G.R. No.
L-28394 November 26, 1970
PEDRO GAYON, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
SILVESTRE GAYON and GENOVEVA DE GAYON, defendants-appellees.
Appeal, taken by plaintiff Pedro Gayon, from an order of the Court of First Instance of
Iloilo dismissing his complaint in Civil Case No. 7334 thereof.
The records show that on July 31, 1967, Pedro Gayon filed said complaint against the
spouses Silvestre Gayon and Genoveva de Gayon, alleging substantially that, on October
1, 1952, said spouses executed a deed — copy of which was attached to the complaint, as
Annex "A" — whereby they sold to Pedro Gelera, for the sum of P500.00, a parcel of
unregistered land therein described, and located in the barrio of Cabubugan, municipality
of Guimbal, province of Iloilo, including the improvements thereon, subject to redemption
within five (5) years or not later than October 1, 1957; that said right of redemption had
not been exercised by Silvestre Gayon, Genoveva de Gayon, or any of their heirs or
successors, despite the expiration of the period therefor; that said Pedro Gelera and his
wife Estelita Damaso had, by virtue of a deed of sale — copy of which was attached to the
complaint, as Annex "B" — dated March 21, 1961, sold the aforementioned land to plaintiff
Pedro Gayon for the sum of P614.00; that plaintiff had, since 1961, introduced thereon
improvements worth P1,000; that he had, moreover, fully paid the taxes on said property
up to 1967; and that Articles 1606 and 1616 of our Civil Code require a judicial decree for
the consolidation of the title in and to a land acquired through a conditional sale, and,
accordingly, praying that an order be issued in plaintiff's favor for the consolidation of
ownership in and to the aforementioned property.
In her answer to the complaint, Mrs. Gayon alleged that her husband, Silvestre Gayon,
died on January 6, 1954, long before the institution of this case; that Annex "A" to the
complaint is fictitious, for the signature thereon purporting to be her signature is not hers;
that neither she nor her deceased husband had ever executed "any document of whatever
nature in plaintiff's favor"; that the complaint is malicious and had embarrassed her and
her children; that the heirs of Silvestre Gayon had to "employ the services of counsel for a
fee of P500.00 and incurred expenses of at least P200.00"; and that being a brother of the
deceased Silvestre Gayon, plaintiff "did not exert efforts for the amicable settlement of the
case" before filing his complaint. She prayed, therefore, that the same be dismissed and
that plaintiff be sentenced to pay damages.
Soon later, she filed a motion to dismiss, reproducing substantially the averments made in
her answer and stressing that, in view of the death of Silvestre Gayon, there is a
"necessity of amending the complaint to suit the genuine facts on record." Presently, or on
September 16, 1967, the lower court issued the order appealed from, reading:
Considering the motion to dismiss and it appearing from Exhibit "A"
annexed to the complaint that Silvestre Gayon is the absolute owner of the
land in question, and considering the fact that Silvestre Gayon is now dead
and his wife Genoveva de Gayon has nothing to do with the land subject of
plaintiff's complaint, as prayed for, this case is hereby dismissed, without
pronouncement as to costs.1
A reconsideration of this order having been denied, plaintiff interposed the present appeal,
which is well taken.
Said order is manifestly erroneous and must be set aside. To begin with, it is not true that
Mrs. Gayon "has nothing to do with the land subject of plaintiff's complaint." As the widow
of Silvestre Gayon, she is one of his compulsory heirs2and has, accordingly, an interest in
the property in question. Moreover, her own motion to dismiss indicated merely "a
necessity of amending the complaint," to the end that the other successors in interest of
Silvestre Gayon, instead of the latter, be made parties in this case. In her opposition to
the aforesaid motion for reconsideration of the plaintiff, Mrs. Gayon alleged, inter alia, that
the "heirs cannot represent the dead defendant, unless there is a declaration of heirship."
Inasmuch, however, as succession takes place, by operation of law, "from the moment of
the death of the decedent"3 and "(t)he inheritance includes all the property, rights and
obligations of a person which are not extinguished by his death,"4 it follows that if his
heirs were included as defendants in this case, they would be sued, not as
"representatives" of the decedent, but as owners of an aliquot interest in the property in
question, even if the precise extent of their interest may still be undetermined and they
have derived it from the decent. Hence, they may be sued without a previous declaration
of heirship, provided there is no pending special proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the decedent.5
As regards plaintiff's failure to seek a compromise, as an alleged obstacle to the present
case, Art. 222 of our Civil Code provides:
No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family
unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have
been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in
article 2035.
It is noteworthy that the impediment arising from this provision applies to suits "filed or
maintained between members of the same family." This phrase, "members of the same
family," should, however, be construed in the light of Art. 217 of the same Code, pursuant
to which:
Family relations shall include those:
(1) Between husband and wife;
(2) Between parent and child;
(3) Among other ascendants and their descendants;
(4) Among brothers and sisters.
Mrs. Gayon is plaintiff's sister-in-law, whereas her children are his nephews and/or nieces.
Inasmuch as none of them is included in the enumeration contained in said Art. 217 —
which should be construed strictly, it being an exception to the general rule — and
Silvestre Gayon must necessarily be excluded as party in the case at bar, it follows that
the same does not come within the purview of Art. 222, and plaintiff's failure to seek a
compromise before filing the complaint does not bar the same.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby set aside and the case remanded to the
lower court for the inclusion, as defendant or defendants therein, of the administrator or
executor of the estate of Silvestre Gayon, if any, in lieu of the decedent, or, in the absence
of such administrator or executor, of the heirs of the deceased Silvestre Gayon, and for
further proceedings, not inconsistent with this decision, with the costs of this instance
against defendant-appellee, Genoveva de Gayon. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. 109068 January 10, 1994
GAUDENCIO GUERRERO, petitioner,
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ILOCOS NORTE, BR. XVI, JUDGE LUIS B. BELLO, JR.,
PRESIDING, and PEDRO G. HERNANDO, respondents.
Filed by petitioner as an accion publicana1 against private respondent, this case assumed
another dimension when it was dismissed by respondent Judge on the ground that the
parties being brother-in-law the complaint should have alleged that earnest efforts were
first exerted towards a compromise.
Admittedly, the complaint does not allege that the parties exerted earnest towards a
compromise and that the same failed. However, private respondent Pedro G. Hernando
apparently overlooked this alleged defect since he did not file any motion to dismiss nor
attack the complaint on this ground in his answer. It was only on 7 December 1992, at the
pre-trial conference, that the relationship of petitioner Gaudencio Guerrero and respondent
Hernando was noted by respondent Judge Luis B. Bello, Jr., they being married to half-
sisters hence are brothers-in-law, and on the basis thereof respondent Judge gave
petitioner five (5) days "to file his motion and amended complaint" to allege that the
parties were very close relatives, their respective wives being sisters, and that the
complaint to be maintained should allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise were
exerted but failed. Apparently, respondent Judge considered this deficiency a jurisdictional
defect.
On 11 December 1992, Guerrero moved to reconsider the 7 December 1992 Order
claiming that since brothers by affinity are not members of the same family, he was not
required to exert efforts towards a compromise. Guerrero likewise argued that Hernando
was precluded from raising this issue since he did not file a motion to dismiss nor assert
the same as an affirmative defense in his answer.
On 22 December 1992, respondent Judge denied the motion for reconsideration holding
that "[f]ailure to allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise is jurisdictional such
that for failure to allege same the court would be deprived of its jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the case." He warned that unless the complaint was amended within five (5)
days the case would be dismissed.
On 29 January 1993, the 5-day period having expired without Guerrero amending his
complaint, respondent Judge dismissed the case, declaring the dismissal however to be
without prejudice.
Guerrero appeals by way of this petition for review the dismissal by the court a quo. He
raises these legal issues: (a) whether brothers by affinity are considered members of the
same family contemplated in Art. 217, par. (4), and Art. 222 of the New Civil Code, as well
as under Sec. 1, par. (j), Rule 16, of the Rules of Court requiring earnest efforts towards a
compromise before a suit between them may be instituted and maintained; and, (b)
whether the absence of an allegation in the complaint that earnest efforts towards a
compromise were exerted, which efforts failed, is a ground for dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction.
The Constitution protects the sanctity of the family and endeavors to strengthen it as a
basic autonomous social institution.2 This is also embodied in Art. 149,3 and given flesh in
Art. 151, of the Family Code, which provides:
Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper
unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest
efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same had
failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must
be dismissed.
This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of
compromise under the Civil Code.
Considering that Art. 151 herein-quoted starts with the negative word "No", the
requirement is mandatory4 that the complaint or petition, which must be verified, should
allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made but that the same
failed, so that "[i]f it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be
dismissed."
Further, Art. 151 is contemplated by Sec. 1, par. (j), Rule 16, of the Rules of Court which
provides as a ground for motion to dismiss "(t)hat the suit is between members of the
same family and no earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made."
The Code Commission, which drafted the precursor provision in the Civil Code, explains
the reason for the requirement that earnest efforts at compromise be first exerted before
a complaint is given due course —
This rule is introduced because it is difficult to imagine a sadder and more
tragic spectacle than a litigation between members of the same family. It
is necessary that every effort should be made toward a compromise before
a litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family. It is known
that a lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than
between strangers . . . A litigation in a family is to be lamented far more
than a lawsuit between strangers . . . 5
But the instant case presents no occasion for the application of the
above-quoted provisions. As early as two decades ago, we already ruled in Gayon v.
Gayon6 that the enumeration of "brothers and sisters" as members of the same family
does not comprehend "sisters-in-law". In that case, then Chief Justice Concepcion
emphasized that "sisters-in-law" (hence, also "brothers-in-law") are not listed under Art.
217 of the New Civil Code as members of the same family. Since Art. 150 of the Family
Code repeats essentially the same enumeration of "members of the family", we find no
reason to alter existing jurisprudence on the matter. Consequently, the court a quo erred
in ruling that petitioner Guerrero, being a brother-in-law of private respondent Hernando,
was required to exert earnest efforts towards a compromise before filing the present suit.

In his Comment, Hernando argues that ". . . although both wives of the parties were not
impleaded, it remains a truism that being spouses of the contending parties, and the
litigation involves ownership of real property, the spouses' interest and participation in the
land in question cannot be denied, making the suit still a suit between half-sisters . . ."7

Finding this argument preposterous, Guerrero counters in his Reply that his "wife has no
actual interest and participation in the land subject of the . . . suit, which the petitioner
bought, according to his complaint, before he married his wife."8 This factual controversy
however may be best left to the court a quo to resolve when it resumes hearing the case.

As regards the second issue, we need only reiterate our ruling in

O'Laco v. Co Cho Chit,9 citing Mendoza v. Court of Appeals, 10 that the attempt to
compromise as well as the inability to succeed is a condition precedent to the filing of a
suit between members of the same family, the absence of such allegation in the complaint
being assailable at any stage of the proceeding, even on appeal, for lack of cause of
action.

It is not therefore correct, as petitioner contends, that private respondent may be deemed
to have waived the aforesaid defect in failing to move or dismiss or raise the same in the
Answer. On the other hand, we cannot sustain the proposition of private respondent that
the case was, after all, also dismissed pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 17, of the Rules of Court
11 for failure of petitioner to comply with the court's order to amend his complaint.

A review of the assailed orders does not show any directive which Guerrero supposedly
defied. The Order of 7 December 1992 merely gave Guerrero five (5) days to file his
motion and amended complaint with a reminder that the complaint failed to allege that
earnest efforts were exerted towards a compromise. The Order of 22 December 1992,
which denied Guerrero's motion for reconsideration, simply stated that "Plaintiff if it (sic)
so desire must
amend the complaint otherwise, the court will have to dismiss the case (emphasis
supplied) . . ." The Order of 29 January 1993 dismissing the case without prejudice only
made reference to an earlier order "admonishing" counsel for Guerrero to amend the
complaint, and an "admonition" is not synonymous with "order". Moreover, since the
assailed orders do not find support in our jurisprudence but, on the other hand, are based
on an erroneous interpretation and application of the law, petitioner could not be bound to
comply with them. 12

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the appealed Orders of

7 December 1992, 22 December 1992 and 29 January 1993 are SET ASIDE. The Regional
Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 16, or whichever branch of the court the case may now
be assigned, is directed to continue with Civil Case
No. 10084-16 with deliberate dispatch.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. NO. 154132 August 31, 2006
HIYAS SAVINGS and LOAN BANK, INC. Petitioner,
vs.
HON. EDMUNDO T. ACUÑA, in his capacity as Pairing Judge of Regional Trial
Court, Branch 122, Caloocan City, and ALBERTO MORENO, Respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to
nullify the Orders 1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 122, dated
November 8, 2001 2 and May 7, 2002 3 denying herein petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss and
Motion for Partial Reconsideration, respectively.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On November 24, 2000, Alberto Moreno (private respondent) filed with the RTC of
Caloocan City a complaint against Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. (petitioner), his wife
Remedios, the spouses Felipe and Maria Owe and the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City
for cancellation of mortgage contending that he did not secure any loan from petitioner,
nor did he sign or execute any contract of mortgage in its favor; that his wife, acting in
conspiracy with Hiyas and the spouses Owe, who were the ones that benefited from the
loan, made it appear that he signed the contract of mortgage; that he could not have
executed the said contract because he was then working abroad. 4
On May 17, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that private
respondent failed to comply with Article 151 of the Family Code wherein it is provided that
no suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from
the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been
made, but that the same have failed. Petitioner contends that since the complaint does not
contain any fact or averment that earnest efforts toward a compromise had been made
prior to its institution, then the complaint should be dismissed for lack of cause of action. 5
Private respondent filed his Comment on the Motion to Dismiss with Motion to Strike Out
and to Declare Defendants in Default. He argues that in cases where one of the parties is
not a member of the same family as contemplated under Article 150 of the Family Code,
failure to allege in the complaint that earnest efforts toward a compromise had been made
by the plaintiff before filing the complaint is not a ground for a motion to dismiss. Alberto
asserts that since three of the party-defendants are not members of his family the ground
relied upon by Hiyas in its Motion to Dismiss is inapplicable and unavailable. Alberto also
prayed that defendants be declared in default for their failure to file their answer on time.
6 for a motion to dismiss in suits between husband and wife when other parties who are
Petitioner filed its Reply to the Comment with Opposition to the Motion to Strike and to
Declare Defendants in Default. 7 Private respondent, in turn, filed his Rejoinder. 8
On November 8, 2001, the RTC issued the first of its assailed Orders denying the Motion to
Dismiss, thus:
The court agrees with plaintiff that earnest efforts towards a compromise is not required
before the filing of the instant case considering that the above-entitled case involves
parties who are strangers to the family. As aptly pointed out in the cases cited by plaintiff,
Magbaleta v. G[o]nong, L-44903, April 25, 1977 and Mendez v. [B]iangon, L-32159,
October 28, 1977, if one of the parties is a stranger, failure to allege in the complaint that
earnest efforts towards a compromise had been made by plaintiff before filing the
complaint, is not a ground for motion to dismiss.
Insofar as plaintiff’s prayer for declaration of default against defendants, the same is
meritorious only with respect to defendants Remedios Moreno and the Register of Deeds of
Kaloocan City. A declaration of default against defendant bank is not proper considering
that the filing of the Motion to Dismiss by said defendant operates to stop the running of
the period within which to file the required Answer. 9
Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration. 10 Private respondent filed his
Comment, 11 after which petitioner filed its Reply. 12 Thereafter, private respondent filed
his Rejoinder. 13
On May 7, 2002, the RTC issued the second assailed Order denying petitioner’s Motion for
Partial Reconsideration. The trial court ruled:
Reiterating the resolution of the court, dated November 8, 2001, considering that the
above-entitled case involves parties who are strangers to the family, failure to allege in
the complaint that earnest efforts towards a compromise were made by plaintiff, is not a
ground for a Motion to Dismiss.
Additionally, the court agrees with plaintiff that inasmuch as it is defendant Remedios
Moreno who stands to be benefited by Art. 151 of the Family Code, being a member of the
same family as that of plaintiff, only she may invoke said Art. 151. 14
xxx
Hence, the instant Petition for Certiorari on the following grounds:
I. Public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction when he ruled that lack of earnest efforts toward a compromise is not a ground
strangers to the family are involved in the suit. Corollarily, public respondent committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when he applied
the decision in the case of Magbaleta v. Gonong instead of the ruling in the case of De
Guzman v. Genato.
II. Public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess
of jurisdiction when he ruled that a party who is a stranger to the family of the litigants
could not invoke lack of earnest efforts toward a compromise as a ground for the dismissal
of the complaint. 15
At the outset, the Court notes that the instant Petition for Certiorari should have been filed
with the Court of Appeals (CA) and not with this Court pursuant to the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts. Reiterating the established policy for the strict observance of this
doctrine, this Court held in Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor 16 that:
Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have
concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted
freedom of choice of court forum. As we stated in People v. Cuaresma:
This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive. It is shared by
this Court with Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of
jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an
absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be
directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the
venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for
petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most
certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level
("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the
latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original
jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and
important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is [an]
established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court’s
time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive
jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court’s docket.
The rationale for this rule is two-fold: (a) it would be an imposition upon the precious time
of this Court; and (b) it would cause an inevitable and resultant delay, intended or
otherwise, in the adjudication of cases, which in some instances had to be remanded or
referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better
equipped to resolve the issues because this Court is not a trier of facts.
Thus, this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be
obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as
cases of national interest and of serious implications, justify the availment of the
extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary
jurisdiction. Exceptional and compelling circumstances were held present in the following
cases: (a) Chavez vs. Romulo on citizens’ right to bear arms; (b) Government of the
United States of America vs. Purganan on bail in extradition proceedings; (c) Commission
on Elections vs. Quijano-Padilla on government contract involving modernization and
computerization of voters’ registration list; (d) Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB vs. Zamora on
status and existence of a public office; and (e) Fortich vs. Corona on the so-called "Win-
Win Resolution" of the Office of the President which modified the approval of the
conversion to agro-industrial area. 17
In the present case, petitioner failed to advance a satisfactory explanation as to its failure
to comply with the principle of judicial hierarchy. There is no reason why the instant
petition could not have been brought before the CA. On this basis, the instant petition
should be dismissed.
And even if this Court passes upon the substantial issues raised by petitioner, the instant
petition likewise fails for lack of merit.
Restating its arguments in its Motion for Partial Reconsideration, petitioner argues that
what is applicable to the present case is the Court’s decision in De Guzman v. Genato 18
and not in Magbaleta v. Gonong, 19 the former being a case involving a husband and wife
while the latter is between brothers.
The Court is not persuaded.
Article 151 of the Family Code provides as follows:
No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from
the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been
made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made,
the case must be dismissed.
This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the
Civil Code.
Article 222 of the Civil Code from which Article 151 of the Family Code was taken,
essentially contains the same provisions, to wit:
No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should
appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same
have failed, subject to the limitations in Article 2035. 20
The Code Commission that drafted Article 222 of the Civil Code from which Article 151 of
the Family Code was taken explains:
[I]t is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a litigation between
members of the same family. It is necessary that every effort should be made toward a
compromise before a litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family. It is
known that a lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than between
strangers. 21
In Magbaleta, the case involved brothers and a stranger to the family, the alleged owner (1) Between husband and wife;
of the subject property. The Court, taking into consideration the explanation made by the
Code Commision in its report, ruled that: (2) Between parents and children;

[T]hese considerations do not, however, weigh enough to make it imperative that such (3) Among other ascendants and descendants; and
efforts to compromise should be a jurisdictional pre-requisite for the maintenance of an
action whenever a stranger to the family is a party thereto, whether as a necessary or
(4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.
indispensable one. It is not always that one who is alien to the family would be willing to
suffer the inconvenience of, much less relish, the delay and the complications that
wranglings between or among relatives more often than not entail. Besides, it is neither and Article 217 of the Civil Code, to wit:
practical nor fair that the determination of the rights of a stranger to the family who just
happened to have innocently acquired some kind of interest in any right or property ART. 217. Family relations shall include those:
disputed among its members should be made to depend on the way the latter would settle
their differences among themselves. 22 x x x. (1) Between husband and wife;

Hence, once a stranger becomes a party to a suit involving members of the same family, (2) Between parent and child;
the law no longer makes it a condition precedent that earnest efforts be made towards a
compromise before the action can prosper.
(3) Among other ascendants and their descendants;
In the subsequent case of De Guzman, the case involved spouses and the alleged
paramour of the wife. The Court ruled that due to the efforts exerted by the husband, (4) Among brothers and sisters.
through the Philippine Constabulary, to confront the wife, there was substantial
compliance with the law, thereby implying that even in the presence of a party who is not Petitioner also contends that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it
a family member, the requirements that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been ruled that petitioner, not being a member of the same family as respondent, may not
exerted must be complied with, pursuant to Article 222 of the Civil Code, now Article 151 invoke the provisions of Article 151 of the Family Code.
of the Family Code.
Suffice it to say that since the Court has ruled that the requirement under Article 151 of
While De Guzman was decided after Magbaleta, the principle enunciated in the Magbaleta the Family Code is applicable only in cases which are exclusively between or among
is the one that now prevails because it is reiterated in the subsequent cases of Gonzales v. members of the same family, it necessarily follows that the same may be invoked only by
Lopez, 23 Esquivias v. Court of Appeals, 24 Spouses Hontiveros v. Regional Trial Court, a party who is a member of that same family.
Branch 25, Iloilo City, 25 and the most recent case of Martinez v. Martinez. 26 Thus, Article
151 of the Family Code applies to cover when the suit is exclusively between or among WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
family members.
Costs against petitioner.
The Court finds no cogent reason why the ruling in Magbaleta as well as in all of the
aforementioned cases should not equally apply to suits involving husband and wife.
SO ORDERED.

Petitioner makes much of the fact that the present case involves a husband and his wife
while Magbaleta is a case between brothers. However, the Court finds no specific, unique,
or special circumstance that would make the ruling in Magbaleta as well as in the
abovementioned cases inapplicable to suits involving a husband and his wife, as in the
present case. In the first place, Article 151 of the Family Code and Article 222 of the Civil
Code are clear that the provisions therein apply to suits involving "members of the same
family" as contemplated under Article 150 of the Family Code, to wit:

ART. 150. Family relations include those:

G.R. No. 162084 June 28, 2005
APRIL MARTINEZ, FRITZ DANIEL MARTINEZ and MARIA OLIVIA MARTINEZ,
petitioners,
vs.
RODOLFO G. MARTINEZ, respondent.
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 59420 setting aside and reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 30, in Civil Case No. 00-96962 affirming, on appeal, the decision
of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Manila in Civil Case No. 164761 (CV) for
ejectment.
The Antecedents
The spouses Daniel P. Martinez, Sr. and Natividad de Guzman-Martinez were the owners of
a parcel of land identified as Lot 18-B-2 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
54334, as well as the house constructed thereon.2 On March 6, 1993, Daniel, Sr. executed
a Last Will and Testament3 directing the subdivision of the property into three lots,
namely, Lots 18-B-2-A, 18-B-2-B and 18-B-2-C. He then bequeathed the three lots to
each of his sons, namely, Rodolfo, Manolo and Daniel, Jr.; Manolo was designated as the
administrator of the estate.
In May 1995, Daniel, Sr. suffered a stroke which resulted in the paralysis of the right side
of his body. Natividad died on October 26, 1996.4 Daniel, Sr. passed away on October 6,
1997.5
On September 16, 1998, Rodolfo found a deed of sale purportedly signed by his father on
September 15, 1996, where the latter appears to have sold Lot 18-B-2 to Manolo and his
wife Lucila.6 He also discovered that TCT No. 237936 was issued to the vendees based on
the said deed of sale.7
Rodolfo filed acomplaint8 for annulment of deed of sale and cancellation of TCT No.
237936 against his brother Manolo and his sister-in-law Lucila before the RTC. He also
filed a criminal complaint for estafa through falsification of a public document in the Office
of the City Prosecutor against Manolo, which was elevated to the Department of Justice.9
On motion of the defendants, the RTC issued an Order10 on March 29, 1999, dismissing
the complaint for annulment of deed of sale on the ground that the trial court had no
jurisdiction over the action since there was no allegation in the complaint that the last will
of Daniel Martinez, Sr. had been admitted to probate. Rodolfo appealed the order to the
CA.11
On October 4, 1999, Rodolfo filed a Petition with the RTC of Manila for the probate of the
last will of the deceased Daniel Martinez, Sr.12
In the meantime, the spouses Manolo and Lucila Martinez wrote Rodolfo, demanding that
he vacate the property. Rodolfo ignored the letter and refused to do so. This prompted the
said spouses to file a complaint for unlawful detainer against Rodolfo in the MTC of Manila.
They alleged that they were the owners of the property covered by TCT No. 237936, and
that pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1508, the matter was referred to the
barangay for conciliation and settlement, but none was reached. They appended the
certification to file action executed by the barangay chairman to the complaint.
In his Answer13 to the complaint filed on October 11, 1999, Rodolfo alleged, inter alia, that
the complaint failed to state a condition precedent, namely, that earnest efforts for an
amicable settlement of the matter between the parties had been exerted, but that none
was reached. He also pointed out that the dispute had not been referred to the barangay
before the complaint was filed.
On October 20, 1999, the spouses Martinez filed an Amended Complaint in which they
alleged that earnest efforts toward a settlement had been made, but that the same proved
futile. Rodolfo filed his opposition thereto, on the ground that there was no motion for the
admission of the amended complaint. The trial court failed to act on the matter.
The spouses Martinez alleged in their position paper that earnest efforts toward a
compromise had been made and/or exerted by them, but that the same proved futile.14 No
amicable settlement was, likewise, reached by the parties during the preliminary
conference because of irreconcilable differences. The MTC was, thus, impelled to terminate
the conference.15
On February 21, 2000, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the spouses Martinez.
The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiff. The
defendant, including any person claiming right under him, is ordered:
1) To vacate the subject premises;
2) To pay plaintiff the sum of ₱10,000.00 a month starting July 17, 1999, the date
of last demand until he vacates the same;
3) To pay the sum of ₱10,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees; and
4) Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.16
The trial court declared that the spouses Martinez had substantially complied with Article
151 of the Family Code of the Philippines17 based on the allegations of the complaint and
the appended certification to file action issued by the barangay captain.
Rodolfo appealed the decision to the RTC. On May 31, 2000, the RTC rendered judgment
affirming the appealed decision. He then filed a petition for review of the decision with the
CA, alleging that:
1. THE RTC ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE MTC WHICH FOUND WITHOUT
MERIT THE DEFENSE OF PETITIONER THAT THERE IS NO ALLEGATION IN THE COMPLAINT
THAT PETITIONER HAS UNLAWFULLY WITHHELD POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY FROM
RESPONDENTS – A REQUIREMENT IN [AN] UNLAWFUL DETAINER SUIT.
2. THE RTC ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE MTC WHICH FOUND THAT
PETITIONER’S POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY IS BY MERE TOLERANCE OF
RESPONDENTS.
3. THE RTC ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE MTC WHICH FOUND THAT THE
RESPONDENTS HAVE A CAUSE OF ACTION.
4. THE RTC ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE MTC WHICH DID NOT RESOLVE
THE SIXTH ISSUE, TO WIT, "Whether or not this Court has jurisdiction over this case
considering that the allegations in the complaint makes out a case of accion publiciana."
5. THE RTC ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE MTC WHICH HAS NO
JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE.
6. THE RTC ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE MTC WHICH FOUND THAT THE
MANDATORY REQUIREMENT OF CONCILIATION HAS BEEN COMPLIED WITH.
7. THE RTC ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE MTC WHICH FOUND THAT
THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE KATARUNGANG PAMBARANGAY LAW.
8. THE RTC ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE MTC WHICH FOUND THAT THE
PENDENCY OF CIVIL CASE NO. 98-91147 AND SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS NO. 99-95281,
INVOLVING THE PETITIONER AND RESPONDENTS AND INVOLVING THE SAME PROPERTY
DID NOT DIVEST THE MTC OF AUTHORITY TO DECIDE THE CASE.
9. THE RTC ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE MTC WHICH GRANTED THE
RELIEF PRAYED FOR BY THE RESPONDENTS.
10. THE RTC ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE MTC.18
On November 27, 2003, the CA rendered judgment granting the petition and reversing the
decision of the RTC. The appellate court ruled that the spouses Martinez had failed to
comply with Article 151 of the Family code. The CA also held that the defect in their
complaint before the MTC was not cured by the filing of an amended complaint because
the latter pleading was not admitted by the trial court.
Upon the denial of their motion for reconsideration of the said decision, the spouses
Martinez filed the present petition for review on certiorari, in which they raise the following
issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE CERTIFICATION TO FILE ACTION AND THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE
COMPLAINT THAT THE CASE PASSED [THROUGH] THE BARANGAY BUT NO SETTLEMENT
WAS REACHED, ARE SUFFICIENT COMPLIANCE TO PROVE THAT, INDEED, EARNEST
EFFORTS WERE, IN FACT, MADE BUT THE SAME HAVE FAILED PRIOR TO THE FILING OF
THE COMPLAINT.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY AND SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING
THAT THERE WAS NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENT PROVIDED FOR UNDER
ARTICLE 151 OF THE FAMILY CODE, CONSIDERING THAT ONE OF THE PARTIES TO A SUIT
IN THIS CASE IS NOT A MEMBER OF THE SAME FAMILY.19
The petitioners alleged that they substantially complied with Article 151 of the Family
Code, since they alleged the following in their original complaint:
2. In compliance with P.D. 1508, otherwise known as the "Katarungang Pambarangay,"
this case passed [through] the Barangay and no settlement was forged between plaintiffs
and defendant as a result of which Certification to File Action was issued by Barangay 97,
Zone 8, District I, Tondo, Manila. xxx" (Underscoring supplied)20
Further, the petitioners averred, they alleged in their position paper that they had exerted
earnest efforts towards a compromise which proved futile. They also point out that the
MTC resolved to terminate the preliminary conference due to irreconcilable difference
between the parties. Besides, even before they filed their original complaint, animosity
already existed between them and the respondent due to the latter’s filing of civil and
criminal cases against them; hence, the objective of an amicable settlement could not
have been attained. Moreover, under Article 150 of the Family Code, petitioner Lucila
Martinez had no familial relations with the respondent, being a mere sister-in-law. She
was a stranger to the respondent; hence, there was no need for the petitioners21 to
comply with Article 151 of the Family Code.
The petition is meritorious.
Article 151 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should
appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise
have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were, in
fact, made, the case must be dismissed.
This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the
Civil Code.
The phrase "members of the family" must be construed in relation to Article 150 of the
Family Code, to wit:
Art. 150. Family relations include those:
(1) Between husband and wife;
(2) Between parents and children;
(3) Among other ascendants and descendants; and
(4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-blood.
Article 151 of the Family code must be construed strictly, it being an exception to the
general rule. Hence, a sister-in-law or brother-in-law is not included in the enumeration.22
As pointed out by the Code Commission, it is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic
spectacle than a litigation between members of the same family. It is necessary that every
effort should be made toward a compromise before a litigation is allowed to breed hate
and passion in the family and it is known that a lawsuit between close relatives generates
deeper bitterness than between strangers.23
Thus, a party’s failure to comply with Article 151 of the Family Code before filing a
complaint against a family member would render such complaint premature.
In this case, the decision of the CA that the petitioners were mandated to comply with
Article 151 of the Family code and that they failed to do so is erroneous.
First. Petitioner Lucila Martinez, the respondent’s sister-in-law, was one of the plaintiffs in
the MTC. The petitioner is not a member of the same family as that of her deceased
husband and the respondent:
As regards plaintiff’s failure to seek a compromise, as an alleged obstacle to the present
case, Art. 222 of our Civil Code provides:
"No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should
appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same
have failed, subject to the limitations in Article 2035."
It is noteworthy that the impediment arising from this provision applies to suits "filed or
maintained between members of the same family." This phrase, "members of the same
family," should, however, be construed in the light of Art. 217 of the same Code, pursuant
to which:
"Family relations shall include those:
(1) Between husband and wife;
(2) Between parent and child;
(3) Among other ascendants and their descendants;
(4) Among brothers and sisters."
Mrs. Gayon is plaintiff’s sister-in-law, whereas her children are his nephews and/or nieces.
Inasmuch as none of them is included in the enumeration contained in said Art. 217 –
which should be construed strictly, it being an exception to the general rule – and Silvestre
Gayon must necessarily be excluded as party in the case at bar, it follows that the same
does not come within the purview of Art. 222, and plaintiff’s failure to seek a compromise
before filing the complaint does not bar the same.24
Second. The petitioners were able to comply with the requirements of Article 151 of the
Family Code because they alleged in their complaint that they had initiated a proceeding
against the respondent for unlawful detainer in the Katarungang Pambarangay, in
compliance with P.D. No. 1508; and that, after due proceedings, no amicable settlement
was arrived at, resulting in the barangay chairman’s issuance of a certificate to file
action.25 The Court rules that such allegation in the complaint, as well as the certification
to file action by the barangay chairman, is sufficient compliance with article 151 of the
Family Code. It bears stressing that under Section 412(a) of Republic Act No. 7160, no
complaint involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon shall be instituted or filed
directly in court for adjudication unless there has been a confrontation between the parties
and no settlement was reached.26
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59420 is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Decision of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, as affirmed on appeal by the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 30, in Civil Case No. 164761(CV) is REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 70261 February 28, 1990
MAURO BLARDONY, JR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. JOSE L. COSCOLLUELA, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CXLVI, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION, MAKATI, METRO MANILA and MA.
ROSARIO ARANETA BLARDONY, respondents.
The petitioner seeks a review of the orders dated August 9, 1983, and February 20, 1985,
of respondent Judge Jose Coscolluela, Jr., of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch
CXLVI, amending the order of his predecessor, Judge Segundo Soza, (which dismissed
private respondent's petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership and partition of
conjugal properties) by requiring petitioner to submit an accounting of his salaries,
allowances, bonuses and commissions.
The petitioner and the private respondent are spouses. They were married on April 30,
1975. During their marriage, they begot one child named Patricia Araneta Blardony, who
was born on November 10, 1975. Due to irreconcilable differences, petitioner and private
respondent separated in March, 1981.
On different dates, the spouses executed the following agreements:
(a) Memorandum of Agreement dated July 1981 for the support of their
child, Patricia;
(b) Receipt dated January 11, 1982, evidencing the Compromise of
Settlement of Advances claimed by private respondent from petitioner;
(c) The Deed of Conveyance of a property situated in Alabang, Muntinlupa;
and
(d) The Confirmation of the waiver by private respondent in favor of
petitioner over a property situated in Calatagan, Batangas. (p. 25, Rollo.)
On May 3, 1982, the wife filed a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership and
Partition of Conjugal Partnership Properties in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch
XXXVI, in Makati, where it was docketed as Sp. No. 9711.
The husband, in his answer, admitted that he had abandoned the conjugal home since
March 1981; that before the filing of the petition, he and his wife, assisted by their
respective counsel, tried to file a joint petition for the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership but their attempt failed due to their inability to agree upon the equitable
partition of their conjugal partnership properties and he prayed the court to order "a fair
and equitable dissolution of their conjugal partnership in accordance with law." (p. 74,
Rollo.)
On October 8, 1982, the husband filed a motion to dismiss the petition on jurisdictional
grounds, claiming that it should have been filed first in the Lupon Tagapamayapa as
provided in P.D. 1508, because both are residents of the same Municipality of Makati.
Mrs. Blardony opposed the motion to dismiss. Nevertheless, Judge Segundo Soza
dismissed her petition on October 8, 1982 for her failure, as plaintiff, to comply with
Section 6 of P.D. 1508.
Mrs. Blardony filed a motion for reconsideration. In the meantime, the courts were
reorganized and the case was transferred to Branch CXLVI (146) of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, presided over by Judge Jose Coscolluela, Jr.
On August 9, 1983, Judge Coscolluela set aside Judge Soza's order of dismissal and
required the defendant to submit an accounting of his salaries, allowances, bonuses, and
commissions. The latter's motion for reconsideration of that order was denied by the court
on February 20, 1985. Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction on the grounds that respondent
Judge exceeded his jurisdiction:
1. in assuming jurisdiction over the case without prior referral to the Lupon
Tagapamayapa as required by P.D. 1508; and
2. in declaring that the issues of support pendente lite and delivery of
personal property belonging to the conjugal partnership of the parties are
essentially involved in the petition, hence, the parties could go directly to
court without passing through the Lupon Tagapamayapa, as provided in
Section 6 of P.D. 1508.
The petition has no merit. Our jurisprudence is replete with decisions of this Court to the
effect that while the referral of a case to the Lupon Tagapayapa is a condition precedent
for filing a complaint in court, it is not a jurisdictional requirement, "its non-compliance
cannot affect the jurisdiction which the court has already acquired over the subject matter
or over the person of the defendant." (Fernandez vs. Militante, May 31, 1988; Gonzales
vs. Court of Appeals, 151 SCRA 287; Royales vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 127 SCRA
470). Petitioner waived the pre-litigation conciliation procedure prescribed in P.D. No.
1508 when he did not file a motion to dismiss the complaint on that score, but filed his
answer thereto wherein he prayed the court to make an equitable partition of the conjugal
properties.
While petitioners could have prevented the trial court from exercising
jurisdiction over the case by seasonably taking exception thereto, they
instead invoked the very same jurisdiction by filing an answer and seeking
affirmative relief from it. ... . Upon this premise, petitioners cannot be
allowed belatedly to adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking the
jurisdiction of the court to which they had submitted themselves
voluntarily. (Royales vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 127 SCRA 470.)
Furthermore, under Section 6 of P.D. 1508, the complaint may be filed directly in a
competent court without passing the Lupon Tagapayapa in the following cases:

SECTION 6. Conciliation, pre-condition to filing of complaint. — No

complaint, petition, action or proceeding involving any matter within the
authority of the Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof, shall be filed or
instituted in court or any other government office for adjudication unless
there has been a confrontation of the parties before the Lupon Chairman
or the Pangkat and no conciliation or settlement has been reached as
certified by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary, attested by the
Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement has been repudiated.
However, the parties may go directly to court in the following cases:

xxx xxx xxx

(3) Actions coupled with provisional remedies such as

preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of personal
properly and support pendente lite; and

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis supplied.)

Respondent Judge correctly observed that:

... the issues of support pendente lite and delivery of personal properties
belonging to the conjugal partnership, although not coupled in the strict
sense of the word with the instant petition, are essentially involved in this
petition because of the minority of the daughter, Patricia Araneta Blardony
who, as of this date, is not yet 8 years old, and because the resolution or
decision of this court on the pending petition would be incomplete without
a clear cut disposition on the partition of the personal and real properties
of the conjugal partnership and consequent delivery thereof to the proper
parties. (p. 20, Rollo.)

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the orders complained of, the petition for
certiorari is denied for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner. This decision is
immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 171916 December 4, 2009
CONSTANTINO A. PASCUAL, substituted by his heirs, represented by Zenaida
Pascual, Petitioner,
vs.
LOURDES S. PASCUAL, Respondent.
Due process dictates that jurisdiction over the person of a defendant can only be acquired
by the courts after a strict compliance with the rules on the proper service of summons.
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction, seeking to
annul the Decision1 dated June 29, 2005 and the Resolution2 dated March 14, 2006 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) nullifying and vacating the Decision3 dated December 3, 2002 and
Order4 dated April 4, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, Malolos, Bulacan.
The facts, as found in the records, are the following:
Petitioner filed a Complaint for Specific Performance with Prayer for Issuance of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction with Damages before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan
against respondent. The process server, in his Return of Service5 dated May 21, 2002,
reported, among others that:
The undersigned Process Server of this Honorable Court went at defendant's given address
at No. 4 Manikling St., Talayan Village, Quezon City on May 20, 2002 to serve the
summons and copy of the Complaint together with the annexes thereto in connection with
the above-entitled case.
At the time of the service of the said summons, the defendant was not at her home and
only her maid was there who refused to receive the said summons [in spite] of the
insistence of the undersigned.
The undersigned, upon his request with the Brgy. Clerk at the said place, was given a
certification that he really exerted effort to effect the service of the said summons but
failed due to the above reason. (Annex "A").
The following day, May 21, 2002, the undersigned went back at defendant's residence to
have her receive the subject summons but again the above defendant was not at her
house.
WHEREFORE, the original summons and copy of the complaint is hereby returned to the
Honorable Court NOT SERVED.
Malolos, Bulacan, May 21, 2002.
Thereafter, an alias summons was issued by the RTC and, on May 29, 2002, the following
report was submitted:
The undersigned, on May 29, 2002, made a 3rd attempt to serve the alias summons
issued by the Hon. Court relative with the above-entitled case at the given address of the
defendant.
The undersigned, accompanied by the barangay officials of the said place, proceeded at
defendant's residence but the undersigned was not permitted to go inside her house and
was given information by her maid that the defendant was not there.
The defendant's car was parked inside her house and inquiries/verification made on her
neighbors revealed that the defendant was inside her house at the time of service of said
summons and probably did not want to show-up when her maid informed her of
undersigned's presence.
WHEREFORE, the undersigned court process server respectfully returned the alias
summons dated May 29, 2002 issued by the Hon. Court "UNSERVED" for its information
and guidance.
Malolos, Bulacan, May 30, 2002.6
Subsequently, on August 14, 2002, the process server returned with the following report,7
stating that a substituted service was effected:
This is to certify that on the 14th day of August, 2002, I personally went at Dr. Lourdes
Pascual's residence at #4 Manikling Street, Talayan Village, Quezon City, to serve the copy
of the Summons dated August 12, 2002, together with a copy of the Complaint and its
annexes thereto.1avvphi1
Defendant Dr. Lourdes Pascual was out during the time of service of the said summons
and only her housemaid was present. The undersigned left a copy of the same to the latter
who is at the age of reason but refused to sign the same.
WHEREFORE, the undersigned respectfully return the service of summons duly served for
information and guidance of the Honorable Court.
Malolos, Bulacan, August 14, 2002.
For failure of the respondent to file a responsive pleading, petitioner, on September 17,
2002, filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in Default8 to which the petitioner filed an
Opposition/Comment to Plaintiff's Motion to Declare Defendant in Default 9 dated October
1, 2002, claiming that she was not able to receive any summons and copy of the
complaint. The RTC, in its Order10 dated October 30, 2002, declared respondent in default
and allowed petitioner to file his evidence ex-parte.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration11 dated November 18, 2002 seeking to set
aside the above-mentioned Order dated October 30, 2002. However, the said motion was
denied by the RTC in its Order12 dated November 27, 2002.
Consequently, on December 3, 2002, the RTC, in its Decision,13 found in favor of the
petitioner. The dispositive portion of the said Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff, Constantino A. Pascual, and against Lourdes S. Pascual, ordering the latter as
follows:
a. to CEASE AND DESIST from further intervening with the corporate and internal
affairs of Rosemoor Mining Corporation, consisting of acts and omissions
prejudicial and detrimental to the interest of the said corporation resulting to
irreparable injury to herein plaintiff;
b. to pay plaintiff the sum of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00), for and
by way of moral damages;
c. to pay the sum of Thirty Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00) for and by way of
Attorney's fees; and
d. to pay the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.
Respondent then filed a Motion to Set Aside Order of Default 14 dated December 13, 2002,
with the argument of non-service of summons upon her. This was denied by the RTC in its
Order15 dated April 4, 2003; and on the same day, a Certificate of Finality and Entry of
Judgment was issued. Eventually, respondent, on April 28, 2003, filed a Motion for
Reconsideration16 of the Order dated April 4, 2003, which was denied by the RTC in its
Order17 dated June 23, 2003. Finally, on June 26, 2003, a Writ of Execution was issued to
enforce the Decision dated December 3, 2002 of the RTC.
Aggrieved, respondent filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court which was granted by the same Court in its Decision18 dated June
29, 2005, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE and GRANTED. The said Decision, as well
as the Orders and the processes on which this is premised, are NULLIFIED and VACATED.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner comes now to this Court through a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, on the following grounds:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS AN INVALID
SERVICE OF SUMMONS UPON THE RESPONDENT AND, HENCE, THE COURT (REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT) DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE RESPONDENT.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION
WHEN FROM THE UNDISPUTED FACTS, THE RESPONDENT'S FAILURE TO INTERPOSE AN
APPEAL OR TO FILE A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OR A PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM
JUDGMENT CLEARLY BARS THE INSTITUTION OF THE SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR
CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65, 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
Petitioner insists that there was a valid substituted service of summons and that there
should be a presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions. He also
avers that certiorari, which was filed by the respondent with the CA, does not lie when the
remedy of appeal has been lost.
In her Comment with Motion to Cite for Contempt19 dated August 29, 2006, respondent
raises the following issues:
1. SHOULD THE PETITION BE DISMISSED FOR HAVING BEEN FILED IN VIOLATION
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6713 IN RELATION TO ART. 5 OF THE CIVIL CODE?
2. ARE THE PETITIONER AND HIS COUNSEL PUNISHABLE FOR CONTEMPT OF
COURT FOR KNOWINGLY MISLEADING THIS HONORABLE COURT?
3. WAS THE ALLEGED SERVICE OF SUMMONS ON THE ILLITERATE MAID
EFFECTIVE TO CONFER JURISDICTION OVER THE DEFENDANT BEFORE THE RTC
OF MALOLOS, BULACAN?
4. ASSUMING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT THAT THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS
WAS VALID, WAS THE ORDER DECLARING THE DEFENDANT IN DEFAULT
RENDERED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION?
5. WAS THE ORDER DENYING THE MOTION TO LIFT AND SET ASIDE THE ORDER
OF DEFAULT RENDERED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION?
6. IS THE PETITIONER GUILTY OF FORUM SHOPPING?
7. WILL THIS HONORABLE COURT ALLOW THE NULL AND VOID DECEMBER 3,
2002 DECISION OF THE RTC TO BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY AND
OBLITERATE THE CRIMINAL ACT OF FALSIFICATION, THEREBY REWARDING THE
AUTHOR OF THE CRIMINAL OFFENSE?
In addressing the above issues, the respondent argues that the CA decision became final
by operation of law because the present petition is null and void for being a violation of the
provisions of Republic Act No. 6712, in relation to Article 5 of the Civil Code, the counsel
for petitioner having filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review and,
thereafter, the Petition for Review itself. She also claims that there was no proper service
of summons as the maid who was purportedly served a copy thereof was illiterate and has
denied being served in a sworn statement executed before a notary public and, thus, the
RTC never acquired jurisdiction over her person. According to her, assuming that the
summons were indeed served, the RTC was guilty of grave abuse of discretion for
declaring her in default and for refusing to lift the order of default because it deprived her
of her right to present evidence in support of her defense. She further disputes the
argument of the petitioner that the Decision dated December 3, 2002 became final
because it did not become the subject of appeal by stating that the said principle can only
be applied to valid judgments that were rendered in accordance with law and not to void
judgments rendered without jurisdiction or in excess thereof. In addition, she avers that
petitioner made a deliberate and malicious concealment of the fact that at the time he
filed the case for specific performance, as well as during the time it was being heard, he
was already being investigated in administrative proceedings before the National Bureau of
Investigation, the Department of Justice and the Municipal Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan,
Branch 2, involving the same subject matter, issues and parties; hence, he violated the
law against forum shopping. Lastly, respondent points out that the CA Decision dated June
29, 2005 is a permanent injunction against the implementation of the contested Orders
and Decisions of the RTC; therefore, there is an urgent necessity to enforce the said
judgment.
On June 30, 2008, this Court granted20 the substitution of the respondent by his heirs as
represented by his wife Zenaida Pascual, after the Manifestation21 dated June 12, 2008
was filed informing this Court of the demise of the same respondent.
After a careful study of the records of this case, this Court finds the petition bereft of any
merit.
Clearly, the main, if not the only issue that needs to be resolved is whether or not there
was a proper and valid substituted service of summons, the resolution of which, will
determine whether jurisdiction was indeed acquired by the trial court over the person of
the petitioner.
In a case where the action is in personam and the defendant is in the Philippines, the
service of summons may be done by personal or substituted service as laid out in Sections
6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court. The provisions state:
Section 6. Service in person on defendant. - Whenever practicable, the summons shall be
served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive
and sign for it, by tendering it to him.
Section 7. Substituted service. - If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served
within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a)
by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of
suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at
defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge
thereof.
A plain and simple reading of the above provisions indicates that personal service of
summons should and always be the first option, and it is only when the said summons
cannot be served within a reasonable time can the process server resort to substituted
service.
This Court gave an in-depth discussion as to the nature and requisites of substituted
service in Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, et al.:22
We can break down this section into the following requirements to effect a valid
substituted service:
(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service
The party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show that
defendant cannot be served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt
service.23 Section 8, Rule 14 provides that the plaintiff or the sheriff is given a
"reasonable time" to serve the summons to the defendant in person, but no
specific time frame is mentioned. "Reasonable time" is defined as "so much time
as is necessary under the circumstances for a reasonably prudent and diligent man
to do, conveniently, what the contract or duty requires that should be done,
having a regard for the rights and possibility of loss, if any, to the other party."24
Under the Rules, the service of summons has no set period. However, when the
court, clerk of court, or the plaintiff asks the sheriff to make the return of the
summons and the latter submits the return of summons, then the validity of the
summons lapses. The plaintiff may then ask for an alias summons if the service of
summons has failed.25 What then is a reasonable time for the sheriff to effect a
personal service in order to demonstrate impossibility of prompt service? To the
plaintiff, "reasonable time" means no more than seven (7) days since an
expeditious processing of a complaint is what a plaintiff wants. To the sheriff,
"reasonable time" means 15 to 30 days because at the end of the month, it is a
practice for the branch clerk of court to require the sheriff to submit a return of the
summons assigned to the sheriff for service. The Sheriff’s Return provides data to
the Clerk of Court, which the clerk uses in the Monthly Report of Cases to be
submitted to the Office of the Court Administrator within the first ten (10) days of
the succeeding month. Thus, one month from the issuance of summons can be
considered "reasonable time" with regard to personal service on the defendant.
Sheriffs are asked to discharge their duties on the service of summons with due
care, utmost diligence, and reasonable promptness and speed so as not to
prejudice the expeditious dispensation of justice. Thus, they are enjoined to try
their best efforts to accomplish personal service on defendant. On the other hand,
since the defendant is expected to try to avoid and evade service of summons, the
sheriff must be resourceful, persevering, canny, and diligent in serving the process
on the defendant. For substituted service of summons to be available, there must
be several attempts by the sheriff to personally serve the summons within a
reasonable period [of one month] which eventually resulted in failure to prove
impossibility of prompt service. "Several attempts" means at least three (3) tries,
preferably on at least two different dates. In addition, the sheriff must cite why
such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only then that impossibility of service can be
confirmed or accepted.
(2) Specific Details in the Return
The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and
circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service.26 The efforts
made to find the defendant and the reasons behind the failure must be
clearly narrated in detail in the Return. The date and time of the attempts on
personal service, the inquiries made to locate the defendant, the name/s of the
occupants of the alleged residence or house of defendant and all other acts done,
though futile, to serve the summons on defendant must be specified in the Return
to justify substituted service. The form on Sheriff’s Return of Summons on
Substituted Service prescribed in the Handbook for Sheriffs published by the
Philippine Judicial Academy requires a narration of the efforts made to find the
defendant personally and the fact of failure.27 Supreme Court Administrative
Circular No. 5 dated November 9, 1989 requires that "impossibility of prompt
service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant
personally and the failure of such efforts," which should be made in the proof of
service.
(3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion
If the substituted service will be effected at defendant’s house or
residence, it should be left with a person of "suitable age and discretion
then residing therein."28 A person of suitable age and discretion is one who has
attained the age of full legal capacity (18 years old) and is considered to have
enough discernment to understand the importance of a summons. "Discretion" is
defined as "the ability to make decisions which represent a responsible choice and
for which an understanding of what is lawful, right or wise may be presupposed".29
Thus, to be of sufficient discretion, such person must know how to read and
understand English to comprehend the import of the summons, and fully realize
the need to deliver the summons and complaint to the defendant at the earliest
possible time for the person to take appropriate action. Thus, the person must
have the "relation of confidence" to the defendant, ensuring that the latter would
receive or at least be notified of the receipt of the summons. The sheriff must
therefore determine if the person found in the alleged dwelling or residence of
defendant is of legal age, what the recipient’s relationship with the defendant is,
and whether said person comprehends the significance of the receipt of the
summons and his duty to immediately deliver it to the defendant or at least notify
the defendant of said receipt of summons. These matters must be clearly and
specifically described in the Return of Summons.
(4) A Competent Person in Charge
If the substituted service will be done at defendant’s office or regular place of
business, then it should be served on a competent person in charge of the place.
Thus, the person on whom the substituted service will be made must be the one
managing the office or business of defendant, such as the president or manager;
and such individual must have sufficient knowledge to understand the obligation of
the defendant in the summons, its importance, and the prejudicial effects arising
from inaction on the summons. Again, these details must be contained in the
Return.
Petitioner contends that there was a valid substituted service of summons as shown in not
one, but three Officer's Return. He points out that the absence in the officer's return of a
statement about the impossibility of personal service does not conclusively prove that the
service was invalid. He adds that proof of prior attempts to serve personally can be
deduced from the other returns when there are several in a series of officer's returns all
tending to establish the impossibility of personal service upon the respondent. However,
the said argument of the petitioner is merely a plain deduction that veers away from the
well-established requisite that the officer must show that the defendant cannot be served
promptly, or that there was an impossibility of prompt service. A cursory reading of the
three Officer's Returns does not show any compliance with the said requisite. The Return
of Service dated May 21, 2002 inadequately states that:
xxxx
At the time of service of the said summons, the defendant was not at her home and only
her maid was there who refused to receive the said summons [in spite] of the insistence of
the undersigned.
The undersigned, upon his request with the Brgy. Clerk at the said place, was given a
certification that he really exerted effort to effect the service of the said summons but
failed due to the above reason. (Annex "A").
The following day, May 21, 2002, the undersigned went back at defendant's residence to
have her receive the subject summons but again the above defendant was not at her
house.
xxxx
Similarly, in the Return of Service dated May 30, 2002, pertinent details were wanting, as
it reads:
xxxx
The undersigned accompanied by the barangay officials of the said place proceeded at
defendant's residence but the undersigned was not permitted to go inside her house and
was given information by her maid that the defendant was not there.
The defendant's car was parked inside her house and inquiries/verification made on her
neighbors revealed that the defendant was inside her house at the time of service of said
summons and probably did not want to show-up when her maid informed her of
undersigned's presence.
xxxx
Lastly, the Return of Service dated August 14, 2002 was no different. It reads:
xxxx
Defendant Dr. Lourdes Pascual was out during the time of service of the said summons
and only her housemaid was present. The undersigned left a copy of the same to the latter
who is at the age of reason but refused to sign the same.
xxxx
The above Return of Summons does not show or indicate the actual exertion or any
positive steps taken by the officer or process server in serving the summons personally to
the defendant. As in Jose v. Boyon,30 this Court ruled that:
The Return of Summons shows no effort was actually exerted and no positive step taken
by either the process server or petitioners to locate and serve the summons personally on
respondents. At best, the Return merely states the alleged whereabouts of respondents
without indicating that such information was verified from a person who had knowledge
thereof. Certainly, without specifying the details of the attendant circumstances or of the
efforts exerted to serve the summons, a general statement that such efforts were made
will not suffice for purposes of complying with the rules of substituted service of summons.
The necessity of stating in the process server's Return or Proof of Service the material
facts and circumstances sustaining the validity of substituted service was explained by this
Court in Hamilton v. Levy,31 from which we quote:
x x x The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be
stated in the proof of service or Officer's Return; otherwise, any substituted service made
in lieu of personal service cannot be upheld. This is necessary because substituted service
is in derogation of the usual method of service. It is a method extraordinary in character
and, hence, may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by
statute. Here, no such explanation was made. Failure to faithfully, strictly, and fully
comply with the requirements of substituted service renders said service ineffective.32
Petitioner further states that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
functions must be applied to the present case. He expounds on the fact that as between
the process server's return of substituted service, which carries with it the presumption of
regularity and the respondent's self-serving assertion that she only came to know of the
case against her when she received a copy of the petitioner's motion to declare her in
default, the process server's return is undoubtedly more deserving of credit. The said
argument, however, is only meritorious, provided that there was a strict compliance with
the procedure for serving a summons. In the absence of even the barest compliance with
the procedure for a substituted service of summons outlined in the Rules of Court, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of public functions does not apply.33
Applying the above disquisitions, the jurisdiction over the person of the respondent was
never vested with the RTC, because the manner of substituted service by the process
server was apparently invalid and ineffective. As such, there was a violation of due
process. Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of
summons or the defendant’s voluntary appearance in court. When the defendant does not
voluntarily submit to the court’s jurisdiction or when there is no valid service of summons,
"any judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is
null and void."34
Petitioner also raises the issue of the impropriety of the remedy resorted to by the
respondent which is the filing of a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, claiming that the said remedy is inappropriate because there are still other plain,
speedy and adequate remedies available, such as an ordinary appeal, the Decision of the
RTC having attained its finality. The question, however, is whether the said Decision has
indeed attained finality. The importance of the doctrine of the finality of judgment has
always been emphasized by this Court. In Pasiona, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,35 this Court has
expounded on the said doctrine, thus:
The Court re-emphasizes the doctrine of finality of judgment. In Alcantara v. Ponce,36 the
Court, citing its much earlier ruling in Arnedo v. Llorente,37 stressed the importance of said
doctrine, to wit:
It is true that it is the purpose and intention of the law that courts should decide all
questions submitted to them "as truth and justice require," and that it is greatly to be
desired that all judgments should be so decided; but controlling and irresistible reasons of
public policy and of sound practice in the courts demand that at the risk of occasional
error, judgments of courts determining controversies submitted to them should become
final at some definite time fixed by law, or by a rule of practice recognized by law, so as to
be thereafter beyond the control even of the court which rendered them for the purpose of
correcting errors of fact or of law, into which, in the opinion of the court it may have
fallen. The very purpose for which the courts are organized is to put an end to
controversy, to decide the questions submitted to the litigants, and to determine the
respective rights of the parties. With the full knowledge that courts are not infallible, the
litigants submit their respective claims for judgment, and they have a right at some time
or other to have final judgment on which they can rely as a final disposition of the issue
submitted, and to know that there is an end to the litigation.38
Then, in Juani v. Alarcon,39 it was held, thus:

This doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on fundamental considerations of public

policy and sound practice. In fact, nothing is more settled in law than that once a
judgment attains finality it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer
be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived
to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is
attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land.40

Again, in Dinglasan v. Court of Appeals,41 the Court declared that:

After the judgment or final resolution is entered in the entries of judgment, the case shall
be laid to rest. x x x

xxxx

The finality of decision is a jurisdictional event which cannot be made to depend on the
convenience of the party. To rule otherwise would completely negate the purpose of the
rule on completeness of service, which is to place the date of receipt of pleadings,
judgment and processes beyond the power of the party being served to determine at his
pleasure.42

The said doctrine, however, is applicable only when the judgment or decision is valid. In
the present case, as earlier pronounced, and as ruled by the CA, the judgment in question
is void, the RTC not having acquired jurisdiction over the person of the respondent. It is a
well-entrenched principle that a void judgment can never become final. As ruled by this
Court in Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v. Alejo:43

In Leonor v. Court of Appeals44 and Arcelona v. Court of Appeals,45 we held thus:

A void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the

source of any right nor the creator of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and
all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final and any
writ of execution based on it is void: "x x x it may be said to be a lawless thing which can
be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits
its head."

Thus, from the above discussion, the Decision of the RTC, not having attained its finality
due to its being void, the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, filed by the respondent with
the CA, was proper.

WHEREFORE, the Petition dated May 3, 2006 is hereby DENIED and the Decision dated
June 29, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77789 is hereby AFFIRMED in
toto.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 211966
JOSE AUDIE ABAGATNAN, JOSEPHINE A. PARCE, JIMMY ABAGATNAN, JOHN
ABAGATNAN, JENALYN A.DELEON, JOEY ABAGATNAN, JOJIE ABAGATNAN, and
JOY ABAGATNAN, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES JONATHAN CLARITO and ELSA CLARITO, Respondents,
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the June 20, 2013 Decision1 and the February 3, 2014 Resolution2 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 03283 which dismissed, albeit without prejudice, the
Complaint for Unlawful Detainer and Damages3 filed by petitioners Jose Audie Abagatnan,
Josephine A. Paree, Jimmy Abagatnan, John Abagatnan, Jenalyn A. De Leon, Joey
Abagatnan, Jojie Abagatnan and Joy Abagatnan against respondents spouses Jonathan
Clarito and Elsa Clarito, for failure to comply with the mandatory requirement of resorting
to prior barangay conciliation, as required under Section 412 of Republic Act No. 7160, or
the Local Government Code (LGC).
The Antecedent Facts
Wenceslao Abagatnan (Wenceslao) and his late wife, Lydia Capote (Lydia), acquired a
parcel ofland designated as Lot 1472-B, with a total land of 5,046 square meters, and
located at Barangay Cogon, Roxas City from Mateo Ambrad (Mateo) and Soterafia Clarito
(Soterafia), by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale4 executed on August 1, 1967.5
On October 4, 1999, Lydia died, leaving her children, who are copetitioners in this case, to
succeed into the ownership of her conjugal share of said property.6
In 1990, respondents allegedly approached Wenceslao and asked for permission to
construct a residential house made oflight materials on a 480-square meter portion of Lot
1472-B (subject property). Because respondent Jonathan Clarito (Jonathan) is a distant
relative, Wenceslao allowed them to do so subject to the condition that respondents will
vacate the subject property should he need the same for his own use.7
In September 2006, petitioners decided to sell portions of Lot 14 72-B, including the
subject property which was then still being occupied by respondents. They offered to sell
said portion to respondents, but the latter declined.8
Consequently, petitioners sent respondents a Demand Letter9 dated October 2, 2006
requiring the latter to vacate the subject property within fifteen (15) days from receipt of
the letter. The respondents, however, refused to heed such demand.10
On November 10, 2006, petitioners filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer and
Damages11 against respondents before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch
2, Roxas City, where they claimed to have been unlawfully deprived of the use and
possession of a portion of their land.
Notably, the Complaint alleged that prior barangay conciliation proceedings are not
required as a pre-condition for the filing of the case in court, given that not all petitioners
are residents of Roxas City. Specifically, petitioner Jimmy C. Abagatnan (Jimmy) resided in
Laguna, while petitioner Jenalyn A. De Leon (Jenalyn) resided in Pasig City.12
In their Answer with Counterclaim,13 respondents argued that prior barangay conciliation
is a mandatory requirement that cannot be dispensed with, considering that Jimmy and J
enalyn had already executed a Special Power of Attomey14 (SPA) in favor of their co-
petitioner and sister, Josephine A. Paree (Josephine), who is a resident of Roxas City.15
Respondents also insisted that Lot 14 72-B is only a portion of Lot 1472 which is covered
by its mother title, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 9882, under the name of Nicolas
Clarita, et al., Jonathan's predecessors-in-interest. Unfortunately, said title was lost or
destroyed during the war, but a copy of the owner's duplicate copy was presented before
the trial court and made part of the records.16
The Municipal Trial Court in Cities Ruling
In its Decision17 dated August 17, 2007, the MTCC rendered judgment in favor of
petitioners and ordered respondents to remove the structures they erected on the subject
property and to vacate the same. It also directed respondents to pay petitioners the
amount of ₱500.00 per month as reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of
the subject property from the date of the filing of the action up to and until the structures
on the property have been removed, as well as the cost of suit.18
The MTCC ruled that by preponderance of evidence, petitioners have a better right of
material possession over the subject property.1âwphi1 It gave merit to petitioners' proof
of purchase of Lot 1472-B from Mateo and Soterafia, the Demand Letter dated October 2,
2006 that they sent to respondents, and respondents' refusal to vacate the property.19
Respondents thereafter appealed the MTCC Decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 19, Roxas City.1âwphi1
The Regional Trial Court Ruling
In its Decision20 dated January 15, 2008, the RTC denied the appeal for lack of merit. It
ruled that since the parties raised the issue of ownership to justify their claims of
possession, and the evidence of ownership is preponderant on petitioners, the MTCC was
justified in ruling the case in the latter's favor.21
The RTC, too, held that the lack of barangay conciliation proceedings cannot be brought on
appeal because it was not made an issue in the Pre-Trial Order.22
Following the denial, respondents filed a Petition for Review23 before the CA, assailing the
RTC's January 15, 2008 Decision.
The Court of Appeals Ruling
In its Decision dated June 20, 2013, the CA ruled that the findings of fact of both the
MTCC and the RTC are supported by the evidence on record. It gave more probative value
to the tax declarations and the Deed of Absolute Sale submitted by petitioners,
considering that only a copy of OCT No. 9882 was presented by respondents in court and
said copy contained clouded and blurred characters. The name of the alleged registered
owner, Francisco Clarito (Jonathan's father), is also not decipherable on the title.24
Nevertheless, the CA granted the Petition and dismissed the petitioners' Complaint, albeit
without prejudice, for lack of prior referral to the Katarungang Pambarangay.25 It pointed
out that majority of petitioners actually resided in Barangay Cogon, Roxas City, while the
two non-residents of Roxas City already executed an SP A in favor of Josephine, whom
they authorized, among others, to enter into an amicable settlement with respondents.
Since respondents also reside in the same barangay, the dispute between the parties is
clearly within the ambit of the Lupon Tagapamayapa's (Lupon) authority.26
The CA thus concluded that petitioners' Complaint had been prematurely filed with the
MTCC, as it should have been first brought before the Lupon for mandatory conciliation to
accord the parties the chance for amicable settlement.27
Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion in its Resolution dated
February 3, 2014. As a consequence, petitioners filed the present Petition for Review on
Certiorari before the Court on April 14, 2014, assailing the CA's June 20, 2013 Decision
and February 3, 2014 Resolution.
The Issue
Petitioners raise the sole issue of whether the CA correctly dismissed the Complaint for
failure to comply with the prior barangay conciliation requirement under Section 412 of the
LGC, despite the fact that not all real parties in interest resided in the same city or
municipality.28
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is impressed with merit.
x x x Section 412(a) of the LGC requires the parties to undergo a conciliation process
before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat as a pre-condition to the filing of a complaint in
court, thus:
SECTION 412. Conciliation - (a) Pre-condition to Filing of Complaint in Court. No
complaint, petition, action, or proceeding involving any matter within the
authority of the lupon shall be filed or instituted directly in court or any other
government office for adjudication, unless there has been a confrontation between
the parties before the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or
settlement has been reached as certified by the lupon or pangkat secretary and
attested to by the lupon or pangkat chairman [or unless the settlement has been
repudiated by the parties thereto. x x x]29 (Emphasis supplied)
The LGC further provides that "the lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring
together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable
settlement of all disputes," subject to certain exceptions enumerated in the law.30
One such exception is in cases where the dispute involves parties who actually
reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities, unless said barangay units
adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable
settlement by an appropriate lupon.31
Thus, parties who do not actually reside in the same city or municipality or adjoining
barangays are not required to submit their dispute to the lupon as a pre-condition to the
filing of a complaint in court.
In Pascual v. Pascual,32 the Court ruled that the express statutory requirement of actual
residency in the LGC pertains specifically to the real parties in interest in the case. It
further explained that said requirement cannot be construed to apply to the attorney-in-
fact of the party-plaintiff, as doing so would abrogate the meaning of a "real party in
interest" as defined in Section 2,33 in relation to Section 3, of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
The same ruling was reiterated in Banting v. Spouses Maglapuz34 where the Court held
that "the requirement under Section 412 of the [LGC] that a case be referred for
conciliation before the Lupon as a precondition to its filing in court applies only to those
cases where the real parties-in-interest actually reside in the same city or
municipality."
In the present case, the Complaint filed before the MTCC specifically alleged that not all
the real parties in interest in the case actually reside in Roxas City:35 Jimmy resided in
Poblacion, Siniloan, Laguna, while Jenalyn resided in Brgy. de La Paz, Pasig City.36 As
such, the lupon has no jurisdiction over their dispute, and prior referral of the
case for barangay conciliation is not a precondition to its filing in court.
This is true regardless of the fact that Jimmy and Jenalyn had already authorized their
sister and co-petitioner, Josephine, to act as their attorney-in-fact in the ejectment
proceedings before the MTCC. As previously explained, the residence of the attorney-in-
fact of a real party in interest is irrelevant in so far as the "actual residence" requirement
under the LGC for prior barangay conciliation is concerned.
Besides, as the RTC correctly pointed out, the lack of barangay conciliation
proceedings cannot be brought on appeal because it was not included in the Pre-
Trial Order, which only enumerates the following issues to be resolved during the trial:

The following issues to be resolved by plaintiffs:

1. Whether or not the defendants have unlawfully withheld the portion of Lot 1472
over which were occupied by them, particularly Lot 1472-B;

2. Whether or not the defendants can be lawfully ejected from that portion of Lot
1472-B which are occupied by them.

3. Whether or not the prevailing parties can recover damages.

For the defendants, the issues to be resolved are as follows:

1. Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action for unlawful detainer
against the defendants; and,

2. Whether or not the prevailing parties are entitled to an award of damages.37

On this point, it is important to stress that the issues to be tried between parties in a case
is limited to those defined in the pre-trial order38 as well as those which may be implied
from those written in the order or inferred from those listed by necessary implication.39

In this case, a cursory reading of the issues listed in the Pre-Trial Order easily shows that
the parties never agreed, whether expressly or impliedly, to include the lack of prior
barangay conciliation proceedings in the list of issues to be resolved before the MTCC.

In effect, the non-inclusion of this issue in the Pre-Trial Order barred its
consideration during the trial. This is but consistent with the rule that parties are
bound by the delimitation of issues that they agreed upon during the pre-trial
proceedings.40

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the Petition for Review on Certiorari. The Decision dated June
20, 2013 and the Resolution dated February 3, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 03283 are REVERSED and SETASIDE. The Decision dated January 15, 2008 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Roxas City in Civil Case No. V-47-07 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 158867 August 22, 2006
JIMMY BANTING, ALFRED REYES and MAXIMA ARCENO REYES, Petitioners,
vs.
SPS. JOSE MAGLAPUZ and RAYMUNDA BANDIN MAGLAPUZ, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court praying
that we (1) declare the Decision1 dated August 13, 2002 of the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch 79, Las Piñas City (MeTC) as null and void; (2) declare the Order2 dated February
4, 2003 issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 199, Las Piñas City (RTC) as null and
void; and (3) reverse and set aside the Resolution3 dated May 16, 2003 of the Court of
Appeals (CA).
The antecedent facts are as follows:
An ejectment complaint was filed with the MeTC entitled, "Sps. Jose Maglapuz &
Raymunda Bandin-Maglapuz,4 represented by their Attorney-in-Fact Rosalinda Maglapuz-
Agulay, Plaintiffs, v. Jimmy Banting and Sps. Alfred Reyes and Maxima Arceno-Reyes,
Defendants" and docketed as Civil Case No. 5663.5 It involved the right to possession of a
parcel of land located at No. 405 Real Street, Talon I, Las Piñas City, containing an area of
258 square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-44306
registered in the name of the Heirs of Victoriana Ramos.6 Raymunda Maglapuz is
purportedly one of the heirs.7
The complaint alleged that spouses Alfred and Maxima Reyes (Spouses Reyes) paid rent to
the Spouses Jose and Raymunda Maglapuz (Spouses Maglapuz) for the use of the property
from 1994 to August 1997 at the rate of P3,500.00 per month; that beginning September
1997, however, Spouses Reyes stopped paying rent;8 that spouses Maglapuz served a
letter dated August 9, 1999 on Spouses Reyes demanding that the latter pay their rentals
and vacate the property;9 that this was received by Spouses Reyes on August 12, 1999;10
that when no payment was made, Spouses Maglapuz filed said Civil Case No. 5663 against
Spouses Reyes impleading Jimmy Banting (Banting) with whom Spouses Reyes entered
into a partnership for the operation of a grocery store on the subject property.
Defendants Spouses Reyes and Banting filed an Answer with Counterclaim.11 They argued
that Spouses Maglapuz have no cause of action against them for their possession of the
subject property is lawful as it is based on a contract of lease executed in their favor by
one named Carmencita dela Cruz, allegedly the rightful owner of the property. They
demanded compensation by way of moral damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00 for
the allegedly vexatious suit filed against them. 12
After preliminary conference and submission of position papers, the MeTC rendered
judgment in favor of Spouses Maglapuz. The decretal portion of the August 13, 2002
Decision of the MeTC reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants for the following:
1) Ordering the defendants to vacate the plaintiff’s property and to return possession
thereof to the plaintiffs;
2) Ordering the defendant to pay rental of P3,500.00 per month from September 1997 up
to the time they have finally vacated the premises;
3) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the amount of P20,000.00 attorney’s fees and
P1,000.00 per court appearance;
4) To pay cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.13
From the foregoing decision, Spouses Reyes and Banting appealed to the RTC (Branch
199, Las Pinas City)14 which issued an Order dated September 27, 2002 directing the
parties to file their respective memoranda on appeal within thirty (30) days from receipt
thereof.15 The records reveal that defendants-appellants Spouses Reyes and Banting
received copy of the Order on October 7, 2002.16 Plaintiffs-appellees Spouses Maglapuz
filed a Memorandum on Appeal.17 Spouses Reyes and Banting did not file any
memorandum.
In an Order dated November 21, 2002, the RTC dismissed the appeal, thus:
It appearing that Defendants-Appellants failed to comply with the Order of this Court
dated September 27, 2002 and pursuant to Section 3 Rule 7 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Appeal is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.18
Spouses Reyes and Banting received copy of the Order on December 4, 2002.19
Earlier, however, on December 2, 2002, Atty. Dionisio Landero, collaborating counsel of
the counsel of record, Atty. Jose Espinas, filed an Entry of Appearance with Omnibus
Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Late Memorandum for Defendants-Appellants.20
He attached thereto a "Memorandum for Defendants Spouses Alfred Reyes and Maxima
Arceno Reyes."21 Counsel explained that the delay in filing the memorandum on appeal
was due to excusable negligence attributable to his clients who called his attention to the
need to file a memorandum on appeal only on November 27, 2002. Prior to that date,
counsel was not aware of any order for submission of memorandum as he did not receive
copy of the September 27, 2002 Order.22 He asked that the memorandum on appeal be The CA dismissed the petition in the herein assailed Resolution dated May 16, 2003,
admitted for it is meritorious in substance. Specifically, it impugns the jurisdiction of the portions of which read:
MeTC to issue the August 13, 2002 Decision on the following grounds: first, the complaint
for ejectment was premature as Spouses Maglapuz failed to comply, much less allege The petition deserves but a short shrift.
compliance, with the requirement of prior referral of a case to the barangay council for
conciliation under Section 12, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court in relation to paragraph c,
1. We cannot review, much less declare null and void, the Decision of the MeTC xxx dated
Section 409, Chapter 7, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160 (Local Government Code); second,
August 13, 2002 (not August 6, 1992 as stated in the prayer of the petitioners; or August
the case is actually one of accion publiciana cognizable by the RTC for it was filed only in
13, 2003, as alleged in page 3 of the petition) for the simple reason that we have no
1999, more than one year from the time possession of the subject property by Spouses
appellate jurisdiciton over it.
Reyes and Banting allegedly became unlawful in 1997; and third, Spouses Maglapuz
utterly failed to establish their title to the property as would justify their claim to a better
right of possession of the property.23 2. For the same reason of lack of jurisdiction we cannot order the dismissal of the
compliant for ejectment x x x;
The RTC rebuffed the motion for reconsideration. It held in its Order of January 7, 2003
that the delay in filing the memorandum on appeal was due to the inexcusable negligence 3. The Order of the RTC dated January 23, 2003 is correct at bottom, as the RTC rightly
of both counsel and clients who were given sufficient notice to file memorandum but, for denied due course to the petitioners’ notice of appeal; only its reasoning was faulty;
lack of coordination, failed to do so.24 Spouses Reyes and Banting received copy of this
Order on January 20, 2003.25 On that same day, they filed with the RTC a Notice of 4. We have no legal basis for awarding private respondents damages and attorney’s fees.
Appeal.26 The RTC, in an Order dated January 23, 2003, disapproved the Notice of Appeal
for failure of Spouses Reyes and Banting to pay appellate court docket fees.27 The latter WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED outright.
received copy of this Order on January 27, 2003. On the next day, it filed a Motion for
Reconsideration on the ground that appellate court docket fees were actually paid on
January 21, 2003 as shown by copies of receipts attached to the motion.28 The RTC SO ORDERED. 34

granted said Motion for Reconsideration in an Order dated January 30, 2003,29 in effect
giving due course to the Notice of Appeal to the CA.
On February 4, 2003, however, the RTC issued the following Order:
This court notes that the Notice of Appeal availed of by the defendants is misplaced under
the circumstances. The proper remedy provided for by law is the filing of a Verified Petition
for Review with the Court of Appeals paying at the same time to the said court the
corresponding docket fees and furnishing this court and adverse party with a copy of the
Petition.
Petitioners Spouses Reyes and Banting filed a Motion for Reconsideration35 from the
foregoing resolution but this was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated June 19, 2003.36
Undaunted, petitioners’ newly appointed counsel filed an Urgent Motion to Admit
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration with a Motion for Reconsideration attached
thereto.37 The CA merely took note of this motion.38
Hence, the present petition raising the following issues:
I

In view thereof, the Order dated January 23, 2003 is hereby RECALLED and the Order of WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS IS COMPETENT TO REVIEW OR DECLARE NULL AND
the Court dated January 30, 2003 is hereby amended accordingly. VOID THE DECISION DATED AUGUST 13, 2002 RENDERED BY THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL
COURT.
SO ORDERED.30
II.
Through counsel, Spouses Reyes and Banting received copy of the foregoing Order on
February 19, 2003.31 WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT’S OUTRIGHT DENIAL OF THE HEREIN PETITIONERS’ NOTICE OF APPEAL IS
Straightaway, they filed on February 24, 2003 a Petition for Review with the CA and paid CORRECT.
on the same day the corresponding appellate docket fees.32 They also served copies of the
petition on the RTC and the adverse parties.33 III.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE DESPITE ITS BEING
MERITORIOUS, CONSIDERING THAT THE TRIAL COURT, WHICH DECIDED THE CASE ON
THE MERITS, DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION.
IV.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE DESPITE ITS BEING
MERITORIOUS, CONSIDERING THAT THE PROPER ACTION TO BE FILED SHOULD HAVE
BEEN ACTION PUBLICIANA OR ACTION REIVI[N]DICATORIA, RATHER THAN A CASE FOR
EJECTMENT.
V.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE DESPITE THE
GROSS NEGLIGENCE OF PETITIONERS’ FORMER COUNSEL IN FAILING TO FILE A
MEMORANDUM OF APPEAL TO THE UTTER PREJUDICE OF THE HEREIN PETITIONERS.39
Upon motion of respondents, we granted the substitution of deceased-respondent
Raymunda Bandin-Maglapuz by her heirs, namely: Jose Maglapuz, Ricardo Manahan,
Angelita Maglapuz, Rodelio Maglapuz, Mauro Maglapuz, Emelita Maglapuz, Lolita Maglapuz-
Lagmay, and Rosalinda Maglapuz-Agulay,40 as party respondents.
The petition lacks merit.
The principal issue underlying the petition is whether the CA is correct in dismissing the
Petition for Review of petitioners.
Appeal by petition for review under Rule 42 filed with the CA is the appropriate remedy
from decisions or final orders issued by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction.41 Section 1 of Rule 42 reads:
Section 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. – A party desiring to appeal from a decision
of the Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a
verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals x x x. The petition shall be filed and
served within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision sought to be reviewed or of the
denial of petitioner’s motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after
judgment. x x x.
An order of the RTC dismissing an appeal from a decision of the MeTC for failure of
appellant to file a memorandum on appeal is one such final order.42 It is appealable by
petition for review under Rule 42.43
In the instant case, the November 21, 2002 and January 7, 2003 RTC Orders dismissed
petitioners’ Appeal from the August 13, 2002 MeTC Decision for their failure to file a
memorandum on appeal. These orders were therefore appealable by petition for review
with the CA. The Notice of Appeal petitioners initially filed was clearly erroneous.
Petitioners sought to rectify their error by filing the Petition for Review with the CA on
February 24, 2003. The question then is whether such recourse would prosper.
In Neypes v. Court of Appeals,44 we fixed a uniform period for appeals filed under Rules
40, 42, 43 and 45. Specifically, we set the period to appeal at 15 days from notice of the
decision or final order appealed from or, where a motion for new trial or reconsideration is
seasonably filed from the said decision or final order, within a fresh period of 15 days from
receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial or reconsideration.
Applying the foregoing rule to the present case, petitioners should have filed the Petition
for Review on February 5, 2003. To recall, petitioners received notice of the November 21,
2002 RTC Order on December 4, 2002. Even before that, however, they were able to file
an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration on December 2, 2002. This was denied by the RTC
in its January 7, 2003 Order. Notice of said Order was received by petitioners on January
20, 2003. Hence, they had a fresh period of 15 days or until February 5, 2003 to file a
petition for review.
As it were, however, petitioners filed instead a Notice of Appeal on January 20, 2003. Such
mode of appeal under Section 2 (a) of Rule 41 was faulty. Recourse to it did not toll the
running of the period within which to file a petition for review. It is axiomatic that a fatally
defective or erroneous appeal or motion will not toll the running of a period to appeal. A
detour from the proper course of an appeal will not earn for the errant party a fresh
start.45
Petitioners therefore got entangled in an erroneous mode of appeal and squandered away
the remaining time it had to file a petition for review. The Petition for Review they filed
with the CA on February 24, 2003 was out of time.
Moreover, the said Petition for Review was fatally defective. The petitioners prayed for the
following reliefs:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Defendants-Appellants, now the herein Petitioners
respectfully pray this Honorable Court, the following:
a) To issue a writ of Preliminary Injunction or Restraining Order ex-parte upon the filing of
this Petition;
b) That upon due consideration of the Petition, an order be issued making the Preliminary
Injunction and/or Restraining Order permanent until after the final resolution of the instant
Petition;
That after due notice and consideration of the herein Petition, Petitioner further pray the
following:
c) To issue an Order declaring the subject Decision Annex "C" of the Lower Court dated
August 6, 1992 [sic]46 null and void;
d) Ordering the Complaint dated September 21, 1999 (Annex "D") dismissed with
prejudice.
e) Ordering the Order [sic] of the Public Respondent Court RTC 199 dated January 23,
2003 null and void; and
f) Furthermore, ordering the Private Respondent to pay the herein Petitioner damages and
attorneys fees to be determined by the Honorable Court.47
The Petition for Review was directed at both the August 13, 2002 Decision of the MeTC
and the January 23, 2003 Order of the RTC. This is odd. The August 13, 2002 MeTC
Decision and the January 23, 2003 RTC Order are matters not proper for a petition for
review under Rule 42. As correctly declared by the CA, it has no appellate jurisdiction over
the MeTC and it cannot entertain a direct appeal from said decision. As to the RTC January
23, 2003 Order disapproving the Notice of Appeal, this was expressly reconsidered by the
RTC in its January 30, 2003 Order,48 in effect allowing the Notice of Appeal. This however
was further amended by the RTC in its Order dated February 4, 2003 declaring that the
Notice of Appeal to the CA was misplaced and that the proper remedy is the filing of a
petition for review. When petitioners filed their Petition for Review, they did not question
the February 4, 2003 Order of the RTC.
All told, the CA did not err in dismissing their Petition for Review for it was not only tardy
but also fatally defective.
We will, nonetheless, briefly treat the substance of the petition for review with the CA, if
only to settle the issue whether or not the RTC committed an error in dismissing
petitioners’ appeal on the ground that no memorandum on appeal has been filed by them.
The RTC validly dismissed the appeal of petitioners from the August 13, 2002 Decision of
the MeTC.
The appeal was deemed abandoned when petitioners failed to file their memorandum on
appeal despite sufficient time given to them by the court. A memorandum on appeal or an
appeal brief is vital to an appeal for only errors specifically assigned and properly argued
in the brief or memorandum will be considered in the decision on the merits, except those
affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter as well as plain and clerical errors. Hence,
the lack of a memorandum on appeal is ground for the dismissal of an appeal.49
The excuse proffered by counsel for petitioners for their failure to file the memorandum of
appeal did not help their cause any. Assuming that he did not receive copy of the
September 27, 2002 Order, he could have nonetheless informed himself of this
requirement by checking on the progress of the case from time to time. A counsel is
required to inquire about the status of the cases assigned to him and the motions he has
filed for a client.50 He cannot pass this burden to his client and blame the latter for every
mishap.51 It was therefore due to the inexcusable negligence of counsel that the
memorandum on appeal was not filed on time.
We stop short, however, from declaring the negligence of counsel as gross so as to
liberate petitioners from the effects of their failure to file a memorandum on appeal. This
is actually what petitioners would have us uphold. 52 They claim that their counsel’s
negligence was so gross that they were virtually deprived of due process and
representation in the proceedings below.
Such argument fails to impress. We refer petitioners to their Entry of Appearance with
Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Late Memorandum for Defendants-
Appellants.53 There they specifically argued that the failure of their counsel to file the
memorandum on appeal was "x x x by reason of his excusable negligence."54 Petitioners
cannot now turn around and claim that the negligence of their counsel is gross and that
they may be said to have been deprived of due process.
In the interest of substantial justice, we deem it likewise necessary to resolve the other
issues raised by petitioners.
They argue that the MeTC had no jurisdiction to issue the August 13, 2002 Decision for
respondents failed to comply with the requirement of barangay conciliation; and that the
case was actually one of accion publiciana cognizable by the RTC.55
Such arguments lack merit.
It is settled that the requirement under Section 412 of the Local Government Code that a
case be referred for conciliation before the Lupon as a precondition to its filing in court
applies only to those cases where the real parties-in-interest actually reside in the same
city or municipality.56 Here, the complaint filed with the MeTC specifically alleged that the
parties reside in different barangays and cities.57
As to the jurisdiction of the MeTC, this can be determined from the complaint itself. It
plainly states that the last demand was made by respondents upon petitioners on August
9, 1999. The complaint for ejectment was filed on September 21, 1999 or before the lapse
of the one-year period. It was therefore properly filed with the MeTC.58
All told, the appeal of petitioners fell short even on the merits. It was properly dismissed
by the RTC. The Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the RTC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-85475 June 30, 1989
MANUEL A. RAMOS, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and DOMINGO RAMOS, respondents.
Domingo Ramos authorized his brother Manuel Ramos to sell his share of certain lands
owned by them in common with their other brothers and sisters. Manuel did. Later,
Domingo revoked the power of attorney and demanded an accounting from Manuel.
Manuel refused. Domingo then filed a complaint with the Punong Barangay of Pampanga,
Buhangin District, City of Davao, which was docketed as Case No. 008-87. 1 The Punong
Barangay scheduled a hearing on March 14, 1987. 2 Manuel appeared but Domingo did
not. He was represented, however, by his wife who said her husband wanted to avoid a
direct confrontation with his brother.3 She requested that the Punong Barangay issue a
certification that no settlement had been reached so a complaint could be filed in court.
The Punong Barangay complied. 4 Thereupon, Domingo sued Manuel in the Regional Trial
Court of Davao City, also for accounting, in Civil Case No. 18560-87.
Manuel moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of non-compliance with the
requirements of P.D. No. 1508. Specifically, he cited the failure of the Punong Barangay to
refer the dispute to the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo after the unsuccessful mediation
proceedings convened by him. The motion was denied. 5 Manuel then filed with this Court
a petition for certiorari which we referred to the Court of Appeals. That court denied the
petition. It held that there was no need for such referral because Domingo had clearly
indicated, by his refusal to appear before the Punong Barangay, that no extrajudicial
settlement was possible between him and his brother. 6 Manuel is now before us to
question this decision.
We hold for the petitioner.
The applicable provisions of P.D. No. 1508 (Emphasis supplied) are as follows:
SEC. 4. Procedure for amicable settlement. —
a) Who may initiate proceedings. — Any individual who has a cause of
action against another individual involving any matter within the authority
of the Lupon as provided in Section 2 may complain orally or in writing, to
the Barangay Captain of the barangay referred to in Section 3 hereof.
b) Mediation by Barangay Captain. — Upon receipt of the complaint, the
Barangay Captain shall within the next working day summon the
respondent/s, with notice to the complainant's for them and their
witnesses to appear before him for a mediation of their conflicting
interests. If he fails in his effort within fifteen (15) days from the first
meeting of the parties before him, he shall forthwith set a date for the
constitution of the Pangkat in accordance with the provisions of Section 1
of this Decree.
c) Hearing before the Pangkat. — The Pangkat shall convene not later than
three (3) days from its constitution, on the day and hour set by the
Barangay Captain, to hear both parties and their witnesses, simplify
issues, and explore all possibilities for amicable settlement. For this
purpose, the Pangkat may issue summons for the personal appearance of
parties and witnesses before it.
xxx
d) Sanctions. — Refusal or willfull failure of any party or witness to appear
in compliance with the summons issued pursuant to the preceding two (2)
paragraphs may be punished by the city or municipal court as for indirect
contempt of court upon application filed therewith by the Lupon Chairman,
the Pangkat Chairman, or by any of the parties. Further, such refusal or
willful failure to appear shall be reflected in the records of the Lupon
Secretary or in the minutes of the Pangkat Secretary and shall bar the
complainant from seeking judicial recourse for the same cause of action,
and the respondent, from filing any counterclaim arising out of or
necessarily connected therewith.
xxx
SEC. 6. Conciliation, pre-condition to filing of complaint. — No complaint,
petition, action or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of
the Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof shall be filed or instituted in
court or any other government office for adjudication unless there has
been a confrontation of the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the
Pangkat and no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by
the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary, attested by the Lupon or
Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement has been repudiated.
It is clear from the above rules that the dispute should not have ended with the mediation
proceedings before the Punong Barangay because of his failure to effect a settlement
between the brothers. One purpose of P.D. 1508 is precisely to effect a confrontation
between the parties in the hope that they can resolve their differences without resort to
the courts of justice. Obviously, this purpose would be nullified if the matter were to be
considered closed simply because either of the parties refuses to confront the other.
It was not for the Punong Barangay to say that referral to the Pangkat was no longer
necessary merely because he himself had failed to work out an agreement between the
petitioner and the private respondent. Indeed, it is possible that the Pangkat could have
exerted more efforts and succeeded (where he had not) in resolving the dispute. The
Punong Barangay could in fact have even issued summons to compel the attendance of
Domingo Ramos, who was the complainant himself in the mediation hearing. It seems the
Punong Barangay had not tried hard enough. In any event, the certification he issued was
certainly premature and did not authorize immediate recourse to judicial action.
The case of Alinsugay v. Cagampang, 7 which was applied by respondent court, is not on
all fours with the petition at bar. There the parties claiming non-compliance with P.D. 1508
were the very parties who did not appear at the mediation proceedings before the Punong
Barangay. The defendants in the case were the respondents who had earlier disregarded
the Katarungang Pambarangay Law and were later inconsistently invoking its provisions.

In the case before us, it is Manuel Ramos, the respondent in the barangay proceedings,
who actually appeared therein and is now invoking the non-appearance of Domingo
Ramos, the complainant himself. Domingo, the herein private respondent, is the party who
did not appear to support his own complaint before the Punong Barangay. He invoked the
Punong Barangay's jurisdiction and then disregarded it. Under Section 4(d), he is now
barred, as complainant in the barangay proceedings, "from seeking judicial recourse for
the same cause of action."

Domingo argues that he did appear through his wife, but this was not permitted by P.D.
No. 1508. Its Section 9 reads:

Appearance of parties in person. — In all proceedings provided for herein,

the parties must appear in person without the assistance of
counsel/representative, with the exception of minors and incompetents
who may be assisted by their next of kin who are not lawyers.

In Alinsugay, the Court said that "where one party fails to appear for no justifiable reason,
convening the Pangkat as a necessary second step will serve no useful purpose." True, but
we must stress the word justifiable. Mere refusal to appear at the confrontation as
required by the law, when the party invoking P.D. 1508 is the one who disregarded it, is
not a justifiable reason.

It remains to add that the other purpose of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law is to
relieve the trial courts of cases among neighbors that hopefully can be settled through the
mediation of their peers in peaceful and even friendly confrontations. This purpose could
be defeated if such cases were allowed immediate access to the already clogged judicial
dockets simply because one of the parties is unwilling to submit to justice at the barangay
level.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the appealed decision is REVERSED. The
respondent judge is ordered to DISMISS Civil Case No. 18560-87. Costs against the
private respondent.

S0 ORDERED.
G.R. No. 96914 July 23, 1992
CECILIA U. LEDESMA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and JOSE T. DIZON, respondents.
Petitioner Cecilia U. Ledesma prays before this Court for the reversal of the Decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals of August 30, 1990 1 ordering the dismissal of her ejectment
complaint before the Manila Metropolitan Trial Court for lack of cause of action due to non-
compliance with Sections 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508 (Katarungang Pambarangay Law) as well
as the Resolution of January 7, 1991 2 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of
said Decision.
The facts of this case as summarized by the petitioner in her Memorandum are as follows:
Petitioner is the owner-lessor of an apartment building located at 800-802
Remedios Street, Malate, Manila. Two (2) units of said apartment building
were leased (now being unlawfully occupied) to private respondent at
monthly rates of P3,450.00 for the unit/apartment located at 800
Remedios Street, Malate, Manila and P2,300.00 for the unit/apartment
located at 802 Remedios Street, Malate, Manila, respectively. . . .
Said lease was originally covered by written contracts of lease both dated
December 10, 1984 and except for the rates and duration, the terms and
conditions of said contracts were impliedly renewed on a "month-to-
month" basis pursuant to Article 1670 of the Civil Code.
One of the terms and conditions of the said Contract of Lease, that of
monthly rental payments, was violated by private respondent and that as
of October 31, 1988, said private respondent has incurred arrears for both
units in the total sum of P14,039.00 for which letters of demand were sent
to, and received by, private respondent.
Upon failure of private respondent to honor the demand letters, petitioner
referred the matter to the Barangay for conciliation which eventually
issued a certification to file action. Petitioner was assisted by her son,
Raymond U. Ledesma, (who is not a lawyer) during the barangay
proceeding as she was suffering from recurring psychological and
emotional ailment as can be seen from the receipts and prescriptions
issued by her psychiatrist, copies of which are attached as Annexes "E-
E10" of the said Petition.
Due to the stubborn refusal of the private respondent to vacate the
premises, petitioner was constrained to retain the services of counsel to
initiate this ejectment proceeding. 3
The Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 10, Manila, rendered a decision on June 21, 1989
ordering private respondent to vacate the premises, to pay rentals falling due after May
1989 and to pay attorney's fees in the amount of P2,500.00. 4 The Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch IX, on appeal, affirmed the MTC ruling except for the award of attorney's
fees which it reduced to P1,000.00. 5
Private respondent, however, found favor with the respondent Court of Appeals when he
elevated the case in a Petition for Review, when it ruled, thus:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision dated October 13, 1989 of the RTC of
Manila, Br. IX in Civil Case No. 89-49672 is reversed and set aside and the
Complaint for Ejectment against petitioner is dismissed for lack of cause of
action. No costs. 6
Thus, this appeal, raising several assignments of error, namely, that the Court of Appeals
erred —
1. In holding that private respondent raised the issue of non-compliance
with Sections 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508 in the lower court when in fact and in
truth his answer and position paper failed to do so, contrary to evidence
on record;
2. In failing to consider that private respondent had waived his right to
question the lack of cause of action of the complaint, if there is any,
contrary to law, established jurisprudence, and evidence on record;
3. In giving undue weight and credence to the self-serving allegations of
the private respondent that summons was not served him, contrary to law,
established jurisprudence and evidence on record.
4. In disregarding the well-known principle of law that barangay
authorities are presumed to have performed their official duties and to
have acted regularly in issuing the certificate to file action and grossly and
manifestly erred in making an opposite conclusion to this effect, contrary
to law, established jurisprudence and evidence on record.
5. In not holding that the settlement was repudiated, contrary to law and
evidence on record.
6. In not affirming the judgment rendered by the Metropolitan Trial Court
and Regional Trial Court below.
Petitioner assails private respondent for raising the issue of non-compliance with Sections
6 and 9 of P.D. 1508 only in his petition for review with the appellate court and which
mislead the court to erroneously dismiss her complaint for ejectment.
Section 6 of P.D. 1508 states:
Sec. 6. Conciliation pre-condition to filing of complaint. — No complaint,
petition, action or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of
the Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof shall be filed or instituted in
court or any other government office for adjudication unless there has
been a confrontation of the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the
Pangkat and no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by
the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary, attested by the Lupon or
Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement has been repudiated. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
while Section 9 states that:
Sec. 9. Appearance of parties in person. — In all proceedings provided for
herein, the parties must appear in person without the assistance of
counsel/representative, with the exception of minors and incompetents
who may be assisted by their next of kin who are not lawyers.
Petitioner submits that said issue, not having been raised by private respondent in the
court below, cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, specially in the Court of
Appeals, citing Saludes vs. Pajarillo. 7 Private respondent had waived said objection,
following the line of reasoning in Royales vs. Intermediate Appelate Court. 8
Private respondent denies having waived the defenses of non-compliance with Sections 6
and 9 of P.D. 1508. His Answer before the Metropolitan Trial Court, specifically paragraphs
4, 7, & 8, substantially raised the fact of non-compliance by petitioner with Sections 6 and
9 of P.D. 1508 and consequently, subjected petitioner's complaint to dismissal for lack of
cause of action, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
4. Answering defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 8, the truth of
the matter being that he was not duly summoned nor subpoenaed by the
Barangay Chairman, who issued the alluded certification, to appear for
hearing. 9
xxx xxx xxx
7. Plaintiff has no cause of action against answering defendant.
8. The certification to file action (annex D of the complaint) was improperly
or irregularly issued as the defendant was never summoned nor
subpoenaed by the Barangay Chairman to appear for hearing in connection
with the alleged complaint of the plaintiff. In effect the mandatory
provision of P.D. 1508 was not complied with warranting the dismissal of
the instant complaint.
xxx xxx xxx 10
We do not agree with petitioner that the issue of non-compliance with Sections 6 and 9 of
P.D. 1508 was raised only for the first time in the Court of Appeals. When private
respondent stated that he was never summoned or subpoenaed by the Barangay
Chairman, he, in effect, was stating that since he was never summoned, he could not
appear in person for the needed confrontation of the parties before the Lupon Chairman
for conciliation and/or amicable settlement. Without the mandatory personal confrontation,
no complaint could be filed with the MTC. Private respondent's allegation in paragraph 4 of
his Answer that he was never summoned or subpoenaed by the Barangay Chairman; that
plaintiff has no cause of action against him as alleged in paragraph 7 of the Answer; and
that the certification to file action was improperly issued in view of the foregoing
allegations thereby resulting in non-compliance with the mandatory requirements of P.D.
No. 1508, as stated in paragraph 8 of the Answer are in substantial compliance with the
raising of said issues and/or objections in the court below.
Petitioner would like to make it appear to this Court that she appeared before the Lupon
Chairman to confront private respondent. She stated in her Petition 11 and her
Memorandum 12 that:
Upon failure of private respondent to honor the demand letters, petitioner
referred the matter to the barangay for conciliation which eventually
issued a certification to file action. Petitioner was assisted by her son,
Raymond U. Ledesma, (who is not a lawyer) during the barangay
proceeding as she was suffering from recurring psychological and
emotional ailment as can be seen from the receipt and prescriptions issued
by her psychiatrist copies of which are attached herewith as Annexes
"E-E10."
However, as found out by the respondent court:
We agree with the petitioner that private respondent Cecile Ledesma failed
to comply with section 6 of P.D. 1508. The record of the case is barren
showing compliance by the private respondent. Indeed, the documentary
evidence of the private respondent herself attached to the complaint
buttresses this conclusion. They show that it is not the private respondent
but her son. Raymund U. Ledesma, and her lawyer, Atty. Epifania Navarro
who dealt with the petitioner regarding their dispute. Thus, the demand
letter dated October 18, 1988 sent to the petitioner for payment of rentals
in the sum of P14,039.00 was signed by Raymund Ledesma. On the other
hand, the demand letter dated November 14, 1988 was signed by Atty.
Epifania Navarro. More telling is the Certification to File Action signed by
Barangay Chairman, Alberto A. Solis where it appears that the complainant
is Raymund U. Ledesma and not the private respondent. 13
As stated earlier, Section 9 of P.D. 1508 mandates personal confrontation of the parties
because:

. . . a personal confrontation between the parties without the intervention

of a counsel or representative would generate spontaneity and a favorable
disposition to amicable settlement on the part of the disputants. In other
words, the said procedure is deemed conducive to the successful
resolution of the dispute at the barangay level. 14

Petitioner tries to show that her failure to personally appear before the barangay Chairman
was because of her recurring psychological ailments. But for the entire year of 1988 15 —
specifically September to December 6 — there is no indication at all that petitioner went to
see her psychiatrist for consultation. The only conclusion is that 1988 was a lucid interval
for petitioner. There was, therefore, no excuse then for her non-appearance at the Lupon
Chairman's office.

Petitioner, not having shown that she is incompetent, cannot be represented by counsel or
even by attorney-in-fact who is next of kin. 16

As explained by the Minister of Justice with whom We agree:

To ensure compliance with the requirement of personal confrontation

between the parties, and thereby, the effectiveness of the barangay
conciliation proceedings as a mode of dispute resolution, the above-quoted
provision is couched in mandatory language. Moreover, pursuant to the
familiar maxim in statutory construction dictating that "expressio unius est
exclusio alterius", the express exceptions made regarding minors and
incompetents must be construed as exclusive of all others not mentioned.
17

Petitioner's non-compliance with Secs. 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508 legally barred her from
pursuing the ejectment case in the MTC of Manila.18 Having arrived at this conclusion,
there is no need for Us to discuss the other issues involved.

WHEREFORE, the questioned decision and resolution of the respondent Court are affirmed
in toto with treble costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 200612, April 05, 2017
RAFAEL C. UY (CABANGBANG STORE), Petitioner, v. ESTATE OF VIPA FERNANDEZ,
Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
annul and set aside the Decision2 dated November 26, 2010 and Resolution3 dated January
24, 2012 issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 04481.
Facts
Vipa Fernandez Lahaylahay (Vipa) is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated in
Lopez Jaena Street, Jaro, Iloilo City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-26576
(subject property).4 Vipa and her husband, Levi Lahaylahay (Levi), have two children �
Grace Joy Somosierra (Grace Joy) and Jill Frances Lahaylahay (Jill Frances).5
Sometime in 1990, a contract of lease was executed between Vipa and Rafael Uy (Rafael)
over the subject property and the improvements thereon, pursuant to which, Rafael bound
himself to pay Vipa, as consideration for the lease of the property, the amount of
P3,000.00 per month, with a provision for a 10% increase every year thereafter.6
On March 5, 1994, Vipa died leaving no will or testament whatsoever. Grace Joy became
the de facto administrator of the estate of Vipa. After Vipa's death, Levi lived in Aklan.7
In June 1998, Rafael stopped paying the monthly rents.8 Consequently, on June 12, 2003,
the Estate of Vipa, through Grace Joy, filed a complaint9 for unlawful detainer with the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Iloilo City against Rafael. It was alleged therein
that, as of June 1998, Rafael was already bound to pay rent at the amount of P3,300.00
per month and that his last payment was made in May 1998. Accordingly, at the time of
the filing of the Complaint, Rafael's unpaid rents amounted to P271,150.00.10 The Estate
of Vipa claimed that despite repeated demands, Rafael refused to pay the rents due.11
In his Answer,12 Rafael denied that he refused to pay the rent for the lease of the subject
property. He claimed that sometime in June 1998 Patria Fernandez-Cuenca (Patria), Vipa's
sister, demanded for the payment of the rents, claiming that she is the rightful heir of
Vipa.13 Since he had no idea on who is entitled to receive the rent for the subject property,
he deposited the amount of P10,000.00 with the Office of the Clerk of Court of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City on November 20, 1998 and that Grace Joy was
informed of such consignation.14 He claimed that a case for the settlement of the Estate of
Vipa was instituted by Patria with the RTC, which was docketed as Special Proceeding No.
6910. He averred that he is willing to pay the rent on the leased property to the rightful
heirs of Vipa and that he made another consignation with the RTC in the amount of
P6,000.00.15
On June 12, 2008, the MTCC rendered a Decision,16 the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing ratiocination, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the [Estate of Vipa] and against [Rafael], ordering the latter, to wit:
1. to vacate the premises subject of this case and covered by TCT No. T-
26576 and to peacefully turn over the possession of the same to the
[Estate of Vipa];
2. to pay the [Estate of Vipa] the amount of Php271,150.00 as payment for
the unpaid rentals with 12% interest per annum from the last demand on
May 3, 2003 until the whole amount is paid;
3. to pay the [Estate of Vipa] the amount of Php3,000.00 per month with
12% interest per annum for the use and occupancy of the premises
computed from the date of the filing of this case on June 12, 2003 until
fully paid;
4. to pay the [Estate of Vipa] attorney's fees in the amount of Php20,000.00;
[and]
5. to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.17
The MTCC found that after Vipa's death in 1994 until 1998, Rafael was paying the rent for
the lease of the subject property to Grace Joy.18 That the real reason why Patria claimed
to be the heir of Vipa is because she owed Rafael money which she could not pay. Patria
then charged the debt she owes to Rafael from the monthly rent of the subject property,
an arrangement that Rafael took advantage to avoid paying Grace Joy the monthly rents.
The MTCC further opined that the consignations made by Rafael in the total amount of
P16,000.00 are not valid since there was no prior tender of payment.19
On appeal, the RTC, in its Decision20 dated April 15, 2009, reversed the MTCC's Decision
dated June 12, 2008 and, thus, dismissed the complaint for unlawful detainer filed by the
Estate of Vipa. Thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE; and the herein complaint is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit; and further
DISMISSING [Rafael's] counterclaim for failure to substantiate the same.
SO ORDERED.21
The RTC opined that Grace Joy was actually the plaintiff in the case and not the Estate of
Vipa. It then pointed out that Grace Joy failed to bring the dispute to the barangay for
conciliation prior to filing the complaint for unlawful detainer.22
The RTC further held that the MTCC erred in including the entire subject property as part
of the Estate of Vipa. The RTC explained that the subject property was acquired by Vipa
during the subsistence of her marriage with Levi and, as such, is part of their conjugal
properties. That after Vipa's death, the conjugal partnership was terminated, entitling Levi
to one-half of the property.23 The RTC then pointed out that Levi sold his share in the
subject property to Rafael, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale24 dated December 29, 2005.25
Accordingly, the RTC ruled that Rafael, as co-owner of the subject property, having bought
Levi's one-half share thereof, had the right to possess the same.26
The Estate of Vipa sought a reconsideration27 of the Decision dated April 15, 2009, but it
was denied by the RTC in its Order dated July 28; 2009.28
The Estate of Vipa then filed a Petition for Review29 with the CA. On November 26, 2010,
the CA rendered a Decision,30 which declared:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for review is GRANTED and
the April 15, 2009 Decision of the court a quo in Civil Case No. 08-29842 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the June 12, 2008 Decision of the Municipal Trial
Court, Branch 4, Iloilo City, in Civil Case No. 03-208 is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.31
The CA held that there was no necessity to bring the dispute before the barangay for
conciliation since the Estate of Vipa, being a juridical person, cannot be impleaded to a
barangay conciliation proceeding. The CA likewise pointed out that any allegations against
Grace Joy's authority to represent the Estate of Vipa had been laid to rest when she was
appointed as administrator of the Estate of Vipa in Special Proceedings No. 6910 pending
before the RTC.32
Further, the CA held that Rafael raised the issue of ownership of the subject property, i.e.,
Levi's sale of his one-half share in the subject property to Rafael, only for the first time in
his appeal with the RTC. Accordingly, it was error on the part of the RTC to have resolved
the issue of ownership of the subject property.33 Furthermore, the CA agreed with the
MTCC that Rafael's consignation of the rent to the RTC is ineffective. It ruled that Rafael
made the consignation only twice and the amount consigned was patently insignificant
compared to the amount of rent due.34
Rafael's motion for reconsideration35 was denied by the CA in its Resolution36 dated
January 24, 2012.
Hence, the instant petition.
Rafael maintains that Grace Joy has no authority to represent the Estate of Vipa and,
when she filed the complaint for unlawful detainer with the MTCC, she did so in her
personal capacity. Thus, Rafael claims that the dispute should have been brought to the
barangay for conciliation before the complaint was filed in the MTCC.37 He further claims
that the CA erred in . reversing the RTC's ruling on the issue of ownership of the subject
property. He insists that he already purchased Levi's one-half share in the subject
property.38
On the other hand, the Estate of Vipa, in its Comment,39 avers that the supposed lack of
authority of Grace Joy to file the complaint for unlawful detainer and the ownership of the
subject property were never raised in the proceedings before the MTCC and, hence, could
not be passed upon by the RTC in the appellate proceedings. In any case, it pointed out
that the RTC's Decision40 dated October 28, 2005 in Special Proceedings No. 6910, which
appointed Grace Joy as the administrator of the intestate estate of Vipa, recognized that
the latter and Jill Frances are legitimate children of Vipa and Levi.
Issue
Essentially, the issue set forth for the Court's resolution is whether the CA erred in
reversing the RTC's Decision dated April 15, 2009.
Ruling of the Court
The petition is partly meritorious.
Rafael's claim that the complaint below should have been dismissed since Grace Joy has
no authority to represent the Estate of Vipa and that there was lack of prior barangay
conciliation is untenable. Unlawful detainer cases are covered by the Rules on Summary
Procedure.41 Section 5 of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure provides that
affirmative and negative defenses not pleaded in the answer shall be deemed waived,
except lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Rafael failed to plead in the answer he filed with the MTCC that Grace Joy has no authority
to represent the Estate of Vipa. Neither did he raise therein the lack of barangay
conciliation between the parties herein prior to the filing of the complaint for unlawful
detainer. Accordingly, the foregoing defenses are already deemed waived.
In any case, the issue of the supposed lack of authority of Grace Joy to represent the
Estate of Vipa had already been rendered moot with the RTC's appointment of Grace Joy
as the administrator of the Estate of Vipa in Special Proceedings No. 6910.
Also, there was no need to refer the dispute between the parties herein to the barangay
for conciliation pursuant to the Katarungang Pambarangay Law.42 It bears stressing that
only individuals may be parties to barangay conciliation proceedings either as
complainants or respondents. Complaints by or against corporations, partnerships or other
juridical entities may not be filed with, received or acted upon by the barangay for
conciliation.43 The Estate of Vipa, which is the complainant below, is a juridical entity that
has a personality, which is separate and distinct from that of Grace Joy.44 Thus, there is no
necessity to bring the dispute to the barangay for conciliation prior to filing of the
complaint for unlawful detainer with the MTCC.
The CA, nevertheless, erred in hastily dismissing Rafael's allegation as regards the
ownership of the subject property. In disregarding Rafael's claim that he owns Levi's one-
half undivided share in the subject property, the CA ruled that the said issue was raised
for the first time on appeal and should thus not have been considered by the RTC, viz.:
On the second issue, the records show that [Rafael] raised the issue of ownership only for
the first time on appeal; hence, the [RTC] erred in deciding the appeal before it on the
findings that part of the subject premises is owned by petitioners, allegedly having bought
the same from [Levi], the husband of [Vipa].
The Court is not unmindful that in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, the MTC may
rule on the issue [of] ownership in order to determine the issue of possession. However,
the issue of ownership must be raised by the defendant on the earliest opportunity;
otherwise, it is already deemed waived. Moreover, the instant case was covered by the
Rules on Summary Procedure, which expressly provide that affirmative and negative
defenses not pleaded therein shall be deemed waived, except for lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter. Thus, the [RTC] erred in resolving the issue of ownership for the first
time on appeal.45 (Citations omitted)
It is true that fair play, justice, and due process dictate that parties should not raise for
the first time on appeal issues that they could have raised but never did during trial.
However, before a party may be barred from raising an issue for the first time on appeal,
it is imperative that the issue could have been raised during the trial.46 What escaped the
appellate court's attention is that the sale of the one-half undivided share in the subject
property to Rafael was consummated only on December 29, 2005, more than two years
after Rafael filed with the MTCC his answer to the complaint for unlawful detainer on July
18, 2003.47 Obviously, Rafael could not have raised his acquisition of Levi's share in the
subject property as an affirmative defense in the answer he filed with the MTCC.
Moreover, Rafael's ownership of the one-half undivided share in the subject property
would necessarily affect the property relations between the parties herein. Thus, the CA
should have exerted efforts to resolve the said issue instead of dismissing the same on the
flimsy ground that it was not raised during the proceedings before the MTCC.
Levi and Vipa were married on March 24, 196148 and, in the absence of a marriage
settlement, the system of conjugal partnership of gains governs their property relations.49
It is presumed that the subject property is part of the conjugal properties of Vipa and Levi
considering that the same was acquired during the subsistence of their marriage and there
being no proof to the contrary.50
When Vipa died on March 5, 1994, the conjugal partnership was automatically
terminated.51 Under Article 130 of the Family Code, the conjugal partnership property,
upon its dissolution due to the death of either spouse, should be liquidated either in the
same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased or, in the absence
thereof, by the surviving spouse within one year from the death of the deceased spouse.
That absent any liquidation, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal partnership
property is void. Thus:
Article 130. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the conjugal partnership
property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased.
If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall
liquidate the conjugal partnership property either judicially or extra-judicially
within six months from the death of the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of
the six-month period no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance
involving the conjugal partnership property of the terminated marriage shall be
void.
Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without compliance with the
foregoing requirements, a mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall
govern the property relations of the subsequent marriage. (Emphasis ours)
Article 130 of the Family Code is applicable to conjugal partnership of gains already
established between the spouses prior to the effectivity of the Family Code pursuant to
Article 105 thereof, viz.:
Article 105. In case the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements that the regime
of conjugal partnership of gains shall govern their property relations during marriage, the
provisions in this Chapter shall be of supplementary application.
The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains
already established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without
prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws
as provided in Article 256. (Emphasis ours)
Rafael bought Levi's one-half share in the subject property in consideration of P500,000.00
as evidenced by the Deed of Sale52 dated December 29, 2005. At that time, the conjugal
partnership properties of Levi and Vipa were not yet liquidated. However, such disposition,
notwithstanding the absence of liquidation of the conjugal partnership properties, is not
necessarily void.
It bears stressing that under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains, the husband and
wife are co-owners of all the property of the conjugal partnership.53 Thus, upon the
termination of the conjugal partnership of gains due to the death of either spouse, the
surviving spouse has an actual and vested one-half undivided share of the properties,
which does not consist of determinate and segregated properties until liquidation and
partition of the conjugal partnership.54 With respect, however, to the deceased spouse's
share in the conjugal partnership properties, an implied ordinary co-ownership ensues
among the surviving spouse and the other heirs of the deceased.55
Thus, upon Vipa's death, one half of the subject property was automatically reserved in
favor of the surviving spouse, Levi, as his share in the conjugal partnership. The other
half, which is Vipa's share, was transmitted to Vipa's heirs � Grace Joy, Jill Frances, and
her husband Levi, who is entitled to the same share as that of a legitimate child. The the filing of the complaint with the MTCC on June 12, 2003, until June 30, 2013 and 6%
ensuing implied co-ownership is governed by Article 493 of the Civil Code, which provides: per annum from July 1, 2013 until fully paid.

Article 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and The award of attorney's fees of P20,000.00 is likewise proper. Attorney's fees can be
benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, awarded in the cases enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code, specifically:
and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co- Article 2208. x x x
owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the
division upon the termination of the co-ownership. (Emphasis ours)
xxxx

Although Levi became a co-owner of the conjugal partnership properties with Grace Joy
(2) Where the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third
and Jill Frances, he could not yet assert or claim title to any specific portion thereof
persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest[.]
without an actual partition of the property being first done either by agreement or by
judicial decree. Before the partition of a land or thing held in common, no individual or co-
owner can claim title to any definite portion thereof. All that the co-owner has is an ideal Certainly, because of Rafael's unjustified refusal to pay the rents due on the lease of the
or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire land or thing.56 subject prope1iy, the Estate of Vipa was put to unnecessary expense and trouble to
protect its interest under paragraph (2), Article 2208 of the Civil Code. In unlawful
detainer cases, where attorney's fees are awarded, the same shall not exceed
Nevertheless, a co-owner could sell his undivided share; hence, Levi had the right to freely
P20,000.00.59
sell and dispose of his undivided interest. Thus, the sale by Levi of his one-half undivided
share in the subject property was not necessarily void, for his right as a co-owner thereof
was effectively transferred, making the buyer, Rafael, a co-owner of the subject property. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition for review on certiorari is
It must be stressed that the binding force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated November 26, 2010 and Resolution dated
legally possible to do so (quando res non valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere potest).57 January 24, 2012 issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 04481 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Rafael C. Uy is hereby directed to pay the Estate
of Vipa Fernandez the following:
However, Rafael became a co-owner of the subject property only on December 29, 2005 �
the time when Levi sold his one-half undivided share over the subject property to the
former. Thus, from December 29, 2005 Rafael, as a co-owner, has the right to possess the 1. The amount of P271,150.00, representing the unpaid rentals, with interest at the
subject property as an incident of ownership. Otherwise stated, prior to his acquisition of rates of twelve percent (12%) per annum from the date of the last demand on
Levi's one-half undivided share, Rafael was a mere lessee of the subject property and is May 3, 2003 until June 30, 2013, and six percent (6%) per annum from July 1,
thus obliged to pay the rent for his possession thereof. 2013 until fully paid;
2. Reasonable rent for the use and occupancy of the subject property from May 2003
until December 28, 2005 at the rate of P3,000.00 per month with interest at the
Accordingly, Rafael could no longer be directed to vacate the subject property since he is
rates of twelve percent (12%) per annum from the date of the last demand, i.e.,
already a co-owner thereof. Nevertheless, Rafael is still bound to pay the unpaid rentals
the filing of the complaint for unlawful detainer on June 12, 2003, until June 30,
from June 1998 until April 2003 in the amount of P271,150.00. In Nacar v. Gallery
2013, and six percent (6%) per annum from July 1, 2013 until fully paid; and
Frames, et al.,58 the Court pointed out that pursuant to Resolution No. 796 of the Bangko
3. The amount of P20,000.00 as attorney's fees.
Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board, the interest rate of loans or forbearance of money, in
the absence of stipulation shall be six percent (6%) effective only from July 1, 2013. Thus,
prior to July 1, 2013, the rate of interest on loans or forbearance of money, in the absence SO ORDERED.
of stipulation, is still 12%. Accordingly, the amount of P271,150.00, representing the
unpaid rentals shall earn interest at the rates of 12% per annum from the date of the last
demand on May 3, 2003 until June 30, 2013 and 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until
fully paid.

Further, Rafael is likewise bound to pay reasonable rent for the use and occupancy of the
subject property from May 2003 until December 28, 2005 at the rate of P3,000.00 per
month with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of the last demand, i.e.,