V.
DISEASE AS A GROUND FOR TERMINATION computed at the rate of P2,080 per year for 36 years of
A. REQUIREMENTS
176. VICENTE SY, TRINIDAD PAULINO, BS TRUCKING
CORPORATION, and SBT TRUCKING CORPORATION
vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and JAIME SAHOT
(ILLNESS – CERTIFICATION BY COMPETENT PUBLIC
HEALTH AUTHORITY; CANNOT BE CURED WITHIN A
PERIOD OF 6 MONTHS)
FACTS:
Throughout all the changes in (corporate) names
and for 36 years, private respondent Sahot continuously
served the trucking business of petitioners. When he
turned 59 years old, he incurred absences as he was
suffering from various ailments and greatly affected the
performance of his task as a driver. Sahot had filed a
week-long leave in May and then applied for extension of
his leave for the whole month of June. Petitioners allegedly
threatened to terminate his employment should he refuse
to go back to work. Petitioners carried out their threat and
dismissed him from work, effective June 30, 1994. He
ended up sick, jobless and penniless.
Sahot filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal.
He prayed for the recovery of separation pay and
attorney’s fees against the petitioners. Petitioners admitted
having trucking business in the 1950s but denied
employing helpers and drivers; that private respondent was
not illegally dismissed as a driver because he was in fact
petitioner’s industrial partner; that SBT Trucking
Corporation was established only in 1994 and only then did
Sahot become an employee of the company. Petitioners
further claimed that sometime prior to June, Sahot went on
leave and was not able to report for work for almost seven
days. Sahot asked permission to extend his leave of
absence until end of June. It appeared that from the
expiration of his leave, private respondent never reported
back to work nor did he file an extension of his leave.
Instead, he filed the complaint for illegal dismissal against
the trucking company and its owners. Petitioners add that
due to Sahot’s refusal to work after the expiration of his
authorized leave of absence, he should be deemed to have
voluntarily resigned from his work. They contended that
Sahot had all the time to extend his leave or at least inform
petitioners of his health condition.
NLRC through Labor Arbiter Santos ruled that
there was no illegal dismissal; that Sahot had failed to
report to work; that petitioners and Sahot were industrial
partners before January 1994; and ordered petitioners to
pay "financial assistance" of P15,000 to Sahot for having
served the company as a regular employee since January
1994 only. On appeal, NLRC modified the judgment of the
LA and ruled that Sahot was an employee, not an industrial
partner, since the start; that Sahot did not abandon his job
but his employment was terminated on account of his
illness (Art. 284 of the Labor Code); and ordered
petitioners to pay private respondent separation pay in the
amount of P60,320.00, at the rate of P2,080.00 per year for
29 years of service. Petitioners assailed the decision of the
NLRC before the Court of Appeals. The appellate court
affirmed with modification the judgment of the NLRC. It
held that private respondent was indeed an employee of
petitioners since 1958. It also increased the amount of
separation pay awarded to private respondent to P74,880,
service from 1958 to 1994.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sahot was validly dismissed
due to his health condition
RULING: No, Sahot was illegally dismissed.
While it was very obvious that complainant did
not have any intention to report back to work due to his
illness which incapacitated him to perform his job, such
intention cannot be construed to be abandonment. Instead,
the same should have been considered as one of those
falling under the just causes of terminating an employment.
Article 277(b) of the Labor Code puts the burden
of proving that the dismissal of an employee was for a valid
or authorized cause on the employer, without distinction
whether the employer admits or does not admit the
dismissal. For an employee’s dismissal to be valid, (a) the
dismissal must be for a valid cause and (b) the employee
must be afforded due process.
In order to validly terminate employment on the
ground of disease, the Omnibus Implementing Rules of the
Labor Code requires a certification by competent public
health authority that the disease is of such nature or at
such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of
six (6) months even with proper medical treatment.
In the case at bar, the employer clearly did not
comply with the medical certificate requirement before
Sahots dismissal was effected. In the same case
of Sevillana vs. I.T. (International) Corp., we ruled:
Since the burden of proving the validity of the dismissal of
the employee rests on the employer, the latter should
likewise bear the burden of showing that the requisites for
a valid dismissal due to a disease have been complied
with. In the absence of the required certification by a
competent public health authority, this Court has ruled
against the validity of the employees dismissal. It is
therefore incumbent upon the private respondents to prove
by the quantum of evidence required by law that petitioner
was not dismissed, or if dismissed, that the dismissal was
not illegal; otherwise, the dismissal would be unjustified.
This Court will not sanction a dismissal premised on mere
conjectures and suspicions, the evidence must be
substantial and not arbitrary and must be founded on
clearly established facts sufficient to warrant his separation
from work.[32]
177. GATUS VS. SSS
(OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE; OTHERWISE,
SUBSTANTIAL PROOF OF WORK-RELATED ILLNESS)
FACTS:
Petitioner Gatus worked at the Central Azucarera de
Tarlac. He was a covered member of the SSS. He
optionally retired from Central Azucarera de Tarlac upon
reaching 30 years of service on January 31, 2002, at the
age of 62 years. In the course of his employment in Central
Azucarera de Tarlac, he was certified fit to work on October
21, 1975.

He suffered chest pains and was confined at the Central
Luzon Doctors Hospital in Tarlac City on August 12,
1995. He was diagnosed to be suffering from Coronary
Artery Disease (CAD): Triple Vessel and Unstable
Angina. His medical records showed him to be
hypertensive for 10 years and a smoker.
On account of his CAD, he was given by the SSS the
following EC/SSS Permanent Partial Disability (PPD)
benefits: (a) 8 monthly pensions effective September 1,
1994 and (b) 4 monthly pensions effective January 3,
1997. He became an SSS retirement pensioner on
February 1, 2002. But in 2003, an SSS audit revealed the
need to recover the EC benefits already paid to him on
the ground that his CAD, being attributed to his
chronic smoking, was not work-related.
Convinced that he was entitled to the benefits, he assailed
the decision but the SSS maintained its position. The SSS
also denied his motion for reconsideration. He elevated the
matter to the ECC, which denied his appeal on December
10, 2004, essentially ruling that although his CAD was a
cardiovascular disease listed as an occupational disease
under Annex A of the Implementing Rules on Employees
Compensation, nothing on record established the presence
of the qualifying circumstances for responsibility; that it was
incumbent upon him to prove that the nature of his
previous employment and the conditions prevailing therein
had increased the risk of contracting his CAD; and that he
had failed to prove this requisite.
He contends that he had contracted the disease due to the
presence of harmful fuel smoke emission of methane gas
from a nearby biological waste digester and a railway
terminal where diesel-fed locomotive engines had
spew(ed) black smoke; and that he had been exposed for
30 years to various smoke emissions that had contained
carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, sulfur, oxide of nitrogen
and unburned carbon.[3]
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner’s ailment is compensable
under PD No. 626, as amended.
DECISION:
No, the petitioner’s ailment is not compensable.
The grounds for compensability are set forth in Section 1,
Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees
Compensation (the Amended Rules), provides that
“…(b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death
to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an
occupational disease listed under Annex A of these Rules
with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof
must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is
increased by the working conditions.”.
Gatus was diagnosed to have suffered from CAD; Triple
Vessel and Unstable Angina, diseases or conditions falling
under the category of Cardiovascular Diseases which are
not considered occupational diseases under the Amended
Rules on Employees Compensation. His disease not being
listed as an occupational disease, he was expected to
show that the illness or the fatal disease was caused by his
employment and the risk of contracting the disease was
increased or aggravated by the working conditions. His
proof would constitute a reasonable basis for arriving at a
conclusion that the conditions of his employment had
caused the disease or that such working conditions had
aggravated the risk of contracting the illness or the fatal
disease.
Gatus did not discharge the burden of proof (substantial
proof) imposed under the Labor Code to show that his
ailment was work-related. While he might have been
exposed to various smoke emissions at work for 30 years,
he did not submit satisfactory evidence proving that the
exposure had contributed to the development of his
disease or had increased the risk of contracting the illness.
Neither did he show that the disease had progressed due
to conditions in his job as a factory worker. In fact, he did
not present any physicians report in order to substantiate
his allegation that the working conditions had increased the
risk of acquiring the cardiovascular disease.
Verily, his mere contention of exposure to various smoke
emissions in the working environment for a period of time
does not ipso facto make the resulting disability
compensable. Awards of compensation cannot rest on
speculations or presumptions, for the claimant must prove
a positive proposition.
The matter of petitioner’s cigarette smoking, established by
two competent government agencies and the appellate
court, is thus a matter that cannot be questioned before us
via petition for review.
There is no doubt that petitioner deserves sympathy
because even the benefits already given to him were
questioned after the SSS found that he was a chronic
cigarette smoker. For humanitarian reasons, as he
pursued his claim all the way to the Court as an
indigent litigant, and due to his advancing age, the
Court clarified that what had already been given him
should no longer be taken away from him. But he is not
entitled to further compensation for his condition.
The Court put great weight to the factual findings of
administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, namely
the SSS and the ECC, as they have acquired expertise in
all matters relating to employee compensation and
disability benefits.
178. VILLARUEL VS. YEO HAN GUA, G.R. No. 169191,
June 01, 2011
(SEPARATION PAY; EMPLOYER MUST BE THE ONE
WHO TERMINATES)
Facts:
Villaruel filed with the NLRC NCR-Quezon City a Complaint
for payment of separation pay against Yuhans Enterprises.
Petitioner alleged that in June 1963, he was employed as a
machine operator by Ribonette Manufacturing Company,
an enterprise engaged in the business of manufacturing
and selling PVC pipes and is owned and managed by
herein respondent Yeo Han Guan. Petitioner further
alleged that in October 1998, he got sick and was confined
in a hospital; In December 1998, he reported for work but
was no longer permitted to go back because of his illness;
he asked that respondent allow him to continue working but
be assigned a lighter kind of work but his request was
denied; instead, he was offered a sum of P15,000.00 as his
separation pay; however, the said amount corresponds
only to the period between 1993 and 1999; petitioner
prayed that he be granted separation pay computed from
his first day of employment in June 1963, but respondent
refused.
On the other hand, respondent averred that petitioner was
hired as machine operator from March 1993 until he
stopped working sometime in February 1999 on the ground
that he was suffering from illness; after his recovery,
petitioner was directed to report for work, but he never
showed up. Respondent was later caught by surprise
when petitioner filed the instant case for recovery of
separation pay. Respondent claimed that he never
terminated the services of petitioner and that during their
mandatory conference, he even told the latter that he could
go back to work anytime but petitioner clearly manifested
that he was no longer interested in returning to work and
instead asked for separation pay.
ISSUE:
What are the requirements for a disease to be a valid
ground for termination?
HELD:
Article 284 of the Labor Code reads:
An employer may terminate the services of an employee
who has been found to be suffering from any disease and
whose continued employment is prohibited by law or is
prejudicial to his health as well as to the health of his co-
employees: Provided, That he is paid separation pay
equivalent to at least 1 month salary or to ½ month salary
for every year of service whichever is greater, a fraction of
at least six months being considered as 1 whole year.
A plain reading of the above quoted provision clearly
presupposes that it is the employer who terminates the
services of the employee found to be suffering from any
disease and whose continued employment is prohibited by
law or is prejudicial to his health as well as to the health of
his co-employees. It does not contemplate a situation
where it is the employee who severs his or her employment
ties.
The Court agrees with the CA in its observation of the
following circumstances as proof that respondent
did not terminate Villaruel’s employment: first, the only
cause of action in petitioner’s original complaint is that he
was “offered a very low separation pay”; second, there was
no allegation of illegal dismissal, both in petitioner’s original
and amended complaints and position paper; and, third,
there was no prayer for reinstatement. This is tantamount
to resignation.
B. UNDER SPECIAL LAWS
a. Philippine Aids Prevention and Control Act of 1998
or RA 8504
b. DRUG-FREE Workplace Guidelines; DO NO, 53-03,
Series of 2003
c. SARS; DO NO. 47-03
d. Disability under the Magna Carta for Disabled
Persons
179. Antiquina v. Magsaysay Maritime Corp
Facts: Wilfredo Y. Antiquina was hired, through
respondent manning agency Magsaysay Maritime
Corporation (MMC), to serve as Third Engineer on the
vessel, M/T Star Langanger, which was owned and
operated by respondent Masterbulk Pte., Ltd. (Masterbulk).
According to petitioner's contract of employment,[4] his
engagement on the vessel was for a period of nine (9)
months at a salary of US$936.00 per month. Petitioner
suffered a fracture on his lower left arm after a part fell
down on him. After first aid treatment was given to
petitioner, he was brought to a hospital and was
diagnosed with "fractura 1/3 proximala cubitus stg."
On October 1, 2000, petitioner was signed off the vessel at
Port Said, Egypt and was repatriated to the Philippines.
Again, petitioner was examined at the Metropolitan
Hospital and Dr. Lim subsequently issued a medical report
confirming that petitioner has an undisplaced fracture of the
left ulna.
Despite several months of physical therapy, petitioner
noticed that his arm still had not healed and he had
difficulty straightening his arm. Another company
designated doctor, Dr. Tiong Sam Lim, evaluated
petitioner's condition and advised that petitioner undergo a
bone grafting procedure. Petitioner allegedly reacted with
fear and decided not to have the operation.
After formally informing respondents of his decision to
forego the medical procedure recommended by the
company physician, petitioner filed a complaint for
permanent disability benefits, sickness allowance,
damages and attorney's fees against herein respondents.
Dr. Rimando Saguin and Dr. Antonio A. Pobre who both
issued medical certificates, finding to the effect that
petitioner was no longer fit for sea service and
recommending a partial permanent disability grade of 11
under the POEA Schedule of Disability Grading. However,
petitioner claimed that, notwithstanding his own medical
evidence regarding his disability grade, he was entitled to
the purportedly superior benefits provided for under
Section 20.1.5 of respondents' collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) with the Associated Marine Officers' and
Seamen's Union of the Philippines (AMOSUP).
Issue: W/N petitioner is entitled for permanent disability
benefits?
Ruling: Yes. While it is true that [petitioner's] claim for
disability is premature, the fact remains that there is still a
work-connected injury and the attendant loss or impairment
of his earning capacity that need to be compensated.
NOTE: Compensation was limited to grade 11 under POEA
Schedule of Disability Grading for petitioner’s failure to
present the alleged CBA.
180. COASTAL SAFEWAY MARINE SERVICES V.
ESGUERRA
(2000 POEA-SEC Section 20-B (3) – EXAMINATION OF
COMPANY DESIGNATED PHYSICIAN IS MANDATORY)
Facts: Elmer T. Esguerra (Esguerra) was hired by Coastal
Safeway Marine Services, Inc. (CSMSI) sometime in 2003
as Third Mate for the M/V Mr. Nelson, an ocean-going
vessel under the flag of the United Arab Emirates (UAE)
owned by its foreign principal, Canada & Middle East
General Trading (CMEGT). Subject to the provisions of the
POEA-SEC, the contract of employment executed by the
parties on 9 May 2003 provided a term of one (1) year and
a basic monthly salary of US$800.00 for a 48-hour work-
week, with provisions for overtime pay and vacation leave
with pay. Rather than the aforesaid vessel, however, it
appears that, on 13 May 2003, Esguerra, as Second
Officer, eventually boarded the vessel M/V Gondwana
which was likewise manned by CSMSI on behalf of Nabeel
Ship management Ltd. Fze. (NSLF).
On 28 June 2003 or after forty six (46) days of shipboard
employment, Esguerra requested medical attention for
back and chest pains while M/V Gondwana was docked at
Port Jebel Ali, UAE. Examined on 5 July 2003 at the Jebel
Ali Medical Centre, Esguerra was declared "not fit for
work until complete cardiac evaluation is done" and
"advised to rest until then" by Dr. Zarga S. Tulmar.
Thereafter, Esguerra insisted on going home on the ground
that he had been rendered unfit for work. Alleging that he
had yet to receive his salary for June 2003 .On 7 July
2003, Esguerra went to the Philippine Heart Center (PHC),
the Philippine Orthopedic Hospital (POH) and the
Philippine General Hospital (PGH) for medical evaluation
and treatment.
On 16 July 2003, Esguerra filed against CSMSI, its
president, Benedicto C. Morcilla (Morcilla), and CMEGT,
the complaint for medical reimbursement, sickness
allowance, permanent disability benefits, damages and
attorney fees before the arbitral level of the NLRC.
Subsequent to the filing of said complaint, Dr. Vicaldo and
Dr. Saguin of the PGH issued separate medical
certificates both declaring Esguerra unfit for work.
In refutation, CSMSI, Morcilla and CMEGT averred that the
tests administered on Esguerra at the Jebel Ali Medical
Centre revealed that he was in good health; and, that
disregarding the finding that he continued to be fit for work,
Esguerra insisted on his repatriation and filed his complaint
without submitting himself to a post-employment medical
examination within three (3) working days upon his return.
The Labor Arbiter, as affirmed by the NLRC, dismissed the
complaint on the ground that Esguerra failed to prove his
disability and to submit himself to a post-employment
medical examination by a company-designated physician,
pursuant to Section 20-B of the POEA SEC.
Through a petition for certiorari with the CA, Esguerra
received a favorable decision. The CA reversed the NLRC
ruling and CSMSI subsequent motion for reconsideration
was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals
misappreciated the evidence and applied the POEA
Standard Employment Contract of 1996 instead of the
Revised Terms and Conditions for Seafarers on Board
Ocean-Going vessels, which is part and parcel of the
Contract of Employment entered into between Esguerra
and the petitioner on May 9, 2003?
HELD: The petition is impressed with merit.
Viewed in light of the fact that Esguerra contract of
employment was executed on 9 May 2003, CSMSI
correctly faults the CA for applying POEA Memorandum
Circular No. 055-96 instead of the 2000 POEA-SEC which
took effect on 25 June 2000. Deemed written in the
seafarer's contract of employment, the 2000 POEA-SEC
like its predecessor was designed primarily for the
protection and benefit of Filipino seamen in the pursuit of
their employment on board ocean-going vessels. Section
20-B (3) thereof has been interpreted to mean that it is the
company-designated physician who is entrusted with the
task of assessing the seaman's disability, whether total or
partial, due to either injury or illness, during the term of the
latter's employment.
Concededly, this does not mean that the assessment of
said physician is final, binding or conclusive on the
claimant, the labor tribunal or the courts. Should he be so
minded, the seafarer has the prerogative to request a
second opinion and to consult a physician of his choice
regarding his ailment or injury, in which case the medical
report issued by the latter shall be evaluated by the labor
tribunal and the court, based on its inherent merit. For the
seaman claim to prosper, however, it is mandatory that he
should be examined by a company-designated physician
within three days from his repatriation. Failure to comply
with this mandatory reporting requirement without
justifiable cause shall result in forfeiture of the right to
claim the compensation and disability benefits
provided under the POEA-SEC.
There is no dispute regarding the fact that Esguerra had
altogether failed to comply with the above-discussed
mandatory reporting requirement.
181. MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORP VS. LOBUSTA
(PERMANENT VS. TEMPORARY DISABILITY –
240DAYS)
FACTS:
Respondent Oberto S. Lobusta is a seaman who has
worked for Magsaysay Maritime Corporation since 1994. In
March 1998, he was hired again as Able Seaman by
Magsaysay Maritime Corporation. Lobusta boarded MV
"Fossanger" on March 16, 1998. After two months, he
complained of breathing difficulty and back pain.
On May 12, 1998, while the vessel was in Singapore,
Lobusta was admitted at Gleneagles Maritime Medical
Center and was diagnosed to be suffering from severe
acute bronchial asthma with secondary infection and
lumbosacral muscle strain. Dr. C K Lee certified that
Lobusta was fit for discharge on May 21, 1998, for
repatriation for further treatment.
Upon repatriation, Lobusta was referred to Metropolitan
Hospital. The medical coordinator, Dr. Robert Lim, issued
numerous medical reports regarding Lobustas condition.
Upon reexamination by the Orthopedic Surgeon on August
11, 1998, he opined that Lobusta needs surgery, called
decompression laminectomy, which was done on August
30, 1998.
As the parties failed to reach a settlement as to the amount
to which Lobusta is entitled, Lobusta filed on October 2,
2000, a complaint for disability/medical benefits against
petitioners before the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC).
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision ordering petitioners
to pay Lobusta (a) US$2,060 as medical allowance, (b)
US$20,154 as disability benefits, and (c) 5% of the awards
as attorneys fees. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the LA
decision. Unsatisfied, Lobusta brought the case to the CA.
The CA granted the petition for certiorari of Lobusta and
modified the findings of the NLRC. As aforesaid, the CA
declared that Lobusta is suffering from permanent total
disability and increased the award of disability benefits in
his favor to US$60,000. Hence, this petition.
Petitioners argue that the CA erred in applying the
provisions of the Labor Code instead of the provisions
of the POEA contract in determining Lobustas
disability, and in ruling that the mere lapse of 120 days
entitles Lobusta to total and permanent disability benefits.
The CA allegedly erred also in holding them liable for
attorneys fees, despite the absence of legal and factual
bases.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in in applying the
provisions of the Labor Code instead of the provisions of
the POEA contract in determining Lobustas disability, and
in ruling that the mere lapse of 120 days entitles Lobusta to
total and permanent disability benefits.
HELD: No. CA Decision Affirmed.
Labor Law
Standard terms of the POEA Standard Employment
Contract agreed upon are intended to be read and
understood in accordance with Philippine laws, particularly,
Articles 191 to 193 of the Labor Code, as amended, and
the applicable implementing rules and regulations in case
of any dispute, claim or grievance.
Petitioners are mistaken that it is only the POEA Standard
Employment Contract that must be considered in
determining Lobusta's disability. In Palisoc v. Easways
Marine, Inc., we said that whether the Labor Codes
provision on permanent total disability applies to seafarers
is already a settled matter.
In Palisoc, we cited the earlier case of Remigio v. National
Labor Relations Commission where we said (1) that the
standard employment contract for seafarers was
formulated by the POEA pursuant to its mandate under
Executive Order No. 247 "to secure the best terms and
conditions of employment of Filipino contract workers and
ensure compliance therewith," and "to promote and protect
the well-being of Filipino workers overseas"; (2) that
Section 29 of the 1996 POEA Standard Employment
Contract itself provides that all rights and obligations of the
parties to the contract, including the annexes thereof, shall
be governed by the laws of the Republic of the Philippines,
international conventions, treaties and covenants where
the Philippines is a signatory; and (3) that even without this
provision, a contract of labor is so impressed with public
interest that the Civil Code expressly subjects it to the
special laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes
and lockouts, closed shop, wages, working conditions,
hours of labor and similar subjects.
Temporary total disability only becomes permanent
when so declared by the company physician within the
periods he is allowed to do so, or upon the expiration of the
maximum 240-day medical treatment period without a
declaration of either fitness to work or the existence of a
permanent disability.
Applying the foregoing considerations, we agree with the
CA that Lobusta suffered permanent total disability. On this
point, the NLRC ruling was not in accord with law and
jurisprudence.
Upon repatriation, Lobusta was first examined by the
Pulmonologist and Orthopedic Surgeon on May 22, 1998.
The maximum 240-day (8-month) medical-treatment period
expired, but no declaration was made that Lobusta is fit to
work. Nor was there a declaration of the existence of
Lobustas permanent disability. On February 16, 1999,
Lobusta was still prescribed medications for his
lumbosacral pain and was advised to return for
reevaluation. May 22, 1998 to February 16, 1999 is 264
days or 6 days short of 9 months.
In fact, the CA has found that Lobusta was not able to work
again as a seaman and that his disability is permanent "as
he has been unable to work since 14 May 1998 to the
present or for more than 120 days." This period is more
than eight years, counted until the CA decided the case in
August 2006. On the CA ruling that Lobustas disability is
permanent since he was unable to work "for more than 120
days," we have clarified in Vergara that this "temporary
total disability period may be extended up to a maximum of
240 days."
Thus, we affirm the award to Lobusta of US$60,000 as
permanent total disability benefits, the maximum award
under Section 30 and 30-A of the 1996 POEA Standard
Employment Contract. We also affirm the award of
US$2,060 as sickness allowance which is not contested
and appears to have been accepted by the parties.
182. PHILASIA SHIPPING AGENCY CORP. VS. ANDRES
G. TOMACRUZ
Facts: Andres G. Tomacruz (Tomacruz) was a seafarer,
whose services were engaged by PHILASIA Shipping
Agency Corp., (PHILASIA) on behalf of Intermodal
Shipping Inc. (petitioners) as Oiler #1 on board the vessel
M/V Saligna.4A twelve-month Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) Contract of
Employment was duly signed by the parties on January 9,
2002.5
This was preceded by four similar contracts, which
Tomacruz was able to complete for the petitioners, aboard
different vessels. For all five contracts, Tomacruz was
required to undergo a pre-employment medical
examination and obtain a "fit to work" rating before he
could be deployed.6
Having been issued a clean bill of health, Tomacruz
boarded M/V Saligna on January 15, 2002 and performed
his duties without any incident. However, sometime in
September 2002, during the term of his last contract,
Tomacruz noticed blood in his urine. Tomacruz
immediately reported this to the Ship Captain, who referred
him to a doctor in Japan. Tomacruz was subjected to
several check-ups and ultrasounds, which revealed a
"stone" in his right kidney. Despite such diagnosis, no
medical certificate was issued; thus, he was allowed to
continue working.7
Eventually, Tomacruz was repatriated to the Philippines
and sent to Micah Medical Clinic & Diagnostic Laboratory.
The November 19, 2002 KUB Ultrasound report of the
clinic revealed that he had stones in both his kidneys.8
Referred by Micah Medical Clinic to Dr. Nicomedes Cruz,
the company-designated physician, Tomacruz went
through more tests, medications, and treatments. On July
25, 2003, Dr. Cruz declared Tomacruz fit to work despite a
showing that there were stones about 0.4 cm in size found
in both his kidneys, and there was the possibility of
hematoma.9
Intending to get his sixth contract, Tomacruz, armed with
the declaration that he was fit to work, proceeded to the
office of the petitioners to seek employment. However, he
was told by PHILASIA that because of the huge amount
that was spent on his treatment, their insurance company
did not like his services anymore.
Dr. Efren R. Vicaldo declared respondent unfit to work as a
seaman.
Months later, or on November 3, 2003, Tomacruz filed a
complaint for disability benefits, sickness wages, damages,
and attorney’s fees against the petitioners.
LA in favor of petitioner. NLRC Affirm. CA reversed. Hence,
the petition.
ISSUE: W/N respondent is entitled to disability benefits?
Ruling: Yes. Entitlement of seafarers to disability benefits
is governed not only by medical findings but also by
contract and by law.
Rule X, Section 2 of the Rules and Regulations
implementing Book IV of the Labor Code:
SEC. 2. Period of entitlement. – (a) The income
benefit shall be paid beginning on the first day of
such disability. If caused by an injury or sickness
it shall not be paid longer than 120 consecutive
days except where such injury or sickness still
requires medical attendance beyond 120 days
but not to exceed 240 days from onset of
disability in which case benefit for temporary total
disability shall be paid. However, the System
may declare the total and permanent status at
any time after 120 days of continuous temporary
total disability as may be warranted by the
degree of actual loss or impairment of physical or
mental functions as determined by the System.
183. DAVID, ET. AL. VS. OSG SHIP MANAGEMENT, ET.
AL.
(REASONABLE LINKAGE)
FACTS:
Petitioner Jessie David (David) entered into a six-month
Contract of Employment with respondent OSG
Shipmanagement Manila, Inc. (OSG Manila), for and in
behalf of its principal Michaelmar Shipping Services, Inc.,
(Michaelmar) as a Third Officer of the crude tanker M/T
Raphael. Part of his duties as a Third Officer of the crude
tanker involved overseeing the loading, stowage, securing
and unloading of cargoes. David was also frequently
exposed to the crude oil that M/T Raphael was carrying.
Barely six months into his employment, David complained
of an intolerable pain on his left foot. Thus, David was
repatriated to the Philippines to undergo treatment.
Immediately after his return to the country, OSG Manila
referred David to the company-designated physician, Dr.
Robert Lim, who referred him to the Cardinal Santos
Medical Center for a Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI).
The pathology report showed that David was suffering from
malignant fibrous histiocytoma (MFH) in his left thigh.
Due to his condition, David underwent chemotherapy.
However, despite several requests, OSG Manila and
Michaelmar refused to shoulder Davids expenses and
medication.
Hence, David filed a complaint to recover his disability
benefits. The LA ruled in favor of David. The NLRC
affirmed the Decision of the LA. However, the CA ruled
against Davids entitlement to the benefits he claimed.
ISSUE: Whether or not Davids illness is compensable?
HELD: The petition has merit.
In this case, David suffered from malignant fibrous
histiocytoma (MFH) in his left thigh. MFH is not one of the
diseases enumerated under Sec. 32 of the POEA-SEC.
However, Sec. 20(B)(4) of the POEA-SEC clearly
established a disputable presumption in favor of the
compensability of an illness suffered by a seafarer during
the term of his contract. This disputable presumption
works in favor of the employee pursuant to the mandate
under Executive Order No. (EO) 247 dated July 21, 1987
under which the POEA-SEC was created: "to secure the
best terms and conditions of employment of Filipino
contract workers and ensure compliance therewith" and "to
promote and protect the well-being of Filipino workers
overseas." Hence, unless contrary evidence is presented
by the seafarers employer/s, this disputable presumption
stands.
David showed that part of his duties as a Third Officer of
the crude tanker M/T Raphael involved "overseeing the
loading, stowage, securing and unloading of cargoes." As a
necessary corollary, David was frequently exposed to the
crude oil that M/T Raphael was carrying. The chemical
components of crude oil include, among others, sulphur,
vanadium and arsenic compounds. Hydrogen sulphide and
carbon monoxide may also be encountered, while benzene
is a naturally occurring chemical in crude oil. It has been
regarded that these hazardous chemicals can possibly
contribute to the formation of cancerous masses.

It is not necessary that the nature of the employment

be the sole and only reason for the illness suffered by
the seafarer. It is sufficient that there is a reasonable
linkage between the disease suffered by the employee
and his work to lead a rational mind to conclude that
his work may have contributed to the establishment or,
at the very least, aggravation of any pre-existing
condition he might have had.