LABOR RELATIONS LAW
the right of enterprises to reasonable returns to
PART ONE – INTRODUCTION MATERIALS
LABOR RELATIONS POLICY: FORMULATION AND
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
1987 CONTITUTION
Article II, SECTION 2. The Philippines renounces war as an
instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land
and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice,
freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.
SECTION 10. The State shall promote social justice
in all phases of national development.
SECTION 18. The State affirms labor as a primary
social economic force. It shall protect the rights of
workers and promote their welfare.
Article III, SECTION 8. The right of the people, including
those employed in the public and private sectors, to form
unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary
to law shall not be abridged.
Article IX – B, SECTION 2. (2) Appointments in the civil
service shall be made only according to merit and fitness to
be determined, as far as practicable, and, except to
positions which are policy-determining, primarily
confidential, or highly technical, by competitive examination.
Article XII, SECTION 12. The State shall promote the
preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and
locally produced goods, and adopt measures that help make
them competitive.
Article XIII, SECTION 3
The State shall afford full protection to labor, local
and overseas, organized and unorganized, and
promote full employment and equality of
employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-
organization, collective bargaining and
negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities,
including the right to strike in accordance with law.
They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane
conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall
also participate in policy and decision-making
processes affecting their rights and benefits as may
be provided by law.
The State shall promote the principle of shared
responsibility between workers and employers and
the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling
disputes, including conciliation, and shall enforce
their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial
peace.
The State shall regulate the relations between
workers and employers, recognizing the right of
labor to its just share in the fruits of production and
investments, and to expansion and growth.
SECTION 14
The State shall protect working women by providing
safe and healthful working conditions, taking into
account their maternal functions, and such facilities
and opportunities that will enhance their welfare and
enable them to realize their full potential in the
service of the nation.
Labor Code of the Philippines
Article 3- ART. 3. Declaration of basic policy. - The State
shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment,
ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or
creed and regulate the relations between workers and
employers. The State shall assure the rights of workers to
self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure,
and just and humane conditions of work.
Art. 211. Declaration of Policy.
A. It is the policy of the State:
a. To promote and emphasize the primacy of free
collective bargaining and negotiations, including
voluntary arbitration, mediation and conciliation, as
modes of settling labor or industrial disputes;
b. To promote free trade unionism as an instrument for
the enhancement of democracy and
the promotion of social justice and development;
c. To foster the free and voluntary organization of a
strong and united labor movement;
d. To promote the enlightenment of workers
concerning their rights and obligations as union
members and as employees;
e. To provide an adequate administrative machinery
for the expeditious settlement of labor or industrial
disputes;
f. To ensure a stable but dynamic and just industrial
peace; and
g. To ensure the participation of workers in decision
and policy-making processes affecting their rights,
duties and welfare.
B. To encourage a truly democratic method of regulating the
relations between the employers and employees by means
of agreements freely entered into through collective
bargaining, no court oradministrative agency or official shall
have the power to set or fix wages, rates of pay, hours
ofwork or other terms and conditions of employment, except
as otherwise provided under this Code.(As amended by
Section 3, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989)
Art. 275. Tripartism and tripartite conferences.
a. Tripartism in labor relations is hereby declared a
State policy. Towards this end, workers and
employers shall, as far as practicable, be
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 represented in decision and policy-making bodies of
the government.
b. The Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly
authorized representatives may, from time to time,
call a national, regional, or industrial tripartite
conference of representatives of government,
workers and employers for the consideration and
adoption of voluntary codes of principles designed
to promote industrial peace based on social justice
or to align labor movement relations with
established priorities in economic and social
development. In calling such conference, the
Secretary of Labor and Employment may consult
with accredited representatives of workers and
employers. (As amended by Section 32, Republic
Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989)
Cases:
1. Associacion de Agricultores vs. Talisay – Silay
Mining Co., 88 SCRA 294
Title: ASSOCIACION DE AGRICULTURES DE
TALISAY-SILAY, INC., et. al. vs.
TALISAY-SILAY MILLING CO., INC., et.
Nature: al
Keywords: G.R. No. L-37662 July 15, 1975
Summary: Class suit determining the constitutionality
of R.A. 809
Planters and millers of sugarcane
Facts: The claim of the plaintiffs is that inasmuch
as under Republic Act 809, approved on
June 22, 1952, it is provided that:
Section 1. In the absence of written milling
agreements between the majority of
planters and the millers of sugarcane in any
milling district in the Philippines, the
unrefined sugar produced in that district
from the mining by any sugar central of the
sugar-cane of any sugar-cane planter or
plantation owner, as well as all by products
and derivatives thereof, shall be divided
between them as follows:
Sixty per centum for the planter, and forty
per centum for the central in any milling
district the maximum actual production of
which is not more than four hundred
thousand piculs: Provided, That the
provisions of this section shall not apply to
sugar centrals with an actual production of
less than one hundred fifty thousand piculs.
Sixty-two and one-half per centum for the
planter, and thirty-seven and one-half per
centum for the central in any milling district
the maximum actual production of which
exceeds four hundred thousand piculs but
does not ex six hundred thousand piculs;
Sixty-five per centum for the planter, and
thirty-five per centum for the central in any
milling district the maximum actual
production of which exceeds six hundred
thousand piculs but does not exceed nine
hundred thousand piculs;
Sixty-seven and one-half per centum for
the planter, and thirty-two and one-half per
centum for the central in any mining district
the maximum actual production of which
exceed nine hundred thousand piculs but
does not exceed one million two hundred
thousand piculs;
Seventy per centum for the planter, and
thirty per centum for the central in any
milling district the maximum actual
production of which exceeds one on two
hundred thousand piculs.
As second and alternative cause of action,
the PLANTERS averred that on or before
October 24, 1954, the CENTRAL executed
contracts with eight planters in which a
higher percentage of partition in the sugar
and by-products and derivatives produced
by the CENTRAL was given to said eight
planters than those given to the rest of the
planters in the district, that is, 63% to 64%,
the latter, whenever the production of the
CENTRAL should be 1,200,000 piculs or
over, whereas all the others were given
only 60%, and inasmuch as under the
provisions of the milling contracts between
the PLANTERS and the CENTRAL since
the crop year 1920-1921.
As third cause of action, the PLANTERS
alleged that notwithstanding that the
applicability of Republic Act 809 to the
Talisay-Silay milling district had already
been ruled upon by the Sugar Quota
Administrator, the Central still refused to
abide by said ruling and to cause the
release to the plaintiffs of the
corresponding amounts to which they are
entitled.
CENTRAL filed its respective answers to
the amended complaint and the
supplements thereto. In said answers, the
CENTRAL alleged in substance the
following defenses: (1) that Republic Act
809 is invalid and unconstitutional; (2) that
even if said Act were valid, it is not
applicable to the Talisay-Silay milling
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district because the majority of the planters
had written milling contracts with the
CENTRAL at the time said Act went into
effect, and that this continued during the
crop years 1951-52, 1952-53, 1953-54, and
all the subsequent crop years in dispute; (3)
that the planters who entered into said
milling contracts did so voluntarily and
those voluntary contracts may not be
altered or modified without infringing the
constitutional guarantee on freedom of
contracts and the non-impairment clause of
the Constitution; and as to those planters
who entered into contracts after the
effective date of the law, they should be
deemed as having voluntarily waived all the
rights and benefits that might accrue to
them under it; (4) that the Act does not
contain any expressed or implied provision
invalidating the written milling contract s
entered into between the CENTRAL and
the owners of adherent plantations before
its effective date; (5) that the Act sanctions
and allows the entering into milling
contracts after its effective date, and as a
matter of fact a large number of the
PLANTERS are also planters in the
Hawaiian-Philippine milling district,
adjoining the Talisay-Silay milling district,
and they had entered into milling contracts
with the Hawaiian-Philippine Co. one year
and four months after the effectivity of the
Act and in their milling contracts they had
stipulations regarding sharing participation
without regard to the ratios fixed in the Act,
and they have abided by those mining
contracts, and (6) that the arrangement,
regarding the issuance of escrow quedans
and the deposit of the proceeds of the sale
of the disputed increased participation of
the planters was agreed to and accepted by
the CENTRAL from the Sugar Quota
Administrator under duress, because said
Administrator would not allow the issuance
of any warehouse receipt on the share of
the mill unless the CENTRAL agreed to the
escrow quedans arrangement; (7) that
neither are the PLANTERS entitled to
increased participation as claimed by them
in their second and alternative cause of
action because they do not qualify as the
PLANTERS contemplated in their invoked
twenty second (Vigesimo Segundo)
paragraph of the original milling contract,
since what are referred to in that paragraph
are only the PLANTERS "que se obliguen
a molercailadulce en la fabrics para la
cosecha 1920-21 "; (8) that the provisions
of Republic Act 809 relating to the
increased sharing participation of the
planters would affect and alter the
allocation of exportable sugar to the United
States (export A sugar) among Philippine
mills and plantation owners, in violation of
the Trade Relations Agreement between
the Philip pines and the United States, and
this is precisely what is expected from the
application of the law as provided in the
second paragraph of Section 8 of the very
same Republic Act 809; and (9) that the
instant case is not a proper one for a class
suit.
Issues: Whetherthat Republic Act 809 is
invalid and unconstitutional. – NO.
Ratio: Police Power
In Lutz vs. Araneta (G.R. No. L-2859, Dec.
22 1959), this Court recognized the
propriety of exercising police power when it
is needed to do so in order that our sugar
industry may be stabilized, and to that end,
it was held that the legislature could provide
that the distribution of benefits from the
proceeds of sugar be readjusted among the
components of the industry to enable it to
resist the added strain of the increase in
taxes that it had to sustain then. With at
least equal persuasiveness must such
reasoning obtain when the re-adjustment of
the distribution of proceeds is impelled by
the need to render social justice among all
the participants in the industry, specially the
laborers. The amicus curiae held that there
is not enough showing of
unreasonableness in the legislation in
question. Quite to the contrary, all the
provisions of the impugned act to be
germane to the end being pursued.
Social Justice
But it is not police power alone that sustains
the validity of the statutory provision in
dispute. Having in view its primary objective
to promote the interests of labor, it can
never be possible that the State would be
bereft of constitutional authority to enact
legislations of its kind. Here, in the
Philippines, whenever any government
measure designed for the advancement of
the working class is impugned on
constitutional grounds and shadows of
doubt are cast over the scope of the State's
prerogative in respect thereto, the
imperious mandate of the social justice
Ideal consecrated in our fundamental laws,
both the old and the new asserts its
majesty, upon the courts to accord utmost
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consideration to the spirit animating the act
assailed, not just for the sake of enforcing
the explicit social justice provisions of the
article on "Declaration of Principles and
State Policies", but more fundamentally, to
serve the sacred cause of human dignity,
which is actually what lies at the core of
those constitutional precepts as it is also
the decisive element always in the
determination of any controversy between
capital and labor.
Thus, Section 5 of Article II of the
Constitution of 1935, under the aegis of
which the law in question was enacted,
made it one of the declared principles to
which the people committed themselves
that "the promotion of social justice to
insure the well being and economic dc
security of all the people should be the
concern of the State." More specifically in
regard to labor, there was also Section 6 of
Article XIX, to the effect that "the State shall
afford protection to labor ... and shall
regulate the relation between . . . labor and
capital in industry and in agriculture. It is
difficult to conceive of any legislation more
aptly rooted in the declared principle and
the plain injunction of the old Constitution
just quoted than the Act under discussion
which is a law to regulate the relations
between the centrals and the planters with
the primordial objective of protecting and
promoting the interests of labor. In regard
then to the arguments of the centrals
relative to due process and the sanctity of
contractual obligations as well as the
freedom of contract, We hold that more
cogently than in regard to the exertion of
police power as discussed above, the
criterion for determining whether or not
social justice has been over-extended in
any given case is nothing more than the
economic viability or feasibility of the
proposed law in favor of labor, and certainly
not the existence of exceptional
circumstances. In other words, as long as
capital in industry or agriculture will not be
fatally prejudiced to the extent of incurring
losses as a result of its enforcement, any
legislation to improve labor conditions
would be valid, provided the assailed
legislation is more or less demanded as a
measure to improve the situation in which
the workers and laborers are actually found
And in the case at bar, there is not even a
pretension that the finances of the centrals
would be anywhere in the red as a result of
the enforcement of Republic Act 809.
In the light of the foregoing considerations,
We do not find the position of the Central
that Section I of Republic Act 809 interferes
unconstitutionally with existing contracts
and the freedom of all the parties
concerned in entering into new ones to be
sufficiently persuasive.
If We declare the Act unconstitutional upon
the ground that it is unwarranted invasion
of the freedom of contract as between the
millers and the planters, the deplorable
condition of the laborers in the sugar farms
would remain as it was before its
enactment. On the other hand, if We
sustain its validity but at the same time
apply it literally and sanction a construction
thereof that would enable the centrals and
their planters to enter into agreements,
under which the latter would have to be
given increased participation without any
obligation to share the same with their
laborers, the Court would be a party to a
conspiracy to virtually defraud labor of the
benefits, the grant of which is precisely its
sole redeeming feature to save it from
unconstitutionality. For it is clear for anyone
to see that without the Act, under the
conditions prevailing in the industry, the
planters would have no means of
persuading, much less compelling, the
centrals or millers to give them any
increase in their respective shares,
whereas, with this law, faced with the
prospect of being forced to grant the
planters their proportion of sharing
prescribed by it, if no written contracts were
to be signed by them with the majority of
the planters, naturally, the centrals would
readily agree to give the planters the
increase they want, — which could be less
than that stipulated in the Act and yet be
exactly what the planters would get under it
if the majority of them were not to have
written contracts with the central. In which
eventuality, and should we uphold the
proposed strictly literal construction of the
Act, the laborers would be left holding the
proverbial empty bag. In that way, the
interests of the capitalist components of the
industry, the millers and planters, would be
served by the compulsive effect of the law
but labor would not be assured of receiving
even the crumbs, when the truth is that the
legislation would have no reason for being
as a constitutional and enforceable statute
if it did not include mandatory provisions
designed to lift them from misery. The
Court emphatically refuses to have
anything to do with such an unconscionable
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 posture vis-a-vis the fate of labor, which
pose, after all We must assume could not
have been in the contemplation of the
legislature that precisely inserted into it its
pro-labor element in order to bring it within
the ambit of the social justice and police
power protection of the fundamental law.
We condemn such a view as definitely anti-
social and as a gross injustice to labor,
which no respectable legislature composed
of duly elected representatives of the
people may ever be deemed as capable of
dirtying the sacred statute books with.
Ruling: All of the CENTRAL's counterclaim are
hereby accordingly overruled. In G.R. No.
L-21304, the petition is hereby dismissed
the issues raised therein, as We have
demonstrated a few pages back, having
already become moot and academic. No
attorney's fees, bad faith on the part of the
CENTRAL in the premises not having been
sufficiently Shown. No costs in both cases.
Doctrine: As long as capital in industry or agriculture
will not be fatally prejudiced to the extent of
incurring losses as a result of its
enforcement, any legislation to improve
labor conditions would be valid, provided
the assailed legislation is more or less
demanded as a measure to improve the
situation in which the workers and laborers
are actually found And in the case at bar,
there is not even a pretension that the
finances of the centrals would be anywhere
in the red as a result of the enforcement of
Republic Act 809.
2. PAL vs. PALEA, 57 SCRA 489
Title: (2) PAL vs PALEA, 57 SCRA 489
(Reinstatement of Fidel Gotangco by the
Nature: Court of Industrial Relations despite the
Keywords: guilty finding for breach of trust and violation
Summary: of the rules and regulations)
Appeal by certiorari from a resolution of
Court of Industrial Relations
Security of tenure, Reinstatement, Too
severe a penalty
Court of Industrial Relation to SC
Facts: Fidel Gotangco was found guilty of breach of
trust and violation of the rules and
regulations of his employer after a piece of
lead material of negligible value which he
intended to bring home for personal use was
confiscated from his person by a security
guard. Hence, Gotangco was dismissed.
However, the Court of Industrial Relations
ordered his reinstatement without payment
of backwages. It ruled that the dismissal is
too severe a penalty to impose on Gotangco
because (1) it is his first time to commit the
charge in question for the duration of his 17
years of service with respondent; (2) the
cost of said material, considering its size, is
negligible (8" x 10" x 1/2"); (3) respondent
did not lose anything after all as the lead
material was retrieved in time; (4) the
ignominy and mental torture undergone by
Gotangco is practically punishment in itself;
and (5) he has been under preventive
suspension to date. For which reason, it
would seem more equitable to retain than
dismiss him.
On the other hand, PAL seek to reverse the
order of the Court of Industrial Relations
reinstating Gotangco. It alleged that the
Court should not order the reinstatement of
Gotangco in the light of its undisputed
finding that he is guilty of breach of trust and
violation of the rules and regulations of his
employer and upon the principle that the
Court of Industrial Relations cannot arrogate
upon itself the authority to order an employer
to reinstate a dismissed employee who
admittedly has breached the trust of his
employer.
Issues: Whether or not the Court of Industrial
Relations can arrogate upon itself the
authority to order an employer to reinstate a
dismissed employee who admittedly has
breached the trust of his employer on the
ground of the Constitutional provision on
security of tenure?
Ruling: Yes. The Court of Industrial Relations may
order an employer to reinstate a dismissed
employee.
The paramount police power is a limitation
on the right of an employer to freely select or
discharge his employees. Moreover, while
there was an admission that misfeasance or
malfeasance could be a ground for
dismissal, the last sentence thereof reads:
"The law, in protecting the rights of the
laborer, authorizes neither oppression nor
self-destruction of the employer." Where,
therefore, it could be shown that the result
would be neither oppressive nor self-
destructive, it cannot be asserted
dogmatically that an outright termination, of
employment is justified. The Constitution
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 also expressly requires the State to assure
workers "security of tenure.
In this case, the court noted that in cases
where the dismissal or suspension of an
employee is capricious, or unjustified, or of
another mode illegal, the State must protect
the worker through its agency or
instruments, in this case, it is the Court of
Industrial Relations.
Doctrine: In cases where the dismissal or suspension
of an employee is capricious, or unjustified,
or of another mode illegal, the State must
protect the worker through its agency or
instruments.
3. PLDT vs. NLRC, 164 SCRA 671
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE
TELEPHONE COMPANY, petitioner,vs.
Title: THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION and MARILYN ABUCAY,
respondents.
Nature:
Terminated for Dishonesty,No Separation
Keywords:
Pay/Financial Assistance
Summary:
• Marilyn Abucay, a traffic operator of the
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company,
was accused by two complainants of having
demanded and received from them the total
amount of P3,800.00 in consideration of her
promise to facilitate approval of their
applications for telephone installation.
• 1 Investigated and heard, she was found
guilty as charged and accordingly separated
from the service.
• LA Marilyn Abucay went to the Ministry of
Labor and Employment claiming she had been
illegally removed. After consideration of the
evidence and arguments of the parties, illegal
termination case is dismissed for lack of merit
Facts: but she must be given one month pay for
every year of service as financial assistance
• Considering that Dr. Helen Bangayan and
Mrs.Consolacion Martinez are not totally
blameless in the light of the fact that the deal
happened outhide the premises of
respondent company and that their act of
giving P3,800.00 without any receipt is
tantamount to corruption of public officers.�
NLRC Both the petitioner and the private
respondent appealed to the National Labor
Relations Board, which upheld the said
decision in toto and dismissed the appeals.
The private respondent took no further
action, thereby impliedly accepting the
validity of her dismissal
Med
Arbiter
director
WON an employee who was terminated due
Issues: to dishonesty is entitled to financial
assistance.
Ratio:
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 NO,the policy of social justice is not intended
to countenance wrongdoing simply because it
is committed by the underprivileged. At best
it may mitigate the penalty but it certainly will
not condone the offense. Compassion for the
poor is an imperative of every humane society
but only when the recipient is not a rascal
claiming an undeserved privilege. Social
justice cannot be permitted to be refuge of
scoundrels any more than can equity be an
impediment to the punishment of the guilty.
Those who invoke social justice may do so
only if their hands are clean and their motives
blameless and not simply because they
happen to be poor. This great policy of our
Constitution is not meant for the protection
of those who have proved they are not
worthy of it, like the workers who have
tainted the cause of labor with the blemishes
Ruling: of their own character.
Applying the above considerations, we hold
that the grant of separation pay in the case at
bar is unjustified. The private respondent has
been dismissed for dishonesty, as found by
the labor arbiter and affirmed by the NLRC
and as she herself has impliedly admitted. The
fact that she has worked with the PLDT for
more than a decade, if it is to be considered
at all, should be taken against her as it reflects
a regrettable lack of loyalty that she should
have strengthened instead of betraying
during all of her 10 years of service with the
company. If regarded as a justification for
moderating the penalty of dismissal, it will
actually become a prize for disloyalty,
perverting the meaning of social justice and
undermining the efforts of labor to cleanse its
ranks of all undesirables.
Social Justice
The policy of social justice is not intended
Doctrine: to countenance wrongdoing simply
because it is committed by the
underprivileged.
Statutory Source and Interpretation
Cases:
4. BF Goodrich Confidential and Salaried Employees
Union vs. BF Goodrich Philippines, Inc., 49 SCRA
532
Title: BF Goodrich Philippines Inc, vs BF
Goodrich Confidential and Salaried
Nature: Employees Union
Keywords: (49 SCRA 532)
Summary: Review for certiorari of decision of
Court of of Industrial Relations
Certification election pending unfair
labor practice case
Court of Industrial Relations (CIR)
CIR (Reconsideration) SC
(certiorari)
Facts:  Rodolfo Pajaro, as President of
B.F. Goodrich (Makati Office)
Confidential and Salaried
Employees Union-NATU, Pablo
C. Fulgar, as President of B.F.
Goodrich (Marikina Factory)
Confidential and Salaried
Employees Union-NATU and one
MarcelinoLontok, Jr.,
representing himself as Vice-
President, NATU, sent a letter to
the petitioner, seeking recognition
as the bargaining agent of such
employees so that thereafter
there could be negotiations for a
collective contract.
 Petitioner, as employer,
countered by filing two petitions
for certification election with
respondent Court of Industrial
Relations (CIR).
 A case for unfair labor practice
(Case No. 5612-ULP) was filed by
the petitioner against the private
respondents for staging a strike to
force recognition of their unions.
The petitioner also filed identical
motions in MC Cases Nos. 2995
and 2996 to hold in abeyance the
hearings of the petitions for
certification election.
 It is petitioner's stand that if Case
No. 5612-ULP will prosper and
the strike staged by respondent
unions during the pendency of the
instant cases will be declared
illegal and the individual members
cited therein as respondents
found guilty of the unfair labor
practice acts complained of, the
latter will consequently lose their
status as employees and will be
disqualified to vote in a
certification election that may be
ordered by the Court
 Respondents maintain that the
pendency of said unfair labor
practice case is not a bar to the
hearing of the instant cases
Court of Industrial Denied the petitioner's motions. Held
Relations (CIR) that Individual respondents in the
ULP case are still employees and
possessed of the right to self-
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 organization. Included therein is their
choice of a bargaining
representative. To hold the
certification proceedings in abeyance
until final judgment of the ULP case
will be a denial of the aforesaid
statutory right, the employees being
left without a collective bargaining
representative."
CIR Decision affirmed
(reconsideration)
Issues: Whether or not a certification election
may be stayed at the instance of the
employer, pending the determination
of an unfair labor practice case filed
by it against certain employees
affiliated with respondent-unions.
Ratio:  There is no valid reason for the
postponement sought. There is
no certitude that the final decision
arrived at in the pending unfair
labor practice case would sustain
the claim of petitioner. Even if
success would attend such
endeavor, it cannot be plausibly
asserted that its employees
adjudged as having been
engaged in such illegal strike are
ipso facto deprived of such status.
 Management is not to be
precluded from filing an unfair
labor practice case but such suit
should not be allowed to lend
itself as a means, whether
intended or not, to prevent a truly
free expression of the will of the
labor group as to the organization
that will represent it.
Ruling: The case does not show abuse of
discretion to warrant reversal of
actuation of the respondent court.
Petition dismissed
Doctrine: As expressly set forth in the Industrial
Peace Act, which speaks of the labor
organizations as "designated or
selected for the purpose of collective
bargaining by the majority of the
employees in an appropriate
collective bargaining unit [be the
exclusive] representative of all the
employees in such unit for the
purpose of collective bargaining."
The law clearly contemplates all the
employees, not only some of them.
As much as possible then, there is to
be no unwarranted reduction in the
number of those taking part in a
certification election, even under the
guise that in the meanwhile, which
may take some time, some of those
who are employees could possibly
lose such status, by virtue of a
pending unfair labor practice case.
5. Caltex Filipino Manager and Supervisors
Association vs. CIR, 44 SCRA 350
CALTEX FILIPINO MANAGERS AND
SUPERVISORS
ASSOCIATION petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS,
Title:
CALTEX
(PHILIPPINES), INC., W.E. MENEFEE and
B.F. EDWARDS,
respondents.
44 SCRA 350
Nature: Statutory Source and Interpretation
Keyword
s:
Summar
y:
The Caltex Filipino Managers and
Supervisors' Association is a labor
organization of Filipino manager’s
supervisors in Caltex(Philippines), Inc.,
respondent Company in this proceeding.
On February 8, 1965, the Association sent
a set of proposals to the Company wherein
one of the demands was the recognition of
the Association as the duly authorized
bargaining agency for managers and
supervisors in the Company. To this the
Company countered stating that a
distinction exists between representatives
of management and individuals employed
as supervisors and that it is Company's
belief that managerial employees are not
Facts:
qualified for membership in a labor
organization; hence, it is digested that the
Association institute a certification
proceeding so as to remove any question
with regard to position titles that should be
included in the bargaining unit. The
Association felt disinclined to follow the
suggestion of the Company and so on
February 22, 1965 the Company initiated a
certification proceeding docketed as Case
1484-MC. On March 8, 1965, the
Association filed notice to strike. On the
basis of the strike notice filed on March 8,
1965 and in view of acts committed by the
Company which the Association considered
as constituting unfair labor practice, the
8
 Association struck on April 22,1965.The
Company, filed Case No. 1484-MC(1)
praying among others, to declare the strike
of Caltex Filipino Managers and
Supervisors Association “illegal”. The
Association's charge for unfair labor
practices against the Company and its
officials on September 10, 1965, in Case
No. 4344-ULP against Caltex (Philippines),
Inc., W. E. Menefee and B.F. Edwards.
According to the latter, the Company and
some of its officials, including B.F.
Edwards, inquired into the organization of
the Association and he manifested his
antagonism to it and its President; that
another Company official, W.E. Menefee
issued a statement of policy designed to
discourage employees and supervisors
from joining labor organizations; that the
Company refused to bargain although the
Association commands majority
representation; that due to the steps taken
by the Company to destroy the Association
or discourage its members from continuing
their union membership, the Association
was forced to file a strike notice; that on
April 22, 1965 it declared a strike; and that
during the strike the Company and its
officers continued their efforts to weaken
the Association as well as its picket lines.
Ruling:
The Company in its answer filed with
respondent court denied the charges of
unfair labor
practice.
(a) Whether or not the CIR has jurisdiction
over Case No. 1484-MC(1);
(b) Whether or not the strike staged by the
Association on April 22, 1965 is illegal and,
incident thereto, whether respondent court
correctly terminated the employee status of
Jose Mapa,
Issues: Dominador Mangalino and Herminigildo
Mandanas and reprimanded and
admonished the other officers of the
Association;
(c)Whether or not respondent court
correctly absolved the respondents in Case
No. 4344-ULP from the unfair labor practice
charge.
Ratio:
Respondent's court's jurisdiction over Case
No. 1484-MC(1) has to be tested by the
allegations, reading of said pleading shows
that the same is for injunctive relief under
Section 9(d) of Republic Act No. 875
(Magna Carta of Labor); for contempt,
obviously pursuant to See, 6 of
Commonwealth Act No. 103 in conjunction
with Sec. 3 (b) of Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court; and for forfeiture of the employee
status of the strikers by virtue of their
participation in what the Company
considered as an "illegal strike." It is well
known that the scheme in Republic Act No.
875 for achieving industrial peace rests
essentially on a free and private agreement
between the employer and his employees
as to the terms and conditions under which
the employer is to give work and the
employees are to furnish labor,
unhampered as far as possible by judicial
or administrative intervention. On this
premise the lawmaking body has virtually
prohibited the issuance of injunctive relief
involving or growing out of labor disputes.
The prohibition to issue labor injunctions is
designed to give labor a comparable
bargaining power with capital and must be
liberally construed to that end (U.S. vs.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 79 F.
Supp. 485, Certiorari denied, 69 S. Ct. 137,
335
U.S. 867, cause remanded on other
grounds, 174 F. 2nd 160, 85 U.S. App. D.C.,
certiorari denied 70 S. Ct. 140, 338 U.S.
872, 94 L. Ed. 535). It is said that the
prohibition creates substantive and not
purely procedural law. (Oregon Shipbuilding
Corporation vs. National Labor Relations
Board, 49 F. Supp. 886). Within the purview
of our ruling, speaking through Justice
Labrador, in Social Security Employees
Association (PAFLU), et al. vs. The Hon.
Edilberto Soriano, et al. (G.R. No. L-20100,
July 16, 1964, 11 SCRA 518, 520), there can
be no injunction issued against any strike
except in only one instance, that is, when a
labor dispute arises in an industry
indispensable to the national interest and
such dispute is certified by the President of
the Philippines to the Court of Industrial
Relations in compliance with Sec. 10 of
Republic Act No. 875. As a corollary to this,
an injunction in an uncertified case must be
based on the strict requirement See. 9 (d) of
Republic Act No. 875; the purpose of such
injunction is not to enjoin the strike itself, but
only unlawful activities. To the extent, then,
that the Company sought injunctive relief
under Sec. 9(d) of Republic Act No.875,
9
respondent court had jurisdiction over the
Company's "Urgent Petition" dated April 26,
1965.
We now come to the issue as to whether the
strike staged by the Association on April 22,
1965 is illegal. To begin with, we view the
return-to-work agreement of May 30, 1965
as in the nature of a partial compromise
between the parties and, more important, a
labor contract; consequently, in the latter
aspect the same "must yield to the common
good" (Art. 1700, Civil Code of the
Philippines) and "(I)n case of doubt ... shall
be construed in favor of the safety and
decent living for the laborer" (Art. 1702, ibid).
To our mind when the Company
unqualifiedly bound itself in the return-to-
work agreement that all employees will be
taken back "with the same employee status
prior to April 22, 1965," the Company
thereby made manifest its intention and
conformity not to proceed with Case No.
1484-MC, (c) relating the illegality of the
strike incident. For while it is true that there
is a reservation in the return-to-work
agreement as follows:
6. The parties agree that all Court cases now
pending shall continue, including CIR Case
No. 1484-MC. we think the same is to be
construed bearing in mind the conduct and
intention of the parties. The failure to
mention Case No. 1484-MC(1) while
specifically mentioning Case No. 1484-MC,
in our opinion, bars the Company from
proceeding with the former especially in the
light of the additional specific stipulation that
the strikers would be taken back with the
same employee status prior to the strike on
April 22, 1965. The records disclose further
that, according to Atty. Domingo E. de Lara
when he testified on October 9, 1965, and
this is not seriously disputed by private
respondents, the purpose of Paragraph 10
of the return-to-work agreement was, to
quote in part from this witness, "to secure
the tenure of employees after the returnto-
work agreement considering that as I
understand there were demotions and
suspensions of one or two employees during
the strike and, moreover, there was this
incident Case No. 1484-MC(1)" (see Brief
for the Petition pp. 41-42). To borrow the
language of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Citizens
Labor Union Pandacan Chapter vs.
Standard Vacuum Oil Company (G.R. No. L-
7478, May 6, 1955), in so far as the illegality
Doctrine
of the strike is concerned in this proceeding
and in the light of the records.
... the matter had become moot. The
parties had both abandoned their original
positions and come to a virtual
compromise and agreed to resume
unconditionally their former relations. To
proceed with the declaration of illegality
would not only breach this
understanding, freely arrived at, but to
unnecessarily revive animosities to the
prejudice of industrial peace .
In addition, it is clear that the strike of the
Association was declared not just for the
purpose of gaining recognition but also for
bargaining in bad faith on the part of the
Company and by reason of unfair labor
practices committed by its officials.
Significantly, in the voluntary return-to-work
agreement entered into between the
Company and the Association, thereby
ending the strike, the Company agreed to
recognize for membership in the Association
the position titles mentioned in Annex "B" of
said agreement.
The guilty conduct of the Company before,
during after the strike of April 22, 1965
cannot escape the Court's attention. It will
suffice to mention typical instances by way
of illustration. Long prior to the strike, the
Company had interferred with the Cebu
Supervisors' Union by enticing Mapa into
leaving the Union under the guise of
promotion in Manila; shortly before the
strike, B.R. Edwards, Manager-Operations,
had inquired into the formation and
organization of the petitioner Association in
this case. During the strike, in addition to the
culpable acts of the Company already
narrated above, due significance must be
given to the inclusion initially of J.J. Mapa
and A. Buenaventura, the Association's
President and Vice-President respectively,
in 1965, in two coercion cases filed at that
time and their subsequent elimination from
the charges the initiative of the Company
after the settlement of strike; the cutting off
of telephone facilities extended Association
members in the refinery; and the use of a
member of the Association to spy for the
company. The discriminatory acts practiced
by the Company against active unionists
after the strike furnish further evidence that
Company committed unfair labor practices
as charged.
there can be no injunction issued against
any strike except in only one instance, that
is, when a labor dispute arises in an
industry indispensable to the national
interest and such dispute is certified by the
President of the Philippines to the Court of
Industrial Relations in compliance with Sec.
10 of Republic Act No. 875
10

Definitions
Article 212.Definitions.
a. "Commission" means the National Labor Relations
Commission or any of its divisions, as the case may
be, as provided under this Code.
b. "Bureau" means the Bureau of Labor Relations
and/or the Labor Relations Divisions in the regional
offices established under Presidential Decree No. 1,
in the Department of Labor.
c. "Board" means the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board established under Executive Order
No. 126
d. "Council" means the Tripartite Voluntary Arbitration
Advisory Council established under Executive
Order No. 126, as amended.
e. "Employer" includes any person acting in the
interest of an employer, directly or indirectly. The
term shall not include any labor organization or any
of its officers or agents except when acting as
employer.
f. "Employee" includes any person in the employ of an
employer. The term shall not be limited to the
employees of a particular employer, unless the
Code so explicitly states. It shall include any
individual whose work has ceased as a result of or
in connection with any current labor dispute or
because of any unfair labor practice if he has not
obtained any other substantially equivalent and
regular employment.
g. "Labor organization" means any union or
association of employees which exists in whole or
in part for the purpose of collective bargaining or of
dealing with employers concerning terms and
conditions of employment.
h. "Legitimate labor organization" means any labor
organization duly registered with the Department of
Labor and Employment, and includes any branch or
local thereof.
i. "Company union" means any labor organization
whose formation, function or administration has
been assisted by any act defined as unfair labor
practice by this Code.
j. "Bargaining representative" means a legitimate
labor organization whether or not employed by the
employer.
k. "Unfair labor practice" means any unfair labor
practice as expressly defined by the Code.
l. "Labor dispute" includes any controversy or matter
concerning terms and conditions of employment or
the association or representation of persons in
negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or
arranging the terms and conditions of employment,
regardless of whether the disputants stand in the
proximate relation of employer and employee.
m. "Managerial employee" is one who is vested with
the powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute
management policies and/or to hire, transfer,
suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or
discipline employees. Supervisory employees are
those who, in the interest of the employer,
effectively recommend such managerial actions if
the exercise of such authority is not merely routinary
or clerical in nature but requires the use of
independent judgment. All employees not falling
within any of the above definitions are considered
rank-and-file employees for purposes of this Book.
n. "Voluntary Arbitrator" means any person accredited
by the Board as such or any person named or
designated in the Collective Bargaining Agreement
by the parties to act as their Voluntary Arbitrator, or
one chosen with or without the assistance of the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board,
pursuant to a selection procedure agreed upon in
the Collective Bargaining Agreement, or any official
that may be authorized by the Secretary of Labor
and Employment to act as Voluntary Arbitrator upon
the written request and agreement of the parties to
a labor dispute.
o. "Strike" means any temporary stoppage of work by
the concerted action of employees as a result of an
industrial or labor dispute.
p. "Lockout" means any temporary refusal of an
employer to furnish work as a result of an industrial
or labor dispute.
q. "Internal union dispute" includes all disputes or
grievances arising from any violation of or
disagreement over any provision of the constitution
and by laws of a union, including any violation of the
rights and conditions of union membership provided
for in this Code.
r. "Strike-breaker" means any person who obstructs,
impedes, or interferes with by force, violence,
coercion, threats, or intimidation any peaceful
picketing affecting wages, hours or conditions of
work or in the exercise of the right of self-
organization or collective bargaining.
s. "Strike area" means the establishment,
warehouses, depots, plants or offices, including the
sites or premises used as runaway shops, of the
employer struck against, as well as the immediate
11
 vicinity actually used by picketing strikers in moving
to and fro before all points of entrance to and exit
from said establishment. (As amended by Section
4, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989)
Section 1, Rule 1, Book V of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code
Section 1. Definition of Terms. -
(a) "Affiliate" refers to an independent union affiliated with a
federation, national union or a chartered local which was
subsequently granted independent registration but did not
disaffiliate from its federation, reported to the Regional
Office and the Bureau in accordance with Rule III, Sections
6 and 7 of these Rules.
(b) "Appeal" refers to the elevation by an aggrieved party to
an agency vested with appellate authority of any decision,
resolution or order disposing the principal issues of a case
rendered by an agency vested with original jurisdiction,
undertaken by filing a memorandum of appeal.
(c) "Audit Examiner" refers to an officer of the Bureau
orLabor Relations Division of the Regional Office authorized
to conduct an audit or examination of the books of accounts,
including all funds, assets and other accountabilities of a
legitimate labor organization and workers' association.
(d) "Bargaining Unit" refers to a group of employees sharing
mutual interests within a given employer unit, comprised of
all or less than all of the entire body of employees in the
employer unit or any specific occupational or geographical
grouping within such employer unit.
(e) "Board" refers to the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board established under Executive Order No. 126.
(f) "Bureau" refers to the Bureau of Labor Relations.
(g) "Cancellation Proceedings" refer to the legal process
leading to the revocation of the legitimate status of a union
or workers' association.
(h) "Certification Election" or "Consent Election" refers to the
process of determining through secret ballot the sole and
exclusive representative of the employees in an appropriate
bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining or
negotiation. A certification election is ordered by the
Department, while a consent election is voluntarily agreed
upon by the parties, with or without the intervention by the
Department.
(i) "Chartered Local" refers to a labor organization in the
private sector operating at the enterprise level that acquired
legal personality through registration with the Regional
Office in accordance with Rule III, Section 2-E of these
Rules. (As amended by DO 40-B-03.)
(j) "Collective Bargaining Agreement" or "CBA" refers to the
contract between a legitimate labor union and the employer
concerning wages, hours of work, and all other terms and
conditions of employment in a bargaining unit.
(k) "Conciliator Mediator" refers to an officer of the Board
whose principal function is to assist in the settlement and
disposition of labor-management disputes through
conciliation and preventive mediation, including the
promotion and encouragement of voluntary approaches to
labor disputes prevention and settlement.
(l) "Consolidation" refers to the creation or formation of a
new union arising from the unification of two or more unions.
(m) "Deregistration of Agreement" refers to the legal process
leading to the revocation of CBA registration.
(n) "Department" refers to the Department of Labor and
Employment.
(o) "Election Officer" refers to an officer of the Bureau
orLabor Relations Division in the Regional Office authorized
to conduct certification elections, election of union officers
and other forms of elections and referenda in accordance
with Rule XII, Sections 2-5 of these Rules.
(p) "Election Proceedings" refer to the period during a
certification election, consent or run-off election and election
of union officers, starting from the opening to the closing of
the polls, including the counting, tabulation and
consolidation of votes, but excluding the period for the final
determination of the challenged votes and the canvass
thereof.
(q) "Eligible Voter" refers to a voter belonging to the
appropriate bargaining unit that is the subject of a petition
for certification election.
(r) "Employee" refers to any person working for an employer.
It includes one whose work has ceased in connection with
any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor
practice and one who has been dismissed from work but the
legality of the dismissal is being contested in a forum of
appropriate jurisdiction.
(s) "Employer" refers to any person or entity who employs
the services of others, one for whom employees work and
who pays their wages or salaries. An employer includes any
person directly or indirectly acting in the interest of an
employer. It shall also refer to the enterprise where a labor
organization operates or seeks to operate.
(t) "Exclusive Bargaining Representative" refers to a
legitimate labor union duly recognized or certified as the sole
and exclusive bargaining representative or agent of all the
employees in a bargaining unit.
(u) "Grievance" refers to any question by either the employer
or the union regarding the interpretation or implementation
of any provision of the collective bargaining agreement or
interpretation or enforcement of company personnel
policies.
(v) "Improved Offer Balloting" refers to a referendum by
secret ballot involving union members on the improved offer
of the employer on or before the 30th day of a strike.
(w) "Independent Union" refers to a labor organization
operating at the enterprise level that acquired legal
personality through independent registration under Article
234 of the Labor Code and Rule III, Section 2-A of these
Rules.
(x) "Inter-Union Dispute" refers to any conflict between and
among legitimate labor unions involving representation
questions for purposes of collective bargaining or to any
other conflict or dispute between legitimate labor unions.
(y) "Interlocutory Order" refers to any order that does not
ultimately resolve the main issue/s in a dispute.
(z) "Interpleader" refers to a proceeding brought by a party
against two or more parties with conflicting claims,
compelling the claimants to litigate between and among
themselves their respective rights to the claim, thereby
relieving the party so filing from suits they may otherwise
bring against it.
12
(aa) "Intervention" refers to a proceeding whereby a person,
labor organization or entity not a party to a case but may be
affected by a decision therein, formally moves to make
himself/herself/itself a party thereto.
(bb) "Intra-Union Dispute" refers to any conflict between and
among union members, including grievances arising from
any violation of the rights and conditions of membership,
violation of or disagreement over any provision of the union's
constitution and by-laws, or disputes arising from chartering
or affiliation of union.
(cc) "Labor Organization" refers to any union or association
of employees in the private sector which exists in whole or
in part for the purpose of collective bargaining, mutual aid,
interest, cooperation, protection, or other lawful purposes.
(dd) "Labor Relations Division" refers to the (1) Labor
Organization and CBA Registration Unit and (2) Med-
Arbitration Unit in the Regional Office. The Labor
Organization and CBA Registration Unit is in charge of
processing the applications for registration of independent
unions, chartered locals, workers associations and
collective bargaining agreements, maintaining said records
and all other reports and incidents pertaining to labor
organizations and workers' associations. The Med-
Arbitration Unit conducts hearings and decides certification
election or representation cases, inter/intra-union and other
related labor relations disputes.
(ee) "Legitimate Labor Organization" refers to any labor
organization in the private sector registered or reported with
the Department in accordance with Rules III and IV of these
Rules.
(ff) "Legitimate Workers' Association" refers to an
association of workers organized for mutual aid and
protection of its members or for any legitimate purpose other
than collective bargaining registered with the Department in
accordance with Rule III, Sections 2-C and 2-D of these
Rules.
(gg) "Lockout" refers to the temporary refusal of an employer
to furnish work as a result of a labor or industrial dispute.
(hh) "Managerial Employee" refers to an employee who is
vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute
management policies or to hire, transfer, suspend, layoff,
recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees.
(ii) "Med-Arbiter" refers to an officer in the Regional Office or
in the Bureau authorized to hear and decide representation
cases, inter/intra-union disputes and other related labor
relations disputes, except cancellation of union registration
cases.
(jj) "Merger" refers to a process where a labor organization
absorbs another resulting in the cessation of the absorbed
labor organization's existence, and the continued existence
of the absorbing labor organization.
(kk) "National Union" or "Federation" refers to a group of
legitimate labor unions in a private establishment organized
for collective bargaining or for dealing with employers
concerning terms and conditions of employment for their
member unions or for participating in the formulation of
social and employment policies, standards and programs,
registered with the Bureau in accordance with Rule III,
Section 2-B of these Rules.
(ll) "Organized Establishment" refers to an enterprise where
there exists a recognized or certified sole and exclusive
bargaining agent.
(mm) "Preventive Mediation Cases" refer to labor disputes
which are the subject of a formal or informal request for
conciliation and mediation assistance sought by either or
both parties or upon the initiative of the Board.
(nn) "Rank-and-File Employee" refers to an employee
whose functions are neither managerial nor supervisory in
nature.
(oo) "Regional Director" refers to the Head of the Regional
Office.
(pp) "Regional Office" refers to the office of the Department
of Labor and Employment at the administrative regional
level.
(qq) "Registration" refers to the process of determining
whether the application for registration of a union or workers'
association and collective bargaining agreement complies
with the documentary requirements for registration
prescribed in Rules III, IV, and XVII of these Rules.
(rr) "Related Labor Relations Dispute" refers to any conflict
between a labor union and the employer or any individual,
entity or group that is not a labor union or workers'
association.
(ss) "Run-off Election" refers to an election between the
labor unions receiving the two (2) highest number of votes
in a certification or consent election with three (3) or more
choices, where such a certified or consent results in none of
the three (3) or more choices receiving the majority of the
valid votes cast; provided that the total number of votes for
all contending unions is at least fifty percent (50%) of the
number of votes cast.
(tt) "Secretary" refers to the Head of the Department.
(uu) "Strike" refers to any temporary stoppage of work by the
concerted action of employees as a result of a labor or
industrial dispute.
(vv) "Strike Area" refers to the establishment, warehouses,
depots, plants or offices, including the sites or premises
used as run-away shops of the employer, as well as the
immediate vicinity actually used by picketing strikers in
moving to and fro before all points of entrance.
(ww) "Strike Vote Balloting" refers to the secret balloting
undertaken by the members of the union in the bargaining
unit concerned to determine whether or not to declare a
strike in meetings or referenda called for that purpose.
(xx) "Supervisory Employee" refers to an employee who, in
the interest of the employer, effectively recommends
managerial actions and the exercise of such authority is not
merely routinary or clerical but requires the use of
independent judgment.
(yy) "Term of Office" refers to the fixed period of five (5)
years during which the duly elected officers of a labor
organization discharge the functions of their office, unless a
shorter period is stipulated in the organization's constitution
and by-laws.
(zz) "Union" refers to any labor organization in the private
sector organized for collective bargaining and for other
legitimate purposes.
(aaa) "Voluntary Arbitrator" refers to any person accredited
by the Board as such, or any person named or designated
13
in the collective bargaining agreement by the parties to act
as their voluntary arbitrator, or one chosen by the parties,
with or without the assistance of the Board, pursuant to a
selection procedure agreed upon in the collective bargaining
agreement.
(bbb) "Voluntary Recognition" refers to the process by which
a legitimate labor union is recognized by the employer as
the exclusive bargaining representative or agent in a
bargaining unit, reported with the Regional Office in
accordance with Rule VII, Section 2 of these Rules.
(ccc) "Workers' Association" refers to an association of
workers organized for the mutual aid and protection of its
members or for any legitimate purpose other than collective
bargaining.
Employer and Employee
Article [212] 219 (e) and (f)
"Employer" includes any person acting in the interest of an
employer, directly or indirectly. The term shall not include
any labor organization or any of its officers or agents except
when acting as employer.
"Employee" includes any person in the employ of an
employer. The term shall not be limited to the employees of
a particular employer, unless the Code so explicitly states. It
shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a
result of or in connection with any current labor dispute or
because of any unfair labor practice if he has not obtained
any other substantially equivalent and regular employment.
Case:
6. Feati University vs. Bautista, 18 SCRA 1191
Title: Feati University vs. Bautista, 18 SCRA
Nature: 1191
Consolidated case that focused on the
Keywords: determination whether charitable
Summary: institution or one organized for profit is
included in the definition of employer
Facts:  On January 14, 1963, the President of
the respondent Feati University Faculty
Club-PAFLU (Faculty Club) wrote a
letter to Mrs. Victoria L. Araneta,
President of petitioner Feati University
(University) informing her of the
organization of the Faculty Club into a
registered labor union.
 The Faculty Club is composed of
members who are professors and/or
instructors of the University.
 On January 22, 1963, the President of
the Faculty Club sent another letter
containing twenty-six demands that
have connection with the employment
of the members of the Faculty Club by
the University, and requesting an
answer within ten days from receipt
thereof.
 On February 18, 1963, the members of
the Faculty Club declared a strike and
established picket lines in the premises
of the University, resulting in the
disruption of classes in the University.
Despite further efforts of the officials
from the Department of Labor to effect
a settlement of the differences between
the management of the University and
the striking faculty members no
satisfactory agreement was arrived at.
On March 21, 1963, the President of
the Philippines certified to the Court of
Industrial Relations the dispute
between the management of the
University and the Faculty Club
pursuant to the provisions of Section 10
of Republic Act No. 875.
 In connection with the dispute between
the University and the Faculty Club and
certain incidents related to said
dispute, various cases were filed with
the Court of Industrial Relations —
hereinafter referred to as CIR.
 The University filed a motion to dismiss
that case upon the ground that the CIR
has no jurisdiction over the case, and
on March 30, 1963 Judge Jose S.
Bautista issued an order denying the
motion to dismiss and declaring that the
Industrial Peace Act is applicable to
both parties in the case and that the
CIR had acquired jurisdiction over the
case by virtue of the presidential
certification; and in that same order
Judge Bautista ordered the strikers to
return to work and the University to take
them back under the last terms and
conditions existing before the dispute
arose; and enjoined the University from
dismissing any employee or laborer
without previous authority from the
court.
Issue: The University has raised several issues in
the present cases, the pivotal one being its
claim that the Court of Industrial Relations
has no jurisdiction over the parties and the
subject matter in CIR Cases 41-IPA, 1183-
MC and V-30, brought before it, upon the
ground that Republic Act No. 875 is not
applicable to the University because it is
an educational institution and not an
industrial establishment and hence not an
"employer" in contemplation of said Act;
and neither is Republic Act No. 875
applicable to the members of the Faculty
Club because the latter are independent
contractors and, therefore, not employees
within the purview of the said Act.
14
Ruling: Does the University operate as an
educational institution for profit? Does it
declare dividends for its stockholders? If it
does not, it must be declared beyond the
purview of Republic Act No. 875; but if it
does, Republic Act No. 875 must apply to
it. The University itself admits that it has
declared dividends.3 The CIR in its order
dated March 30, 1963 in CIR Case No. 41-
IPA — which order was issued after
evidence was heard — also found that the
University is not for strictly educational
purposes and that "It realizes profits and
parts of such earning is distributed as
dividends to private stockholders or
individuals (Exh. A and also 1 to 1-F, 2-x 3-
x and 4-x)"4 Under this circumstance, and
in consonance with the rulings in the
decisions of this Court, above cited, it is
obvious that Republic Act No. 875 is
applicable to herein petitioner Feati
University.
But the University claims that it is not an
employer within the contemplation of
Republic Act No. 875, because it is not an
industrial establishment. At most, it says, it
is only a lessee of the services of its
professors and/or instructors pursuant to a
contract of services entered into between
them. We find no merit in this claim. Let us
clarify who is an "employer" under the Act.
Section 2(c) of said Act provides:
Sec. 2. Definitions.—As used in this Act —
(c) The term employer include any person
acting in the interest of an employer,
directly or indirectly, but shall not include
any labor organization (otherwise than
when acting as an employer) or any one
acting in the capacity or agent of such
labor organization.
As stated above, Republic Act No. 875
does not give a comprehensive but only a
complementary definition of the term
"employer". The term encompasses those
that are in ordinary parlance "employers."
What is commonly meant by "employer"?
The term "employer" has been given
several acceptations. The lexical definition
is "one who employs; one who uses; one
who engages or keeps in service;" and "to
employ" is "to provide work and pay for; to
engage one's service; to hire." (Webster's
New Twentieth Century Dictionary, 2nd
ed., 1960, p. 595). The Workmen's
Compensation Act defines employer as
including "every person or association of
persons, incorporated or not, public or
private, and the legal representative of the
deceased employer" and "includes the
owner or lessee of a factory or
establishment or place of work or any other
person who is virtually the owner or
manager of the business carried on in the
establishment or place of work but who, for
reason that there is an independent
contractor in the same, or for any other
reason, is not the direct employer of
laborers employed there." [Sec. 39(a) of
Act No. 3428.] The Minimum Wage Law
states that "employer includes any person
acting directly or indirectly in the interest of
the employer in relation to an employee
and shall include the Government and the
government corporations". [Rep. Act No.
602, Sec. 2(b)]. The Social Security Act
defines employer as "any person, natural
or juridical, domestic or foreign, who
carries in the Philippines any trade,
business, industry, undertaking, or activity
of any kind and uses the services of
another person who is under his orders as
regards the employment, except the
Government and any of its political
subdivisions, branches or
instrumentalities, including corporations
owned or controlled by the Government."
(Rep. Act No. 1161, Sec. 8[c]).
Under none of the above definitions may
the University be excluded, especially so if
it is considered that every professor,
instructor or teacher in the teaching staff of
the University, as per allegation of the
University itself, has a contract with the
latter for teaching services, albeit for one
semester only. The University engaged the
services of the professors, provided them
work, and paid them compensation or
salary for their services. Even if the
University may be considered as a lessee
of services under a contract between it and
the members of its Faculty, still it is
included in the term "employer". "Running
through the word `employ' is the thought
that there has been an agreement on the
part of one person to perform a certain
service in return for compensation to be
paid by an employer. When you ask how a
man is employed, or what is his
employment, the thought that he is under
agreement to perform some service or
services for another is predominant and
paramount." (Ballentine Law Dictionary,
Philippine ed., p. 430, citing Pinkerton
National Detective Agency v. Walker, 157
15
Ga. 548, 35 A. L. R. 557, 560, 122 S.E.
Rep. 202).
To bolster its claim of exception from the
application of Republic Act No. 875, the
University contends that it is not state that
the employers included in the definition of
2 (c) of the Act. This contention can not be
sustained. In the first place, Sec. 2 (c) of
Republic Act No. 875 does not state that
the employers included in the definition of
the term "employer" are only and
exclusively "industrial establishments"; on
the contrary, as stated above, the term
"employer" encompasses all employers
except those specifically excluded by the
Act. In the second place, even the Act itself
does not refer exclusively to industrial
establishments and does not confine its
application thereto. This is patent
inasmuch as several provisions of the Act
are applicable to non-industrial workers,
such as Sec. 3, which deals with
"employees' right to self-organization";
Sections 4 and 5 which enumerate unfair
labor practices; Section 8 which nullifies
private contracts contravening employee's
rights; Section 9 which relates to
injunctions in any case involving a labor
dispute; Section 11 which prohibits strikes
in the government; Section 12 which
provides for the exclusive collective
bargaining representation for labor
organizations; Section 14 which deals with
the procedure for collective bargaining;
Section 17 which treats of the rights and
conditions of membership in labor
organizations; Sections 18, 19, 20 and 21
which provide respectively for the
establishment of conciliation service,
compilation of collective bargaining
contracts, advisory labor-management
relations; Section 22 which empowers the
Secretary of Labor to make a study of labor
relations; and Section 24 which
enumerates the rights of labor
organizations. (See Dissenting Opinion of
Justice Concepcion in Boy Scouts of the
Philippines v. Juliana Araos, G.R. No. L-
10091, January 29, 1958.)
The University urges that even if it were an
employer, still there would be no employer-
employee relationship between it and the
striking members of the Faculty Club
because the latter are not employees
within the purview of Sec. 2(d) of Republic
Act No. 875 but are independent
contractors. This claim is untenable.
This definition is again, like the definition of
the term "employer" [Sec. 2(c)], by the use
of the term "include", complementary. It
embraces not only those who are usually
and ordinarily considered employees, but
also those who have ceased as employees
as a consequence of a labor dispute. The
term "employee", furthermore, is not
limited to those of a particular employer. As
already stated, this Court in the cases of
The Angat River Irrigation System, et al. v.
Angat River Workers' Union (PLUM), et al.,
supra, has defined the term "employer" as
"one who employs the services of others;
one for whom employees work and who
pays their wages or salaries.
"Correlatively, an employee must be one
who is engaged in the service of another;
who performs services for another; who
works for salary or wages. It is admitted by
the University that the striking professors
and/or instructors are under contract to
teach particular courses and that they are
paid for their services. They are, therefore,
employees of the University.
The contention of the University that the
professors and/or instructors are
independent contractors, because the
University does not exercise control over
their work, is likewise untenable. This
Court takes judicial notice that a university
controls the work of the members of its
faculty; that a university prescribes the
courses or subjects that professors teach,
and when and where to teach; that the
professors' work is characterized by
regularity and continuity for a fixed
duration; that professors are compensated
for their services by wages and salaries,
rather than by profits; that the professors
and/or instructors cannot substitute others
to do their work without the consent of the
university; and that the professors can be
laid off if their work is found not
satisfactory. All these indicate that the
university has control over their work; and
professors are, therefore, employees and
not independent contractors. There are
authorities in support of this view.
Moreover, even if university professors are
considered independent contractors, still
they would be covered by Rep. Act No.
875. In the case of the Boy Scouts of the
Philippines v. Juliana Araos, supra, this
Court observed that Republic Act No. 875
was modelled after the Wagner Act, or the
National Labor Relations Act, of the United
16
 States, and this Act did not exclude
"independent contractors" from the orbit of
"employees". It was in the subsequent
legislation — the Labor Management
Relation Act (Taft-Harley
Act) — that "independent contractors"
together with agricultural laborers,
individuals in domestic service of the
home, supervisors, and others were
excluded. (See Rothenberg on Labor
Relations, 1949, pp. 330-331).
Doctrine: The term employer encompasses all
employers except those specifically
excluded in the Industrial Peace Act. the
Act itself specifically enumerated those
who are not included in the term
"employer", namely: (1) a labor, (2) anyone
acting in the capacity of officer or agent of
such labor organization, and (3) the
Government and any political subdivision
or instrumentality thereof insofar as the
right to strike for the purpose of securing
changes or modifications in the terms and
conditions of employment is concerned.
Among these statutory exemptions,
educational institutions are not included;
hence, they can be included in the term
"employer.
The Industrial Court has jurisdiction over
unfair labor practice charges against
institutions that are organized, operated
and maintained for profit. The Industrial
Peace Act is applicable to any organization
or entity- whatever may be its purpose
when it was created- that is operated for
profit or gain.
Labor Organization: Legitimate Labor Organization
Article [212] 219 (g) and (h)
"Labor organization" means any union or association of
employees which exists in whole or in part for the purpose
of collective bargaining or of dealing with employers
concerning terms and conditions of employment.
"Legitimate labor organization" means any labor
organization duly registered with the Department of Labor
and Employment, and includes any branch or local thereof.
Cases:
7. Airline Pilots Association, et al. vs. CIR, 76 SCRA
274
Title: AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES (GASTON GROUP) vs. THE
CIR and AIR LINES PILOTS ASSOCIATION
Nature: OF THE PHILIPPINES (GOMEZ GROUP),
Keywords: respondents.
PETITIONS for certiorari of the resolutions
of the Court of Industrial Relations.
Summary: A labor union may authorize a segment
thereof to bargain collectively with the
employer and in the exercise of such
authority to have custody of the union’s fund
and office and make use of the union’s
name.
CIRSC
Facts:  On October 30, 1970, a general
membership meeting was held to
amend ALPAP's constitution and
by-laws in anticipation of the fact
that they may be forced to resign or
retire because of their union
activities. They adopted a new
section stating that “Any active
member who shall be forced to
retire or forced to resign or
otherwise terminated for union
activities as solely determine by the
Association shall have the option to
either continue to be and remain as
an active member in good standing
or to resign in writing his active
membership with the Association. .
.”
 At that time, PAL and ALPAP were
locked in a labor dispute which was
the cause of strikes staged by
ALPAP
 Afterwards, a substantial majority of
the ALPAP members filed letters of
retirement/resignation from PAL
 PAL filed an urgent ex parte motion
with the industrial court to enjoin the
members of ALPAP from retiring or
resigning en masse
 The court issued an order
commanding ALPAP members not
to strike under pain of dismissal and
forfeiture of rights and privileges
 Still, majority of the ALPAP
members filed their letters of
retirement/resignation which PAL
eventually accepted with the caveat
that the pilots concerned will not be
entitled to any benefit or privilege by
reason of their employment
 On December 18-22, 1970, an
election of ALPAP officers was held
resulting in the election of Felix
Gaston as President by 180 votes.
The following day, 45 pilots who did
not tender their retirement or
resignation elected Ben Hur Gomez
as President.
 On January 2, 1971, ALPAP
(Gomez group) filed a petition with
CIR praying for certification as the
sole and exclusive collective
17
 bargaining representative. This was
opposed by ALPAP (Gaston group)
on the ground that the industrial
court has no jurisdiction.
 The court rendered a decision
certifying that ALPAP (Gomez) as
the sole and exclusive bargaining
rep entitled to all the rights and
privileges of a legitimate labor org,
including the right to its office and its
union fund. The following
circumstances were cited to justify
the conclusions reached by him in
his decision, namely:
1. that there has been no
certification election within the
period of 12 months prior to the date
the petition for certification was filed;
2. that the PAL entered into a
collective bargaining agreement
with ALPAP for “pilots in the employ
of the Company” only for the
duration of the period from February
1, 1969 to January 31, 1972;
3. that PAL pilots belonging to
the Gaston group, in defiance of
court orders issued in Case 101-
IPA(B) (see L-35206, infra)
retired/resigned en masse from the
PAL and accompanied this with
actual acts of not reporting for work;
4. that the pilots affiliated with
the Gaston group tried to retrieve
their deposits and other funds from
the ALPAP Cooperative Credit
Union on the ground that they have
already retired/resigned from PAL;
5. that some of the members
of the Gaston group joined another
airline after their
retirement/resignation;
6. that the Gaston group
claimed before the industrial court
that the order enjoining them from
retiring or resigning constituted a
violation of the prohibition against
involuntary servitude (see L-35206,
infra); and
7. that the contention that the
mass retirement or resignation was
merely an involuntary protest by
those affiliated with the Gaston
group is not borne out by the
evidence as, aside from their
aforementioned acts, the said group
of pilots even filed a civil complaint
against the PAL in which the
cessation of their employment with
PAL was strongly stressed by them.
Issue: WON the CIR acted without jurisdiction in
passing upon (1) the question of which,
between the groups of Gaston and Gomez
is the duly elected set of officers of the
ALPAP, and (2) the question of which,
between the two groups, is entitled to the
name, office and funds of the said
Association.
Ruling: (1) The fundamental assumptions relied
upon by the industrial court as bases for
authorizing ALPAP (Gomez) to take over
the office and funds of ALPAP being, in this
Court’s opinion, erroneous, and, in the
absence of any serious dispute that Gaston,
and four other pilots, were elected by the
required majority of ALPAP members as
officers of their association, this Court
hereby rules that the mentioned
authorization to ALPAP (Gomez) to take
over the office, funds and name of ALPAP
was done with grave abuse of discretion.
Moreover, this Court cannot hold as valid
and binding the election of Gomez as
President of ALPAP. He was elected at a
meeting of only 45 ALPAP members called
just one day after the election of Gaston as
President of ALPAP who, as shown,
received a majority of 180 votes out of a
total membership of 270.
While this Court considers the ruling of the
court below, on the matter of who has the
exclusive rights to the office, funds and
name of ALPAP, as having been
erroneously made, we cannot hold,
however, that those belonging to the group
of ALPAP (Gomez) do not possess any right
at all over the office, funds and name of
ALPAP of which they are also members.
In our opinion, it is perfectly within the
powers and prerogatives of a labor
organization, through its duly elected
officers, to authorize a segment of that
organization to bargain collectively with a
particular employer. As the circumstances
show that ALPAP (Gaston) has extended
recognition to ALPAP (Gomez) to enter and
conclude collective bargaining contracts
with PAL. Having given ALPAP (Gomez)
this authority, it would be clearly
unreasonable on the part of ALPAP
(Gaston) to disallow the former a certain use
of the office, funds and name of ALPAP
when such use is necessary or would be
required to enable ALPAP (Gomez) to
exercise, in a proper manner, its delegated
authority to bargain collectively with PAL. In
the eventuality that the pilots presently
employed by PAL and who subscribe to the
leadership of Gomez should consider it to
their better interest to have their own
18
 separate office, name and union funds,
nothing can prevent them from setting up a
separate labor union. Whatever vested
rights, interest or participation they may
have in the assets of ALPAP as a result of
their membership therein should properly be
liquidated in favor of such withdrawing
members of the association.
(2) On the matter of whether the industrial
court also abuse its authority for allowing
ALPAP (Gomez) to appropriate the ALPAP
name, it does not appear that the herein
petitioner has shown below any exclusive
franchise or right to the use of that name.
Hence, there is no proper basis for
correcting the action taken by the court
below on this regard.
8. Lopez Sugar Corporation vs. Secretary of Labor,
247 SCRA 1
Title LOPEZ SUGAR CORPORATION,
petitioner,
vs. SECRETARY OF
LABOR,NATIONAL CONGRESS OF
UNIONS IN THE SUGAR INDUSTRY OF
THE PHILIPPINES (NACUSIP) and
COMMERCIAL AND AGRO-
INDUSTRIAL LABOR ORGANIZATION
(CAILO), respondents.
Nature Petition of Certiorari
Keywords Art 257 applied to Legitimate Labor
Organization
Summary
Facts - 6 July 1989, private respondent National
Congress of Unions in the Sugar Industry
of the Philippines- TUCP ("NACUSIP-
TUCP") filed with the Department of
Labor and Employment ("DOLE") a
petition for direct certification or for
certification election to determine the sole
and exclusive collective bargaining
representative of the supervisory
employees of herein petitioner, Lopez
Sugar Corporation.
- NACUSIP-TUCP averred that it was a
legitimate national labor organization; that
LSC was employing 55 supervisory
employees, the majority of whom were
members of the union; that no other labor
organization was claiming membership
over the supervisory employees; that
there was no existing collective
bargaining agreement covering said
employees; and that there was no legal
impediment either
to a direct certification of NACUSIP-TUCP
or to the holding of a certification election.
- LSC contended, that the petition was
bereft of any legal or factual basis; that
the petition was designed to harass the
company; and that its employees above
the
rank-and-file category were in truth
unaware of the petition.
-18 August 1989, the Commercial and
Agro-Industrial Labor Organization also
claiming to count substantial membership
among the LSC supervisory employees,
moved to intervene. (Granted)
- 22 August 1989, NACUSIP-TUCP
submitted Charter Certificate No. 003-89,
dated 20 July 1989, of the NACUSIP-
TUCP Lopez Sugar Central Supervisory
Chapter. LSC, on its part, submitted a list
of its employees above the rank-and-file
status preparatory to the
inclusion/exclusion proceedings.
- One Carlos S. Gevero, asserting a right
to represent the "supervisors of LSC,"
filed a motion to dismiss the petition for
lack of interest on the part of the
supervisory employees.
Med-Arbiter Med-Arbiter Felizardo T. Serapio issued
an Order granting the petition. He ruled
that under Article 257 of the Labor Code,
as amended, the Med-Arbiter was left with
no option but to order the conduct of a
certification election immediately upon
the filing of the petition, holding that the
subsequent disaffiliation or withdrawals of
members did not adversely affect the
standing of the petition.
"VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF THE
FOREGOING, the petition for certification
election
is hereby GRANTED with the following
choices:
"1) National Congress of Unions in the
Sugar Industry of the Phils. (NACUSIP-
TUCP)
2) Commercial and Agro-Industrial Labor
Organization (CAILO);
"3) No Union.
DOLE Secretary of Labor ruled that the holding
by the Med-Arbiter of a certification
election is mandatory under Article 257 of
the Labor Code (appealdenied)(same
reason w/M-A)
19
ISSUE Whether Art 257 of the Labor Code
should be applied on the ground that
NACUSIP-TUCP is a legitimate
organization.
RULING NO.
The law did not reduce the Med-Arbiter to
an automaton which can instantly be set
to impulse by the mere filing of a petition
for certification election. He is still tasked
to satisfy himself that all the conditions of
the law are met, and among the legal
requirements is that the petitioning union
must be a legitimate labor organization in
good standing.
The petition for certification election, in
the case at bench, was filed by the
NACUSIP-TUCP, a national labor
organization duly registered with the
DOLE render Registration Certificate No.
FED-402-6390-IP. The legitimate status
of NACUSIP-TUCP might be conceded;
being merely, however, an agent for the
local organization (the NACUSIP-TUCP
Lopez Sugar Central Supervisory
Chapter), the federation's bona
fide status alone would not suffice. The
local chapter, as its principal, should also
be a legitimate labor organization in good
standing.
A local or chapter therefore becomes a
legitimate labor organization only upon
submission of the following to the BLR:
1) A charter certificate, within 30 days
from its issuance by the labor federation
or national union, and
2) The constitution and by-laws, a
statement on the set of officers, and the
books of accounts all of which are
certified under oath by the secretary or
treasurer, as the case may be, of such
local or chapter, and attested to by its
president.
Absent compliance with these mandatory
requirements, the local or chapter does
not become a legitimate labor
organization. 16
The only document extant on record to
establish the legitimacy of the NACUSIP-
TUCP Lopez Sugar Central Supervisory
Chapter is a charter certificate and
nothing else. The instant petition, at least
for now, must thus be GRANTED.
DOCTRINE Article 257 cited by the Solicitor General
directs the automatic conduct of a
certification election in an unorganized
establishment, it also requires that the
petition for certification election must be
filed by a legitimate labor organization.
Article 212(h) defines a legitimate labor
organization as "any labor organization
duly registered with the DOLE
and includes any branch or local thereof."
(Emphasis supplied) Rule I, Section 1(j),
Book V of the Implementing Rules
likewise defines a legitimate labor
organization as "any labor organization
duly registered with the DOLE
and includes any branch, local or
affiliate thereof."
Labor Dispute
Article [212] 219
"Labor dispute" includes any controversy or matter
concerning terms and conditions of employment or the
association or representation of persons in negotiating,
fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and
conditions of employment, regardless of whether the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and
employee.
Definition
Case:
9. San Miguel Corporation Employees Union vs.
Bersamira, 186 SCRA 496
Title SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION
EMPLOYEES UNION-PTGWO, DANIEL
S.L. BORBON I I , HERMINIA REYES,
MARCELA PURIFICACION, ET AL.,
petitioners, vs. HON. JESUS G.
BERSAMIRA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 166,
RTC, PASIG, and SAN MIGUEL
CORPORATIONCORPORATION,responde
nts
Nature Special civil action for Certiorari and
Prohibition
Keyword Definition of labor dispute
s
Summar A labor dispute exists at the case at bar
y
Facts Sometime in 1983 and 1984, SanMig entered
into contracts for merchandising services with
Lipercon and D'Rite. These companies are
independent contractors duly licensed by the
Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE).
In said contracts, it was expressly understood
and agreed that the workers employed by the
contractors were to be paid by the latter and
20
 that none of them were to be deemed
employees or agents of SanMig. There was
to be no employer- employee relation
between the contractors and/or its workers,
on the one hand, and SanMig on the other.
San Miguel Corporation Employees Union-
PTWGO (the Union, for brevity) is the duly
authorized representative of the monthly paid
rank-and-file employees of SanMig with
whom the latter executed a Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) effective 1 July
1986 to 30 June 1989. Section 1 of their CBA
specifically provides that "temporary,
probationary, or contract employees and
workers are excluded from the bargaining
unit and, therefore, outside the scope of this
Agreement."
In a letter, dated 20 November 1988, the
Union advised SanMig that some Lipercon
and D'Rite workers had signed up for union
membership and sought the regularization of
their employment with SMC. The Union
alleged that this group of employees, while
appearing to be contractual workers of
supposedly independent contractors, have
been continuously working for SanMig for a
period ranging from six (6) months to fifteen
(15) years and that their work is neither
casual nor seasonal as they are performing
work or activities necessary or desirable in
the usual business or trade of SanMig. Thus,
it was contended that there exists a "labor-
only" contracting situation. It was then
demanded that the employment status of
these workers be regularized. On 12 January
1989, on the ground that it had failed to
receive any favorable response from SanMig,
the Union filed a notice of strike for unfair
labor practice, CBA violations, and union
busting.
On 30 January 1989, the Union again filed a
second notice of strike for unfair labor
practice. Beginning 14 February 1989 until 2
March 1989, series of pickets were staged by
Lipercon and D'Rite workers in various SMC
plants and offices. On 6 March 1989, SMC
filed a verified Complaint for Injunction and
Damages before respondent Court
Decision RTC - Issued the corresponding Writ of
of Courts Preliminary Injunction after SanMig had
posted the required bond of P100,000.00 to
answer for whatever damages petitioners
may sustain by reason thereof. In issuing the
Injunction, respondent Court rationalized:
The absence of employer-employee
relationship negates the existence of labor
dispute. Verily, this court has jurisdiction to
take cognizance of plaintiff's grievance. The
evidence so far presented indicates that
plaintiff has contracts for services with
Lipercon and D'Rite. The application and
contract for employment of the defendants'
witnesses are either with Lipercon or D'Rite.
What could be discerned is that there is no
employer-employee relationship between
plaintiff and the contractual workers
employed by Lipercon and D'Rite.
NCMB of DOLE (Conciliation) - On 3 May
1989, the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board (NCMB) called the parties to
conciliation. The Union stated that it would lift
the strike if the thirty (30) Lipercon and D'Rite
employees were recalled, and discussion on
their other demands, such as wage distortion
and appointment of coordinators, were made.
Effected eventually was a Memorandum of
Agreement between SanMig and the Union
that "without prejudice to the outcome of G.R.
No. 87700 and Civil Case No. 57055, the laid-
off individuals . . . shall be recalled effective 8
May 1989 to their former jobs or equivalent
positions under the same terms and
conditions prior to lay-off '. In turn, the Union
would immediately lift the pickets and return
to work
Issue/s Whether or not the case at bar involves, or is
in connection with, or relates to a labor
dispute.
Ratio & A "labor dispute" as defined in Article 212 (1)
Ruling of the Labor Code includes "any controversy
or matter concerning terms and conditions of
employment or the association or
representation of persons in negotiating,
fixing, maintaining, changing, or arranging
the terms and conditions of employment,
regardless of whether the disputants stand in
the proximate relation of employer and
employee.
While it is SanMig's submission that no
employer-employee relationship exists
between itself, on the one hand, and the
contractual workers of Lipercon and D'Rite on
the other, a labor dispute can nevertheless
exist "regardless of whether the disputants
stand in the proximate relationship of
employer and employee” provided the
controversy concerns, among others, the
terms and conditions of employment or a
"change" or "arrangement" thereof.
That a labor dispute, as defined by the law,
does exist herein is evident. At bottom, what
21
 the Union seeks is to regularize the status of
the employees contracted by Lipercon and
D'Rite and, in effect, that they be absorbed
into the working unit of SanMig. This matter
definitely dwells on the working relationship
between said employees vis-a-visSanMig.
Terms, tenure and conditions of their
employment and the arrangement of those
terms are thus involved bringing the matter
within the purview of a labor dispute.
Doctrine A labor dispute can nevertheless exist
"regardless of whether the disputants stand
in the proximate relationship of employer and
employee” provided the controversy
concerns, among others, the terms and
conditions of employment or a "change" or
"arrangement" thereof.
10. Gold City Integrated Port Services vs. NLRC, 245
SCRA 627
Title: GOLD CITY PORT SERVICES VS. NLRC
Nature: (10)
Keywords: Petition for certiorari against decision of
Summary: NLRC
Illegal strike of stevedorers
Labor Arbiter NLRC SC
Facts:  Apr 30,1985 Gold City Port
service’s employees gathered in
mass action to express their
grievances. They were members of
Macajalar Labor Union- Federation
of Free workers (MLU-FFW).
 On same morning, strikers filed
individual notices of strike.
 Due to failure of conciliation,
INPORT filed a complaint for illegal
strike with Labor Arbiter
 On May 7, 1985 NLRC issued a
TRO and majority returned for work
except respondents.
 278 employees claimed they were
duped to sign the notice of strike
and returned to work.
Labor Strike is found to be illegal. LA held strikers
Arbiter should be accepted back without screening
required and that union officers should also
be accepted back to work after seeking
reconsideration from petitioner.
NLRC NLRC affirmed LA’s decision with
modification-holding in view of strained
relationships between parties, separation
pay must be rewarded in lieu of
reinstatement. It awarded 6 months’ salary
as separation pay.
CA
Issues: Whether separation pay and backwages
may be awarded by public respondent
NLRC to participants of illegal strike
Ratio: No backwages will be awarded to private
respondent-union members as a penalty for
their participation in the illegal strike. Their
continued participation in said strike, even
after most of their coworkers had returned
to work, can hardly be rewarded by such an
award.
The fate of private respondent-union
officers is different. Their insistence on
unconditional reinstatement or separation
pay and backwages is unwarranted and
unjustified. For knowingly participating in an
illegal strike, the law mandates that a union
officer may be terminated from
employment.
Ruling: WHEREFORE, from the foregoing
premises, the Petition in G.R. No. 103560
(“Gold City Integrated Port Service, Inc. vs.
National Labor Relations Commission, et
al.”) is GRANTED One month salary for
each year of service until 1985 is awarded
to private respondents who were not union
officer as separation pay. The petition in
G.R. No. 103599 (“AdeloEbuna, et al. vs.
National Labor Relations Commission, et
al.”) is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No
costs.
Doctrine: Labor dispute includes any controversy or
matter concerning terms or conditions of
employment or the association or
representation of persons in negotiating, ,
fixing or maintaining, changing or arranging
the terms and conditions of employment,
regardless of whether or not disputants
stand in the proximate relation of employers
and employees.
Test for Determining Labor Dispute
Case:
11. RCPI vs. Philippine Communications Electronics
and Electricity Workers Federation, 65 SCRA 82
Title: RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI), vs.
PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS
ELECTRONICS & ELECTRICITY
Nature: WORKERS' FEDERATION (FCWF), et.
Keywords: al.
Summary: G.R. No. L-37662 July 15, 1975
Prayer for modified judgment
order of reinstatement
Modification of previous SC decision
22

Facts: Facts (August 30, 1974 case)
Philippine Communications Electronics
and Electricity Workers' Federation
presented to the petitioner a set of
proposals to be embodied in a collective
bargaining agreement. As the response
was negative, the main ground being that
there was already an existing collective
labor contract, an impasse resulted. It was
sought to be resolved by the Bureau of
Labor Relations of the Department of Labor
acting as conciliator. The attempt was
unsuccessful. A strike was declared on
November 17, 1967. The respondent Court
took over as there was an element of an
unfair labor practice. In addition, on
January 3, 1968, the Secretary of Labor
sent a communication to respondent Court
endorsing the labor dispute under Section
16(c) of the Minimum Wage Law. There
was on February 15, 1968 a motion filed by
respondent labor Union seeking an order of
reinstatement pending the resolution of the
case on the merits. It was granted by
respondent Court in a resolution of April 23,
1968. Apparently, the return-to-work order
was not complied with, as on December 27,
1969, a writ of execution was issued by the
Clerk of Court of respondent Court
requiring the reinstatement of the strikers
without loss of seniority.
In this case, the respondents pray to
include in the judgment an award of
backwages to the employees and laborers
concerned, in addition to their immediate
reinstatement. The plea is opposed by
petitioner upon the ground that the issue of
payment of backwages was neither raised
in nor passed upon by the Industrial Court
and is, in fact, not even touched in the
previous pleadings of the parties in the
instant case. Additionally, it is averred that
the matter is now actually being looked into
by the National Labor Relations Board,
hence it is not necessary for this Court to
take it up.
Issues: Whether the respondents may claim
backwages? – YES
Ratio: The fact that nothing was done in the court
below about it is not a valid objection to the
granting thereof. Neither can its denial be
justified just because it was not expressly
demanded by respondents before Our
decision was handed down.
We are not dealing here with backwages to
be paid to workers who are being ordered
reinstated as a consequence of a finding by
the court that their suspension or dismissal
by their employer is illegal, which, of
course, is dependent on the sound
discretion of the court. (Union of Philippine
Education Employees vs. Philippine
Education Company, 91 Phil. 93.) In the
present instance, what is involved is a
failure to comply with, nay a veiled defiance
by respondent of a return-to-work order of
the Industrial Court issued seven years
ago. Worse, from all appearances, such
continued resistance of petitioner to said
peremptory order can hardly evoke
sympathy. To begin with, its attempt to
question the identity of those entitled to
reinstatement claiming that they were not
actually in their employ at the time of the
declaration of the strike sounds hollow. It is
inconceivable that strangers and outsiders
would try to be taken in such a surreptitious
manner. Neither can the allegation that
petitioner has presented evidence of
abandonment prior to the strike and of
resignations subsequent thereto be of help
to petitioner. Voluntary abandonment of
work before a strike is too unusual to be
readily credible whereas purported
resignations after a strike and during the
pendency of protracted reinstatement
proceedings are at least suspect and do not
affect the employee status of the persons
concerned, unless there is patent evidence
that the pretended abandonment or
resignation was due to another
employment. Moreover, the proceedings
below had been stalled by transparent
dilatory moves of petitioner which are
basically irreconcilable with the attitude of
cooperativeness and obedience an
employer is expected to maintain at all
times towards orders of the court issued by
virtue of powers expressly granted to it by
law. (Section 10, Republic Act 875; Section
19, Commonwealth Act 103.)
Employees and workers deprived of their
means of livelihood in defiance of a judicial
order the legality of which is beyond dispute
do not have to remind the court of their right
to get compensated of their lost earnings
upon their actual reinstatement. Award
thereof should come as a matter of course.
For us not to rule on this point now only to
leave it for action by the National Labor
Relations Board and thereby give rise to
another possible appeal to Us is to
unnecessarily lengthen even more the
23
 tortuous road already travelled by
respondents in their effort to get what has
been rightfully due them since years ago.
We would be recreant to our constitutional
duty to give protection to labor that way.
Accordingly, each of the 167 members of
respondent unions named in the decision
under review and found by the Industrial
Court to be entitled to reinstatement should
be paid backwages for two years, without
any deduction or qualification, at the
respective rates of compensation they were
receiving at the time of the strike,
November 17, 1967. It goes without saying
that all those who can be shown by
incontestible evidence to have died prior to
the date of the strike shall be disregarded,
but the heirs of those who have died after
the strike shall receive the respective
proportional amounts due their
predecessors-in-interest as of the time of
death, if the same occurred less than two
years from the date of the strike, and the full
two-years backwages, if after two years
from said date. Any amount paid by reason
or on the occasion of supposed
resignations after the strike shall not be
deducted.
Ruling: WHEREFORE, the motion for
reconsideration of petitioner dated
September 16, 1974 as well as the motion
to intervene of URCPICLA-PAFLU of
October 16, 1974 are both denied for lack
of merit. On the other hand, the motion of
respondent RCPIEU of November 6, 1974
for modification of judgment is granted, if
only to complete Our decision, which
cannot be final without such award being
included therein. Petitioner is ordered to
pay the 167 employees and workers of
petitioner enumerated in the lndustrial
Court's order of October 5,1973
backwages for two years, without any
deduction or qualification, pursuant to the
tenor of the above opinion. This resolution
is also immediately executory.
Doctrine: Employees and workers deprived of their
means of livelihood in defiance of a judicial
order the legality of which is beyond dispute
do not have to remind the court of their right
to get compensated of their lost earnings
upon their actual reinstatement. Award
thereof should come as a matter of course.
Labor Relations Policy
Dispute Settlement Methodology
Article [211] 218 (a)- To promote and emphasize the
primacy of free collective bargaining and negotiations,
including voluntary arbitration, mediation and conciliation, as
modes of settling labor or industrial disputes;
Collective Bargaining
Case:
12. Kiok Loy vs. NLRC, 1414 SCRA 179
Title: (12) Kiok Loy vs NLRC, 141 SCRA 179
Nature: (Employer’s unjustified refusal to bargain)
Keywords: Petition on certiorari to annul the decision of
Summary: NLRC
Collective Bargaining, Unfair Labor Practice
BLR – LA – NLRC - SC
Facts: The PambansangKilusangPaggawa
(Union), a legitimate labor federation, won in
the certification election and was
subsequently certified by the Bureau of
Labor Relations (BLR) as the sole and
exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-
file employees of Sweden Ice Cream Plant
(Company).
Thereafter, the Union furnished the
Company with two copies of its proposed
collective bargaining agreement (CBA)
together with its request for the Company’s
counter proposals. However, the company
did not act on the request despite the
reiteration of the Union of its requests.
Left with no other alternative in its attempt to
bring the Company to the bargaining table,
the Union, on filed a "Notice of Strike", with
the BLR on ground of unresolved economic
issues in collective bargaining.
Conciliation proceedings then followed
during the thirty-day statutory cooling-off
period. But all attempts towards an amicable
settlement failed, prompting the BLR to
certify the case to the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) for
compulsory arbitration. The labor arbiter set
the initial hearing, however, both parties
failed to submit their respective position
papers as required. Hence, the said hearing
was cancelled and reset to another date.
Meanwhile, the Union submitted its position
paper. The Company did not, and instead
requested for a resetting which was granted.
The Company was directed anew to submit
its financial statements for the years 1976,
1977, and 1978.
24
 The case was further reset to May 11, 1979
due to the withdrawal of the Company's
counsel of record, Meanwhile, Atty.
FortunatoPanganiban formally entered his
appearance as counsel for the Company
only to request for another postponement
allegedly for the purpose of acquainting
himself with the case. Meanwhile, the
Company submitted its position paper on
May 28, 1979.
When the case was called for hearing as
scheduled, the Company's representative
who was supposed to be examined failed to
appear. Again, it requested for
postponement which the labor arbiter denied
and that the Company has waived its right to
present further evidence and, therefore,
considered the case submitted for
resolution.
The labor arbiter submitted its report to the
NLRC which eventually rendered its
decision declaring the company guilty of
unjustified refusal to bargain. It also ruled
that the draft proposal for a collective
bargaining agreement sent by the Union to
the company was found to be reasonable
and declared to be the collective agreement
which should govern the relationship
between the parties herein.
The company assailed the decision of the
NLRC alleging that it acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
in rendering the challenged decision. The
Court initially dismissed the petition for lack
of merit but was the Resolution of dismissal
was reconsidered and the petition was given
due course.
The company alleged that its right to
procedural due process has been violated
when it was precluded from presenting
further evidence in support of its stand and
when its request for further postponement
was denied. It also contends that the
NLRC's finding of unfair labor practice for
refusal to bargain is not supported by law
and the evidence and that the Collective
Bargaining Agreement approved and
adopted by the NLRC is unreasonable and
lacks legal basis.
BLR The Union filed a notice of strike with the
BLR on ground of unresolved economic
issues in collective bargaining. Conciliation
proceedings then followed during the thirty-
day statutory cooling-off period. But all
attempts towards an amicable settlement
failed, prompting the BLR to certify the case
to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration.
Labor The labor arbiter set the initial hearing,
Arbiter however, both parties failed to submit their
respective position papers as required.
Hence, the said hearing was cancelled and
reset to another date. Meanwhile, the Union
submitted its position paper. The Company
did not, and instead requested for a resetting
which was granted. The Company was
directed anew to submit its financial
statements for the years 1976, 1977, and
1978.
After several postponement and when the
scheduled examination of the Company's
representative failed to appear, the Labor
Arbiter denied another postponement and
ruled the Company has waived its right to
present further evidence and, therefore,
considered the case submitted for
resolution.
The labor arbiter submitted its report to the
NLRC.
NLRC The NLRC rendered its decision declaring
the company guilty of unjustified refusal to
bargain. It also ruled that the draft proposal
for a collective bargaining agreement sent
by the Union to the company was found to
be reasonable and declared to be the
collective agreement which should govern
the relationship between the parties herein.
Issues: Whether or not Sweden Ice Cream Plant
committed an unfair labor practice for
unjust refusal to bargain?
Ruling: Yes, Sweden Ice Cream Plant committed an
unfair labor practice for unjust refusal to
bargain.
Collective bargaining which is defined as
negotiations towards a collective
agreement, is one of the democratic
frameworks under the New Labor Code,
designed to stabilize the relation between
labor and management and to create a
climate of sound and stable industrial peace.
It is a mutual responsibility of the employer
and the Union and is characterized as a
legal obligation. So much so that Article 249,
par. (g) of the Labor Code makes it an unfair
labor practice for an employer to refuse "to
meet and convene promptly and
expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of
negotiating an agreement with respect to
wages, hours of work, and all other terms
25
 and conditions of employment including
proposals for adjusting any grievance or
question arising under such an agreement
and executing a contract incorporating such
agreement, if requested by either party.
In this case, Sweden Ice Cream Plant unjust
refusal to bargain
Doctrine: the Labor Code makes it an unfair labor
practice for an employer to refuse "to meet
and convene promptly and expeditiously in
good faith for the purpose of negotiating an
agreement with respect to wages, hours of
work, and all other terms and conditions of
employment including proposals for
adjusting any grievance or question arising
under such an agreement and executing a
contract incorporating such agreement, if
requested by either party.
Trade Unionism
Article [211] 218 (b) and (e)
b. To promote free trade unionism as an instrument for the
enhancement of democracy and the promotion of social
justice and development;
e. To provide an adequate administrative machinery for the
expeditious settlement of labor or industrial disputes;
Article [212] 219 (g)
g. "Labor organization" means any union or association of
employees which exists in whole or in part for the purpose
of collective bargaining or of dealing with employers
concerning terms and conditions of employment.
Worker Enlightenment
Article [211] 218 (d)
d. To promote the enlightenment of workers concerning their
rights and obligations as union members and as employees;
Article [241] 249 (p): Rights and conditions of Membership
in a Labor Organization
Art. 241. Rights and conditions of membership in a labor
organization. The following are the rights and
conditions of membership in a labor organization:
p. It shall be the duty of any labor organization and its
officers to inform its members on the provisions of its
constitution and by-laws, collective bargaining agreement,
the prevailing labor relations system and all their rights and
obligations under existing labor laws.
Article 277 (a)
Art. 277. Miscellaneous provisions.
a. All unions are authorized to collect reasonable
membership fees, union dues, assessments and fines and
other contributions for labor education and research, mutual
death and hospitalization benefits, welfare fund, strike fund
and credit and cooperative undertakings. (As amended by
Section 33, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989)
Sections 1 – 3, Rule XX, Book V
RULE XX
LABOR EDUCATION AND RESEARCH
Section 1. Labor education of workers and employees. - The
Department shall develop, promote and implement
appropriate labor education and research programs on the
rights and responsibilities of workers and employers.
It shall be the duty of every legitimate labor organization to
implement a labor education program for its members on
their rights and obligations as unionists and as employees.
Section 2. Mandatory conduct of seminars. - Subject to the
provisions of Article 241, it shall be mandatory for every
legitimate labor organization to conduct seminars and
similar activities on existing labor laws, collective
agreements, company rules and regulations and other
relevant matters. The union seminars and similar activities
may be conducted independently of or in cooperation with
the Department and other labor education institutions.
Section 3. Special fund for labor education and research.
- Every legitimate labor organization shall, for the above
purpose, maintain a special fund for labor education and
research. Existing strike funds may, in whole or in part, be
transformed into labor education and research funds. The
labor organization may also periodically assess and collect
reasonable amounts from its members for such funds.
Cases:
13. Davao Integrated Fort vs. Olvida, 210 SCRA 553
Title INTEGRATED PORT AND
STEVEDORING SERVICES
CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
Title:
ALFREDO C. OLVIDA IN HIS CAPACITY
AS VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR, AND
THE ASSOCIATION OF TRADE UNIONS
(ATU¬TUCP)., respondents.
petition for certiorari with prayer for the
Nature:
issuance of a temporary restraining order
interpretation of CBA for 6 days sick leave/
Keywords:
education assistance
Summary:
The union composing of petitioner's
employees sought for the interpretation of
two provisions of the five¬year Collective
Bargaining Agreement:
Facts: 1. ARTICLE VIII — SICK, VACATION
AND EMERGENCY LEAVES.
Sec. 4 — Emergency Leaves. The
Company agrees to grant a maximum or
six (6) days Emergency Leave with pay
per calendar year to all regular field
26
workers, covered by this agreement who
have rendered at least six months of
service (including overtime) per calendar
year, are members of the Regular Labor
Pool, upon prior approval by the company.
Said Emergency Leave is not cumulative
(sic) nor commutable." (pp. 46¬47, Rollo;
Emphasis supplied.)
ARTICLE XVII — SPECIAL PROVISIONS.
Sec. 4 — Union Education and Training
Fund. The Company agrees to contribute
twelve thousand (P12,000.00) pesos per
year to the Union Education and Training
Fund. (p. 48, Rollo.)
The company's new Assistant General
Manager Benjamin Marzo, insisted that
the above provisions are to be interpreted
as:
1. Under Article VIII, Section 4
(Emergency Leave) — that before the
intermittent field workers who are
members of the Regular Labor Pool can
avail of the six (6) days Emergency Leave
provided in this provision, the workers
must have rendered at least six months of
service per calendar year regardless of
their employment status (i.e., regular or
probationary). Thus, all regular (non¬
intermittent) field workers, who belong to
the Regular Labor Pool must have
rendered at least six months of service per
calendar year to be entitled to the six days
Emergency Leave Pay. Petitioner pointed
out that the phrase "per calendar year" is
used twice in Section 4, the first of which
modifies the word "pay" and the second
modifies the phrase "who or rendered at
least six months of service." (pp.
130¬131.) The entitlement and enjoyment
of the emergency leave must be strictly
availed in the calendar year on which the
six months service was rendered.
2. Under Article XVII, Section 4 (Union
Education and Training Fund) — petitioner
required that the Union should first
prepare and submit a seminar program
before it can avail of the Education and
Training Fund of P12,000.00 per annum.
Arbitrator:
After due hearing, respondent Arbitrator
rendered a decision on May 19, 1990,
upholding the union's interpretations of
Article VIII, Section 4 and Article XVII,
Section 4, of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement.
The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
1. The first sentence of Article VIII, Section
4 which read: "The Company agrees to
grant maximum or six (6) days Emergency
Leave with pay per calendar year to all
regular field workers" — refers to all non-
intermittent regular field workers who
reported for work everyday and therefore
the requirement of six (6) months or 1,248
hours does not apply; whereas, the next
sentences which stated the following:
"covered by this agreement who have
rendered at least six months (including
overtime) per calendar year, are members
of the Regular Labor Pool, upon prior
approval by the company." — refers to
intermittent workers/members of the
Regular Labor Pool, whose work depends
upon the arrival of vessels in the wharf
and therefore must comply [with] the
requirement in the agreement, and so
before it can avail of the six (6) days
Emergency Leave with pay must first
rendered at least six months (including
overtime) per calendar year. Once the
1,248 hours (6 months) is complied
subject workers can avail the benefit
anytime an Emergency occurred and the
same condition of 1,248 hours shall no
longer apply in the succeeding calendar
years.
2. With respect to the other provision of
Article XVII, Section 4 of the new CBA —
Union Education and Training Fund —
since the language of the agreement is
clear and simple the respondent company
shall comply [with] its obligation by
contributing to the Union Education and
Training Fund the amount of Twelve
Thousand (P12,000.00) pesos per year at
the beginning of each and every year
and/or P1,000.00 at the end of each and
every month during the lifetime of the CBA
at the option of the respondent company.
Any post signing condition impose by
either or the parties that may affect the
spontaneous implementation of Article
XVII, Section 4 is foreign to the language
of the contract.
Interpretation of CBA provisions as
Issues:
mentioned
Ratio:
27
 In this petition for certiorari, petitioner
assails the respondent Arbitrator's
construction
Ruling: Court finds the petitioner's
interpretation of Section 4, Article VIII
(emergency leave) more logical than the
Arbitrator's and the Union's. The provision
of the CBA is clear: (1) the employee must
be a member of the Regular Labor Pool;
(2) he is entitled to only six (6) days
emergency leave with pay per calendar
year; and (3) he must have rendered Doctrine:
service for at least six (6) months during
the year when he took his emergency 14. Victoria vs. Inciong, 157 SCRA 339
leave. The emergency leave may be
staggered or it may last for any number of
Title:
days as emergencies arise but the
Nature:
employee is entitled only to six (6) days of
Keywords:
emergency leave "with pay" per year.
Summary:
Since the emergency leave is allowed to
enable the employee to attend to an
emergency in his family or household, it
may be taken at any time during the
calendar year but he must render at least
six months service for that year to be
Facts:
entitled to collect his wages for the six (6)
days of his emergency leave. Since
emergencies are unexpected and
unscheduled happenings, it would be
absurd to require the employee to render
Ruling:
six (6) months service before being
entitled to take a six¬day emergency leave
with pay for it would mean that no
emergency leave can be taken by an
employee during the first six months of a
calendar year.
With regard to the provision on Union
Education and Training Fund in Section 4,
Article XVII of the CBA, the petitioner's
requirement that the Union submit a
seminar program for each calendar year
before it may claim the company's
P12,000 yearly donation to the fund, is not
warranted by the terms of the CBA. The
Arbitrator did not abuse his discretion in
ruling that the respondent company should
comply with its obligation to contribute to
the Union Education and Training Fund
the amount of Twelve Thousand
(P12,000.00) pesos per year by paying
said amount to the Union at the beginning
of each and every year, or contributing
P1,000.00 at the end of each and every
month during the lifetime or the CBA, at
the option of the company. As correctly
observed by the Arbitrator, the employer's
demand for the submission of a seminar
program "is foreign to the language of the
contract" with the union.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is
GRANTED. Section 4, Article VIII of the
CBA is interpreted to mean that any
employee who is a member of the Regular
Labor Pool is entitled to six (6) days
emergency leave with pay per calendar
year provided he has rendered at least six
(6) months service during the year when
he took his emergency leave. The decision
of the respondent Voluntary Arbitrator is
AFFIRMED in other respects.
Victoria vsInciong-Acting Labor Secretary –
(Respondent Company: Far East
Broadcasting Company Inc)
Review for Certiorari of Order of Acting
Secretary of Labor
Responsibility of Union Leader to inform its
members on prevailing labor standards
Labor Arbiter NLRC Labor Secretary
SC (certiorari)
 Petitioner Saturno Victoria is the
president of the Far East
Broadcasting Company Employees
Union. The said union declared a
strike against respondent company
for refusal to recognize the union
on the ground that the respondent,
being a non-profit, non-stock, non-
commercial and religious
corporation, is not covered by
Republic Act 875, otherwise known
as the Industrial Peace Act, the
labor law enforced at that time.
Respondent filed with the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan, Civil
Case No. 750-V, for the issuance
of an injunction and a prayer that
the strike be declared illegal.
 Petitioner together with the other
strikers filed with the ad hoc
National Labor Relations
Commission Case Nos. 0021 and
0285 for reinstatement. The
Arbitrator rendered a decision and
ordered respondent to reinstate
petitioner
 In a Decision dated April 23, 1975,
in Civil Case No. 750-V,
promulgated by the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan, the strike
staged by herein petitioner and the
other strikers was declared illegal
inasmuch as it was for the purpose
of compelling the company to
recognize their labor union which
28
 could not be legally done because
the company is not covered by
Republic Act 875 as it is a non-
profit organization since it does not
declare dividends. Based on said
Decision, respondent company
dismissed the petitioner from his
employment. Hence, he filed the
instant complaint for illegal
dismissal before the NLRC against
the respondent company alleging
violation of Article 267 of the Labor
Code which requires clearance
from the Secretary of Labor for
every shutdown of business
establishments or dismissal of
employees.
Labor  Based on the finding that
Arbiter respondent did not file any
application for clearance to
terminate the services of
complainant before dismissing him
from his employment, Labor Arbiter
rendered a decision in petitioner's
favor declaring the dismissal to be
illegal, thereby ordering
reinstatement with full backwages.
NLRC (on  Respondent appealed. NLRC
appeal) affirmed Labor Arbiter.
Secretary  Respondent appealed from the
of Labor decision of NLRC. Decision was set
(on aside. A new judgment entered,
appeal) ordering respondent company to
give petitioner separation pay
equivalent to one-half month salary
for every year of service
Issues: 1. Whether or not a clearance from
the Secretary of Labor is still
necessary before the petitioner
could be dismissed.
2. Whether or not the decision of the
CFI-Bulacan in the civil case ipso
facto gave the private respondent
authority to dismiss petitioner
without clearance from the
Secretary of Labor.
Ratio: 1. Technically speaking, no clearance
was obtained by private respondent
from the then Secretary of Labor.
However, the rationale behind the
clearance requirement was fully
met. The Secretary of Labor was
apprised of private respondent's
intention to terminate the services
of petitioner. This in effect is an
application for clearance to dismiss
petitioner from employment. The
affirmance of the restrictive
condition in the dispositive portion
of the labor arbiter's decision in
NLRC Case Nos. 0021 and 0285
by the Secretary of Labor and the
Office of the President of the
Philippines, signifies a grant of
authority to dismiss petitioner in
case the strike is declared illegal by
the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan. Respondent company
acted in good faith when it
terminated the employment of
petitioner upon a declaration of
illegality of the strike by the Court
of First Instance of Bulacan.
Moreover, the then Secretary of
Labor manifested his conformity to
the dismissal, not once, but twice.
In this regard, the mandatory rule
on clearance need not be applied.
2. The law then enforced, Republic
Act 875 specifically excluded
respondent company from its
coverage. Even if the parties had
gone to court to compel
recognition, no positive relief could
have been obtained since the same
was not sanctioned by law.
Because of this, there was no
necessity on the part of private
respondent to show specific acts of
petitioner during the strike to justify
his dismissal. Petitioner should
have known and it was his duty to
impart this imputed knowledge to
the members of the union that
employees and laborers in non-
profit organizations are not covered
by the provisions of the Industrial
Peace Act and the Court of
Industrial Relations/ Court of First
Instance has no jurisdiction to
entertain petitions of labor unions
or organizations of said non-profit
organizations for certification as the
exclusive bargaining
representatives of said employees
and laborers.
Ruling: Inasmuch as there was a valid and
reasonable ground to dismiss petitioner but
no report as required by the implementing
rules and regulations of the Labor Code
was filed by respondent Company with the
then Department of Labor, petitioner as
held by the Acting Secretary of Labor, is
entitled to separation pay equivalent to
one-half month salary for every year of
service.
Petition is dismissed. The decision of the
acting Secretary of Labor is Affirmed.
29
 Doctrine: Worker Enlightenment
Petitioner as a union leader, must see to it
that the policies and activities of the union in
the conduct of labor relations are within the
precepts of law and any deviation from the
legal boundaries shall be imputable to the
leader. He bears the responsibility of guiding
the union along the path of law and to cause
the union to demand what is not legally
demandable, would foment anarchy which is
a prelude to chaos.
Machinery Dispute Settlement
Article 211 (e)
e. To provide an adequate administrative machinery for the
expeditious settlement of labor or industrial disputes;
Industrial Peace
Article 211 (f)
f. To ensure a stable but dynamic and just industrial peace;
and
Article 273 (a) – (i)
Title IX
SPECIAL PROVISIONS
Article 273.Study of labor-management relations. The
Secretary of Labor shall have the power and it shall be his
duty to inquire into:
a. the existing relations between employers and
employees in the Philippines;
b. the growth of associations of employees and the
effect of such associations upon employer-
employee relations;
c. the extent and results of the methods of collective
bargaining in the determination of terms and
conditions of employment;
d. the methods which have been tried by employers
and associations of employees for maintaining
mutually satisfactory relations;
e. desirable industrial practices which have been
developed through collective bargaining and other
voluntary arrangements;
f. the possible ways of increasing the usefulness and
efficiency of collective bargaining for settling
differences;
g. the possibilities for the adoption of practical and
effective methods of labor-management
cooperation;
h. any other aspects of employer-employee relations
concerning the promotion of harmony and
understanding between the parties; and
i. the relevance of labor laws and labor relations to
national development.
The Secretary of Labor shall also inquire into the causes of
industrial unrest and take all the necessary steps within his
power as may be prescribed by law to alleviate the same,
and shall from time to time recommend the enactment of
such remedial legislation as in his judgment may be
desirable for the maintenance and promotion of industrial
peace.
Worker Participation in decision Making
Article 211 (g)
g. To ensure the participation of workers in decision and
policy-making processes affecting their rights, duties and
welfare.
Article 277 (g)
g. The Ministry shall help promote and gradually develop,
with the agreement of labor organizations and employers,
labor-management cooperation programs at appropriate
levels of the enterprise based on the shared responsibility
and mutual respect in order to ensure industrial peace and
improvement in productivity, working conditions and the
quality of working life. (Incorporated by Batas
PambansaBilang 130, August 21, 1981)
Right Test
Case:
15. PAL vs. NLRC, 225 SCRA 301
Title: PAL vs. NLRC, 225 SCRA 301
Nature: Petition for certiorari on the issue of
whether or not the formulation of a Code
Keywords: of Discipline among employees is a
Summary: shared responsibility of the employer and
the employees.
Facts:  On March 15, 1985, the
Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL)
completely revised its 1966 Code
of Discipline. The Code was
circulated among the employees
and was immediately
implemented, and some
employees were forthwith
subjected to the disciplinary
measures embodied therein.
 On August 20, 1985, the
Philippine Airlines Employees
Association (PALEA) filed a
complaint in the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC)
for unfair labor practice (Case
No. NCR-7-2051-85) with the
following remarks: "ULP with
arbitrary implementation of PAL's
Code of Discipline without notice
and prior discussion with Union
by Management" (Rollo, p. 41).
CONTENTION OF PALEA:
 that PAL, by its unilateral
implementation of the Code, was
guilty of unfair labor practice,
specifically Paragraphs E and G
of Article 249 and Article 253 of
the Labor Code
 that copies of the Code had been
circulated in limited numbers;
30
  that being penal in nature the
Code must conform with the
requirements of sufficient
publication, and
 that the Code was arbitrary,
oppressive, and prejudicial to the
rights of the employees.
PRAYER OF PALEA:
o that implementation of the Code
be held in abeyance;
o that PAL should discuss the
substance of the Code with
PALEA;
o that employees dismissed under
the Code be reinstated and their
cases subjected to further
hearing; and
o that PAL be declared guilty of
unfair labor practice and be
ordered to pay damages
MOTION TO DISMISS
PAL asserts its prerogative as an
employer to prescribe rules and
regulations regarding employees' conduct
in carrying out their duties and function
CONTENTION OF PAL
 that by implementing the Code, it
had not violated the collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) or
any provision of the Labor Code.
 that the complain is unsupported
by evidence
 that Article 253 of the Labor Code
cited by PALEA reffered to the
requirements for negotiating a
CBA which was inapplicable as
indeed the current CBA had been
negotiated.
REPLY OF PALEA
In its reply to PAL's position paper,
PALEA maintained that Article 249 (E) of
the Labor Code was violated when PAL
unilaterally implemented the Code, and
cited provisions of Articles IV and I of
Chapter II of the Code as defective for,
respectively, running counter to the
construction of penal laws and making
punishable any offense within PAL's
contemplation.
MID November 7, 1986, Decision: Labor
ARBITER Arbiter Isabel P. Ortiguerra
 No unfair labor practice had been
committed
- finding no bad faith on the
part of PAL in adopting the
Code
 PAL was "not totally fault free"
Reason:
- while the issuance of rules
and regulations governing the
conduct of employees is a
"legitimate management
prerogative" such rules and
regulations must meet the test
of "reasonableness, propriety
and fairness."
 PAL "failed to prove that the new
Code was amply circulated."
- such "failure" on the part of
PAL resulted in the imposition
of penalties on employees
who thought all the while that
the 1966 Code was still being
followed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
respondent PAL is hereby ordered as
follows:
1. Furnish all employees with the
new Code of Discipline;
2. Reconsider the cases of
employees meted with penalties
under the New Code of Discipline
and remand the same for further
hearing; and
3. Discuss with PALEA the
objectionable provisions
specifically tackled in the body of
the decision.
All other claims of the complainant union
(is) [are] hereby, dismissed for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
National  PAL APPEALED TO THE NLRC
Labor  found no evidence of unfair labor
Relations practice committed by PAL and
Commission  affirmed the dismissal of PALEA's
(NLRC) charge.
 made the following observations:
o failure of management to
discuss the provisions of
a contemplated code of
discipline would result in
the erosion and
deterioration of an
otherwise harmonious
and smooth relationship
between them as did
31
 happen in the instant
case
o the complainant union in
this case has the right to
feel isolated in the
adoption of the New Code
of Discipline.
o the Code of Discipline
involves security of tenure
and loss of employment
— a property right
o participation by the union
in the adoption of the
code if conduct could
have accelerated and
enhanced their feelings of
belonging and would
have resulted in
cooperation rather than
resistance to the Code. In
fact, labor-management
cooperation is now "the
thing."
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
we modify the appealed decision in
the sense that the New Code of
Discipline should be reviewed and
discussed with complainant union,
particularly the disputed provisions [.]
(T)hereafter, respondent is directed to
furnish each employee with a copy of
the appealed Code of Discipline. The
pending cases adverted to in the
appealed decision if still in the arbitral
level, should be reconsidered by the
respondent Philippine Air Lines. Other
dispositions of the Labor Arbiter are
sustained.
SC Petition for certiorari
PAL then filed the instant petition for
certiorari charging public respondents
with grave abuse of discretion in:
(a) directing PAL "to share its
management prerogative of formulating a
Code of Discipline";
(b) engaging in quasi-judicial legislation in
ordering PAL to share said prerogative
with the union;
(c) deciding beyond the issue of unfair
labor practice, and
(d) requiring PAL to reconsider pending
cases still in the arbitral level (p. 7,
Petition; p. 8, Rollo.)
PAL assertion:
o that when it revised its Code on
March 15, 1985, there was no
law which mandated the sharing
of responsibility therefore
between employer and
employee.
Issues: Whether management may be compelled
to share with the union or its employees
its prerogative of formulating a code of
discipline.
Ratio: Indeed, it was only on March 2, 1989,
with the approval of Republic Act No.
6715, amending Article 211 of the Labor
Code, that the law explicitly considered it
a State policy "(t)o ensure the
participation of workers in decision and
policy-making processes affecting the
rights, duties and welfare." However,
even in the absence of said clear
provision of law, the exercise of
management prerogatives was never
considered boundless.
All this points to the conclusion that the
exercise of managerial prerogatives is not
unlimited. It is circumscribed by
limitations found in law, a collective
bargaining agreement, or the general
principles of fair play and justice
(University of Sto. Tomas vs. NLRC, 190
SCRA 758 [1990]). Moreover, as
enunciated in Abbott Laboratories (Phil.),
vs. NLRC (154 713 [1987]), it must be
duly established that the prerogative
being invoked is clearly a managerial
one.
PAL's position that it cannot be saddled
with the "obligation" of sharing
management prerogatives as during the
formulation of the Code, Republic Act No.
6715 had not yet been enacted
(Petitioner's Memorandum, p. 44; Rollo,
p. 212), cannot thus be sustained. While
such "obligation" was not yet founded in
law when the Code was formulated, the
attainment of a harmonious labor-
management relationship and the then
already existing state policy of
enlightening workers concerning their
rights as employees demand no less
than the observance of transparency
in managerial moves affecting
employees' rights.
Ruling: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED
and the questioned decision AFFIRMED.
No special pronouncement is made as to
costs.
Doctrine: "participation of workers in decision and
policy making processes affecting their
rights, duties and welfare."
Wage Fixing
Article 211B
32
B. To encourage a truly democratic method of regulating the
relations between the employers and employees by means
of agreements freely entered into through collective
bargaining, no court or administrative agency or official shall
have the power to set or fix wages, rates of pay, hours of
work or other terms and conditions of employment, except
as otherwise provided under this Code. (As amended by
Section 3, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989)
Article 263 (g)
Art. 263. Strikes, picketing and lockouts.
g. When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing
or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry
indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor
and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute
and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for
compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification
shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended
or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption
or certification order. If one has already taken place at the
time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out
employees shall immediately return-to-work and the
employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit
all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing
before the strike or lockout. The Secretary of Labor and
Employment or the Commission may seek the assistance of
law enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with this
provision as well as with such orders as he may issue to
enforce the same.
Rationale Policy
Case:
16. Caltex Filipino Manager and Supervisors
Association vs. CIR, 44 SCRA 350
(please refer to case #5)
Tripartism
Article 275 (a) and (b)
Art. 275. Tripartism and tripartite conferences.
a. Tripartism in labor relations is hereby declared a
State policy. Towards this end, workers and
employers shall, as far as practicable, be
represented in decision and policy-making bodies of
the government.
b. The Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly
authorized representatives may, from time to time,
call a national, regional, or industrial tripartite
conference of representatives of government,
workers and employers for the consideration and
adoption of voluntary codes of principles designed
to promote industrial peace based on social justice
or to align labor movement relations with
established priorities in economic and social
development. In calling such conference, the
Secretary of Labor and Employment may consult
with accredited representatives of workers and
employers. (As amended by Section 32, Republic
Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989)
PART TWO: RIGHT TO SELF-ORGANIZATION
Basis of Right
1. 1987 Constitution
Article III- SECTION 8. The right of the people,
including those employed in the public and private
sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for
purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
2. Article XIII- SECTION 3. The State shall afford full
protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality
of employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-
organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and
peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in
accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of
tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage.
They shall also participate in policy and decision-making
processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be
provided by law.
The State shall promote the principle of shared
responsibility between workers and employers and the
preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes,
including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual
compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.
The State shall regulate the relations between workers and
employers, recognizing the right of labor to its just share in
the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to
reasonable returns on investments, and to expansion and
grow.
3. Section 6, Article III, 1935 Constitution- (No Section 6,
Only Section 1, Paragraph 6)
(6) The right to form associations or societies for purposes
not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Section 7, Article IV, 1973 Constitution
4. SEC. 7. The right to form associations or societies for
purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Cases:
17. Metrolab Industries vs. Roldan Confessor, G.R. No.
108855, February 25, 1996
Title: METROLAB INDUSTRIES, INC.
vs. HONORABLE MA. NIEVES
Nature: ROLDAN-CONFESOR
Keywords: G.R. No. 108855. February 28, 1996
Summary: Petition for certiorari
Confidential employees
DOLE - SC
Facts: Metro Drug Corporation Employees
Association-Federation of Free Workers
33
(Union) is a labor organization representing
the rank and file employees of petitioner
Metrolab Industries, Inc. and also of Metro
Drug, Inc.
The CBA between Metrolab and the Union
expired. The negotiations for a new CBA,
however, ended in a deadlock.
Consequently, the Union filed a notice of
strike against Metrolab and Metro Drug
Inc. The parties failed to settle their dispute
despite the conciliation efforts of the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board.
To contain the escalating dispute, the then
Secretary of Labor and Employment,
Ruben D. Torres, issued an assumption
order enjoining the strike and lockout and
directed the parties to cease and desist
from committing any and all acts that might
exacerbate the situation.
Thereafter, then Labor Secretary Torres
issued an order resolving all the disputed
items in the CBA and ordered the parties
involved to execute a new CBA. The Union
filed a motion for reconsideration. During its
pendency, Metrolab laid off 94 of its rank
and file employees. On the same date, the
Union filed a motion for a cease and desist
order to enjoin Metrolab from implementing
the mass layoff, alleging that such act
violated the prohibition against committing
acts that would exacerbate the dispute as
specifically directed in the assumption
order. On the other hand, Metrolab
contended that the layoff was temporary
and in the exercise of its management
prerogative.
Acting Labor Secretary Confesor issued a
resolution declaring the layoff of Metrolabs
94 rank and file workers illegal and ordered
their reinstatement with full
backwages. Metrolab filed a Partial Motion
for Reconsideration alleging that the layoff
did not aggravate the dispute since no
untoward incident occurred as a result
thereof. It, likewise, filed a motion for
clarification regarding the constitution of the
bargaining unit covered by the CBA.
Labor Secretary Confesor denied the
partial motion for reconsideration and also
ruled that executive secretaries are
excluded from the closed-shop provision of
the CBA, not from the bargaining unit.
The Union filed a motion for execution.
Metrolab opposed. Hence, the present
petition for certiorari with application for
issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order.
Issues: Whether or not the Hon. Secretary of
Labor and Employment gravely
abused her discretion in including
Executive Secretaries as part of the
bargaining unit of the rank and file
employees.
Ratio: Although Article 245 of the Labor
Code limits the ineligibility to join, form
and assist any labor organization to
managerial employees, jurisprudence
has extended this prohibition to
confidential employees or those who by
reason of their positions or nature of
work are required to assist or act in a
fiduciary manner to managerial
employees and hence, are likewise privy
to sensitive and highly confidential
records.
In Golden Farms, Inc. vs. Ferrer-Calleja,
this Court explicitly made this rationale
applicable to confidential employees:
This rationale holds true also for
confidential employees such as accounting
personnel, radio and telegraph operators,
who having access to confidential
information, may become the source of
undue advantage. Said employee(s) may
act as a spy or spies of either party to a
collective bargaining agreement. This is
specially true in the present case where the
petitioning Union is already the bargaining
agent of the rank-and-file employees in the
establishment. To allow the confidential
employees to join the existing Union of the
rank-and-file would be in violation of the
terms of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement wherein this kind of employees
by the nature of their functions/positions
are expressly excluded.
xxx xxx xxx.
Similarly, in National Association of
Trade Union - Republic Planters Bank
Supervisors Chapter v. Torres we
declared:
xxx xxx xxx.
. . . As regards the other claim of
respondent Bank that Branch
Managers/OICs, Cashiers and Controllers
are confidential employees, having control,
custody and/ or access to confidential
matters, e.g., the branchs cash position,
statements of financial condition, vault
combination, cash codes for telegraphic
transfers, demand drafts and other
negotiable instruments, pursuant to Sec.
1166.4 of the Central Bank Manual
34
regarding joint custody, this claim is not
even disputed by petitioner. A confidential
employee is one entrusted with
confidence on delicate matters, or with
the custody, handling, or care and
protection of the employers
property. While Art. 245 of the Labor
Code singles out managerial employees
as ineligible to join, assist or form any
labor organization, under the doctrine of
necessary, implication, confidential
employees are similarly disqualified. . . .
xxx xxx xxx.
. . .(I)n the collective bargaining process,
managerial employees are supposed to be
on the side of the employer, to act as its
representatives, and to see to it that its
interest are well protected. The employer is
not assured of such protection if these
employees themselves are union
members. Collective bargaining in such a
situation can become one-sided. It is the
same reason that impelled this Court to
consider the position of confidential
employees as included in the
disqualification found in Art. 245 as if the
disqualification of confidential employees
were written in the provision. If confidential
employees could unionize in order to
bargain for advantages for themselves,
then they could be governed by their own
motives rather than the interest of the
employers. Moreover, unionization of
confidential employees for the purpose of
collective bargaining would mean the
extension of the law to persons or
individuals who are supposed to act in the
interest of the employers. It is not
farfetched that in the course of collective
bargaining, they might jeopardize that
interest which they are duty-bound to
protect. . . .
xxx xxx xxx.
And in the latest case of Pier 8
Arrastre& Stevedoring Services, Inc. vs.
Roldan-Confesor,[23] we ruled that:
xxx xxx xxx
. employees, jurisprudence has extended
Upon the other hand, legal secretaries are
neither managers nor
supervisors. Their work is basically
routinary and clerical. However, they
should be differentiated from rank-and-
file employees because they are tasked
with, among others, the typing of legal
documents, memoranda and
correspondence, the keeping of records
and files, the giving of and receiving
notices, and such other duties as
required by the legal personnel of the
corporation. Legal secretaries therefore
fall under the category of confidential
employees. . . .
The Unions assurances fail to
convince. The dangers sought to be
prevented, particularly the threat of conflict
of interest and espionage, are not
eliminated by non-membership of
Metrolabs executive secretaries or
confidential employees in the
Union. Forming part of the bargaining unit,
the executive secretaries stand to benefit
from any agreement executed between the
Union and Metrolab. Such a scenario, thus,
gives rise to a potential conflict between
personal interests and their duty as
confidential employees to act for and in
behalf of Metrolab. They do not have to be
union members to affect or influence either
side.
Finally, confidential employees cannot be
classified as rank and file. As previously
discussed, the nature of employment of
confidential employees is quite distinct from
the rank and file, thus, warranting a
separate category. Excluding confidential
employees from the rank and file
bargaining unit, therefore, is not
tantamount to discrimination.
Ruling: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
petition is partially GRANTED. The
resolutions of public respondent Secretary
of Labor dated 14 April 1992 and 25
January 1993 are hereby MODIFIED to the
extent that executive secretaries of
petitioner Metrolabs General Manager and
the executive secretaries of the members
of its Management Committee are
excluded from the bargaining unit of
petitioners rank and file employees.
Doctrine: Although Article 245 of the Labor
Code limits the ineligibility to join, form and
assist any labor organization to managerial
this prohibition to confidential employees or
those who by reason of their positions or
nature of work are required to assist or act
in a fiduciary manner to managerial
employees and hence, are likewise privy to
sensitive and highly confidential records.
18. Singer Sewing Machine Co. vs. Drilon, 193 SCRA
270
35

Title: SINGER SEWING MACHINE COMPANY
vs. HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, MED-
Nature: ARBITER FELIX B. CHAGUILE, JR., and
Keywords: SINGER MACHINE COLLECTORS
UNION-BAGUIO (SIMACUB)
Summary: PETITION for certiorari to review the order
and resolution of the Department of Labor
and Collection agents are not employees
and so not entitled to right to join or form a
labor organization
MedArbiter DesignateLabor
SecretarySC
Facts:  The respondent union filed a
MedArbiter petition for direct certification as the
Designate sole and exclusive bargaining
agent of all collectors of the Singer
Sewing Machine Company, Baguio
City branch
 The Company opposed the petition
mainly on the ground that the union
Labor members are actually
Secretary employees but are independent
SC contractors as evidenced by the
collection agency agreement
 The respondent Med-Arbiter,
finding that there exists an
employer-employee relationship,
granted the petition for certification
election.
 On appeal, Secretary of Labor
Franklin M. Drilon affirmed it.
 The motion for reconsideration of
the Secretary’s resolution was
denied.
Hence, this petition
 The petitioner relies on the
following stipulations in
Collection Agency Agreement:
(a) a collector is designated as a
“collecting agent” who is to be
considered at all times as an
independent contractor and
not employee of the Company;
(b) collection of all payments on
installment accounts are to be
made monthly or oftener;
(c) an agent is paid
compensation for service in
the form of a commission of
6% of all collections made and
turned over plus a bonus on
said collections;
(d) an agent is required to post a
cash bond of three thousand
pesos (P3,000.00)
(e) he is subject to all the terms
and conditions in
agreement;
(f) the agreement is effective for
one year from the date of its
execution and renewable on a
yearly basis; and
(g) hisservices shall be terminated
in case of failure to satisfy the
minimum monthly collection
performance required, failure
to post a cash bond, or
cancellation of the agreement
at the instance of either party
unless the agent has a
pending obligation or
indebtedness in favor of the
Company.
 The respondents, to prove that
union members are employees,
asserted that they “perform the
most desirable and necessary
activities for the continuous and
effective operations of the business
not of the petitioner Company” citing
Article 280 of the Labor Code. They
also contend that they cannot
legally qualify as independent
contractors who have substantial
capital or investment in the form of
equipment, tools, and the like
necessary in the conduct of the
business. Further, they quote
paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 of the
agreement as control measures
over the means by which an agent
is to perform his services.
-paragraph 2 states that an
agent shall utilize only receipt
forms authorized and issued
the by the Company
-paragraph 3 states that an
agent has to submit and deliver
at least once a week or as
often as required a report of all
collections made using report
forms furnished by the
Company
-paragraph 4 on the monthly
collection quota
his Issues: WON the commission agents are not
employees but are independent
contractors not entitled to right to join or
form a labor organization
Ruling: The present case mainly calls for the
application of the control test, which if not
satisfied, would lead us to conclude that no
employer-employee relationship exists.
Hence, if the union members are not
employees, no right to organize for
the purposes of bargaining, nor to be certified
as such bargaining agent can ever be
recognized.
36

The following elements are generally
considered in the determination of the
employer-employee relationship; “(1) the
selection and engagement of the employee;
(2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of
dismissal; and (4) the power to control the
employee’s conduct—although the latter is
the most important element”
The Agreement confirms the status of the
collecting agent in this case as an
independent contractor not only because he
is explicitly described as such but also
because the provisions permit him to
perform collection services for the company
without being subject to the control of the
latter except only as to the result of his work.
The requirement that collection agents
utilize only receipt forms and report forms
issued by the Company and that reports
shall be submitted at least once a week is
not necessarily an indication of control over
the means by which the job of collection is
to be performed. The agreement itself
specifically explains that receipt forms shall
be used for the purpose of avoiding a co-
mingling of personal funds of the agent with
the money collected on behalf of the
Company. Likewise, the use of standard
report forms as well as the regular time
within which to submit a report of collection
is intended to facilitate order in office
procedures. The monthly collection quota is
a normal requirement found in similar
contractual agreements and is so stipulated
to encourage a collecting agent to report at
least the minimum amount of proceeds.
The Court finds the contention of the
respondents that the union members are
employees under Article 280 of the Labor
Code to have no basis. The definition that
regular employees are those who perform
activities which are desirable and
necessary for the business of the employer
is not determinative in this case. Article 280
is not the yardstick for determining the
existence of an employment relationship
because it merely distinguishes between
two kinds of employees, i.e., regular
employees and casual employees, for
purposes of determining the right of an
employee to certain benefits, to join or form
a union, or to security of tenure. Article 280
does not apply where the existence of an
employment relationship is in dispute.
The respondents’ contention that the union
members are employees of the Company is
based on selected provisions of the
Agreement but ignores the following
circumstances 1. The collection agents are
not required to observe office hours or
report to Singer’s office everyday except,
naturally and necessarily, for the purpose of
remitting their collections; 2. The collection
agents do not have to devote their time
exclusively for SINGER. There is no
prohibition on the part of the collection
agents from working elsewhere. Nor are
these agents required to account for their
time and submit a record of their activity; 3.
The manner and method of effecting
collections are left solely to the discretion of
the collection agents without any
interference on the part of Singer; 4. The
collection agents shoulder their
transportation expenses incurred in the
collections of the accounts assigned to
them; 5. The collection agents are paid
strictly on commission basis. The amounts
paid to them are based solely on the
amounts of collection each of them make.
They do not receive any commission if they
do not effect any collection even if they put
a lot of effort in collecting. They are paid
commission on the basis of actual
collections; and 6. The commissions earned
by the collection agents are directly
deducted by them from the amount of
collections they are able to effect. The net
amount is what is then remitted to Singer.
The Court finds that since private
respondents are not employees of the
Company, they are not entitled to the
constitutional right to join or form a labor
organization for purposes of collective
bargaining. Accordingly, there is no
constitutional and legal basis for their
“union” to be granted their petition for direct
certification.
Resolution and order reversed and set
aside.
Extent and Scope of Right
Cases:
19. Reyes vs. Trajano, 209 SCRA 484
Title ALEXANDER REYES, ALBERTO M. NERA,
EDGARDO M. GECA, and 138 others,
vs. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO, as
Officer-in-Charge, Bureau of Labor
Relations, Med. Arbiter PATERNO ADAP,
37
 and TRI-UNION EMPLOYEES UNION, et
al., respondent.
Nature special civil action of certiorari
Keywords Right to self organization, available to all
Summary
Facts The certification election was authorized
among the employees of Tri-Union Industries
Corporation. The competing unions were Tri-
Union Employees Union-Organized Labor
Association in Line Industries and Agriculture
(TUEU-OLALIA), and Trade Union of the
Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS). Of
the 348 workers initially deemed to be
qualified voters, only 240 actually took part in
the election. Among the 240 employees who
cast their votes were 141 members of the
IglesianiKristo.
The ballots provided for three (3) choices.
(a) TUPAS and (b) TUEU-OLALIA; and,
conformably with established rule and
practice, 1 for (c) a third choice: "NO
UNION."
The final tally of the votes showed the
following results:
TUPAS 1, TUEU-OLALIA 95, NO UNION 1,
SPOILED 1, CHALLENGED 141
The challenged votes were those cast by the
141 INK members. They were segregated
and excluded from the final count in virtue of
an agreement between the competing
unions, reached at the pre-election
conference, that the INK members should
not be allowed to vote "because they are not
members of any union and refused to
participate in the previous certification
elections."
The INK employees promptly made known
their protest to the exclusion of their votes.
They filed f a petition to cancel the election
alleging that it "was not fair" and the result
thereof did "not reflect the true sentiments of
the majority of the employees." TUEU-
OLALIA opposed the petition. It contended
that the petitioners "do not have legal
personality to protest the results of the
election," because "they are not members of
either contending unit, but . . . of the INK"
which prohibits its followers, on religious
grounds, from joining or forming any labor
organization . . . ."
Med- The Med-Arbiter saw no merit in the INK
Arbiter employees 1 petition. He certified the TUEU-
OLALIA as the sole and exclusive bargaining
agent of the rank-and-file employees. He
decided the fact that "religious belief was
(being) utilized to render meaningless the
rights of the non-members of the
IglesianiKristo to exercise the rights to be
represented by a labor organization as the
bargaining agent," and declared the
petitioners as "not possessed of any legal
personality to institute this present cause of
action" since they were not parties to the
petition for certification election.
The petitioners brought the matter up on
appeal to the Bureau of Labor Relations.
There they argued that the Med-Arbiter had
"practically disenfranchised petitioners who
had an overwhelming majority," and "the
TUEU-OLALIA certified union cannot be
legally said to have been the result of a valid
election where at least fifty-one percent of all
eligible voters in the appropriate bargaining
unit shall have cast their votes.
BLR Assistant Labor Secretary Cresenciano B.
Trajano, then Officer-in-Charge of the
Bureau of Labor Relations, denied the
appeal. He opined that the petitioners are
"bereft of legal personality" since they "are
not constituted into a duly organized labor
union, hence, not one of the unions which
vied for certification as sole and exclusive
bargaining representative."
He also pointed out that the petitioners "did
not participate in previous certification
elections in the company for the reason that
their religious beliefs do not allow them to
form, join or assist labor organizations."
ISSUE Whether the141 INK members should be
denied the right to vote on the ground that
they "did not participate in previous
certification elections in the company for the
reason that their religious beliefs do not allow
them to form, join or assist labor
organizations
RULING NO.
The right of self-organization includes the
right to organize or affiliate with a labor union
or determine which of two or more unions in
an establishment to join, and to engage in
concerted activities with co-workers for
purposes of collective bargaining through
representatives of their own choosing, or for
their mutual aid and protection, i.e., the
protection, promotion, or enhancement of
their rights and interests. 5
38
 The respondents' argument that the
petitioners are disqualified to vote because
they "are not constituted into a duly
organized labor union" — "but members of
the INK which prohibits its followers, on
religious grounds, from joining or forming any
labor organization" — and "hence, not one of
the unions which vied for certification as sole
and exclusive bargaining representative," is
specious.Neither law, administrative rule nor
jurisprudence requires that only employees
affiliated with any labor organization may
take part in a certification election. On the
contrary, the plainly discernible intendment
of the law is to grant the right to vote to
all bona fide employees in the bargaining
unit, whether they are members of a labor
organization or not
The contention that petitioners should be
denied the right to vote because they "did not
participate in previous certification elections
in the company for the reason that their
religious beliefs do not allow them to form,
join or assist labor organizations," persuade
acceptance. No law, administrative rule or
precedent prescribes forfeiture of the right to
vote by reason of neglect to exercise the
right in past certification elections. In denying
the petitioners' right to vote upon these
egregiously fallacious grounds, the public
respondents exercised their discretion
whimsically, capriciously and oppressively
and gravely abused the same.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is
GRANTED; the Decision of the then Officer-
in-Charge of the Bureau of Labor Relations
dated December 21, 1987 (affirming the
Order of the Med-Arbiter dated July 22,
1988) is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
20 .Knitjoy vs. Calleja, 214 SCRA 174
Title KNITJOY MANUFACTURING, INC., petitioner,
, vs.. PURA FERRER- PURA FERRER-
CALLEJA, Director of Bureau of Labor Relat
ions, and KNITJOYCALLEJA, Director of
Bureau of Labor Relat ions, and KNITJOY
MONTHLY EMPLOYEES UNION, MONTHLY
EMPLOYEES UNION, respondents
Nature Two consolidated cases
Keywo Right to self organization – extent and scope
rds
Summ
ary
Facts Petitioner KNITJOY had a collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) with the
Federation of Filipino Workers (FFW). The
bargaining unit covered only the regular rank-
and-file employees of KNITJOY paid on a daily
or piece-rate basis. It did not include regular
rank- and-file office and production employees
paid on a monthly basis. The CBA expired on
15 June 1987. Prior to its expiration, the FFW
was split into two (2) factions — the Johnny
Tan and the Aranzamendez factions. The
latter eventually became the Confederation of
Filipino Workers (CFW), herein petitioner in
G.R. No. 82111.
Also prior to the expiration of the CBA, the
Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied
Services (TUPAS) filed a petition for the
holding of a certification election among
KNITJOY's regular rank-and-file employees
paid on a daily and piece-rate basis. Excluded
were the regular rank-and-file employees paid
on a monthly basis. In the certification election
conducted on 10 June 1987, CFW emerged as
the winner; thereafter, negotiations for a new
CBA between CFW and KNITJOY
commenced.
On 24 June 1987, during the pendency of the
said negotiations, private respondent KMEU
filed a petition for certification election among
KNITJOY's regular rank-and-file monthly-
paid employees with Regional Office No. IV of
the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) which docketed the same as R-04-
OD-M-6-75-87. The Knitjoy Monthly
Employees
Association and Confederation of Citizens
Labor Union (KMEU-CCLU), another union
existing in the said company, and petitioner
CFW intervened therein.
In the bargaining history of KNITJOY, the CBA
has been consistently limited to the regular
rank-and-file employees paid on a daily or
piece-rate basis. On the other hand, the rank-
and-file employees paid on a monthly basis
were never included within its scope.
Respondent KMEU's membership is limited to
the latter class of employees, KMEU does not
39
 seek to dislodge CFW as the exclusive
bargaining representative for the former. The
records further disclose that in the
certification solicited by TUPAS and during the
elections which followed thereafter,
resulting in the certification of CFW as the
exclusive bargaining representative, the
monthly-paid employees were expressly
excluded. Thus, the negotiations between
CFW
and KNITJOY following such a certification
could only logically refer to the rank-and-file
employees paid on a daily or piece-rate basis.
Clearly therefore, KNITJOY and CFW
recognize that insofar as the monthly-paid
employees are concerned, the latter's
constituting a separate bargaining unit with the
appropriate union as sole bargaining
representative, can neither be prevented nor
avoided without infringing on these
employees' rights to form a union and to enter
into collective bargaining negotiations.
Stated differently, KNITJOY and CFW
recognize the fact that the existing bargaining
unit in
the former is not — and has never been — the
employer unit. Given this historical and
factual setting, KMEU had the unquestioned
and undisputed right to seek certification as
the exclusive bargaining representative for the
monthly-paid rank-and-file employees; both
KNITJOY and CFW cannot block the same on
the basis of this Court's declaration in
BuletinPublishingCorp.vs.Hon.Sanchez15 and
GeneralRubberandFootwearCorp.vs.
Bureau of Labor Relations (155 SCRA 283
[1987]) regarding the one-company-one union
concept.
Decisio LA - The petition for certification election was
n of dismissed in the Order of 4 September 1987 of
Courts Med-Arbiter Rolando S. de la Cruz, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
petition is hereby Dismissed, but the
parties are instructed to work out (sic) towards
the formation of a single union in
the company."
BLR - KMEU filed a motion to reconsider this
order, which was treated as an appeal by the
Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR).
On 1 December 1987, public respondent
PuraFerrer-Calleja. Director of the BLR,
handed
down a Decision 22 reversing the order of
Med-Arbiter de la Cruz. The dispositive portion
of
the Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Appeal of Knitjoy Monthly Employees is
hereby granted subject to the exclusion of the
monthly paid employees who are
deemed managerial.
Issue/s Whether or not petitioner KNITJOY's monthly-
paid regular rank-and-file
employees can constitute an appropriate
bargaining unit separate and distinct
from the existing unit composed of daily or
piece-rate paid regular rank-and-file
employees.
Ratio & The present Article 245 of the Labor Code
Ruling expressly allows supervisory employees who
are not performing managerial functions to
join, assist or form their separate union but
bars them from membership in a labor
organization of the rank-and-file employees.
The second case on the other hand,
demolishes the stand of KNITJOY and CFW
for, as
correctly contended by the respondents, it in
fact recognizes an exception to the one
company-one union concept. Thus:
"Perhaps it is unusual for the petitioner to have
to deal with two (2) collective
bargaining unions but there is no one to blame
except petitioner itself for creating
the situation it is in. From the beginning of the
existence in 1963 of a bargaining
unit for the employees up to the present,
petitioner had sought to indiscriminately
suppress the members of the private
respondent's right (sic) to self-organization
provided for by law. Petitioner, in justification
of its action, maintained that the
exclusion of the members of the private
respondent from the bargaining union of
the rank-and-file or from forming their own
union was agreed upon by petitioner
corporation with the previous bargaining
representatives . . . Such posture has no
leg to stand on. It has not been shown that
private respondent was privy to this
agreement. And even if it were so, it can never
bind subsequent federations and
unions particularly private respondent-union
because it is a curtailment of the
right to self-organization guaranteed by the
labor laws. However, to prevent any
difficulty and to avoid confusion to all
concerned and, more importantly, to fulfill
the policy of the New Labor Code as well as to
be consistent with Our ruling in the
Buletin case, supra, the monthly-paid rank-
and-file employees should be allowed
40
 to join the union of the daily-paid-rank-and-file
employees of petitioner so that
they can also avail of the CBA benefits
ortoformtheirownrank-and-fileunion,
withoutprejudicetothecertificationelectionthatha
sbeenordered." 2121
(Emphasis supplied)
The public respondent then committed no
abuse of discretion ordering a certification
election among the monthly-paid rank-and-file
employees, except managerial employees, of
KNITJOY. The choice however, should not be,
as correctly contended by CFW, limited to
merely (a) KMEU and (b) no union. The
records disclose that the intervenors in the
petition for certification are the KMEA-CCLU
and CFW. They should be included as among
the choices in the certification election.
Doctrin The right to form a union or association or to
e self-organization comprehends two (2) broad
notions, to wit: (a) the liberty or freedom, i.e.,
the absence of restraint which guarantees that
the employee may act for himself without
being prevented by law, and (b) the power, by
virtue of which an employee may, as he
pleases, join or refrain from joining an
association. (Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope
Workers' Union, 59 SCRA 54)
21. General Rubber and Footwear Corp. vs. BLR, 155
SCRA 283
Title: GENERAL RUBBER AND FOOTWEAR
Nature: CORP. VS BLR (21)
Petition for review due to serious error of
Keywords: law and grave abuse of discretion on the
Summary: part of the Bureau of Labor Relations
Formation of another bargaining unit in
same company
Labor Arbiter NLRC NLRC
(Reconsideration) CA SC
Facts:  In 1985, the
SamahangManggagawasa General
Rubber Corporation — ANGLO was
formed by the rank and file employees
as their union after the expiration on
October 15, 1985 of the collective
bargaining agreement executed by
petitioner with General Rubber
Workers Union (Independent) on
October 15, 1982.
 On July 17, 1985, the National
Association of Trade Unions of
Monthly Paid Employees-NATU, filed
a petition for direct certification with tile
Bureau of Labor Relations which
petition was opposed by petitioner.
 On September 2, 1985, the Med-
Arbiter issued an Order for the holding
of a certification election after finding
that a certification election is in order in
this case and observing that it is the
fairest remedy to determine whether
employees of petitioner desire to have
a union or not.
 On appeal, the Bureau of Labor
Relations denied both the appeal and
motion for reconsideration interposed
by petitioner and affirmed the ruling of
the Med-Arbiter.
Labor --NA
Arbiter
NLRC --NA
CA --NA
 Issues:  Whether The Bureau of Labor
Relations committed serious error of
law and grave abuse of discretion in
ordering the creation of a new
bargaining unit at petitioner,
notwithstanding that there is already
an existing bargaining unit
 Whether the Bureau of Labor Relations
committed serious error of law in
holding that managerial employees or
those employees exercising
managerial functions can legally form
and join a labor organization and be
members of the new bargaining unit.
 Whether the Bureau of Labor Relations
committed grave abuse of discretion in
holding that supervisors, employees
performing managerial, confidential
and technical functions and office
personnel, who are negotiated by
petitioner to be excluded from the
existing bargaining unit because they
are performing vital functions to
management, can form and join a labor
organization and be members of the
new bargaining unit.
 Ratio: Thus, it can be readily seen from the
above findings of the Bureau of labor
Relations that the members of private
respondent are not managerial employees
as claimed by petitioners but merely
considered as rank-and-file employees
who have every right to self-organization
or to be heard through a duly certified
collective bargaining union. The
Supervisory power of the members of
private respondent union consists merely
in recommending as to what managerial
actions to take in disciplinary cases.
These members of private respondent
41
 union do not fit the definition of managerial
employees which We laid down in the
case of Bulletin Publishing Corporation v.
Sanchez (144 SCRA 628). These
members of private respondent union are
therefore not prohibited from forming their
own collective bargaining unit since it has
not been shown by petitioner that "the
responsibilities (of these monthly-paid-
employees) inherently require the
exercise of discretion and independent
judgment as supervisors" or that "they
possess the power and authority to lay
down or exercise management policies."
Similarly, he held in the same case that
"Members of supervisory unions who do
not fall within the definition of managerial
employees shall become eligible to loin or
assist the rank-and-file labor organization,
and if none exists, to form or assist in the
forming of such rank-and-file
organizations.
 Ruling: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
 Doctrine: Rank-and-file employees have every right
to self-organization or to be heard through
a duly certified collective bargaining union.
Workers with Right to Self-Organization
Section 8, Article III, 1987 Constitution
SECTION 8. The right of the people, including those
employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions,
associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law
shall not be abridged.
All Employees
Article 243.Coverage and employees’ right to self-
organization. All persons employed in commercial, industrial
and agricultural enterprises and in religious, charitable,
medical, or educational institutions, whether operating for
profit or not, shall have the right to self-organization and to
form, join, or assist labor organizations of their own choosing
for purposes of collective bargaining. Ambulant, intermittent
and itinerant workers, self-employed people, rural workers
and those without any definite employers may form labor
organizations for their mutual aid and protection. (As
amended by Batas PambansaBilang 70, May 1, 1980)
Cases:
22. Alliance of Nationalist, et al vs. Samahang, 285,
SCRA 271
Title: ALLIANCE OF NATIONALIST AND
GENUINE LABOR ORGANIZATION
(ANGLO-KMU)vs. SAMAHAN NG MGA
Nature: MANGAGAWANG NAGKAKAISA SA
Keywords: MANILA BAY SPINNING MILLS AT J.P.
Summary: COATS (SAMANA BAY)
G.R. No. 118562. July 5, 1996
Petition for certiorari
local union has the right to disaffiliate from
its mother union
Med Arbiter - DOLE (appeal) - SC (petition
for certiorari under Rule 65)
Facts: ANGLO is a duly registered labor
organization while SAMANA BAY is its
affiliate. In representation of SAMANA
BAY, ANGLO entered and concluded a
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
with Manila Bay Spinning Mills and J.P.
Coats Manila Bay, Inc. on November 1,
1991. On December 4, 1993, the Executive
Committee of SAMANA BAY decided to
disaffiliate from ANGLO in view of the
latter's dereliction of its duty to promote and
advance the welfare of SAMANA BAY and
the alleged cases of corruption involving
the federation officers. Said disaffiliation
was unanimously confirmed by the
members of SAMANA BAY.
On April 4, 1994, a petition to stop
remittance of federation dues to ANGLO
was filed by SAMANA BAY with the Bureau
of Labor Relations on the ground that the
corporations, despite having been
furnished copies of the union resolution
relating to said disaffiliation, refused to
honor the same. ANGLO counteracted by
unseating all officers and board members
of SAMANA BAY and appointing, in their
stead, a new set of officers who were duly
recognized by the corporations.
In its position paper, ANGLO contended
that the disaffiliation was void considering
that a collective bargaining agreement is
still existing and the freedom period has not
yet set in. ANGLO wants to impress that
the disaffiliation was invalid for two
reasons, namely: that the procedural
requirements for a valid disaffiliation were
not followed; and that it was made in
violation of P.D. 1391.
Labor The Med-Arbiter resolved that the
Arbiter disaffiliation was void but upheld the
illegality of the ouster officers of SAMANA
BAY.
DOLE 1. declared the disaffiliation of
SAMANA BAY from ANGLO
as valid;
2. directed Manila Bay Spinning
Mills, Inc. and J.P. Coats to
42
 stop remitting to ANGLO
federation dues and instead to
remit the whole amount of
union dues to the treasurer of
SAMANA BAY; and
3. enjoined ANGLO-KMU from
interfering in the affairs of
SAMANA BAY.
Issues: 1. whether the disaffiliation was
valid; and
2. whether petitioner can validly
oust individual private
respondents from their
positions.
Ratio: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Ruling: 1. Failure to observe certain
procedural requirements for a valid
disaffiliation. Non-compliance with
the procedure on disaffiliation,
being premised on purely technical
grounds cannot rise above the
fundamental right of self-
organization.
Settled is the rule that a local union has the
right to disaffiliate from its mother union
when circumstances warrant. Generally, a
labor union may disaffiliate from the mother
union to form a local or independent union
only during the 60-day freedom period
immediately preceding the expiration of the
CBA. However, even before the onset of
the freedom period, disaffiliation may be
carried out when there is a shift of
allegiance on the part of the majority of the
members of the union.
2. ANGLO contends that individual
private respondents were validly
ousted as they have ceased to be
officers of the incumbent union
(ANGLO-KMU) at the time of
disaffiliation. In order to fill the
vacuum, it was deemed proper to
appoint the individual
replacements so as not to put in
disarray the organizational
structure and to prevent chaos and
confusion among the general
membership and within the
company.
The contention is bereft of merit. A local
labor union is a separate and distinct unit
primarily designed to secure and maintain
an equality of bargaining power between
the employer and their employee-
members. A local union does not owe its
existence to the federation with which it is
affiliated. It is a separate and distinct
voluntary association owing its creation to
the will of its members.[7] The mere act of
affiliation does not divest the local union of
its own personality, neither does it give the
mother federation the license to act
independently of the local union. It only
gives rise to a contract of agency[8] where
the former acts in representation of the
latter.
By SAMANA BAY's disaffiliation from
ANGLO, the vinculum that previously
bound the two entities was completely
severed. ANGLO was divested of any and
all power to act in representation of
SAMANA BAY. Thus, any act performed by
ANGLO affecting the interests and affairs of
SAMANA BAY, including the ouster of
herein individual private respondents, is
rendered without force and effect.
Doctrine: All employees enjoy the right to self-
organization and to form and join labor
organizations of their own choosing for the
purpose of collective bargaining. This is a
fundamental right of labor and derives its
existence from the Constitution. In
interpreting the protection to labor and
social justice provisions of the Constitution
and the labor laws, rules or regulations, we
have always adopted the liberal approach
which favors the exercise of labor rights.
23. Kapatiransa Meat and Canning Division vs. Calleja,
162 SCRA 367
Title: (23) Kapatiransa Meat and Canning
Nature: Division vsCalleja, 162 SCRA 367
Review of the resolution of Director of BLR
dismissing the appeal of Tupas on the order
Keywords: of Med-Arbiter to conduct a certification of
Summary: election among regular daily paid rank and
file employees to determine the contending
unions
Right to self-organization
Med-Arbiter - BLR- SC
Facts: TUPAS was the sole and exclusive
collective bargaining representative of the
workers in the Meat and Canning Division
of the Universal Robina Corporation from
1984-1987, with a 3-year collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) which was to
expire on November 15, 1987. Within the
freedom period of 60 days prior to the
expiration of its CBA, TUPAS filed an
43
 amended notice of strike on to pressure the
company to extend, renew, or negotiate a
new CBA with it.On October 12, 1987, the
TUPAS staged a strike. However, ROBINA
obtained an injunction against the strike,
resulting in an agreement to return to work
and for the parties to negotiate a new CBA.
Meanwhile, on October 8, 1987, the NEW
ULO, composed mostly of workers
belonging to the IGLESIA NI KRISTO sect,
registered as a labor union. Thereafter, it
claimed that it has "the majority of the daily
wage rank and file employees numbering
191 and filed a petition for a certification
election at the Bureau of Labor Relations.
TUPAS moved to dismiss the petition for
being defective in form and that the
members of the NEW ULO were mostly
members of the IglesianiKristo sect which
three (3) years previous refused to affiliate
with any labor union. It also accused the
company of using the NEW ULO to defeat
TUPAS' bargaining rights. However, the
Med-Arbiter ordered the holding of a
certification election within 20 days.
TUPAS appealed the order to the BLR but
was dismissed. Likewise, their motion for
reconsideration was denied. Meanwhile,
TUPAS was able to negotiate a new 3-year
CBA with ROBINA.
Med- NEW ULO registered as a labor union and
Arbiter claimed that it has the majority of the daily
wage rank and file employees. It filed a
petition for a certification election at the
Bureau of Labor Relations. Tupas moved to
dismiss the petition from being defective in
form and that the members of the NEW ULO
were mostly members of the IglesianiKristo
sect which three (3) years previous refused
to affiliate with any labor union. It also
accused the company of using the NEW
ULO to defeat TUPAS' bargaining rights.
The Med-Arbiter ordered the holding of a
certification election within 20 days.
BLR TUPAS appealed to the Bureau of Labor
Relations BLR. However, the BLR
dismissed the appeal. Likewise, their
motion for reconsideration was denied.
Issues: Whether or not the regular daily wage rank
and file employees who are members of
IglesianiKristo has the right to self-
organization?
Ruling: Yes. The regular daily wage rank and file
employees who are members of
IglesianiKristohas the right to self-
organization.
The right of members of the IGLESIA NI
KRISTO sect not to join a labor union for
being contrary to their religious beliefs, does
not bar the members of that sect from
forming their own union. The recognition of
the tenets of the sect should not infringe on
the basic right of self-organization granted
by the constitution to workers, regardless of
religious affiliation.
Doctrine: The right of members of the IGLESIA NI
KRISTO sect not to join a labor union for
being contrary to their religious beliefs, does
not bar the members of that sect from
forming their own union.
Non – Profit Organization
Cases:
24. FEU-Dr. Nicanor Reyes Medical Foundation, Inc.
vs.Trajano, 152 SCRA 725
FEU-DR. NICANOR REYES MEDICAL
FOUNDATION, INC.,petitioner, �vs.�HON.
CRESENCIANO TRAJANO and RICARDO C.
Title: CASTRO, FAR EASTERN UNIVERSITY DR.
NICANOR REYES MEDICAL FOUNDATION,
INC. ALLIANCE OF FILIPINO WORKERS
(AFW),respondents.
petition for certiorari seeking to annul and set
Nature:
aside the decision of the respondent Director
FEU( a non profit org) employees can form a
Keywords:
union
Summary:
44
 The petitioner, Far Eastern University-
Dr.Nicanor Reyes Memorial Foundation, Inc.,
has a work force of about 350 rank and file
employees, majority of whom are members of
private respondent Alliance of Filipino Workers.
The Union,privaterespondent,filed a Petition for
Consent and/or Certification Election with The
Ministry of Labor and Employment. The
petitioner opposed the petition on the ground
that a similar petition involving the same issues
and the same parties is pending the Supreme
Court. The PR admitted it filed a similar petition
for certification election with the Ministry of
Labor and Employment earlier but the petition
was denied by the MED Arbiter and the
Facts:
Secretary of Labor on appeal, on the ground
that the petitioner was a non-stock, non-profit
medical institution, therefore, its employees
may not form, join, or organize a union pursuant
to
Article 244 of the Labor Code; that private
respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the
Supreme Court assailing the constitutionality of
Article 244 of the Labor Code; that pending
resolution of the aforesaid petition, or on May 1,
1980, Batas PambansaBilang 70 was enacted
amending Article 244 of the Labor Code, thus
granting even employees of non-stock, non-
profit institutions the right to form, join and
organize labor unions of their choice;
Med Arbiter issued an Order granting the
petition, declaring that a certification election be
Med
Arbiter conducted to determine the exclusive
bargaining representative of all the rank and file
employees of the petitioner
affirmed. In dismissing the appeal(of
petitioner)however, respondent Director said
that:... respondent's (petitioner herein, reliance
on the petition with the Supreme Court involving
as it does the provisions of Article 244 of the
director Labor Code vis-a-vis the character of the
hospital, which has been alleged as a non-profit
medical foundation, has been rendered moot
and academic by virtue of the amendatory BP
#70, which allows employees of non-profit
medical institutions to unionize.
Whether or not a non-profit org can form a
Issues:
union.
Ratio:
Yes ,At the time private respondent filed its
petition for certification election on February 13,
1986, Article 244 of the Labor Code was
already amended by Batas PambansaBilang
70, to wit:
Art. 244. Coverage and employees' right to self-
organization. — All persons employed in
commercial, industrial and charitable, medical
or educational institutions whether operating for
profit or not, shall have the right to self-
organizations of their own choosing for
purposes of collective bargaining. Ambulant
intermittent and itinerant workers, self-
employed people, rural workers and those
without any definite employers may form labor
Ruling: organizations for the purpose of enhancing and
defending their interests and for their mutual aid
and protection.
Under the aforequoted provision, there is no
doubt that rank and file employees of non-profit
medical institutions (as herein petitioner) are
now permitted to form, organize or join labor
unions of their choice for purposes of collective
bargaining. Since private respondent had
complied with the requisites provided by law for
calling a certification election (p. 15, Rollo), it
was incumbent upon respondent Director to
conduct such certification election to ascertain
the bargaining representative of petitioner's
employees.
Doctrine: Non Profit Organization can for a union
25. Kapatiransa Meat and Canning Division vs. Calleja,
162 SCRA 367
Title: (25) Kapatiransa Meat and Canning
Nature: Division vsCalleja, 162 SCRA 367
Keywords:
Summary: Right to self-organization. Not-for-profit
Facts: TUPAS was the sole and exclusive
collective bargaining representative of the
workers in the Meat and Canning Division
of the Universal Robina Corporation.
Meanwhile, the NEW ULO composed
mostly of workers belonging to the
IglesianiKristo sect, registered as a labor
union. Thereafter, it claimed that it has the
majority of the daily wage rank and file
employees and filed a petition for a
certification election at the Bureau of Labor
Relations to determine which of the
contending unions shall be the bargaining
unit of the daily wage rank and file
employees.
The Med-Arbiter ordered the holding of a
certification election within 20 days despite
45
 the moved of TUPAS to dismiss the petition
for being defective in form and that the
members of the NEW ULO were mostly
members of the IglesianiKristo sect which
three (3) years previous refused to affiliate
with any labor union. It also accused the
company of using the NEW ULO to defeat
TUPAS' bargaining rights.
TUPAS appealed to the Bureau of Labor
Relations BLR but was dismissed. Its
motion for reconsideration was denied.
Med- NEW ULO registered as a labor union and
Arbiter claimed that it has the majority of the daily
wage rank and file employees. It filed a
petition for a certification election at the
Bureau of Labor Relations. Tupas moved to
dismiss the petition from being defective in
form and that the members of the NEW ULO
were mostly members of the IglesianiKristo
sect which three (3) years previous refused
to affiliate with any labor union. It also
accused the company of using the NEW
ULO to defeat TUPAS' bargaining rights.
The Med-Arbiter ordered the holding of a
certification election within 20 days
BLR TUPAS appealed to the Bureau of Labor
Relations BLR. However, the BLR
dismissed the appeal. Likewise, their
motion for reconsideration was denied.
Issues: Whether or not the member of
IglesianiKristo has the right to self-
organization?
Ruling: Yes. Members of IglesianiKristo has the
right to self-organization.
granted by the constitution to workers,
regardless of religious affiliation.
Employees of Government Corporations
Article 244.Right of employees in the public service.
Employees of government corporations established under
the Corporation Code shall have the right to organize and to
bargain collectively with their respective employers. All other
employees in the civil service shall have the right to form
associations for purposes not contrary to law. (As amended
by Executive Order No. 111, December 24, 1986)
Supervisors
Article 245.Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any
labor organization; right of supervisory employees.
Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form
any labor organization. Supervisory employees shall not be
eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank-
and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate
labor organizations of their own. (As amended by Section
18, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989)
Article 212 (m)
m. "Managerial employee" is one who is vested with the
powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute
management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-
off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees.
Supervisory employees are those who, in the interest of the
employer, effectively recommend such managerial actions if
the exercise of such authority is not merely routinely or
clerical in nature but requires the use of independent
judgment. All employees not falling within any of the above
definitions are considered rank-and-file employees for
purposes of this Book.

The rights of members of the IGLESIA NI

KRISTO sect not to join a labor union for
being contrary to their religious beliefs, does
not bar the members of that sect from
forming their own union. The "recognition of
the tenets of the sect ... should not infringe
on the basic right of self-organization
granted by the constitution to workers,
regardless of religious affiliation.

Doctrine: The rights of members of the IGLESIA NI

KRISTO sect not to join a labor union for
being contrary to their religious beliefs, does
not bar the members of that sect from
forming their own union. The "recognition of
the tenets of the sect ... should not infringe
on the basic right of self-organization

46