Reliability and Availability

ANNEX 2.
1
Reliability and availability
March 2014
Annex 2.1: Reliability and availability March 2014
Guidance for the reader
The purpose of this annex
This annex has been written to provide additional supporting information and explanation for the
propositions we have made in the core narrative.
The annex includes detailed information on our past and current reliability performance, and how
this benchmarks against our peers. It provides detailed information on the investments that we will
need to make and the technologies that we will employ to meet our target improvements in
reliability performance.
Our target audience for this annex
This annex is primarily aimed at stakeholders with an expertise in asset management and an interest
in getting a deeper understanding of how we maintain our strong reliability performance.
While we have sought to limit the use of technical language, in order to provide full information for
stakeholders we have inevitably included some concepts and terminology that may not be familiar
to the general reader.
Mapping this annex to the core narrative
The relevant sections in the core narrative that relate to this annex are:
 Section 2.2, section 1.3.1, section 1.3.2
Document history
This document is similar to the version that we published in June 2013 as part of our well-justified
business plan. It has been updated to reflect stakeholder feedback on our well-justified business
plan and our latest view of the costs of meeting the outputs that we have proposed in our plan. We
have also updated it to ensure that cross-references to other parts of the plan remain accurate.
* We have included at annex GL.1 a glossary that explains the key technical terms and abbreviations
used in our business plan.
* For more detail on how this plan differs from our June 2013 plan, please refer to annex G.12.
Northern Powergrid: Our business plan for 2015-23 Page 2 of 30

Contents
1 Keeping the lights on – our proposal ................................................................................ 4
1.1 Our proposal in a little more detail… ........................................................................... 4
1.2 Why we think our proposal is the right one ................................................................ 5
1.3 Evaluating the “realistic” options ................................................................................ 7
2 Our target reliability-output performance ........................................................................ 9
3 Our plans for proposed future reliability performance .................................................. 11
3.1 Maintaining underlying reliability performance ........................................................ 12
3.2 Planned reduction in number of power cuts ............................................................. 12
3.3 Planned reduction in duration of power cuts ............................................................ 13
3.4 Dealing with long-duration power cuts ..................................................................... 13
3.5 Improving reliability for the worst-performing parts of our network ....................... 14
3.6 Improving intermittent-fault performance................................................................ 15
3.7 Minimising the inconvenience of planned power cuts .............................................. 15
4 Our plans for ensuring network resilience ...................................................................... 16
4.1 Installing additional flood defences ........................................................................... 16
4.2 Improving our storm network resilience ................................................................... 18
4.3 Black-start resilience .................................................................................................. 18
4.4 Increased security measures at strategic sites .......................................................... 19
5 Managing future uncertainties ........................................................................................ 19
5.1 Smart meters.............................................................................................................. 19
5.2 Metal theft ................................................................................................................. 19
5.3 Low-carbon technology.............................................................................................. 20
5.4 Climate change adaptation ........................................................................................ 20
6 Benchmarking of our performance ................................................................................. 21
7 Our past and present reliability performance ................................................................. 24

1 Keeping the lights on – our proposal
What we plan to do - headlines…

Seek incremental improvement where efficient, whilst maintaining power reliability of 99.98% as a
system-wide average.
Meet or beat the output performance targets proposed by Ofgem.
Reduce the duration of power cuts where they do occur by 20%.
Reconfigure our operational response capability to move from the current 18-hour maximum for
restoration so that we restore supplies within a maximum of 12 hours and pay compensation if we
are not successful.
Improve the targeting and responsiveness of planned investment to address network weak spots
promptly when they occur.
Install additional protective measures such as flood defences and vegetation management to
improve network resilience.
1.1 Our proposal in a little more detail…

This section summarises our plans to improve reliability of supply from our network over the next
decade and explains what this means for the service we provide to our customers and how we will
achieve that improvement.
On average, electricity supply is currently available to customers for 99.98% of the time. This system-
wide level of performance is typical of the reliability customers receive across the UK and it
benchmarks favourably in international comparisons.1 This type of system-wide measure is most
useful for monitoring medium- and long-term trends in network performance and for strategic
planning. However, such measures alone are not adequate for capturing the quality-of-service
experience that customers receive. Few customers actually receive the average quality of service as
expressed by these indicators: most receive better, some receive worse and a few receive much worse
than the average. For this reason the majority of customers do not generally discern the full
implication of service-quality experiences that are distinguished only by modest differences at the
system average level. This is perhaps unsurprising given, as already stated, that few actually
experience the average level of service. Thus it is the reported experience of those customers who
receive worse than the average quality of supply combined with the perceived potential for others to
have similar experience that ignites customers’ interest in our network’s performance. It is for this
reason that customers have told us it is not a priority for them that we incur material costs in pursuit
of a step change in system-wide reliability, but they do want us to deal swiftly with underperformance
on discrete parts of our network. So, we will broadly maintain the underlying level of reliability by
looking after our existing assets, reducing the number of unplanned power cuts by 8%. We can
minimise the likelihood of an asset failure that results in a power cut for our customers by adhering
strictly to our regimes for inspecting, maintaining and replacing our assets.
From our discussions with customers and other stakeholders it is clear that reducing the number and
length of power cuts experienced is important, and we believe that we can do more to improve
1 th
5 CEER benchmarking report on the quality of electricity supply 2011

availability to all customers. We plan to improve our performance by targeting a 20% reduction in the
average time for getting the lights back on compared with present levels. 2 The system-wide average
reliability figures for our 3.9m customers can hide extremes of performance. Consequently we will
also continue to reduce long-duration power cuts. We will move our operational response capability
from the present 18-hour maximum for restoration to 12 hours. Where we are unable to achieve the
12-hour standard we will provide compensation: this affects relatively few of our customers, as fewer
than 1% of them experience a power cut.
Domestic customers typically felt the worst-served areas should be prioritised for improvements,
regardless of the number of customers affected, as everyone should be able to expect the same level
of service: therefore we are especially determined to make significant improvements for those
customers who receive a particularly poor service. Our plan is focused on improving service for those
customers who suffer significantly more power cuts than the average. We will do this by prioritising
our replacement of network components on the power lines that supply those customers, with £42m
of our asset replacement expenditure specifically allocated for that purpose.
The electricity network performs a vital role in the provision of a service upon which daily life in the UK
depends. So, as well as looking to maintain the underlying level of reliability, we seek to identify and
manage risks to the network from hazards that are outside our control. In managing these hazards we
maintain the longer-term level of network reliability. The hazards are usually low-probability but high-
consequence events such as widespread power cuts due to natural disasters, e.g. flooding or ice
storms. Through working with government agencies and other key stakeholders we have developed
plans to improve the resilience of the network. These plans involve the installation of protective
measures for our assets and improvements to the way we respond to major incidents. These
protective measures include installation of flood defences, creation of vegetation-free corridors
around our overhead lines and additional security measures at strategic sites.
1.2 Why we think our proposal is the right one

In forming our proposition, we have considered a range of potential alternatives, ranging from
radically different output proposals to subtler variations in the service offerings we can make.
The range of choices and options we face might be characterised as a spectrum of investment choices
and outcomes. At one end of the spectrum lies an approach of incremental improvement,
characterised by generally maintaining existing performance and adding some stretch targets on
outage duration and particular poorly-performing areas of the network. We do not consider anything
less than this in terms of investment would be acceptable to our customers and other stakeholders, or
realistic in terms of delivering a safe and reliable network. More expensive approaches that would
deliver higher levels of reliability include total automation of the high-voltage network (characterised
by significant expenditure on HV switchgear and actuators, HV interconnection, communications
networks and network control systems) and guaranteed replacement before failure (characterised by
massive asset replacement expenditure and significantly more highly-rated equipment, for example
stronger overhead line poles).
In the area of network reliability outputs there is a wide range of possible outcomes in evidence
already, if we take a global perspective, and generally the UK compares very well – but it is not the
best that is on offer. We think it is relatively simple to conclude that most of those outcomes, although
technically possible, are not practical propositions for customers in the UK.
2 Average restoration time for a high voltage fault on our network is 62 minutes and 200 minutes for a low voltage fault

Narrowing down the range of options
Prior to evaluating our options in more detail, we established at a high level the potential range of
options that were available to us. These were then narrowed down by applying stakeholder
requirements and economic/technical constraints to derive a set of suitable ‘realistic’ options.
First, we considered a number of options that would result in a step change reduction in the number
of faults, the duration of the fault and/or the number of customers affected by the fault. We know
that in some parts of the world customer minutes lost (CML) arising from the high-voltage network
have been all but eliminated by investing in automation technology in every substation on the high-
voltage (HV) feeders. This ensures that, for a single HV fault, the network can be reconfigured within
the three-minute watershed, wherever the fault is on the feeder. Given the cost of this programme,
however, it is only suitable for areas of very high population density. For example, Hong Kong has
applied this approach with some success, but it has a population density of 26,000 per square
kilometre compared with 4,000 for urban Leeds. We have ruled out this kind of approach because the
costs to apply it to urban areas (i.e. ground-mounted substations) alone, would be grossly
disproportionate to the benefits.
We have also considered whether we could deliver a step change in reliability, perhaps 60%, by
significantly increasing cable-overlay and overhead line refurbishment/rebuilding programmes to
significantly reduce the risk of individual asset faults relative to current levels. Targeting a level that
would deliver material success would be massively expensive, perhaps increasing asset replacement
expenditure ten- or twentyfold. This is because of the high reliability of network assets relative to the
population of assets as a whole. For example, the proportion of low-voltage (LV) mains that develop a
fault in a given year is tiny relative to the population, of the order of 1% or 2%. Only those new
installations that replaced assets that would otherwise have failed would deliver any real benefit, but,
in order to be confident of preventing one future fault, i.e. to be confident of actually catching one LV
main that would have faulted if we had not replaced it, we would need to replace at least 10 LV mains
because our hit-rate would be no better than 1 in 10 and probably worse than that. In our view this
approach would be both financially inefficient and irresponsibly wasteful of physical resources.
Finally, and in order to overcome this problem, we considered whether deployment of predictive
technology on each feeder would yield significant improvements in supply availability at reasonable
cost. Currently, however, such technology is not cost-effective enough to be deployed as standard for
the general mass of cable assets. It is also ineffective on cables with multiple branches and at low
voltage. Thus its use would be limited to problem high-voltage feeders, and we believe this is unlikely
to change during the RIIO-ED1 price control period: if it does we will adopt it at our own expense. A
similar problem exists with overhead lines. With these assets we can and do assess condition and we
are therefore confident of being better able to spot those that might potentially fail. However, in
reality a high proportion of overhead faults are caused by environmental factors such as bad weather
and accurate prediction of the order of failure even with condition data is only partially successful. We
do stack the odds in the customer’s favour, but the hit-rate is far from 100%.
For these reasons we have concluded that targeting a radically improved reliability provision in the
short to medium term would be expensive, inefficient, difficult to implement and, in short, not in
customers’ best interests. We do not, therefore, believe that a step change in reliability performance
is a realistic option for our plan. We do, however, face choices within a range of reasonable cost and
output combinations, whereby some additional expenditure might deliver incremental reliability
improvements. In drawing up our plan, we had to evaluate the choices and trade-offs within this range
of options. We discuss this evaluation in the next section.

1.3 Evaluating the “realistic” options

As discussed above, our proposition is based upon commitments to:
 Seek incremental improvement where efficient, whilst maintaining power reliability of 99.98%
as a system-wide average;
 Meet or beat the output performance targets proposed by Ofgem;
 Reduce the duration of power cuts when they do occur by 20%;
 Reconfigure our operational response capability to move from the current 18-hour maximum
for restoration so that we restore supplies within a maximum of 12 hours and pay
compensation if we are not successful;
 Improve the targeting of planned investment to address network weak spots promptly when
they occur; and
 Install additional protective measures such as flood defences and vegetation management to
improve network resilience.
We have considered whether there are alternatives to this plan that would yield a different
prioritisation of outputs that would result in a different customer experience.
Whilst we have not fully costed all the alternatives, we have assessed the alternative scenarios and
output combinations at a high level. This allows us to assess the added value of each scenario, relative
to the base case. Our evaluation criteria are:
 Customer and other stakeholder feedback;
 Willingness of customers to pay, as proxied by the Interruptions Incentive Scheme (IIS) rates
compared with the incremental cost of each scenario;
 Potential for a given option to overachieve or create other spin-off benefits;
 Consistency or compatibility with the rest of our operation;
 Compliance with legal or licence requirements;
 Compliance with binding agreements with external parties; and
 Technical feasibility and deliverability.
Below we set out a summary of our assessment of a range of alternatives to our central plan, each of
which is assessed against these criteria. This demonstrates why we considered our proposition for
2015-23 delivers greater net benefits relative to alternative propositions.
 Target bigger improvements in average reliability, aspiring to significantly beat the output
performance targets proposed by Ofgem
Average reliability is based on three factors, the number of faults that happen, the number of
people affected by each fault and the length of time they are affected. We could pursue
different options in any of these three areas in order to change reliability performance.
- We could pursue a material reduction in underlying fault volumes. As described earlier

this would not be a cost-effective approach and certainly not economic when evaluated
against the reliability incentive rates.
- We could pursue reducing the customers per fault by sectioning the HV network further.
We have a clear policy in this regard based on a cost/benefit analysis: our policy is to

reduce customer numbers per feeder to the point where the costs, which we recover
from customers, would start to outweigh the benefits to customers of increased
reliability. The evaluation we make is of the costs of various engineering solutions against
the level of consequential improvement in reliability performance, costed using the
Interruptions Incentive Scheme (IIS) incentive rates. Our policy presents several different
potential solutions, such as application of new protection points or automated switches,
or splitting of HV circuits for different volumes of connected customers. Our plan has
been developed to meet this policy and has the efficient costs built in already. If we find
any feeders that are not compliant with this policy, we will fix that at our cost.
- We have placed the greatest emphasis on targeting improved restoration times within
our plan, because it is the most cost-effective component to pursue to improve overall
availability. The gains that can be made are material and can be secured at reasonable
cost. The initiatives we will deploy cover installation of new assets, introduction of
revised operational procedures, use of advanced fault management devices and
leveraging of new IT systems to provide an efficient targeted design or operational
response. Using this portfolio of solutions our analysis suggests that 20% improvement in
restoration times is consistent with the cost-effective level of expenditure using the 2015-
23 incentive rates set on behalf of all customers. It is possible to make further gains than
we plan to do, but we believe this would be inefficient.
 Reduce the duration of power cuts when they do occur by more than 20%.
As a component of overall availability, the duration of faults is a particular irritant to our
customers and we have carefully considered the level of improvement in this area that we
should pursue. Essentially our analysis shows that an improvement of this order can be
secured within the current quantum of technology and resource deployment, which itself is
justified by customers’ willingness to pay, as reflected in the incentive rates. In other words,
securing an improvement materially greater than 20% requires a different solution set. So, for
example, automating normal open points on HV rings is part of the tool kit that secures 20%.
To go beyond this we would have to automate not just the normal open point but all potential
open points on the ring. The whole point of a ring system is that any point can act as the open
point when required, so this means automating all other substations on the ring. In other
words, the benefit does not simply continue to manifest itself linearly once all normal open
points are automated. Our plan is not to stop focusing on reducing fault duration as we
achieve a 20% reduction, rather it simply recognises in the cost proposals that this is the
efficient improvement available at current levels of customer valuation. We could deliver less
than a 20% improvement, but we believe that we should target the highest level of
performance that we can justifiably deliver under the incentive regime.
 Target planned investment more/less intensively to address network weak spots promptly
when they occur.
Where intermittent faults and poorly-performing sections of network are concerned, we
believe there are few real alternatives to our policy of responding to these issues as they arise.
The feedback from our customers indicates that the repeated fault situation leads to the
greatest level of frustration and poor customer service. Although such situations are rare and
investment could be increased in these areas, it is unclear that this would bring much definite
benefit: certainly such problems cannot be completely eliminated, even at grossly inefficient
levels of expenditure. Customers tell us that they understand this approach and hence we
believe the correct policy is one that drives a prompt response to the issue that customers
see: accordingly that is what we have built that into our plan. This response consists of initial
operational measures followed by appropriate asset replacement where the scope of works is

sufficient to prevent the underlying cause of interruptions from reappearing. In doing this we
believe we have a plan that optimises for the service customers want and the costs they are
willing to meet. Should the costs of meeting that service expectation exceed what we have put
in our plan, any additional costs of meeting it are at our risk.
 Take steps to improve network resilience: as alternative options we considered doing more
or less resilience-enhancing work such as vegetation management and installation of flood
defences.
We have worked closely with the Environment Agency, Defra and DECC on developing plans
and policies we believe optimise between costs and risk for greater resilience against flooding,
widespread transmission failure (black start), storms and security threats as set out later in
this annex. We believe that such a level of governmental input limits our options at this stage
and it is now for us to execute the agreed policies. Our commitment to customers is to deliver
these obligations, and our cost assumptions are such that, if delivering the levels of resilience
set out involves costs greater than we have planned for, we will assume that risk and manage
it without scaling back on our delivery commitment.
 Reconfigure our operational response capability to move from the current 18-hour
maximum for restoration so that we restore supplies within a maximum of 12 hours and pay
compensation if we are not successful.
For long-duration faults we have set out our operational plan to move from an 18-hour
backstop to a 12-hour backstop. To do this we will reconfigure our operational response
capability to be closer to the customer base. There is no technically plausible change that can
be made to the network that would not result in grossly disproportionate costs. So, as set out
in Section 1 of our main plan document, we will be optimising our operational bases and
resources for ‘lights-out’ response and not just focusing on cost minimisation. We believe that
the move from an 18-hour standard to a 12-hour standard is matched by customers’
willingness to pay (see our stakeholder engagement annex G9), but this approach is scalable
so that, should we move in the future to a world where the standard tightened again, we
could localise our operational capability even further. Of course the willingness to pay would
need to match that, because it is clear that costs increase the more we localise and at some
point that effect accelerates as operational capability becomes so fragmented.
2 Our target reliability-output performance

We aim to provide a reliable and continuous electricity supply to our 3.9m customers. Unfortunately
power cuts do occur and, regardless of whether they are unplanned or planned, we understand that
the disruption to our customers can be the same. The standard industry measures of reliability output
are the number of power cuts or customer interruptions for each 100 connected customers (CI) and
the average power cut duration, known as customer minutes lost, for each customer (CML).
Unplanned power cuts arise from faults on our assets due to adverse weather conditions, third-party
activity and asset component failure. To minimise the impact of these power cuts, we endeavour to
prevent faults from occurring in the first place and to reduce the length of the power cuts when they
do occur. We believe the reliability-output targets set by Ofgem for unplanned power cuts are
challenging but fair as shown in figures 1 & 2. These relate to interruptions that are greater than three
minutes in duration. Our plan is to continue to improve our reliability output measure performance
over the next regulatory period by building on our performance during the present regulatory period.
Although the levels of performance shown in these graphs are referred to as Ofgem targets, they are
more accurately described as the neutral points on a symmetrically-calibrated incentive scale. We

accept that the method used by Ofgem in setting these targets is an entirely appropriate one and it is
our intention to respond to the incentive arrangements that are in place and perform better than the
IIS targets set by Ofgem.
75 Northeast
Customer interuptions
70
65
60
55
50
45
40
Yorkshire
75
Customer Interruptions
70
65
60
55
50
45
40
Figure 1: Target unplanned customer interruption performance
75 Northeast
Customer minutes lost
70
65
60
55
50
45
40

75 Yorkshire
70
Customer minutes lost 65
60
55
50
45
40
Figure 2: Target unplanned customer minutes lost performance
Planned power cuts can be required for us to replace, repair or maintain our network assets. As part of
our planning for these events we assess whether to use generator sets to maintain supplies, but this is
not possible in all cases. When a power cut is required we will ensure that the disruption is kept to a
minimum. Advance notification and assistance are provided to all the affected customers. We will
report on our planned power cut performance over 2015-23 separately from our performance in
relation to unplanned power cuts. We accept the target-setting mechanism for planned power cuts
proposed by Ofgem, as it will respond to the level of work required on the network while still
encouraging us to minimise the number and duration of power cuts.
To supplement the main or primary measures of reliability performance (i.e. CI and CML), we have a
number of secondary measures, which are deliverables that we commit to in terms of asset health and
criticality. Further details on the planned levels of secondary output deliverables associated with
reliability are presented in section 2.8 of the business plan. This annex will focus on our commitments
relating to delivery of primary output measures of reliability as seen by our customers.
3 Our plans for proposed future reliability performance

It is clear from stakeholder feedback that perceptions of current standards of reliability and availability
amongst domestic customers are dependent on their own experiences. Where improvements have
been made to address unreliable network areas, these were acknowledged. Other stakeholders
typically felt reliability and availability were good and also recognised improvements during the
current price control period. 3 The large organisations that were interviewed did not have any
problems with their power supply and did not feel that this was an issue for them. Customers were
questioned as to whether reducing the number of power cuts experienced or reducing the length of
power cuts experienced was of greater importance. The majority felt reducing length was more
important than reducing the number, in order to ensure freezer contents are not lost and to limit the
level of inconvenience. Respondents experiencing very frequent cuts were more focussed on the
number. We are targeting a 20% improvement in restoration times over the next regulatory period,
based on this stakeholder feedback. The second theme to emerge from the consultation was an on-
3
Annex G.9: Stakeholder research reports summary - RIIO Phase 1 stakeholder consultation summary

going investment and upgrading programme in order to address weak spots on the existing network.
Respondents in previous weak-spot areas recommended upgrading the network because, in their
view, repairs in response to a fault were temporary and they were looking for a long-term solution.
3.1 Maintaining underlying reliability performance

A core aspect of achieving good network reliability is being effective managers of our assets. If we can
look after our existing assets, we can reduce the likelihood of an asset failure that results in a power
cut for our customers.
We look after our assets by inspecting, maintaining and replacing them as appropriate. Our system for
managing our network assets is assessed and certified in accordance with the British Standards
Publicly Available Specification 55 (PAS55) for the “Specification for the Optimised Management of
Physical Assets”. The aim of our asset management policy is to ensure that we deliver reliable network
performance at an acceptable risk and for an efficient cost.
A key component of our asset management approach is the use of asset condition and risk assessment
processes. We gather condition and performance data on our assets to determine their health and
useful remaining life. This data is collected and reviewed on an annual basis to help determine the
future asset replacement needs. Information on asset criticality in terms of safety, reliability and
environmental impact is used to further refine and prioritise our plans. Our underlying maintenance
and asset replacement strategy seeks to maintain the fault-rate performance at existing levels while
targeting specific reliability improvements in areas of underperformance.
3.2 Planned reduction in number of power cuts

Our strategy for reducing the number of unplanned customer interruptions over the period involves:
 Implementing network automation in our control centre:
- As part of the upgrading of our network management system used to remotely control
the network, we are introducing state-of-the-art network-automation functionality.
- This will allow our networks to be automatically reconfigured in less than three minutes
to prevent measured customer interruptions from occurring.
- The system will be expanded as further assets capable of being operated remotely are
installed.
 Delivering our core asset maintenance and replacement plan:
- We will inspect our assets to understand their condition and undertake maintenance of
those assets in line with our policies.
- We will replace assets that are in poor condition or that are unreliable, to prevent future
asset failure.
- This will ensure that we maintain the long-term integrity of our network.
 Managing the vegetation surrounding our overhead lines:
- Having previously cut back any vegetation from our lines we will revisit those lines on a
regular basis to maintain that clearance.
- This will minimise the impact of vegetation-caused power cuts.

3.3 Planned reduction in duration of power cuts

Our strategy for reducing the duration of unplanned power cuts by 20% over the period involves:
 Continuing to increase the number of remote control switches:
- We will continue to add more remote control to our assets, where economic for our
customers.
- This will provide our control engineers with more options to rapidly reconfigure the
network.
- The replacement of remote control equipment will be delivered on a timely basis to

ensure that the devices operate at their target level of efficiency.
 Improving operational response times from our staff:
- Not all faults can be restored remotely and many require us to dispatch staff to restore
customers’ supplies via network rerouting or repair work.
- Building on the significant technology-refresh of our IT systems in the current regulatory

period, we will use these systems to assist our engineers in effective fault location.
- Our new IT systems will allow us to develop ways of more rapidly dispatching skilled staff
to site and providing accurate fault-status information for our customers.
 Strengthening our operational management:
- We are reviewing our operational management structure to ensure that we can deliver a
cost-effective fault-response service for our customers.
- This involves assessing the location and skills mix of our workforce to ensure that our
working patterns match the type, volume and timing of fault activity.
- This will be supplemented by the ongoing monitoring of operational performance and

staff accountability.
 Using innovative fault-location techniques:
- We intend to continue to work closely with manufacturers to develop devices that

provide accurate fault-location information, such as the Bidoyng devices we introduced
during 2012.
3.4 Dealing with long-duration power cuts

The previous section details initiatives that will reduce the duration of an average power cut. This
section details our approach to a relatively small proportion, less than 1%, of customers who
experience a power cut that is in excess of 12 hours.
A proportion of our stakeholders, including Consumer Futures, are seeking an improvement for these
customers who experience a long-duration unplanned power cut. This will require us to reconfigure
our operational response capability to move from the current 18-hour maximum for restoration so
that we restore supplies within a maximum of 12 hours. We will change the mix of the types of
operational staff we employ in certain parts of our region to ensure that they have the correct skills to
deal with the predominant types of network fault for that region. For example, in urban centres, such
as Newcastle and Leeds, we will increase the availability of jointing staff to deal with underground

cable faults. In rural areas such as North Yorkshire and Northumberland, on the other hand, we will
increase the availability of linesmen to deal with overhead line faults. This transformation will involve
the location of our staff nearer to the population centres they serve and the recruitment of future
staff through our workforce renewal programme into those local areas.
Additionally, our analysis of the types of fault that lead to a longer-duration power cut indicates that a
significant number are reported to us in the evening. This presents a challenge in restoring power
supplies to customers when a repair is required. Overnight working to undertake repairs is often not
supported by domestic customers for reasons of safety and disruption, and feedback continues to
reinforce this fact. In addition, carrying out this type of work during certain night-time hours can be
prohibited by Local Authorities. The opposite was true for business customers. Our plan assumes that
our engineers will stop working before midnight and then continue any necessary repair work in a safe
manner first thing in the morning. Where practical and should customers agree, we will use mobile
generation as a means of temporarily restoring power supplies overnight.
Finally, our recent survey of domestic customer priorities identified the provision of compensation as
being important to them. When we do have an unplanned power cut in excess of 12 hours we will
provide compensation to all customers in line with and above our regulator’s proposal for the
guaranteed standard that governs supply restoration in normal weather conditions. We hope also, in
doing this, to demonstrate that these payments represent a genuine apology on our part for below-
par performance in such a fundamental area of our activities, rather than just something that we are
compelled to provide.
3.5 Improving reliability for the worst-performing parts of our

network
Feedback from our customers indicates that we need to improve the levels of reliability for customers
who receive the worst performance. Domestic customers typically felt the worst-served network areas
should be prioritised for improvements, regardless of the number of customers affected, as everyone
should be able to expect the same level of service, and this was a view expressed strongly by
customers in weak-spot areas. There were comments, however, from more urban areas that there
must be an appropriate balance between the number of people affected and the work involved, and
that people who live in rural areas are often more accepting of and prepared for power cuts, meaning
they are less of a problem.
As a result of this feedback our plan is particularly focused on improving service for those customers
whose supply is provided from the worst-performing parts of our network. This will involve prioritising
our replacement of network components on the power lines that supply those customers. The type of
solution we implement will depend upon the root causes of reliability problems. Target performance
in respect of all customers is the same: however, some measures may not be cost-effective when
deployed to small numbers of customers and therefore they will not be used. Overall we will be
targeting £42m of asset replacement expenditure to remove unreliable circuit components on
approximately 240 high-voltage and 190 low-voltage circuits over the 2015-23 period.
The work will be targeted by looking at circuits that have a poor record of reliability in the short term
and long term. The programme will also address any fundamental design deficiencies with these
circuits and bring them up to modern levels of required performance. This investment will be
additional to our routine underground cable replacement programme where poorly-performing
sections of cable are identified for replacement. The solutions we implement will vary according to the
cause of the power cuts. For example, one of the solutions we will use is the undergrounding of cables
in vulnerable areas. This was highlighted by a proportion of customers, particularly those who were
suffering power loss as a result of overhead line faults.

Better integration of our IT systems and development of our GROND reliability-analysis system will
allow our design engineers to select the investments that will provide the best cost-effective
improvements in overall reliability for our customers. We will also be able to analyse the
improvements in customer service from this targeted asset replacement.
To support this analysis, we will continue to operate a hotspot management process to ensure timely
network investment interventions are based on customer feedback in conjunction with our desktop
activity. A customer hot spot is an area of the network that we select for more intensive management
attention, based on customer feedback and the type of reliability problems. These areas are the
subject of detailed plans for improvement and customer care.
3.6 Improving intermittent-fault performance

Over 10% of our customer complaints arise from repeated power cuts involving the same network
component. Our experience is that a large proportion of these interruptions are transient in nature
and we define them as intermittent faults. On overhead line networks we dispatch staff to walk the
route of the line to identify the cause of the fault, whereas for underground cable networks fault
location is more difficult.
To improve performance, we presently install devices that are able to restore power automatically and
locate the position of the fault on a cable. Building on our experience of deploying smart fault-
reclosing devices, such as REZAP, Faultmaster and Bidoyng, we intend to increase their application.
This involves installing them more quickly on networks that, based on their cable construction (such as
aluminium neutrals), are more prone to intermittent faults. Presently we wait until several power cuts
have occurred before we install these devices on cable circuits. We will revise our policy by reducing
our trigger level for deploying the devices to prevent further power cuts when customers experience
more than two power cuts in three months. This will involve our investing £4m in this type of
equipment over the 2015-23 period. In parallel with installing such a device, our staff will commence
the process of fault location and they will use information from the device to allow us to dig down on
the potential fault location. This minimises the impact on customers through a faster fault-repair
response and reduced environmental impact.
3.7 Minimising the inconvenience of planned power cuts

To maintain our network reliability, we have to shut down parts of our network to carry out essential
work on the assets. We know that planned power cuts can be as disruptive as unplanned ones, and
customer feedback is telling us that we must get better at planning the duration of these power cuts,
and then sticking to those times.
By the start of the next regulatory period we shall already have changed our systems to help us make
sure we always tell our customers what work is planned, why that work is being done and when, how
long it is likely to last, whether it is a one-off event, who will be doing the work and whom to contact if
they have any queries. We are also going to provide customers with better guidance on, and
assistance with, preparing for the planned power cut. Customers on our priority services register will
get the care and assistance they need, while knowing how to access any support facilities and
community services within the area affected.
An economic test, using interruption incentive rates, is applied during the planning process to evaluate
whether it is appropriate to deploy mobile generation during a job. For some jobs it will not be
economic or technically feasible to use generation, and so we must interrupt supplies. We are
committed to applying a further layer of management scrutiny to this process for interruptions that
exceed six hours or that involve more than 20 customers. We will also examine a customer’s previous

history of both planned and unplanned power cuts within the last 12 months to ensure that customers
only suffer further interruptions where it is absolutely necessary.
4 Our plans for ensuring network resilience

Our overall strategy for improving network resilience remains consistent between the present and
next regulatory period. This is to ensure that we deliver on our existing commitments and act on
feedback from customers relating to additional flood protection. Consequently we will:
 Consider the threat from current and future natural hazards in the design of new assets,
networks and systems to avoid disruption arising in the first place;
 Increase the robustness and resilience of existing services or assets by building additional
network connections, or by providing backup facilities to ensure continuity of service. Actions
may include protection measures such as permanent or temporary flood defences;
 Identify key components and move them out of harm’s way, for example by moving high-
criticality assets that are vulnerable to flooding into a lower-risk area. For most infrastructure
assets, relocation can only be a longer-term option, meaning that short–term measures may
be needed to buy time to plan for the necessary change;
 Improve arrangements for sharing of information on infrastructure network performance and
standards; and
 Enhance our skills and capabilities to respond to emergencies arising from natural hazards.
To deliver this strategy we work with national government agencies, local government resilience
groups and other electricity network operators. This work involves the establishment of national
standards for improving resilience and running exercises on a regional basis to test the effectiveness of
our response plans.
4.1 Installing additional flood defences

Extreme weather conditions such as flooding seem to be getting more frequent and more severe. As a
result of our experience with flooding incidents over the last 10 years, we have already made
significant investment to defend our substations from flood risk, with 33 larger substations now
protected and portable flood-defence equipment available for deployment at 63 lower-risk
substations. This programme for the protection of electricity substations at risk of fluvial or tidal
flooding will be completed early in the 2015-23 period. Figures 3 and 4 shows the level of investment
over the 2010-15 and 2015-23 periods on these types of flood defence and the improvement in risk
reduction to our customers over the same period. By 2023 all major substation sites supplying
customers will be protected to a 1-in-1000-years fluvial or tidal flood event.

8.0
7.0
6.0
5.0
£m
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.0
Yorkshire Northeast
Figure 3: Historical and forecast flood-defence investment
800,000
700,000
600,000
Number of customers
500,000
400,000
300,000
200,000
100,000
Yorkshire Northeast
Figure 4: At risk customer defended
We will be supplementing this flood-defence investment with additional defence work at substations
that are at risk of surface-water flooding, in line with feedback from customers.4 We are working with
4
Customer prioritisation research summary – Explain January 2013 – Annex G.9 report 1

the Environment Agency and other network operators to expand industry guidance for flood-risk
assessment and defence measures. Our preliminary analysis concentrates on the risk presented to our
substation sites from 1-in-300-years surface-water flooding events. Our assessment has produced a
plan to defend:
 56 sites belonging to our Northeast licensee at a cost of £17m, mitigating surface-water flood
risk for sites serving 2m customers
 70 sites belonging to our Yorkshire licensee at a cost of £22m, mitigating surface-water flood
risk for sites serving 2.5m customers
As the national guidance evolves we will change our plans accordingly.
4.2 Improving our storm network resilience

Our overhead line network is vulnerable to adverse weather conditions. To reduce the impact of high
winds we review the risk of power cuts from falling trees and clear vegetation from a corridor around
some overhead lines. Another less common weather condition we have problems with is ice storms. In
these situations, ice forms on our overhead lines and the weight of the ice can cause them to fail. To
manage this problem we redesign and strengthen our overhead lines in high-risk areas based on the
latest research into weather conditions.
We will continue to deliver our vegetation management strategy, more detail is provided in annex 1.6.
This will ensure that we maintain vegetation clearances around our existing overhead lines and
develop further storm resilience via the removal of trees that present a credible risk of causing
damage to overhead lines feeding large numbers of customers. The storm resilience for our main high-
voltage circuits will be maintained in line with national guidelines (Engineering Technical
Recommendation 132). As part of this activity we are trialling innovative tree-growth regulators to
assist in the management of vegetation in sensitive areas.
Cost-effective improvements to overhead line resilience will be made as part of our routine overhead
line asset replacement. This will involve upgrading of overhead line construction in “at risk” weather
zones to make the network more resilient during ice storms. As part of our refurbishment activity, we
will install devices, called triggered spark gaps, to improve performance during lightning storms. We
will deliver this as part of our core asset replacement activity.
4.3 Black-start resilience

A review of our ability to restore all electricity supplies in the event of a UK-wide total loss of
electricity, known as black start, has resulted in the issuing of some national guidelines in 2012. These
guidelines state that the local power supplies to our substations should have 72 hours’ resilience. We
have assessed our substation sites to develop a number of cost-effective solutions to achieve the
required standard.
To provide an adequate level of resilience for a black-start event we are planning to invest during 2015
– 23 £4.6m in our Northeast service area and £6.2m in our Yorkshire service area. This will ensure that
all major substation sites have 72-hour resilience with their local power supplies and comply with the
national guidelines (Engineering Recommendation G91). Additionally this investment ensures that all
related communications infrastructure for protection and control meets the 72-hour standard.

4.4 Increased security measures at strategic sites

The protective security measures we install at strategically important substation sites have been
reviewed in line with the Centre for the Protection of Critical National Infrastructure (CPNI). The
review examined our risk-management processes and gave guidance on security measures deployed
on our substation sites as designated via specific criteria set by the Department of Energy and Climate
Change (DECC). A series of site visits to view physical security confirmed that the mitigation measures
currently in place were not sufficient to deter, detect and delay an attempted attack on our sites in
line with CPNI requirements.
The 13 sites currently qualifying as critical national infrastructure have been surveyed to determine
the current levels of physical security in line with Northern Powergrid’s routine security-risk
assessment processes. The investment is assessed to be £13m based upon the current level of
information available from DECC. It should be noted that DECC is reviewing the current list of
qualifying sites, which has the potential to change in volume and location.
5 Managing future uncertainties

Looking out across the next regulatory period, we can see one opportunity to improve customer
service using smart meter data and three potential threats to performance that we have plans to
manage. We can manage these reliability risks over the period and do not believe that any regulatory
uncertainty mechanisms are required. In other words we will handle the uncertainties within the final
agreed IIS targets and cost allowances.
5.1 Smart meters

The significant investment in smart meters will provide us with an opportunity to understand exactly
which customer supplies have been disconnected. Although domestic customers had little or no
knowledge about smart metering, more quickly identifying power cuts was felt to be important. Often
customers were surprised that we did not have the technology to be able to identify power cuts
instantly and were in some instances reliant on the public making a call. We often need a customer to
inform us of a power cut because we do not have any live monitoring information on the state of our
low-voltage network. This is the case for over 80% of the faults we typically encounter. When
customers have a smart meter installed we will be able to use information from the meter to
understand which customers’ supplies have been interrupted, which will assist fault location. We will
also know more promptly when a power cut has occurred, enabling us to respond and restore
customers’ supplies more quickly. Annex 1.10 on smart metering discusses the benefits in more detail.
5.2 Metal theft

Metal theft has been a significant cause of power cuts in recent years. We have been working hard
with the police and other parties to tackle this societal problem. Despite recent legislative changes we
still believe that metal theft will be a credible risk to customer supplies in the future. To manage this
threat we will continue to make improvements to the security measures at our operational sites. The
use of alternative conductors such as aerial bundled conductor for our overhead lines at low voltage
will help to deter third-party activity, provide safety benefits compared with bare-wire conductor and
provide some additional protection for supplies during storm conditions. Metal theft is discussed
further in annex 2.4 on safety.

5.3 Low-carbon technology

There is a potential threat to future reliability from the connection of electric vehicle chargers, heat
pumps and photovoltaic generation. We are actively working with industry stakeholders on ensuring
that customer connections remain fit for purpose as additional stress is placed on the electricity
network. We need to receive notification of changes in electrical load at customers’ premises to
ensure that the network to which they are connected is adequate and that the supplies to other
customers are not affected. Information from smart metering and other devices on our network will
help us to ensure that the reliability of electricity supply is maintained.
5.4 Climate change adaptation

We have collaborated with the Met Office and other distribution network operators to consider how
the frequency of weather-related faults on the UK transmission and distribution electricity networks
may change in the future as a result of climate change. The project involved close collaboration
between climate scientists and industry experts to develop methodologies for the various types of
weather-related fault. The scientific insights gained from appropriate use of climate projections were
combined with the industry experts' understanding of the relevant thresholds, procedures and actions
involved in managing the impact of weather and climate on the electricity network. The result was an
assessment of projected future risk that we used to input into our climate-adaptation strategy and
more specifically our quality-of-supply strategy. This provides support for our flooding and storm
resilience initiatives.
As a result of the floods experienced in 2000, Northern Powergrid recognised the growing concerns
relating to climate-change risk. Our initial assessment identified the requirement to review our
engineering standards and policies and to track developments in the science behind climate change
and our understanding of the likely impacts on the performance of the network.
Early in 2010, Northern Powergrid participated in a working group, led by the Energy Networks
Association, which looked in detail at adaptation to climate change. This resulted in the production of
an industry-wide report on the risks posed by climate change, based on the projections within the
Government’s UKCP09 work and an industry-wide project carried out in conjunction with the Met
Office (EP2) in order to assess how climate change may affect both the capabilities and the fault rates
of distribution assets.
Northern Powergrid went on to complete a full risk assessment and adaptation report in line with
Defra’s requirements for reporting, which was prepared from the discussions within the national
assessment and utilises regionally-specific climate-change predictions from UKCP09 and the
Environment Agency in conjunction with our own established internal risk classifications to consider
how the risks could affect us as a company. The full risk assessment can be found within our
adaptation to climate change report located at:
http://www.northernpowergrid.com/downloads/usefulinfo/sustainability.cfm
In compiling the risk assessment, we considered the following climate events:
 Flooding – fluvial, pluvial & coastal
 Hurricane & high winds
 Extreme prolonged temperature –heat wave & cold spell
 Heavy rain
 Heavy snow

 Gradual warming
 Lightning
 Ice & wind
 Drought (soil drying & movement)

The risks posed by each climate event were considered for each of the following areas:
 Substations
 Overhead Lines
 Transformers
 Circuit Breakers
 Earthing
 Underground Cables
 Vegetation Management
 Emergency Response
 Protection
 Routine Business
 Customer Service
The risks detailed were assessed on a probability and impact basis, using Northern Powergrid’s risk -
management process. The risks were assessed for the current climate, as well as for the climate
conditions predicted for the 2020s, 2050s and 2080s. Actions were then considered for any areas
where the risks were felt to be unacceptably high.
In order to ensure that climate-change adaptation is adequately embedded within our long-term
investment programmes, where appropriate all new and replacement plant will be specified to take
account of the possible climate-change effects over the lifetime of the equipment. That said, we
believe that current standards for equipment are sufficient to cater for the existing projections within
the Government’s analysis and we therefore are not proposing additional investment relating to
specification changes.
6 Benchmarking of our performance

Our reliability performance can be benchmarked against the level of service received by customers
supplied from other electricity networks and the reliability targets determined by our regulator.
Reliability-improvement work undertaken by Great Britain electricity network operators and
encouraged by Ofgem has produced a level of performance that stands up well in an international
context. This fact supports the position taken by customers during our consultation that a step change
in performance is not required.

For example, the quality-of-supply benchmarking work of the Council of European Energy Regulators
indicates that UK customers experience a reliability performance that is positioned strongly in the
group of 27 countries assessed. 5 Benchmarking activity that Northern Powergrid has undertaken with
electricity distribution companies in the US shows that UK reliability performance ranks alongside the
very best utilities in the US, as highlighted in Figure 5 below. The comparison is provided against
results from a survey conducted covering 88 distribution electricity networks in the US using the IEEE
benchmarking framework for outage duration. The benchmarking measures performance using the
IEEE measure of system average interruption duration index (SAIDI), which is equivalent to the CML
measure used in Great Britain.
140
120
Customer minutes lost
100
80
60
40
2009 2010 2011 2012
First Quartile IEEE Survey Northern Powergrid (Northeast)
Northern Powergrid (Yorkshire)
Figure 5: US benchmarking of Northern Powergrid performance

The distribution network operators of Great Britain all measure performance in the same way using CI
and CML. Due to differences in network construction, population densities and geography, a
comparison of absolute performance alone has limitations. However, comparison of reliability
performance for the high-voltage elements of electricity networks does provide an indicative view.
Figures 6 and 7 demonstrate that the Northeast and Yorkshire networks experience an average level
of performance.
5 th
5 CEER Benchmarking Report on the Quality of Electricity Supply 2011

Figure 6: UK benchmarking of performance - HV CI performance
Figure
7: UK benchmarking of performance - HV CML performance

Figure 8: UK benchmarking of performance - fault duration
Another way for customers to assess their level of service is to compare distribution network
operators’ performance against our regulator’s targets. The methodology for setting these targets
uses industry benchmarking data and improvement factors to determine a set of unplanned
interruption targets. These targets encourage distributors to reduce the number and duration of
power cuts by financially penalising or rewarding them. This financial incentive to improve reliability
performance is calibrated based on customers’ willingness to pay. Our historical performance against
these targets is demonstrated in the next section.
7 Our past and present reliability performance

We have delivered performance improvements for our customers that have resulted in a downward
trend against all of our reliability output measures. Figures 9-12 show the historical performance
against these reliability output measures since 2005. The measures show total unplanned and planned
power cut performance against our regulator’s targets. There is a positive trend despite some annual
volatility due to weather conditions. Adverse weather conditions have an effect on the number of
power cuts, access to sites in order to restore supplies and in some incidents the high volume of faults
in a close geographic region means we take longer to restore some customers’ supplies with the
resources we are able to deploy.

Figure 9: Historical reliability performance - CI Northeast

Figure 10: Historical reliability performance - CI Yorkshire
Figure 11: Historical reliability performance - CML Northeast
Figure 12: Historical reliability performance - CML Yorkshire

To date our performance improvements have been delivered through investment in network
equipment to reduce the duration of power cuts, operational initiatives to improve how our staff
respond to faults, initiatives to prevent faults from occurring and the use of innovative equipment on
the network.
In the past, interruptions to supply on remote power lines could cut off customers for hours whilst
engineers searched for the problem. Now such interruptions to supply can be limited to less than
three minutes, thanks to the growing number of over 5,500 remote control switches installed in our
area. They enable us to isolate the faulty area and reroute the supply around it, saving valuable time in
restoring power. Since 2010 we have invested over £10m in these types of network asset. Figures 13
and 14 show the increasing volume of remotely-controlled switches that have been installed and the
rising percentage of customer supplies that have been restored using this facility.
Figure 13: Improved restoration by remote switching - Northeast

Figure 14: Improved restoration by remote switching - Yorkshire

Not all customer supplies can be restored using remote switching and in many cases repairs to
network assets are required. Therefore we rely upon our operational engineers to respond on a 24/7
basis to power cuts. Our first responders are staff dedicated to restoring supplies and then, depending
upon their assessment of the severity of the interruption, additional staff may be dispatched. To
improve our response times we have introduced a system called Fonetrack. This system uses the
locational ability of smartphone technology to identify the most suitable engineers closest to the
power cut and allow us to dispatch them more rapidly. For faults on our high-voltage network a
minimum of three engineers are dispatched to the area to perform switching operations to restore
supplies, whereas for faults on our less complex low-voltage network fewer engineers are often
required to restore supplies.
Sometimes customers’ supplies have to be quickly restored on a temporary basis to allow us to carry
out further more time-consuming, permanent (non-urgent) fault-repair work afterwards. We have a
target level of outstanding fault-repair work that equates to a single week’s worth of repair activity.
Managing our network to this target level ensures the network is maintained in a reliable state and
minimises the risk of further loss of customer supplies.

Two-thirds of our network is underground and faults can be harder to trace here than on overhead
lines, because the supply system is out of sight. We use devices that allow us to quickly pinpoint the
location of the problem, saving the trouble and cost, say, of digging up the road in the wrong place.
Additionally customers may often experience intermittent faults that disappear when we first try to
restore supply. Unfortunately in these situations the fault can often reappear many times, weeks or
months later, causing further disruption. This type of fault is very difficult to find and fix permanently.
In these circumstances, therefore, we are using an innovative device to help us to proactively tackle
intermittent faults on low-voltage underground cables. The device does two things: firstly it will help
us restore supply more quickly to limit the time customers are without electricity, and secondly it will
try to trace the fault before it disappears again. Once we get a good idea of where the problem is, we
can proactively carry out the necessary repairs and restore a more reliable supply.
CASE STUDY: Innovation in action: Kelvatek Bidoyng

When a power cut occurs we send an engineer out to investigate the problem. In a lot of cases
this means that a fuse has blown in the substation and sometimes simply replacing the fuse is
enough to restore the electricity supply. In such cases customers will still be without power until
we get someone there to do the work. This is much the same as when an appliance in the home
blows a fuse in the plug and is replaced. However, whenever the same fuse keeps on blowing
over a period of weeks or months this is telling us that something in the network is faulty and that
at some stage simply replacing the fuse will not work. At these times customers will be off supply
until we have carried out tests and dug down to find the fault and repair it.
This new device, often known as a ‘smart fuse’, replaces the existing fuse in the substation and
comprises two fuses, a main one and a backup. It is able to detect when the main fuse blows and
will automatically switch supplies to the backup fuse within minutes, without the need to wait for
an engineer.
The unit is then able to call in and tell us that a fuse has blown so that we can send someone out
to replace the blown main fuse without customers having another power cut.
The final benefit of the device is that, when the fuse blows, it is able to “look down” the cable
from the substation and assess how far down the cable the fault was. This ‘fault location’ gives us
a chance to investigate and fix the faulty point on the network before it causes another
unexpected power cut.
Part of our strategy to improve reliability has been to prevent power cuts from occurring in the first
place. Two significant initiatives targeted at high-voltage overhead lines have been the installation of
arc-suppression-coil earthing and the implementation of a rigorous vegetation (trees etc)
management programme.
We have installed over 60 arc-suppression coils at primary substations. These substations have been
selected because they supply customers via a large proportion of overhead line and have a history of
transient or short-duration supply interruptions. A proportion of faults occurring on high-voltage
overhead lines are of a short duration and the lines are not permanently damaged. Lightning,
windblown debris and tree branches are typical causes of these faults. Although they are transient
faults, they do cause operation of a circuit breaker and supplies to the area are interrupted for tens of
seconds as the automatic control system tries to restore the supply. The arc-suppression coil earthing
system can prevent the circuit breaker from operating for a number of these transient faults by
controlling the amount of power dispersed during the fault. This prevents customers from even seeing
a momentary dip in the lights. Although we believe we have reached the point of saturation on our

network with these devices, we continue to explore via our innovation research the further
application of similar devices.
CASE STUDY: Innovation in action: Arc-Suppression Coil

We are one of only three distribution network operators to protect overhead lines by the use of a
special device called an arc-suppression coil. These devices have been used extensively on the
continent for many years and can lead to a reduction in the number of customer interruptions.
We trialled the use of arc-suppression coils in a novel manner best suited to the electricity
networks needs of the UK over 10 years ago and proved that they deliver benefits to our
customers. Since then we have deployed the devices across our network as part of our reliability
improvement strategy.
In technical terms, an arc-suppression coil is a variable inductance connected between true earth
and the system neutral point. The coil is used to create a high-impedance path for single-phase
to earth currents by virtue of its formation of a resonant circuit with the connected network. The
coil is only switched into the circuit for a short time duration. This is effective in mitigating the
effects of transient interruptions to customers’ supplies and allowing conventional systems to
locate and restore permanent faults. The benefit to customers from this type of investment is a
reduction in the number of power cuts they experience.
Throughout the present regulatory period we have delivered a vegetation management programme
that ensures the level of interference is minimised. We accomplish this by assessing the type of
vegetation in the locality of our overhead lines, cutting back the vegetation to a minimum distance
and then maintaining this clearance distance through regular visits as described in annex 1.6. This
programme commenced in 2005 and the final initial cuts were completed in 2012. Over this time we
have seen a reduction in faults caused by vegetation.

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ANNEX 2.

Guidance for the reader

The purpose of this annex

Our target audience for this annex

Mapping this annex to the core narrative

 Section 2.2, section 1.3.1, section 1.3.2

Northern Powergrid: Our business plan for 2015-23 Page 2 of 30

Northern Powergrid: Our business plan for 2015-23 Page 3 of 30

1 Keeping the lights on – our proposal

What we plan to do - headlines…

1.1 Our proposal in a little more detail…

Northern Powergrid: Our business plan for 2015-23 Page 4 of 30

1.2 Why we think our proposal is the right one

Northern Powergrid: Our business plan for 2015-23 Page 5 of 30

Narrowing down the range of options

Northern Powergrid: Our business plan for 2015-23 Page 6 of 30

1.3 Evaluating the “realistic” options

- We could pursue a material reduction in underlying fault volumes. As described earlier

Northern Powergrid: Our business plan for 2015-23 Page 7 of 30

Northern Powergrid: Our business plan for 2015-23 Page 8 of 30

2 Our target reliability-output performance

Northern Powergrid: Our business plan for 2015-23 Page 9 of 30

Figure 1: Target unplanned customer interruption performance

Northern Powergrid: Our business plan for 2015-23 Page 10 of 30

Figure 2: Target unplanned customer minutes lost performance

3 Our plans for proposed future reliability performance

Northern Powergrid: Our business plan for 2015-23 Page 11 of 30

3.1 Maintaining underlying reliability performance

3.2 Planned reduction in number of power cuts

- This will minimise the impact of vegetation-caused power cuts.

Northern Powergrid: Our business plan for 2015-23 Page 12 of 30

3.3 Planned reduction in duration of power cuts

- The replacement of remote control equipment will be delivered on a timely basis to

- Building on the significant technology-refresh of our IT systems in the current regulatory

- This will be supplemented by the ongoing monitoring of operational performance and

- We intend to continue to work closely with manufacturers to develop devices that

3.4 Dealing with long-duration power cuts

Northern Powergrid: Our business plan for 2015-23 Page 13 of 30

3.5 Improving reliability for the worst-performing parts of our

Northern Powergrid: Our business plan for 2015-23 Page 14 of 30

3.6 Improving intermittent-fault performance

3.7 Minimising the inconvenience of planned power cuts

Northern Powergrid: Our business plan for 2015-23 Page 15 of 30

4 Our plans for ensuring network resilience

4.1 Installing additional flood defences

Northern Powergrid: Our business plan for 2015-23 Page 16 of 30

Figure 3: Historical and forecast flood-defence investment

Figure 4: At risk customer defended

Northern Powergrid: Our business plan for 2015-23 Page 17 of 30

4.2 Improving our storm network resilience

4.3 Black-start resilience

Northern Powergrid: Our business plan for 2015-23 Page 18 of 30

4.4 Increased security measures at strategic sites

5 Managing future uncertainties

5.1 Smart meters

5.2 Metal theft

Northern Powergrid: Our business plan for 2015-23 Page 19 of 30

5.3 Low-carbon technology

5.4 Climate change adaptation

Northern Powergrid: Our business plan for 2015-23 Page 20 of 30

 Ice & wind

 Drought (soil drying & movement)

6 Benchmarking of our performance

Northern Powergrid: Our business plan for 2015-23 Page 21 of 30