Mary Grace Natividad S.

Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was found abandoned as a new-born infant in the

Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo. Petitioner was reported and registered as a foundling with the Office of the
Civil Registrar of Iloilo City (OCR-Iloilo). When petitioner was 5 years old, spouses Fenando Poe, Jr. and
Susan Roces adopted her. Petitioner continue her studies abroad and left for the U.S. in 1988. In 1991,
petitioner married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares (a citizen of both the Philippines and the U.S.)
in San Juan City. The couple flew back to the U.S. after the wedding ceremony. In 2001, petitioner
became a naturalized American citizen and obtained U.S. Passport. The petitioner stayed in the country
from December 2004 until February 2005 to take care of her father's funeral arrangements as well as to
assist in the settlement of his estate. Later, petitioner and her husband decided to move and reside
permanently in the Philippines on May 24, 2005.

On July 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to R.A.
No. 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003). On October 2010, President Aquino
appointed petitioner as Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board
(MTRCB). Petitioner executed an "Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America
and Renunciation of American Citizenship" before a notary in satisfaction of the legal requisites stated in
R.A. No. 9225. This was also submitted to the Bureau of Immigration and took her oath of office as
Chairperson of the MTRCB.

On October 2012, the petitioner filed with the COMELEC her COC for Senator for the 2013 Elections
wherein she declared 6 years and 6 months of residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013.
Petitioner was eventually proclaimed Senator. On October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the
Presidency for the May 2016 Elections wherein she declared that she is a natural-born citizen and that
her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be ten (10) years and eleven
(11) months counted from 24 May 2005.

Petitioner's filing of her COC for President in the upcoming elections triggered the filing of several
COMELEC cases against her.

Issue:

1. WON petitioner can be declared a natural born Filipino (YES)

As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the 1935 Constitution's
enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely
exclude foundlings either. The Court finds no such intent or language permitting discrimination
against foundlings under the Constitution. On the contrary, all three Constitutions (1935, 1973
and 1987) guarantee the basic right to equal protection of the laws.

Moreover, Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos.
These laws do not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the
adoptee must be a Filipino in the first place to be adopted.

Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Generally accepted principles of
international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws
of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. Generally accepted principles of
international law include international custom as evidence of a general practice accepted as law,
 and general principles of law recognized by civilized nations. The common thread of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR"), UN-CRC, International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) is to obligate the Philippines to grant nationality from birth and ensure
that no child is stateless (the grant of nationality must be at the time of birth).

2. WON petitioner’s repatriation resulted to reacquisition of natural born citizenship (YES)

In Bengson v. HRET, it was stated that repatriation results in the recovery of the original
nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his
prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-
born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a
natural-born Filipino. R.A. No. 9225 was obviously passed in line with Congress' sole prerogative
to determine how citizenship may be lost or reacquired. Congress saw it fit to decree that
natural-born citizenship may be reacquired even if it had been once lost.

3. WON Petitioner is a resident of the Philippines for 10 years (YES)

The Constitution requires presidential candidates to have 10 years residence in the Philippines
before the day of the elections. Petitioner must then have been a resident of the Philippines
prior to 9 May 2016 (Election Day) for 10 years. In answer to the requested information she put
in "10 years 11 months" the beginning date of which is 25 May 2005.

When petitioner immigrated to the U.S. in 1991, she lost her original domicile, which is the
Philippines. There are three requisites to acquire a new domicile: (1.) Residence or bodily
presence in a new locality; (2.) an intention to remain there; and (3.) an intention to abandon
the old domicile. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual
removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place
of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In
other words, there must basically be animus manendi (intention to remain) coupled with animus
non revertendi (intention to abandon old domicile).

Petitioner presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her family abandoned their
U.S. domicile and relocated to the Philippines for good. Despite such, COMELEC still refused
alleging there was no intention to abandon the old domicile. The evidence of petitioner is
overwhelming unlike in the cases cited by the COMELEC. The pieces of evidence leads to no
other conclusion that she decided to permanently abandon her U.S. residence (selling the
house, taking the children from U.S. schools, getting quotes from the freight company, notifying
the U.S. Post Office of the abandonment of their address in the U.S., donating excess items to
the Salvation Army, her husband resigning from U.S. employment right after selling the U.S.
house) and permanently relocate to the Philippines and actually re-established her residence
here on 24 May 2005 (securing T.I.N, enrolling her children in Philippine schools, buying
property here, constructing a residence here, returning to the Philippines after all trips abroad,
her husband getting employed here). Indeed, coupled with her eventual application to reacquire
 Philippine citizenship and her family's actual continuous stay in the Philippines over the years, it
is clear that when petitioner returned on 24 May 2005 it was for good.

Quita v. CA and Blandina Dandan G.R. No. 124862. December 22, 1998, BELLOSILLO, J

Fe D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan (both Filipinos) were married in the Philippines (no
children). Somewhere along the way their relationship soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in
U.S.A. Eventually she obtained a final judgment of divorce. 3 weeks thereafter she married a certain
Felix Tupaz in the same locality but their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she
married for the third time, to a certain Wernimont.

Later, Arturo died and he left no will. Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with the RTC of Quezon City for
issuance of letters of administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust
Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan (Blandina Padlan, claiming to be the surviving spouse), and
Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda (claiming to be surviving children of Arturo),
opposed the petition. Later, the oppositors submitted certified photocopies of the private writing and
the final judgment of divorce between petitioner and Arturo. Later Ruperto T. Padlan (brother of Arturo)
intervened. Petitioner moved for the immediate declaration of heirs of the decedent and the distribution of his
estate.

The RTC disregarded the divorce between petitioner and Arturo. Accordingly, equal adjudication of the net
hereditary estate was ordered in favor of the two intestate heirs. Later on MR, the children with the exception of
Alexis, were declared as legitimate children based on their birth certificates.

CA declared that the judgment is void as the case was decided without a hearing, in violation of Sec. 1, Rule 90 of
the RoC which provides that if there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the
deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy
shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases. Thus, ordered the case to be remanded.

Issue: WON petitioner was still entitled to inherit from the decedent? (Not answered)

Held:

1. If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased
person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law,
the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
2. Petitioner said Arturo remained a Filipino citizen and this legally married to her. Reading
between the lines, she averred she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce
from Arturo. This should have prompted the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish her
citizenship. We emphasize however that the question to be determined by the trial court should
be limited only to the right of petitioner to inherit from Arturo as his surviving spouse. Private
respondent's claim to heirship was already resolved by the trial court. She and Arturo were
married on 22 April 1947 while the prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo was subsisting
thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage considered void from the beginning under Arts. 80 and
83 of the Civil Code. Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this
status presupposes a legitimate relationship
 WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

Republic v. CA and Molina, G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997, Panganiban, J;

Roridel Molina (respondent) and Reynaldo were married and had a son name Andre. A year after
their marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father
since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his
money. He was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels.
Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of
the family. One day, the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was
estranged. Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them. Reynaldo had
thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and
was a highly immature and habitually quarrel some individual. Thus she filed a verified petition for
declaration of nullity of their marriage. RTC and CA declared that the marriage is void.

Issue: WON opposing and conflicting personalities is equivalent to psychological incapacity (NO.)

Held: In Leouel Santos vs. CA this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that there is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability
to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated."

Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the
Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."

In the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an
incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting
personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties
failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be
shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor physical) illness.

The following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby
handed down:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity.
 (2) (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, should be given great respect by our courts. Since the purpose of including such
provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people,
it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given
to decision of such appellate tribunal. This is one instance where, contemporaneous religious
interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church shall walk
together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and
the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear
as counsel for the state.

Tan v. Andrade
Rosario Vda. De Andrade was the registered owner of parcels of land which she mortgaged and
subsequently foreclosed by one Simon Diu. Rosario sought the assistance of Bobby Tan who agreed
to redeem the subject properties. Rosario sold the same to Bobby and her son, Proceso Andrade,
Jr. The latter eventually assigned his share unto Bobby. Rosario’s childre (all surnamed Andrade)
filed a complaint for reconveyance and annulment of deeds of conveyance and damages against
Bobby. They alleged that the transaction was not one of sale but was actually an equitable mortgage
which was entered into to secure Rosario’s indebtedness. They also claimed that since the subject
properties were inherited by them from their father, Proceso Andrade, Sr. (Proceso, Sr.), the subject
properties were conjugal in nature, and thus, Rosario had no right to dispose of their respective
shares therein. Issue: WON Conjugal in nature (NO). SC = Pertinent to the resolution of this second
issue is Article 160 of the Civil Code which states that "all property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or
to the wife." For this presumption to apply, the party invoking the same must, however, preliminarily
prove that the property was indeed acquired during the marriage. In this case, records reveal that
the conjugal partnership of Rosario and her husband was terminated upon the latter’s death. Other
than their bare allegation, no evidence was adduced by the Andrades to establish that the subject
properties were procured during the coverture of their parents or that the same were bought with
conjugal funds.

Dino v. Dino
Alain M. Diño (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Diño (respondent) were married. During the course of
the relationship, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against respondent
citing psychological incapacity. Respondent did not file an answer. Petitioner later learned that
respondent filed a petition for divorce/dissolution of her marriage with petitioner, which was granted
by the Superior Court of California. Petitioner also learned that respondent married a certain Manuel
V. Alcantara. The trial court granted the petition however the dispositive portion of the ruling said that
“A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after liquidation, partition and
distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.”

Issue: Whether the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall
only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147
of the Family Code. (YES)

In Valdes v. RTC, it was ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations
of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the
Family Code. Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated
and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void.
The ruling of the RTC here has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule (A.M. 02-11-10-SC,
March 15, 2003) does not apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code. It
is clear from Article 50 (to which the Rule pertains to) of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the
Rule applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under
Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to
marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be
declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties. Thus, what governs
the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-
ownership.

Perla v. Baring

Respondent Mirasol Baring (Mirasol) and her then minor son, Randy (collectively respondents), filed before a Complaint for
support against Antonio. Mirasol and Antonio lived together as common-law spouses for two years and as a result of said
cohabitation, Randy was born. Amtonio allegedly abandoned them and failed to give any support to his son.

SC said respondents’ Complaint for support is based on Randy’s alleged illegitimate filiation to Antonio. To be entitled for
support, his filiation must be established with sufficient certainty. A review of the Decision of the RTC would show that it is
bereft of any discussion regarding Randy’s filiation. It merely declared the certified true copies of Randy’s birth certificate and
baptismal certificate both identifying Antonio as the father as good proofs of his filiation with Randy and nothing more. This is
despite the fact that the said documents do not bear Antonio’s signature. The rules for establishing filiation are found in Articles
172 and 175 of the Family Code. The Certificate of Live Birth of Randy identifying Antonio as the father has no probative value
to establish Randy’s filiation to Antonio since the latter had not signed the same. It is settled that "a certificate of live birth
purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative
father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate."

BBB v. AAA
During the relationship with BBB, AAA bore two more children namely, DDD and EEE. To legalize their
relationship, BBB and AAA married in civil rights and thereafter, the birth certificates of the children,
including CCC’s, was amended to change their civil status to legitimated by virtue of the said marriage. Their
relationship later turned sour. AAA decided to leave the conjugal home with the children and lived
temporarily at a friend’s house. While living separately from BBB, AAA discovered that BBB was not paying
the rentals due on the condominium unit they were occupying. AAA was likewise compelled to find work to
support the family. AAA feels threatened after discovering that BBB was stalking her and/or their children as
BBB has sought the help of one GGG, his friend who lives within the same compound where AAA lives, to go
through the guard’s logbook to monitor their every move. AAA filed an application for the issuance of a TPO
with a request to make the same permanent (PPO) after due hearing. RTC granted this. CA affirmed the
factual findings and dispositions of the RTC, but ordering the remand of the case to determine who shall be
awarded custody of the children (because this issue was raised by BBB with the CA).

SC affirms the CA’s order to remand the case for the RTC to resolve the question of custody. Since the
children are now all older than seven years of age, they can choose for themselves whom they want to stay
with. If all the three children would manifest to the RTC their choice to stay with AAA, then the PPO issued
by RTC shall continue to be executed in its entirety. However, if any of the three children would choose to be
under BBB’s care, necessarily, the PPO issued against BBB relative to them is to be modified. The PPO, in its
entirety, would remain effective only as to AAA and any of the children who opt to stay with her.
Consequently, the RTC may accordingly alter the manner and amount of financial support BBB should give
depending on who shall finally be awarded custody over the children.

Edralin v. pvb - ownership

Veterans Bank granted petitioner spouses a loan. As security thereof, petitioners executed a REM in favor of Veterans Bank
over a real property registered in the name of petitioner Fernando. The Edralins failed to pay their obligation to Veterans Bank
so the latter filed a Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of the REM. It was sold in a public auction and Veterans Bank was the
highest bidder and a Certificate of Sale was issued and registered and annotated at the back of its TCT. Edralin failed redeem
the property during the one year period so the bank acquired absolute ownership. The Edralin's TCT was cancelled and a new
one under the name of Veterans Bank replaced it.

Veterans Bank filed an Ex-Parte Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession but was dismissed for Veterans Bank’s failure
to prosecute. Veterans Bank again filed another petition. RTC dismissed the case because under paragraph (d) of the REM, the
Veterans Bank agreed to take possession of the Edralins’ property without any judicial intervention. Furthermore, the trial court
held that, assuming the contract allowed for the issuance of a writ of possession, Veterans Bank’s right to seek possession had
already prescribed as Veterans Bank had only 10 years from February 24, 1983 to seek possession of the property. CA reversed
the decision.

SC said that the purchaser, who has a right to possession after the expiration of the redemption period, becomes the absolute
owner of the property when no redemption is made. The purchaser can demand possession at any time following the
consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a new TCT. After consolidation of title in the purchaser’s
name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem the property, the purchaser’s right to possession ripens into the absolute right of a
confirmed owner. At that point, the issuance of a writ of possession, upon proper application and proof of title becomes merely
a ministerial function. With the consolidated title, the purchaser becomes entitled to a writ of possession and the trial court has
the ministerial duty to issue such writ of possession.

Angeles v. Pascual
Neighbors Regidor Pascual (Pascual) and Pedro Angeles (Angeles) were registered owners of adjacent parcels of land located in

Cabanatuan City. Metrobank, as the highest bidder in the foreclosure sale of the adjacent Lot 3, caused the relocation survey of

Lot 3 and the geodetic engineer discovered that Pascuals house had encroached on Lot 3. As a consequence, Metrobank

successfully ejected Pascual. In turn, Pascual caused the relocation survey of his own Lot 4 and discovered that Angeles house

also encroached on his lot. Pascual demanded rentals for the use of the encroached area of Lot 4 from Angeles, or the removal

of Angeles house. Angeles refused the demand. Accordingly, Pascual sued Angeles for recovery of possession and damages in the

RTC. The RTC and CA ruled in favour of Pascual. According to the SC, good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land

he is building on is his and in his ignorance of a defect or flaw in his title. With the unassailable finding that Angeles house

straddled the lot of Pascual, and that Angeles had built his house in good faith, Article 448 of the Civil Code, which spells out the

rights and obligations of the owner of the land as well as of the builder, is unquestionably applicable. Consequently, the land

being the principal and the building the accessory, preference is given to Pascual as the owner of the land to make the choice as
between appropriating the building or obliging Angeles as the builder to pay the value of the land. Contrary to the insistence of

Angeles, therefore, no inconsistency exists between the finding of good faith in his favor and the grant of the reliefs set forth in

Article 448 of the Civil Code.

Andres v. sta. lucia

Petitioners filed a Complaint for Easement of Right-of-Way against respondent before the RTC. They alleged

that they are co-owners and possessors for more than 50 years of three parcels of unregistered agricultural

lands. Respondent acquired the lands surrounding the subject property, developed the same into a residential

subdivision and built a concrete perimeter fence around it such that petitioners were denied access from

subject property to the nearest public road and vice versa. They thus prayed for a right-of-way within the

subdivision in order for them to have access to Col. Guido Street, a public road. RTC ruled in favour of plaintiffs.

It observed that petitioners’ allegation in their Complaint that they were in possession of the subject property

for more than 50 years was not denied by respondent in its Answer. CA reversed. SC said petitioners are not

entitled to demand an easement of right-of-way from respondent. Under Article 649 of the Civil Code, an

easement of right-of-way may be demanded by the owner of an immovable or by any person who by virtue

of a real right may cultivate or use the same. Anent petitioners' invocation of ordinary acquisitive prescription,

the Court notes that the same was raised for the first time on appeal.

Even if timely raised, such argument of petitioners fails. "Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring

ownership under the Civil Code." There are two modes of prescription through which immovables may be

acquired - ordinary acquisitive prescription which requires possession in good faith and just title for 10 years

and, extraordinary prescription wherein ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired

through uninterrupted adverse possession for 30 years without need of title or of good faith. However, it was

clarified in the Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic of the Philippines, that only lands of the public domain
subsequently classified or declared as no longer intended for public use or for the development of national

wealth, or removed from the sphere of public dominion and are considered converted into patrimonial lands

or lands of private ownership, may be alienated or disposed through any of the modes of acquiring ownership

under the Civil Code. And if the mode of acquisition is prescription, whether ordinary or extraordinary, it must

first be shown that the land has already been converted to private ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive

prescriptive period.

Republic v. CFI

In 1943 defendant Dolores Infants obtained loans (P683.10) from the Bank of Taiwan, Ltd. On September 15, 1961, plaintiff
Republic of the Philippines (the assets of the Bank of Taiwan transferred it to the US Gov’t and later to the Republic of the
Philippines.) filed a complaint to collect from the defendant the said amount of P683.10. The defendant moved to dismiss the
complaint on the ground of prescription. Motion to dismiss was granted.

According to the SC, the complaint was brought by the Republic of the Philippines not as a nominal party but in the exercise of
its sovereign functions, to protect the interests of the State over a public property. Under paragraph 4 of Article 1108 of the
Civil Code prescription, both acquisitive and extinctive, does not run against the State. Secondly, the running of the period of
prescription of the action to collect the loan from the appellant was interrupted by the moratorium laws.

In the case at bar, the loans which had no maturity dates were contracted in 1943, or during the period of the Japanese
occupation of the Philippines. Ordinarily, the counting of the prescriptive period should be reckoned from the date the debt
became due and demandable. However, the moratorium decrees supervene suspending the enforcement of payments of all
debts and other monetary obligations contracted during the war, although the moratorium laws were later declared
unconstitutional. Before they were declared unconstitutional, they suspended the running of the prescriptive period during
their effectivity. Thus, the 10-year period within which to institute the action against herein appellee began the day after the
moratorium laws were declared unconstitutional or, to be precise, on May 19, 1953. It was on September 27, 1954 when
plaintiff (appellant) made extra-judicial written demand on defendant. As the loans in question did not have any maturity dates
and, therefore, payable on demand, prescription could have accrued, only when petitioner made the extra-judicial demand.

Succession

Sayson v. CA

Eleno and Rafaela Sayson had 5 children (Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro). Eleno died on

1952 and Rafaela on 1976. Teodoro, married to Isabel, died on 1972 while Isabel died on 1981. Their

properties were left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel who claim to be their children. Mauricio,

Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together with Juana (Isabel's mother) (collectively as plaintiffs) filed a

complaint for partition and accounting (1st civil case) of the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel. The action

was resisted by Delia, Edmundo and Doribel Sayson (the children), who alleged successional rights as lawful

descendants.

Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint (2nd civil case), this time for the accounting and partition

of the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela against the couple's four surviving children. The complainants

asserted the same defense that Delia and Edmundo were the adopted children and Doribel was the legitimate
daughter. As such, they were entitled to inherit Teodoro's share in his parents' estate by right of

representation.

In the 1st civil case = in favour of defendants (the children), saying that they are the legitimate heirs of

Teodoro and Isable thereby excluding plaintiffs from succeeding.

In the 2nd civil case = in favour of the plaintiffs (the children), saying they are entitled to inherit from Eleno

and Rafaela by right of representation.

CA = consolidated the cases. Affirmed both decision but modified the decision in 2nd civil case excluding Delia

and Edmundo (being adopted children) from inheriting by right of representation from Eleno and Rafaela’s

estate.

According to the SC, the 3 children are the exclusive heir of Teodoro and Isabel. The petitioners seek to annul

the adoption of Delia and Edmundo on the ground that Teodoro and Isabel already had a legitimate daughter

at the time but in the same breath try to demolish this argument by denying that Doribel was born to the

couple. However, it is too late now to challenge the decree of adoption, years after it became final and

executory. Also, their challenge to the validity of the adoption cannot be made collaterally, as in their action

for partition, but should be in a direct proceeding frontally addressing the issue.

Doribel is considered as legitimate, the birth certificate being a formidable piece of evidence. Also, Doribel's

legitimacy cannot be questioned in a complaint for partition and accounting but in a direct action.

Thus, the court holds that Doribel (legitimate daughter) and Delia and Edmundo (adopted children) are the

exclusive heirs to the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel. The principle underlying Art. 979 is that a person's

love descends first to his children and grandchildren before it ascends to his parents and thereafter spreads

among his collateral relatives. It is also supposed that one of his purposes in acquiring properties is to leave

them eventually to his children as a token of his love for them and as a provision for their continued care even

after he is gone from this earth.

Re: right of representation to the estate of Eleno and Rafaela.

As the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the granddaughter of Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a right

to represent her deceased father in the distribution of the intestate estate of her grandparents (Under Article

981). A different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and Edmundo, to whom the grandparents

were total strangers. While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and have

the same right as the latter, these rights do not include the right of representation. The relationship created
by the adoption is between only the adopting parents and the adopted child and does not extend to the blood

relatives of either party.