larger
mercenary and increasingly national forces. Infantry
was becoming important. In the 15th century, Swiss pikemen
proved they could engage and defeat feudal heavy cavalry in
open battle. In response, Maximilian I, Holy Roman Emperor
(1508-19), organized the Landsknechte, professional infantry
armed in the same manner as the Swiss, though going them
one better by making increasing use of the new gunpowder
weapons. The Landsknechte were originally to serve only the
Habsburg Empire, but they ended up fighting as mercenaries
throughout Europe.
The Renaissance saw a new wave of wars with the rise
of national states such as France and Spain, the attempts of
Charles V (Holy Roman Emperor, 1519-56) to unify Europe,
the ongoing skirmishing with the Turks, and the emerging
Protestant-Catholic conflict. Command and control needed
to adapt to ensure effective fighting forces, where “wastage
rates” (death and desertion) could be as high as 25% per month
on campaign and up to 50% in battle. Originally, Renaissance
soldiers were grouped into small, autonomous units such as
companies of 100 to 200 men, but the conditions of emerg-
ing modern warfare dictated the need for larger and more
structured formations. Armies campaigned longer and for
48 #260
ST 260 Issue.indd 48
goals that were increasingly national in character. As a result,
companies and other independent units were organized into
larger units such as squadrons and battalions. With larger units
in the field, the need for drill was increased. Troops armed
with gunpowder weapons needed to know such movements
as the countermarch in order to generate greater rates of fire.
In general, commanders realized disciplined movements
provided increased unit flexibility on the battlefield.
As the 17th century opened, European warfare underwent
changes. Open battles were still common, but sieges were
becoming increasingly important as fortification underwent
a revolution. Fortresses were now built according to scien-
tific principles to minimize the advantages of an attacker’s
artillery while maximizing the defender’s firepower. Sieges
constituted a cost-effective, albeit more protracted, means to
secure cities and towns. Growing armies strained logistics,
and the strain increased as the distance from bases increased.
When the system broke down, not only the army suffered but
also the civilian populace, as foraging turned into pillaging
the countryside and looting the towns.
On the battlefield, dense, semi-static squares of pikemen
and musketeers had surpassed heavy cavalry as the dominant
force. The increasing use of gunpowder small arms necessi-
tated cooperation between an army’s arquebusiers/musketeers
11/9/09 12:40:07 PM
 (“shot”), pikes, artillery and cavalry components. The weak-
nesses of one “weapons system” were compensated by the
strengths of another. Musketeers could provide firepower, but
needed pikemen for protection against cavalry. Cavalry, by the
early 17th century, had become increasingly an arm of mobile
firepower, with riders discharging pistols and carbines into
enemy ranks via complex movements such as the caracole.
All that necessitated greater reliance on a professional
military cadre. Commanders accepted greater responsibility
for organizing, equipping and training their men. Administra-
tive and logistical specialists were required to ensure the ranks
were filled and the troops supplied. Junior officers had to be
able to drill their men and lead them on the battlefield.
ST 260 Issue.indd 49
Successful officers needed to be skilled in many disciplines:
tactics, strategy, mathematics, geography, ballistics and en-
gineering. Being able to calculate the time a unit required to
deploy, or the trajectories of artillery, were essential parts of
command. Staff duties included organizing supply, obtaining
provisions, supervising foraging and rounding up wagons
(under a forage master-general), making and breaking camp,
providing judicial services, and gathering intelligence (under
a scoutmaster general); and deploying the army for battle (a
sergeant major general). Two systems of command resulted,
where generals and colonels drawn from the nobility dictated
high-level decisions while sergeants, sergeant majors, and
sergeant major generals led units and enforced discipline.
strategy & tactics 49
11/9/09 12:40:10 PM
 During combat, infantry usually occupied the battleline’s
center and provided the army’s base of maneuver. Infantry
units consisted of pikes and shot, though the musketeers
would sometimes be detached for skirmishing. Heavy and
light cavalry were on the army’s flanks or in reserve. Pioneers,
foragers, field messengers and whatever medical personnel
were available encompassed the remaining force. Pre-battle
preparations included:
• Commanders scouting the terrain and enemy dispositions,
then creating battle plans to be implemented by the sergeant
majors.
• The sergeant major general determining unit frontages
and depths using sophisticated tables.
• Orders regarding the terrain and unit compositions being
passed to subordinate sergeant majors who returned to their
units to inform their officers. They would then march their
men into position according to the deployment require-
ment.
Spain is Square
In 1492 Spain completed the Reconquista, finally driv-
ing the Muslims from Iberia after centuries of conflict. And
the Spanish military learned many lessons from those wars.
Veterans were lightly armed and armored to fight in the hit-
and-run tactics of frontier combat. The Spanish military also
developed what were some of the first combined arms units
in Europe made up of professional soldiers. They included
pikemen (“pike”), arquebusiers/musketeers (“shot”) and
sword-and-shield men. The latter were used as skirmishers
as well as to attack dense pike columns, infiltrating between
the pikemen’s rigid files.
Initially called colonellas (“little columns”), those units
were perfected during Spain’s long wars in Italy against the
French. In 1534 colonellas were combined into larger units
called tercios. Tercios had 3,000 men on paper, though in the
field they counted perhaps 1,500. The ranks were deployed
25-30 men deep, with a frontage of 50-100. The depth was
useful in defense, since a tercio could turn to front, flank or
rear with ease. Moreover, that made battlefield maneuver
easier as the rear ranks simply had to “follow the leader.”
Throughout the 16th century, the mix of weapons changed.
Muskets replaced arquebuses and the sword-and-shield men
disappeared as gunpowder weapons became more efficient.
The three original tercios were the Lombardia (Lom-
bardy), Napoli (Naples) and Sicilia (Sicily), named after the
regions in which they were raised. The “Spanish” army was
cosmopolitan, drawing recruits from all over the Habsburg
(Spanish and Austrian) domains and beyond. The tercios
proved to be an extremely successful battlefield organization
for the Habsburgs in their wars with the Valois Dynasty. Ad-
ditional tercios were soon raised and sent to fight throughout
the Habsburg lands, though officially they fought only for the
King of Spain. Considered an elite, tercios were led by royal
princes called infantas or honorary colonels. (Incidentally,
that is where we get the modern word “infantry,” from foot
soldiers who fought under the infantas.)
Tercios were structured as a cuadro de terreno (“field
square”) with a dense carré of pikemen as a core supported
by mangas of “shot” at the corners. The deployment of
musketeers at each corner of the square offered all-around
firepower at the expense of losing the ability to concentrate
fire in a single direction. The formation as a whole was better
suited to defense. Cavalry was considered the offensive arm
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 on the battlefield, though much changed from its medieval
origins.
Back in the early 16th century, pike formations were so
effective against charges there was a temporary decline in the
cavalry’s presence on the battlefield. That changed for a couple
reasons: one was the increasing use of combined arms tactics;
Arquebusiers/musketeers and cannon could blow gaps in the
pike ranks into which cavalry could charge. Also, the cavalry
increasingly adapted gunpowder weapons, wheel-lock pistols
and carbines, which allowed horsemen to engage infantry.
Firepower was increasing. Muskets fired a heavier round
than the arquebus. Greater penetration of armor could be
achieved, though the additional weight fatigued the user
and necessitated a fork to support the piece during firing.
Skirmishers screened an army’s front and used firepower
to break-up enemy formations prior to contact. Additional
arquebusier/musketeer “garrisons” (a unit type) functioned
similarly to the mangas, except the former remained with
the pikemen while the latter was permitted to operate semi-
autonomously.
The Spaniards were also adept at using field fortifications
to bolster the defense. Two of the greatest Spanish victories of
this era, Cerignola/Barletta (1503) and Bicocca (1522), were
won by them using entrenchments to protect their arquebus-
iers.
As for artillery, the guns were largely immobile once
emplaced on the battlefield. They were deployed between
the tercio’s main body and the forward skirmishers to sup-
port friendly forces during the advance. Gunners tended to
be trained technicians and were frequently outside the normal
chain of command.
Spain’s military system dominated European battlefields
until the early Thirty Years War (1618-1648), but like all
military systems, someone found a way to beat it.

New Regiments
Though tercios excelled in open battles, siege and vari-
ous forms of set-piece combat, Spain’s long-running war in
the Netherlands necessitated adjustments. In 1566 the Dutch
revolted against their Spanish overlords. Spain moved to crush
the rebels but found the battlefields in the Netherlands restricted
by canals and other impediments to open warfare. Maurice
of Nassau, the revolt’s great military leader, reorganized the
Dutch army and is usually credited for inventing linear tactics,
reducing unit depth and maximizing firepower.
All that forced the tercios to “re-lighten,” with depth
reduced to around 10 ranks per unit. Musketeers no longer
functioned well in the traditional manga corners due to the
reduction of depth and instead deployed in two groups, one
on each of the pike block’s flanks. Likewise, the added flank
protection provided by the “garrisons” was phased out as
the thinner ranks proved more flexible and enabled greater
concentrated firepower. By the opening of the Thirty Years
War, the Spanish army was taking on a new look.
The Habsburg clashes with Sweden’s King Gustavus Adol-
phus at Breitenfeld (1631) and Luetzen (1632) completed the
transition. The traditional “Spanish square” tercios were out-
moded. That was recognized by Spanish military thinkers. At
Luetzen, for example, Albrecht von Wallenstein, commanding
the Habsburg army, deployed his tercios in shallow formations
in order to counter Swedish fire tactics. Now “auxiliary” tercios
were being raised, composed of 1,000 men in 10 companies.
They were followed in 1637 by “provincial” tercios with 1,200
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 Arms & the Post-Renaissance Soldier
By the end of the 16th century, gunpowder weapons were
well established in Europe’s military mainstream. Dense blocks
of pikemen and supporting musketeers supplanted heavy
cavalry as the dominant battlefield formation. Combined-arms
armies integrated artillery, infantry and cavalry to support
each other and offer superior tactical flexibility and mobil-
ity. As wars increased in scope and duration, survival on the
battlefield increasingly depended on discipline, organization
and logistics. The Thirty Years War offered an environment
to apply new tactics and technologies, as well as ushering in
the modern age of warfare.
Pikemen formed the central core of infantry units. They
were useful for repelling cavalry, and carrying the shock of-
fensive via the “push of pike,” though they were increasingly
vulnerable to fire weapons. Throughout this period, troops
would often cut down the length of their own pike shafts to
make them more useful in the offense.
Musketeers were armed mainly with the matchlock, a big
heavy piece requiring a rest to be fired. Muskets could provide
a steady volume of fire via countermarch tactics, in which
the front rank of a column of musketeers would fire, then
march to the rear to reload, being replaced by the next rank.
Coming into use was volley fire, in which musketeers formed
in shallow lines, maximizing the number of weapons firing.
The arquebus, an older and lighter version of the musket, was
sometimes used by skirmishers. Also coming into play was
the “firelock,” a musket that used a wheel-lock or flintlock
to ignite the powder. While more effective than matchlocks,
they still had mechanical “bugs” to be worked out before they
could be mass-issued.
Swords were carried by all infantry, though there were
increasingly fewer chances to use them. Meanwhile, body
armor was being lightened, and even eliminated, as it was
little protection against gunpowder weapons.
Cavalry were of several general types. The older heavies
used the caracole, advancing toward the enemy at the trot, firing
their pistols, then countermarching to reload. The objective
of the caracole was to first disorder the enemy formation and
then charge-in and exploit any gaps in the enemy line. Swedes,
Poles and French used their cavalry for shock action instead.
Dragoons were originally mounted infantry, but were rapidly
becoming mobile firepower and general purpose troops.
Field artillery for the most part consisted of big heavy
guns that had little battlefield mobility. It was not uncommon
during a battle for one side to capture the enemy’s guns and
then turn them around on their former employers. The Swedes
introduced light, mobile guns to provide direct support for the
infantry.
Throughout the Thirty Years War, the long-standing mer-
cenary approach to war yielded to armies becoming nationally
based, or at least recruited around a cadre of national officers.
The art of war advanced rapidly and professionalism, science,
and speed became essential criteria. Those armies whose
commanders did not possess forward-looking mindsets risked
defeat and destruction. The increasing cost of war crippled
even governments with deep pockets, as each struggled to
keep forces in the field through extended campaign seasons
and long sieges. Perhaps most important, firepower ushered
in a new age of warfare founded on principles of maneuver-
ability and combined arms. Each country’s army organized
its units to adapt to those conditions.
52 #260
ST 260 Issue.indd 52
men in 12 companies. Three years later, tercios incorporated
Dutch-style Vanguard, Bataille and Rearguard configurations
as part of a battalion structure. Finally, in 1704, King Philip
V of Spain abolished the tercio designation and replaced it
with the more modern French-style “regiment.”
Dutch Regiment & Swedish Brigade
During the Dutch Revolt (1566-1648), Maurice of Nassau’s
Dutch had to fight against the Spanish who had the initial
edge with their disciplined professional army, backed up
by the resources of an entire empire. So Maurice upgraded
his army. He developed volley fire, standardized weapons,
established an equal musket to pike ratio in the ranks, and
published the first pictorial drill manual. He also instituted
regular payment to the troops, itself something of a revolution
in an era in which soldiers’ pay was often years in arrears.
Constant drill increased his musketeer’s rate-of-fire. Units
were deployed in linear formations that allowed the soldiers
to deliver a coordinated, continuous, and devastating volley
or “countermarch” fire.
Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden expanded the Dutch tactics
by introducing lighter muskets that eliminated need for the
forked rest. He also brought in lighter guns that could keep up
with the infantry and provide mobile firepower. For command
control, he formed brigades as the highest regular command.
Brigades were composed of three or four half-regiments (bat-
talions/squadrons), each of eight companies. Depth was just
six ranks to enable groups of three lines to fire simultaneously.
After discharging their pieces, the musketeers would fall back
a couple paces and be replaced by the other three ranks who
would fire. With that revolving system of volleys, the enemy
could be kept under continuous fire.
Gustavus is also known for employing his cavalry for
battlefield shock. They could do so as they were supported
by light guns and detached parties of musketeers, who could
break up enemy formations for the cavalry to exploit with
sword in hand. Gustavus’s re-organization gave the infantry
the decisive combination of firepower and protection, and the
cavalry the necessary mobility and shock, creating a battle-
wining system.
Swedish cavalry usually formed in three ranks, with the
front armed with pistols. Musketeer units would be interspaced
with the horse. In the attack, horsemen would advance at a
brisk walk with swords drawn. Once in pistol range the front
rank would open fire, supported by the musketeers, and then
all three lines would charge. The combination of shock and
firepower proved deadly, but the reliance on the musketeers
presented a minor handicap insofar as the infantry could not
move fast enough to keep up with the horse.
Though the brigade was a somewhat common if ad-hoc
battle formation by the late 1620s, Gustavus made it a perma-
nent structure with an assigned command hierarchy. A colonel
commanded the brigade, a lieutenant colonel a squadron, and
a captain the company, with subordinate officers operating as
lieutenants. The brigade formed a “T” with its base toward
the enemy. Pikemen formed a protective core from which
musketeers at the rear and flanks could maneuver, fire and
return to reload in relative safety. “Commanded” (detached)
musketeers anchored the rear of the formation, as well as per-
forming reconnaissance, outpost, and cavalry support duties.
The flexibility, maneuverability, and firepower of the individual
squadrons were superior to the sluggish tercio, but the higher
brigade configurations nonetheless proved troublesome.
continues on page 57
11/9/09 12:40:13 PM
 Spain (1618-1648)
For decades, Catholic Spain had dominated Europe politi-
cally and militarily. Spain’s profitable overseas empire sup-
ported a successful, disciplined army that was as much emulated
as feared. Supplanting condottieri (Italian mercenaries) and
Swiss schlachthaufen (“battle crowds”), Spanish soldiers were
solid professionals. They formed mixed independent infantry
companies, which were grouped into colonellas (Italian for
“little columns”) of pikemen and arquebusiers/musketeers.
The Spaniards also made some use of sword and shield armed
infantry who were useful in attacking enemy pikemen, though
their use had died out in the mid-16th century. Colonellas were
grouped in threes and became known as tercios (“thirds”),
being the equivalent of a reinforced regiment. The tercios
originated in 1534 during the Italian Wars (1494-1559), and
excelled in open terrain battlefields and the slow, methodical
tactics of the day.

Tercio (with “horns”, i.e., arquebusiers) (1620) (3,000 men)

3 coronelia (battalions) of 4 banderas (companies) each
(250 men)
Carré (“square” formation) (1,566 men)
Concentrated pikemen core to protect arquebusiers/mus-
keteers from enemy cavalry.
Pikemen could disengage from the carré to form with
cuerno.
“Push of pike” combat where the first 4-5 rows engage
while the remaining ranks support them by “pushing” at
their backs to add to shock effect.
Cuerno (“horn” formation) (972 men)
Mobile arquebusier groups deployed to support each
corner of the carré.
Rear cuerno could deploy with those in front when the
enemy was exclusively forward.
Can reinforce other units, form independent cuerno, or
skirmish.
Deployed from 3 to 12 rows deep depending on the desired
firing type (constant fire, precise fire, or volley).
Garrisons (270 men)
Skirmishers (192 men)
8 arquebusier companies deployed in front to disorganize
an opponent prior to contact.
Difficult to control in combat.
Tercios:
Required experienced soldiers due to formations’ com-
plexity.
Were both administrative and tactical formation integrat-
ing a permanent staff.
Fought independently and not as part of larger (brigade
level) units.
Unit depth provided all-around protection better suited
for defense than offense.
Deeper formations probably not used after the Battle of
White Mountain (in 1620).
Were increasingly referred to as regiments after the 16th cen-
tury (some references 10-company units being “regiments”
while tercio remained a term for 12-company units).
Deployment
3 tercios (1 forward and 2 to its rear flanks)
4 tercios (diamond configuration)
Escuadrón (“swarm”) (1,000 men): Ad-hoc configuration
(regimental structure) of experienced musketeers/arquebusiers
and/or pikemen companies (from several tercios/regiments)
for specific missions. Often substituted for tercios.
Tropa (“troop”): Newly-raised companies formed as detach-
ments (organized as echelon between companies and tercios/
regiments). Increased infantry flexibility in the field.
Cavalry Regiment (1620) (600 troopers)
2 squadrons (300 troopers)
Each of 5 corneta (companies).
Deep formations to facilitate caracole.
Provincial trozo (“piece” or cavalry section, began organiza-
tion in 1643) (600 troopers)
2 squadrons of 3 corneta (companies) each.
Company (102 troopers).
Heavy cavalry (cavallos lanzas/ corazas) and light horse-
men anchored the army’s flanks.
Mounted arquebusiers were replaced by dragoons in the
1640s.
From Colonello to Coronelia & Back Again
The English word “colonel” has its origins in the Old
Italian word colonello, meaning a little column (equivalent
to a battalion). The Spanish term for the commander of such
a unit was coronelia. Eventually it made its way into Eng-
lish as the commander of a regiment. Oddly enough, while
English retained the spelling from “colonello” it took on the
pronunciation from “coronelia” with the hard “r.”

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 The Empire (1618-1648) United Provinces (Dutch) (1619-1648)
The “Empire” was the general term for the Habsburg holdings Since 1568, Dutch success in its rebellion against Spain
in Europe, sometimes known as the Holy Roman Empire (though, was largely the result of Maurice of Nassau’s tactics. They
as both philosophers and wags pointed out, it was neither “holy” emphasized firepower over mass. Initially, the Dutch orga-
[being a secular state], “Roman” [the city of Rome was outside its nized militias similar to Germany’s solid infantry regiments
boundaries], nor much of an “empire” [consisting of various scat- and waardgelders (burgher militia) companies, but they were
tered kingdoms, principalities and free cities]). During the Thirty consistently outclassed by Spanish professionalism. Maurice
Years War, the emperor ruled from Vienna, though closely aligned subsequently adapted his forces to follow Roman-inspired drill,
with Habsburg Spain. Troops were drawn from all over Europe. discipline and deployment flexibility. He drilled the Dutch
army to deliver continuous firepower via countermarching
Infantry Regiment (with “sleeves”) (organized in 1631): El pro- ranks of musketeers. He used linear configurations to place
longado de gran frente (“wide extension”) (1,000 men) many muskets up front. He also paid the troops regularly,
10 banderas (companies) a revolutionary idea at the time. Aided by the terrain of the
Carré (340 men) rebellious northern half of the Spanish Netherlands (known as
the United Provinces after 1606, modern Holland), Maurice’s
Manga (“sleeve”) (486 men)
new army outmaneuvered its sluggish Spanish adversary,
Garrisons (100 men)
eventually forcing the Empire to recognize the country’s
Skirmishers (75 men) independence.
Cavalry Regiment (organized in 1631) (600 troopers)
2 squadrons (300 troopers) Provincial Infantry Regiment (organized in 1619) (800
Each of 5 corneta (companies). men)
Deep formations to facilitate caracole. 2 hopen (battalions) (400 men each)
8 companies (100 men each)
Catholic League (1609-1635) Pikemen companies (200 men)
The Catholic League was formed under the guidance of Duke Positioned in front or center of musketeers as enemy
Maximilian of Bavaria as a confederacy of the Catholic states in closes.
Germany. Getting the diverse German states to cooperate was at first Musketeer companies (200 men)
difficult, but by 1620 the League formed a mercenary army that had
Positioned in front if enemy was at a distance to ensure
about 30,000 soldiers.
maximum firepower.
Infantry Regiment (organized 1625) (1,000 men)
8 ranks after 1630 (2 sections of 4 for volley fire).
10 banderas (companies) (100 men each) Linear formations present a reduced artillery target than
Pikemen (512 men). denser tercios.
Musketeers (320 men). Gaps are left open between unit flanks to allow reserves
Musketeers/skirmishers (160 men). to move forward.
German landsknechts (mercenaries) also adopted this forma- Provincial Brigade (organized in 1619) (3,200 men)
tion. 4 mutually-supporting regiments
Infantry Regiment (with “sleeves”) (organized in 1631) (2,000 “Vanguard” (regiment), front line.
men) “Bataille” (2 x regiments), main line.
10 companies (200 men each) “Rearguard” (regiment), reserve.
Carré (680 Provincial Infantry Regiment (organized in 1629) (550
Manga (“sleeve”) (1,026 men) men)
Garrisons (200 men) Deploy either abreast or in a checkerboard formation
Skirmishers (93 men) Pikemen company (250 men)
Cavalry Regiment (organized in 1631) (600 troopers) Musketeer company (300 men)
2 squadrons (300 troopers) Provincial Cavalry Regiment (organized in 1629) (600
Each of 5 corneta (companies). men)
6 compagnies (companies) (100 men)
Deep formations to facilitate caracole.
Companies deployed in a checkerboard formation
Walloon
Walloons came from the French speaking part of what were then
the Habsburg Netherlands, modern Belgium. They had a reputation
as stolid mercenaries and did much service in the Spanish army.
Tercio (with “surrounds”) (organized in 1621) (3,000 men)
10 companies (300 men each)
Pikemen (1,152 men)
Musketeers (1,560 men)
Musketeers (480 men)
Cavalry Regiment (organized in 1621) (600 troopers)
2 squadrons (300 troopers each)
Each of 5 corneta (companies).
Deep formations to facilitate caracole. Infantry support: multi-barreled light artillery piece.
54 #260

ST 260 Issue.indd 54 11/9/09 12:40:14 PM

 Sweden (1626-1648)
As king of Sweden (1611–1632), Gustavus Adolphus
established a sophisticated administrative system that enabled
him to form a “modern” army, inspired by Maurice of Nassau
and other progressive military thinkers. He employed new
methods to conscript, equip and supply troops in the field,
as well as training them in innovative and complex tactics
to promote speed, flexibility and continuous firepower. With
Protestant fortunes waning by 1630, Adolphus embarked on
an invasion of central Germany to balance power against
the Catholic Habsburgs and establish Sweden as a European
power. Much of the Swedish army, by the way, was recruited
from foreigners.
Infantry half-regiment (battalion) (organized in 1631) (500
men).
Tactical/administrative formation integrating a permanent
staff.
8 companies.
Pikemen company (216 men).
Musketeer company (192 men).
Salvo firing from alternate platoons or ranks.
“Commanded” (attached) Musketeers (96 men).
Often integrated with cavalry.
Infantry regiments have their own light artillery.
Officers encouraged to show initiative.
Integrated, mutually-supporting unit types providing better
protection, mobility, and hitting power than tercios or even
the Dutch linear formations.
Brigade (1627-1634) (1,500 men)
3 half-regiments deploy in an inverted “T” formation.
Effective if formation was retained, easily disrupted in
combat.
1627, 1631-1634
3 squadrons per brigade (1,500 men)
1632: Sweden moves from lighter to heavier artillery.
1634: Brigade echelon abolished as not providing enough
offensive power.
Smaller is better: battalion deployed for combat.
ST 260 Issue.indd 55
1628-1630
4 squadrons per brigade (2,000 men).
Cavalry (reiterei) Regiment (1631) (400 troopers)
2 squadrons of 4 companies each.
Companies (50 troopers).
Finnish Hakkapeliitat composition as well.
Cavalry and “commanded” (attached) musketeers.
Deployed in alternating small squares for added ma-
neuverability and protection.
Disciplined cavalry countercharge after the “com-
manded” musketeers disorder an enemy with fire.
Cold steel attacks stressed (mass, speed, and shock) over
caracole.
Difficult to control horses and horsemen after combat
was joined.
In 1630 Swedish artillery was grouped under a single
“General of Artillery” with cannons of shorter, lighter, and
limited caliber compositions than their European contempo-
raries. That made them easier to deploy and maneuver on the
battlefield. The guns were classed as follows.
“Siege” (24-pounder): Three, one and a half, and three
quarter ton sizes firing round shot.
“Field” (12 and 6-pounder): One and a quarter, under
one, and slightly over half a ton varieties firing grape
and canister.
“Regimental” (3-pounder): Two to a regiment, firing
grape and canister.
Fixed ammunition in wooden cases enabled a rate of
fire 1.3 times greater than muskets.
Provided direct infantry support at the unit level.
France (1619-1621, 1628-1648)
The primary French concern in this period was maintaining
a balance of power against the Habsburgs. The French army
was in poor shape owing to too many inexperienced soldiers
and a lack of finances. French troops were sent to aid the United
Provinces to gain experience, while alliances were forged with
several Protestant groups that offered support and military
advisors. Effectively, Catholic France prefered to promote its
national interest instead of religious sectarianism. Following
Sweden’s military successes, France adopted the more flexible
Dutch-inspired military model. During the 1640s the French
army was overhauled, expanded and buttressed by the inclusion
of 8,000 ex-Swedish veterans.
Infantry Regiment (1643) (500 men)
20 companies (25 men each)
Pikemen company (174 men)
Musketeer company (324 men)
Fusiliers: Armed with flintlocks instead of matchlocks
Enfants perdus (“Lost Children”/“Forlorn Hopes”): Hand-
picked, ad-hoc, mixed weapons infantry for special assign-
ments.
Senior regiments occupied flanks.
Cavalry Regiment (1643) (300 troopers)
2 squadrons (150 troopers each) of 2 companies
strategy & tactics 55
11/9/09 12:40:15 PM
 Nations supporting the Habsburgs: Nations against the Emperor:
Poland (1618-1620, 1625-1629, 1631-1634) Russia (1629-1634)
Niemiski Autorament (Foreign Model) Kormovye (enlisted/ “supplied by the state”) Infantry Regiment
Army mainly mercenary. (1630) (1,600 men)
Pluk (Infantry Regiment) (organized in 1633) (1,600 men) Regimental staff
8 choragiew (companies) (200 men) 8 companies (200 men each)
Employed countermarch. Musketeers (120 men)
Rajtar (Reiter, cavalry) Regiment (300 troopers) Pikemen (80 each)
Poczet (“fellowship”), no greater than 3 ranks deep. Reiter (heavy cavalry) Regiment (1632) (2,000 troopers)
Large wing formations designed for deep and/or encircling 14 companies (144 troopers each)
thrusts after enemy disrupted by infantry and artillery. 1633- dragoon company (400 troopers) added
Stationary tabor (armored wagon trains) often anchor (Imperial model)
cavalry flanks. Bohemia (1618-1620)
Excessively long lances in the lead ranks useful for spear- Infantry Regiment (with “surrounds”) (1620) (1,100 men)
ing enemy pikemen. Pikemen (510 men)
Narodnie Autorament (Traditional Model) Musketeers (600 men)
Mainly Poles and Hungarians. Brandenburg (1636-1641)
Cavalry-heavy formations. Savoy (1618-1619)
Levied “quarter troops.” Saxony (1630-1635)
Dynamic, cavalry-heavy style contrasting with Western Transylvania (1618-1621, 1622-1624, 1625-1626, 1629-1631,
Europe’s systematic tactics. 1643-1645)
Infantry initially not a separate entity. (Dutch model)
Pro-Habsburg countries using the Imperial Denmark (1642-1645)
England (1619-1621, 1624-1630)
military model
Infantry Regiment (1630) (1,500 men)
Bavaria (1619-1646, 1647-1648)
10 companies (150 men)
Brandenburg (1630-1635)
Cavalry Regiment (1630) (500 troopers)
Papacy (Papal States) (1618-1629, 1631-1632)
10 squadrons (50 troopers each)
Savoy (1629-1631)
Hesse-Kassel (1629-1648)
Saxony (1619-1620, 1636-1645)
Palatinate (1618-1632)
Pro-Habsburg countries using the Dutch Swiss Confederation
military model Regiment (mercenary) (1643) (1,600 men)
Denmark (1624-1629 and 1642-1645) 8 companies
Infantry Regiment (1,400 men) Pikemen (640 men)
7 companies (200 men) Musketeers (960 men)
Cavalry Regiment (600 men)
6 companies (100 men)

The price of power: Austrian mercenary warlord Wallenstein is assassinated.

56 #260

ST 260 Issue.indd 56 11/9/09 12:40:16 PM

 For one thing, the Swedish brigade became ever more difficult to control as it required
experienced soldiers to operate effectively. Sweden could field a well trained army in 1630
when it intervened in the Thirty Years War. Attrition among commanders and especially junior A Novel
officers undermined command control. Following Adolphus’s death at Luetzen, the brigade’s
complex structure was deemed inappropriate for offensive action. In 1634 it was abolished in
favor of individual squadrons and half-regiments. The Battle of
Under Gustavus, the Swedish army displayed considerable restraint for the time, as did his
mercenary units (mainly German and Scottish). Looting and pillaging were minimized. But as
Sweden’s fortunes waned, the army became composed of a greater percentage of mercenaries
73 Easting
whose loyalty to the profession outweighed that of the cause. Discipline diminished and an
increasing number of troops resorted to the customary plundering to offset privation.

On to Rocroi The
France declared war on Spain in 1635, seeking to adjust the European balance of power in
favor of itself. Louis XIII’s army at the time lacked discipline and was under-funded. Cardinal
Richelieu reinvigorated the army with a war ministry to build a new military organization,
First Gulf War
recruit soldiers and provide logistical support. Spain’s success with tercios prompted France
to incorporate their basic structure on a smaller scale. The French units were called regiments,
composed of one or more battalions. The latter were generally organized six-deep with pikemen Through a howling sand
in the center, flanked by musketeers. When deployed, the battalions would form a checkerboard
formation with an interval large enough to allow second-line and reserve battalions to pass storm, against the Iraqi
through the gaps. That gave the battalions space to maneuver, while allowing the front to be Republican Guard; the
solidified by moving up units from the rear. A high percentage of “shot” to pike (3:2) permitted
musketeer detachments to break-off and support the cavalry as needed. Cavalry commanders largest and most intense
were aggressive and capable of implementing wide sweeping maneuvers on the field.
The French system proved its worth at the battle of Rocroi (19 May 1643), where the regi-
tank battle of the First
ments smashed Spain’s tercios. By the end of the Thirty Years War, France’s military system Gulf War...
was in position to dominate Europe.

Sources
Parrot, David A. Strategy and Tactics in the Thirty Years’ War: The “Military Revolution”. Mil-
itärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen (MGM) 38, 1985, S. 7
Hoeven, Marco van der. Ed. Exercise of Arms Warfare in the Netherlands, 1568-1648. New York,
N.Y. 1997.
Basta, Giorgio. Il maestro di campo generale. Venice. 1606. [microfilm]
Il governo della cavalleria leggiera. Venice. 1612. [microfilm]
Cruso, John. Militarie Instructions for the cavallrie, or, Rules and directions for the service of
horse. Cambridge. 1644. [microfilm]
Cuesta, Julio Albi de la. De Pavía a Rocroi: Los tercios de infantería española en los siglos XVI y
XVII. Madrid. 1999.
Gheyn, Jacob de. The Exercise of Armes for Caliures, Musketts and Pikes. 1607. [microfilm]
Markham, Gervase. The Souldiers Grammer. 1627. [microfilm]
The Souldiers Exercise. 1639. [microfilm]
Brockington, William S. ed. Monro His Expedition with the Worthy Scots Regiment. 1637.

Available at
Parker, Geoffrey. The army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567-1659: the logistics of Spanish
victory and defeat in the Low Countries’ Wars. Cambridge. 2004.
Quatrefages, René. Los tercios españoles (1567-1577). Madrid. 1979.
Ward, Robert. Anima’dversions of warre; or, A militarie magazine of the truest rules, and ablest
instructions, for the managing of warre. London. 1639.
Watts, William. The Swedish Intelligencer, Part III. London. 1633.
Amazon
The Swedish Intelligencer, Part I. London. 1634.
Wallhausen, Johann Jacobi von. Corpus militare. Hanover, [1617]). [microfilm]
Art militaire a cheval. 1621. [microfilm]
Swedish General Staff. Sveriges Krig 1611-1632, I-IV. Stockholm. 1939.
www.gulfwarone.com
strategy & tactics 57

ST 260 Issue.indd 57 11/9/09 12:40:17 PM

 Mega Feedback Report: Results from issue #258
The Mega-Feedback survey was run in issue
#258 and was posted on the S&T website. Total
responses ran about the same as last time while
the proportion of responses coming in through
the web page continued to climb. We cut the
response postcard due to the reality that the price
of printing 15,000 postcards to get less than
100 responses via postcards is not worth it; the
respondents who mail in their feedback also tend
to add a lot of comments that take up more than
a postcard’s worth of space so we used to get the
postcard plus a letter. Now for the game proposals! It’s another
In addition to the customary game propos-
als, we asked other questions about the focus
of future magazines we are considering and
the possible formats. The response to starting
another magazine was quite positive although
a shade less than our WWII magazine World at
War. At this stage, we were more interested in
the responses about the various format possi-
bilities: Game versus No Game, Board versus
Computer, and a Game in every issue versus an
annual Special Edition. In these areas the re-
sponse was decisive about there being a game in
the magazine and that the games be board games
rather than computer games. Whether a game
was included in every issue or once a year or
what the topic of a new magazine was more of a
split result. We’ll be conducting further research
2009 2010
WWI 255: Battle Over Britain 261: Kaiser’s War 267: Russian Civil War
Gunpowder 256: Marlborough’s Bat. 262: Frederick’s War 268: When Lions Sailed
Modern 257: Chosin 263: Kabul & Wurzburg 269: Falklands
Americana 258: Santiago Camp. 264: Shiloh
WWII 259: Battle for China 265: Op. Jubilee
Ancient 260: Black Prince 266: Reconquista
58 #260
ST 260 Issue.indd 58
before proceeding and appreciate the feedback
comments respondents provided about the vari-
ous possibilities.
One area we are proceeding with is the Spe-
cial Editions. We’ve decided to begin publishing
the Special Edition topics once every two years.
The next Special Edition will be Russian Civil
War in issue #267. We’ll continue publishing a
Special Edition every two years and expect the
era category for the Special Edition to vary each
time.
mixed bag of new designers and returning
designers. Veteran designer Joseph Miranda
was the only designer to be selected more than
once (Lions Sailed, Anaconda, and Russian Civil
War). Returning designers include several regu-
lars: Javier Romero (Pacific War), Brian Train
& Ty Bomba (Reichswehr), and Paul Youde
(Tobruk). Also welcome to all the new design-
ers: Robert Cowling (Lepanto), William Nester
(Ticondaroga), Dan Cooper (Irish Uprising),
and Roger Deal with new scenarios for a Joseph
Miranda design in the Special Edition (Sun
Never Sets 2).
2011 2012
273: Irish Uprising
(Special Edition)
274: Pacific War
275: Anaconda
270: Amer Rev. 276: Ticondaroga
271: 2nd Kharkov 277: Tobruk
272: Julian 278: Lepanto
11/9/09 12:40:17 PM
 Struggle for the
Galactic Empire
In the far future, Earth is a distant myth. When mankind
gained the means to transit the vastness of space safely
and quickly, a great human wave extended across the
galaxy, and humans soon inhabited thousands of worlds.
Communities of worlds formed alliances; alliances became
federations, and eventually a galactic empire was born.
That empire existed for millennia, growing and consoli-
dating, bringing most of the inhabited worlds under its
control.
Despite its size and apparent success, though, all is
not well in the Galactic Empire. There are rebels, usurp-
ers, those who want to create empires of their own, and
aliens of every imaginable form. Over the long millennia,
even the form of man is taking a new shape with genetic
engineering.
Struggle for the Galactic Empire is a solitaire science
fiction game. You assume leadership of the forces of the
Galactic Empire as it strives to maintain and expand its
dominion while fighting off the forces of chaos that seek
to destroy it. You make all the military, political, social and
economic decisions to deal with the threats that arise,
keep the far-flung empire stable, and still expand and bring
new glory through discovery, colonization and conquest.
The map shows the entire galaxy divided into sectors
of star systems. Production is carried out by nano-assem-
blers to create starships and world-sized weapons. Units
include combat and colonization ships, control groups and
leaders. Units have two types of combat values: weap-
ons and morphogenetic systems. Weapons destroy the
enemy, while morphogenetic systems change them into
friends. Loyalties switch back and forth depending on the
situation.
Threats are generated by over 100 randomly drawn
chaos markers. They include: rebels, usurpers, independent
empires, invaders and alien forces, as well as technologi-
cal, economic, social, political and military events. You can
also launch expeditions to attempt to gain new knowledge
and technology. Other rules allow you to use psychosocial
warfare and propaganda to repress rebellions.

Contents:
• 176 Die cut counters • Player Aid cards $50 Available Now!
• 1 34” x 22” Map • 1 Die
• Rule booklet • Storage bags PO Box 21598
Bakersfield CA 93390
661/587-9633 • fax 661/587-5031 • www.decisiongames.com
Name
Address Shipping Charges (Rates are subject to change without notice.)
City/State/Zip 1st unit Adt’l units Type of Service
Country $12 $2 UPS Ground/USPS Priority Mail add $5
24 3 Canada
V/MC # Exp.
34 3 Europe, South America, Asia
Signature 36 5 Australia
Phone #
strategy & tactics 59

ST 260 Issue.indd 59 11/9/09 12:40:19 PM

 New Games for 2009!
D-Day at Omaha
Beach
6 June 1944
D-Day at Omaha Beach recreates America’s most bloody
and heroic day of World War II. In this solitaire game from the
designer of the solo classics RAF and Ambush, you control the
forces of the US 1st and 29th Divisions landing under fire on the
Normandy shore, and struggling desperately to establish a vi-
able beachhead. The game is also great for two players playing
cooperatively, each controlling one US division.
US units include assault infantry, amphibious tanks, artil-
lery, engineers and HQs. The game system controls the hidden
German defenders in Widerstandsnest resistance points on the
bluffs overlooking the beaches. US forces that manage to break
through the deadly coastal defenses and reach the high ground
must then contend with German mobile reinforcements in the
bewildering hedgerows of Normandy’s bocage. An innovative
diceless combat system highlights unknown enemy deployments
and the importance of utilizing the right weapons and tactics.
Event cards keep the action flowing and the rules simple,
while controlling German strategy and introducing extensive
historical detail. The game includes amphibious landings, Ger-
man artillery and rocket barrages, US naval bombardment, tides,
engineer operations, and intangibles such as US leadership under
fire and the initiative of the American GIs.
Scenarios: The First Waves (two to three hour playtime) intro-
duces the basics of the game in a recreation of the initial assault.
Beyond the Beach (four to five hours) picks up on the high ground
at 10:00 a.m. and adds rules for German tactics. D-Day at Omaha
Beach (seven hours) covers the entire day, from 6:15 a.m. to 6:00
p.m. Optional rules explore what-ifs, such as more pre-invasion
bombardment or the arrival of German armor.

Game Contents:
• 352 5/8” Counters
• One 34x22” Full-Color Game Map
• 55 Event Cards
• Rules Booklet
• Historical Study Booklet
• Player Aid Cards.
Game Scale
Time: each turn equals 15 minutes in the basic game,
30 in the extended game.
Units: companies for both sides.
Map: each hex equals 275 yards (250 meters).
Players: one or two.
60 #260

ST 260 Issue.indd 60 11/9/09 12:40:22 PM

 :
Ed i tion
ayer
RAF
N e w
o- P l
The Battle of Britain, 1940
A l l
& Tw
France has fallen. England stands alone against the might of a triumphant Germany,
r e
tai
defended only by the Spitfire and Hurricane squadrons of the Royal Air Force. Hitler
l i
So orders his mighty Luftwaffe to destroy the RAF in preparation for Operation Sealion—the
invasion of England. German fighters and bombers fill the English skies and the RAF
responds.
Now you command the RAF or the Luftwaffe in history’s greatest air campaign—the
Battle of Britain. Improving on his award winning solitaire classic, designer John Butterfield
ramps up the historical accuracy, tension and play options with three complete games.
RAF: Lion puts you in control of British Fighter Command, responding to German raids.
The game’s unique card system generates targets and forces, which may remain hidden
until after you commit your squadrons. Your foe is no mindless system: the Luftwaffe
has priorities and a strategy. Scenarios range from one raid day, taking an hour to
complete, to the full campaign, playable in 12 hours.
RAF: Eagle puts you in control of the Luftwaffe forces raiding England. You schedule raids
and assign missions to your bombers and fighters, attempting to deliver the knockout
blow. Can you take out the British radar system and cripple their aircraft production?
The game controls the RAF response to your strategies. How does a foe so close to
defeat keep coming back?
RAF: 2-Player pits you against a live opponent, one controlling Fighter Command and the
other the raiding Luftwaffe forces. Historical features include: German high command
priorities, close escort, free hunt, the Channel Patrol, Jabos, day and night bombing,
radar, the Observer Corps, weather, ULTRA intercepts, squadron patrols, “big wings,”
altitude advantage, ace squadrons and flak.
Game Scale
Time: each game turn equals a “raid day” with six two-hour segments.
Units: British squadrons and German Gruppen.
Map: one inch equals 20 miles (32 kilometers). Contents:
• 176 Die cut counters
• 165 Cards
• 3 34” x 22” Map
• Rule booklets
• Player Aid cards & display
• 2 Dice
• Storage bags

QTY Title Price Total

RAF: Lion vs Eagle $75
D-Day at Omaha Beach $55

Shipping
PO Box 21598
Bakersfield CA 93390
Name 661/587-9633 • fax 661/587-5031 • www.decisiongames.com
Address
City/State/Zip Shipping Charges (Rates are subject to change without notice.)
1st unit Adt’l units Type of Service
Country
$12 $2 UPS Ground/USPS Priority Mail add $5
V/MC # Exp.
24 3 Canada
Signature 34 3 Europe, South America, Asia
Phone # 36 5 Australia
strategy & tactics 61

ST 260 Issue.indd 61 11/9/09 12:40:24 PM

 AVAILABLE
Available
NOW!
Fall 2009

$70 0000
$80

62 #260

ST 260 Issue.indd 62 11/9/09 12:40:26 PM

 Windows Edition
War in Europe is a computer-moderated simulation of the European Theater
of Operations in World War II.  There’s no computer/AI player in the game;
players make all the critical decisions. You decide on production schedules,
declare war on neutral nations, and control the ground, air, sea and strategic
forces of the Axis, Allied and Soviet powers in order to change or recreate
the events of the war. The game is a division-level simulation, with some
brigade and corps-sized ground units. Play takes place on a 159x133 hex
map of Europe and North Africa. Naval power and air power are abstracted
as points rather than on-map units, including: surface fleet, U-Boat,
transport, amphibious assault, tactical air and strategic bomber points.

F Battle on three fronts—War in the West (two-player, Allies versus

Axis); War in the East (two- player, Soviets versus Axis); and
War in Europe (three-player, Axis versus Allies & Soviets).
F Select from 10 scenarios (shorter games focused on a single major
offensive), or 16 campaigns (the whole war from a specified date
through May ‘45 or the defeat of one side).
F A unique “tabbed” map display allows each player to define his
own set of map views, while also allowing one-click switching
between areas of interest.
F Multiple map overlays show the supply net, territory ownership,
air range, and zones of control.
F Fully integrated PBEM mode, with autosend, inbox, browse mode
and multiple file load/save tracking.
F Support for any screen resolution; multiple customizable map sets
and customizable icons.
F Fully featured game editor for creation of new scenarios and
campaigns; create new units, new setups, and edit the data tables
used in the game. $59.95
Shipping Charges (Rates are subject to change without notice.)
1st unit Adt’l units Type of Service
$12 $2 UPS Ground/USPS Priority Mail add $5
System requirements :
24 3 Canada OS : Windows 98/ME/NT/2000/XP/Vista (XP/Vista recommended)
34 3 Europe, South America, Asia CPU : Pentium III 800Mhz (Pentium 4, 1.2Ghz recommended)
RAM : 128 MB (256 MB recommended)
36 5 Australia Screen : Minimum resolution 1024x768, 16 bit color
HD : 50MB free space
Windows Compatible Sound Card and Mouse
Name
Address
City/State/Zip
Country
V/MC # Exp.
Signature PO Box 21598
Bakersfield CA 93390
Phone # 661/587-9633 • fax 661/587-5031 • www.decisiongames.com
strategy & tactics 63

ST 260 Issue.indd 63 11/9/09 12:40:30 PM

 Turning the Pages of History
World at War magazine provides a sharp focus on WWII, with
the same in-depth format as Strategy & Tactics. The articles
focus on the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of war, and are richly illustrated
with maps, diagrams and photos. Use the subscription card or
order online. Don’t miss a single issue!

In-Depth Analysis

Detailed Maps

Orders of Battle

P.O. Box 21598

Bakersfield, CA 93390-1598
ph: (661) 587-9633 • Fax: (661) 587-5031
www.StrategyAndTacticsPress.com
64 #260

ST 260 Issue.indd 64 11/9/09 12:40:34 PM