Smart Meter Using AES Algoritham

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Abstract— Smart meter is the upgradation of

the existing meter in terms of cost,
communication infrastructure, internet of things
and reliable technologies. In ambitious flagship
programme of digital India-project an initiative
of India, the potential fields of the missions are
identified in the area are smart energy, smart
meters, smart homes and smart cities. More than
100 smart cities are planned for information and
communication technology driven solutions
with big data analytics in India. The exponential
growth in smart meter has given certain security
risks, cyber threats and protection of stored data
as Nation security. Smart meters, comprising of
several communication, monitoring intelligent,
metering and electrical equipment used in power
meter, have a greater exposure to meter security
and cyber-attacks which are potentially disrupt
distribution in a city. The paper discusses the
electrical meter, challenges in smart meter and
the use of Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
algorithm enable with field-programmable gate
array (FPGA) hardware in smart meter. The AES
encryption and decryption chip is designed in
Xilinx ISE 14.2 software, synthesized on
SPARTAN-3E FPGA and verified with some
test cases to ensure that AES can be employed in
smart meter security and communication
infrastructure.
Keywords— Security, FPGAsynthesis, AES
algorithm
INTRODUCTION
A smart meter is a new kind of gas and electricity
meter that can digitally send meter readings to
your energy supplier for more accurate energy
bills. Smart meters come with in home displays,
so you can better understand your energy usage.
Every home in Britain will have been offered a
smart meter from their supplier by 2020.
Smart meters are a next generation meter for both
gas and electricity. They are a replacement for
standard meters, which use technology created
decades ago and require households track their
own readings and submit them to suppliers if they
want accurate bills.
Smart meters use a secure national communication
network (called the DCC) to automatically and
wirelessly send your actual energy usage to your
supplier. This means households will no longer
rely on estimated energy bills or have to provide
their own regular readings.
Smart meters will also come with an in-home
display. This display gives the household real-
time usage info, including kWh use and cost.
1.1 Existing System
First gen smart meters / SMETS1
The first generation of smart meters (called
SMETS1) that have been installed to date — and
that some suppliers are still currently installing —
can temporarily lose smart functionality when
they switch energy supplier. Households with
SMETS1 smart meters can still switch, it just
means they have to revert back to providing meter
readings until a remote upgrade will be made to
make them multi-supplier compatible. This is
expected to happen in 2018.
Second generation smart meters / SMETS2
These newer model smart meters are fully
compatible with the DCC (the secure national
network that the meters "talk" to all suppliers
through). This means households with SMETS2
meters will have no issues with energy
switching.2. Proposed System
PLC COMMUNICATION SECURITY - Each
meter must have a CCC secret key, a unique
CC_LAN key, a unique CC_LOCALE key and
two session keys for the LAN interface and a
session key for the Local interface, transmitted
when the application association with the Client
concerned was created
1 Encryption method - 128-bit AES symmetrical
key algorithm, GCM operation mode. It is used to
ensure data confidentiality and authentication.
2 "CCC" secret key - The CCC key is used to
reprogram the "CC_LAN" key or the
"CC_LOCALE" key in a meter. This key is never
used to encrypt the communications between the
concentrator and the meter. It is known only to the
meter and the IS (Central server). When the
CC_LAN (and the CC_LOCALE respectively) is
generated, the IS encrypts it with the CCC and
transfers it to the meter via the concentrator. This
transfer is completely transparent for the
concentrator which sends the encrypted data to the
meter. The meter that knows the CCC is
responsible for decryption the data in order to
retrieve the CC_LAN (and the CC_LOCALE
respectively). The CCC key is not accessible in
read mode.
3 Unique "CC_LAN" and "CC_LOCALE"
keys - The CC_LAN and CC_LOCALE keys are
only used during the application association phase
between the concentrator and the meter, and the
TSP and the meter respectively. They are used to
crypt the service allowing this application
association. This service transfers the session key
that will then be used, in the context defined by t
his application association, to crypt the
communications between the concentrator/TSP
and the meter. The CC_LAN and CC_LOCALE
keys cannot be accessed in read mode.
Using asymmetric cryptography in the meters
would have some benefits:
 it can make passive eavesdropping of
meter/server communication useless, even to
a party holding or able to use the server's
private key; something not achieved with
secret-key cryptography.
 it can ensure that any central key leak can not
compromise the capability to authenticate
messages from the meters.
CONCLUSIONS
Microprocessors used for smart meter devices
are not necessarily powerful so manufacturers do
not want to devote too much area for security.
Asymmetric cryptography is very expensive in
terms of power consumption, time execution and
code size (unless the chip has a cryptographic
hardware accelerator, but it increases the final
cost considerably). That is why symmetric
cryptography is often used.
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