Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
1. PEOPLE VS CELIS
Section 14. Who may apply - The following persons may file in the proper Court
of the First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) an application for registration of
title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
Hence, it is clear that to be qualified under Section 14(2), a registrant must be able to
show not only
(1) that the subject property is alienable or disposable but also that the
same is patrimonial property of the state,
(2) no longer intended for public use or service or for the development of
national wealth.
2. REPUBLIC VS DOLDOL
The original Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 provided for possession and occupation of
lands of the public domain since July 26, 1894. This was superseded by R.A. No.
1942,[2] which provided for a simple thirty year prescriptive period of occupation by
an applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The same, however, has
already been amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, approved on January 25,
1977. As amended, Section 48(b) now reads:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title, except when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter. (Italics ours)
Thus, in the aforecited Republic vs. CA case, we stated that the Public Land Act
requires that the applicant must prove (a) that the land is alienable public land and (b)
that his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
same must either be since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public
Land Act. When the conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the
land, by operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without the
necessity of a certificate of title being issued.
3. REPUBLIC VS NAGUIT
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under
the provisions of existing laws.
In that case, the subject land had been certified by the DENR as alienable and
disposable in 1980, thus the Court concluded that the alienable status of the land,
compounded by the established fact that therein respondents had occupied the land
even before 1927, sufficed to allow the application for registration of the said
property. In the case at bar, even the petitioner admits that the subject property was
released and certified as within alienable and disposable zone in 1980 by the DENR.
Tax Declarations Are Not Conclusive Evidence of Ownership, But Good Indicia
Of Possession
Although tax declarations and realty tax payment of property are not conclusive
evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of the possession in the
concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property
that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. They constitute at least
proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration
of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only ones sincere and
honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against
the State and all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed
revenues to the Government. Such an act strengthens ones bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership.
4. REPUBLIC VS INC
(a) Since Section 48 (b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and
does not require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable
during the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure
judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and
disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land
Act.
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act
is further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
Note:
5. WEE VS GONZALES
Land Ceases To Be A Public Land And Becomes Private Once Patent Is Issued
In the case of Republic vs. Umali, this Court ruled that once a patent is registered and
the corresponding certificate of title is issued, the land ceases to be part of public
domain and becomes private property over which the Director of Lands has neither
control nor jurisdiction. A public land patent, when registered in the corresponding
Register of Deeds, is a veritable Torrens title, and becomes as indefeasible upon the
expiration of one (1) year from the date of issuance thereof. Said title, like one issued
pursuant to a judicial decree, is subject to review within one (1) year from the date of
the issuance of the patent. This rule is embodied in Section 103 of PD 1529, which
provides that:
Section 103. Certificates of title pursuant to patents. – Whenever public land is by
the Government alienated, granted or conveyed to any person, the same shall be
brought forthwith under the operation of this Decree. x x x After due registration
and issuance of the certificate of title, such land shall be deemed to be registered
land to all intents and purposes under this Decree.
Verily, once a title is registered, as a consequence either of judicial or administrative
proceedings, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the
portals of the court sitting in the mirador de su casa to avoid the possibility of losing
his land.
6. BIENVINIDO VS GABRIEL
Questions Of Facts Are Not Reviewable Except When The Inference Drawn By
Appellate Court Is Manifestly Mistaken
Settled is the rule that questions of fact are not reviewable in petitions for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as only questions of law shall be raised
in such petitions. While this Court is not a trier of facts, if the inference drawn by the
appellate court from the facts is manifestly mistaken, it may, in the interest of justice,
review the evidence in order to arrive at the correct factual conclusions based on the
record.
Art. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired
by ordinary prescription through possession of ten years.
Art. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe
through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of
title or of good faith.
Civil Interruption Takes Place With The Service Of Judicial Summons Not By
Filing Of Notice Of Adverse Claim
In the case of Heirs of Marcelina Azardon-Crisologo v. Raon this Court citing Article
1123 of the Civil Code held that civil interruption takes place with the service of
judicial summons to the possessor and not by filing of a mere Notice of Adverse
Claim.
7. MATTHEWS VS TAYLOR
Injunction/Requisites
Injunction, as a preservative remedy, aims to protect substantive rights and interests.
To be entitled to a writ of injunction, the complainant must establish the following
requisites:
(1) there must be a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; and
(2) the act against which injunction is to be directed is a violation of such right.
The grant of the writ is conditioned on the existence of the complainants clear
legal right, which means one clearly founded in or granted by law or is
enforceable as a matter of law.
A notice of lis pendens neither affects the merits of a case nor creates a right or a
lien.
A notice of lis pendens neither affects the merits of a case nor creates a right or a lien.
It serves to protect the real rights of the registrant while the case involving such rights
is pending resolution. While the notice of lis pendens remains on a certificate of title,
the registrant could rest secure that he would not lose the property or any part of it
during the litigation. Once a notice of lis pendens has been duly registered, any
subsequent transaction affecting the land involved would have to be subject to the
outcome of the litigation. For this reason, the Court has pronounced that a purchaser
who buys registered land with full notice of the fact that it is in litigation
between the vendor and a third party stands in the shoes of his vendor and his
title is subject to the incidents and result of the pending litigation.
Agrarian Dispute
10. YAP VS REPUBLIC
RES JUDICATA
In a catena of cases, the Court discussed the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment,
as a concept of res judicata as follows:
The second concept - conclusiveness of judgment - states that a fact or question
which was in issue in a former suit and was there judicially passed upon and
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the
judgment therein as far as the parties to that action and persons in privity with
them are concerned and cannot be again litigated in any future action between
such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court of concurrent
jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of action, while the judgment
remains unreversed by proper authority. It has been held that in order that a
judgment in one action can be conclusive as to a particular matter in another
action between the same parties or their privies, it is essential that the issue be
identical. If a particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the
judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or question, a
former judgment between the same parties or their privies will be final and
conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and
adjudicated in the first suit x x x. Identity of cause of action is not required but
merely identity of issue.
The general rule precluding the re-litigation of material facts or questions which were
in issue and adjudicated in former action are commonly applied to all matters
essentially connected with the subject matter of the litigation. Thus, it extends to
questions necessarily implied in the final judgment, although no specific finding may
have been made in reference thereto and although such matters were directly referred
to in the pleadings and were not actually or formally presented. Under this rule, if the
record of the former trial shows that the judgment could not have been rendered
without deciding the particular matter, it will be considered as having settled that
matter as to all future actions between the parties and if a judgment necessarily
presupposes certain premises, they are as conclusive as the judgment itself.
In Nabus v. CA,35 the Court stressed that when a party seeks relief upon a cause of
action different from the one asserted by him in a previous one, the judgment in the
former suit is conclusive only as to such points or questions as were actually in issue
or adjudicated therein.
in Calalang v. Register of Deeds of Quezon City,37 the Court clarified that the bar on
re-litigation of a matter or question extends to those questions necessarily implied in
the final judgment, although no specific finding may have been made in reference
thereto, and although those matters were directly referred to in the pleadings and were
not actually or formally presented.38 "If the record of the former trial shows that the
judgment could not have been rendered without deciding a particular matter, it will be
considered as having settled that matter as to all future actions between the parties."
Verily, as developed, these principles now embody paragraph (c) of Section 47, Rule
39 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest,
that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order
which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and
necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.
A buyer for value in good Faith is one who buys property of another, without notice
that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays full and
fair price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the
claim or interest of some other persons in the property. He buys the property with the
well-founded belief that the person from whom he receives the thing had title to the
property and capacity to convey it.
To prove good faith, a buyer of registered and titled land need only show that he
relied on the face of the title to the property. He need not prove that he made further
inquiry for he is not obliged to explore beyond the four comers of the title. Such
degree of proof of good faith, however, is sufficient only when the following
conditions concur:
first, the seller is the registered owner of the land;
second, the latter is in possession thereof; and
third, at the time of the sale, the buyer was not aware of any claim or interest of
some other person in the property, or of any defect or restriction in the title of the
seller or in his capacity to convey title to the property.
Absent one or two of the foregoing conditions, then the law itself puts the buyer
on notice and obliges the latter to exercise a higher degree of diligence by
scrutinizing the certificate of title and examining all factual circumstances in
order to determine the seller's title and capacity to transfer any interest in the
property. Under such circumstance, it is no longer sufficient for said buyer to
merely show that he relied on the face of the title; he must now also show that he
exercised reasonable precaution by inquiring beyond the title. Failure to exercise
such degree of precaution makes him a buyer in bad faith.52 (Emphasis and italics
in the original)
[T]he law protects to a greater degree a purchaser who buys from the registered
owner himself. Corollarily, it requires a higher degree of prudence from one who
buys from a person who is not the registered owner, although the land object of the
transaction is registered. While one who buys from the registered owner does not
need to look behind the certificate of title, one who buys from one who is not the
registered owner is expected to examine not only the certificate of title but all factual
circumstances necessary for him to determine if there are any flaws in the title of the
transferor, or in his capacity to transfer the land.
This Court has consistently applied the stricter rule when it comes to deciding the
issue of good faith of one who buys from one who is not the registered owner, but
who exhibits a certificate of title.
Torrens Title Emanating From A Fraudulent Free Patent Does Not Become
Indefeasible
In the case of Lorzano v. Tabayag, Jr. the Court reiterated that a Torrens title
emanating from a free patent which was secured through fraud does not become
indefeasible because the patent from whence the title sprung is itself void and of no
effect whatsoever.
Once a patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of title is issued, the land
covered thereby ceases to be part of public domain and becomes private property, and
the Torrens Title issued pursuant to the patent becomes indefeasible upon the
expiration of one year from the date of such issuance. However, a title emanating
from a free patent which was secured through fraud does not become indefeasible,
precisely because the patent from whence the title sprung is itself void and of no
effect whatsoever.
On this point, the Court's ruling m Republic v. Heirs of Felipe Alejaga, Sr.62 is
instructive:
True, once a patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of title [is]
issued, the land covered by them ceases to be part of the public domain and
becomes private property. Further, the Torrens Title issued pursuant to the patent
becomes indefeasible a year after the issuance of the latter. However, this
indefeasibility of a title does not attach to titles secured by fraud and
misrepresentation. Well-settled is the doctrine that the registration of a patent
under the Torrens System does not by itself vest title; it merely confirms the
registrant's already existing one. Verily, registration under the Torrens System is
not a mode of acquiring ownership.
Only The Government May Assail The Certificate Of Title Issued Pursuant To
Free Patent Fraudulently Acquired
Nonetheless, a free patent that was fraudulently acquired, and the certificate of title
issued pursuant to the same, may only be assailed by the government in an action for
reversion, pursuant to Section 101 of the Public Land Act. In Sherwill Development
Corporation v. Sitio Sta. Nino Residents Association, Inc., the Court pointed out that:
It is also to the public interest that one who succeeds in fraudulently acquiring
title to a public land should not be allowed to benefit therefrom, and the State
should, therefore, have an even existing authority, thru its duly-authorized
officers, to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the issuance of any such
title, to the end that the Republic, thru the Solicitor General or any other officer
who may be authorized by Jaw, may file the corresponding action for the
reversion of the land involved to the public domain, subject thereafter to disposal
to other qualified persons in accordance with law. In other words, the
indefeasibility of a title over land previously public is not a bar to an investigation
by the Director of Lands as to how such title has been acquired, if the purpose of
such investigation is to determine whether or not fraud had been committed in
securing such title in order that the appropriate action for reversion may be filed
by the Government.
Mirror Doctrine
Complementing this is the mirror doctrine which echoes the doctrinal rule that
every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of
the certificate of title issued therefor and is in no way obliged to go beyond the
certificate to determine the condition of the property. The recognized exceptions
to this rule are stated as follows:
[A] person dealing with registered land has a right to rely on the Torrens
certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further except when
the party has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a
reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry or when the purchaser has
knowledge of a defect or the lack of title in his vendor or of sufficient facts to
induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the title of the
property in litigation. The presence of anything which excites or arouses suspicion
should then prompt the vendee to look beyond the certificate and investigate the
title of the vendor appearing on the face of said certificate. One who falls within
the exception can neither be denominated an innocent purchaser for value nor a
purchaser in good faith and, hence, does not merit the protection of the law.
Thus, in Domingo Realty, Inc. v. CA, we emphasized the need for prospective parties
to a contract involving titled lands to exercise the diligence of a reasonably prudent
person in ensuring the legality of the title, and the accuracy of the metes and bounds
of the lot embraced therein, by undertaking precautionary measures, such as:
1. Verifying the origin, history, authenticity, and validity of the title with the
Office of the Register of Deeds and the Land Registration Authority;
2. Engaging the services of a competent and reliable geodetic engineer to verify
the boundary, metes, and bounds of the lot subject of said title based on the
technical description in the said title and the approved survey plan in the Land
Management Bureau;
3. Conducting an actual ocular inspection of the lot;
4. Inquiring from the owners and possessors of adjoining lots with respect to the
true and legal ownership of the lot in question;
5. Putting up of signs that said lot is being purchased, leased, or encumbered; and
6. Undertaking such other measures to make the general public aware that said lot
will be subject to alienation, lease, or encumbrance by the parties.
These circumstances, taken altogether, strongly indicate that Carlos and the spouses
Guevara failed to exercise the necessary level of caution expected of a bona fide
buyer and even performed acts that are highly suspect.
12. SPS PERALTA VS HEIRS OF BERNARDINA
Section 14(1) Covers Alienable And Disposable Lands While Section (2) Covers
Patrimonial Property Of The State
As this Court clarified in Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic of the Philippines, and
Republic of the Philippines v. East Silverlane Realty Development Corporation,
Section 14(1) covers alienable and disposable lands while Section 14(2) covers
private property. Thus, for ones possession and occupation of an alienable and
disposable public land to give rise to an imperfect title, the same should have
commenced on June 12, 1945 or earlier. On the other, for one to claim that his
possession and occupation of private property has ripened to imperfect title, the same
should have been for the prescriptive period provided under the Civil Code. Without
need for an extensive extrapolation, the private property contemplated in Section
14(2) is patrimonial property as defined in Article 421 in relation to Articles 420
and 422 of the Civil.
Condition Of Possession
It is concerned with lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down by
law, namely, that the possession should be in the concept of an owner, public,
peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse. Possession is open when it is patent, visible,
apparent, notorious and not clandestine. It is continuous when uninterrupted,
unbroken and not intermittent or occasional; exclusive when the adverse possessor
can show exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his own use
and benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known and
talked of by the public or the people in the neighborhood. The party who asserts
ownership by adverse possession must prove the presence of the essential elements of
acquisitive prescription.
Regalian Doctrine
It is doctrinal that all lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion
presumptively belong to the State. Public lands not shown to have been reclassified or
released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State
remain part of the inalienable public domain. Unless public land is shown to have
been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the
inalienable public domain. The onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the
presumption that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable or
disposable rests with the applicant.
Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the
public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any
ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been
reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person
by the State remain part of the inalienable public domain.
Here, it is undisputed that Espinosa was granted a cadastral decree and was
subsequently issued OCT No. 191-N, the predecessor title of Caliston's TCT No.
91117. Having been granted a decree in a cadastral proceeding, Espinosa can be
presumed to have overcome the presumption that the land sought to be
registered forms part of the public domain. 33 This means that Espinosa, as the
applicant, was able to prove by incontrovertible evidence that the property is
alienable and disposable property in the cadastral proceedings.
Burden of Proof In Land Registration Proceedings
In land registration proceedings, the applicant has the burden of overcoming the
presumption of State ownership. It must establish, through incontrovertible evidence,
that the land sought to be registered is alienable or disposable based on a positive act
of the government. Since cadastral proceedings are governed by the usual rules of
practice, procedure, and evidence, a cadastral decree and a certificate of title are
issued only after the applicant proves all the requisite jurisdictional facts-that they are
entitled to the claimed lot, that all parties are heard, and that evidence is considered.
As such, the cadastral decree is a judgment which adjudicates ownership after
proving these jurisdictional facts.
Rule on Evidence
The rules require that documentary evidence must be formally offered in evidence
after the presentation of testimonial evidence, and it may be done orally, or if allowed
by the court, in writing. Due process requires a formal offer of evidence for the
benefit of the adverse party, the trial court, and the appellate courts. This gives the
adverse party the opportunity to examine and oppose the admissibility of the
evidence. When evidence has not been formally offered, it should not be considered
by the court in arriving at its decision. Not having been offered formally, it was error
for the trial court to have considered the survey map. Consequently, it also erred in
ordering the reversion of the property to the mass of the public domain on the basis of
the same.
Reconveyance
An action for reconveyance is an action in personam available to a person whose
property has been wrongfully registered under the Torrens system in another’s name.
Although the decree is recognized as incontrovertible and no longer open to review,
the registered owner is not necessarily held free from liens. As a remedy, an action
for reconveyance is filed as an ordinary action in the ordinary courts of justice and
not with the land registration court.Reconveyance is always available as long as the
property has not passed to an innocent third person for value.1awphi1.nét A notice of
lis pendens may thus be annotated on the certificate of title immediately upon the
institution of the action in court. The notice of lis pendens will avoid transfer to an
innocent third person for value and preserve the claim of the real owner.
SECTION 29. After the filing of the application and before the issuance of the
decree of title by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, the land
therein described may be dealt with and instruments relating thereto shall be
recorded in the office of the register of deeds at any time before issuance of the
decree of title, in the same manner as if no application had been made. The
interested party may, however, present such instruments to the Court of First
Instance instead of presenting them to the office of the Register of Deeds, together
with a motion that the same be considered in relation with the application, and the
court, after notice to the parties shall order such land registered subject to the
encumbrance created by said instruments, or order the decree of registration
issued in the name of the buyer or of the person to whom the property has been
conveyed by said instruments. x x x
One should be careful, however, to distinguish between movants as mere interested
parties prescribed under Section 22 of PD 1529 and movants as intervenors-
oppositors to the land registration proceedings. It is only in the latter case that a
motion to lift the order of general default is required. It is only in the latter case that
the doctrine pronounced in Serrano v. Palacio,39 as repeatedly invoked by the LRA
and OSG, is applicable:
x x x [P]etitioners committed an error of procedure when they filed a motion to
intervene in the x x x land registration case for the proper procedure would have
been for them to ask first for the lifting of the order of general default, and then, if
lifted, to file an opposition to the application of the applicants. This is so because
proceedings in land registration are in rem, and not in personam, the sole object
being the registration applied for, and not the determination of any right not
connected with the registration (Estila vs. Alvero, 37 Phil. 498).