1 Political Law

U.P.
LAW BOC POLITICAL LAW PRE-WEEK REVIEWER
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
Q1: Can the President declare the existence of a state of national emergency without the approval of the
Congress?
A1: Yes. The President can validly declare the existence of a state of national emergency even in the absence of a
Congressional enactment. Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution grants the President such power. [David
v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396 (2006)].
Q2: During the existence of a state of national emergency, the President ordered the taking over of privately-
owned public utilities and businesses affected with public interest. Can the President do this without a
delegation from Congress?
A2: No. The taking over of privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest requires a
delegation from Congress.
Q3: Under what circumstances can the President suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus?
A3: Three conditions must concur for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus to be valid:
(a) there must be invasion or rebellion;
(b) the public safety must require the suspension of the privilege;
(c) for a period not exceeding sixty (60 days). [Lansang v. Garcia, G.R. No. L-33964 December 11, 1971; 1987 CONST.,
ART. III, Section 15 and ART. VII, Section 18]
Q4: Can the Congress review the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or proclamation of
martial law by the President?
A4: Yes. The Congress can either revoke or extend such suspension or proclamation.
Within forty-eight (48) hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress.
The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may
revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President.
Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or
suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety
requires it. [1987 CONST., ART. VII, Section 18].
Q5: On December 4, 2009, President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1959 declaring martial law
and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the Province of Maguindanao. On December 9,
2009, Congress convened to review the validity of the President’s action. But, two days later or on December
12 before Congress could act, the President issued Presidential Proclamation 1963, lifting martial law and
restoring the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao. Can the constitutionality of Presidential
Proclamation 1959 be still challenged before the Supreme Court?
A5: No. The case has become moot. President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959 before the joint houses of
Congress, which had in fact convened, could act on the same. Consequently, the petitions challenging
Proclamation 1959 have become moot and the Court has nothing to review. The lifting of martial law and
restoration of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao was a supervening event that obliterated
any justiciable controversy.
Q6: A concerned citizen filed an ethics complaint against Senator Sixto, due to acts committed during his term
as a Department Secretary in the immediately preceding administration. As a result of the investigation, the
Senate Ethics Committee issued a Resolution finding her guilty of the charges. On the basis of such resolution,
the Senate issued a resolution suspending him for 30 days. Senator Sixto questioned such resolution before
the Supreme Court, arguing that the acts alleged did not constitute “disorderly behavior” since the acts
questioned took place before he was elected Senator. Can the Supreme Court reverse the Senate resolution?
A6: No. Each House of Congress is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior, not only because the
Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual
circumstances of which that House knows best but which cannot be depicted in black and white for presentation
to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if this Court assumed the power to determine whether Senator
Sixto’s conduct constituted disorderly behavior, it would thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the
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U.P. LAW BOC POLITICAL LAW PRE-WEEK REVIEWER
Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the Government. The theory of separation of
powers demands in such situation a prudent refusal to interfere. [Osmeña v. Pendatun, G.R. No. L-17144 (1950)].
Q7: Does the Sandiganbayan have the power to decree a ninety-day preventive suspension of an incumbent
Senator charged with violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act?
A7: Yes. The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an incumbent public official
charged with violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has both legal and jurisprudential support. The
order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its
own ranks under the Constitution which provides that each-
x x x house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with
the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when
imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.
The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon
determination by the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member. On the
other hand, the suspension under Section 13 of RA 3019 is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure.
The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to have effectively excluded members of
Congress from Republic Act No. 3019 nor from its sanctions [Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 128055 (2001)].
Q8: A Special Committee found Congressman Osmeña guilty of serious disorderly behavior for having made
serious imputations of bribery against the President in a speech he delivered on the floor of Congress. The
House issued Resolution No. 175 declaring him guilty as recommended, and suspending him from office for
fifteen months. Senator Osmeña questioned the constitutionality of the suspension. He argued that he enjoys
absolute parliamentary immunity. Is he correct?
A8: No. He is not correct. Section 15 [now Section 11] of Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any speech
or debate" in Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of Representative "shall not be questioned in any
other place." Although exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, the members
of Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself. Observe that "they shall not be questioned in any
other place" than Congress.
Furthermore, the Rules of the House which petitioner himself has invoked (Rule XVII, sec. 7), recognize the House's
power to hold a member responsible "for words spoken in debate." [Osmeña v. Pendatun, G.R. No. L-17144 (1950)]
Q9. Can the Supreme Court review the determination of the Congress that the delivery of speeches attacking
the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly conduct for which an erring Senator may be disciplined or
suspended?
A9: No. The Supreme Court cannot review such determination made by Congress. The House is the judge of what
constitutes disorderly behavior, not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also
because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which cannot be
depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if this Court assumed
the power to determine whether a Senator’s conduct constituted disorderly behavior, it would thereby have
assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the
Government. The theory of separation of powers fastidiously observed by this Court, demands in such situation a
prudent refusal to interfere. Each department, it has been said, had exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere. [Osmeña v. Pendatun, G.R. No. L-17144 (1950)]
Q10. The Madrid Protocol, concluded in 1989, governs the Madrid System for the International Registration
of Marks, which is the centralized system providing a one-stop solution for registering and managing marks
worldwide. This System allows the trademark owner to file one application in one language, and to pay one
set of fees to protect his mark in the territories of up to 97 member-states. Conformably with its express
authority under Section 9 of Executive Order No. 459, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) determined
that the Madrid Protocol was an executive agreement. Thus, the President ratified it through an instrument
of accession. The Intellectual Property Association assailed the constitutionality of such instrument. It argued
that the DFA Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion in determining the Madrid Protocol as an
executive agreement. Does the Madrid Protocol need to be ratified by the Senate?
A10: No. The Madrid Protocol is an executive agreement that does not require legislative concurrence or Senate
ratification to be binding, unlike treaties. The registration of trademarks and copyrights has been the subject of
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executive agreements entered into without the concurrence of the Senate. Some executive agreements have been
concluded in conformity with the policies declared in the acts of Congress with respect to the general subject
matter. After examining the Declaration of State Policy under the Intellectual Property Code (Republic Act No.
8293, IP Code), the Supreme Court held that the Madrid Protocol was concluded in conformity with the IP Code,
a policy declared in acts of Congress with respect to the general subject matter. [Intellectual Property Association
of the Philippines v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204605 (2016)]
Q11: What are the differences between a treaty and an executive agreement?
A11:
TREATIES EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS
formal documents which require ratification with the become binding through executive action without the
approval of two-thirds of all the members of the need of a vote by the Senate or by Congress
Senate
agreements involving political issues or changes in merely involve arrangements on the implementation
national policy, as well as those involving of existing policies, rules, laws, or agreements.
international agreements of a permanent character
generally intended to implement a treaty already
enforced or to determine the details of the
implementation thereof that do not affect the
sovereignty of the State
They are concluded:

(1) to adjust the details of a treaty;
(2) pursuant to or upon confirmation by an act of the
Legislature; or
(3) in the exercise of the President's independent
powers under the Constitution.
can create new international obligations cannot create new international obligations that are
not expressly allowed or reasonably implied in the law
they purport to implement
Products of the acts of the Executive and the Senate Solely an executive act
Same level as a statute Not of the same level as a statute

A later law or a later treaty takes precedence over one Executive agreements that are inconsistent with either
that is prior if there is an irreconcilable conflict. a law or a treaty are considered ineffective.
[Saguisag v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 212426 (2016)]
Q12: What are the requirements for validity of an international agreement allowing foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities in the Philippines?
A12: An international agreement allowing foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the Philippines must be:
1. Under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate;
2. Ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, when
the Congress so requires; and
3. Recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State. [Article XVIII, Section 25 of the 1987 Constitution]
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Q13: What is the doctrine of incorporation?

A13: Under the doctrine of incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the and land no further
legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere. The doctrine of incorporation,
as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not
superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogat priori takes effect — a
treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the constitution is the highest law
of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in
conflict with the constitution [Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465 (2000)].
Q14: Should members of the House who are outside the country be counted for the purpose of computing the
required quorum?
A14: No. Members of the House who are incapacitated to discharge their duties because of death, incapacity, or
absence from the jurisdiction of the house, such as those outside the Philippines, or for other causes which make
attendance of the member concerned impossible, even through coercive process which each house is empowered
to issue to compel attendance, are not included for the purpose of computing the quorum [Avelino v. Cuenco, G.R.
No. L-2821 (1949)].
Q15: With the impending vacancy of one of the positions of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, the Chair
of the Senate Committee on Justice suggested to his counterpart in the House of Representatives that they
split their votes to ensure the participation of both Houses in the formation of the shortlist. The Chair of the
House Committee on Justice, who is currently sitting on the Judicial and Bar Council, cited the ruling in Chavez
v. Judicial and Bar Council in declining the suggestion. His Senate counterpart responded that the Supreme
Court in Chavez only prevented two members from sitting in the Council at any given time, but did not prevent
them from splitting their votes. Can the two chairs split the vote among themselves?
A15: No. In the JBC, any member of Congress, whether from the Senate or the House of Representatives, is
constitutionally empowered to represent the entire Congress. Thus, when the Constitution envisioned one member
of Congress sitting in the JBC, it is sensible to presume that this representation carries with him one full vote.
[Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242 (2013)].
Q16: Mr. Samonte was appointed Civil Service Commissioner on February 2, 2011. His term ends seven years
later. On October 5, 2014, he was appointed Chairperson of the Commission to replace Mr. Dela Vega, whose
full seven-year term ended February 2, 2013. On February 1, 2018, the President appointed Ms. Jayme as
Chairperson, whose term would take effect the next day. Mr. Samonte protested, arguing that due to his
appointment as Chairperson, his term ends only on October 5, 2020. Is Mr. Samonte correct?
A16: No. Mr. Samonte is not correct. In no case can one be a COA member, either as chairman or commissioner,
or a mix of both positions, for an aggregate term of more than 7 years. The promotional appointment as COA
Chairman of Samonte for a stated fixed term of less than seven (7) years is void for violating a clear, but mandatory
constitutional prescription. There can be no denying that the vacancy in the position of COA chairman when Dela
Vega stepped down in February 2, 2013 resulted from the expiration of his 7-year term. Hence, the appointment
to the vacancy thus created ought to have been one for seven (7) years in line with the verba legis approach of
interpreting the Constitution. In net effect, the President could not have had, under any circumstance, validly
appointed Mr. Samonte as COA Chairman, for a full 7-year appointment, as the Constitution decrees, was not
legally feasible in light of the 7-year aggregate rule. Mr. Samonte had already served 4 years of his 7-year term as
COA Commissioner. A shorter term, however, to comply with said rule would also be invalid as the corresponding
appointment would effectively breach the clear purpose of the Constitution of giving to every appointee so
appointed subsequent to the first set of commissioners, a fixed term of office of 7 years. To recapitulate, a COA
commissioner like respondent Villar who serves for a period less than seven (7) years cannot be appointed as
chairman when such position became vacant as a result of the expiration of the 7-year term of the
predecessor. Such appointment to a full term is not valid and constitutional, as the appointee will be allowed to
serve more than seven (7) years under the constitutional ban. [Funa v. Villar, G.R. No. 192791 (2012)].
Q17: Ms. Tengco filed a petition praying for a writ of amparo before the Court of Appeals, impleading the
President, the Philippine National Police, and the Armed Forces of the Philippines. She alleged that elements
of the military had abducted and interrogated her, and after her release, has continued to harass her and her
family. The Court of Appeals dropped the President from the suit. Ms. Tengco questions this before the
Supreme Court, arguing that the President is no longer immune from suit during his tenure since the
constitutional provision granting it is not present in the Constitution. Is Ms. Tengco correct?
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A17: No. The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under the present system of government, albeit
not expressly reserved in the Constitution. Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or
actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the
Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be
dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of
harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and
functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which
impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the
Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government. [Rubico v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 183871
(2010)].
Q18: Francesca filed a petition for cancellation of Mario’s certificate of candidacy before the Commission on
Elections. She argued that Mario, a foundling, is not a natural born Filipino since the issuance of a foundling
certificate in his favor constitute an act to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship. Is Francesca correct?
A18: No. Francesca is not correct. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship 1987 CONST., ART IV, Section
2]. Firstly, "having to perform an act" means that the act must be personally done by the citizen. In this instance,
the determination of foundling status is done not by the child but by the authorities. Secondly, the object of the
process is the determination of the whereabouts of the parents, not the citizenship of the child. Lastly, the process
is certainly not analogous to naturalization proceedings to acquire Philippine citizenship, or the election of such
citizenship by one born of an alien father and a Filipino mother under the 1935 Constitution, which is an act to
perfect it. [Poe v. Llamanzares, G.R. No. 221697 (2016)].
Q19: Differentiate naturalization from repatriation.

A19: Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Repatriation, on the
other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed
forces; (2) service in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of the
United States at any other time;(4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political and economic
necessity.
As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath
of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place
where the person concerned resides or last resided.
The person desiring to reacquire Philippine citizenship would not even be required to file a petition in court, and
all that he had to do was to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to register that fact
with the civil registry in the place of his residence or where he had last resided in the Philippines.
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who
lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as
a natural-born Filipino. [Bengson v. HRET, G.R. No. 142840 (2001)]
Q20: Who are citizens of the Philippines?

A20: The following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution; 
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines; 
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine Citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority; and 
4. Those who are naturalized in the accordance with law. [1987 CONST, ART. IV, Section 1]
Q21: Who are natural born citizens?

A21: Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any
act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.
Those who are born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority shall be deemed natural-born citizens.
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Q22: Petitioner Go raised the defense of res judicata and estoppel against the Government in questioning his
status as a Filipino citizen. Go argued that the grounds raised by the government have been raised before or
during the hearing of the petition for his naturalization. Is Go correct?
A22: No. Go is incorrect. It is settled that the doctrine of estoppel or of laches does not apply against the
Government suing in its capacity as Sovereign or asserting governmental rights. It has been held that the
Government is never estopped by mistakes or errors on the part of its agents, and that estoppel cannot give validity
to an act that is prohibited by law or is against public policy.
Furthermore, unlike final decisions in actions and other proceedings in court, a decision or order granting
citizenship to the applicant does not really become executory and a naturalization proceeding not being a judicial
adversary proceeding, the decision rendered therein is no res judicata as to any of the reasons or matters which
would support a judgment cancelling the certificate of naturalization for illegal or fraudulent procurement. As a
matter of fact, it is settled in this jurisdiction that a certificate of naturalization may be cancelled upon grounds or
conditions subsequent to the granting of the certificate o naturalization. Thus, a certificate of naturalization may
be cancelled if it is found subsequently that the applicant for citizenship secured the same by misleading the courts
on any material fact.
Q23: Does the operative fact doctrine apply to executive acts?

A23: Yes. The operative fact doctrine does not only apply to laws subsequently declared unconstitutional or
unlawful, as it also applies to executive acts subsequently declared as invalid. Evidently, the operative fact doctrine
is not confined to statutes and rules and regulations issued by the executive department that are accorded the
same status as that of a statute or those which are quasi-legislative in nature. The Court can apply the operative
fact doctrine to acts and consequences that resulted from the reliance not only on a law or executive act which is
quasi-legislative in nature but also on decisions or orders of the executive branch which were later nullified. This
Court is not unmindful that such acts and consequences must be recognized in the higher interest of justice, equity
and fairness. [Hacienda Luisita v. PARC, G.R. No. 171101 (2011)]
Q24: In an investigation in aid of legislation, Senator Estrada asked Atty. Francisco I. Chavez, as resource
person, on the facts and issues the latter raised with the Supreme Court in Chavez v. National Housing
Authority. The said case has already been decided by the Court with finality. Is the subject matter of the
legislative inquiry sub judice?
A24: No. The subject matter of the legislative inquiry is no longer sub judice or before a court or judge for
consideration. The Court already denied with finality the motion of Chavez, as the petitioner in Chavez v. National
Housing Authority, for reconsideration of the Decision of the Court. The sub judice issue has been rendered moot
and academic by the supervening issuance of the en banc Resolution. An issue or a case becomes moot and
academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy, so that a determination of the issue would be without
practical use and value. In such cases, there is no actual substantial relief to which the petitioner would be entitled
and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition. In fine, it will not avail petitioners any to invoke
the sub judice effect of Chavez and resist, on that ground, the assailed congressional invitations and subpoenas.
[Romero v. Senator Estrada, G.R. No. 174105 (2009)]
Q25: Will a pending case before the Supreme Court bar the continuance of a Senate Committee investigation?
A25: No. On-going judicial proceedings do not preclude congressional hearings in aid of
legislation. While Sabio and Standard Chartered Bank advert only to pending criminal and administrative cases
before lower courts as not posing a bar to the continuation of a legislative inquiry, there is no rhyme or reason that
these cases’ doctrinal pronouncement and their rationale cannot be extended to appealed cases and special civil
actions awaiting final disposition before the Supreme Court. The mere filing of a criminal or an administrative
complaint before a court or quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative
investigation. Otherwise, it would be extremely easy to subvert any intended inquiry by Congress through the
convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an administrative complaint. Surely, the exercise of sovereign legislative
authority, of which the power of legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made subordinate to a
criminal or administrative investigation.
Q26: Can cabinet secretaries invoke executive privilege and excuse themselves from appearing in Senate
investigations?
A26: No. They cannot invoke the executive privilege in their own capacities. In light of this highly exceptional
nature of the executive privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit to the President the power to invoke the
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privilege. She may of course authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf, in which case
the Executive Secretary must state that the authority is "By order of the President," which means that he personally
consulted with her. The privilege being an extraordinary power, it must be wielded only by the highest official in
the executive hierarchy. In other words, the President may not authorize her subordinates to exercise such power.
It follows, therefore, that when an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his own judgment,
might be covered by executive privilege, he must be afforded reasonable time to inform the President or the
Executive Secretary of the possible need for invoking the privilege. This is necessary in order to provide the
President or the Executive Secretary with fair opportunity to consider whether the matter indeed calls for a claim
of executive privilege. If, after the lapse of that reasonable time, neither the President nor the Executive Secretary
invokes the privilege, Congress is no longer bound to respect the failure of the official to appear before Congress
and may then opt to avail of the necessary legal means to compel his appearance. [Senate v. Ermita, G.R. No.
169777 (2006)]
Q27: What are the elements of presidential communications privilege?

A27:
1) The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable presidential power.
2) The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a close advisor of the President or the
President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in operational proximity with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing
of adequate need, such that the information sought likely contains important evidence and by the unavailability
of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. [Neri v. Senate, G.R. No. 180643 (2008)]
Q28: Can the government share the control and supervision of the exploration, development, and utilization
of its natural resources with other states or corporations?
A28: No. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint
venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-
five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided
by law.
The State shall protect the nation’s marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic
zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.
Q29: What are the three modes of amending the Constitution?

A29: Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the Constitution.
The first mode is through Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its Members.
The second mode is through a constitutional convention.
The third mode is through a people's initiative.
The system of initiative as a mode of effecting changes in the Constitution is strictly limited to amendments – not
to a revision – thereof.
Amendments to the Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative, upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district
must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this
section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once
every five years thereafter.
Q30: Would a shift from presidential to a parliamentary form of government merely require an amendment to
the Constitution?
A30: No. It would require a revision, not a mere amendment, of the Constitution. Revision broadly implies a change
that alters a basic principle in the constitution, like altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of
checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as
when the change affects substantial provisions of the constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly refers
to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects
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several provisions of the constitution, while amendment generally affects only the specific provision being
amended.
A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the three great co-equal
branches of government in the present Constitution are reduced into two. This alters the separation of powers in
the Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system
is a revision of the Constitution. Merging the legislative and executive branches is a radical change in the structure
of government.
The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of Executive Power alters the separation of powers
and thus constitutes a revision of the Constitution. Likewise, the abolition alone of one chamber of Congress alters
the system of checks-and-balances within the legislature and constitutes a revision of the Constitution.
By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary
system, involving the abolition of the Office of the President and the abolition of one chamber of Congress, is
beyond doubt a revision, not a mere amendment.
The petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution if in truth and in fact a proposal for the revision
thereof is barred from the system of initiative upon any legally permissible construction of Section 2, Article XVII
of the Constitution. [Lambino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 174153 (2006)]
Q31: When is an impeachment proceeding deemed initiated?

A31: An impeachment proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the
Committee on Justice for action.
No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one
year. [Francisco v. HOR, G.R. No. 160261 (2003)]
Q32: What is a political question?

A32: A political question refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people
in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature
or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a
particular measure.
The political question doctrine which, under the classic formulation of Baker v. Carr, applies when there is found,
among others:
1. a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department;
2. a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it or
3. the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non- judicial
discretion.
Q33. What are the constitutional safeguards on the exercise of the President’s power to proclaim martial law?
A33: The following are the constitutional safeguards to the exercise of the power of the President to proclaim
martial law:
1. There must be actual invasion or rebellion;
2. The duration of the proclamation shall not exceed sixty (60) days;
3. Within forty-eight (48) hours, the President shall report his action to Congress. If Congress is not in
session, it must convene within forty-eight (48) hours;
4. Congress may by majority vote of all its members voting jointly revoke the proclamation, and the
President cannot set aside the revocation;
5. By the same vote and in the same manner, upon initiative of the President, Congress may extend the
proclamation if the invasion or rebellion continues and public safety requires the extension;
6. The Supreme Court may review the factual sufficiency of the proclamation, and the Supreme Court must
decide the case within thirty (30) days from the time it was filed;
7. Martial law does not automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the operation of
the Constitution. It does not supplant the functioning of the civil courts and of Congress. Military courts
8
have no jurisdiction over civilians where civil courts are able to function (Cruz, Philippine Political Law,
1995 ed., pp. 213-214.)
Q34: Under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they
are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they
themselves also determine. Is this constitutional?
A34: No. It is unconstitutional. The 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority
to individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to
individually exercise the power of appropriation which is lodged in Congress. The power to appropriate must be
exercised only through legislation. Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states that: "No money shall
be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." The power of appropriation
involves (a) the setting apart by law of a certain sum from the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose.
As these two (2) acts under the 2013 PDAF Article comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation, and given
that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators
have been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not, however, allow. Thus, the 2013 PDAF
Article, as well as all other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the similar legislative identification
feature is unconstitutional. [Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566 (2013)]
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2
Q35: What is the knock and announce principle?
A35: Police officers are obliged to give the appellant notice, show to her their authority, and demand that they be
allowed entry. They may only break open any outer or inner door or window of a house to execute the search
warrant if, after such notice and demand, such officers are refused entry to the place of directed search. This is
known as the knock and announce principle which is embodied in Anglo-American Law. The method of entry of
an officer into a dwelling and the presence or absence of such notice are as important considerations in assessing
whether subsequent entry to search and/or arrest is constitutionally reasonable. The proper trigger point in
determining, under the knock and announce rule, whether the police waited long enough before entering the
residence to execute a warrant, is when those inside should have been alerted that the police wanted entry to
execute a warrant. [People v. Huang Zhen Hua, G.R. No. 139301 (2004)]
Q36: Differentiate searches incidental to lawful arrests from "stop and frisk" searches.
A36: Searches incidental to a lawful arrest require that a crime be committed in flagrante delicto, and the search
conducted within the vicinity and within reach by the person arrested is done to ensure that there are no weapons,
as well as to preserve the evidence. On the other hand, "stop and frisk" searches are conducted to prevent the
occurrence of a crime. "Stop and frisk" search should be used when dealing with a rapidly unfolding and
potentially criminal situation in the city streets where unarguably there is no time to secure a search warrant.
[People v. Cogaed, G.R. No. 200334 (2014)].
Q37: Patrolman Espiritu and his companions observed during their surveillance that the male person had red
eyes and was wobbling like a drunk along the Caloocan City Cemetery, which according to police information
was a popular hangout of drug addicts. When this male person tried to avoid the policemen, the latter
approached him and introduced themselves as police officers. The policemen then asked the male person
what he was holding in his hands. The male person tried to resist. Patrolman Espiritu asked the male person
if he could see what said male person had in his hands. The latter showed the wallet and allowed Patrolman
Espiritu to examine the same. Pat. Espiritu took the wallet and examined it. He found suspected crushed
marijuana residue inside. Was there a valid search?
A37: Yes. The search was valid, being akin to a stop-and-frisk. In the landmark case of Terry vs. Ohio, a stop-and-
frisk was defined as the vernacular designation of the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street,
interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s). The interest of effective crime prevention and detection allows a police
officer to approach a person, in appropriate circumstances and manner, for purposes of investigating possible
criminal behavior even though there is insufficient probable cause to make an actual arrest.
Q38: Is a tip given by a police informant sufficient to justify a valid warrantless arrest?
9
A38: No. A reliable information alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest. The rule requires, in addition,
that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense. [People v. Raquero, G.R. No. 186529 (2010)].
Q39: What is a custodial investigation?

A39: Custodial investigation refers to any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. This presupposes that he
is suspected of having committed a crime and that the investigator is trying to elicit information or a confession
from him. The rule begins to operate at once, as soon as the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime, and direction is aimed upon a particular suspect who has been taken into custody and to whom
the police would then direct interrogatory questions which tend to elicit incriminating statements. [Jesalva v.
People, G.R. No. 187725 (2011)]
Q40: What is a writ of amparo?

A40: The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security
is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
For the protective writ of amparo to issue, allegation and proof that the persons subject thereof are missing are
not enough. It must also be shown and proved by substantial evidence that the disappearance was carried out by,
or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to
acknowledge the same or give information on the fate or whereabouts of said missing persons, with the intention
of removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. Simply put, the petitioner in an
amparo case has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the indispensable element of government
participation.
A writ of amparo may lie against a private individual or entity. But even if the person sought to be held accountable
or responsible in an amparo petition is a private individual or entity, still, government involvement in the
disappearance remains an indispensable element. [Navia v. Pardico, G.R. No. 184467 (2012)]
Q41: Are checkpoints legal?

A41: Checkpoints are not illegal per se. Thus, under exceptional circumstances, as where the survival of organized
government is on the balance, or where the lives and safety of the people are in grave peril, checkpoints may be
allowed and installed by the government. Implicit in this proposition is that when the situation clears and such
grave perils are removed, checkpoints will have absolutely no reason to remain.
Admittedly, the routine checkpoint stop does intrude, to a certain extent, on motorist's right to "free passage
without interruption", but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention of travellers during
which the vehicle's occupants are required to answer a brief question or two. For as long as the vehicle is neither
searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual
search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individual's right against unreasonable search.
[Valmonte v. de Villa, G.R. No. 83988 (1990)]
Q42: What are the requisites for a valid classification under the equal protection clause?
A42:
1. The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
2. It is germane to the purpose of the law;
3. It is not limited to existing conditions only; and;
4. It applies equally to all members of the same class. [Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commision, G.R. No. 192935
(2010)]
Q43: What is the strict scrutiny standard?

A43: According to the strict scrutiny standard, a legislative classification that impermissibly interferes with the
exercise of fundamental rights or operates to the peculiar class disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed
unconstitutional. The burden is on the government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a
10
compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest. The strict scrutiny
standard was used to assess the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as
other fundamental rights, as expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection. [Disini v. Secretary of
Justice, G.R. No. 203335 (2014)]
Q44: Filipinas Computer Corporation (FCC), a local manufacturer of computers and computer parts, owns a
sprawling plant in a 5,000-square meter lot in Pasig City. To remedy the city's acute housing shortage,
compounded by a burgeoning population, the Sangguniang Panglungsod authorized the City Mayor to
negotiate for the purchase of the lot. The Sanggunian intends to subdivide the property into small residential
lots to be distributed at cost to qualified city residents. But FCC refused to sell the lot. Hard pressed to find a
suitable property to house its homeless residents, the City filed a complaint for eminent domain against FCC.
If FCC hires you as lawyer, what defense or defenses would you set up in order to resist the expropriation of the
property? Explain.
A44: I will raise the defense that the selection of lot to be expropriated violates due process, because it is arbitrary.
Since it is devoted to commercial use, the beneficiaries of the expropriation will not settle there and will instead
merely lease out or resell the lot for a profit. [Manotok v. National Housing Authority, 150 SCRA 89 (1987)]
Q45: If the Court grants the City's prayer for expropriation, but the City delays payment of the amount
determined by the court as just compensation, can FCC recover the property from Pasig City? Explain.
A45: The mere delay in the payment of the just compensation will not entitle the Filipinas Computer Corporation
to recover the property. Instead, legal interest on the just compensation should be paid (National Power Corp. v.
Henson, 300 SCRA 751 [1998].) However, if payment was not made within five (5) years from the finality of
judgment in the expropriation case, Filipinas Corporation can recover the property. To be just, the compensation
must be paid within a reasonable time. [Republic v. Lim, 462 SCRA 265 (2005)]
Q46: Suppose the expropriation succeeds, but the City decides to abandon its plan to subdivide the property
for residential purposes having found a much bigger lot, can FCC legally demand that it be allowed to
repurchase the property from the City of Pasig? Why or why not?
A46: If the lot was expropriated with the condition that it can be used only for low-cost housing, it should be
returned to Filipinas Computer Corporation upon abandonment of the purpose. [Heirs of Timoteo Moreno v.
Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority, 413 SCRA 502 (2003)].
Q47: Section 23 (3) of Republic Act No. 10354 otherwise known as The Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012 states that the conscientious objection of a health care service provider based
on his/her ethical or religious beliefs shall be respected. However, the conscientious objector shall
immediately refer the person seeking such care and services to another health care service provider within the
same facility or one which is conveniently accessible: Provided, further, That the person is not in an emergency
condition or serious case as defined in Republic Act No. 8344, which penalizes the refusal of hospitals and
medical clinics to administer appropriate initial medical treatment and support in emergency and serious
cases.
Is the imposition on conscientious objectors of the duty to refer the person seeking reproductive care and
services to another health care service provider constitutional?
A47: No. It is unconstitutional. The obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the religious belief and
conviction of a conscientious objector. Once the medical practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking
information on modem reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods, his conscience is
immediately burdened as he has been compelled to perform an act against his beliefs.
Though it has been said that the act of referral is an opt-out clause, it is, however, a false compromise because it
makes pro-life health providers complicit in the performance of an act that they find morally repugnant or
offensive. They cannot, in conscience, do indirectly what they cannot do directly. One may not be the principal, but
he is equally guilty if he abets the offensive act by indirect participation.
In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of individuals, on one hand, and the interest
of the State, on the other, to provide access and information on reproductive health products, services, procedures
and methods to enable the people to determine the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children, the
11
Court is of the strong view that the religious freedom of health providers, whether public or private, should be
accorded primacy. Accordingly, a conscientious objector should be exempt from compliance with the mandates of
the RH Law. If he would be compelled to act contrary to his religious belief and conviction, it would be violative of
"the principle of non-coercion" enshrined in the constitutional right to free exercise of religion. [Imbong v. Ochoa,
G.R. No. 204819 (2014)]
Q48: What is Maximum Tolerance?

A48: The highest degree of restraint that the military, police and other peacekeeping authorities shall observe
during a public assembly or in the dispersal of the same. [Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169838 (2006)]
Q49: Is inflation included in the formula for just compensation?

A49: No. the formula for determination of just compensation to landowners does not include the factor for
inflation rate, as inflation is properly accounted for through payment of interest on the amount due to the
landowner, and through the award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees in cases where there was irregularity
in the taking of property. [NPC v. Manalastas, G.R. No. 196140, January 27, 2016]
Q50: What does the constitutional exercise of the Congress’ power to reimpose the death penalty entail?
A50: It entails the following:
“(1) that Congress define or describe what is meant by heinous crimes;
(2) that Congress specify and penalize by death only crimes that qualify as heinous in accordance with the
definition set in the death penalty bill and/or designate crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death in which
latter case, death can only be imposed upon the attendance of circumstances duly proven in court that
characterize the crime to be heinous in accordance with the definition or description set forth in the death penalty
bill;
(3) that Congress, in enacting this death penalty bill, be singularly motivated by ‘compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes.” [People v. Echegaray, G.R. No. 117472 (1997)]
Q51: Can special, humanitarian, and compelling circumstances be considered in determining whether a
person should be admitted to bail?
A51: Yes. This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and
dignity of every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those charged in criminal proceedings but also
to extraditees upon a clear and convincing showing:
(1) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and
(2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances.
Thus, an aging Senator, charged with a crime punishable by the penalty of reclusion perpetua, may be granted bail
due to his social standing and his poor health indicating that the risk of his flight or escape from this jurisdiction
is highly unlikely. [Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 213847 (2015)]
Q52: When does presumption of innocence end?

A52: Until the accused is finally proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt, the presumption of innocence stands.
Thus, where the conviction by a lower court is still on appeal and it has not yet reached finality, the accused still
enjoys such presumption. Re: Judge Angeles, A.M. No. 06-9-545 RTC, January 31, 2008 (citing Mangubat v
Sandiganbayan where the court held that respondent Sandiganbayan did not act with grave abuse of discretion
when it ruled that despite her conviction, the accused still enjoyed presumption of innocence).
PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW

Q53: What are the four groups of officers whom the President shall appoint?
A53: There are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him
in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the president may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. [Sarmiento
III v. Mison, 156 SCRA 549 (1987)]
12
Q54: Emilio, as a candidate for the position of Provincial Governor, is only authorized to incur an election
expense amounting to PhP 4,576,566.00, under par. (a), Section 5 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 or
otherwise known as the Rules and Regulations Implementing FAIR ELECTION ACT. However, for television
campaign commercials alone, Emilio already spent the sum of PhP23,730.784. A petition for disqualification
was filed against Emilio for having committed an election offense.
Emilio argued that it is clear from COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 that the limit set by law applies only to
election expenditures of candidates and not to contributions made by third parties. Is Emilio correct?
A54: No. Emilio is wrong. Section 103 of the Omnibus Election Code states that expenditures duly authorized by
the candidate or the treasurer of the party shall be considered as expenditures of such candidate or political party.
By virtue of the legal requirement that a contribution or donation should bear the written conformity of the
candidate, a contributor/supporter/donor certainly qualifies as "any person authorized by such candidate or
treasurer. The inclusion of the amount contributed by a donor to the candidate’s allowable limit of election
expenses does not trample upon the free exercise of the voters’ rights of speech and of expression. As a content-
neutral regulation, the law’s concern is not to curtail the message or content of the advertisement promoting a
particular candidate but to ensure equality between and among aspirants with "deep pockets" and those with less
financial resources. Any restriction on speech or expression is only incidental and is no more than necessary to
achieve the substantial governmental interest of promoting equality of opportunity in political
advertising. [Ejercito v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 212398 (2014)]
Q55: What is a public office?

A55: A right, authority, or duty, created and conferred by law, by which for a given period either fixed by law or
enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign power
of government to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. [Fernandez v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 116418 (1995)]
Q56: Francisco T. Duque III, Chairman of the CSC, was designated as a member of the Board of Directors or
Trustees in an ex officio capacity of the (a) Government Service Insurance System (GSIS); (b) Philippine Health
Insurance Corporation (PHILHEALTH), (c) the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC), and (d) the Home
Development Mutual Fund (HDMF). Was Duque validly designated to the said Boards in ex-officio capacity?
A56: No. Duque was not not designated to said governing boards in ex-officio capacity. The term ex officio means
"from office; by virtue of office." It refers to an "authority derived from official character merely, not expressly
conferred upon the individual character, but rather annexed to the official position." Ex officio likewise denotes an
"act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other appointment or authority
other than that conferred by the office." An ex officio member of a board is one who is a member by virtue of his
title to a certain office, and without further warrant or appointment.
The ex officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it follows that the
official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his services in the said position. The reason
is that these services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his principal office.
When the CSC Chairman sits as a member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, he
may exercise these powers and functions, which are not anymore derived from his position as CSC Chairman, such
as imposing interest on unpaid or unremitted contributions, issuing guidelines for the accreditation of health care
providers,or approving restructuring proposals in the payment of unpaid loan amortizations. Duque’s designation
as member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF entitles him to receive per diem, a
form of additional compensation that is disallowed by the concept of an ex officio position by virtue of its clear
contravention of the proscription set by Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution. This situation goes against
the principle behind an ex officio position, and must, therefore, be held unconstitutional.
Q57: What is a De Facto Officer?

A57: A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having colorable authority to appoint, if the
office is an appointive office, and whose appointment is valid on its face. He may also be one who is in possession
of an office, and is discharging its duties under color of authority, by which is meant authority derived from an
appointment, however irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer. Consequently, the acts
of the de facto officer are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so far as the public or third
persons who are interested therein are concerned. [Funa v. Agra, G.R. No. 191644 (2013)]
13
Q58: Do the appointments of NLRC Chairman and Commissioners require the confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments?
A58: No. Their appointments do not require the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments is required only for presidential appointees mentioned in the first sentence
of Section 16, Article VII, including, those officers whose appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution
itself in the president.
The NLRC Chairman and Commissioners fall within the second sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution, more specifically under the "third groups" of appointees referred to in Mison, i.e. those whom the
President may be authorized by law to appoint. Undeniably, the Chairman and Members of the NLRC are not
among the officers mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII whose appointments requires
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
Q59: The President issued an Executive Order which states that a member of the Cabinet, undersecretary or
assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Department may, in addition to his primary
position, hold not more than two positions in the government and government corporations and receive the
corresponding compensation therefor. Is the executive order constitutional?
A59: No The executive order is unconstitutional. Appointive officials shall not hold any other governmental
position, unless otherwise allowed by law or his position’s primary functions [Sec. 7(2), Art. IX-B]  The Members of
the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any
other office or employment during their tenure. [Par. 1, Sec. 13, Art. VII, Const.]
Exceptions:
1. Unless otherwise provided in the Constitution (e.g. Secretary of Justice as ex officio member of the JBC);
or
2. Ex Officio positions.
Q60: Perfecto is a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship after he was naturalized as
citizen of USA. Perfecto applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 before the Consul General of the
Philippines in San Franciso, USA. He took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on July 10,
2008 and, on even date, an Order of Approval of Citizenship Retention and Re acquisition was issued in his
favor. On April 3, 2009, Perfecto executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship. On
November 30, 2009, Perfecto filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for the mayoralty post of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte for the May 10, 2010 national and local elections.
A rival mayoralty candidate, however, filed a petition to disqualify Perfecto and/or to cancel his CoC on the
ground that Perfecto remained a US citizen because he continued to use his US passport for entry to and exit
from the Philippines after executing aforesaid Affidavit of Renunciation. COMELEC issued a Resolution
holding that Perfecto's continued use of his US passport effectively negated his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of
Renunciation. Thus, he was disqualified to run for public office for failure to comply with the requirements of
RA 9225. Is the COMELEC correct?
A60: Yes. The COMELEC did not err, nor did it commit grave abuse of discretion, in disqualifying Perfecto from
running for public office.
Natural-born citizens who reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 may now run for public office in
the Philippines provided that they:
1. meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws;
and,
2. make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath prior to or at the time of filing of their CoC.
Perfecto’s Affidavit of Renunciation was deemed withdrawn when he used his US passport after executing said
affidavit. Consequently, at the time he filed his CoC on October 1, 2012 for purposes of the May 13, 2013 elections,
Perfecto had yet to comply with said second requirement. [Arnado v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 210164 (2015)]
Q61: What are the only instances in which the President may not extend pardon?
14
A61: The only instances in which the President may not extend pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment cases;
(2) cases that have not yet resulted in a final conviction; and (3) cases involving violations of election laws, rules
and regulations in which there was no favorable recommendation coming from the COMELEC. Therefore, it can
be argued that any act of Congress by way of statute cannot operate to delimit the pardoning power of the
President.
Q62: Can Congress limit the power of the President to grant pardon?
A62: No. The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action. Any act of Congress by way
of statute cannot operate to delimit the pardoning power of the President. [Risos-Vidal v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
206666 (2015)]
Q63: What is the rule on incompatibility of office? When is an office incompatible?

A63: The general rule contained in Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution permits an appointive official to hold more
than one office only if allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position. In the case of Quimson v. Ozaeta,
the Court ruled that, [t]here is no legal objection to a government official occupying two government offices and
performing the functions of both as long as there is no incompatibility. The crucial test in determining whether
incompatibility exists between two offices was laid out in People v. Green - whether one office is subordinate to the
other, in the sense that one office has the right to interfere with the other. [Public Interest Center v. Elma, G. R. No.
138965 (2006)]
Q64: Distinguish a temporary appointment from a permanent appointment.

A64: A permanent appointment is extended to a person possessing the requisite qualifications, including the
eligibility required, for the position. A permanent appointee enjoys the constitutional guarantee of security of
tenure. In the absence of appropriate eligibles and when it becomes necessary in the public interest to fill a
vacancy, a temporary appointment shall be issued to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to
which he is being appointed except the appropriate civil service eligibility; provided, that such temporary
appointment shall not exceed twelve months, but the appointee may be replaced sooner if a qualified civil service
eligible becomes available.
Q65: Can a COMELEC Commissioner be removed from office administratively?

A65: No. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable
violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.
All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
[Section 2, ARTICLE XI, 1987 Constitution]
Q66: Regina filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the lone district of
Marinduque. A registered voter in the said district filed a Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the
Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of Regina on the ground that it contained material misrepresentations i.e. she
is a Filipino citizen when she is, in fact, an American citizen.
The COMELEC En Banc, on 14 May 2013, found that, contrary to the declarations that she made in her COC,
Regina is not a citizen of the Philippines because of her failure to comply with the requirements of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003. Thus, she is ineligible to run
for the position of Representative for the lone district of Marinduque. Four days thereafter or on 18 May 2013,
Regina was proclaimed winner of the 13 May 2013 Elections. On 5 June 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued a
Certificate of Finality declaring the 14 May 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc final and executory,
considering that more than twenty-one (21) days have elapsed from the date of promulgation with no order
issued by this Court restraining its execution. On the same day, Regina took her oath of office before Feliciano
R. Belmonte Jr., Speaker of the House of Representatives.
Regina argued that the COMELEC was ousted of its jurisdiction when she was duly proclaimed because
pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribuna
(HRET) has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the "sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications" of the Members of the House of Representatives. Is she correct?
A66: No. The COMELEC retains jurisdiction over the case. HRET’s jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests
relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has
15
become a member of the House of Representatives. Regina not being a member of the House of Representatives,
it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question. To be considered a Member of the
House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a
proper oath, and (3) assumption of office.
Here, Regina cannot be considered a Member of the House of Representatives because, primarily, she has not yet
assumed office. The term of office of a Member of the House of Representatives begins only "at noon on the
thirtieth day of June next following their election." Thus, until such time, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction. [Reyes
v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207264 (2013)]
Q67: Distinguish ad-interim appointments from appointments in an acting capacity.

A67: Both of them are effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim appointments are extended only during a recess
of Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended any time there is a vacancy. Moreover, ad-interim
appointments are submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting
appointments are not submitted to the Commission on Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of
temporarily filling important offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of circumventing the need for
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. [Pimentel v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 164978 (2005), citing
Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary (1996)]
Q68: Are courtesy resignations valid?

A68: A "courtesy resignation" cannot properly be interpreted as resignation in the legal sense for it is not
necessarily a reflection of a public official's intention to surrender his position. Rather, it manifests his submission
to the will of the political authority and the appointing power. Resignation is defined as the act of giving up or the
act of an officer by which he declines his office and renounces the further right to use it. To constitute a complete
and operative act of resignation, the officer or employee must show a clear intention to relinquish or surrender his
position accompanied by the act of relinquishment. Resignation implies an expression of the incumbent in some
form, express or implied, of the intention to surrender, renounce and relinquish the office, and its acceptance by
competent and lawful authority. [Ortiz v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 78957 (1988)].
Q69: What are the exceptions to the prohibition on nepotic appointments?

A69: The prohibition on nepotic appointments in the Civil Service Law does not apply if the appointee is:
(a) person employed in a confidential capacity;
(b) teachers;
(c) physicians;
(d) member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines;
Q70: The Civil Service Law prohibits all appointments in the national and local governments or any branch or
instrumentality thereof made in favor of the relative of:
appointing authority; recommending authority; chief of the bureau or office; or person exercising immediate
supervision over the appointee.
Up to what civil degree does the prohibition on nepotism apply?
A70: Within the third degree of either consanguinity or of affinity. [Sec. 59, Civil Service Law]
Q71: Does the Ombudsman have disciplinary power over members of Congress?
A71: No. The Ombudsman has no disciplinary power over the following (Sec. 21, RA 6770)
(1) Officials who may be removed only by impeachment
(2) Members of Congress
(3) Members of the Judiciary
However, the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to investigate any serious misconduct in office committed
by officials removable by impeachment, for the purpose of filing a verified complaint for impeachment, if
warranted. (Sec. 22, RA 6770).
Q72: A criminal complaint against a judge was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman. Should the
Ombudsman defer action on said criminal complaint against the judge where the same arises from his
administrative duties?
A72: Yes. The Ombudsman should defer action on the criminal complaint and refer the same to the Supreme
Court for determination whether said judge had acted within the scope of their administrative duties.
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The Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases against judges and court personnel filed before it, referred to the
Supreme Court for determination as to whether and administrative aspect is involved therein. This rule should
hold true regardless of whether an administrative case based on the act subject of the complaint before the
Ombudsman is already pending with the Court. For, aside from the fact that the Ombudsman would not know of
this matter unless he is informed of it, he should give due respect for and recognition of the administrative
authority of the Court, because in determining whether an administrative matter is involved, the Court passes
upon not only administrative liabilities but also other administrative concerns. [Caoibes v. Ombudsman, G.R. No.
132177 (2001)]
Q73: Can private individuals be subject to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan?

A73: Yes. In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public
officers or employees including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be
tried jointly with said public officers and employees. [Section 4, P.D. No. 1606].
Q74: When is substitution of a candidate allowed?

A74: If after the last day for filing of the certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered political party
(a) dies, (b) withdraws or (c) is disqualified for any cause, he may be substituted by a candidate belonging to and
nominated by the same political party.
Only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace
the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified.
The substitute candidate nominated by the political party concerned may file his certificate of candidacy for the
office affected not later than mid-day of the day of the election.
If the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day before the election and mid-day of
election day, said certificate may be filed with any board of election inspectors in the political subdivision where
he is a candidate, or, in the case of candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate of the country, with the
COMELEC. [Sec. 77, B.P. 881]
Q75: What are the grounds to declare a duly registered candidate as a nuisance candidate?
A75: When his or her certificate of candidacy has been filed:
1. To put the election process in mockery or disrepute or;
2. To cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates or by
other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to
run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful
determination of the true will of the electorate.
Q76: What are the respective compositions of the Senate and House of Representatives Electoral Tribunals?
What are their jurisdictions?
A76: Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme
Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The
senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
The Senate and the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunals shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members, respectively.
These electoral tribunals exercise jurisdiction over election contests only after a candidate has already been
proclaimed winner in an election. [1987 CONST., ART. VI, Section 7; Macalintal v. PET, G.R. No. 191618, November
23, 2010]
Q77: What are the grounds for impeachment of the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the
Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman?
A77:
1. culpable violation of the Constitution
2. treason
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3. bribery
4. graft and corruption
5. other high crimes, or
6. betrayal of public trust
Q78: Can a person whose Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) is cancelled or denied due course under Sec. 78 for
false material representation be validly substituted?
A78: No. He cannot be validly substituted. A cancelled CoC does not give rise to a valid candidacy, there can be
no valid substitution of the candidate under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code. It should be clear, too, that
a candidate who does not file a valid CoC may not be validly substituted, because a person without a valid CoC is
not considered a candidate in much the same way as any person who has not filed a CoC is not at all a candidate.
[Talaga v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 196804 (2012)]
Q79: Does a person who files a certificate of candidacy automatically become a candidate?
A79: No. A person who files a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period. A
candidate is liable for an election offense only for acts done during the campaign period, not before. Before the
start of the campaign period, such election offenses cannot be committed and any partisan political activity is
lawful. [Penera v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 181613 (2009)]
Q80: In case the certificate of candidacy (COC) of the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes in
the elections is subsequently cancelled, who should be proclaimed as winner?
A80: The one who obtained the highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates. A void COC cannot
produce any legal effect. Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in
determining the winner of an election.
The votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute the sole and total expression of the sovereign
voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible and legitimate candidates form part of that voice and must also be
respected. As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine the qualifications and
disqualifications of those who are allowed to participate as players. When there are participants who turn out to
be ineligible, their victory is voided and the laurel is awarded to the next in rank who does not possess any of the
disqualifications nor lacks any of the qualifications set in the rules to be eligible as candidates. [Maquiling v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 195649 (2013)]
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Q81: What is the “Prior Consultation” requirement?
A81: Sections 26 and 27 of the Local Government Code of 1991provides for the maintenance of a sound ecology
and clean environment. Section 27 of the LCG should be read in conjunction with Section 26. Thus, the projects
and programs mentioned in Section 27 should be interpreted to mean projects and programs whose effects are
among those enumerated in Sections 26 and 27, to wit, those that:
1. may cause pollution;
2. may bring about climatic change;
3. may cause the depletion of non-renewable resources;
4. may result in loss of crop land, rangeland,or forest cover;
5. may eradicate certain animal or plant species; and
6. other projects or programs that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in the
locality where these will be implemented. [Bangus Fry Fisherfolk v. Lanzanas, G.R. No. 131442 (2003)]
Q82: Requisites for the exercise of Eminent Domain by an LGU

A82:
1. An ORDINANCE is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf
of the local government unit, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation
proceedings over a particular private property;
2. The power is exercised for PUBLIC USE, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless;
3. There is payment of JUST COMPENSATION based on the fair market value of the property at the time of
taking; and
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4. A VALID AND DEFINITE OFFER was previously made to the owner of the property, but the offer was not
accepted. [Heirs of Suguitan v. City of Mandaluyong, G.R. No. 135087 (2000)]
Q83: The Municipality of Biglang-Liko is sued for damages arising from injuries sustained by a pedestrian who
was hit by a glass pane that fell from a dilapidated window frame of the municipal hall. The municipality files
a motion to dismiss the complaint, invoking state immunity from suit. Resolve the motion with reasons.
A83: The motion to dismiss should be denied. Under Sec. 24 of the Local Government Code and Article 2189 of
the Civil Code, the Municipality of Biglang-Liko is liable for damages arising from injuries to person by reason of
negligence of local government units or local offices of the defective condition of the municipal hall, which is under
their control and supervision.
Q84: How does the local legislative assembly override the veto by the local chief executive of an ordinance?
A84: Under Secs. 54(a) and 55(c) of the Local Government Code, the local legislative assembly can override the
veto of the local chief executive by two-thirds vote of all its members.
Q85: On what grounds can local chief executive veto an ordinance?

A85: Under Sec. 55(a) of the Local Government Code, the local chief executive may veto an ordinance on the
ground that it is ultra vires or prejudicial to the public welfare.
Q86: How can an ordinance vetoed by a local chief executive become a law without it being overridden by the
local legislative assembly?
A86: Pursuant to Sec. 54(b) of the Local Government Code, an ordinance vetoed by the local chief executive shall
be deemed approved if he does not communicate his veto to the local legislative assembly within fifteen days in
the case of a province, and ten days in the case of a city or a municipality. Likewise, if the veto by the local executive
has been overridden by the local legislative assembly, a second veto will be void. Under Sec. 55(c) of the Local
Government Code, the local chief executive may veto an ordinance only once.
Q87: Vice Mayor Olivares filed her certificate of candidacy for the same office in the last elections. Municipal
Mayor Rodriguez was also running for re-election. Both were official candidates of the same political party.
After the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, the Mayor died. Under these facts –
Can the Vice Mayor succeed to the office of Mayor pursuant to the provisions of the Local Government Code?
Explain.
A87: Yes, the vice mayor can succeed to the office of mayor. Under Sec. 44 of the Local Government Code, he
stands next in line to the office of mayor in case of a permanent vacancy in it. His filing of a Certificate of Candidacy
for Mayor did not automatically result to his being considered resigned (Sec. 67, Omnibus Election Code).
Q88: A vacancy occurred in the sangguniang bayan of the Municipality of Amoy-Araw, when Dingdong, a
member, died. Dingdong did not belong to any political party.
To fill up the vacancy, the Provincial Governor appointed Victor, upon recommendation of the sangguniang
panlalawigan. On the other hand, for the same vacancy, the municipal mayor appointed Cardo, upon
recommendation of the sangguniang bayan.
Which of the appointments is valid?

A88: As held in Farinas v. Barba, 256 SCRA 396 (1996), neither of the appointments is valid. Under Sec. 45 of the
Local Government Code, in case of a permanent vacancy in the Sangguniang Bayan created by the cessation in
office of a member who does not belong to any political party, the Governor shall appoint a qualified person
recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan. Since Victor was not recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan, his
appointment by the Governor is not valid. Since Cardo was not appointed by the Governor but by the Municipal
Mayor, his appointment is also not valid.
Q89: What are the verifiable indicators of viability used as basis for the creation or conversion of a local
government unit?
A89:
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1. Income – It must be sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to provide for all essential government
facilities and services and special functions commensurate with the size of its population, as expected of
the local government unit concerned;
2. Population – It shall be determined as the total number of inhabitants within the territorial jurisdiction
of the local government unit concerned; and
3. Land Area – It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two or more islands, or is separated by a local
government unit independent of the others; properly identified by metes and bounds with technical
descriptions; and sufficient to provide for such basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of its
populace.
Q90: What are the two branches of the General Welfare Clause?
A90: Under Sec. 16 of the LGC,
1. General legislative power – Authorizes municipal councils to enact ordinances and make regulations not
repugnant to law and may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred
upon it by law
2. Police power proper – Authorizes the municipality to enact ordinances as may be proper and necessary
for the health and safety, prosperity, morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the
municipality and its inhabitant, and for the protection of their property [Fernando v. St. Scholastica’s
College, G.R. No. 161107 (2013)]
Q91: What are the grounds for the disciplinary action of Elective Officers?
A91: Under Sec. 60, an elective local official may be disciplined, suspended, or removed from office on any of the
following grounds:
1. Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines;
2. Culpable violation of the Constitution;
3. Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence, or dereliction of duty;
4. Commission of any offense involving moral turpitude or an offense punishable by at least prision mayor;
5. Abuse of authority;
6. Unauthorized absence for 15 consecutive working days, except in the case of members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, sangguniang bayan, and sangguniang barangay;
7. Application for, or acquisition of, foreign citizenship or residence or the status of an immigrant of another
country; and
8. Such other grounds as may be provided in this Code and other laws.
Q92: Governor Dimalapitan was charged of Grave Misconduct and Dishonesty by her ex-mistress Miss
Dinamalandi before the Office of the President. Upon investigation of the DILG Secretary Dimatibag, he
recommended that the governor be dismissed from office. Adopting the recommendations of the DILG
Secretary, the President, through Executive Secretary Dinagisip, issued an order dismissing the governor.
Was the governor’s dismissal valid?
A92: No, the order dismissing Governor Dimalapitan was not valid. Article 60 of the Local Government Code
provides that local elective officials may only be removed by the proper court. Although the President is
empowered to discipline the governor, he is not authorized to dismiss him from office. [see Salalima v. Guingona,
G.R. Nos. 117589-92 (1996)]
Q93: Mayor Makata was elected as during the 2010 elections. He was administratively charged in 2012 for an
act he committed the previous year. In 2013, during the pendency of the administrative investigation, he was
re-elected as mayor. Should the administrative charge against him be dismissed?
A93: Under the circumstances, Mayor Makata could invoke the condonation doctrine wherein his re-election in
2013 would be tantamount to a condonation by the electorate of his acts during his previous term. The
abandonment of the condonation doctrine by the Supreme Court in the 2015 case of Carpio-Morales v. Court
Appeals (G.R. Nos. 217126-27) was qualified that the ruling therein should only apply prospectively.
Q94: Supposed that he was again administratively charged in 2015 for an act he committed in 2014 and he
was again re-elected in 2016, would your answer be the same?
A94: No. In this case, the ruling in Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals would already be applicable. Mayor Makata
cannot invoke the condonation doctrine since it was already abandoned by the Supreme Court.
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Q95: Mayor Maytama went on sick leave to undergo medical treatment for a period of four months. During
that time: (a) Will Vice Mayor Nasabik be performing executive functions? (b) Can Vice Mayor Nasabik
simultaneously perform his functions as presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan?
A95:
A) Since the Municipal Mayor is temporarily incapacitated to perform his duties, in accordance with Section 46(a),
LGC, the Municipal Vice Mayor shall exercise his powers and perform his duties and functions. The Municipal Vice
Mayor will be performing executive functions because the functions of the Municipal Mayor are executive.
B) The Municipal Vice Mayor cannot simultaneously preside over the Sangguniang Bayan while he is acting as
Municipal Mayor. The temporary vacancy in the office of the Municipal Mayor creates a corresponding temporary
vacancy in the office of the Municipal Vice Mayor when he acts as the Municipal Mayor.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Q96: What are the tests for a valid delegation of legislative power?
A96: The law must be complete in itself and must set forth the policy to be executed (Completeness), and the law
must fix a standard, the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable, to which the delegate must
conform (Sufficient Standards).
Q97: What is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction?

A97: If a determination of a case is such that it requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the
proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief
must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though
the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of the court. Thus, the judicial process is suspended pending referral of
such issues to the administrative body for review. [Industrial Enterprises v. CA, 184 SCRA 426]
Q98: Distinguish the doctrine of primary jurisdiction from the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies. Does the failure to exhaust administrative remedies before filing a case in court oust said court of
jurisdiction to hear the case? Explain.
A98: The doctrine of primary jurisdiction and the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies both deal with
the proper relationships between the courts and administrative agencies. The doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies applies where a claim is cognizable in the first instance by an administrative agency
alone. Judicial interference is withheld until the administrative process has been completed. As stated in Industrial
Enterprises, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies where a case is within the
concurrent jurisdiction of the court and an administrative agency but the determination of the case requires the
technical expertise of the administrative agency. In such a case, although the matter is within the jurisdiction of
the court, it must yield to the jurisdiction of the administrative case.
No, the failure to exhaust administrative remedies before filing a case in court does not oust the court of jurisdiction
to hear the case. As held in Rosario vs. Court of Appeals, the failure to exhaust administrative remedies does not
affect the jurisdiction of the court but results in the lack of a cause of action, because a condition precedent that
must be satisfied before action can be filed was not fulfilled.
Q99: What are the two (2) requisites for the judicial review of administrative decision/actions, that is, when
is an administrative action ripe for judicial review?
A99:
1. The administrative action has already been fully completed and, therefore, is a final agency action; and
2. All administrative remedies have been exhausted.
Q100: What is the doctrine of qualified political agency?

A100: As the President cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time and in person, he
will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members. Under this doctrine, which recognizes the
establishment of a single executive, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and
except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or the law to act in person or the
exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions
of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of
21
such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. [Carpio v. Executive Secretary,
G.R. No. 96409 (1992), citing Villena v. Secretary of Interior (1939)]
Q101: Distinguish between the subpoena power and contempt power of an administrative agency
A101: The administrative agency shall have the power, in any contested case, to require the attendance of
witnesses or the production of books, papers, documents and other pertinent data, upon request of any party
before or during the hearing upon showing of general relevance. However, unless otherwise provided by law, the
agency may, in case of disobedience, invoke the aid of the Regional Trial Court within whose jurisdiction the
contested case being heard falls. The Court may punish contumacy or refusal as contempt. [Sec. 13, Book VII,
Administrative Code of 1987]
Q102: What is the essence of due process in administrative proceedings? Explain.

A102: In administrative proceedings, due process simply means an opportunity to be heard and seek a
reconsideration of the order complained of; it cannot be fully equated to due process in its strict jurisprudential
sense. A respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to be informed of the preliminary findings and
recommendations; he is entitled only to a reasonable opportunity to be heard, and to the administrative decision
based on substantial evidence. (Vealasquez v. CA, G.R. No. 150732, August 31, 2004, 437 SCRA 357). Note that it
is the administrative order, not the preliminary report, which is the basis of any further remedies the losing party
in an administrative case may pursue. [Viva Footwear Mfg. Corp. v. SEC, et al., G.R. No. 163235 (2005)].
Q103: The Civil Service Commission (an administrative agency vested with quasi-judicial powers), upon
motion of H, who is one of the parties to a case before the Commission, issued a writ of execution to enforce
its order which had become final and executory. The other party, G, opposed and argued that the Commission
had no such power to issue a writ of execution. Is G’s contention correct? Explain.
A103: NO. The authority to decide cases is inutile unless accompanied by the authority to see that what has been
decided is carried out. Hence, the grant to a tribunal or agency of adjudicatory power, or the authority to hear and
adjudge cases, should normally and logically be deemed to include the grant of authority to enforce or execute
the judgments it thus renders, unless the law otherwise provides. [GSIS v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 96938
1991]
Q104: Under the law, D, the head of the agency, is the officer vested with the power to decide cases brought
before him. Under the rules of procedure promulgated by the agency, D is authorized to delegate the power
to conduct hearings to his subordinates or persons duly designated by him. Is this rule valid? Explain.
A104: Yes. While the power to decide resides solely in the administrative agency vested by law, this does not
preclude a delegation of the power to hold a hearing on the basis of which the decision of the administrative
agency will be made. The rule that requires an administrative officer to exercise his own judgment and discretion
does not preclude him from utilizing, as a matter of practical administrative procedure, the aid of subordinates to
investigate and report to him the facts, on the basis of which the officer makes his decisions. It is sufficient that
the judgment and discretion finally exercised are those of the officer authorized by law. Neither does due process
of law nor the requirements of fair hearing require that the actual taking of testimony be before the same officer
who will make the decision in the case. As long as a party is not deprived of his right to present his own case and
submit evidence in support thereof, and the decision is supported by the evidence in the record, there is no question
that the requirements of due process and fair trial are fully met. [American Tobacco Co. v. Director of Patents, G.R.
No. L-26803 (1975)]
Q105: What are the kinds of quasi-judicial powers?

A105:
1. Determinative powers – it is the power to grant or deny applications for licenses and permits to engage
in a particular business or occupation; to grant or deny applications for exemptions or be relieve from
complying with the law; to exercise investigatory or inquisitorial powers; and otherwise ensure that the
laws and regulations are complied with
2. Summary powers – it is the power to apply compulsion or force against persons or properties without
need of prior judicial warrant
Q106: What are the classifications of administrative rules?
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A106: In the case of Republic v. Drugmakers Laboratories [G.R. No. 190837 (2014)], the Court classified
administrative rules, as follows:
1. Legislative rules are in the nature of subordinate legislation designed to implement a primary legislation
by providing the details thereof.
2. Interpretative rules are intended to interpret, clarify, or explain existing statutory regulations under which
the administrative body operates. Their purpose or objective is merely to construe the statute being
administered and purport to do no more than interpret the statute.
3. Contingent rules are those issued by an administrative authority based on the existence of certain facts
or things upon which the enforcement of the law depends.
Q107: What are the exceptions to the doctrine of non-delegation of legislative power?
A107: In the case of Abakada Guro v. Ermita [G.R. No. 168056 (2005)], the Court enumerated the following
exceptions:
1. Tariff powers of the President under Section 28 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution
2. Emergency powers of the President under Section 23 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution
3. People at large
4. Administration and governance of local concerns by LGUs
5. Administration and regulation by administrative agencies
Q108: What are the cardinal primary rights which must be respected in administrative proceedings?
A108: Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations [G.R. No. L-46496 (1940)] laid down these cardinal primary rights,
to wit:
1. The right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case
and submit evidence in support thereof.
2. the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
3. While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which
cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision.
4. the evidence must be "substantial." It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.
5. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected.
6. The administrative body must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
7. The administrative body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that
the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions
rendered.
Q109: Is the right to counsel part of administrative due process?

A109: NO. The right to counsel is not imperative in administrative investigations because such inquiries are
conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measures against erring public
officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service [Lumiqued v. Exevea,
G.R. No. 117565 (1997)]
Q110: Differentiate the binding nature of an administrative rule and an administrative interpretation of a law.
A110: A rule is binding on the courts so long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed, and its scope
is within the statutory authority granted by the legislature, even if the courts are not in agreement with the policy
stated therein or its innate wisdom. On the other hand, administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely
advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means. [Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Social Security
Commission, G.R. No. L-16704 (1962)]
Q111: What are the requirements on publication for the effectivity of administrative rules and regulations?
A111: Pursuant to the ruling in Tañada v. Tuvera [G.R. No. L-63915 (1986)] interpreting Article 2 of the New Civil
Code, administrative rules and regulations must be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing
law pursuant also to a valid delegation. It must also comply with Sec. 3, Book VII of the Administrative Code of
1987 which provides that every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified
copies of every rule adopted by it. The requirements of publication and filing with the Office of National
Administrative Register (ONAR) were put in place as safeguards against abuses on the part of lawmakers and as
23
guarantees to the constitutional right to due process and to information on matters of public concern and,
therefore, require strict compliance. [Republic v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp., G.R. No. 173918 (2008)]
(Note: Article 2, NCC has been amended by E.O. 200 to read: Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines,
unless it is otherwise provided.)
Q112: Is the doctrine of res judicata applicable to administrative proceedings?

A112: YES. While the Court has declared that the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial
proceedings, and not to the exercise of administrative powers, the latter has also been limited to proceedings
purely administrative in nature. Therefore, when the administrative proceedings take on an adversary character,
the doctrine of res judicata applies. [Heirs of Maximino Derla v. Heirs of Catalina Derla Vda. De Hipolito, G.R. No.
157717 (2011)]
Q113: What are the exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies?
A113:
1. Purely legal questions
2. There is grave doubt as to the availability of the administrative remedy
3. Steps to be taken are merely matters of form
4. Administrative remedy not exclusive but merely cumulative or concurrent to a judicial remedy
5. There are circumstances indicating urgency of judicial intervention
6. Rule does not provide plain, speedy, adequate remedy
7. Resort to exhaustion will only be oppressive and patently unreasonable
8. Where the administrative remedy is only permissive or voluntary and not a prerequisite to the institution
of judicial proceedings
9. Application of the doctrine will only cause great and irreparable damage which cannot be prevented
except by taking the appropriate court action
10. When it involves the rule-making or quasi-legislative functions of an administrative agency
11. Administrative agency is in estoppel
12. Doctrine of qualified political agency (respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of
the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter)
13. Subject of controversy is private land in land case proceedings
14. Violation of due process
15. Where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant
16. Administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
17. Resort to administrative remedy will amount to a nullification of a claim
18. No administrative review provided for by law
19. Issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies rendered moot
20. When the claim involved is small
21. When strong public interest is involved
22. In quo warranto proceedings
23. Law expressly provides for a different review procedure.
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

Q114: What is the principle of pacta sunt servanda?
A114: Pursuant to Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, this principle means that every treaty
in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.
Q115: What is the principle of rebus sic stantibus?

A115: The doctrine of rebus sic stantibus is a principle in customary international law providing that where there
has been a fundamental change of circumstances since an agreement was concluded, a party to that agreement
may withdraw from or terminate it. It is justified by the fact that some treaties may remain in force for long periods
of time, during which fundamental changes might have occurred.
This doctrine has been codified in Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law on Treaties. This provides that,
as a fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with regard to those existing at the time of the
24
conclusion of a treaty, and which was not foreseen by the parties, may not be invoked as a ground for terminating
or withdrawing from the treaty. The exceptions to this rule are when:
1. The existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the consent of the parties to be
bound by the treaty; and
2. The effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of obligations still to be performed under the
treaty.
However, a fundamental change in circumstances may not be invoked:

1. If the treaty establishes a boundary; or
2. If the fundamental change is the result of a breach by the party invoking it either of an obligation under
the treaty or of any other international obligation owed to any other party to the treaty.
Q116: What are erga omnes obligations?

A116: Erga omnes obligations are those owed by a State to the international community as a whole. By their very
nature, they are the concern of all States. Examples of such obligations are the outlawing of acts of aggression,
and of genocide, as well as the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, including
protection from slavery and racial discrimination [Barcelona Traction, ICJ (1970)].
Q117: Under international law, differentiate “hard law” from “soft law”.
A117: “Hard law” refers to binding international legal norms or those which have coercive character. “Soft law,”
on the other hand, refers to norms that are non-binding in character but still have legal relevance. Examples of
“hard law” are the provisions of the U.N. Charter, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 and other treaties in force. Examples of “soft law” are resolutions of the U.N. General
Assembly and draft articles of the International Law Commission.
Q118: Differentiate the process of incorporation from the process of transformation.

A118: Under the 1987 Constitution, an international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by
transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed
into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. On the other hand, generally
accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the
laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations [Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 221697
& 221698-700].
Q119: The State of Cassius entered into a multilateral treaty on human rights. However, it claimed that it had
certain cultural practices that were categorized under the treaty as torture. It thus sought to make a
reservation to the provision prohibiting torture.
a) What is a jus cogens norm?
b) Should the reservation be allowed?
A119:
a) A jus cogens norm is defined by Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as norm
accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international
law having the same character. This is also known as a peremptory norm of general international law.
b) No, because the prohibition on torture is generally accepted to be a jus cogens norm, and jus cogens norms
do not allow derogation therefrom, even when they are codified in treaty provisions. Even if no treaty
existed, Cassius would be bound by the jus cogens norm.
Q120: The President of the Republic of Gianch entered into an executive agreement in 2011 regarding a USD
100 million loan agreement with another state. However, in 2010, the Gianchi Congress passed a law limiting
the allowable amount of foreign loans that the government could accumulate to USD 70 million. Does the
executive agreement amend the prior law?
A120: No. An executive agreement cannot amend or repeal a prior law, but must comply with State policy
embodied in an existing municipal law. Under no circumstance can a mere executive agreement prevail over a
prior law inconsistent with such executive agreement [J. Carpio, Dissenting Opinion, Bayan Muna v. Romulo, G.R.
No. 159618 (2011)].
Q121: What is the right of legation?
25
A121: This refers to diplomatic intercourse, or the right of a state to send and receive diplomatic missions, which
enables states to carry on friendly intercourse.
Q122: What is the procedure for extradition under Philippine law?

A122: The procedure is set forth in P.D. No. 1069.
1. The foreign state or government with which the Philippines has an extradition treaty or convention must
request for the extradition of any accused who is or suspected of being in the territorial jurisdiction of the
Philippines. Said request is must be made to the Scretary of Justice.
2. The Secretary of Justice shall immediately designate and authorize an attorney to take charge of the case,
who shall then file a petition with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the province or city having jurisdiction
over the place.
3. The RTC judge shall summon the accused to appear and to answer the petition, and may issue a warrant
for his or her immediate arrest, if it appears that this will best serve the ends of justice.
4. Upon receipt of the answer, or should the accused fail to answer within the time fixed, the judge shall
hear the case or set another date for hearing.
5. The order and notice, as well as the warrant of arrest, if any, shall be promptly served upon the accused
and the attorney in charge of the case.
6. The hearing shall then take place, where the attorney appointed may represent the requesting state. The
requesting state may likewise retain private counsel. Counsel de oficio may likewise be appointed if the
accused does not have counsel de parte.
7. Upon conclusion of the hearing, the judge shall render granting or dismissing the petition. A granting of
such must state the reasons therefor upon showing of the existence of a prima facie case.
Q123: Julie was a diplomatic agent sent from Jeramia to the Philippines. She entered into a commercial
contract with a Filipino citizen, Paulo, in her private capacity. She failed to perform her obligations
thereunder, so Paulo filed a civil action against her with the RTC. Julie asserted that she was absolutely
immune from suit.
a) What is the difference between ratione materiae and ratione personae?
b) Is Julie correct?
A123:
a) Ratione materiae or functional immunity pertains to immunity which attaches to acts performed by state
officials in the exercise of their functions. It is determined by reference to the nature of the acts in question
rather than by reference to the particular office of the official. Ratione personae or personal immunity
refers to immunity that attaches to certain state officials as a result of their office or status. It covers both
official and private acts.
b) No. While the general rule under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations is that a
diplomatic enjoys immunity from a State’s civil and administrative jurisdiction, one exception thereto is
an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the
receiving State outside his official functions
Q124: The Philippines maintains an embassy in the State of Emiria. A group of Emirian rebels attacked said
embassy, and Emirian officials entered the diplomatic premises without consent in order to protect the
Filipinos therein.
a) Did Emiria violate the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations?
b) If the premises involved were consular in nature, would the answer be the same?
A124:
a) Yes. Article 22 thereof provides that the premises of the mission shall be inviolable. The agents of the
receiving State may not enter them, except with the consent of the head of the mission. No consent was
given in this case.
b) No. Under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, the consular premises are inviolable
only to a limited extent. The authorities of the receiving State shall not enter that part of the consular
premises which is used exclusively for the purpose of the work of the consular post except with the consent
of the head of the consular post or of his designee or of the head of the diplomatic mission of the sending
State. The consent of the head of the consular post may, however, be assumed in case of fire or other
disaster requiring prompt protective action. In this case, the attack constituted a disaster requiring
prompt protective action.
26
Q125: What is the doctrine of restrictive immunity?

A125: This doctrine provides that States are not liable for acta jure imperii, but are liable for acta jure gestionis.
Acta jure imperii are acts performed in its capacity as a sovereign. Acta jure gestionis are private or commercial
transactions.
Q126: President Maureen of the Philippines signed an agreement with President Artkario of Rahad involving
trading activities. She did not submit the agreement to the Ritanian Senate for concurrence. Section 21, Article
VII of the Constitution provides that no treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective without
such concurrence. Is the agreement valid and effective despite the lack of concurrence?
A126: The agreement is valid. The right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of
subsequent congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days of our history we
have entered into executive agreements covering such subjects as commercial and consular relations, most-
favored-nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and navigation arrangements and
the settlement of claims. The validity of these has never been seriously questioned by our courts [Bayan v. Zamora,
G.R. No. 138570 (2000)].
Q127: In 2014, the President of Johanni started a “War on Drugs.” To date, this so-called war has taken over
20,000 lives of Johannian citizens due to the acts of military and police personnel. A petition for the writ of
amparo was filed by the Rodrigo family, seeking to hold the President liable pursuant to the principle of
command responsibility under international law.
a) What is command responsibility?
b) Will the petition prosper?
A127:
a) Command responsibility pertains to the responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by
subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars
or domestic conflict [In the Matter of the Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data in favor of Noriel
H. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 191805 (2011)].
b) Yes. Although originally used for ascertaining criminal complicity, the command responsibility doctrine
has also found application in civil cases for human rights abuses. The application of this doctrine has been
liberally extended even to cases not criminal in nature and thus applies to proceedings seeking the
privilege of the writ of amparo. To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, the
following elements must obtain:
c) the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as superior and the perpetrator
of the crime as his subordinate;
d) the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be or had been committed; and
e) the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal acts or punish
the perpetrators thereof [In the Matter of the Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data in favor of
Noriel H. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 191805 (2011)].
Q128: Describe the following maritime regimes under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea:
a) Territorial sea
b) Contiguous zone
c) Exclusive economic zone
d) Continental shelf
A128:
a) Territorial sea – These waters stretch up to 12 miles from the baseline on the seaward direction. They are
subject to the jurisdiction of the coastal state, which jurisdiction almost approximates that which is
exercised over land territory, except that the coastal state must respect the rights to: a) Innocent passage;
and b) In the case of certain straits, to transit passage.
b) Contiguous zone – It is that which is contiguous to its territorial sea. It may not extend beyond 24 nautical
miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. In a contiguous zone,
the coastal State may exercise the control necessary to: a) Prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal,
immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea; and b) Punish
infringement of the above laws and regulations committed within its territory or territorial sea.
c) Exclusive economic zone – It is the stretch of area up to 200 miles from the baselines. Within this zone, a
State may regulate non-living and living resources, other economic resources, artificial installations,
scientific research, and pollution control. The UNCLOS gives the coastal State sovereign rights over all
27
economic resources of the sea, seabed, and subsoil in an area extending not more than 200 nautical miles
beyond the baseline from which the territorial sea is measured.
d) Continental shelf – It is the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas extending beyond the territorial
sea of the coastal state throughout the natural prolongation of its lands territory up to: a) The outer edge
of the continental margin; or b) A distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines of the territorial sea
where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance. The continental shelf
does not form part of the territory of the coastal state. It only has sovereign rights with respect to the
exploration and exploitation of its natural resources, including the mineral and other non-living resources
of the seabed and subsoil together with living organisms belonging to the sedentary species.
Q129: What is a low-tide elevation?

A129: According to Article 13 of the UNCLOS, a low-tide elevation is a naturally formed area of land which is
surrounded by and above water at low tide but submerged at high tide.
Where a low-tide elevation is situated wholly or partly at a distance not exceeding the breadth of the territorial
sea from the mainland or an island, the low-water line on that elevation may be used as the baseline for measuring
the breadth of the territorial sea.
Where a low-tide elevation is wholly situated at a distance exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from the
mainland or an island, it has no territorial sea of its own.
Except where a low-tide elevation falls within the breadth of a territorial sea generated from a high-tide feature
or mainland, it generates no territorial sea of its own. Necessarily, such a low-tide elevation is not entitled to an
exclusive economic zone or continental shelf (Philippines v. China, 2016).
Q130: What is the right to hot pursuit under the UNCLOS?

A130: Article 11 provides that the hot pursuit of a foreign ship may be undertaken when the competent authorities
of the coastal State have good reason to believe that the ship has violated the laws and regulations of that State.
Such pursuit must be commenced when the foreign ship or one of its boats is within the internal waters, the
archipelagic waters, the territorial sea or the contiguous zone of the pursuing State, and may only be continued
outside the territorial sea or the contiguous zone if the pursuit has not been interrupted. The right of hot pursuit
applies mutatis mutandis to violations in the exclusive economic zone or on the continental shelf, including safety
zones around continental shelf installations, of the laws and regulations of the coastal State applicable in
accordance with the UNCLOS to the exclusive economic zone or the continental shelf, including such safety zones.
Q131: What is the straight baselines method?

A131: Article 47 provides that an archipelagic State may draw straight archipelagic baselines joining the outermost
points of the outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago provided that within such baselines are
included the main islands and an area in which the ratio of the area of the water to the area of the land, including
atolls, is between 1 to 1 and 9 to 1. The length of such baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles, except that up
to 3 per cent of the total number of baselines enclosing any archipelago may exceed that length, up to a maximum
length of 125 nautical miles. The drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the
general configuration of the archipelago.
Q132: What is the difference between a rock and island in international law?
A132: Unlike islands, rocks are features which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own.
[UNCLOS, Art. 121(3)]. Rocks are not entitled to an exclusive economic zone or continental shelf. Rocks may be
composed of solid rock or matter that is rock-like in nature. In Philippines v. China, the Permanent Court of
Arbitration ruled that to sustain human habitation is to provide that which is necessary to keep humans alive and
healthy over a continuous period of time, according to proper standard. It further ruled that to sustain economic
life is to sustain means to provide that which is necessary not just to commence, but also to continue, an activity
over a period of time in a way that remains viable on an ongoing basis.
Q133: Define innocent passage.

A133: Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State.
Passage of a foreign ship shall be considered to be prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal
State if in the territorial sea it engages in any of the following activities:
28
(a) any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of the coastal
State, or in any other manner in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the
United Nations;
(b) any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind;
(c) any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defence or security of the coastal State;
(d) any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defence or security of the coastal State;
(e) the launching, landing or taking on board of any aircraft;
(f) the launching, landing or taking on board of any military device;
(g) the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person contrary to the customs, fiscal, immigration or
sanitary laws and regulations of the coastal State;
(h) any act of wilful and serious pollution contrary to this Convention;
(i) any fishing activities;
(j) the carrying out of research or survey activities;
(k) any act aimed at interfering with any systems of communication or any other facilities or installations of the
coastal State;
(l) any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage.
Q134: Who are stateless persons?

A134: For the purpose of this Convention, the term “stateless person” means a person who is not considered as a
national by any State under the operation of its law (Article 1(1), 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless
Persons).
Q135: What is the rule on use of force in international relations?

A135: All [United Nations] Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations [Article 2(4), UN Charter].
Q136: What is the rule on self-defense in international relations?

A136: Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an
armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures
necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right
of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority
and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems
necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security [Article 51, UN Charter].
Q137: Differentiate between ICJ jurisdiction and ICC jurisdiction.

A137: The jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice is set forth in Article 36 of its Statute. It comprises all
cases which the parties refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in
treaties and conventions in force. State Parties may likewise at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory
ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the
jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning:
1. the interpretation of a treaty;
2. any question of international law;
3. the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation;
4. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international ob-ligation.
The jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court is set forth in the Rome Statute. Article 1 provides that ICC has
the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern, and shall
be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions. Article 5 states that such jurisdiction shall be limited to the
most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole, particularly:
1. The crime of genocide;
2. Crimes against humanity;
3. War crimes; and
4. The crime of aggression.
Q138: A case was filed against the President of Acadia before the ICC. He then unilaterally announced via
press conference that the State was withdrawing from the ICC.
29
a) Can this be done?

b) Assuming it is valid, what is the effect of the withdrawal on the case filed?
A138:
a) No. Article 127 of the Rome Statute provides for the method for withdrawal from the ICC: “A State Party
may, by written notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, withdraw from this
Statute. The withdrawal shall take effect one year after the date of receipt of the notification, unless the
notification specifies a later date.”
b) The case shall proceed. Article 127 further provides: “A State shall not be discharged, by reason of its
withdrawal, from the obligations arising from this Statute while it was a Party to the Statute, including
any financial obligations which may have accrued. Its withdrawal shall not affect any cooperation with
the Court in connection with criminal investigations and proceedings in relation to which the withdrawing
State had a duty to cooperate and which were commenced prior to the date on which the withdrawal
became effective, nor shall it prejudice in any way the continued consideration of any matter which was
already under consideration by the Court prior to the date on which the withdrawal became effective.”
Q139: The States surrounding the Garvian Sea have a regional custom prohibiting the taking of eels, and
Tannin is a State in this region. The local council of the small rural town of Hansh in Tannin passed a local
ordinance allowing such taking.
a) What is a regional custom?
b) What are the elements of custom?
c) Did Tannin incur State responsibility for the act of Hansh?
A139:
a) A regional custom is a rule that arises among States after constant and uniform practice, such that its
usage becomes an expression of a right and corresponding duty among such States [Asylum Case, ICJ
(1950)].
b) The elements custom are opinio juris sive necessitates and state practice. Opinio juris refers to the belief
on the part of states that a particular practice is required by law, and not because of courtesy or political
expediency [North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (ICJ, 1969)]. State practice must be consistent and general.
c) Yes. The local council of Hansh is a state organ. A state organ is defined in Article 4 of the Articles on the
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA) as any person or entity which has that
status in accordance with the internal law of the State. Tannin is therefore liable for its acts, which, in this
case, are contrary to the regional custom.
Q140: What are the forms of reparation available under international law for breaches thereof?
A140:
a) Restitution – A State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to make
restitution, that is, to re-establish the situation which existed before the wrongful act was committed,
provided and to the extent that restitution:
i. Is not materially impossible;
ii. Does not involve a burden out of all proportion to the benefit of the party deriving from restitution
instead of compensation [Art. 35, ARSIWA].
b) Compensation – The State is under an obligation to compensate for the damage caused thereby, insofar
as such damage is not made good by restitution. The compensation shall cover any financially assessable
damage including loss of profits insofar as it is established [Art. 36, ARSIWA].
c) Satisfaction – The State responsible is under an obligation to give satisfaction for the injury caused by
that act insofar as it cannot be made good by restitution or compensation. Satisfaction may consist in an
acknowledgement of the breach, an expression of regret, a formal apology or another appropriate
modality.
Q141: What is the concept of association under international law?

A141: An association is formed when two states of unequal power voluntarily establish durable links. In the basic
model, one state, the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the other, the principal, while maintaining its
international status as a state. Free associations represent a middle ground between integration and
independence [Province of North Cotabato v. GRP, G.R. No. 183591 (2008)].
Q142: Is the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) a treaty or an executive agreement?
30
A142: It is an executive agreement. The President has the inherent power to enter into agreements with other
states, including the prerogative to conclude binding executive agreements that do not require further Senate
concurrence. EDCA is consistent with the content, purpose, and framework of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the
Visiting Forces Agreement, the treaties which it implemented [Saguisag v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 212426 (2016)].
Q143: The Intellectual Property Protectors (IPP) filed a petition contending that the accession of the Philippine
President to the Madrid Protocol was invalid for not having been transmitted to the Senate for concurrence.
Is IPP correct?
A143: No. International agreements involving political issues or changes of national policy and those involving
international arrangements of a permanent character usually take the form of treaties, but international
agreements embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well-established national policies and traditions and
those involving arrangements of a more or less temporary nature usually take the form of executive agreements.
The registration of trademarks and copyrights have been the subject of executive agreements entered into without
the concurrence of the Senate. Congress itself expressed the state policy in Section 2 of the Intellectual Property
Code, and the same was merely carried out by the executive agreement. [Intellectual Property Association v. Ochoa,
G.R. No. 204605 (2016)]
Q144: What is the rule on double criminality?

A144: Under the double criminality rule, the extraditable offense must be criminal under the laws of both the
requesting and the requested states. This means that the requested state comes under no obligation to surrender
the person if its laws do not regard the conduct covered by the request for extradition as criminal [Government of
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v. Muñoz, G.R. No. 207342 (2016)].
Q145: Marimar Gracia was adopted by two Filipino citizens after they found her by the wayside of a river. She
contends that foundlings are natural-born citizens of the Philippines pursuant to international law and
domestic law. Is she correct?
A145: Under international law: She is correct. Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),
Article 7 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), and Article 24 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) obligate the Philippines to grant nationality from birth and ensure that no
child is stateless. Moreover, it is a generally accepted principle of international law to presume foundlings as
having been born of nationals of the country in which the foundling is found [Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC, G.R.
Nos. 221697 & 221698-700].
Under domestic law: She is also correct. Current legislation reveals the adherence of the Philippines to this
generally accepted principle of international law. In particular, RA 8552, RA 8042 and the Supreme Court's Rules
on Adoption, expressly refer to "Filipino children." In all of them, foundlings are among the Filipino children who
could be adopted. Likewise, it has been pointed that the DFA issues passports to foundlings. Passports are, by
law, issued only to citizens. This shows that even the executive department, acting through the DFA, considers
foundlings as Philippine citizens [Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 221697 & 221698-700].
Q146: Can a petition for certiorari be filed with the courts to compel the Executive Department to espouse the
claims of individual citizens before international tribunals?
A146: No. The question whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against a
foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our
Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In the international sphere, traditionally, the only
means available for individuals to bring a claim within the international legal system has been when the individual
is able to persuade a government to bring a claim on the individual’s behalf. Since the exercise of diplomatic
protection is the right of the State, reliance on the right is within the absolute discretion of states. There is no
sufficient evidence to establish a general international obligation for States to exercise diplomatic protection of
their own nationals abroad, even for violations of jus cogens norms [Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 162230
(2010)].
Q147: What is the precautionary principle?

A147: Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration embodies the precautionary principle: “In order to protect the
environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where
there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for
31
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.” [cited in International Service for the
Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc. v. Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Philippines), G.R. No. 209271 (2015)]
Q148: What is the effect of the precautionary principle on the rules of evidence?
A148: Section 1 of Rule 20 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases states that when there is a lack of
full scientific certainty in establishing a causal link between human activity and environmental effect, the court
shall apply the precautionary principle in resolving the case before it. The constitutional right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology shall be given the benefit of the doubt. Section 2 thereof provides that applying
the precautionary principle, the following factors, among others, may be considered: (1) threats to human life or
health; (2) inequity to present or future generations; or (3) prejudice to the environment without legal
consideration of the environmental rights of those affected.
The precautionary principle bridges the gap in cases where scientific certainty in factual findings cannot be
achieved. By applying the precautionary principle, the court may construe a set of facts as warranting either judicial
action or inaction, with the goal of preserving and protecting the environment. This may be further evinced from
the second paragraph where bias is created in favor of the constitutional right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology. In effect, the precautionary principle shifts the burden of evidence of harm away from those
likely to suffer harm and onto those desiring to change the status quo. An application of the precautionary
principle to the rules on evidence will enable courts to tackle future environmental problems before ironclad
scientific consensus emerges. For purposes of evidence, the precautionary principle should be treated as a
principle of last resort, where application of the regular Rules of Evidence would cause in an inequitable result for
the environmental plaintiff. When these features — uncertainty, the possibility of irreversible harm, and the
possibility of serious harm — coincide, the case for the precautionary principle is strongest. When in doubt, cases
must be resolved in favor of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology [International Service for
the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc. v. Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Philippines), G.R. No. 209271 (2015)].
32

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1 Political Law

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U.P.

LAW BOC POLITICAL LAW PRE-WEEK REVIEWER

They are concluded:

Same level as a statute Not of the same level as a statute

[Saguisag v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 212426 (2016)]

Q13: What is the doctrine of incorporation?

Q19: Differentiate naturalization from repatriation.

Q20: Who are citizens of the Philippines?

Q21: Who are natural born citizens?

Q23: Does the operative fact doctrine apply to executive acts?

Q27: What are the elements of presidential communications privilege?

Q29: What are the three modes of amending the Constitution?

Q31: When is an impeachment proceeding deemed initiated?

Q32: What is a political question?

Q39: What is a custodial investigation?

Q40: What is a writ of amparo?

Q41: Are checkpoints legal?

Q43: What is the strict scrutiny standard?

Q48: What is Maximum Tolerance?

Q49: Is inflation included in the formula for just compensation?

Q52: When does presumption of innocence end?

PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW

Q55: What is a public office?

Q57: What is a De Facto Officer?

Q63: What is the rule on incompatibility of office? When is an office incompatible?

Q64: Distinguish a temporary appointment from a permanent appointment.

Q65: Can a COMELEC Commissioner be removed from office administratively?

Q67: Distinguish ad-interim appointments from appointments in an acting capacity.

Q68: Are courtesy resignations valid?

Q69: What are the exceptions to the prohibition on nepotic appointments?

Q73: Can private individuals be subject to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan?

Q74: When is substitution of a candidate allowed?

Q82: Requisites for the exercise of Eminent Domain by an LGU

Q85: On what grounds can local chief executive veto an ordinance?

Which of the appointments is valid?

Q97: What is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction?

Q100: What is the doctrine of qualified political agency?

Q102: What is the essence of due process in administrative proceedings? Explain.

Q105: What are the kinds of quasi-judicial powers?

Q106: What are the classifications of administrative rules?

Q109: Is the right to counsel part of administrative due process?

Q112: Is the doctrine of res judicata applicable to administrative proceedings?

PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

Q115: What is the principle of rebus sic stantibus?

However, a fundamental change in circumstances may not be invoked:

Q116: What are erga omnes obligations?

Q118: Differentiate the process of incorporation from the process of transformation.

Q121: What is the right of legation?

Q122: What is the procedure for extradition under Philippine law?

Q125: What is the doctrine of restrictive immunity?

Q129: What is a low-tide elevation?

Q130: What is the right to hot pursuit under the UNCLOS?

Q131: What is the straight baselines method?

Q133: Define innocent passage.

Q134: Who are stateless persons?

Q135: What is the rule on use of force in international relations?

Q136: What is the rule on self-defense in international relations?

Q137: Differentiate between ICJ jurisdiction and ICC jurisdiction.

a) Can this be done?

Q141: What is the concept of association under international law?

Q144: What is the rule on double criminality?

Q147: What is the precautionary principle?

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