Research article

Asian Journal of Comparative Politics

2016, Vol. 1(1) 44–61
Democratic consolidation in ª The Author(s) 2015
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DOI: 10.1177/2057891115620683
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perspective

Ian McAllister
School of Politics and International Relations, Australian National
University, Canberra, Australia

Abstract
Taiwan has been one of the most successful East Asian countries in transitioning from authoritarian
rule to liberal democracy. Using a wide range of survey data, this paper examines the process of
democratic consolidation in Taiwan from 1996 to 2012, and benchmarks the country’s progress
with other East Asian democracies, third wave democracies, and established democracies. The
results show that positive regime evaluations have been generally stable since the mid-1990s,
although efficacy is slightly lower than is found elsewhere. Party attachments among the mass
public have increased incrementally, against the international trends. The level of polarization
within the party system has remained consistently low by international standards. Overall, the
results confirm that the process of democratic consolidation in Taiwan is close to completion.

Keywords
Democratization, political opinion, Taiwan

There is little disagreement among scholars that what ordinary citizens think about democracy and
its institutions is a key element in democratization. While institutional rules and procedures estab-
lish the principles of democracy, citizen support for those principles links the mass public and the
political system together. Indeed, it is often argued that the point at which an overwhelming major-
ity of the mass public embraces democracy as ‘the only game in town’ (p. 15) (Linz and Stepan,
1996) marks the point at which democratic consolidation has been achieved (Diamond, 1999;
Rose, 2001). When that stage has been reached, a democracy can begin to accumulate a reservoir
of popular support that will help it to overcome the periodic crises and challenges that inevitably
afflict all countries (Dalton, 1999).

Corresponding author:
Ian McAllister, School of Politics and International Relations, Australian National University, Canberra, 2600, Australia.
Email: ian.mcallister@anu.edu.au
McAllister 45

Following gradual liberalization in Taiwan during the 1980s, martial law was finally lifted in
1987, paving the way for the 1996 presidential election which elected Lee Teng-hui as president
with a decisive majority. Since 1996, five presidential elections have been held, and since 1992
seven elections to the legislative Yuan. In a comparative context, turnout has generally been high
in both presidential and legislative elections; in the 2012 presidential election turnout was 76.0 per-
cent and in the legislative election of the same year it was 74.7 percent. In only two national
elections since 1991 has turnout dropped below 60 percent. The 1996 presidential election is
usually regarded as the founding election (Jacobs, 2012), and forms the benchmark election for
almost all studies of democratization in Taiwan.
Measuring democratic consolidation presents various challenges. Traditional approaches tend
to examine either institutional arrangements, such as the rule of law, the integrity of elections, and
the absence of political violence, or political attitudes, such as popular support for democratic
norms and values (Diamond, 1994; Schedler, 2001; Schneider and Schmitter, 2004). Neither
approach provides a complete picture of the state of democracy in a country, and there are obvi-
ously problems inferring causality. The assumption used here is that a country can establish insti-
tutional structures that will accord with the principles of democracy, but their successful operation
requires unconditional public support. As Schedler (2001: 75) puts it, ‘no democracy embedded in
a ‘‘democratic consensus’’ has ever broken down.’
Accordingly, this paper examines how the mass public has viewed democracy in Taiwan since
1996, and places these views within a global perspective using a wide range of public opinion sur-
veys. Two separate dimensions are examined in order to benchmark these opinions. First, the paper
compares Taiwanese public opinion with the same views that are found in three groups of coun-
tries: comparable East Asian democracies; in the new democracies that have emerged in the third
wave of democratization; and in the established democracies. Second, a comparison is made of
these changes over time, starting in 1996 and extending through to the 2012 Taiwanese Election
and Democratization Survey (TEDS). Examining public opinion across these cross-national and
longitudinal dimensions provides a unique opportunity to trace the development of democratic val-
ues in Taiwan.
The surveys enable an examination to be made of three central aspects of the democratization
process. These topics are determined by the questions that are asked consistently in the four mod-
ules of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) project, of which Taiwan was a foun-
der member.1 The first section of the paper examines regime evaluations, and the extent to which
citizens are satisfied with democracy and express a sense of political efficacy. The second section
focuses on the institutionalization of the party system, and measures the level of partisanship and
unpacks its roots in the process of social learning. The third and final section deals with the degree
of party system polarization, and asks if the party system is experiencing more or less polarization
and how that compares with other democracies around the world. The conclusion presents some
explanations for Taiwan’s relatively smooth democratic transition.

Democratization in Taiwan
Since the 1996 presidential election, Taiwanese politics have been dominated by two major polit-
ical parties, the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Both parties also
dominate legislative elections to the Yuan, although less decisively because of the electoral system
which has undergone a series of significant changes since 2008. These changes have provided a
stronger electoral incentive for smaller parties to compete (Chi, 2014; Fell, 2005; Patterson and
46 Asian Journal of Comparative Politics 1(1)

Stockton, 2010).2 The relative stability of the party system in Taiwan stands in contrast to other
consolidated or partly consolidated democracies within the region, particularly South Korea which
has been marked by electoral volatility and party fluidity punctuated by periods of military rule
(Hermanns, 2009). By contrast, Taiwan’s armed forces are very clearly under civilian control,
which began in the early 1990s with a KMT-initiated process of depoliticization among the mil-
itary (Tien and Chu, 1996).
Historically, the major political cleavage in Taiwan has been relations with China, with the
KMT advocating reunification and the DPP continued independence. In the 1970s and 1980s this
division was reflected in an ethnic cleavage, separating those whose ancestors were of Taiwanese
origin from mainlanders who had arrived in Taiwan relatively recently (Hsieh, 2005). In recent
years the two parties have generally converged in an informal agreement to maintain the status quo
and downplay the territorial issue, in recognition of its potential divisiveness.3 At the same time,
there has been a significant increase in the proportion of Taiwanese who identify themselves as
such, rather than as simultaneously Taiwanese and Chinese, or as Chinese alone (Chu, 2011). The
creation of this distinctive Taiwanese national identity has served to weaken the saliency of the
territorial issue (Chu and Lin, 2001). In addition, the consolidation of the party system around two
main political parties has enabled citizens to focus their attention on two alternative policy plat-
forms, which have increasingly been dominated by competing social policies, rather than the
once-dominant territorial issue (Aspalter, 2002).
In addition to its stable party system, Taiwan has had two other advantages in the successful
transition to democracy. First, economic growth has been one of the fastest in the region, and the
country was relatively unaffected by the Asian economic crisis of 1997–1998 or the 2007–2008
global financial crisis. Sustained economic growth has been aided by a skilled workforce and rel-
atively low labour costs. Unlike the countries of postcommunist Europe, therefore, Taiwan did not
have to contend with the simultaneous shocks of a democratic transition and an economic
downturn. Second, economic growth and a reasonably equitable distribution of wealth in the
pre-democratic period has created a popular acceptance of the role of the state in ensuring socio-
economic equity (Wong, 2003). This has also been underpinned by relatively high educational levels,
a policy which began in the 1930s under Japanese colonial rule and continued under the postwar
KMT government (Jacobs, 2012: 8–9).
One qualification to this optimistic interpretation of the democratic transition in Taiwan con-
cerns the role of Confucianism and its relationship to socially conservative values. It has been
argued by Doh Shin and others (see Park and Shin, 2006; Shin, 1999) that these values make it
more difficult for East Asian societies to reject authoritarian rule since Confucianism stresses the
authoritarian values of unity and hierarchy, not the democratic values of diversity and competition.
While it is possible to construct the rules and procedures of democracy, in this view elements of
authoritarianism remain embedded in the political culture, and make it more difficult for citizens to
embrace democracy as ‘the only game in town’ (Shin and Wells, 2005). While the argument has
been made most forcefully in relation to South Korea (and to a lesser extent Singapore), it also has
resonance for Taiwan, although it has been estimated that less than one in 10 Taiwanese remain
under the influence of Confucian values (Shi and Lu, 2010: 128).

Data and method

The data are drawn from the four modules of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems project,
which commenced collecting cross-national survey data about the operation of democracy (and
McAllister 47

especially electoral systems) in 1996 (Klingemann, 2009). All of the details of the surveys, includ-
ing the questionnaires, the methodology, and the datasets, can be accessed at www.cses.org. The
TEDS surveys (1996, included in module 1; 2001 and 2004 in module 2; 2008 in module 3; and
2012 in module 4) come from the CSES.4
In order to place trends in Taiwanese public opinion within a cross-national perspective, three
comparison groups are used. The first is the other East Asian democracies, represented here by
Japan and South Korea. Since South Korea was not included in module 4 of the CSES, only results
for modules 1 to 3 are reported here. Other countries which could have been included (for example,
the Philippines and Thailand) were not represented in all of the CSES modules, and for consistency
(and because, with a small number of countries, having different countries at each timepoint would
risk unduly biasing the results) it was decided that comparisons with Japan and South Korea only
would be used. This therefore limits the strict comparisons that can be made between Taiwan and
the rest of East Asia.
A broad range of countries are used to represent the new democracies and the established
democracies. The new democracies are exclusively composed of postcommunist countries, which
democratized after the collapse of communism in 1989–1990. The established democracies are
composed of a wide range of first and second wave democracies. In order to ensure that the contrast
between the new and established democracies is as robust as possible, Spain and Portugal are
excluded as are various Latin American countries which experienced interrupted periods of
democracy during the 1970s and 1980s.5 The details of the country classifications together with
the survey years in each of the four CSES modules are shown in the Appendix Table.

Regime evaluations
How citizens view their regime is arguably one of the most important indicators of democratic con-
solidation. As Merkel (1998: 59) argues, regime support represents ‘the key to democratic conso-
lidation.’ While no regime enjoys complete trust from its citizens, trust and confidence should not
reach such low levels that normal political activity and the daily transactions between citizens and
government become strained. When public trust is low, there is less support for redistributive pub-
lic policies (Rudolf and Evans, 2005). Research into public support for democracy suggests that
support for democratic regimes emerging from authoritarian rule is characterized by skepticism
rather than outright distrust (see, for example, McAllister and White, 2007). Public skepticism sug-
gests that the mass public is waiting to evaluate the regime’s performance prior to forming a judg-
ment. If the new system performs well, then public trust is likely to be forthcoming, with positive
consequences for regime support.
The CSES contains two items which directly measure citizens’ evaluations of the political
regime within which they live, and both have been included in each of the four modules. The first
question, satisfaction with democracy, asks the respondents: ‘On the whole, are you very satisfied,
fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in [coun-
try]?’ The question therefore asks the respondents to evaluate the operation of the democratic sys-
tem. This question has been widely used in comparative surveys in order to measure the health of
the regime in a particular country, and to benchmark countries against one another.
This survey question has been criticized for, among other things, not translating well into dif-
ferent political cultures (Norris, 1999) and being open to different interpretations depending on the
political context, such as the level and intensity of party competition (see Canache et al., 2001). It is
also sensitive to changes in government so that supporters of the winning party or coalition express
48 Asian Journal of Comparative Politics 1(1)

higher satisfaction than supporters of the losing side (Anderson and Guillory, 1997). Nevertheless,
it remains a central comparative measure of democratic confidence and has been shown to corre-
late strongly with other indicators of support for democracy (Klingemann, 1999). It is generally
accepted to be closely associated with the legitimacy of a political regime, since it deals with
regime norms and procedures (Dalton, 2004: 24).
The second item measures external political efficacy with the question: ‘Some people say that
no matter who people vote for, it won’t make any difference to what happens. Others say that who
people vote for can make a difference to what happens.’ The question therefore taps into views
about elections as a mechanism for ensuring accountability in the voting process (Ikeda et al.,
2008; Kittilson and Anderson, 2010).6
The patterns of responses to these two items measuring regime evaluations in the 2012 TEDS
study are shown in Table 1. The results indicate relatively high levels of satisfaction with
democracy, although only 5 percent exhibit the highest level of satisfaction. A total of 71 per-
cent of the respondents say that they are ‘very’ or ‘fairly’ satisfied, compared to 29 percent who
say they are ‘not very’ or ‘not at all’ satisfied. Overall, those who are satisfied outnumber those
who are dissatisfied by more than two to one. The external political efficacy question also
shows positive results. Taking the first two categories as representing high efficacy and the last
two categories as low efficacy, over six in 10 respondents display high efficacy and just one in
five show low efficacy.
How do these patterns of regime support compare across time, both in comparison with pre-
vious Taiwanese election studies and with other groups of countries? Figures 1 and 2 present the
patterns of support for the two regime evaluations from the late 1990s to the present, spread
across the four CSES modules. In terms of satisfaction with democracy, the 2012 estimates show
the highest level of support for democracy in Taiwan—71 percent—of any of the five studies that
have been so far collected. Satisfaction with democracy in the 2001 study shows the next highest
level of support, at 68 percent. The lowest level of support occurs in 1996, at 47 percent, which is
the only study in which those who are dissatisfied outnumber those who are satisfied. Over the
five studies, support for democracy averages 59 percent.
The other part of Figure 1 places these trends in the context of patterns in the two East Asian
democracies, Japan and South Korea (with the exception of module 4, where South Korea was
unavailable and therefore no results are reported), the new democracies, and the established
democracies. Satisfaction with democracy is higher in Taiwan than in the other East Asian
democracies. Satisfaction is also consistently higher than is found in the new democracies, and
in the early 2000s substantially so. As we would expect, satisfaction with democracy is gener-
ally higher in the established democracies, especially in the late 1990s; it is notable that the
most recent estimate for Taiwan is only 1 point lower than the same estimate for the established
democracies, all countries that were surveyed after 2011.
The patterns for external political efficacy (Figure 2) show fewer variations across time and
space than is the case for satisfaction with democracy. Efficacy has varied from a low of 55 percent
in 2005 (using the first two categories of the five category scale as representing high efficacy) to a
high of 68 percent in 1996. The latter results undoubtedly reflect the eagerness to cast a ballot after
many decades of authoritarian rule and the relative novelty of democratic institutions. Taiwan is
slightly below most of the other democracies in the levels of efficacy over the period, with the
exception of 2004 when the differences are small. However, the comparison with the other two
East Asian democracies is instructive, and in three of the four CSES modules, efficacy is higher
in Taiwan than in Japan and South Korea.
McAllister 49

Table 1. Regime evaluations in Taiwan, 2012 (percent).

Satisfaction with Big difference

Democracy who vote for

Very satisfied 5 Big difference 44

Fairly satisfied 66 2 19
Not very satisfied 25 3 16
Not at all satisfied 4 4 6
— No difference 15
Total 100 —
(N) (1742) Total 100
(N) (1764)
‘Don’t know’ and missing responses excluded. See text for question wordings.
Source: TEDS 2012.

80

70
Percent 'very' or 'fairly' satisfied

60

50

40

30 Taiwan

20 East Asia
New democracies
10 Established democracies

0
Module 1 (1996-2000) Module 2 (2000-05) Module 3 (2006-11) Module 4 (2011-16)

Figure 1. Satisfaction with democracy, 1996–2012. ‘Don’t know’ responses excluded. See text for question
wordings. ‘East Asia’ is Japan and South Korea; for the composition of other countries, see Appendix Table.
Sources: CSES modules 1–4.

Overall, these results show general long-term stability in the attitudes of the Taiwanese pub-
lic towards their regime. Across time, opinions among the mass public exhibit particularly sta-
ble levels of external political efficacy and (with the exception of the 2001 survey) stability in
democratic satisfaction. Placed in cross-national perspective, in most cases the positive regime
evaluations that emerge in Taiwan are below those found in the established democracies, as we
would expect (Norris, 1999). However, with some exceptions the differences are relatively
modest. While patterns of political efficacy are generally stable, the most recent results show
an increase in satisfaction with democracy, especially when compared to the very first TEDS
survey conducted in 1996.
50 Asian Journal of Comparative Politics 1(1)

80

'Big difference' who vote for 70

60

50

40
Taiwan
30
East Asia
20 New democracies
Established democracies
10

0
Module 1 (1996-2000) Module 2 (2000-05) Module 3 (2006-11) Module 4 (2011-16)

Figure 2. External political efficacy, 1996–2012. See notes to Figure 1. Sources: CSES modules 1–4.

Party system institutionalization

Parties are central institutions in democracy: they nominate candidates for public office; determine
the policy choices that citizens are faced with at elections; and generally structure the functioning
of democratic government (Dalton et al., 2011). Without parties, modern democracy would be
impractical: as Schattschneider (1977 [1942]: 1) expressed it most famously, ‘modern democracy
is unthinkable save in terms of the parties.’ The extent to which citizens identify with parties is
often regarded as the main measure of the health of a party system. While party membership has
been declining worldwide (with some minor exceptions in the emerging democracies of central
and eastern Europe—see van Biezen et al., 2012), the extent to which citizens identify with parties
is a crucial indicator of how far party systems have institutionalized.
How citizens come to form long-term, affective attachments to parties has been the subject of
numerous studies. Democratic learning, channeled via parents, childhood socialization at school,
and frequent electoral participation, all combine to play their part in the learning process. But the
process is often truncated or only partially completed in new democracies, which are emerging
from authoritarian rule. The growth of partisanship is normally viewed as a primary indicator of
the progress of any democratic transition, and research in both Latin America (for example, Main-
waring, 1999; Mainwaring and Zoco, 2007) and the new postcommunist states of central and east-
ern Europe (for example, Kitschelt et al., 1999) have confirmed this finding. In general, high levels
of partisanship tend to dampen electoral volatility and encourage party system stability reflected in
the electoral dominance of a small number of competing parties.
In order to measure partisan attachments, the CSES asks the question: ‘Do you usually think
of yourself as close to any particular political party?’ The concept of closeness differs from how
the question is asked in other surveys, but it nevertheless still taps into a concept of partisan
attachment that is largely independent of vote. All of the CSES surveys also ask the question
in post-election surveys, so the political context is broadly similar, thereby minimizing potential
measurement error.
McAllister 51

Table 2. Party identification in Taiwan, 1996–2012 (percent).

1996 2001 2004 2008 2012

Partisan 34 43 49 51 55
Non-partisan 66 57 51 49 45
Total 100 100 100 100 100
(N) (1152) (1511) (1495) (1841) (1777)
‘Don’t know’ responses excluded. See text for question wording.
Sources: TEDS, 1996–2012.

Levels of party identification in Taiwan have been incrementally increasing since 1996, at a
time when partisanship in most other democracies has been declining. In 1996, Table 2 shows that
around one in three citizens said that they felt close to a party; by 2012 this had increased signif-
icantly, to 55 percent. This gradual but consistent rise suggests that party identification is increas-
ing by an average of about 5 percent in each inter-election period. Moreover, this trend is not a
consequence of patterns of turnout across the various elections. When the level of party identifi-
cation is estimated just for those who reported voting, the pattern is the same, except that the level
of identification is several points higher.7
The extent to which this trend towards increased partisanship in Taiwan is operating against the
broader patterns in other democracies is illustrated in Figure 3. While partisanship has declined in
the established democracies, although by only 1 percentage point comparing the first and fourth
CSES modules, it has increased in Taiwan by more than 20 percentage points. Moreover, over the
same period, Taiwan has overtaken the new democracies in levels of partisanship. For example, in
1996 partisanship in Taiwan was 10 percentage points lower than the same figure in the new
democracies, and 20 percentage points below that in the established democracies. By 2012 parti-
sanship was considerably higher in Taiwan than in either the new or the established democracies.
The exception to the pattern is the other two East Asian democracies, Japan and South Korea,
where partisanship increased markedly in the early 2000s, only to decline again later in the decade.
Closer inspection of the data reveals that the main cause of the rapid rise and equally rapid decline
is Japan, rather than South Korea. Again, this would appear to be a consequence of the impact of
the Asian economic crisis on Japan in the late 1990s, followed by an improvement in economic
conditions in the early part of the new decade. The decline in partisanship in the 2007 Japanese
survey stems from the heavy defeat experienced by the once dominant Liberal Democratic Party
in that year’s upper house election.
It is generally agreed that partisanship is formed by political socialization through the family
combined with electoral experience once citizens enter the active electorate and turnout to vote.
This is at the core of Converse’s social learning framework (Converse, 1969; see also Dalton
and Weldon, 2007). The social learning model provides a baseline onto which patterns of party
competition and major political events can be layered, in order to understand how and under
what circumstances partisanship varies between countries. This model has particular implica-
tions for new democracies, insofar as children cannot ‘learn’ their partisanship from their
parents and the absence of a stable, competitive party system means that the political learning
experience at the beginning of the lifecycle—what Converse called ‘the partisan push’
(p. 140)—is often missing. For voters in these countries, social learning must come about
almost exclusively from their electoral experiences.
52 Asian Journal of Comparative Politics 1(1)

60

50
Percent party identifers

40

30

20 Taiwan
East Asia
10 New democracies
Established democracies
0
Module 1 (1996-2000) Module 2 (2000-05) Module 3 (2006-11) Module 4 (2011-16)

Figure 3. Party identification, 1996–2012. See notes to Figure 1. Sources: CSES modules 1–4.

70

60

50
Percent party identifiers

40

30

Taiwan
20
New democracies
10 Established democracies

0
18-24 25-33 34-43 44-53 54-63 64-73 74+

Figure 4. Party identification in Taiwan by age cohort, 2012. ‘Don’t know’ responses excluded. Source:
TEDS, 2012.

The key, then, to the development of partisanship in democracies undergoing the transition from
authoritarian rule to stable democracy is the uptake of partisanship among the younger age groups.
As the democratic transition progresses, we would expect levels of partisanship to increase with
age, ‘but the initial relationship might be relatively flat because older voters lack a long electoral
history’ (Dalton and Weldon, 2007: 185). To test this hypothesis, Figure 4 displays patterns of
party identification for seven age cohorts for Taiwan, and the new and established democracies.8
McAllister 53

The patterns in Figure 4 confirm the hypothesis that social learning has been taking place.
For the established democracies, the proportion of partisans increases in an almost linear pat-
tern, almost doubling comparing the youngest to the oldest age cohort. In Taiwan, by contrast,
the line tends to be flat, albeit starting from a higher base, as Dalton and Weldon (2007) predict.
Partisanship is higher in the established democracies for those aged in their 50s or younger;
among the older age cohorts, the established democracies have more partisans in their ranks.
The new democracies display a similar pattern to the established democracies until middle age,
when partisanship declines. This is as we would expect, since this group has no experience of
democratic elections.
The decline of party identification is often assumed to be a global phenomenon. It has its
roots in three main factors. First, parties increase voters’ expectations of what they can deliver
if they win office and when these expectations are not met, public confidence erodes. Second,
the decline in the membership of political parties—caused in part by more reliable state fund-
ing of parties—means that parties are more restricted in what they can do, especially during
election campaigns when party workers are needed to mobilize the vote. Third, there is the
declining impact of political socialization, so that many citizens have non-political parents
or decide to make up their own minds on how to vote. These concerns have not yet affected
the average Taiwanese voter. The surveys suggest that partisanship has been increasing, against
the international trends, and even against the trend in the new democracies of central and east-
ern Europe. Indeed, in 2012 partisanship was higher in Taiwan than it was in the established
democracies.

Party system polarization

For a party system to operate efficiently, parties must offer clear policy choices to voters. In
turn, such choices need to reflect the major cleavages within the society, and represent clear
programmatic choices between competing parties and alliances. Without such choices, elec-
tions risk descending into ‘ephemeral expressions of opinions or personality contests, rather
than instrumental acts of governance’ (Dalton and Tanaka, 2007: 203). In addition, the rela-
tive positions of the parties on the major issues of the day also have implications for the
legitimacy of the political system and for government. Highly polarized systems may experi-
ence greater conflict and immobilism, while convergence may foster agreement and
compromise.
Measuring party polarization in the established democracies is relatively straightforward
using a question about left-right self-placement. While the terms ‘left’ and ‘right’ have different
meanings in different countries (Freire, 2008), they tap a common underlying preference for col-
lectivism versus the free market. As a consequence, the terms are widely used to measure the
degree of ideological distance between parties and the level of polarization within a party sys-
tem. The problem occurs in applying the left-right schema to new democracies, which often have
a diverse range of parties, many competing on multiple cross-cutting cleavages (see Rohrschnei-
der and Whitefield, 2012). This is no less the case in East Asia, where there is often a high level
of fluidity and volatility among the various party systems (see Chu and Huang, 2007; Jou, 2010;
McAllister, 2007).
In Taiwan, only around half of the respondents in each of the surveys conducted between 1996
and 20089 could locate themselves on the left-right dimension, and there has been little variation in
this pattern between the surveys (Figure 5). By contrast, around eight in every 10 respondents in
54 Asian Journal of Comparative Politics 1(1)

100

90

80
Percent with left right position

70

60

50

40

30 Taiwan

20 New democracies

10 Established democracies

0
Module 1 Module 2 Module 3
(1996-2000) (2000-05) (2006-11)

Figure 5. Proportion of left-right identifiers, 1996–2008. Estimates show the percent of respondents able to
locate themselves on the left-right dimension. See text for question wording. Sources: CSES modules 1–3.

the established democracies can place themselves on the scale, and among respondents from the
new democracies, the proportion increased from 72 percent in the late 1990s to 88 percent in the
mid-2000s, before declining to 77 percent in the late 2000s.10 In general, most of the Taiwanese
respondents had heard of the left-right dimension, but were simply unable to locate themselves on
it. For example, in the 2008 study, just 10 percent said that they had not heard of the left-right
dimension, while 34 percent responded that they didn’t know when asked to locate themselves
on it. Overall, Taiwan consistently has the fewest left-right identifiers in any of the CSES modules
(Dalton et al., 2011: 87).
Previous studies have equated the citizen’s position on the issue of unification or independence
with China with left-right position, insofar as it represents a major cleavage within the society and
it is clearly articulated by the competing political parties. The distribution of opinions across a con-
tinuum (typically on a six- or 11-point scale, see Hsieh and Niou, 2005) is also analogous to a
left-right scale, in that the bulk of the respondents place themselves around the median point of
the scale. In the 2008 survey, 59 percent of the respondents who gave a valid response to the ques-
tion placed themselves on the mid-point of the zero to 10 scale, as did 49 percent of the respondents
on the independence versus unification scale. However, the latter resulted in just over one in five of
the respondents placing themselves on the extreme points of the scale, compared to less than half
that proportion on the left-right scale.
An alternative way of measuring the extent of party polarization is to examine party likes and
dislikes, which avoids unfamiliar concepts (such as left-right) or contentious issues (such as inde-
pendence versus unification). In each of the CSES modules the respondents were asked the ques-
tion: ‘I’d like to know what you think about each of our political parties. After I read the name of a
political party, please rate it on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means you strongly dislike that party
and 10 means that you strongly like that party. If I come to a party you haven’t heard of or you feel
you do not know enough about, just say so.’ The respondent is then asked to give her views on up to
McAllister 55

35

30
KMT
25
DPP
20
Percent

15

10

0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Dislike Like

Figure 6. Views of the KMT and DPP, 2012. Estimates show the percent of respondents who gave a view of
the KMT and DPP. See text for question wording. Source: TEDS, 2012.

nine parties, with the number varying between countries. By weighting the responses according to
the strength of views for each party, we can ascertain the degree of polarization that a particular
party elicits among voters.11
The responses to the party likes-dislikes question for the KMT and the DPP in the 2012
survey are shown in Figure 6. Unlike the left-right question, the vast majority of the respon-
dents have no difficulty in placing a party on the scale: just 5 percent were unable to give an
answer for both parties. The broad patterns equate to those that are found for left-right self-
placement, with the largest groups of citizens placing themselves on the mid-point on the zero
to 10 scale. For example, 28 percent choose the mid-point for the KMT and 31 percent for the
DPP. Reflecting their electoral support in the 2012 election, the respondents found most to like
about the KMT (with a mean of 5.44 on the scale) and slightly less to like about the DPP
(mean of 5.07).
In order to estimate a robust measure of party system polarization, the weighted scores of the
respondents’ likes and dislikes of the two main parties in each country were combined. The result-
ing measure, on a scale running from zero (low polarization) to 5 (high polarization), provides a
summary of the level of party system polarization in each country. The estimates for Taiwan and
the three groups of countries are shown in Figure 7. The results confirm that the level of polariza-
tion in Taiwan has been consistent over the period of the surveys, varying only marginally, from a
low of 1.56 in 1996 to a high of 1.89 in 2004; in 2012 the figure was 1.80. To the extent that there
has been any change over the period, it is in the direction of increased polarization, but the incre-
mental increase is small.
Placing Taiwan in the context of the other three groups of countries shows that the level of party
polarization is lower than all the other groups of countries over the period, with the minor excep-
tion of 2008, when it was marginally higher than the two East Asian countries. In general, however,
56 Asian Journal of Comparative Politics 1(1)

3.5

2.5
Party polarization

1.5
Taiwan
1
East Asia

0.5 New democracies

0
Module 1 (1996-2000) Module 2 (2000-05) Module 3 (2006-11) Module 4 (2011-16)

Figure 7. Levels of party system polarization, 1996–2012. See text for estimation procedure. Sources: CSES
modules 1–4.

the two East Asian countries display levels of polarization over the period that are consistently sim-
ilar to Taiwan, over the three timepoints for which data are available. As we would expect, polar-
ization is highest in the new democracies, averaging close to 3 on the zero to five scale; the
established democracies display much lower levels of polarization, with an average of just under
2.5 on the scale.

Conclusion
Across East Asia, third wave democratization has proceeded at an uneven pace. While the democ-
racies in northeast Asia (South Korea and Taiwan) appear to be nearing the completion of the pro-
cess, the democracies to the south, such as Indonesia and the Philippines, have either stagnated or
reverted back to authoritarian rule (see Alagappa, 2001; Croissant, 2004). The results presented
here have charted the progress of democratic consolidation in Taiwan judged against a wide range
of other countries, using public attitudes towards the regime and towards parties and party compe-
tition. By examining these patterns across time, it has also been possible to identify the trajectories
of change. While the analyses are necessarily limited by the survey items that are consistently
available, the evidence suggests that democratic consolidation in Taiwan is either close to comple-
tion, or complete.
The survey evidence as it relates to mass public opinion towards the regime and to political
parties suggests that, in many respects, Taiwan is moving in the opposite direction to many
other countries. Satisfaction with democracy and feelings of external political efficacy are now
almost at the same level as the established democracies. At the same time, levels of party iden-
tification are increasing, while they are declining in almost all other countries. Moreover,
McAllister 57

partisanship is higher among the young than in any comparable countries, and as the democ-
racy matures, we would expect what Converse (1969) calls ‘the partisan push’ to enhance
partisanship through parental socialization. The evidence suggests, then, that the ‘democratic
consensus’ which has been seen by some scholars as the key to democratic consolidation, has
finally emerged.
The reasons for the success of this transition to a fully-fledged liberal democracy in Tai-
wan, and more hesitant progress elsewhere, remain a matter of speculation. However, in the
case of Taiwan, three explanations may be important. First, sustained economic growth over
four decades and a concomitant demand among the mass public for property rights, the rule
of law, and an equitable distribution of wealth, must be primary considerations. Although
economic growth on its own does not produce democratization (see Lynch, 2006), the expe-
rience of the postcommunist states is that the absence of a severe economic shock in the early
years of democracy will assist with a smoother transition (Tavits, 2005). Taiwan’s economic
prosperity over an extended period has meant that political elites have been able to focus
their attention on redistributive policies, rather than on managing austerity or dealing with
crises.
A second explanation for the successful transition is the creation of a stable, competitive
party system, and the relative absence of protest or anti-system parties. In part, this is a conse-
quence of electoral engineering, but in part, too, it reflects the stability of intraparty competi-
tion, insofar as the main parties adequately represent the policy choices of voters (Mainwaring
and Torcal, 2006). Another factor has been the transformation of the once-dominant KMT into
an early acceptance of the legitimacy of opposition. This change within the KMT was driven
by leadership transformation, shifts in the issue agenda, and not least by the need to address
declining electoral support (Tan, 2002). The net effect has been that the institutionalization
of the party system has provided a stable framework within which political competition can
take place.
The third and final explanation concerns the weakening of the territorial issue with
China and the concomitant emergence of a distinct Taiwanese national identity. This change
has been encouraged by political elites as part of the state formation and nation building
process, but it has also been driven by hostility from the China communist regime towards
democratization in Taiwan, which has weakened ethnic divisions among the Taiwanese in
the face of an external threat. The change has also had the effect of removing a divisive,
non-bargainable issue from the political agenda and replacing it with a portfolio of bargain-
able economic issues accompanied by the inevitable need for compromise and conciliation
(Lin, 2002). In turn, voters have responded by recording high levels of turnout in national
elections.
History is littered with examples of regimes that appeared to manage a democratic tran-
sition successfully, only to revert back to authoritarianism. The creation of democratic
institutions and the public support which is required to make them work does not guaran-
tee democratic stability, but it does make a collapse less likely. On the basis of the evi-
dence presented here, democracy in Taiwan would appear to be close to the end of this
process.
58 Asian Journal of Comparative Politics 1(1)

Appendix Table: Categorization of countries and survey years

CSES Module 1 (1996–2000)

Taiwan 1996
East Asian democracies Japan (1996), South Korea (2000)
New democracies Belarus (2001), Czech Republic (1996), Hungary (1998), Lithuania (1997), Poland
(1997), Slovenia (1996), Romania (1996), Russia (2000), Ukraine (1998)
Established democracies Australia (1996), Belgium (1999), Britain (1997), Canada (1997), Denmark (1998),
Germany (1998), Iceland (1999), Israel (1996), Netherlands (1998), New Zealand
(1996), Norway (1997), Sweden (1998), Switzerland (1999), United States (1996)

CSES Module 2 (2000-05)

Taiwan 2001, 2004

East Asian democracies Japan (2004), South Korea (2004)
New democracies Albania (2005), Bulgaria (2001), Czech Republic (2002), Hungary (2002), Poland
(2001), Romania (2004), Russia (2004), Slovenia (2004)
Established democracies Australia (2004), Belgium (2003), Britain (2005), Canada (2004), Denmark (2001),
Finland (2003), France (2002), Germany (2002), Iceland (2003), Ireland (2002),
Israel (2003), Italy (2006), Netherlands (2002), New Zealand (2002), Norway
(2001), Sweden (2002), Switzerland (2003), United States (2004)

CSES Module 3 (2006-11)

Taiwan 2008
East Asian democracies Japan (2007), South Korea (2008)
New democracies Belarus (2008), Croatia (2007), Czech Republic (2006), Estonia (2011), Poland
(2007), Slovakia (2010), Slovenia (2008)
Established democracies Australia (2007), Austria (2008), Denmark (2007), Finland (2007), France (2007),
Germany (2009), Iceland (2007), Ireland (2007), Israel (2006), Netherlands (2006),
New Zealand (2008), Norway (2005), Sweden (2006), Switzerland (2007)

CSES Module 4 (2011-16)

Taiwan 2012
New democracies Montenegro (2012), Poland (2007), Serbia (2012)
Established democracies Australia (2013), Austria (2013), France (2012), Germany (2013), Iceland (2013),
Ireland (2011), New Zealand (2011), Switzerland (2011), United States (2012)

Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publi-
cation of this article: An earlier version of the paper was delivered at the conference ‘The Maturing of Taiwan
Democracy: Findings and Insights from the 2012 TEDS Survey’ Conference, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Tai-
wan, 3–4 November 2012. My thanks to the Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, for pro-
viding the TEDS surveys, and to two anonymous reviewers from this journal for their constructive comments.

Notes
1. The use of the CSES data necessarily excludes certain topics which have not been consistently repre-
sented in the three modules. Topics that have not been consistently covered in the CSES which would
McAllister 59

have been valuable to cover here include direct support for democracy, civic values, and election cam-
paign participation.
2. Until 2008 legislative elections were based on a single non-transferable vote electoral system; from 2012
a mixed member majoritarian system has been used. An additional important change was a reduction in
the total number of seats from 225 to 113.
3. This change has created what Hsieh (2008) has termed ‘a mildly divided society.’
4. A later, 2013, TEDS survey is available, but since it has no corresponding benchmark with the CSES (and
also does not include the full range of variables examined here) it has been excluded.
5. Hong Kong is included in all three CSES modules but is excluded here because it is not a nation state.
6. A second question on external political efficacy asks: ‘Some people say that it doesn’t make any differ-
ence who is in power. Others say that it makes a big difference who is in power.’ This question measures
citizens’ sense of efficacy as it relates to government and the decisions that it takes. In practice the two
efficacy items are highly correlated; in module 1 the correlation between the two items was 0.324 (p <
0.000); in module 2, 0.402 (p < 0.000); and in module 3, 0.552 (p < 0.000).
7. Of course, reported turnout in the surveys is higher than the actual turnout, but this does not affect the
broad trends.
8. East Asia is excluded because the 2012 survey did not include South Korea.
9. The question was not asked in 2012. The two East Asian countries are not shown in Figure 6.
10. The two East Asia countries are excluded because the question was not asked consistently in the CSES
modules. The left-right question was not asked in the 2012 Taiwan study.
11. A response is given a higher score the farther it is from the median. For example, a response of 1 or 10
would both be given a score of 5, a response of 2 or 9 a score of 4, and so on.

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