G.R. No.

182498 February 16, 2010

GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, JR., Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); Police
Chief Superintendent RAUL CASTAÑEDA, Chief, Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group (CIDG); Police Senior Superintendent LEONARDO A.
ESPINA, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response (PACER); and
GEN. JOEL R. GOLTIAO, Regional Director of ARMM, PNP, Petitioners,
vs.
MARY JEAN B. TAGITIS, herein represented by ATTY. FELIPE P. ARCILLA,
JR., Attorney-in-Fact, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

BRION, J.:

We resolve in this Resolution the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioners
-- Gen. Avelino I. Razon, former Chief of the Philippine National Police
(PNP);1 Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal, former Chief of the Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group (CIDG), PNP;2 Police Senior Superintendent Leonardo A. Espina,
former Chief of the Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response (PACER),
PNP;3 and Gen. Joel Goltiao, former Regional Director of the PNP-Autonomous
Region of Muslim Mindanao4 (petitioners) -- addressing our Decision of December
3, 2009. This Decision affirmed the Court of Appeals’ (CA) decision of March 7,
2008 confirming the enforced disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis
(Tagitis) and granting the Writ of Amparo.

Our December 3, 2009 Decision was based, among other considerations, on the
finding that Col. Julasirim Ahadin Kasim (Col. Kasim) informed the respondent
Mary Jean Tagitis (respondent) and her friends that her husband had been under
surveillance since January 2007 because an informant notified the authorities,
through a letter, that Tagitis was a liaison for the JI;5 that he was "in good hands"
and under custodial investigation for complicity with the JI after he was seen talking
to one Omar Patik and a certain "Santos" of Bulacan, a "Balik Islam" charged with
terrorism (Kasim evidence).

We considered Col. Kasim’s information, together with the consistent denials by

government authorities of any complicity in the disappearance of Tagitis, the
dismissive approach of the police authorities to the report of the disappearance,
as well as the haphazard investigations conducted that did not translate into any
meaningful results, to be indicative of government complicity in the disappearance
of Tagitis (for purposes of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo).
We explained that although the Kasim evidence was patently hearsay (and was
thus incompetent and inadmissible under our rules of evidence), the unique
evidentiary difficulties posed by enforced disappearance cases compel us to adopt
standards that were appropriate and responsive to the evidentiary difficulties
faced. We noted that while we must follow the substantial evidence rule, we must
also observe flexibility in considering the evidence that we shall take into account.
Thus, we introduced a new evidentiary standard for Writ of Amparo cases in this
wise:

The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all the pieces of evidence
adduced in their totality, and to consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible
under our usual rules to be admissible if it is consistent with the admissible
evidence adduced. In other words, we reduce our rules to the most basic test of
reason – i.e., to the relevance of the evidence to the issue at hand and its
consistency with all the other pieces of adduced evidence, Thus, even hearsay
evidence can be admitted if it satisfies this minimum test. [Emphasis in the original]

We held further that the Kasim evidence was crucial to the resolution of the present
case for two reasons: first, it supplied the gaps that were never looked into or
clarified by police investigation; and second, it qualified a simple missing person
report into an enforced disappearance case by injecting the element of
participation by agents of the State and thus brought into question how the State
reacted to the disappearance.

Based on these considerations, we held that the government in general, through

the PNP and the PNP-CIDG, and in particular, the Chiefs of these organizations,
together with Col. Kasim, were fully accountable6 for the enforced disappearance
of Tagitis. Specifically, we held Col. Kasim accountable for his failure to disclose
under oath information relating to the enforced disappearance; for the purpose of
this accountability, we ordered that Col. Kasim be impleaded as a party to this
case. Similarly, we also held the PNP accountable for the suppression of vital
information that Col. Kasim could, but did not, provide with the same obligation of
disclosure that Col. Kasim carries.

The Motion for Reconsideration

The petitioners cited two grounds in support of their Motion for Reconsideration.

First, the petitioners argue that there was no sufficient evidence to conclude that
Col. Kasim’s disclosure unequivocally points to some government complicity in the
disappearance of Tagitis. Specifically, the petitioners contend that this Court erred
in unduly relying on the raw information given to Col. Kasim by a personal
intelligence "asset" without any other evidence to support it. The petitioners also
point out that the Court misapplied its cited cases (Secretary of Defense v.
Manalo,7 Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras,8 and Timurtas v. Turkey9) to support
its December 3, 2009 decision; in those cases, more than one circumstance
pointed to the complicity of the government and its agents. The petitioners
emphasize that in the present case, the respondent only presented a "token piece
of evidence" that points to Col. Kasim as the source of information that Tagitis was
under custodial investigation for having been suspected as a "terrorist supporter."
This, according to the petitioners, cannot be equated to the substantial evidence
required by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.10

Second, the petitioners contend that Col. Kasim’s death renders impossible
compliance with the Court’s directive in its December 3, 2009 decision that Col.
Kasim be impleaded in the present case and held accountable with the obligation
to disclose information known to him and to his "assets" on the enforced
disappearance of Tagitis. The petitioners alleged that Col. Kasim was killed in an
encounter with the Abu Sayaff Group on May 7, 2009. To prove Col. Kasim’s death,
the petitioners attached to their motion a copy of an article entitled "Abus kill Sulu
police director" published by the Philippine Daily Inquirer on May 8, 2009.11 This
article alleged that "Senior Supt. Julasirim Kasim, his brother Rosalin, a police
trainee, and two other police officers were killed in a fire fight with Abu Sayyaf
bandits that started at about 1 p.m. on Thursday, May 7, 2009 at the boundaries
of Barangays Kulasi and Bulabog in Maimbung town, Sulu." The petitioners also
attached an official copy of General Order No. 1089 dated May 15, 2009 issued by
the PNP National Headquarters, indicating that "PS SUPT [Police Senior
Superintendent] Julasirim Ahadin Kasim 0-05530, PRO ARMM, is posthumously
retired from PNP service effective May 8, 2009."12Additionally, the petitioners point
out that the intelligence "assets" who supplied the information that Tagitis was
under custodial investigation were personal to Col. Kasim; hence, the movants can
no longer comply with this Court’s order to disclose any information known to Col.
Kasim and his "assets."

The Court’s Ruling

We hold that our directive to implead Col. Kasim as a party to the present case
has been rendered moot and academic by his death. Nevertheless, we resolve to
deny the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

Paragraph (e) of the dispositive portion of our December 3, 2009 decision directs:

e. Ordering Colonel Julasirim Ahadin Kasim impleaded in this case and holding
him accountable with the obligation to disclose information known to him and to
his "assets" in relation with the enforced disappearance of Engineer Morced N.
Tagitis;
Undisputably, this directive can no longer be enforced, and has been rendered
moot and academic, given Col. Kasim's demise. His intervening death, however,
does not necessarily signify the loss of the information Col. Kasim may have left
behind, particularly the network of "assets" he utilized while he was in the service.
Intelligence gathering is not an activity conducted in isolation, and involves an
interwoven network of informants existing on the basis of symbiotic relationships
with the police and the military. It is not farfetched that a resourceful investigator,
utilizing the extraordinary diligence that the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo requires,13 can still access or reconstruct the information Col. Kasim
received from his "asset" or network of assets during his lifetime.

The extinction of Col. Kasim’s personal accountability and obligation to disclose

material information, known to him and his assets, does not also erase the burden
of disclosure and investigation that rests with the PNP and the CIDG. Lest this
Court be misunderstood, we reiterate that our holding in our December 3, 2009
Decision that the PNP -- through the incumbent PNP Chief; and the PNP-CIDG,
through its incumbent Chief -- are directly responsible14 for the disclosure of
material facts known to the government and to their offices regarding the
disappearance of Tagitis; and that the conduct of proper investigation using
extraordinary diligence still subsists. These are continuing obligations that will not
truly be terminated until the enforced disappearance of the victim, Engr. Morced
N. Tagitis, is fully addressed by the responsible or accountable parties, as we
directed in our Decision.

We now turn to the petitioners’ substantial challenge to the merits of our December
3, 2009 decision.

We see no merit in the petitioners’ submitted position that no sufficient evidence

exists to support the conclusion that the Kasim evidence unequivocally points to
some government complicity in the disappearance. Contrary to the petitioners’
claim that our conclusions only relied on Col. Kasim’s report, our Decision plainly
and pointedly considered other evidence supporting our conclusion, particularly
the consistent denials by government authorities of any complicity in the
disappearance of Tagitis; the dismissive approach of the police authorities to the
report of the disappearance; and the conduct of haphazard investigations that did
not translate into any meaningful results. We painstakingly ruled:

To give full meaning to our Constitution and the rights it protects, we hold that, as
in Velasquez, we should at least take a close look at the available evidence to
determine the correct import of every piece of evidence – even of those usually
considered inadmissible under the general rules of evidence – taking into account
the surrounding circumstances and the test of reason that we can use as basic
minimum admissibility requirement. In the present case, we should at least
determine whether the Kasim evidence before us is relevant and meaningful to the
disappearance of Tagistis and reasonably consistent with other evidence in the
case.

xxx

The Kasim evidence assumes critical materiality given the dearth of direct
evidence on the above aspects of the case, as it supplies the gaps that were never
looked into and clarified by police investigation. It is the evidence, too, that colors
a simple missing person report into an enforced disappearance case, as it injects
the element of participation by agents of the State and thus brings into question
how the State reacted to the disappearance.

xxx

We glean from all these pieces of evidence and developments a consistency in the
government’s denial of any complicity in the disappearance of Tagitis, disrupted
only by the report made by Col. Kasim to the respondent at Camp Katitipan. Even
Col. Kasim, however, eventually denied that he ever made the disclosure that
Tagitis was under custodial investigation for complicity in terrorism. Another
distinctive trait that runs through these developments is the government’s
dismissive approach to the disappearance, starting from the initial response by the
Jolo police to Kunnong’s initial reports of the disappearance, to the responses
made to the respondent when she herself reported and inquired about her
husband’s disappearance, and even at Task Force Tagitis itself.

As the CA found through Task Force Tagitis, the investigation was at best
haphazard since the authorities were looking for a man whose picture they initially
did not even secure. The returns and reports made to the CA fared no better, as
the CIDG efforts themselves were confined to searching for custodial records of
Tagitis in their various departments and divisions. To point out the obvious, if the
abduction of Tagitis was a "black" operation because it was unrecorded or officially
unauthorized, no record of custody would ever appear in the CIDG records; Tagitis,
too, would not be detained in the usual police or CIDG detention places. In sum,
none of the reports on record contains any meaningful results or details on the
depth and extent of the investigation made. To be sure, reports of top police
officials indicating the personnel and units they directed to investigate can never
constitute exhaustive and meaningful investigation, or equal detailed investigative
reports of the activities undertaken to search for Tagitis. Indisputably, the police
authorities from the very beginning failed to come up to the extraordinary diligence
that the Amparo Rule requires. [Emphasis in the original]
Likewise, we see no merit in the petitioners’ claim that the Kasim evidence does
not amount to substantial evidence required by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
This is not a new issue; we extensively and thoroughly considered and resolved it
in our December 3, 2009 Decision. At this point, we need not go into another full
discussion of the justifications supporting an evidentiary standard specific to the
Writ of Amparo. Suffice it to say that we continue to adhere to the substantial
evidence rule that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires, with some adjustments
for flexibility in considering the evidence presented. When we ruled that hearsay
evidence (usually considered inadmissible under the general rules of evidence)
may be admitted as the circumstances of the case may require, we did not thereby
dispense with the substantial evidence rule; we merely relaxed the evidentiary rule
on the admissibility of evidence, maintaining all the time the standards of reason
and relevance that underlie every evidentiary situation. This, we did, by
considering the totality of the obtaining situation and the consistency of the hearsay
evidence with the other available evidence in the case.

We also cannot agree with the petitioners’ contention that we misapplied Secretary
of Defense v. Manalo,15Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras,16 and Timurtas v.
Turkey17 to support our December 3, 2009 decision. The petitioners make this
claim with the view that in these cases, more than one circumstance pointed to the
government or its agents as the parties responsible for the disappearance, while
we can only point to the Kasim evidence. A close reading of our December 3, 2009
Decision shows that it rests on more than one basis.

At the risk of repetition, we stress that other pieces of evidence point the way
towards our conclusion, particularly the unfounded and consistent denials by
government authorities of any complicity in the disappearance; the dismissive
approach of the police to the report of the disappearance; and the haphazard
handling of the investigation that did not produce any meaningful results. In cruder
but more understandable language, the run-around given to the respondent and
the government responses to the request for meaningful investigation, considered
in the light of the Kasim evidence, pointed to the conclusion that the Tagitis affair
carried a "foul smell" indicative of government complicity or, at the very least, an
attempt at cover-up and concealment. This is the situation that the Writ of Amparo
specifically seeks to address.

Manalo, Velasquez Rodriguez and Timurtas, read in proper perspective, fully

support our findings and conclusions in this case.

Manalo is different from Tagitis in terms of their factual settings, as enforced

disappearance was no longer a problem in that case. The enforced disappearance
of the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo effectively ended when they
escaped from captivity and surfaced, while Tagitis is still nowhere to be found and
remains missing more than two years after his reported disappearance. An
Amparo situation subsisted in Manalo, however, because of the continuing threat
to the brothers’ right to security; the brothers claimed that since the persons
responsible for their enforced disappearance were still at large and had not been
held accountable, the former were still under the threat of being once again
abducted, kept captive or even killed, which threat constituted a direct violation of
their right to security of person. In ruling that substantial evidence existed to
support the conclusion that the respondents’ right to security had been violated,
the Court not only considered the respondents’ affidavit and testimony which
positively identified the perpetrators, but also noted other evidence showing the
ineffective investigation and protection on the part of the military. The Court
significantly found that:

Next, the violation of the right to security as protection by the government. Apart
from the failure of military elements to provide protection to respondents by
themselves perpetrating the abduction, detention, and torture, they also miserably
failed in conducting an effective investigation of respondents’ abduction as
revealed by the testimony and investigation report of petitioners’ own witness, Lt.
Col. Ruben Jimenez, Provost Marshall of the 7th Infantry Division.

The one-day investigation conducted by Jimenez was very limited, superficial, and
one-sided. He merely relied on the Sworn Statements of the six implicated
members of the CAFGU and civilians whom he met in the investigation for the first
time. He was present at the investigation when his subordinate Lingad was taking
the sworn statements, but he did not propound a single question to ascertain the
veracity of their statements or their credibility. He did not call for other witnesses
to test the alibis given by the six implicated persons nor for the family or neighbors
of the respondents.

In his affidavit, petitioner Secretary of National Defense attested that in a

Memorandum Directive dated October 31, 2007, he issued a policy directive
addressed to the AFP Chief of Staff, that the AFP should adopt rules of action in
the event the writ of amparo is issued by a competent court against any members
of the AFP, which should essentially include verification of the identity of the
aggrieved party; recovery and preservation of relevant evidence; identification of
witnesses and securing statements from them; determination of the cause,
manner, location and time of death or disappearance; identification and
apprehension of the person or persons involved in the death or disappearance;
and bringing of the suspected offenders before a competent court. Petitioner AFP
Chief of Staff also submitted his own affidavit attesting that he received the above
directive of respondent Secretary of National Defense and that acting on this
directive, he immediately caused to be issued a directive to the units of the AFP
for the purpose of establishing the circumstances of the alleged disappearance
and the recent reappearance of the respondents, and undertook to provide results
of the investigations to respondents. To this day, however, almost a year after the
policy directive was issued by petitioner Secretary of National Defense on October
31, 2007, respondents have not been furnished the results of the investigation
which they now seek through the instant petition for a writ of amparo.

Under these circumstances, there is substantial evidence to warrant the conclusion

that there is a violation of respondents’ right to security as a guarantee of protection
by the government. [Emphasis supplied]18

Similarly in Velasquez Rodriguez, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights

(IACHR) acknowledged that when the Honduran Government carried out or
tolerated enforced disappearances, the police customarily used a distinctive form
of kidnapping. Consequently, the IACHR presumed that Velasquez disappeared
at the "hands of or with the acquiescence of those officials within the framework of
that practice." Moreover, the IACHR found that negative inferences may be drawn
from the fact that the government failed to investigate or to inquire into his
disappearance, and thwarted the attempts by the victim’s family to do so; these
according to the Court strongly suggested the government’s involvement in the
disappearance, even if there was no direct evidence indicating that the government
kidnapped Velasquez.19 The Court thus held:201avvphi1

iii. In the case of Manfredo Velásquez, there were the same type of denials by his
captors and the Armed Forces, the same omissions of the latter and of the
Government in investigating and revealing his whereabouts, and the same
ineffectiveness of the courts where three writs of HABEAS corpus and two criminal
complaints were brought ( testimony of Miguel Angel Pavón Salazar, Ramón
Custodio López, Zenaida Velásquez, press clippings and documentary evidence
).

h. There is no evidence in the record that Manfredo Velásquez had disappeared

in order to join subversive groups, other than a letter from the Mayor of Langue,
which contained rumors to that effect. The letter itself shows that the Government
associated him with activities it considered a threat to national security. However,
the Government did not corroborate the view expressed in the letter with any other
evidence. Nor is there any evidence that he was kidnapped by common criminals
or other persons unrelated to the practice of disappearances existing at that time."

148. Based upon the above, the Court finds that the following facts have been
proven in this proceeding: (1) a practice of disappearances carried out or tolerated
by Honduran officials existed between 1981 and 1984; ( 2) Manfredo Velásquez
disappeared at the hands of or with the acquiescence of those officials within the
framework of that practice; and (3) the Government of Honduras failed to
guarantee the human rights affected by that practice.

Finally, in Timurtas, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) altered the
prevailing jurisprudence by permitting a lesser evidentiary burden in cases of
enforced disappearances. The ECHR dismissed the need for direct evidence
previously held necessary in the leading case of Kurt v. Turkey,21 and instead
permitted the use of circumstantial evidence to establish a violation of the right to
life. It stated that "whether the failure on the part of authorities to provide a plausible
explanation as to a detainee’s fate, in the absence of a body, might raise issues
under Article 2 of the Convention (right to life), will depend on the circumstances
of the case and, in particular, on the existence of sufficient circumstantial evidence
based on concrete elements, from which it may be concluded to the requisite
standard of proof that the detainee must be presumed to have died in
custody."22 The ECHR found that:23

Noting that more than six and a half years has gone by since Abdulvahap Timurtas’
apprehension and having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, the
Court found that the disappearance of Abdulvahap Timurtas after he had been
taken into detention led, in the circumstances of this case, to a presumption that
he had died. No explanation having been provided by the Government as to what
had happened to him during his detention, the Government was liable for his death
and there was a violation of Article 2 of the Convention. [Emphasis supplied]

Significantly (in the context of the present case), the ECHR also noted that the
inadequacy of the investigation into the disappearance of Timurtas also constituted
a violation of his right to life under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human
Rights.

Thus viewed, common threads that plainly run in the three cited cases are
applicable to the present case. There is the evidence of ineffective investigation
in Manalo and Velasquez Rodriguez, while in all three was the recognition that the
burden of proof must be lowered or relaxed (either through the use of
circumstantial or indirect evidence or even by logical inference); the requirement
for direct evidence to establish that an enforced disappearance occurred -- as the
petitioners effectively suggest -- would render it extremely difficult, if not
impossible, to prove that an individual has been made to disappear. In these lights,
we emphasized in our December 3, 2009 Decision that while the need for
substantial evidence remains the rule, flexibility must be observed where
appropriate (as the Courts in Velasquez Rodriguez and Timurtas did) for the
protection of the precious rights to life, liberty and security. This flexibility, we
noted, requires that "we should take a close look at the available evidence to
determine the correct import of every piece of evidence – even of those usually
considered inadmissible under the general rules of evidence – taking into account
the surrounding circumstances and the test of reason that we can use as basic
minimum admissibility requirement." From these perspectives, we see no error that
we should rectify or reconsider.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we resolve to GRANT the motion to declare

the inclusion of PS/Supt. Julasirim Ahadin Kasim moot and academic, but,
otherwise, DENY the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. Let this case be
remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings as directed in our
Decision of December 3, 2009.

SO ORDERED.
MR. ALEXANDER “LEX” ADONIS, REPRESENTED BY THE CENTER FOR
MEDIA FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY (CMFR), THROUGH ITS
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, MRS. MELINDA QUINTOS-DE JESUS; AND THE
NATIONAL UNION OF JOURNALISTS OF THE PHILIPPINES (NUJP),
THROUGH ITS CHAIRPERSON, MR. JOSE TORRES,
JR., Petitioners, v. SUPERINTENDENT VENANCIO TESORO, DIRECTOR,
DAVAO PRISONS AND PENAL FARM, PANABO CITY, DIGOS, DAVAO DEL
NORTE, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

This is a Petition for the Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus1 under Rule 102
of the 1997 Rules of Court filed by petitioner Alexander Adonis (Adonis), praying
that the Court directs respondent Superintendent Venancio Tesoro (respondent),
Director of the Davao Prisons and Penal Farm, to have the body of the former
brought before this Court and in the alternative, praying for the application of the
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 08-2008,2 which imposes the penalty
of a fine instead of imprisonment in Criminal Case No. 48679-2001.3

Antecedent Facts

In Criminal Case No. 48679-2001, Adonis was convicted by the Regional Trial
Court of Davao City (RTC), Branch 17 for Libel, filed against him by then
Representative Prospero Nograles. He was sentenced to an indeterminate
sentence of five (5) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor maximum, as
minimum penalty, to four (4) years, six (6) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional medium, as maximum penalty.4 He began serving his sentence at the
Davao Prisons and Penal Farm on February 20, 2007. 5

A second libel case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 48719-2001 was likewise filed
against Adonis by Jeanette L. Leuterio, pending before the RTC of Davao City,
Branch 14.6

On December 11, 2007, the Board of Pardons and Parole (BPP) issued an order
for the Discharge on Parole of seven (7) inmates in various jails in the country,
which included Adonis. The said document was received by the City Parole and
Probation Office of Davao on May 2, 2008.7
Meanwhile, on January 25, 2008, this Court issued Administrative Circular No. 08-
2008, the subject of which is the “Guidelines in the Observance of a Rule of
Preference in the Imposition of Penalties in Libel Cases.”

In view of these developments, Adonis, on April 18, 2008 filed with the RTC Branch
17 a Motion to Reopen Case (With Leave of Court),8 praying for his immediate
release from detention and for the modification of his sentence to payment of fine
pursuant to the said Circular.

On May 26, 2008, in Criminal Case No. 48719-2001 before the RTC Branch 14,
Adonis moved for his provisional release from detention. The motion was granted
by Presiding Judge George Omelio in open court and he was allowed to post bail
in the amount of P5,000.9 Subsequently on even date and after Adonis filed a cash
bond and an undertaking,10 the trial court issued an Order directing the Chief of
Davao Penal Colony “to release the accused Alexis Adonis unless he is being held
for some other crimes or offenses.”11 On the same date, the said order was served
to the respondent,12 but the release of Adonis was not effected.

On May 30, 2008, Adonis filed the instant petition for the issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus alleging that his liberty was restrained by the respondent for no
valid reason.13

The respondent consequently filed his Comment.14 Adonis then filed on October
27, 2008 an Urgent Motion to Resolve15 and on November 7, 2008 a Manifestation
and Motion,16 reiterating all his previous prayers.

On February 11, 2009, the Court received the letter from the respondent, informing
the Court that Adonis had been released from confinement on December 23, 2008
after accepting the conditions set forth in his parole and with the advise to report
to the City Parole and Probation Officer of Davao.17

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is without merit.

The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person from
unlawful restraint. The writ exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve
persons from unlawful restraint and as an effective defense of personal freedom.
It is issued only for the lone purpose of obtaining relief for those illegally confined
or imprisoned without sufficient legal basis. It is not issued when the person is in
custody because of a judicial process or a valid judgment. 18
Section 4, Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court provides when a writ must not
be allowed or discharge authorized, to wit:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. - If it appears that the
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of
record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the
judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction
appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of
any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in
this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted
of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful
judgment.
In the instant case, Adonis was convicted for libel by the RTC Branch 17, in
Criminal Case No. 48679-2001. Since his detention was by virtue of a final
judgment, he is not entitled to the Writ of Habeas Corpus. He was serving his
sentence when the BPP granted him parole, along with six (6) others, on
December 11, 2007.19 While it is true that a convict may be released from prison
on parole when he had served the minimum period of his sentence; the pendency
of another criminal case, however, is a ground for the disqualification of such
convict from being released on parole.20 Notably, at the time he was granted the
parole, the second libel case was pending before the RTC Branch 14.21 In fact,
even when the instant petition was filed, Criminal Case No. 48719-01 was still
pending. The issuance of the writ under such circumstance was, therefore,
proscribed. There was basis for the respondent to deny his immediate release at
that time.

Further, Adonis seeks the retroactive application of Administrative Circular No. 08-
2008, citing Fermin v. People,22 where the Court preferred the imposition of the
fine rather than imprisonment under the circumstances of the case. Administrative
Circular No. 08-2008, was issued on January 25, 2008 and provides the
“guidelines in the observance of a rule of preference in the imposition of penalties
in libel cases.” The pertinent portions read as follows:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
All courts and judges concerned should henceforth take note of the foregoing rule
of preference set by the Supreme Court on the matter of the imposition of penalties
for the crime of libel bearing in mind the following principles:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

1. This Administrative Circular does not remove imprisonment as an

alternative penalty for the crime libel under Article 355 of the Revised
Penal Code;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

2. The Judges concerned may, in the exercise of sound discretion, and

taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case,
determine whether the imposition of a fine alone would best serve the
 interests of justice or whether forbearing to impose imprisonment
would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work violence on the
social order, or otherwise be contrary to the imperative of
justice;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

3. Should only a fine be imposed and the accused be unable to pay the
fine, there is no legal obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal
Code provision on subsidiary imprisonment.23 (Emphasis ours)

A clear reading of the Administrative Circular No. 08-2008 and considering the
attendant circumstances of the case, the benefits of the administrative circular can
not be given retroactive effect in Criminal Case No. 48679-2001. It is too late in the
day for Adonis to raise such argument considering that Criminal Case No. 48679-
2001 has already become final and executory; and he had, in fact, already
commenced serving his sentence. Eventually, he was released from confinement
on December 23, 2008 after accepting the conditions of the parole granted to him.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 182498 February 16, 2010

GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, JR., Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); Police Chief Superintendent
RAUL CASTAÑEDA, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG); Police Senior
Superintendent LEONARDO A. ESPINA, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response
(PACER); and GEN. JOEL R. GOLTIAO, Regional Director of ARMM, PNP, Petitioners,
vs.
MARY JEAN B. TAGITIS, herein represented by ATTY. FELIPE P. ARCILLA, JR., Attorney-in-
Fact, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

BRION, J.:

We resolve in this Resolution the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioners -- Gen. Avelino I.
Razon, former Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP);1 Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal, former Chief of
the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG), PNP;2 Police Senior Superintendent Leonardo A.
Espina, former Chief of the Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response (PACER), PNP;3 and Gen. Joel
Goltiao, former Regional Director of the PNP-Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao4 (petitioners) --
addressing our Decision of December 3, 2009. This Decision affirmed the Court of Appeals’ (CA) decision
of March 7, 2008 confirming the enforced disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis (Tagitis) and
granting the Writ of Amparo.

Our December 3, 2009 Decision was based, among other considerations, on the finding that Col. Julasirim
Ahadin Kasim (Col. Kasim) informed the respondent Mary Jean Tagitis (respondent) and her friends that
her husband had been under surveillance since January 2007 because an informant notified the
authorities, through a letter, that Tagitis was a liaison for the JI;5 that he was "in good hands" and under
custodial investigation for complicity with the JI after he was seen talking to one Omar Patik and a certain
"Santos" of Bulacan, a "Balik Islam" charged with terrorism (Kasim evidence).

We considered Col. Kasim’s information, together with the consistent denials by government authorities
of any complicity in the disappearance of Tagitis, the dismissive approach of the police authorities to the
report of the disappearance, as well as the haphazard investigations conducted that did not translate into
any meaningful results, to be indicative of government complicity in the disappearance of Tagitis (for
purposes of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo).
We explained that although the Kasim evidence was patently hearsay (and was thus incompetent and
inadmissible under our rules of evidence), the unique evidentiary difficulties posed by enforced
disappearance cases compel us to adopt standards that were appropriate and responsive to the
evidentiary difficulties faced. We noted that while we must follow the substantial evidence rule, we must
also observe flexibility in considering the evidence that we shall take into account. Thus, we introduced a
new evidentiary standard for Writ of Amparo cases in this wise:

The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in their totality, and
to consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be admissible if it is consistent
with the admissible evidence adduced. In other words, we reduce our rules to the most basic test of reason
– i.e., to the relevance of the evidence to the issue at hand and its consistency with all the other pieces of
adduced evidence, Thus, even hearsay evidence can be admitted if it satisfies this minimum test.
[Emphasis in the original]

We held further that the Kasim evidence was crucial to the resolution of the present case for two reasons:
first, it supplied the gaps that were never looked into or clarified by police investigation; and second, it
qualified a simple missing person report into an enforced disappearance case by injecting the element of
participation by agents of the State and thus brought into question how the State reacted to the
disappearance.

Based on these considerations, we held that the government in general, through the PNP and the PNP-
CIDG, and in particular, the Chiefs of these organizations, together with Col. Kasim, were fully
accountable6 for the enforced disappearance of Tagitis. Specifically, we held Col. Kasim accountable for
his failure to disclose under oath information relating to the enforced disappearance; for the purpose of
this accountability, we ordered that Col. Kasim be impleaded as a party to this case. Similarly, we also
held the PNP accountable for the suppression of vital information that Col. Kasim could, but did not,
provide with the same obligation of disclosure that Col. Kasim carries.

The Motion for Reconsideration

The petitioners cited two grounds in support of their Motion for Reconsideration.

First, the petitioners argue that there was no sufficient evidence to conclude that Col. Kasim’s disclosure
unequivocally points to some government complicity in the disappearance of Tagitis. Specifically, the
petitioners contend that this Court erred in unduly relying on the raw information given to Col. Kasim by a
personal intelligence "asset" without any other evidence to support it. The petitioners also point out that
the Court misapplied its cited cases (Secretary of Defense v. Manalo, 7 Velasquez Rodriguez v.
Honduras,8 and Timurtas v. Turkey9) to support its December 3, 2009 decision; in those cases, more than
one circumstance pointed to the complicity of the government and its agents. The petitioners emphasize
that in the present case, the respondent only presented a "token piece of evidence" that points to Col.
Kasim as the source of information that Tagitis was under custodial investigation for having been
suspected as a "terrorist supporter." This, according to the petitioners, cannot be equated to the
substantial evidence required by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.10

Second, the petitioners contend that Col. Kasim’s death renders impossible compliance with the Court’s
directive in its December 3, 2009 decision that Col. Kasim be impleaded in the present case and held
accountable with the obligation to disclose information known to him and to his "assets" on the enforced
disappearance of Tagitis. The petitioners alleged that Col. Kasim was killed in an encounter with the Abu
Sayaff Group on May 7, 2009. To prove Col. Kasim’s death, the petitioners attached to their motion a copy
of an article entitled "Abus kill Sulu police director" published by the Philippine Daily Inquirer on May 8,
2009.11 This article alleged that "Senior Supt. Julasirim Kasim, his brother Rosalin, a police trainee, and
two other police officers were killed in a fire fight with Abu Sayyaf bandits that started at about 1 p.m. on
Thursday, May 7, 2009 at the boundaries of Barangays Kulasi and Bulabog in Maimbung town, Sulu."
The petitioners also attached an official copy of General Order No. 1089 dated May 15, 2009 issued by
the PNP National Headquarters, indicating that "PS SUPT [Police Senior Superintendent] Julasirim
Ahadin Kasim 0-05530, PRO ARMM, is posthumously retired from PNP service effective May 8,
2009."12Additionally, the petitioners point out that the intelligence "assets" who supplied the information
that Tagitis was under custodial investigation were personal to Col. Kasim; hence, the movants can no
longer comply with this Court’s order to disclose any information known to Col. Kasim and his "assets."

The Court’s Ruling

We hold that our directive to implead Col. Kasim as a party to the present case has been rendered moot
and academic by his death. Nevertheless, we resolve to deny the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration
for lack of merit.

Paragraph (e) of the dispositive portion of our December 3, 2009 decision directs:

e. Ordering Colonel Julasirim Ahadin Kasim impleaded in this case and holding him accountable with the
obligation to disclose information known to him and to his "assets" in relation with the enforced
disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis;

Undisputably, this directive can no longer be enforced, and has been rendered moot and academic, given
Col. Kasim's demise. His intervening death, however, does not necessarily signify the loss of the
information Col. Kasim may have left behind, particularly the network of "assets" he utilized while he was
in the service. Intelligence gathering is not an activity conducted in isolation, and involves an interwoven
network of informants existing on the basis of symbiotic relationships with the police and the military. It is
not farfetched that a resourceful investigator, utilizing the extraordinary diligence that the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo requires,13 can still access or reconstruct the information Col. Kasim received from his "asset"
or network of assets during his lifetime.

The extinction of Col. Kasim’s personal accountability and obligation to disclose material information,
known to him and his assets, does not also erase the burden of disclosure and investigation that rests
with the PNP and the CIDG. Lest this Court be misunderstood, we reiterate that our holding in our
December 3, 2009 Decision that the PNP -- through the incumbent PNP Chief; and the PNP-CIDG,
through its incumbent Chief -- are directly responsible14 for the disclosure of material facts known to the
government and to their offices regarding the disappearance of Tagitis; and that the conduct of proper
investigation using extraordinary diligence still subsists. These are continuing obligations that will not truly
be terminated until the enforced disappearance of the victim, Engr. Morced N. Tagitis, is fully addressed
by the responsible or accountable parties, as we directed in our Decision.

We now turn to the petitioners’ substantial challenge to the merits of our December 3, 2009 decision.

We see no merit in the petitioners’ submitted position that no sufficient evidence exists to support the
conclusion that the Kasim evidence unequivocally points to some government complicity in the
disappearance. Contrary to the petitioners’ claim that our conclusions only relied on Col. Kasim’s report,
our Decision plainly and pointedly considered other evidence supporting our conclusion, particularly the
consistent denials by government authorities of any complicity in the disappearance of Tagitis; the
dismissive approach of the police authorities to the report of the disappearance; and the conduct of
haphazard investigations that did not translate into any meaningful results. We painstakingly ruled:

To give full meaning to our Constitution and the rights it protects, we hold that, as in Velasquez, we should
at least take a close look at the available evidence to determine the correct import of every piece of
evidence – even of those usually considered inadmissible under the general rules of evidence – taking
into account the surrounding circumstances and the test of reason that we can use as basic minimum
admissibility requirement. In the present case, we should at least determine whether the Kasim evidence
before us is relevant and meaningful to the disappearance of Tagistis and reasonably consistent with
other evidence in the case.

xxx

The Kasim evidence assumes critical materiality given the dearth of direct evidence on the above aspects
of the case, as it supplies the gaps that were never looked into and clarified by police investigation. It is
the evidence, too, that colors a simple missing person report into an enforced disappearance case, as it
injects the element of participation by agents of the State and thus brings into question how the State
reacted to the disappearance.

xxx

We glean from all these pieces of evidence and developments a consistency in the government’s denial
of any complicity in the disappearance of Tagitis, disrupted only by the report made by Col. Kasim to the
respondent at Camp Katitipan. Even Col. Kasim, however, eventually denied that he ever made the
disclosure that Tagitis was under custodial investigation for complicity in terrorism. Another distinctive trait
that runs through these developments is the government’s dismissive approach to the disappearance,
starting from the initial response by the Jolo police to Kunnong’s initial reports of the disappearance, to
the responses made to the respondent when she herself reported and inquired about her husband’s
disappearance, and even at Task Force Tagitis itself.

As the CA found through Task Force Tagitis, the investigation was at best haphazard since the authorities
were looking for a man whose picture they initially did not even secure. The returns and reports made to
the CA fared no better, as the CIDG efforts themselves were confined to searching for custodial records
of Tagitis in their various departments and divisions. To point out the obvious, if the abduction of Tagitis
was a "black" operation because it was unrecorded or officially unauthorized, no record of custody would
ever appear in the CIDG records; Tagitis, too, would not be detained in the usual police or CIDG detention
places. In sum, none of the reports on record contains any meaningful results or details on the depth and
extent of the investigation made. To be sure, reports of top police officials indicating the personnel and
units they directed to investigate can never constitute exhaustive and meaningful investigation, or equal
detailed investigative reports of the activities undertaken to search for Tagitis. Indisputably, the police
authorities from the very beginning failed to come up to the extraordinary diligence that the Amparo Rule
requires. [Emphasis in the original]

Likewise, we see no merit in the petitioners’ claim that the Kasim evidence does not amount to substantial
evidence required by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. This is not a new issue; we extensively and
thoroughly considered and resolved it in our December 3, 2009 Decision. At this point, we need not go
into another full discussion of the justifications supporting an evidentiary standard specific to the Writ of
Amparo. Suffice it to say that we continue to adhere to the substantial evidence rule that the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo requires, with some adjustments for flexibility in considering the evidence presented. When
we ruled that hearsay evidence (usually considered inadmissible under the general rules of evidence)
may be admitted as the circumstances of the case may require, we did not thereby dispense with the
substantial evidence rule; we merely relaxed the evidentiary rule on the admissibility of evidence,
maintaining all the time the standards of reason and relevance that underlie every evidentiary situation.
This, we did, by considering the totality of the obtaining situation and the consistency of the hearsay
evidence with the other available evidence in the case.

We also cannot agree with the petitioners’ contention that we misapplied Secretary of Defense v.
Manalo,15Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras,16 and Timurtas v. Turkey17 to support our December 3, 2009
decision. The petitioners make this claim with the view that in these cases, more than one circumstance
pointed to the government or its agents as the parties responsible for the disappearance, while we can
only point to the Kasim evidence. A close reading of our December 3, 2009 Decision shows that it rests
on more than one basis.

At the risk of repetition, we stress that other pieces of evidence point the way towards our conclusion,
particularly the unfounded and consistent denials by government authorities of any complicity in the
disappearance; the dismissive approach of the police to the report of the disappearance; and the
haphazard handling of the investigation that did not produce any meaningful results. In cruder but more
understandable language, the run-around given to the respondent and the government responses to the
request for meaningful investigation, considered in the light of the Kasim evidence, pointed to the
conclusion that the Tagitis affair carried a "foul smell" indicative of government complicity or, at the very
least, an attempt at cover-up and concealment. This is the situation that the Writ of Amparo specifically
seeks to address.

Manalo, Velasquez Rodriguez and Timurtas, read in proper perspective, fully support our findings and
conclusions in this case.

Manalo is different from Tagitis in terms of their factual settings, as enforced disappearance was no longer
a problem in that case. The enforced disappearance of the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo
effectively ended when they escaped from captivity and surfaced, while Tagitis is still nowhere to be found
and remains missing more than two years after his reported disappearance. An Amparo situation
subsisted in Manalo, however, because of the continuing threat to the brothers’ right to security; the
brothers claimed that since the persons responsible for their enforced disappearance were still at large
and had not been held accountable, the former were still under the threat of being once again abducted,
kept captive or even killed, which threat constituted a direct violation of their right to security of person. In
ruling that substantial evidence existed to support the conclusion that the respondents’ right to security
had been violated, the Court not only considered the respondents’ affidavit and testimony which positively
identified the perpetrators, but also noted other evidence showing the ineffective investigation and
protection on the part of the military. The Court significantly found that:

Next, the violation of the right to security as protection by the government. Apart from the failure of military
elements to provide protection to respondents by themselves perpetrating the abduction, detention, and
torture, they also miserably failed in conducting an effective investigation of respondents’ abduction as
revealed by the testimony and investigation report of petitioners’ own witness, Lt. Col. Ruben Jimenez,
Provost Marshall of the 7th Infantry Division.

The one-day investigation conducted by Jimenez was very limited, superficial, and one-sided. He merely
relied on the Sworn Statements of the six implicated members of the CAFGU and civilians whom he met
in the investigation for the first time. He was present at the investigation when his subordinate Lingad was
taking the sworn statements, but he did not propound a single question to ascertain the veracity of their
statements or their credibility. He did not call for other witnesses to test the alibis given by the six implicated
persons nor for the family or neighbors of the respondents.

In his affidavit, petitioner Secretary of National Defense attested that in a Memorandum Directive dated
October 31, 2007, he issued a policy directive addressed to the AFP Chief of Staff, that the AFP should
adopt rules of action in the event the writ of amparo is issued by a competent court against any members
of the AFP, which should essentially include verification of the identity of the aggrieved party; recovery
and preservation of relevant evidence; identification of witnesses and securing statements from them;
determination of the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance; identification and
apprehension of the person or persons involved in the death or disappearance; and bringing of the
suspected offenders before a competent court. Petitioner AFP Chief of Staff also submitted his own
affidavit attesting that he received the above directive of respondent Secretary of National Defense and
that acting on this directive, he immediately caused to be issued a directive to the units of the AFP for the
purpose of establishing the circumstances of the alleged disappearance and the recent reappearance of
the respondents, and undertook to provide results of the investigations to respondents. To this day,
however, almost a year after the policy directive was issued by petitioner Secretary of National Defense
on October 31, 2007, respondents have not been furnished the results of the investigation which they now
seek through the instant petition for a writ of amparo.

Under these circumstances, there is substantial evidence to warrant the conclusion that there is a violation
of respondents’ right to security as a guarantee of protection by the government. [Emphasis supplied] 18

Similarly in Velasquez Rodriguez, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) acknowledged that
when the Honduran Government carried out or tolerated enforced disappearances, the police customarily
used a distinctive form of kidnapping. Consequently, the IACHR presumed that Velasquez disappeared
at the "hands of or with the acquiescence of those officials within the framework of that practice."
Moreover, the IACHR found that negative inferences may be drawn from the fact that the government
failed to investigate or to inquire into his disappearance, and thwarted the attempts by the victim’s family
to do so; these according to the Court strongly suggested the government’s involvement in the
disappearance, even if there was no direct evidence indicating that the government kidnapped
Velasquez.19 The Court thus held:201avvphi1

iii. In the case of Manfredo Velásquez, there were the same type of denials by his captors and the Armed
Forces, the same omissions of the latter and of the Government in investigating and revealing his
whereabouts, and the same ineffectiveness of the courts where three writs of HABEAS corpus and two
criminal complaints were brought ( testimony of Miguel Angel Pavón Salazar, Ramón Custodio López,
Zenaida Velásquez, press clippings and documentary evidence ).

h. There is no evidence in the record that Manfredo Velásquez had disappeared in order to join subversive
groups, other than a letter from the Mayor of Langue, which contained rumors to that effect. The letter
itself shows that the Government associated him with activities it considered a threat to national security.
However, the Government did not corroborate the view expressed in the letter with any other evidence.
Nor is there any evidence that he was kidnapped by common criminals or other persons unrelated to the
practice of disappearances existing at that time."

148. Based upon the above, the Court finds that the following facts have been proven in this proceeding:
(1) a practice of disappearances carried out or tolerated by Honduran officials existed between 1981 and
1984; ( 2) Manfredo Velásquez disappeared at the hands of or with the acquiescence of those officials
within the framework of that practice; and (3) the Government of Honduras failed to guarantee the human
rights affected by that practice.

Finally, in Timurtas, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) altered the prevailing jurisprudence by
permitting a lesser evidentiary burden in cases of enforced disappearances. The ECHR dismissed the
need for direct evidence previously held necessary in the leading case of Kurt v. Turkey, 21 and instead
permitted the use of circumstantial evidence to establish a violation of the right to life. It stated that
"whether the failure on the part of authorities to provide a plausible explanation as to a detainee’s fate, in
the absence of a body, might raise issues under Article 2 of the Convention (right to life), will depend on
the circumstances of the case and, in particular, on the existence of sufficient circumstantial evidence
based on concrete elements, from which it may be concluded to the requisite standard of proof that the
detainee must be presumed to have died in custody."22 The ECHR found that:23

Noting that more than six and a half years has gone by since Abdulvahap Timurtas’ apprehension and
having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, the Court found that the disappearance of
Abdulvahap Timurtas after he had been taken into detention led, in the circumstances of this case, to a
presumption that he had died. No explanation having been provided by the Government as to what had
happened to him during his detention, the Government was liable for his death and there was a violation
of Article 2 of the Convention. [Emphasis supplied]

Significantly (in the context of the present case), the ECHR also noted that the inadequacy of the
investigation into the disappearance of Timurtas also constituted a violation of his right to life under Article
2 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

Thus viewed, common threads that plainly run in the three cited cases are applicable to the present case.
There is the evidence of ineffective investigation in Manalo and Velasquez Rodriguez, while in all three
was the recognition that the burden of proof must be lowered or relaxed (either through the use of
circumstantial or indirect evidence or even by logical inference); the requirement for direct evidence to
establish that an enforced disappearance occurred -- as the petitioners effectively suggest -- would render
it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to prove that an individual has been made to disappear. In these
lights, we emphasized in our December 3, 2009 Decision that while the need for substantial evidence
remains the rule, flexibility must be observed where appropriate (as the Courts in Velasquez Rodriguez
and Timurtas did) for the protection of the precious rights to life, liberty and security. This flexibility, we
noted, requires that "we should take a close look at the available evidence to determine the correct import
of every piece of evidence – even of those usually considered inadmissible under the general rules of
evidence – taking into account the surrounding circumstances and the test of reason that we can use as
basic minimum admissibility requirement." From these perspectives, we see no error that we should rectify
or reconsider.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we resolve to GRANT the motion to declare the inclusion of
PS/Supt. Julasirim Ahadin Kasim moot and academic, but, otherwise, DENY the petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration. Let this case be remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings as directed in
our Decision of December 3, 2009.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO RENATO C. CORONA

Acting Chief Justice Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE P. PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Resolution were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1
General/Police Director General Avelino I. Razon was compulsorily retired from the PNP
service effective September 27, 2008. Police Director General Jesus A. Versoza is currently
the incumbent Chief of the PNP.
2
General/Police Director Edgardo M. Doromal was compulsorily retired from the PNP service
effective February 9, 2008. The PNP-CIDG is currently headed by Police Director Raul
Castañeda.
3
Police Senior Superintendent (now, Police Chief Superintendent) Leonardo A. Espina has
been reassigned to the OCPNP, specifically, the PNP’s Public Information Office (PIO),
effective June 4, 2009. At present, the incumbent Chief of PACER is Police Senior
Superintendent Isagani R. Nerez.
4
General/Police Chief Superintendent Joel Goltiao was compulsorily retired from the PNP
service effective September 19, 2008. Police Senior Superintendent Bienvenido Latag is
currently the Acting Regional Director of the ARMM Police Regional Office.
5
Jema’ah Islamiah.
6
In our December 3, 2009 ruling, we defined the concept of responsibility and accountability
for Writ of Amparo cases as follows: "Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been
established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or
omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of remedies this Court shall craft,
among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the
responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability refers to the measure of remedies that
should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance
without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or
who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the
burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of
extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance."
7
G.R. No. 180906, October 7, 2008, 568 SCRA 1.
8
I/A Court H.R. Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988, Series C No. 4.
9
(23531/94) [2000] ECHR 221 (13 June 2000).
10
THE RULE ON THE WRIT OF AMPARO, Section 17.
11
Annex "A," Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration dated January 4, 2010.
12
Annex "A-1," Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration dated January 4, 2010.
13
Supra note 10.
14
See Supra note 6.
 15
Supra note 7.
16
Supra note 8.
17
Supra note 9.
18
Supra note 7, pp. 62-64.
19
Gobind Singh Sethi, The European Court of Human Rights Jurisprudence on Issue of
Enforced Disappearances, 8 No. 3Hum. Rts. Brief 29 (2001).
20
Supra note 8.
21
27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 373 (1998).
22
Supra note 19.
23
Supra note 9.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Constitution
Statutes
Executive Issuances
Judicial Issuances
Other Issuances
Jurisprudence
International Legal Resources
AUSL Exclusive