G.R. No.
100728 June 18, 1992
WILHELMINA JOVELLANOS, MERCY JOVELLANOS-MARTINEZ and JOSE HERMILO
JOVELLANOS, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, and ANNETTE H. JOVELLANOS, for and in her behalf, and in
representation of her two minor daughters as natural guardian, ANA MARIA and MA.
JENNETTE, both surnamed JOVELLANOS, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the
decision 1 promulgated by respondent court on June 26, 1991 in CA-G.R. CV No. 27556
affirming with some modifications the earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 85, which, inter alia, awarded one-half (1/2) of the property subject
of Civil Case No. Q-52058 therein to private respondent Annette H. Jovellanos and one-
sixth (1/6) each of the other half of said property to the three private respondents. all
as pro indiviso owners of their aforesaid respective portions.
As found by respondent court, 2 on September 2, 1955, Daniel Jovellanos and Philippine
American Life Insurance Company (Philamlife) entered into a contract denominated as a
lease and conditional sale agreement over Lot 8, Block 3 of the latter's Quezon City
Community Development Project, including a bungalow thereon, located at and known as
No. 55 South Maya Drive, Philamlife Homes, Quezon City. At that time, Daniel Jovellanos
was married to Leonor Dizon, with whom he had three children, the petitioners herein.
Leonor Dizon died on January 2, 1959. On May 30, 1967, Daniel married private respondent
Annette H. Jovellanos with whom he begot two children, her herein co-respondents.
On December 18, 1971, petitioner Mercy Jovellanos married Gil Martinez and, at the
behest of Daniel Jovellanos, they built a house on the back portion of the premises. On
January 8, 1975, with the lease amounts having been paid, Philamlife executed to Daniel
Jovellanos a deed of absolute sale and, on the next day, the latter donated to herein
petitioners all his rights, title and interests over the lot and bungalow thereon. On
September 8, 1985, Daniel Jovellanos died and his death spawned the present controversy,
resulting in the filing by private respondents of Civil Case No. Q-52058 in the court below.
Private respondent Annette H. Jovellanos claimed in the lower court that the aforestated
property was acquired by her deceased husband while their marriage was still subsisting,
by virtue of the deed of absolute sale dated January 8, 1975 executed by Philamlife in favor
of her husband, Daniel Jovellanos. who was issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. 212286
of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City and which forms part of the conjugal partnership
of the second marriage. Petitioners, on the other hand, contend that the property,
specifically the lot and the bungalow erected thereon, as well as the beneficial and
equitable title thereto, were acquired by their parents during the existence of the first
marriage under their lease and conditional sale agreement with Philamlife of September
2, 1955.
On December 28, 1989, the court a quo rendered judgment 3 with the following
dispositions:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows
1. Ordering the liquidation of the partnership of the second marriage and
directing the reimbursement of the amount advanced by the partnership of
the first marriage as well (as) by the late Daniel Jovellanos and the defendants
spouses Gil and Mercia * J. Martinez in the acquisition of the lot and
bungalow described in the Lease and Conditional Sale Agreement (Exhs. D and
1);
2. After such liquidation and reimbursement, declaring the plaintiff Annette
Jovellanos as pro-indiviso owner of 1/2 of the property described in TCT No.
212268 (sic) and the bungalow erected therein;
3. Declaring the plaintiff Annette Jovellanos, as well as the minors Anna Marie
and Ma. Jeannette (sic) both surnamed Jovellanos and the herein defendants,
as owners pro indiviso of 1/6 each of the other half of said property;
4. Declaring the defendants spouses Gil and Mercia Martinez as exclusive
owners of the two-storey house erected on the property at the back of the
said bungalow, with all the rights vested in them as builders in good faith
under Article 448 of the New Civil Code;
5. Ordering the parties to make a partition among themselves by proper
instruments of conveyances, subject to the confirmation of this Court, and if
they are unable to agree upon the partition, ordering that the partition should
be made by not more than three (3) competent and disinterested persons as
commissioners who shall make the partition in accordance with Sec. 5, Rule
69 of the Revised Rules of Court;
6. Ordering the defendant(s) to pay plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the sum of
P5,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus costs.
SO ORDERED. 4
Respondent Court of Appeals, in its challenged decision, held that the lease and conditional
sale agreement executed by and between Daniel Jovellanos and Philamlife is a lease
contract and, in support of its conclusion, reproduced as its own the following findings of
the trial court:
It is therefore incumbent upon the vendee to comply with all his
obligations, i.e., the payment of the stipulated rentals and adherence to the
limitations set forth in the contract before the legal title over the property is
conveyed to the lessee-vendee. This, in effect. is a pactum reservati
dominii which is common in sales on installment plan of real estate whereby
ownership is retained by the vendor and payment of the agreed price being a
condition precedent before full ownership could be transferred (Wells vs.
Samonte, 38768-R, March 23, 1973; Perez vs. Erlanger and Galinger Inc., CA
54 OG 6088). The dominion or full ownership of the subject property was only
transferred to Daniel Jovellanos upon full payment of the stipulated price
giving rise to the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale on January 8, 1975
(Exh. 2) when the marriage between the plaintiff and Daniel Jovellanos was
already in existence.
The contention of the defendants that the jus in re aliena or right in the
property of another person (Gabuya vs. Cruz, 38 SCRA 98) or beneficial use
and enjoyment of the property or the equitable title has long been vested in
the vendee-lessee Daniel Jovellanos upon execution of Exh. "1" is true, But
the instant case should be differentiated from the cited cases of Pugeda v.
Trias, et al., 4 SCRA 849; and Alvarez vs. Espiritu, G.R. L-18833, August 14,
1965, which cannot be applied herein even by analogy. In Pugeda. the subject
property refers solely to friar lands and is governed by Act 1120 wherein the
certificate of sale is considered a conveyance of ownership subject only to the
resolutory condition that the sale may be rescinded if the agreed price has
not been paid in full; in the case at bar, however, payment of the stipulated
price is a condition precedent before ownership could be transferred to the
vendee. 5
With the modification that private respondents should also reimburse to petitioners their
proportionate shares on the proven hospitalization and burial expenses of the late Daniel
Jovellanos, respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court. applying
Article 118 of the Family Code which provides:
Art. 118. Property bought on installment paid partly from exclusive funds of
either or both spouses and partly from conjugal funds belongs to the buyer or
buyers if full ownership was vested before the marriage and to the conjugal
partnership if such ownership was vested during the marriage. In either case,
any amount advanced by the partnership or by either or both spouses shall
be reimbursed by the owner or owners upon liquidation of the partnership.
Petitioners now seek this review, invoking their assignment of errors raised before the
respondent court and which may be capsulized into two contentions, namely, that (1) the
lower court erred in holding that the lot and bungalow covered by the lease and
conditional sale agreement (Exhibit 1) is conjugal property of the second marriage of the
late Daniel Jovellanos: and (2) the lower court erred in holding that the provisions of the
Family Code are applicable in resolving the rights of the parties herein. 6
It is petitioners' position that the Family Code should not be applied in determining the
successional rights of the party litigants to the estate of Daniel Jovellanos. for to do so
would be to impair their vested property rights over the property in litigation which they
have acquired long before the Family Code took effect. 7
To arrive at the applicable law, it would accordingly be best to look into the nature of the
contract entered into by the contracting parties. As appositely observed by respondent
court, the so-called lease agreement is, therefore, very much in issue. Preliminarily, we do
not lose sight of the basic rule that a contract which is not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy has the force of law between the contracting parties
and should be complied with in good faith. 8 Its provisions are binding not only upon them
but also upon their heirs and assigns. 9
The contract entered into by the late Daniel Jovellanos and Philamlife is specifically
denominated as a "Lease and Conditional Sale Agreement" over the property involved with
a lease period of twenty years at a monthly rental of P288.87, by virtue of which the
former, as lessee-vendee, had only the right of possession over the property. 10In a lease
agreement, the lessor transfers merely the temporary use and enjoyment of the thing
leased. 11 In fact, Daniel Jovellanos bound himself therein, among other things, to use the
property solely as a residence, take care thereof like a good father of a family, permit
inspection thereof by representatives of Philamlife in regard to the use and preservation
of the property. 12
It is specifically provided, however, that "(i)f, at the expiration of the lease period herein
agreed upon, the LESSEE-VENDEE shall have fully faithfully complied with all his obligations
herein stipulated, the LESSOR-VENDOR shall immediately sell, transfer and convey to the
LESSEE-VENDEE the property which is the subject matter of this agreement; . . . 13
The conditional sale agreement in said contract is, therefore, also in the nature of a
contract to sell, as contrdistinguished from a contract of sale. In a contract to sell or a
conditional sale, ownership is not transferred upon delivery of the property but upon full
payment of the purchase price. 14 Generally, ownership is transferred upon delivery, but
even if delivered, the ownership may still be with the seller until full payment of the price
is made, if there is stipulation to this effect. The stipulation is usually known as a pactum
reservati dominii, or contractual reservation of title, and is common in sales on the
installment plan. 15 Compliance with the stipulated payments is a suspensive
condition. 16 the failure of which prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from
acquiring binding force. 17
Hornbook lore from civilists clearly lays down the distinctions between a contract of sale
in which the title passes to the buyer upon delivery of the thing sold, and a contract to sell
where, by agreement, the ownership is reserved in the seller and is not to pass until full
payment of the purchase price: In the former, non-payment of the price is a negative
resolutory condition; in the latter, full payment is a positive suspensive condition. In the
former, the vendor loses and cannot recover the ownership of the thing sold until and
unless the contract of sale is rescinded or set aside; in the latter, the title remains in the
vendor if the vendee does not comply with the condition precedent of making full payment
as specified in the contract.
Accordingly, viewed either as a lease contract or a contract to sell, or as a contractual
amalgam with facets of both, what was vested by the aforestated contract in petitioners'
predecessor in interest was merely the beneficial title to the property in question. His
monthly payments were made in the concept of rentals, but with the agreement that if he
faithfully complied with all the stipulations in the contract the same would in effect be
considered as amortization payments to be applied to the predetermined price of the said
property. He consequently acquired ownership thereof only upon full payment of the said
amount hence, although he had been in possession of the premises since September 2,
1955, it was only on January 8, 1975 that Philamlife executed the deed of absolute sale
thereof in his favor.
The conditions of the aforesaid agreement also bear notice, considering the stipulations
therein that Daniel Jovellanos, as lessee-vendee, shall not —
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Sublease said property to a third party;
(c) Engage in business or practice any profession within the property;
xxx xxx xxx
(f) Make any alteration or improvement on the property without the prior
written consent of the LESSOR-VENDOR;
(g) Cut down, damage, or remove any tree or shrub, or remove or quarry any
stone, rock or earth within the property, without the prior written consent of
the LESSOR-VENDOR;
(h) Assign to another his right, title and interest under and by virtue of this
Agreement, without the prior written consent and approval of the LESSOR-
VENDOR. 18
The above restrictions further bolster the conclusion that Daniel Jovellanos did not enjoy
the full attributes of ownership until the execution of the deed of sale in his favor. The law
recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations
than those established by law, 19 and, under the contract, Daniel Jovellanos evidently did
not possess or enjoy such rights of ownership.
We find no legal impediment to the application in this case of the rule of retroactivity
provided in the Family Code to the effect that —
Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice
or impair vested or acquired nights in accordance with the Civil Code or other
laws.
The right of Daniel Jovellanos to the property under the contract with Philamlife was
merely an inchoate and expectant right which would ripen into a vested right only upon
his acquisition of ownership which, as aforestated, was contingent upon his full payment
of the rentals and compliance with all his contractual obligations thereunder. A vested right
as an immediate fixed right of present and future enjoyment. It is to be distinguished from
a right that is expectant or contingent. 20 It is a right which is fixed, unalterable, absolute,
complete and unconditional to the exercise of which no obstacle exists, 21 and which is
perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency. 22Thus, for a property right to be
vested, there must be a transition from the potential or contingent to the actual, and the
proprietary interest must have attached to a thing; it must have become fixed or
established and is no longer open to doubt or controversy. 23
The trial court which was upheld by respondent court, correctly ruled that the cases cited
by petitioners are inapplicable to the case at bar since said cases involved friar lands which
are governed by a special law, Act 1120, which was specifically enacted for the purpose. In
the sale of friar lands, upon execution of the contract to sell, a certificate of sale is delivered
to the vendee and such act is considered as a conveyance of ownership, subject only to
the resolutory condition that the sale may be rescinded if the agreed price shall not be paid
in full. In the instant case, no certificate of sale was delivered and full payment of the
rentals was a condition precedent before ownership could be transferred to the
vendee. 24
We have earlier underscored that the deed of absolute sale was executed in 1975 by
Philamlife, pursuant to the basic contract between the parties, only after full payment of
the rentals. Upon the execution of said deed of absolute sale, full ownership was vested in
Daniel Jovellanos. Since. as early as 1967, he was already married to Annette H. Jovellanos,
this property necessarily belonged to his conjugal partnership with his said second wife.
As found by the trial court, the parties stipulated during the pre-trial conference in the case
below that the rentals/installments under the lease and conditional sale agreement were
paid as follows (a) from September 2, 1955 to January 2, 1959, by conjugal funds of the
first marriage; (b) from January 3, 1959 to May 29, 1967, by capital of Daniel Jovellanos;
(c) from May 30, 1967 to 1971, by conjugal funds of the second marriage; and (d) from
1972 to January 8, 1975, by conjugal funds of the spouses Gil and Mercy Jovellanos
Martinez. 25 Both courts, therefore, ordered that reimbursements should be made in line
with the pertinent provision of Article 118 of the Family Code that "any amount advanced
by the partnership or by either or both spouses shall be reimbursed by the owner or
owners upon liquidation of the partnership."
ACCORDINGLY, finding no reversible error in the judgment of respondent court, the same
is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-18032 November 23, 1922
ELISEO SANTOS, as administrator of Estanislao Santos, plaintiff-appellant, vs. PABLO
BARTOLOME, as administrator of Marcela Tizon, defendant-appellee.
The questions involved in this appeal arise in connection with the liquidation of the
community estate pertaining to the spouses Estanislao Santos and Marcela Tizon, both of
whom are now deceased, and whose respective estates are now represented before the
court by Eliseo Santos, as administrator of Estanislao Santos, and Pablo Bartolome, as
administrator of Marcela Tizon. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the question here
presented are these: Estanislao Santos and Marcela Tizon were united in marriage many
years ago and lived together as man and wife in the Province of Pampanga until in the year
1914, when Estanislao Santos died. The widow, Dña. Marcela Tizon, survived until
December, 1917, when she also died. No children appear to have been born to the pair,
and the persons now interested in their properties are the collateral heirs of the two
spouse respectively.
After the death of Estanislao Santos the community property pertaining to the two spouses
came into the possession and under the control of his administrator, Eliseo Santos, with
corresponding duty to collect assets, pay off the debts, and liquidate the estate according
to law. In connection with the discharge of these duties, said administrator also came into
the possession of certain property pertaining to the widow in her own right, which he
managed to the same extent as the community property itself.
In the course of the proceedings conducted as aforesaid for the settlement of the estate
of Estanislao Santos, the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, by order of June 12, 1921,
ordered Eliseo Santos, as administrator, to submit a project for a division of the property
pertaining to the estate; and pursuant to this order the said Eliseo Santos presented such
a project, accompanied by a general inventory. In Base II of this project were included
seven items, lettered respectively (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), ( f ), and (g), representing certain
sums which, it was submitted, constituted valid charges against Marcela Tizon in the
liquidation of the ganancial property. A more detailed statement concerning these items
will be necessary later. Suffice it at this point to say that opposition to the allowance of
these charges against Marcela Tizon was made by Pablo Bartolome, as her administrator.
At the same time said administrator submitted a counter-project of partition in which
these items were eliminated.
When the two opposing projects of division came under the consideration of the trial
judge, his Honor admitted the property of items (a) and (b) in the project of partition
submitted by Eliseo Santos, and he accordingly allowed those items as valid charges against
Marcela Tizon, though it is erroneously supposed in the appellant's assignment of errors
that he had disallowed those items. The other items, included in Base II of the same project
and lettered respectively (c), (d), (e), ( f ), and (g), were disallowed. In thus rejecting the
project of Eliseo Santos and adopting the counter-project of Pablo Bartolome to the extent
stated, his Honor proceeded on the idea that, even assuming the facts regarding these
items to be as claimed, they did not constitute legal charges against Marcela Tizon; and he
accordingly disallowed the same without giving to the administrator of Estanislao Santos
an opportunity to prove said claims in fact.
From the action thus taken, Eliseo Santos, as administrator appealed, and in this appeal
the heirs of Estanislao Santos have joined. In the form in which the case is thus brought
before us it is apparent that, if we should arrive at the conclusion that any of the items (c),
(d), (e), ( f ), and (g) represent claims which as a matter of law could constitute valid charges
against Marcela Tizon in the settlement of the ganancial estate, the order appealed from
should be reversed as to such item or items and the cause remanded in order that proof
may be submitted with respect thereto.
Four legal questions are thus presented which must be considered in turn. The first relates
to item (c), representing P1,292, said to have been paid by Estanislao Santos out of the
community property to redeem certain lands belonging to his wife (Marcela Tizon),
situated in Bacolor, Pampanga, which lands had been sold, prior to the marriage, under a
contract of sale with pacto de retro.
Assuming the facts as to this items to be as thus suggested, there can be no doubt that the
amount thus paid out to effect the redemption of the property should be deducted from
the community assets in liquidation, thereby in effect charging one-half thereof against the
portion pertaining to Marcela Tizon. It is undeniable that when the property to which
reference is here made was redeemed, it remained, as it had been before, the particular
property of Marcela Tizon, for if the right of redemption pertained to her, so also must the
property belong to her after redemption. (Civ. Code, arts. 1337-2; 1396-3.) And of course
where community assets have been used to effect the redemption, the community estate
becomes creditor to the extent of the amount thus expended. It follows that, in the
liquidation of the community property, account should be taken of this obligation (arts.
1404, 1419, Civ. Code).
As already stated, the item (c), now under consideration, is identical in character with items
(a) and (b), which were allowed without question by the trial judge; and the only reason
suggested for making any distinction between this and the items (a) and (b) is that the
latter had been recognized by Judge Moir of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in a
prior litigation between the guardian of Marcela Tizon, then still living, and the
administrator of Estanislao Santos. Into the details of that proceeding it is unnecessary
here to enter. It is enough to say that the validity of the claim constituting item (c) in the
project of division now under consideration was in no wise brought in question in that
litigation and the fact that it was not recognized in Judge Moir's decision is immaterial. It
results that his Honor the trial judge, erred in the court below in holding that item (c) could
not constitute a legal charge against the interest of Marcela Tizon in the proceedings for
the liquidation of the ganancial estate of the spouses Estanislao Santos and Marcela
Tizon.lawph!l.net
The second point to be considered relates to item (d) representing the sum of P3,000, said
to have been expended out of the community assets for the construction of an irrigation
system upon the lands of Marcela Tizon, resulting in an appreciation of their value to the
extent of 300 per centum. In respect to this item also, it is evident that the trial judge fell
into error in holding the claim to be inadmissible against the estate of Marcela Tizon. An
irrigation system beneficial to real property is a useful expenditure with the contemplation
of article 1404 of the Civil Code and, if financed from the community assets, is chargeable
against the party benefit when the time comes for the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership.
The third point to be considered relates to item (e), representing the sum of P7,140.97,
expended by Eliseo Santos, as administrator of Estanislao Santos, for the support and
maintenance of Marcela Tizon during the period that elapsed between the death of
Estanislao Santos and that of Marcela Tizon herself. It is undeniable that the expense of
the maintenance and support of Marcela Tizon, during widowhood, and while the conjugal
partnership had not as yet been liquidated, was properly borne by the administrator of the
deceased husband, but this expenditure was in the nature of a mere advancement and
under article 1430 of the Civil Code is to be deducted from the share pertaining to the heirs
of Marcela Tizon in so far as it exceeds what they may have been entitled to as fruits or
income. It results that there was error in the disallowance of this item. We should add,
however, that when this claims is again brought under the consideration of the trial judge,
the administrator of Estanislao Santos should be required to show the source, or sources,
from which the funds used for the maintenance and support of Marcela Tizon were
derived; and if it should appear that any part thereof was derived from the net income of
the proper property of Marcela Tizon, such amount should not be charged against her
heirs, in conformity with the precept of the article above cited.
The last point to be considered relates to items ( f ), and (g), representing expenditures of
the sums of P1,034.95 and P209.85, respectively. The first of these represents the costs of
purchase, transportation, and erection of a grave stone of Italian marble, placed to the
memory of Marcela Tizon. The second represents the cost of a memorial crown on a
porcelain frame, wit gold lettering, dedicated to the memory of Marcela Tizon. As we
understand the record, these expenditures were incurred just after the death of Marcela
Tizon and at the request of her own administrator, Pablo Bartolome, there being a verbal
agreement between the two administrator to the effect that Eliseo Santos should advance
the necessary sums for these expenditures, the same to be subsequently reimbursed by
Pablo Bartolome, as administrator of Marcela Tizon. There can be no doubt whatever as
to the property of allowing these items against the estate of Marcela Tizon in the
liquidation of the partnership property; and his Honor, the trial judge, was mistaken in
rejecting the same.
From an observation contained in the appealed decision we infer that the action of the
trial judge in rejecting the various claims to which reference has been made was based in
part on the idea that said claims should have been submitted to the committed appointed
to appraise the property and allow claims against the estate of Marcela Tizon in
administration, in conformity with the requirements of section 695, and related provisions
of the Code of Civil Procedure. This suggestion is in our opinion untenable as regards all of
said items. Items ( f ) and (g) were not proper to be submitted to the committee because
they relate to expenditures made after the death of Marcela Tizon; and as regard the other
items the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure requiring the presentation of claims to
the committee are not pertinent to proceedings for the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership.
From what has been said it results that the judgment appealed from must be reversed, and
the clause will be remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion. It is
so ordered, without express pronouncement as to costs.
Araullo, C. J., Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-4085 July 30, 1952
AGAPITO LORENZO, ET AL., petitioners, vs. FLORENCIO NICOLAS ET AL., respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to review a judgment of the Court of Appeals the
dispositive part of which reads, as follows:
IN VIEW HEREOF, the Court reverses the judgement appealed from, with
respects to Parcels Nos. 5 and 6, declares the same to be paraphernal
properties of the deceased Magdalena Clemente; declares the sale (Exhibit D)
made by Magdalena Clemente in favor of the Defendants-Appellants of said
Parcel of Land No. 6, on June 26, 1916, binding lawful and effective; orders
the partition by and among the plaintiffs and defendants of Parcels of Land
Nos. 2, 3 and 4, in the proportion of one-half (½) for the Plaintiffs and the
other half (½) for the Defendants; dismisses the complaint, with respect to
Parcels of land Nos. 1, 5, 6 and 7, without special pronouncement as to costs;
orders the Defendants to pay to the conjugal partnership one-half of the
whole amount paid to the Bureau of Lands, with legal interest thereon, from
the date of the filing of the complaint, after deducting from said amount the
initial payments made on the said lots Nos. 5 and 6; and further orders the
Plaintiffs to pay to pay the Defendants the sum of P50.00, representing ½ of
the attorneys' fees paid by said Defendants in connection with parcel No. 2.
The facts of the case as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
Prior to 1910, Magdalena Clemente was the surviving widow of the deceased
Gregorio Nicolas, Manuel Lorenzo, former husband of the deceased Carlosa
Santamaria, was also at that time a widower. On January 16, 1910, Magdalena
Clemente and Manuel Lorenzo contracted marriage. Manuel Lorenzo died on
January 7, 1929, while Magdalena died on January 31, 1934. During their
coverture, the two had no children. In his first marriage, however, Manuel
Lorenzo left, as heirs, the plaintiffs Agapito and Marcela Lorenzo and
Policarpio Lorenzo, deceased, who had been succeeded by his children, the
plaintiffs Faustina, Federico, Guillermo and Manuel all surnamed Lorenzo;
while Magdalena Clemente, in her first marriage, left as heirs, the deceased
Gerardo Nicholas, father of the defendants Florencio, Elena, Felix, Trinidad,
Cecilia and Basilisa, all surnamed Nicolas. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
As to Parcel of land No. 6. — This parcel of land which is lot No. 72 of the Friars
Land Subdivision in Guiguinto, Bulacan, was purchased in her own name by
Magdalena Clemente, for her own exclusive benefit on October 17, 1908
(Exhibit 7), prior to her marriage with Manuel Lorenzo. She had paid the sum
of P169.16 on account of the purchase price before her marriage with
Lorenzo and, according to the terms of the contract of the sale, the balance
of P833.32 was payable on installments, namely: P25.32 on June 1, 1909, and
the balance in annual payment of P42.00 each, payable on the first day of
June of each year, plus interest of 4% per annum.
The receipts, evidencing the payments of these installments (Exhibits I-A to I-
M), presented by Plaintiffs themselves, demonstrate that they were paid in
her own name. On August 21, 1928, the deed of final conveyance was
executed in the sole favor of Magdalena Clemente, notwithstanding the fact
that Manuel Lorenzo was then alive. This parcel of land was registered under
the Torrens System, in the exclusive name of Magdalena Clemente. The real
estate tax receipts, covering this particular parcel, are under the exclusive
name of Magdalena Clemente. The presumption of continuity of condition is
also in favor of Magdalena Clemente. The status of the land from the time she
acquired it and before her marriage to Lorenzo, contained until it is otherwise
changed, for it is presumed that a thing once proved to exist continues as long
as is usual with things of that nature. All the acts just mentioned are also acts
of ownership. And again, it is to be presumed that a person is the owner of a
property from exercising acts of ownership over it [Sec. 69 (j) (dd), Rule 123;
Heirs of Junero vs. Lizares, 17 Phil., 112]. These are presumptions which the
plaintiffs should but failed to rebut. And Manuel Lorenzo, indoubtedly
recognizing that Magdalena Clemente had the right of ownership over the
land, did not even as much as care to place the title to the land in the name
of the conjugal partnership, even after the payment of the installments paid
by Magdalena Clemente during the marriage. However, the evidence is not
clear as to the source of the money with which the payment of the
installments was made, except the advanced payment, which was admittedly
paid from her own purse. "Any useful expenditures made for the benefit of
the separate property of either one of the spouses by means of the advances
made by the partnership or by the industry of the husband or wife, are
partnership property." (Art. 1404, Civil Code). The amount spent for the
payments of installments due during the marriage, or obligations affecting the
separate property of Magdalena Clemente, is certainly a useful expenditures
because it preserves her right to the ownership of the land, and is, therefore,
a credit which belongs to the conjugal partnership, and must be reimbursed
to it by her. (9 Manresa, 606; 5 Sanchez Roman, 840.) In other words, while
the ownership of the land remains with Magdalena Clemente, the conjugal
partnership is entitled to the reimbursement of paid installments. (Ona vs.
Regala, 58 Phil. 881.)
The learned trial court sustained plaintiffs pretension on the strength of
Article 1407 of the Civil Code which declares that "all the property of the
spouses shall be deemed partnership property, in the absence of proof that it
belongs exclusively to the husband or to the wife", thereby establishing a
presumption which may be "overcome by the introduction of competent
evidence to the contrary" (Casino vs. Samaniego, 30 Phil., 135). We hold that
the evidence adduced to rebut this presumption, is not only most competent
but also convincing, as has heretofore been discussed.
As to Parcel of land No. 5. — This parcel was also purchased by Magdalena
Clemente from the Bureau of Lands on October 17, 1908 (Exhibit E), for
P967.16, of which amount P116.84 had previously been paid by her, before
her marriage to Manuel Lorenzo. According to the terms of the sale, the
balance of P850.32 was payable by installments: namely, P52.32 on June 1,
1909, and P42.00 annually on June 1, of each succeeding year. Payments on
account of the installments were made by her, the receipts therefor were
issued in her own name by the Bureau of Lands (Exhibits I-A to I-M). On
October 7, 1933 or 4 ½ years after the death of Manuel Lorenzo, the final,
certificate of sale was executed by the Director of Lands in her favor and in
her name. By virtue thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 13269 was issued
in the sole name of Magdalena Clemente. The legal principles hereinabove
discussed apply with equal force to this parcel of land No. 5.
On October 12, 1932, parcel of land No. 6, together with lots Nos. 226 and
216 of the Friars Lands Subdivision in Guiguinto, were conveyed in absolute
sale for valuable consideration by Magdalena Clemente in favor of herein
Defendants (Exhibit J). The trial court considered the sale as having been
made in bad faith and consequently annulled the same. In view of our
conclusion, that parcels Nos. 5 and 6 are paraphernal properties of
Magdalena Clemente, further discussion of this assignment of error would be
deemed unnecessary. However, we propose to pass upon this point in order
to settle, once and for all, the validity of the sale which is precisely one of the
basis of Defendant's title to the lands under litigation. The sale took place
about 3 ½ years after Manuel Lorenzo's death on January 7, 1921 it was duly
registered in the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan, and the corresponding T.C.T.
No. 17786 was issued in their favor, Aside from the presumption of good faith,
connection with this transaction (Art. 434, Civil Code), there is no evidence at
all showing that defendants were aware of the flaw in the title of their
immediate transferor, Magdalena Clemente. At the time of the purchase of
this parcel of land, Defendants did not have any notice of the claim or interest
of the herein Plaintiffs over the said property. The price was paid. During the
lifetime of Magdalena Clemente, Plaintiffs did not dispute at all her exclusive
right over said land, and it was only two years after her death that they filed
the claim against the Defendants. Fraud in the transaction should be proven
clearly; it should not solely be predicated upon a mere presumption arising
from the relationship of the vendor and the vendees. Defendants took
possession of the land completely relying upon the fact that it was the sole
property of Magdalena Clemente. Furthermore, every purchaser of registered
land should take and hold the same free and clear from any and all prior
claims, liens and encumbrances, except those set forth in the decree of
registration and those expressly mentioned in the Land Registration Act as
having been preserved against it. (Sec. 39, Act No. 496; De Jesus vs. City of
Manila, 29 Phil., 73; Anderson & Co. vs. Garcia, 64 Phil., 506.) No such claim,
liens or encumbrances are set forth on the certificate of title.
Plaintiffs tried to prove fraud by the presentation of Exhibit 1, the deed of sale
in 1934, in favor of Martina Rodrigo of the parcel of land No. 7. This deed does
not in any way prove fraud in the sale of parcels of land Nos. 1 and 6, for this
deed refers only to parcel No. 7, as to which, Plaintiffs' complaint had been
dismissed by the trial court. The imputation of fraud is belied by the statement
in Exhibit J that lot No. 216 was sold to Martina Rodrigo for the purpose only
of defraying the expenses of the last illness of Magdalena Clemente. The court
below, by dismissing the complaint as to parcel No. 7 covered by the deed of
sale, Exhibit J, impliedly recognized the validity of the said deed of sale, Exhibit
J.
It is, therefore, evident that the annullment of the deed of sale, Exhibit J, by
the court a quo, is an error. In view of this conclusion, the query posed by
Defendants, whether in an action for partition, the question of the nullity of
Exhibit J. on the ground of fraud, can be drawn collaterally, need not to be
determined. The same thing may be said with respect to the question of
estoppel by laches raised by the Defendants.
In support of the petition for review the petitioners claim that:
(a) That the Honorable Court of Appeals in declaring parcels of land Nos. 5
and 6 paraphernal properties of the deceased Magdalena Clemente has
committed an error of law.
(b) That the Honorable Court of Appeals has committed an error which
amounts to serious abuse of discretion by declaring that parcels of land Nos.
5 and 6 were acquired by Magdalena Clemente before her marriage to
Manuel Lorenzo..
(c) That the Honorable Court of Appeals has committed an error which
amounts to a grave abuse of discretion by not declaring the deed of sale
Exhibit "J" null and void.
So the petitioners question only the correctness of the judgment of the Court of Appeals
as to parcels Nos. 5 and 6 held to be paraphernal properties of the late Magdalena
Clemente reversing the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan which held that
they were conjugal, The third assignment of error involves a question of fact.
Upon the presumption that the parcels of land Nos. 5 and 6 continued to be the exclusive
properties of Magdalena Clemente until shown otherwise and because she had paid the
sum of P116.84 for parcel No. 5 and P169.16 for parcel No. 6 before her marriage to the
late Manuel Lorenzo, the ancestor of the petitioners, from whom they claim the deprive
their rights to one-half of the parcels of land, the Court of Appeals is of the opinion that
they were paraphernal properties of the late Magdalena Clemente. What she had paid
during coverture for said parcels of land was declared conjugal and deemed useful
expenditures for which the conjugal partnership is entitled to reimbursement.
The two parcel of land in question were part of the Friar Lands the alienation of which is
provided for in Act No. 1120.
Section 11 of Act No, 1120 provides:
 Should any person who is the actual and bona fide settler upon and occupant
of any portion of said land . . . desire to purchase the land so occupied by him,
he shall be entitled to do so at the actual cost thereof to the Government, and
shall be allowed ten years from the date of purchase within which to pay for
the same in equal annual installments, if he so desires, all deferred payments
to bear interest at the rate of four per centum per annum.
Section 12 of the same Act partly provides:
. . . When the cost thereof shall have been thus ascertained the Chief of the
Bureau of Public Lands shall give the said settler and occupant a certificate
which shall set forth in detail that the Government has agreed to sell to such
settler and occupant the amount of land so held by him, at the prize so fixed,
payable as provided in this Act ... and that upon the payment of the final
installment together with all accrued interest the Government will convey to
such settler and occupant the said land so held by him by proper instrument
of conveyance, which shall be issued and become effective in the manner
provide in section one hundred and twenty-two of the Land Registration Act.
....
Section 16 thereof in part provides:
In the event of the death of a holder of a certificate the issuance of which is
provided for in section twelve hereof, prior to the execution of a deed by the
Government to any purchaser, his window shall be entitled to received a deed
of the land stated in the certificate upon showing that she has complied with
the requirements of law for the purchase of the same. In case a holder of a
certificate dies before the giving of the deed and does not leave a widow, then
the interest of the holder of the certificate shall descend and deed shall issue
to the persons who under the laws of the Philippine Islands would have taken
had the title been perfected before the death of the holder of the certificate,
upon proof of the holders thus entitled of compliance with all the
requirements of the certificate. . . .
From these provision it is apparent that the pervading legislative intent is to sell the friar
lands acquired by the Government to actual settlers and occupants of the same. In case of
death of a holder of a certificate which is only an agreement to sell it is not the heirs but
the widow who succeeds in the parcels of land to be sold by the Government. Only do the
heirs succeed in the rights of the deceased holder of a certificate if no widow survives him.
The fact that all receipts for installments paid even during the lifetime of the late husband
Manuel Lorenzo were issued in the name of Magdalena Clemente and that the deed of
sale or conveyance of parcel No. 6 was made in her name in spite of the fact that Manuel
Lorenzo was still alive shows that the two parcels of land belonged to Magdalena
Clemente. The petitioner, the heirs of the late Manuel Lorenzo, are not entitled to one-
half of the two parcels of land. But the installments paid during coverture are deemed
conjugal, there being no evidence that they were paid out of funds belonging exclusively
to the late Magdalena Clemente.
Upon these grounds and reasons the judgment of the Court of Appeals under review is
affirmed, without cost.
Paras, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 46827. January 15, 1940.
FELISBERTO GONZALES, plaintiff-appellant, against CHARLES H. MILLER, as Administrator of
the Intestado of CATALINA CLIMACO, defendant-appealed.
1. PARAFERNAL GOODS; FINANCIAL GOODS; LOTS ACQUIRED CONDINERO EXCLUSIVO DE
LA MUJER. - Article 1407 of the Civil Code declares that "All marital assets are deemed to
be marital property until proven to belong privately to a husband or wife." While it is true
that when CC acquired by purchase of ID and J. D on November 26, 1928 lots Nos. 356 and
357 were already married to CHM, it is stated by his statement not contradicted or
impugned of false that the money with that he acquired them was his exclusive property
or paraphernalia.
2. ID .; ID; PERSONAL DEBTS OF THE HUSBAND. - Having come to the conclusion that the
lots here are CC paraphernalia, wife of CHM, do not respond to the payment of the
personal debts of this, although the acquisition of the car, for which the price is not paid,
He would have benefited from his family; since, according to article 1386 of the Civil Code,
the personal obligations of the husband can only be made effective on the fruits of the
paraphernalia, when it is proved that it is redundant for the benefit of the family. Beware
of this that not being the lots in discussion fruits of paraphernalia of the woman, but
paraphernalia of it, are not subject to the payment of the obligations of the husband C. H.
M.
The plaintiff Felisberto Gonzales appeals to this Court in appeal against the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Zamboanga in which the defendant Charles H. Miller, as
administrator of the intestate of Catalina Climaco, is acquitted of the suit and dismissed
with the costs to the plaintiff.
In support of his appeal, the appellant points out the following alleged errors as committed
by the Court a quo in his aforementioned judgment: jgc: chanrobles.com.ph
"1. The court a quo erred in declaring that Lots 356 and 357 with Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. 8373 and 8372, respectively, were paraphernal properties of Catalina Climaco,
now deceased.
"2. The court a quo erred in declaring that Lots Nos. 356 and 357 with Transfer Certificates
of Title Nos. 8373 and 8372, respectively, were not subject to attachment or execution in
connection with the judgment rendered against Charles H. Miller in favor of Jose
Malcampo.
"3. The court a quo erred in denying the motion for a new trial presented by the plaintiff."
The facts found as proven by the Court a quo, and whose resolution depends on the
resolution of the legal issues raised in this appeal, are, in summary, the following:
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
On or about January 22, 1929, Charles H. Miller contracted an obligation of P500 in favor
of Jose Malcampo, which represented the unpaid balance of the purchase price of a "Ford"
automobile, which the former had purchased from the latter. by payment in installments.
Having Charles H. Miller incurred in the payment of the stipulated terms, Jose Malcampo
filed the corresponding claim, having obtained a judgment against said Charles H. Miller
for the sum of P500 plus the corresponding legal interest, costs and attorney's fees. Having
issued a writ of execution, lots 356 and 357, described in the Title 8373 and 8372
Certificates, respectively, were seized, which lots had been acquired by Catalina Climaco
de Isabelo Delante and Julian Delante on November 26, 1928 with money from their
exclusive property obtained in a loan on the same date from the Zamboanga Mutual
Building and Loan Association with a guarantee of the same lots and two others, Nos. 352
and 353, which are included in the Certificate of Title Nos. 376 and 348, issued by the
Registrar of Titles of the Province of Zamboanga dated July 16, 1923 and September 1935.
(Exhibit 1.) Charles H. Miller married Catherine Climaco in 1927. Later, the lots seized were
sold in public auction and awarded to Jose Malcampo himself. Having elapsed the deadline
for the withdrawal and not having exercised the aforementioned right, the Provincial
Sheriff of Zamboanga granted deed of definitive sale of said lots in favor of the
aforementioned Jose Malcampo who, on June 7, 1929, sold and granted his rights in favor
of the plaintiff here, Felisberto Gonzales.
The first question of the right to be resolved in the present appeal, which arises in the first
indication of supposed error, is whether the lots here are Catalina Climaco's paraphernalia
or her and her husband's, Charles H. Miller.
Article 1407 of the Civil Code states that "Marital property is deemed to be all property
until proven to belong privately to a husband or wife." Although it is true that when
Catalina Climaco acquired by purchase of Isabelo Delante and Julian Delante on November
26, 1928, lots Nos. 356 and 357 were already married to Charles H. Miller, it is confirmed
by her statement not contradicted or impugned as false. that the money with which he
acquired them was his exclusive property or paraphernalia.
In addition, the fact that in the certificates of transfer of titles Nos. 8372 and 8373,
referring to the aforementioned lots, it is not said that the registered owners are Catalina
Climaco and her husband Charles H. Miller, but that it is said to be Catalina Climaco, "the
wife of Charles H. Miller," indicates that these lots are not marital property of both spouses
but paraphernalia of the wife Catherine Climaco, since the English phrase "the wife of
Charles H. Miller" is simply a description of your marital status
The Court a quo did not incur, then, in the supposed first statement of error that is
attributed to him having committed. Regarding the second indication of alleged error,
having reached the conclusion that the lots involved here are paraphernalia Catherine
Climaco, wife of Charles H. Miller, do not respond to the payment of personal debts of this,
although the acquisition of the automobile, for which the unpaid price is charged, it would
have benefited his family; since, according to Article 1386 of the Civil Code, the personal
obligations of the husband can only be made effective on the fruits of paraphernalia, when
it is proven that they have benefited the family. Beware of this that not being the lots in
discussion fruits of paraphernalia of women, but paraphernalia of it, are not subject to the
payment of the obligations of husband Charles H. Miller.
In virtue of this, not finding any error in the appealed sentence, we confirm it in all its parts,
with the costs to the appellant.
Avanceña, Pres., Imperial, Diaz, Laurel and Concepcion, MM., Are satisfied.
G.R. No. 41278. May 5, 1934.
PEOPLE BANK AND TRUST CO., Petitioner-Appellant, v. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR THE
CITY OF MANILA, Respondent-Appellee.
1. CONTRACTS; TRUST. — D. A., a married woman, without permission of her husband,
conveyed in trust to the Peoples Bank and Trust Co. her paraphernal property consisting
of lands and buildings the administration of which she had not conferred upon her
husband, for the following purposes: So that the lands would be subdivided into small lots;
that such lots would be sold either for cash or by installment; that the trustee would
redeem the mortgage constituted on the property with funds a loan of P10,000 with which
to redeem the mortgage in question; and that the said trustee would collect the rents due
on the property during the time the lots remained unsold. Held: That under the deed of
trust in question the grantor did not part with nor alienate the rents to be derived from
the said property in favor of the trustee, and therefore, the instrument thus executed is
susceptible of registration.
2. PARAPHERNAL PROPERTY NOT DELIVERED TO THE HUSBAND BEFORE A NOTARY;
MANAGEMENT. — Pursuant to the provisions of article 1384 of the Civil Code, the wife
has the management of the paraphernal property which has not been delivered to her
husband before a notary.
3. ID.; ID.; POWER OF THE WIFE TO DELEGATE MANAGEMENT. — Inasmuch as the wife
has the management of her paraphernal property which has not been delivered to her
husband, in accordance with article 1384 of the Civil Code, there is no question that she
has the right to collect the rents thereof and that she may delegate such power to
another person. To deny her such power would be tantamount to converting her from an
administratrix into a mere collector of rents.
4. FRUITS OF PARAPHERNAL PROPERTY; MANAGEMENT. - Pursuant to the provisions of
articles 1385 and 1401 (3) of the Civil Code, the husband has the management of the
fruits of paraphernal property on the ground that they belong to the conjugal partnership
of which he is the administrator. However, inasmuch as under article 1384 of the same
Code the wife has the management of her paraphernal property which she has not
delivered to her husband before a notary, it follows that while the fruits thereof remain
unliquidated they should continue under her management on the ground that they
answer for the necessary and indispensable expenses for their administration and
preservation. Not till then does the husband have the right to claim them for the conjugal
partnership of which he is the exclusive legal administrator.
5. PARAPHERNAL PROPERTY; PROHIBITION OF ARTICLE 1387 OF THE CIVIL CODE. —
Failure to comply with the requisite prescribed in article 1387 of the Civil Code, which
was in force before the promulgation of Act No. 3922 of the Philippine Legislature, does
not render the contract, executed by the wife without permission of her husband, null
and void ab initio but merely voidable, and the right of action which may arise under such
circumstances exclusively belongs to the husband or his heirs. Wherefore, even granting
that such public instrument is defective, it is, nevertheless, susceptible of registration.
IMPERIAL, J.:
This is an appeal taken by the Peoples Bank and Trust Co. from the judgment rendered by
the Court of First Instance of Manila, denying the registration of a certain instrument
entitled "Agreement and Declaration of Trust."
The undisputed facts of the case may be summarized as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
On October 26, 1933, Dominga Angeles, married to Manuel Sandoval who resides in
Palawan and from whom she lives separate and apart, executed an instrument entitled
"Agreement and Declaration of Trust" in favor of the Peoples Bank and Trust Co. whereby
she conveyed in trust her paraphernal property consisting of three (3) parcels of land
together with two (2) buildings thereon, situated at Nos. 1989 and 1993 Juan Luna, Manila,
particularly described in transfer certificate of title No. 21661 issued in her name. The said
trust was constituted in order that the lands would be subdivided into small lots; that said
lots would be sold either for cash or by installments; that the trustee would redeem the
mortgage constituted on said property with funds derived from the rents or sale thereof;
that the trustee would grant a loan of P10,000 with which to redeem the mortgage in
question; and that the said trustee would collect the rents to be derived from said property
while the lots remained unsold.
The instrument was presented to the register of deeds for the City of Manila for
registration, which was denied by the said official. Whereupon the Peoples Bank and Trust
Co. brought the matter in consulta before the Court of First Instance of Manila, which on
January 5, 1934, sustained the action of the register of deeds and denied the registration
applied for.
The trial court based its decision on the alleged ground that according to the terms of the
contract the trustee was authorized to collect the fruits of the paraphernal property while
the lots remained unsold or unalienated to other persons in the manner above stated, and,
inasmuch as under the provisions of articles 1385 and 1401 (3) of the Civil Code such fruits
are considered conjugal partnership property, the management of which corresponds to
the husband, in accordance with article 1412 of the said Code, and said husband did not
intervene in nor give his consent to the instrument in question, the same is null and void
and, therefore, not susceptible of registration.
The appellant contends that pursuant to the provisions of article 1387 of the Civil Code, as
amended by section 1 of Act No. 3922 of the Philippine Legislature, the grantor Dominga
Angeles did not need marital consent thereto and, therefore, the instrument is valid and
susceptible of registration.
The question raised in this appeal does not require interpretation nor application of the
provisions of Act No. 3922, amending article 1387 of the Civil Code. For the purposes of
this decision it is taken for granted that, in accordance with the provisions of articles 1385
and 1401 (3) of the Civil Code, the fruits of the paraphernal property, which had been
conveyed in trust, belong to the conjugal partnership, the management of which
corresponds exclusively to the husband of the grantor (article 1412).
It should be borne in mind that according to the deed of trust the grantor neither parts
with nor conveys the rents of her paraphernal property in favor of the trustee but merely
authorizes it to collect them during the time the lots remain unsold. The authority thus
conferred only constitutes a mere act of administration which article 1384 expressly vests
upon the grantor, in the instant case involving paraphernal property which she has not
delivered to her husband before a notary, for the purpose of conferring its management
upon him. The article in question reads as follows.
"ART. 1384. The wife shall have the management of the paraphernal property unless she
has delivered the same to her husband before a notary, for the purpose of conferring its
management upon him.
"In such cases it shall be the duty of the husband to execute a mortgage for the value of
any personality which may be so delivered to him or otherwise secure it in the manner
prescribed with respect to dowry property."
If the grantor is the legal administratrix of the property in question, there can be no
question that she has the right to collect the fruits thereof and that she may, as she has
done in this case, delegate such power to other persons. To deny her such right would be
tantamount to converting her from administratrix thereof into a mere collector of rents.
To the wife belongs the management of the fruits of her paraphernal property, which has
not been delivered to her husband under the formalities prescribed by the law, while such
fruits remain unliquidated, on the ground that they answer for the necessary and
indispensable expenses incurred in the administration and preservation of the property.
Not till then does the husband acquire the right to claim them for the conjugal partnership
of which he is the sole administrator. Applying this principle to the case under
consideration, it becomes evident that the grantor’s husband cannot claim the fruits in
question for their conjugal partnership until a liquidation thereof has been made by her.
On the other hand, failure to comply with the requisite prescribed in article 1387 does not
render the contract null and void ab initio but merely voidable, and the right of action
which may arise under such circumstances exclusively belongs to the husband or his heirs.
Wherefore, even granting that such public instrument is defective, it is, nevertheless,
susceptible of registration.
What we have heretofore stated finds support in the following commentaries of Manresa:
"Fortunately there is already a decision of the Supreme Court to that effect. The doctrine
is sufficiently explicit. A married woman, actually living separate from her husband, leases
her paraphernal property, collects rents and appoints administrators thereof, without
marital consent. The husband claims that such acts demand his permission as an
indispensable requisite. The trial court absolves the wife and, upon appeal, it is held, on
November 8, 1898, that the management of paraphernal property conferred upon the wife
by article 1384 of the Civil Code carries with it the power to enter into contracts regarding
the same, subject only to the limitation contained in article 1387, the wife personally
defraying the expenses incurred therein as a consequence, without prejudice to the
liabilities to which such property is subject, in accordance with the provisions of article
1385.
"Later, the decision of October 16, 1918, held that the management of the paraphernal
property by the wife should be conducted in accordance with the provisions of article 1384
of the Civil Code, which only differs from the former law in that for such acts and contracts
executed in connection with said management the wife does not need marital consent.
This management should not be understood as limited by the law merely to gathering fruits
and collecting rents and interest thereon and delivering them to the husband, for that
would be tantamount to converting the wife from an administratrix into a mere collector
of rents of the paraphernal property, which is one of the manifold acts embraced by the
administration, and which, on the other hand, is compatible with the provisions of article
1385.
"Finally, the decision of January 14, 1928, ratifies this same doctrine and holds that the
prohibition contained in article 1387 cannot, from its very nature, be interpreted except in
a restrictive manner, by reason of which the wife may legally perform every act not
intended to alienate, mortgage or otherwise encumber her paraphernal property, she
being authorized to execute contracts arising from the administration of an estate, and
consequently to obtain loans, without marital consent, for the benefit of said property.
"From the foregoing, we may conclude that, although the Civil Code has not solved this
question at issue explicitly and definitely, the most logical interpretation that can be given
to article 1384, in connection with article 1387, is that which grants the wife complete
freedom in the management of her paraphernal property and renders marital consent as
unnecessary, except for acts expressly stated in articles 1387, 995 and 1053. The
exceptions contained in articles 61 and 1263, although vague and broad in scope, agree
with this solution inasmuch as in the last analysis they admit of cases in which a married
woman does not need marital consent. Such broadness leaves enough ground to suppose
that the aforesaid cases include the management granted the wife by article 1384.
x x x
"The consent of the husband has the same meaning in article 1387 as in all the other
articles of the Code which demand this requisite. It does not merely fill up any defect in
the capacity of a woman to contract and bind herself. It is a very personal power granted
the head of the family to maintain good order therein, as affirmed by the Registry Office,
or to avoid loss or damages that the conjugal partnership might suffer without such
intervention, as affirmed by the Supreme Court. (Resolution of January 24, 1898, and
decisions of June 27, 1866, and January 30, 1872.)
"Lack of marital consent does not render the act null and void but merely voidable at the
instance of the husband or of his heirs. Hence the admission for registration nowadays of
contracts executed by the wife without such requisite, stating such circumstance therein,
as we have declared at the end of the commentary on article 65, second edition of this
work. (Resolutions of November 23, 1892, August 22, 1894, and March 31, 1898.)"
(Manresa, vol. IX, pp. 433, 434, 448, Fourth Edition.)
x x x asserts that by virtue of the said alleged acts of prodigality committed by the defendant
"Article 62 declares null and void the acts executed by the wife without the consent of her
husband in cases where such consent is a necessary requisite. However, according to the
legal provision just considered, only the husband and his heirs may avoid such acts, which
is but logical and natural, considering the spirit of the legal provision in question. From the
foregoing and applying the Civil Marriage Law and the former laws which accepted the
same doctrine, the Supreme Court, in its decisions of June 27, 1866, January 30, 1872, and
November 14, 1862, held that acts performed by a married woman without permission of
her husband are not null and void but merely voidable, at the instance of the husband or
his heirs, on the ground that the legal prohibition in question was not established in favor
of third persons but with a different end or purpose, that is, in favor of the husband whom
the law wants to protect from possible damages to the conjugal partnership of which he is
the head.
"After the Civil Code went into effect, the General Registry Office accepted the same
doctrine and even considered acts and contracts, executed by a married woman without
permission of her husband, susceptible of registration as long as such circumstance was
stated in the record, to serve as notice to third persons who might later contract with
regard to the same property. (Resolutions of November 23, 1892 and August 22, 1894.) It
would seem that this doctrine is contradicted by those established on January 24, 1898,
March 29, 1901, and April 21, 1908, but the principal question raised in the first case was
whether or not the husband could authorize a third person to give such consent, while in
the second and third cases no statement was made to the effect that the contracts was
not registerable, nor much less null and void, but that the deed was not extended by the
notary, who instituted the appeal, in accordance with the provisions of the law. On March
31, 1898, the General Registry Office reiterated its views in favor of registration
notwithstanding the lack of the requisite of marital consent."]
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, and the register of deeds for
the City of Manila is hereby ordered to register the instrument in question, upon payment
of the corresponding legal fees, without special pronouncement as to the costs. So
ordered.
Malcolm, Villa-Real, Hull and Goddard, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-14874. September 30, 1960.]
ANTONIO PEREZ, in his own representation and as Guardian Ad Litem of his son BENIGNO
PEREZ y TUASON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ANGELA TUASON DE PEREZ, Defendant-Appellee.
1. COURTS; JURISDICTION; GUARDIANSHIP COGNIZABLE BY JUVENILE AND DOMESTIC
RELATIONS COURT. — Since the complaint asks that defendant be placed under
guardianship because of her prodigality, and prays that a suitable person or institution be
appointed to administer her properties, the action falls squarely under the provisions of
subsection (b), Sec. 38-A, Republic Act No. 1401, as a "case involving. . . . . guardianship"
exclusively cognizable by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.
2. ID.; ID.; PROCEEDINGS UNDER ART. 116, CIVIL CODE; COGNIZABLE BY JUVENILE AND
DOMESTIC RELATIONS COURT. — Inasmuch as the plaintiff seeks to recover damages
because his wife’s acts placed him "in an embarrassing and contemptible position and
causing him grave anxiety, wounded feelings, extreme humiliation," the case involves
acts of a spouse that brings . . . dishonor . . . upon the other "under Art. 116," Civil Code;
hence, pursuant to subsection (d), Sec. 38-A of Republic Act No. 1401, this action likewise
fails exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.
3. ID.; ID.; MERE SUBMISSION OF COMPROMISE DOES NOT PLACE PARTY IN ESTOPPEL;
COURT MAY MOTU PROPRIO DISMISS ACTION. — Assuming for the sake of argument
that defendant was placed in such estoppel by merely executing the compromise and
submitting it to the Court’s approval, such estoppel could not operate against it, because
regardless of the parties, the Court, at any time, could motu proprio inquire and
determine whether it had jurisdiction, and could dismiss the case if it found it had no
power to act therein.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal from an order, dated October 27, 1958, of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
dismissing its Civil Case No. 34626 for lack of jurisdiction.
Plaintiff Antonio Perez, in his own representation and as guardian ad litem of his adoptive
son, Benigno Perez y Tuason, initiated this civil case against Angela Tuason de Perez, the
plaintiff’s wife and Benigno’s mother. The complaint states three causes of action.
Under the first cause of action, it is averred that the defendant is squandering all of her
estate on a young man by the name of Jose Antonio Campos Boloix, because of which
Benigno Perez y Tuason, acting through his guardian ad litem, the plaintiff, prays that his
mother, the defendant, be declared a prodigal and placed under guardianship; that a
suitable person or institution be appointed to administer her properties; and that during
the pendency of this suit, a writ of injunction be issued to prevent the continued waste
and dissipation of her properties.
In his second cause of action, the husband Antonio Perez, for and in his own behalf,
wife, the conjugal partnership of gain is being dissipated to the prejudice of both
spouses; wherefore, he prays for a writ of injunction to restrain her from "dissolving and
liquidating the conjugal partnership of gains."
Finally, as a third cause of action, the plaintiff husband avers that, in addition to the
aforementioned acts, the defendant has repeatedly advised him, as well as other
persons, that she intends to marry Jose Campos Boloix and to have a child by him not
withstanding her present marriage to the plaintiff, Antonio Perez; and that, if she could
not have such a child, she was willing to have one by any other person, just to put
plaintiff in a ridiculous and embarrassing position. Plaintiff, therefore, seeks to recover
from her the total sum of P185,000.00 by way of damages and attorney’s fees. On
January 2, 1958, after a preliminary hearing, wherein plaintiff was heard ex parte, the
Court of First Instance of Manila issued a preliminary injunction as prayed for in the
complaint.
On March 19, 1958, the defendant appeared through counsel and prayed for the
dismissal of the case on the ground of res judicata, and that the preliminary injunction be
dissolved. Said motion was denied by the court a quo in its order of April 2, 1958.
On April 16, 1958, the defendant filed a second motion to dismiss the case, this time on
the ground that the Court of First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction over the present
proceedings, which, according to her, is vested under Republic Act No. 1401 with the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. While this last motion was being considered by
the Court, a compromise agreement was arrived at and submitted for approval of the
court on May 2, 1958. On May 31, 1958, before the Court could act, defendant filed an
opposition to the approval of the compromise agreement, on the ground that (a) the
same is contrary to law and (b) it was not freely or validly entered into by her
representative. Without resolving this particular question, the lower court asked the
parties to submit further memoranda on the sole issue of jurisdiction. After this was
done, the trial court, by order of September 30, 1958, ordered the dismissal of the case
on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter. Hence, plaintiffs Perez
(father and son) appealed.
Appellants assign three alleged errors in the order appealed from, as follows:
"The trial court erred in holding that the Court of First Instance of Manila has no
jurisdiction over the causes of action alleged by Antonio Perez in the complaint.
"The trial court erred in holding that the Court of First Instance of Manila has no
jurisdiction over the causes of action alleged by Benigno Perez y Tuason in the
complaint.
The trial court cried in holding that the Doctrine of Estoppel of Jurisdiction is not
applicable in this country and erred further in failing to apply said doctrine to the present
proceedings."
We find the appeal to be untenable.
Republic Act No. 1401, creating the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of the City of
Manila and defining its jurisdiction, provides, among other things,
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 38-A — Provisions of the Judiciary Act to the contrary notwithstanding, the court
shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases after the
effectivity of this Act:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(b) — Cases involving custody, guardianship, adoption, paternity and acknowledgment;
x x x
(d) — Proceedings brought under the provisions of Articles one hundred sixteen, two
hundred twenty-five, two hundred fifty, two and three hundred thirty-one of the Civil
Code." (Italics supplied.)
While Article 116 of the Civil Code (referred to in subsection [d] above)
states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties to the conjugal union or brings
danger, dishonor or material injury upon the other, the injured party may apply to the
court for relief.
The court may counsel the offended party to comply with his or her duties, and take such
measures as may be proper." (Italics supplied.)
It is easy to see that the first cause of action set forth in the complaint, wherein the
minor Benigno Perez y Tuason, through his representative, asks that his mother be
placed under guardianship because of her alleged prodigality, and prays that a suitable
person or institution be appointed to administer her properties, is exclusively cognizable
by the Domestic Relations Court. The action falls squarely under the provisions of
subsection (b), Section 38-A, R. A. 1401, above-quoted, as a "case involving . .
guardianship." No error was, therefore, committed in the appealed order in holding that
this cause of action lay outside the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance.
The same thing can be said of the third cause of action wherein Antonio Perez seeks to
recover damages and attorney’s fees because his wife’s act (avowing openly her
intention to marry and have a child by Campos Boloix or if not, by anyone else) placed
the plaintiff "in an embarrassing and contemptible position" (sic) and causing him "grave
anxiety, wounded feelings, extreme humiliation." The case involves acts of a spouse that
"brings . . . dishonor . . . upon the other (spouse)" under Article 116 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, and also lies within the jurisdiction of the Domestic Relations Court. The
law (subsection (d), Sec. 38-A) expressly gives that court exclusive original jurisdiction
over proceedings under the provisions of Article 116 of the Civil Code.
More controversial is the issue involved in the second cause of action of the complaint,
wherein Antonio Perez alleges that the prodigal acts of his wife result in the conjugal
partnership of gains being dissipated to the prejudice of both spouses, and prays for a
writ of injunction to restrain her from "dissolving and liquidating the conjugal partnership
of gains." The Court of First Instance held that this cause of action is also one of those
provided by Article 116 of the Civil Code, as a case where one spouse "brings danger . . .
or material injury" upon the other, and, therefore, relief should be sought in the Court of
Domestic Relations.
We are inclined to think that" material injury" as used in Article 116 does not refer to
patrimonial (economic) injury or damage, but to personal (i. e. physical or moral) injury to
one of the spouses, since Article 116 lies in the chapter concerning personal relations
between husband and wife. Nevertheless, the court below was correct in viewing this
cause of action as primarily predicated on the grant of guardianship due to alleged
prodigality of the wife, since the allegation thereof is therein reiterated, and the remedy
of injunction sought against further (i.e. future) acts of disposition (no annulment of her
past transactions is demanded) must be necessarily based on the wife’s being subject to
guardianship.
If the wife were not in any way incapacitated, the mere fact that the alienation of her
paraphernal would deprive the conjugal partnership of the future fruits thereof would
not give rise to a cause of action for injunction, since the conjugal partnership is only
entitled to the net fruits of such property, after deducting administration expenses
(People’s Bank v. Register of Deeds, 60 Phil., 167), and it is now here alleged that any
such net fruits exist. More fundamental still, the wife’s statutory power to alienate her
paraphernal (Phil. Civil Code, Article 140) necessarily implies power to alienate its future
fruits, since the latter are mere accessory to the property itself.
Wherefore, the second cause of action is inextricably woven into and cannot stand
independently of the demand for guardianship of the wife, the injunction being a mere
incident thereof; so that like the first cause of action, the second also lay within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Domestic Relations.
The third alleged error charged against the Court below, that it should have held that
defendant was in estoppel to question the jurisdiction of the trial court, is, on its face,
without merit. Assuming for the sake of argument that defendant appellee was placed in
such estoppel by merely executing the compromise and submitting it to the Court’s
approval, such estoppel could not operate against the Court. Regardless of the parties,
the Court, at any time, could motu proprio inquire and determine whether it had
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, and could dismiss the case (as it did) if
it found that it had no power to act therein.
The order appealed from is hereby affirmed. Costs against appellants.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Gutierrez David,
Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-3629 September 28, 1907
MATEA E. RODRIGUEZ, plaintiff-appellant, vs. SUSANA DE LA CRUZ, ESCOLASTICO DE LA
CRUZ, AND PROCESA DE LA CRUZ, defendants-appellees.
On the 21st day of August, 1905, the plaintiff, through her attorneys, filed an amended
complaint in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Albay for the purpose of
recovering from the defendant certain pieces or parcels of land described in the complaint,
alleging: That she was the owner of the said lands; that she had acquired said lands during
her first marriage from her deceased father, Alejo Rodriguez; that Hilarion de la Cruz was
her second husband and that she had permission from him to commence this action in her
own name against the said defendant; that she had been in possession of said lands and
enjoyed the fruits of the same, from the month of May, 1882, until the month of February,
1905; that the said Hilarion de la Cruz had no interest or right in said property; that on or
about the 20th of February 1905, the defendants in the cause commenced an action in the
Court of First Instance of the Province of Albay against the said Hilarion de la Cruz for the
partition of the lands described in the present cause; that on the 29th day of March, 1905,
the judge of the said court adjudged in favor of the defendant Susana de la Cruz in this
action the ownership and possession of the lands described under letter "B" in the
complaint in this cause adjudging and decreeing the ownership and possession of lands
described in letter "A" in this complaint to Escolastico de la Cruz; that the plaintiff in this
cause was not made a party in the action for partition between the present defendants
and the said Hilarion de la Cruz.
To this petition the defendants filed a special denial, denying certain parts of the facts set
out in the complaint and admitting certain other of the facts alleged in said complaint. As
a special defense the defendants set up the judgment of the Court of First Instance of the
Province of Albay of the 29th of March, 1905.
The issue thus formed was duly submitted to the lower court, and after hearing the
evidence the lower court rendered a judgment in favor of the defendants and against the
plaintiff, dismissing the said cause with costs to the plaintiff. The lower court found as a
fact from the evidence adduced during the trial that the lands described in the complaint
were acquired by Hilarion de la Cruz, the father of the present defendants, "during his
married life with his first wife, Andrea de Leon," and that said lands were not inherited by
the present defendant from her father, Alejo Rodriguez.
From this decision the plaintiff appealed to this court, alleging that the lower court
committed errors, in substance as follows:
1. That the lower court erred in considering the fact that the said Matea E. Rodriguez did
not intervene in said action for partition between the said Hilarion de la Cruz and his
children of the first marriage as sufficient to show that she had no interest in the lands in
question.
2. That the court erred in declaring that the said Hilarion de la Cruz was the owner of the
lands in question, for simple fact that he had been administering said lands during the
entire period of his marriage with the present plaintiff.
3. That the court erred in finding from the evidence that the said Hilarion de la Cruz has
acquired said lands during the existence of his marriage relation with the said Andrea de
Leon, his first wife, and that said lands were not inherited by the present plaintiff from her
deceased father.
With reference to the first assignment of error above noted, we are of the opinion, and so
hold, that for the reason that the said Matea E. Rodriguez had not been made a party in
the action for partition between the present defendants and the said Hilarion de la Cruz,
her interest in said lands was in no way prejudiced by the decision of the court in that
cause.
Section 277 of the Code of Civil Procedure in Civil Actions provides, among other things,
that proceedings in a cause against one person can not affect the rights of another.
It is admitted by the parties in the present action that the said Matea E. Rodriguez was not
made a party in the former action for the partition between the present defendants and
the said Hilarion de la Cruz, neither is it shown that she had any knowledge or information
concerning the existence or pendency of said action.,
With reference of the second assignment of error above noted, it is admitted that soon
after the marriage of the said Hilarion de la Cruz with the present plaintiff he commenced
to administer the property in question. There is no provision in the Civil Code which
prohibits a husband from administering the property of his wife, as her representative, and
certainly it can not be concluded that the property which he administers for his wife is his
for the mere reason that he has administered the same for a long time.

Article 1382 of the Civil Code provides that the wife shall retain the ownership of her
property which she brings to the marriage relation. It is true that article 1384 prescribes
that she shall have the management of the property, unless she was delivered the same to
her husband by means of a public document, providing that he may administer said
property; but it can not be claimed; from the mere fact that she has permitted her husband
to administer her property without having his authority to do so evidenced by a public
document, that she has thereby lost her property and that the same has become the
property of her husband. No such claim was made in the court below on behalf of the
defendants. Their claim was that the said Hilarion de la Cruz had acquired said property
during the existence of his marriage with his first wife, Andrea de Leon.

With reference to the third assignment of error above noted, we are of the opinion, and
so hold, after an examination of the evidence adduced during the trial of said cause, that
the said lands in question were acquired by Matea E. Rodriguez by inheritance during the
existence of her first marriage, from her deceased father, Alejo Rodriguez.

Therefore, from all the foregoing facts, we are of the opinion that the judgment of the
lower court should be reversed, and it is hereby ordered that the said cause be remanded
to the lower court with direction that a judgment be entered declaring that the said
plaintiffs, Matea E. Rodriguez, is the owner and is entitled to the possession, as against the
said defendants, of the lands described i the amended complaint presented in this cause.

Without any finding as to costs, it is so ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Willard, and Tracey, JJ., concur.