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Arroyo

investigation lasted for about 5 years and 3 months from the date of the filing of
WEEK 10 CASE DIGESTS the formal complaint. Since the duration of the preliminary investigation is
excessive, it is incumbent then on the prosecution to justify the delay. The
1. Magante v. Sandiganbayan (ANNE) prosecution provided that there were 10 respondents in the complaint led with
July 23, 2018| Velasco, Jr., J. | Rights of accused to have a speedy trial the OMB and each of them was afforded the right to explain themselves and that
the records of the case were allegedly voluminous that entailed considerable
time to study and analyze. However, these ​reasons do not sufficiently explain
PETITIONER​​: Elpidio Tagaan Magante
the more than five-year long preliminary investigation​​. Contrary to the
RESPONDENTS​​: Sandiganbayan (Third Division) and People of the
finding of the Sandiganbayan, there is a hiatus on the part of the Ombudsman
Philippines
during this period. ​Left unsatisfactorily explained, this amounts to a violation
of petitioner's constitutional right to a speedy disposition of case, corollarily
SUMMARY​​: 2 separate Informations for Falsification of Public Documents,
warranting the dismissal of the criminal case against him. ​Magante's ​alleged
and for Splitting of Contracts, were led against Magante and his 5
failure to assert his right is not a veritable ground for the denial of the
co-respondents therein before the Sandiganbayan. Magante led a Motion to
motion in the absence of any motion, pleading, or act on his part that
Dismiss the cases against him on the ground that inordinate delay attended the
contributed to the delay​​. It is not for him to ensure that the wheels of justice
conduct of the preliminary investigation of his alleged crimes, in violation of his
continue to turn but for the State to guarantee that the case is disposed within a
constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases. The prosecution claimed
reasonable period. It is sufficient that he raised the constitutional infraction prior
that there was neither hiatus, inaction nor any intentional delay on the part of the
to his arraignment before the Sandiganbayan. There could have been ​no grave
Ombudsman and that Magante failed to assert his right to a speedy disposition of
prejudice suffered by the State ​from the delay ​since the criminal charges for
his cases all throughout the proceedings, and, thus, like any other constitutional
falsification of public documents and splitting of contracts are offenses that
right, the same may be waived. The prosecution appropriately explained the
chiefly rely on the presentation of documentary evidence.
circumstances surrounding the drafting of the 2 Informations against the 10
respondents, all of whom were accorded their constitutional right to be heard.
DOCTRINE: SECTION 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. All persons
Based thereon, the Sandiganbayan did not find that the proceedings before
shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial,
Ombudsman were attended by any vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays.
quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
The issue here is WON the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion
Prevailing jurisprudence on the speedy disposition of cases is sourced from the
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolutions
landmark ruling of the US Supreme Court in ​Barker v. Wingo​, wherein a delicate
without regard to the constitutional right of Magante to speedy disposition of the
balancing test was crafted to determine whether or not the right had been
investigation.
violated. A balancing test necessarily compels courts to approach speedy trial
cases on an ad hoc basis. The Court identified 4 factors which courts should
The Court held that there was grave abuse of discretion. The Court adopted the
assess in determining whether a particular defendant has been deprived of his
factors set forth in ​Barker ​(e.g. delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's
right: length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his
assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant). Magante’s preliminary
right, and prejudice to the defendant.

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FACTS:
1. In the Ombudsman's Resolution dated April 25, 2016, 2 separate
informations for Falsification of Public Documents, and for
Splitting of Contracts, were led against Magante and his 5
co-respondents therein on October 7, 2016 before the
Sandiganbayan.
2. Magante led a ​Motion to Dismiss the cases against him on the
ground that inordinate delay attended the conduct of the
preliminary investigation of his alleged crimes, in violation of
his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases​​.
3. Magante claimed that it took the Ombudsman about 7 years, from
the commencement of the fact-finding investigation in 2009 up to
2016, to issue its Resolution directing the filing of 2 informations
against him.
4. Magante reckoned the period from April 21, 2009, the date of the
Affidavit and Narrative Audit Report that was submitted by
Aguilar, Regional Director of the Commission on Audit Regional
Office, which led to the commencement of a fact-finding
investigation by the Ombudsman.
5. Magante also asserted that even if the period were to be counted
from February 15, 2011, which is the date when the Ombudsman
issued an Order directing him and his co-respondents therein to
submit their respective counter-affidavits, up to the approval of its
Resolution, there is still a clear inordinate delay of 5 years and 2
months in resolving his case.
6. The prosecution asserted that there was neither hiatus, inaction,
nor any intentional delay on the part of the Ombudsman from the
time that the letter-complaint of Aguilar against Magante was
received by the OMB-Visayas on September 1, 2009, until the
approval of the Final Evaluation Report dated June 30, 2010 by the
then Ombudsman Gutierrez on November 18, 2010.
7. The Final Evaluation Report recommended the upgrading of the
fact- finding investigation into a criminal and administrative case
before the Ombudsman.
8. The Public Assistance and Corruption Prevention Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas (PACPO-OMB-Visayas) led a
formal complaint against Magante on January 7, 2011.
9. The Resolution finding probable cause was only promulgated on
April 15, 2016 because there were 10 respondents in the complaint
and each of them was afforded the right to explain themselves. The
records of the case were also voluminous that entailed
considerable time to study and analyze.
10. The prosecution further claimed that Magante failed to assert his
right to a speedy disposition of his cases all throughout the
proceedings, and, thus, like any other constitutional right, the same
may be waived.
11. The Sandiganbayan denied Magante’s Motion to Dismiss for utter
lack of merit and affirmed the prosecution’s findings that the
rulings in the cases cited are inapplicable to the cases at bar
because of the material differences in their factual milieu.
12. In contrast to the following cases, the attendant circumstances in
these cases do not show a deliberate attempt to delay the
proceedings.
a. Tatad- the 3-year delay in terminating the preliminary
investigation against him was attended by "political
motivations which played a vital role in activating and
propelling the prosecutorial process;" and, there was a
departure from the established procedure in conducting
the preliminary investigation and that the issues involved
were simple. The present cases involve no imputation of
any political motivation in the filing of the present
Informations against Magante.
b. Roque- no explanation was given why it took almost six
years for the Ombudsman to resolve the complaints
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c. People v. Sandiganbayan- inordinate delay on the part of
the Ombudsman when it resolved a complaint-affidavit
only on April 15, 2008, notwithstanding the fact that it
was filed on December 23, 2002.
d. Achangco, Jr- the delay of more than 6 years in resolving
the complaints was violation of the accused's
constitutional right to due process and speedy disposition
of cases for two (2) reasons: [1] the administrative aspect
of the case had already been dismissed; and [2]
petitioner's several motions for early resolution and
motion to dismiss remained unacted even at the time of
the petition for mandamus before the Supreme Court.
Here, Magante did not file any motion or letter seeking
the early resolution of the case against him and signifying
that he was not waiving his right to its speedy disposition.
e. Coscolluela- petitioners were unaware that a preliminary
investigation against them was ongoing so the Court ruled
that they could not be faulted for their alleged failure to
assert their right to speedy disposition of cases. Here,
Magante was very much aware that there was a pending
investigation against him, as in fact he led his counter-a
davit before the OMB-Visayas and also lated led a MR of
an adverse Resolution of the Ombudsman. He actively
participated in the proceedings before the Ombudsman
and failed to assert his right to a speedy disposition of
cases.
13. The prosecution appropriately explained the circumstances
surrounding the drafting of the two 2 Informations against the 10
respondents, all of whom were accorded their constitutional right
to be heard. Based thereon, the Sandiganbayan does not find that
the proceedings before Ombudsman were attended by any
vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays.
14. The petitioner moved for its reconsideration but it was also denied
for being pro forma and/or lack of merit.
ISSUES:
1. WON the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing the assailed resolutions without regard to the
constitutional right of Magante to speedy disposition of the
investigation? – YES.
RATIO:
The right to speedy disposition of cases and the Ombudsman's bounden duty
to observe the same
1. The constitutional guarantee to speedy disposition of cases was
reproduced verbatim in Article III, Sec. 16 which provides:
SECTION 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition
of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
2. It expanded the speedy trial guarantee afforded to the accused in a
criminal proceeding, which was already in place in the 1935
Constitution.
3. The 1989 case of ​Tatad w ​ as the first to have applied the provision
as a personal right against the conduct of a proceeding, rather than
as a constitutional challenge against a statute.
4. In ​Dansal v. Fernandez​, the right in Article III, Sec. 16 embraces
the periods before, during and after trial.
5. In Article XI, Sec. 12 of the Constitution, it was stated that the
Ombudsman shall act promptly on complaints led in any form or
manner, which was further amplified by Sec. 13 of RA 6770.
6. However, these provisions do not specify a period for the OMB to
render its ruling in cases or matters before it. Neither did the
mentioned laws enumerate the criteria in determining what
duration of disposition could be considered as "prompt."
7. The ​lack of statutory definition on what constitutes "prompt"
action on a complaint opened the gates for judicial interpretation,
which merely listed factors to consider in treating petitions
invoking the right to speedy disposition of cases.
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Attempts in jurisprudence to define "inordinate delay"
8. Prevailing jurisprudence on the speedy disposition of cases is
sourced from the landmark ruling of the US Supreme Court in
Barker v. Wingo​, wherein a delicate balancing test was crafted to
determine whether or not the right had been violated.
9. A ​balancing test necessarily compels courts to approach speedy
trial cases on an ad hoc basis. The Court identified 4 factors which
courts should assess in determining whether a particular defendant
has been deprived of his right: length of delay, the reason for the
delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the
defendant.
10. The Court adopted the factors set for forth in ​Barker in local
jurisprudence in determining ​inordinate delay.
a. Length of the delay
11. The Court has never set a threshold period for concluding
preliminary investigation proceedings before the OMB premised
on the idea that "speedy disposition" is a relative and flexible
concept. It has often been held that a ​mere mathematical
reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient in determining
whether or not there was inordinate delay on the part of the
investigating officer, and that particular regard must be taken of
the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.
12. This is opposed with Sec. 58 of the 2008 Manual for Prosecutors
observed by the National Prosecutorial Service, and that mandated
by the Constitution to resolve matters and controversies within a
definite timeline. The prescribed period for the Judicial branch at
least gives the party litigants an idea on when they could
reasonably expect a ruling from the courts, and at the same time
ensures that judges are held to account for the cases not so timely
disposed.
13. The Court is not unmindful of the duty of the Ombudsman under
the Constitution and RA 6770 to act promptly on complaints
brought before him but this imposition should not be mistaken
with a hasty resolution of cases at the expense of thoroughness and
correctness.
14. This duty does not license this Court to a specific period for the
office to resolve the cases and matters before it, lest the Court
encroaches upon the constitutional prerogative of the Ombudsman
to promulgate its own rules and procedure.
15. The reckoning point when delay starts to run is the date of the
filing of a formal complaint by a private complainant or the filing
by the Field Investigation Office with the Ombudsman of a formal
complaint based on an anonymous complaint or as a result of its
motu proprio investigations. The period devoted to the fact-finding
investigations prior to the date of the filing of the formal complaint
with the Ombudsman shall NOT be considered in determining
inordinate delay. After the filing of the formal complaint, the time
devoted to fact-finding investigations shall always be factored in.
​b. Reasons for the delay
16. Valid reasons for the delay identified and accepted by the Court
include, but are not limited to: (1) extraordinary complications
such as the degree of difficulty of the questions involved, the
number of persons charged, the various pleadings led, and the
voluminous documentary and testimonial evidence on record; and
(2) acts attributable to the respondent.
17. The period for re-investigation cannot automatically be taken
against the State. Re-investigations cannot generally be considered
as "vexatious, capricious, and oppressive" practices proscribed by
the constitutional guarantee since these are performed for the
benefit of the accused.
c. Assertion of Right by the Accused
22. The Court ruled in several cases that failure to move for the early
resolution of the preliminary investigation or similar reliefs before
the Ombudsman amounted to a virtual waiver of the constitutional
right.
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23. Following ​Dela Peña​, it is the duty of the respondent to bring to
the attention of the investigating officer the perceived inordinate
delay in the proceedings of the formal preliminary investigation.
d. Prejudice to the respondent
25. The length of the delay and the justification proffered by the
investigating officer therefore would necessarily be
counterbalanced against any prejudice suffered by the respondent.
26. Reasonable deferment of the proceedings may be allowed or
tolerated to the end that cases may be adjudged only after full and
free presentation of evidence by all the parties, especially where
the deferment would cause no substantial prejudice to any party.
27. In the macro-perspective, it is not only the respondent who stands
to suffer prejudice from any delay in the investigation of his case.
For inordinate delays likewise makes it difficult for the
prosecution to perform its bounden duty to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt when the case is filed in court.
28. It is for the Courts then to determine who between the two parties
was placed at a greater disadvantage by the delay in the
investigation.
​Time frame for resolution of criminal complaint
29. The Ombudsman has the power to formulate its own rules on
pleading and procedure. All these controversies surrounding
inordinate delay can easily be avoided had it prescribed a rule on
the disposition period for the investigating graft officer to resolve
the preliminary investigation of the formal complaints.
Application in the case at bar
1. The Court ​must first determine the extent of the delay in the
conduct of the preliminary investigation before the Ombudsman.
The Court deem the case against petitioner initiated on January 7,
2011, when the PACPO-OMB-Visayas led a formal complaint
against petitioner.
2. The fact- finding investigation, having preceded the filing of the
formal complaint, is excluded in computing the duration of the
delay. Thus, petitioner's preliminary investigation lasted for about
5 years and 3 months from the date of the filing of the formal
complaint, and 5 years and 2 months from when petitioner was
ordered to file his counter-affidavit.
3. Since the duration of the preliminary investigation is excessive, it
is incumbent then on the prosecution to justify the delay.
4. The prosecution provided that there were 10 respondents in the
complaint led with the OMB and each of them was afforded the
right to explain themselves and that the records of the case were
allegedly voluminous that entailed considerable time to study and
analyze. However, these ​reasons do not sufficiently explain the
more than five-year long preliminary investigation​​.
5. No clarificatory hearing or further investigation was conducted
that could have added a new dimension to the case.
7. The prosecution did not offer any acceptable explanation for the
gap between February 15, 2011 and April 15, 2016. Contrary to
the finding of the Sandiganbayan, there is a hiatus on the part of
the Ombudsman during this period. ​Left unsatisfactorily
explained, this amounts to a violation of petitioner's
constitutional right to a speedy disposition of case​​, corollarily
warranting the dismissal of the criminal case against him.
9. The plea for dismissal cannot be premised on the finding that the
instant criminal complaints were not politically-motivated unlike
in ​Tatad.​
10. Duterte had modified the ruling to the effect that the Court is now
agnostic of whether or not the political strong-arm is being flexed
to prosecute the accused. That the filing of the criminal complaint
is ill-motivated is not a requisite before the right to a speedy
disposition of a case can be invoked.
11. Magante's ​alleged failure to assert his right is not a veritable
ground for the denial of the motion in the absence of any
motion, pleading, or act on his part that contributed to the
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delay​​. It is not for him to ensure that the wheels of justice continue
to turn but for the State to guarantee that the case is disposed
within a reasonable period. It is sufficient that he raised the
constitutional infraction prior to his arraignment before the
Sandiganbayan.
12. Neither can petitioner be deemed to have waived his right to a
speedy disposition of a case when he led a motion for
reconsideration against an adverse resolution of the Ombudsman.
The filing of this singular motion cannot by itself be considered
as active participation in the preliminary investigation
proceeding that amounted to a waiver of a constitutional right.
13. There could have been ​no grave prejudice suffered by the State
from the delay ​since the criminal charges for falsification of
public documents and splitting of contracts are offenses that
chiefly rely on the presentation of documentary evidence that, at
this point, has already formed part of the records of the case.

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2. Cagang v. Sandiganbayan (Fifth) (Rhald) The Supreme Court said that there was delay but there is no violation of the
July 31, 2018 | Leonen, J. | Right to speedy disposition of cases (inordinate accused's right to speedy disposition of cases considering that there was a waiver
delay) of the delay of a complex case. Admittedly, while there was delay, petitioner has
not shown that he asserted his rights during this period, choosing instead to wait
PETITIONERS: ​Cesar Matas Cagang until the information was filed against him with the Sandiganbayan.
RESPONDENTS: ​ Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division
DOCTRINE​​:
SUMMARY: ​[​This case is long. A lot of facts and block quotes (plus the fact 1. First, the right to speedy disposition of cases is different from the right
that it’s written by Leonen).]
to speedy trial. While the rationale for both rights is the same, the right
This is a consolidation of three cases involving the same accused. Accused is
to speedy trial may only be invoked in criminal prosecutions against
charged with violation of RA 3019 and Malversation of Public Funds. Cadang,
courts of law. The right to speedy disposition of cases, however, may
the Governor of Sarranggani, and a handful of officers of the Provincial Office
be invoked before any tribunal, whether judicial or quasi-judicial.
of Saranggani were charged with Malversation of Public Funds through an
2. Second, a case is deemed initiated upon the filing of a formal complaint
anonymous complaint. So an investigation by COA started. It was later found
prior to a conduct of a preliminary investigation. This Court
out the the embezzlement was done in conspiracy with Brgy. Captain
acknowledges, however, that the Ombudsman should set reasonable
Macagcalat and Mangalen (President and Treasurer of Kamaga Muslim
periods for preliminary investigation, with due regard to the
Christian Fishermen’s Cooperative. They made it appear that funds were
complexities and nuances of each case. Delays beyond this period will
extended to the Cooperative but in reality, there was none. The criminal
be taken against the prosecution. The period taken for fact-finding
complaint against petitioner was filed on ​February 10, 2003​​. On ​August 11,
investigations prior to the filing of the formal complaint shall not be
2004​​, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a Resolution finding probable cause
included in the determination of whether there has been inordinate
against petitioner. This Resolution, however, was modified by the Resolution
delay.
dated ​October 18, 2004​​, which ordered the conduct of further fact-finding
3. Third, courts must first determine which party carries the burden of
investigation against some of the other respondents in the case. This further
proof. If the right is invoked within the given time periods contained in
fact-finding was resolved by the Office of the Ombudsman on ​April 12, 2005.
current Supreme Court resolutions and circulars, 171 and the time
On ​August 8, 2011​​, or six (6) years after the recommendation to file
periods that will be promulgated by the Office of the Ombudsman, the
informations against petitioner was approved by Tanodbayan Marcelo, Assistant
defense has the burden of proving that the right was justifiably invoked.
Special Prosecutor II Pilarita T. Lapitan submitted the informations for
a. If the defense has the burden of proof, it must prove first,
Ombudsman Carpio Morales' review. Informations against petitioner were filed
whether the case is motivated by malice or clearly only
on ​November 17, 2011​​. Cagang filed a Motion to Quash/Dismiss with Prayer to
politically motivated and is attended by utter lack of evidence,
Void and Set Aside Order of Arrest while Macagcalat and Mangalen separately
and second, that the defense did not contribute to the delay.
filed their own Motion to Quash/Dismiss with Prayer to Void and Set Aside
b. Once the burden of proof shifts to the prosecution, the
Order of Arrest Cagang argued ​that there was an inordinate delay of seven (7)
prosecution must prove first, that it followed the prescribed
years in the filing of the Informations. ​The issue is was whether there was a
procedure in the conduct of preliminary investigation and in
delay and whether the accused’s right to speedy disposition of cases violated.

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the prosecution of the case; second, that the complexity of the
issues and the volume of evidence made the delay inevitable;
and third, that no prejudice was suffered by the accused as a
result of the delay.
4. Fourth, determination of the length of delay is never mechanical. Courts
must consider the entire context of the case, from the amount of
evidence to be weighed to the simplicity or complexity of the issues
raised.
a. An exception to this rule is if there is an allegation that the
prosecution of the case was solely motivated by malice, such
as when the case is politically motivated or when there is
continued prosecution despite utter lack of evidence.
Malicious intent may be gauged from the behavior of the
prosecution throughout the proceedings. If malicious
prosecution is properly alleged and substantially proven, the
case would automatically be dismissed without need of further
analysis of the delay.
b. Another exception would be the waiver of the accused to the
right to speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial.
If it can be proven that the accused acquiesced to the delay, the
constitutional right can no longer be invoked.
5. Fifth, the right to speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial
must be timely raised. The respondent or the accused must file the
appropriate motion upon the lapse of the statutory or procedural
periods. Otherwise, they are deemed to have waived their right to
speedy disposition of cases.
FACTS:
1. This is a consolidation of 3 cases before the Supreme Court. Same
accused: Cesar Matas Cagang, the provincial treasurer of the
Provincial Government of Saranggani.
2. [First two cases] Cagang is appealing the Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan when it did not grant his Motion to Quash/Dismiss
with Prayer to Void and Set Aside Order of Arrest in Criminal
Case Nos. SB-11-CRIM-0456 and SB-11-CRM-0457.
3. [Third case] Cagang’s petition for Certiorari with an urgent prayer
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injuction assailing Resolutions of Sandiganbayan.
4. All the Petitions questions the Sandiganbayan’s denial to quash the
Informations and Order of Arrest against Cagang despite the
Office of the Ombudsman’s alleged inordinate delay.
5. On February 10 2003, On February 10, 2003, the Office of the
Ombudsman received an anonymous complaint alleging that
Amelia May Constantino, Mary Ann Gadian, and Joy Tangan of
the Vice Governor's Office, Sarangani Province committed graft
and corruption by diverting public funds given as grants or aid
using barangay officials and cooperatives as "dummies."
6. On December 31, 2002, the Commission on Audit submitted its
audit report finding that the officials and employees of the
Provincial Government of Sarangani appear to have embezzled
millions in public funds by sourcing out the funds from grants, aid,
and the Countrywide Development Fund of Representative Erwin
Chiongbian using dummy cooperatives and people's organizations.
7. COA found the following:
a. Releases of financial assistance intended for
nongovernmental organizations/people's organizations
and local government units that were fraudulently and
illegally made through inexistent local development
projects, resulting in a loss of P16,106,613.00.
b. Financial assistance was granted to cooperatives whose
officials
and members were government personnel or relatives of
officials
of Sarangani. (P2,456,481.00)
c. Fraudulent encashment and payment of checks, and
frequent travels of the employees of the Vice Governor's
Office. (P83,212.34)
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d. Inexistent Sagiptaniman projects were set up for farmers
affected by calamities, which resulted in wastage and
misuse of government funds amounting to P4,000,000.00.
8. The Ombudsman issued a Joint Order terminating the cases. It
concurred with COA and recommended that a criminal case for
Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public
Documents and Violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 ​be filed
against public officers named by COA.
9. The list involved 180 accused.
10. Ombusman had to identify the accused who appeared the most
responsible.
11. The accused were directed to file their counter-affidavits and
submit controlling evidence.
12. All of the accused (elective and appointive alike) filed a Petition
for Prohibition, Mandamus, injunction with Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order with Brach 28, RTC
of Alabel Saranggani.
13. The RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the
Office of the Ombudsman from enforcing its October 29, 2003
Joint Order.
14. In an Order dated December 19, 2003, the RTC dismissed the
Petition on the ground that the officials had filed another similar
Petition with the Supreme Court, which the SC had dismissed.
Thus, some of the accused filed their counter-affidavits.
15. After what the Office of the Ombudsman referred to as "a
considerable period of time," it issued another Order directing the
accused who had not yet filed their counter-affidavits to file them
within seven (7) days or they will be deemed to have waived their
right to present evidence on their behalf.
16. The Ombudsman found probable cause to charge ​Governor
Miguel D. Escobar, ​Vice Governor Felipe Constantino, ​Board
Members​​, and ​several employees of the Office of the Vice
Governor of Sarangani and the Office of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan with Malversation through Falsification of Public
Documents and Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No.
3019.
17. Tanodbayan Simeon Marcelo ordered the conduct of further
fact-finding investigations on some of the other accused in the
case. Thus, a preliminary investigation docketed as
OMB-M-C-0480-K was conducted on accused Hadji Moner
Mangalen (Mangalen) and Umbra Macagcalat (Macagcalat).
18. In the meantime, the Office of the Ombudsman filed an
Information dated July 12, 2005, charging Miguel Draculan
Escobar ​(Governor)​​, Margie Purisima ​Rudes (Board Member)​​,
Perla Cabilin ​Maglinte (Provincial Administrator)​​, Maria
Deposo ​Camanay (Provincial Accountant)​​, and Cesar Matas
Cagang (Provincial Treasurer) of Malversation of Public Funds
thru Falsification of Public Documents.
a. Amount of P375,000.00 by encashment through a DBP
check.
19. June 17, 2010​: Gov. Escobar, Provincial Adminin. Magligante, and
Prov. Treasurer Cagang pleaded not guilty. Board Member Rudes
and Prov. Accountant Camanay remianed at large.
20. Escobar, Magligante, Cagang found not guilty for insufficiency of
evidence. Case of Rudes and Camanay were archived for
Sandiganbayan’s inability to acquire jurisdiction over them.
21. August 8, 2011: Omb. Carpio-Morales found probable cause to
charge Mangalen and Macagcalat with Malversation of Public
Funds through Falsification and Violation of Section 3( e) of
Republic Act No. 3019.
a. A certain Mary Ann Gadian was made as a State witness
regarding the cases of malversation in the Pronvince of
Saranggani.(Later on it was said that Ombudsman said
that one of the reasons of the delay was ascertaining
whether may serve as a state witness)
b. Felipe Constantino was found to be dead. (Later on,
Ombudsman said that one reason for the delay was their
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verification of Constatino’s death; because if he’s alive,
he would have been included in the charge).
22. November 17, 2011: Omb. Carpio-Morales approved
recommendation and filed information against Cagang, Camanay,
Macagcalat, Mangalen. (See FACT # 21; so the previously charged
people plus Macagcalat and Mangalen this time pursuant to Omb’s
finding of probable cause)
a. They are charged for violating the following:
i. Section 3(e) of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act)
ii. Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification
of Public Documents.
b. The information provides that the accused conspired with
Brgy. Captain Macagcalat and Mangalen (President and
Treasurer of Kamaga Muslim Christian Fishermen’s
Cooperative (Cooperative)).
i. “ x x x to make it appear that financial assistance
was requested and given to the Cooperative,
when in truth and in fact, neither was there a
request for financial assistance received by the
said Cooperative after the check was encashed,
as herein accused, conspiring and confederating
with each other, did then and there malverse,
embezzle, misappropriate and convert to their
own personal use and benefit the said amount of
P350,000.00 thereby causing undue injury to the
government in the aforesaid amount”
23. Cagang filed a Motion to Quash/Dismiss with Prayer to Void and
Set Aside Order of Arrest while Macagcalat and Mangalen
separately filed their own Motion to Quash/Dismiss with Prayer to
Void and Set Aside Order of Arrest Cagang argued ​that there was
an inordinate delay of seven (7) years in the filing of the
Informations​​. Citing Tatad v. Sandiganbayan and Roque v.
Ombudsman, he argued that the delay violated his constitutional
rights to due process and to speedy disposition of cases. (This case
heavily cited Tatad v. Sandiganbayan).
24. Prosecution: Argues that the accused have not yet submitted
themselves to the jurisdiction of the court and that there was no
showing that delay in the filing was intentional, capricious,
whimsical, or motivated by personal reasons.
25. September 10, 2012: ​Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying
the Motions to Quash/Dismiss.
a. It found that Cagang, Macagcalat, and Mangalen
voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court by
the filing of the motions.
b. It also found that there was no inordinate delay in the
issuance of the information, considering that 40
different individuals were involved with direct
participation in more or less 81 different transactions.
c. Accordingly, ​Tatad is not applicable ​because the filing
of the Informations was ​not politically motivated​​.
d. It pointed out that ​the accused did not invoke their right
to speedy disposition of cases ​before t​ he Office of the
Ombudsman but only did so after the filing of the
Informations.
e. Cagang filed for an MR; it was denied.
26. G.R. Nos. 206438 and 206458:
a. Cagang filed for a Petition for Certiorari before the SC
(concerning FACTS # 25)
27. G.R. Nos. 210141-42:
a. June 13, 2013: Cagang filed an Urgent Motion to Quash
Order of Arrest. Cagang alleged that an Order of Arrest
was issued against him. He moved for the quashal of the
Order on the ground that he had a pending Petition for
Certiorari before this Court.
b. June 28. 2013: Sandiganbayan denied the Urgent Motion
on the ground that it failed to comply with the three
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(3)-day notice rule and that no temporary restraining order
was issued by this Court. (See FACT #27a)
c. September 10, 2013: Sandiganbayan denied MR.
d. Cagang filed for a TRO in SC.
e. February 5, 2014: SC granted the TRO enjoining the
Sandiganbayan from continuing with the proceedings of
the case and from implementing the warrant of arrest
against Cagang.
28. After granting the TRO (FACT #27e), SC consolidated the cases.
29. Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion when:
a. It dismissed his Motion to Quash/Dismiss since the
Informations filed against him violated his constitutional
rights to due process and to speedy disposition of cases.
b. Citing Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, Cagang argues that the
Office of the Ombudsman lost its jurisdiction to file the
cases in view of its inordinate delay in terminating the
preliminary investigation almost seven (7) years after the
filing of the complaint.
c. This delay violates Article III, Section 16 of the
Constitution and Rule 112, Section 3(f) of the Rules of
Court.
d. He points out that the Sandiganbayan overlooked two
(2) instances of delay by the Office of the
Ombudsman​​:
i. The filing of the complaint on February 10, 2003
to the filing of the Informations on November
17, 2011. (7 years)
ii. The conclusion of the preliminary investigation
in 2005 to the filing of the Informations on
November 1 7, 2011.
e. Cagang stated that the it has already been investigated by
the Commission on Audit in its Audit Report; thus, the
Office of the Ombudsman should not have taken more
than seven (7) years to study the evidence needed to
establish probable cause.
f. Petitioner likewise emphasizes that the Sandiganbayan
should have granted his Motion to Quash Order of Arrest
since there was a pending Petition before this Court
questioning the issuance of the Informations against him.
He argues that the case would become moot if the Order
of Arrest is not quashed
30. Prosecution’s defense:
a. Petitioner should have invoked his right to speedy
disposition of cases when the case was still pending
before the Office of the Ombudsman, not when the
Information was already filed with the Sandiganbayan.
b. Tatad was inapplicable since there were peculiar
circumstances which prompted this Court to dismiss the
information due to inordinate delay.
c. It points out that a petition for certiorari is not the proper
remedy to question the denial of a motion to quash and
that the appropriate remedy should be to proceed to trial.
ISSUE:
PROCEDURAL:
1. Whether or not the pendency of a petition for certiorari with this
Court suspends the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan. ​No, it
will not prevent the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with the
case absent the issuance of TRO or writ of preliminary
injunction.
2. Whether or not the denial of a motion to quash may be the subject
of a petition for certiorari. ​No.
SUBSTANTIVE:
1. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying petitioner Cesar Matas Cagang's Motion to
Quash/Dismiss with Prayer to Void and Set Aside Order of Arrest
and Urgent Motion to Quash Order of Arrest on the ground of
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inordinate delay. ​There was delay BUT there is no violation of
the accused's right to speedy disposition of cases considering
that there was a waiver of the delay of a complex case.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Temporary Restraining
Order dated February 5, 2014 is LIFTED. The Sandiganbayan is
DIRECTED to resolve Case No. SB-ll-CRM-0456 and Case No. SB-11-
CRM-0457 with due and deliberate dispatch.
RATIO:
ISSUE # 1 & 2 (PROCEDURAL):
1. Contrary to petitioner's arguments, the pendency of a petition for
certiorari before this Court will not prevent the Sandiganbayan
from proceeding to trial absent the issuance of a temporary
restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction
2. Since this Comi did not issue injunctive relief when the Petition in
G.R. Nos. 206438 and 206458 (FACT # was filed, the
Sandiganbayan cannot be faulted from proceeding with trial.
3. As a general rule, the denial of a motion to quash is not appealable
as it is merely interlocutory. Likewise, it cannot be the subject of a
petition for certiorari.
4. The adequate, plain, and speedy remedy is to ​proceed to trial
and to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.
5. A party may, however, question the denial in a petition for
certiorari if the party can establish that the denial was tainted
with grave abuse of discretion​​.
ISSUE # 3 (SUBSTANTIVE):
1. The right to a speedy trial is invoked against the courts in a
criminal prosecution.
2. The right to speedy disposition of cases, however, is invoked even
against quasi-judicial or administrative bodies in civil, criminal, or
administrative cases before them.
3. Neither the Constitution nor Republic Act No. 6770 provide for
a specific period within which to measure promptness​​. Neither
do they provide for criteria within which to determine what could
already be considered as delay in the disposition of complaints.
Thus, ​judicial interpretation became necessary to determine
what could be considered "prompt" and what length of time
could amount to unreasonable or "inordinate delay."
4. The concept of inordinate delay was introduced in ​Tatad v.
Sandiganbayan,​ where this Court was constrained to apply the
“radical relief” of dismissing the criminal complaint against an
accused due to the delay in the termination of the preliminary
investigation.
5. So in ​Tatad v. Sandiganbayan​:
a. A report was submitted to the Legal Panel, Presidential
Security Command sometime in October 1974, ​charging
Francisco S. Tatad (Tatad) ​with ​graft and corruption
during his stint as Minister of Public Information.
b. Long story short: It was only a year after when he was
charged. Then only 3 years after is when the information
was approved by the Tanodbayan but Sandiganbayan still
asked them to amend the date of commission of the crime.
After the change of administration brought by EDSA
Revolution, the new Tanodbayan said that they’ll still
prosecute Tatad because his offense was against the State.
c. In deciding, the Supreme Court took note that the finding
of ordinate delay applied on a case-to-case basis.
d. This Court found that there were peculiar circumstances
which attended the preliminary investigation of the
complaint, the most blatant of which was that the 1974
report ​against Tatad was only acted upon by the
Tanodbayan when Tatad had a falling out with
President Marcos in 1979.
e. Thus, the delay of three (3) years in the tennination of the
preliminary investigation was found to have been
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 BLOCK A 2021 | CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | Atty. Arroyo
inordinate delay, which was violative of petitioner's
constitutional rights.
6. Political motivation, however, is merely one of the circumstances
to be factored in when determining whether the delay is inordinate.
(Leonen goes on citing A LOT of cases which used Tatad as the
standard)
7. This Court, however, emphasized that "[a] mere mathematical
reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient" to rule that there
was inordinate delay.
8. Despite the promulgation of Tatad, however, this Court struggled
to apply a standard test within which to determine the presence of
inordinate delay. The SC introduced another test called the
“balancing test.”
9. The ​Barker balancing test provides that courts must consider the
following factors when determining the existence of inordinate
delay.
a. First, the length of delay;
b. Second, the reason for delay;
c. Third, the defendant's assertion or non-asse1iion of his or
her right;
d. Fourth, the prejudice to the defendant as a result of the
delay.
(Again, Leonen goes on citing A LOT of cases which used this
Baker balancing test.)
10. Then, SC applied ​both the Tatad doctrine and the Barker balancing
test in the 1991 case of Gonzales v. Sandiganbayan.
11. Determining the length of delay necessarily involves a query on
when a case is deemed to have commenced.
12. In Dans al v. Fernandez, this Court recognized that the right to
speedy disposition of cases does not only include the period from
which a case is submitted for resolution. Rather, ​it covers the
entire period of investigation even before trial. Thus, the right
may be invoked as early as the preliminary investigation or
inquest.
13. (A LOT OF BLOCK QUOTES STATING LAWS THAT
MANDATE SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES; I INCLUDED
A FEW)
a. The Speedy Trial Act of 1998 provides that the entire trial
period must not exceed 180 days, except as otherwise
provided for by this Court.
i. The law likewise provides for a time limit of 30
days from the filing of the information to
conduct the arraignment, and 30 days after
arraignment for trial to commence.
b. Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98
i. The time limit with respect to the period from
arraignment to trial imposed by said provision
shall be one hundred eighty (180) days. For the
second twelve-month period, the time limit shall
be one hundred twenty (120) days, and for the
third twelve-month period the time limit shall be
eighty (80) days.
14. A ​dilemma arises as to whether the period includes
proceedings in quasi-judicial agencies before a formal
complaint is actually filed. The Office of the Ombudsman, for
example, has no set periods within which to conduct its
fact-finding investigations.
15. They are only mandated to act promptly. Thus, in People v.
Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, ​this Court stated ​that a
fact-finding investigation conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman should not be deemed separate from preliminary
investigation for the purposes of determining whether there
was a violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases​​.
a. RE-EXAMINATION OF PEOPLE V.
SANDIGANBAYAN, FIFTH DIVISION.
b. When an anonymous complaint is filed or the Office of
the Ombudsman conducts a motu proprio fact-finding
investigation, ​the proceedings are not yet adversarial.
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 BLOCK A 2021 | CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | Atty. Arroyo
Even if the accused is invited to attend these
investigations, ​this period cannot be counted since
these are merely preparatory to the filing of a formal
complaint​​. At this point, the Office of the Ombudsman
will not yet determine if there is probable cause to charge
the accused.
c. The period of investigation will not be counted in the
determination of whether the right to speedy
disposition of cases was violated.
d. Thus, this Court now holds that for the purpose of
determining whether inordinate delay exists, ​a case is
deemed to have commenced from the filing of the
formal complaint and the subsequent conduct of the
preliminary investigation.
16. For the court to appreciate a violation of the right to speedy
disposition of cases, delay must not be attributable to the defense.
17. Certain unreasonable actions by the accused will be taken against
them. This includes delaying tactics like failing to appear despite
summons, filing needless motions against interlocutory actions, or
requesting unnecessary postponements that will prevent courts or
tribunals to properly adjudicate the case. When proven, this may
constitute a waiver of the right to speedy trial or the right to speedy
disposition of cases.
18. So in this case, there is no showing that this case was attended by
malice. There is no evidence that it was politically motivated.
19. The criminal complaint against petitioner was filed on ​February
10, 2003​​. On ​August 11, 2004​​, the Office of the Ombudsman
issued a Resolution finding probable cause against petitioner. This
Resolution, however, was modified by the Resolution dated
October 18, 2004​​, which ordered the conduct of further
fact-finding investigation against some of the other respondents in
the case. This further fact-finding was resolved by the Office of the
Ombudsman on ​April 12, 2005. On ​August 8, 2011​​, or six (6)
years after the recommendation to file infonnations against
petitioner was approved by Tanodbayan Marcelo, Assistant Special
Prosecutor II Pilarita T. Lapitan submitted the informations for
Ombudsman Carpio Morales' review. Informations against
petitioner were filed on ​November 17, 2011​​.
20. Six (6) years is beyond the reasonable period of fact-finding of
ninety (90) days. The burden of proving the justification of the
delay, therefore, is on the prosecution, or in this case, respondent.
21. Respondent alleged that the delay in the filing of the informations
was justified since it was still determining whether accused Mary
Ann Gadian (Gadian) could be utilized as a state witness and it still
had to verify accused Felipe Constantino's death. The
recommendation, however, to utilize Gadian as a state witness was
approved by Tanodbayan Marcelo on December 20, 2004. Felipe
Constantino's death was verified by the Sandiganbayan in its
November 14, 2006 Order.
22. Admittedly, while there was delay, petitioner has not shown
that he asserted his rights during this period, choosing instead
to wait until the information was filed against him with the
Sandiganbayan​​.
23. The records of the case show that the transactions investigated are
complex and numerous. As respondent points out, there were over
a hundred individuals investigated, and eventually, 40 of them
were determined to have been involved in 81 different anomalous
transactions.
24. This Court finds that there is no violation of the accused's right
to speedy disposition of cases considering that there was a
waiver of the delay of a complex case.
 
 
 
 
 
 
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 BLOCK A 2021 | CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | Atty. Arroyo
3. People v. Sandiganbayan (Brian)
DOCTRINE​​: A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not
April 16, 2018 | Tijam, J. | Right to speedy disposition of cases
sufficient. The right to speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial,
is deemed violated only:
PETITIONERS: ​People of the Philippines
RESPONDENTS: Sandiganbayan 4​th Division, Alejandro Gamos, Rosalyn
Gile
SUMMARY: ​On February 18, 2008, a complaint was filed against former Sta.
Magdalena, Sorsogon Mayor Alejandro E. Gamos (Gamos), Municipal
Accountant Rosalyn E. Gile (Gile), and Municipal Treasurer Virginia E. Laco
(Laco) for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. On March 30,
2015, two Informations for malversation of public funds were filed against
Gamos, Gile, and Laco before the Sandiganbayan. ​On February 1, 2017, the
Sandiganbayan issued its assailed Resolution, dismissing the cases, on the
ground of delay, depriving the respondents-accused Gamos, Gile and Laco of
their right to a speedy disposition of their cases. Sandiganbayan found that seven
years had passed since the filing of the First Complaint in 2008 until the filing of
the Informations before it. The issue in this case is whether or not the
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the cases
before it on the ground of delay. ​Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. The
conduct of both the prosecution and defendant are weighed apropos the four-fold
factors, to wit: (1) length of the delay; (2) reason for the delay; (3) defendant's
assertion or non-assertion of his right; and (4) prejudice to defendant resulting
from the delay.
It is not unreasonable for the investigating officer to embark into the detailed
investigation of the cases. As alleged, there were 63 cash advance transactions in
the two complaints to investigated upon, covering the period of 2004 to 2007.
There is nothing on record that would show that respondents asserted this right
to speedy disposition during the OMB proceedings when they alleged that the
delay occurred. In fact, it took respondents one year and eight months after the
Informations were filed before the court a quo on March 30, 2015 before they
finally asserted such right in their Motion to Dismiss. Neither was there a
considerable prejudice caused by a delay upon the respondents. Respondents
were practically not made to undergo any investigative proceeding prior to the
COA's response to respondents' request for the review of the audit reports upon
which the complaints were anchored.
● when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays; or
● when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured;
● when without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is
allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.
FACTS: Take note of the dates underlined!
1. Two separate complaints were filed against ​Gamos, Gile and
Laco for violation of ​Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019 ​and of ​Art. 217 of
1
RPC from alleged illegal cash advances.
a. Gamos is the former Sta. Magdalena Sorsogon Mayor;
Gile is the Municipal Accountant; ​Laco is the Municipal
Treasurer
2. February 18, 2008​​: ​First complaint ​was filed before Deputy
Ombudsman Luzon by Jocelyn Gallanosa and Joselito Robillos
(both are Sangguniang Bayan Members). They alleged that the
three accused, in conspiracy with each other, made illegal cash
advances in the total amount of P6,380,725.84 in 2004 and 2006,
as per COA Audit Observation Memorandum.
3. March 31, 2008​: ​Gamos, Gije, and Laco were directed to submit
counter-affidavits but they filed motion for extension of time to
file.
4. May 12, 2008: ​The 3 accused filed their counter-affidavits,
praying for the dismissal of the cases for being malicious, baseless,
and premature.
a. In return, in August 2009, Gallanosa filed a Manifestation
and Urgent Motion for Preventive Suspension.
5. December 3, 2009: ​Gallanosa filed ​a Second Complaint against
the three accused. She alleged that the three accused, in conspiracy
1
Malversation of public funds 
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 BLOCK A 2021 | CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | Atty. Arroyo
with each other, made illegal cash advances amounting to
P2,226,500 made in Jan-May 2007.
a. Gallanosa was the elected-mayor during this time.
6. February 23, 2010: ​The three accused were directed to file their
counter-affidavits to the Second Complaint. Accused, once again,
filed motions for extension of time to file their counter-affidavits.
7. May 7, 2010: The three-accused filed their counter-affidavit for
the second complaint asking for its dismissal.
8. September 1, 2010: Gamos filed a Comment/Opposition to the
earlier motion praying for his preventive suspension (Fact 4a)
9. October 7, 2010: The three accused file ​an Ex-parte
manifestation and motion to Admit Letter to COA Chairman
requesting for the review of the audit reports on which the
complaints were based.
10. October 19, 2010 OMB Resolution​​: OMB Investigation officer
found that it is ​premature to determine criminal and
administrative liabilities as the COA audit reports​​, wherein the
complaints were based, ​were not yet final​.​
a. Recommended for the dismissal of the complaints
without prejudice to the outcome of review requested
by the three accused (Fact 9) and to the refiling of the
complaints if circumstances warrant.
11. OMB Resolution ​(Fact 10) were only approved ​on May 17, 2011
by Acting OMB Casimiro.
a. Reason: ​delay was caused by the resignation of Deputy
OMB for Luzon Jalandoni and OMB Gutierrez.
12. Gallanosa and Robillos (Complainants) moved for motion for
reconsideration of OMB Resolution. This was received by OMB
Luzon ​on July 7, 2011​​. The three accused were only able to file
their Comment-Opposition to the Motion ​on December 5, 2011
after requesting for motion for extension
13. January 9, 2012: ​OMB-Luzon received Gallanosa and Robillos’
Position Paper, wherein the COA Chairman’s Letter dated Sep.
2010 was attached, which effectively denies the request for the
review of the audit report.
14. June 13, 2013​​: ​Gallanosa and Robillos ​MR (fact 12) ​was finally
resolved, granting the same​. There was a finding of probable
cause to indict Gamos, Gile and Laco for malversation of public
funds
15. Gamos MR was received by OMB Luzon in Februray 2014 but
was denied in June 2014. OMB approved the denial of Gamos’
MR in February 2015.
16. March 30, 2015​​: Two informations for malversation of public
funds were filed against Gamos, Gile, and Laco before the
Sandiganbayan.
17. For several times, Gamos failed to appear before the said court for
his arraignment despite notice. As such, Sandiganbayan issued a
Resolution directing Gamos to show cause why he should not be
cited in contempt.
18. November 22, 2016: ​Gamos and Giles filed Motion to Dimiss ​on
the ground of capricious and vexatious delay in the OMB’s
conduct of preliminary investigation to the damage and prejudice
of the accused.
19. Sandiganbayan: dismissed the cases on the ground of delay,
depriving the three-accused of their right to speedy disposition of
their cases.
a. Seven years had passed since the filing of the first
complaint.
b. While the accused may have contributed to the delay for
filing several motions for extension, the OMB took 2
years to act upon the complaints.
i. OMB investigating officer issued resolution in
October 2010 but was only approved in May
2011 (Fact 10 &11)
c. The resignations of the Deputy OMB and OMB were not
justifiable reasons for the delay.
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 BLOCK A 2021 | CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | Atty. Arroyo
d. The OMB Investigating officer took another 2 years in
granting the MR filed by Gallanosa and Robillos (Fact
14) and the delay was not satisfactorily explained by the
prosecution.
20. Hence, this petition. People imputes grave abuse of discretion
against the Sandiganbayan in dismissing the cases on the ground of
delay.
ISSUE:
1. Was there a violation of Gamos and Gile’s right to speedy
disposition of their cases to warrant the dismissal thereof? – NONE
2. WoN this petition shall be dismissed based on double jeopardy? –
NO
RULING: ​Petition is GRANTED. Sandiganbayan’s resolution (Fact 19) is
hereby REVERSED.
RATIO:
1. Section 16, Art. 3 of the Constitution declares: All persons shall
have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all
judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies.
2. But​​, the Court has held that this right is a flexible concept. ​A mere
mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient.
3. The right to speedy disposition of a case, like the right to
speedy trial, is deemed violated ​only:
a. when the proceeding is attended by vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays; or
b. when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked
for and secured; or
c. when without cause or justifiable motive, a long period
of time is allowed to elapse without the party having
his case tried.
4. In determining whether this right is violation, ​the balancing test
must be applied. Balancing test weighs the conduct of both the
prosecution and defendant. Their conducts are weighed according
to these four factors:
a. Length ​of delay
b. Reason ​for delay
c. Defendant’s assertion or non-assertion of this right
d. Prejudice ​to the defendant as a result of the delay.
5. Sandiganbayan’s conclusion that the right was violated because the
OMB took 7 years to resolve from the filing of the first complaint
is not well-taken.
6. Based from the series of events and circumstances that happened,
no delay was contemplated.
a. First Complaint was filed on Feb. 18, 2008. ​By March 1,
2008, OMB already acted on complaint by directing the
accused to respond.
b. April-June of the same year, pleadings from both parties
were filed.
c. Pending this, the second complaint was filed. Again, there
were exchanges of pleadings filed.
d. OMB investigating officer issued October 2010
Resolution recommending for the dismissal of the cases
based on prematurity.
e. In view of the consecutive resignations of Deputy OMB
and OMB, the Resolution was only approved on May 17,
2011 or 11 days after the former OMB’s resignation.
f. Gallanosa and Robillos’ MR was filed followed by the
submission of COA Chairman’s letter-response to the
accused’s request for review of COA’s audit reports,
informing the accused of denial of their request.
7. The Court does not find it unreasonable for the investigating
officer to embark into the detailed investigation of the cases.
8. Allegedly, there were 63 cash advance transactions in the
complaints to be investigated on, covering periods from
2004-2007. ​It took the investigating officer only 1 year and 3
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 BLOCK A 2021 | CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | Atty. Arroyo

months from the receipt of last pleading to conclude the

investigation​​ and find probable cause against respondents.
9. This Court takes judicial notice of the fact that these cases are not
the only ones pending before the OMB. ​The Sandiganbayan
merely ventured into a mathematical computation of the
period from the filing of the First complaint up to the filing of the
Informations before it.
10. The concept of speedy trial or speedy disposition of cases for that
matter is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.
11. Another essential matter disregarded by the Sandiganbayan is
the fact that there is nothing on record that would show that
the respondents asserted this right to speedy disposition during
the OMB proceedings.
a. It took respondents 1 year and 8 months after the
Informations were filed before they asserted this right in
their Motion to Dismiss.
12. Neither was there a considerable prejudice caused by a delay upon
the accused. Accused were practically not made to undergo any
investigative proceeding prior to COA’s response to their request
for review.
13. Hence, the investigating officer recommended the dismissal of the
complaints as it was premature. In fact, upon COA’s denial of such
request, the investigating officer started the investigation.
14. The determination of whether or not there was delay in the
investigation proceedings cannot be indiscriminately reckoned
form the filing of the first complaint.
15. In this case, there is no allegation, much less proof, that
respondents were persecuted, oppressed, or made to undergo any
vexatious process such as in the above-cited cases, during the
investigation period before the filing of the Informations.
16. What the Constitution prohibits

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17. are unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays which dismissed at respondent-accused’s insistence, thus, with their
render rights nugatory. express consent.
23. In the resolution of this case, the Court has to take into
On matters raised by the respondents-accused in their consideration not only the rights of the respondents as accused
Comment/Opposition but also the equally important right of the State to due process
Gamos and Gile argued that the instant petition should be dismissed as it and/or to prosecute offenses.
effectively put them in jeopardy and also for being filed out of time. The 24. The Sandiganbayan's indiscriminate and erroneous dismissal of the
motion for reconsideration was unnecessary and prohibited as the nature of cases deprived the People of a day in court. Rights are shields
an acquittal is final, immediately executory and unappealable. In addition, against abuses, not weapons, which may be wielded at any time
this petition was filed out of the 60-day prescriptive period; the prescriptive according to the holder's whims and caprices.
period should have been reckoned from the issuance of the Sandiganbayan 25. While no less than the Constitution guarantees the right of the
Resolution​, ​not from its receipt of the denial. accused to speedy disposition of cases, such right does not
preclude the rights of public justice, especially when
18. An order, decision, or resolution rendered with grave abuse of wrongfully asserted.
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction (GADALEJ)
is a void judgment. ​A void judgment is no judgment at all
legally and it can never become final.
19. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy to
annul Sandiganbayan’s resolution as it was issued with
GADALEJ.
20. Hence, since Sandiganbayan’s dismissal of the cases was void,
it is as if there was no acquittal or dismissal of the cases at all.
21. Double jeopardy also does not exist in this case. ​Double jeopardy
attaches only when the following elements concur:
a. Accused is ​charged under a complaint of Information
sufficient in form and substance to sustain their
conviction
b. Court ​has jurisdiction
c. Accused ​has been arraigned and has pleaded
d. He/she is ​convicted or acquitted ​or the case is ​dismissed
without his/her consent.
22. In this case, the order of dismissal was rendered by a court who
acted with GADALEJ; the three accused have not yet been
arraigned for their refusal to appear therein and the cases were

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4. Alva v. CA (Marian) 2. MR: Alva explained that he has a bail 2 duly approved by Judge
April 12, 2006 | J. Chico-Nazario | Rule 116, Sec 1 - Jurisdiction over Muro
person 3. 2002 Resolution - dismissed the appeal since Alva failed to
PETITIONER​​: Arnold Alva secure bond
RESPONDENTS​​: Hon. Court of Appeals 4. MR: Alva explained that he thought he was just asked to explain
SUMMARY​​: Alva was charged with estafa under par. 2a where he why there was no bond. Alva appended a Bond Endorsement
defrauded Veranga to pay to him P120k in exchange of a US Visa which showing that Bail 2 was extended up to May 2003
Alva knew to be false. A warrant was issued but retracted due to Alva’s 5. 2003 Resolution - disposed MR because Alva failed to submit
filing of bail approved by Hon. Bayhon (bail 1). ​Alva was arraigned himself to the custody of law & no valid bond
where he pled not guilty. Subsequently, Alva’s counsel filed a motion to Issue: WON Alva submitted himself to the court’s jurisdiction. - Yes.
cancel promulgation of RTC’s decision from May 5 to June 17 because of SC differentiated custody of the law & jurisdiction over the person (see
prior commitment but the RTC only moved it on May 19. Alva failed to doctrine).
show up on this date so the RTC promulgated its decision in absentia and 1. Alva correctly argues that he has been under the court’s
a bench warrant was issued. Alva was found guilty of the offense and jurisdiction evident from the numerous pleadings he submitted
sentenced to an imprisonment of 9-17 years. Appended to this decision is after the RTC’s decision
a personal bail bond secured by Mega Pacific Insurance Corp (Bail 2). On 2. However, he is not under the custody of the law because he was
the same day however, Alva’s Bail 1 was executed upon due to the not arrested nor is he detained.
bondsman’s failure to secure his presence on trial. The Chief of Warrant 3. *personal note, Rule 116, Sec 1g says that arraignment generally
and Subpoena then manifested that they were not able to serve the warrant happens 30 days after acquiring jurisdiction over person. Since
because it was out of their coverage area & Alva changed his address. Alva was arraigned, it follows that jurisdiction over him was
Alva then MR-ed thru registered mail. This is what happened at the RTC: acquired.
1. RTC declined to rule on the MR DOCTRINE:
2. Alva filed a Notice of Appeal - RTC declined to give due course
Custody of the Law Jurisdiction over Person
to this since it was filed out of time
3. Alva MR-ed again - granted in the interest of justice because Arrest or voluntary surrender. Arrest or voluntary appearance.
Alva, a non-lawyer, prepared his own paperworks. However, Literal custody over body of Lost only when case is terminated
RTC said that their decision was based on merits so they stick by accused. and exists despite escape.
their decision (convicting Alva of estafa) and ordered the records
be submitted to the CA In custody but not yet subject to Subject to jurisdiction but not in
jurisdiction​ when person files a custody​ when an accused escapes
On the CA:
motion to quash warrant before custody after his trial has
1. 2001 Resolution - asked Alva to show cause why appeal should trial commenced.
not be dismissed despite failure to secure bail bond for his
provisional liberty

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FACTS:
1. This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the 2 resolutions
of the CA
a. Resolution 1 dated Oct 2002 - dismissed the appeal
because Alva failed to post a new bond in compliance
with the 2001 CA Resolution
b. Resolution 2 dated Feb 2003 - Alva failed to submit
himself to the jurisdiction of the court or under custody of
law since his conviction in 1999
c. These resolutions dismissed Alva’s appeal of the RTC’s
decision convicting him due to his failure to post a new
bail bond to secure his provisional liberty on appeal
2. An information charged Alva of estafa under Art 315, par 2a of the
RPC
a. On Oct to December 1993 in Manila City
b. Alva defrauded Veranga by means of false manifestation
c. Where Alva told Veranga that he can process her US Visa
in if she pays him P120,000 (with intent to defraud)
d. Veranga did pay Alva and Alva
3. This led to a criminal case at the Manila RTC Branch 54 → ℅
Judge Muro, a warrant was subsequently issued
4. This warrant was retracted thru a Recall Order because of the bail
bond approved by Hon. Bayhon of Manila (hereinafter ​Bail 1​)
5. Upon arraignment, Alva pled not guilty. ​The case was now
submitted for decision.
6. Alva’s counsel filed an Urgent Motion to Cancel Promulgation to
reset the schedule of the promulgation of RTC’s decision from
May 5, 1999 to June 17, 1999 because the counsel had prior
commitment of equal importance
a. This was granted but moved only to May 19, 1999
b. However, on May 18 (day before approved date), counsel
again sought a reschedule
7. Come May 19, Alva & counsel did not appear so a Joey Perez
(alleged Alva’s representative) delivered to the RTC a handwritten
medical certificate stating that Alva’s absence is due to
hypertension
8. So RTC issued an order directing the promulgation of its decision
in absentia
a. May 19, 1999 → RTC also issued a bench warrant of
arrest2
b. May 25, 1999 → Later on RTC found Alva guilty of
estafa (2a). He was sentenced to an indeterminate term of
imprisonment
i. Prision mayor min → 9 years and 1 day to
ii. Reclusion temporal max → 17 years
9. Appearing in the records of the RTC of the duplicate of the
decision in no. 8 was a document entitled Personal Bail Bond
issued by Mega Pacific Insurance Corp. (dated May 21, 1999,
hereinafter ​Bail 2​) approved by Judge Muro
a. This means that Alva was admitted to bail again after his
conviction at the RTC (note: “again” because his 1st bail
was in Fact 4)
10. However, in an order released on same day as judgment of
conviction, Alva’s Bail 1 was forfeited against the Easter Insurance
and Surety Corp in the amount of P17,000 because of Alva’s
failure to appear within the 10 day period abovementioned (note:
I’m assuming the 10 day period began from Alva’s failure to
appear on May 19 for promulgation)
11. Police Superintendent De Jesus (Chief of Warrant and Subpoena
section) manifested to the RTC the return of the bench warrant
because Alva’s address (Unit 12 Fersal Condominium, Kalayaan
Ave, Diliman) was out of their area of responsibility & Alva
moved out without informing the RTC
2
Provision on bench warrant is expressed under Section 9, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court which
states that "[w]hen a ​respondent released on bail fails to appear on the day fixed for the
hearing​​, the court may issue another order of arrest or may order the bond for his appearance
to be forfeited and confiscated, or both. A ​bench warrant is defined as a writ issued directly
by a judge to a law-enforcement officer​​, especially for the arrest of a person who has been
held in contempt, has disobeyed a subpoena, or has to appear for a hearing or trial
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12. On July 15, a Remedios Caneda delivered to the RTC Alva’s
request for the photocopies of his exhibits submitted to the RTC on
trial
13. On July 21, Alva filed a Termination of Legal Services before the
RTC because he fired his counsel & was looking for a new one
14. On July 26, Alva filed an MR thru registered mail
a. On Aug 30, RTC declined to rule on said MR and
considered it as a mere scrap of paper
15. On Sept 2, Alva filed a Notice of Appeal
a. RTC declined to give due course to this again because it
was filed out of time. The MR filed on July 26 (July 23
sabi sa case pero tingin ko yung July 26 pinepertain) was
not acted upon; thus, it did not stop the reglamentary
period to file an appeal.
16. On Nov 25, Alva MR-ed again. This was granted by the RTC in
the interest of justice because Alva, not a lawyer, solely prepared
his MR. However, the RTC denied the MR because the decision
being reconsidered has aptly decided on merits. Now, the appeal is
given due course since it was filed on time pending this MR. RTC
ordered the records of the case be transmitted to the CA.
17. CA Resolution (Oct 16, 2001) → asked Alva to show cause within
10 days why appeal should not be dismissed despite absence of
bail bond for his provisional liberty
a. Oct 29 → Alva, thru new counsel, complied with this and
explained that he filed Bail 2 duly approved by Judge
Muro
18. CA Resolution (2002) → dismissed the appeal because Alva failed
to post a new bond in compliance with the 2001 CA Resolution
a. Alva MR-ed. His counsel explained that they thought the
2001 CA Resolution merely required them to explain,
they did not understand that it required the posting of a
new bail bond
b. Alva also reiterated that Bail 2 has been extended (they
appended to this MR a ​Bond Endorsement extending the
bail coverage from May 21, 1999 → May 21, 2003)
19. OSG was asked to comment on the MR and they stated the ff
objections
a. Application for bail can only be availed by a person ​in
custody of law
b. Bail on appeal is a matter of discretion when the
penalty imposed by the RTC is greater than 6 years
imprisonment
20. CA Resolution (2003) → disposed the MR. Held that Alva failed
to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court or under custody
of law since his conviction in 1999. There was also no valid bond
when he appealed.
21. Hence, finally, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. WON CA erred in dismissing the appeal due to Alva’s failure to
post bail bond on appeal → No. By jumping bail, Alva waived his
right to appeal.
2. WON Alva failed to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the
court → No, Alva submitted himself to the court’s jurisdiction
when he was arraigned.
a. Note: I think this issue relates to Rule 116 because:
i. Under Rules of Court, arraignment shall be held
30 days from date the court acquires jurisdiction
over the person of the accused unless there is a
shorter period ℅ special law or SC Circular
[Rule 116, 1g]
ii. Note also that accused cannot be tried in absentia
if he hasn’t been arraigned.
iii. In this case, since there was an arraignment (fact
5), trial in absentia pushed through. Thus, he
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court.
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RULING:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The
assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR No. 24077,
which dismissed petitioners appeal, are hereby AFFIRMED. In this
connection, Judge Manuel Muro is DIRECTED to issue forthwith a warrant
of arrest for the apprehension of Petitioner Arnold Alva and for proper
disposition of the case in line with the foregoing discussion. Costs against
the petitioner.
RATIO:
1. Alva’s main arguments before the SC
a. CA erred in ruling that Alva did not submit himself to the
jurisdiction of the court because, evidently, Alva filed
several pleadings after the promulgation of judgment at
the RTC
b. Alva recognizes that his bail might have been denied in
lieu of Rule 114 but he should have been given proper
notice by the prosecution that he is under the bail negating
circumstances. Still he argues that none of these
circumstances apply to him.
2. People, thru OSG, avers that despite presence of Bail 2, Alva never
surrendered, was arrested, nor deprived of his liberty after
promulgation of RTC decision. Specifically,
a. The bench warrant issued by the RTC was returned
b. RTC rendered a judgment against Bail 1 due to the
bondsman’s failure to secure Alva’s presence before the
court.
c. Alva’s belatedly attached the bond endorsement (fact 18b)
does not guarantee that said bail bond’s efficacy
3. [Issue 1] Sec 5, Rule 114 addresses this issue.
a. Alva was convicted by the RTC with a penalty of
imprisonment exceeding 6 years.
b. Thus, approval of his bail is discretionary.
4. Posting of bail bond presupposes that accused is detained or in the
custody of law. In this case, it is evident that the bench warrant
was never served.
a. No record showing that he was arrested nor did Alva
voluntarily surrender.
b. Right to bail can only be availed of by person in
custody of the law or deprived of liberty.
5. No bail should have been granted to the petitioner. Bail 2 was
irregularly approved.
a. No record of a motion filed by Alva formally applying for
Bail 2
b. Assuming that Bail 2 was regularly approved, it is invalid
because Alva is not entitled to bail on appeal. The
prosecution was not duly notified that he applied for such
bail; thus, Alva’s argument of lack of notice on the bail
negating circumstances (Ratio 1b) is unsound.
c. Alva falls under one of the bail negating circumstances -
violation of condition/s of bail - because of his absence
during the promulgation of the RTC decision.
d. His hypertension as evidenced by a medical certificate is
lacking because was no description of his physical state
that would render him unable to go to court for an hour or
two. Worse, though said medical certificate (examined by
Rodel Aquino, MD) was notarized, affiant’s identity was
not provided (sketch)
e. Further evidence of violation of bail is Alva’s change of
address without informing the court as evidenced by the
Process Server’s Return (this is a document ata)
6. Dismissal of the appeal was also proper in lieu of Rule 124,
Section 8 of the Rules of Court where a person who jumps bail will
have his appeal dismissed.
a. Within the contemplation of the Revised Rules on
Crimpro, a person withdraws his appeal by jumping bail
because he is beyond the reach & application of the law;
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thus, he merely relies on the appeal to speculate his

chances of the reversal of the unfavorable decision of the
lower court.
7. [Issue 2] Jurisdiction once acquired, is not lost at the instance of
the parties but continues until the case is terminated.
a. Alva is correct that he has been under the court’s
jurisdiction
b. This is evident when he appeared and entered pled not
guilty to the crime charged even if he later on jumped
bail
8. However, Alva is not under the custody of the law because custody
signifies restraint on the person where he is deprived of his will &
liberty to be obedient to the law. Custody of the law is equated to
the custody of the body of the accused and since Alva is a fugitive,
he cannot be granted any relief by the CA.

SEPARATE OPINIONS: none

CONCURRING: none

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5. Miranda v. Tuliao (Sel)
March 31, 2006 | Chico-Nazario | Rule 116 - Section 1
PETITIONER​​: Jose Miranda, Alberto Dalmacio, Romeo Ocon
RESPONDENTS​​: Virgilio Tuliao
SUMMARY​​: ​2 burnt cadavers were discovered in Ramon, Isabela which
were later identified as the bodies of Bauzon and Tuliao, son of the private
respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is now under the witness protection
program. Two Informations for murder were filed against 5 police officers
including SPO2 Maderal in the RTC of Santiago City. The venue was later
transferred to the RTC of Manila. The RTC convicted the accused and
sentenced them two counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal
who was yet to be arraigned at that time being at large. Upon automatic
review, the SC acquitted the accused on the ground of reasonable doubt. In
Sept. 1999, Maderal was arrested. He executed a sworn confession and
identified the petitioners as the ones responsible for the death of the
victims, so, Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against the
petitioners. Acting Presiding Judge Tumaliuan issued a warrant of arrest
against the petitioners and SPO2 Maderal. Then, the petitioners filed an
urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and
to recall or quash the warrant of arrest. In the hearing of the urgent motion,
Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of the petitioners and issued a Joint
order denying the urgent motion on the ground that since the court did not
acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly
heard by the court. Issue: W/N erred in setting aside Judge Anghad’s order
-- No. The SC said that ​adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of
arrest requires neither jurisdiction over the person of the accused nor
custody of law over of the body of the accused, quashing a warrant of
arrest based on a subsequently filed petition for review with the SoJ and
based on doubts endangered by the political climate constitutes GAD,
dismissing a criminal case on the basis of a decision of the SC in
another case with different accused constitutes GAD, nullification of a
proceeding necessarily carries with it the reinstatement of the orders set
aside by the nullified proceeding and No double jeopardy in the
reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before arraignment
DOCTRINE: ​Regarding rule 116 → ​The reinstatement of a criminal
case dismissed before arraignment does not constitute double
jeopardy. Double jeopardy cannot be invoked where the accused has
not been arraigned and it was upon his express motion that the case
was dismissed
FACTS:
1. 2 burnt cadavers were discovered in Ramon, Isabela. It was later
identified to be the bodies of ​Bauzon and ​Tuliao (son of
respondent Virgilio) who is now under the witness protection
program.
2. 2 informations for murder were filed against ​SPO1 Leaño, SPO1
Marzan, SPO1 Agustin, SPO2 Micu, SPO2 Maderal and SPO4
Ramirez ​in RTC Santiago City.
3. Venue was later moved to Manila. RTC Manila convicted all of the
accused and sentenced them to 2 counts of RP except SPO2
Maderal who was yet to be arraigned because he was still at large.
4. The case was appealed to the SC on automatic review and
acquitted the accused on the ground of reasonable doubt.
5. SPO2 Maderal was finally arrested. He pointed to a number of
individuals as the persons responsible for the death of Bauzon and
Tuliao.
6. So Virgilio filed a criminal complaint for murder against the
petitioners (Miranda, et al) based on SPO2 Maderal’s sworn
confession.
7. Judge Tumaliuan then issues warrants of arrests against petitioners
and SPO2 Maderal.
8. Petitioners filed a motion to complete preliminary investigation, to
reinvestigate, and to quash the warrants of arrest.
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9. Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of petitioners and denied their
motion since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their
persons.
10. In the meantime, petitioners appealed the resolutions of State
Prosecutor Reyes to the DOJ.
11. The new presiding judge (Judge Anghad) reversed the order of
Judge Tumaliuan. He also ordered the cancellation of the warrant
of arrest of Miranda, Ocon, and Dalmacio.
12. State Prosecutor Reyes and Virgilio moved for reconsideration and
the inhibition of Judge Anghad but was denied.
13. Virgilio filed for a petition for certiorari, mandamus and TRO
seeking to enjoin Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the
case.
14. Court granted the TRO against Judge Anghad.
15. Shortly after the resolution, Judge Anghad issued a Joint Order
dismissing the 2 informations against the petitioners.
16. Virgilio filed with the SC a motion to cite Judge Anghad in
contempt for deliberately and willfully committing contempt of
court when he dismissed the informations. The SC referred the
motion to the CA which it ordered the reinstatement of the
criminal cases as well as the warrants of arrest.
17. So the petitioners appealed to the SC.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the CA erred in setting aside Judge Anghad’s order -- NO
2. W/N the CA erred in reinstating the criminal cases and for the
reissuance of the warrants of arrest -- NO
3. W/N CA erred in reinstating the criminal case alleging that the
order of dismissal issued had become final and executory -- NO
RATIO:
Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither
jurisdiction over the person of the accused nor custody of law over of the
body of the accused
1. CA said that Miranda, Ocon, and Dalmacio cannot seek any
judicial relief since they were not yet arrested or deprived of their
liberty at the time they filed their “urgent motion to complete
preliminary investigation; to reinvestigate, to quash warrants of
arrest”.
2. Petitioners naman say that jurisdiction over the person of the
accused is required only in applications for bail. They quoted
retired CA Justice Herrera. They also said that jurisdiction over
their person was already acquired by their filing of the above
urgent motion (quoted Santiago case)
3. SC says the Santiago cases distinguishes between ​custody of the
law​ and ​jurisdiction over the person.​
a. Custody of the law = required before the court can act
upon the application for bail but not required for
adjudication of other reliefs; accomplished either by arrest
or voluntary surrender → you can be under custody of
law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over
his person like when a person arrested by virtue of a
warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash
warrant → custody of law is literally custody over the
body of the accused
b. Jurisdiction over the person = acquired upon arrest or
voluntary appearance → you can be subject to the
jurisdiction of the court over his person and not yet be in
custody of the law like when an accused escapes custody
after his trial has commenced.
4. GR: one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court → constitutes voluntary
appearance.
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5. E: in the case of pleadings whose prayer is precisely for the
avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court which only leads to a
special appearance
a. In civil cases -- motions to dismiss on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction over the person
b. In criminal cases -- motions to quash a complaint on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of
the accused
c. Motions to quash a warrant of arrest
6. THUS, the requirement of custody of law in applications for bail
are not present in motions to quash the warrant of arrest.
Quashing a warrant of arrest based on a subsequently filed petition for
review with the SoJ and based on doubts endangered by the political
climate constitutes GAD
1. There’s GAD in the assailed actions of Judge Anghad. He was a
little too eager to dismiss the criminal cases.
2. First, he quashed the standing warrant of arrest issued by his
predecessor because of a subsequently filed appeal to the SOJ and
because of his doubts on the existence of probable cause due to the
political climate in the city
3. Second, after the SOJ affirmed the prosecution’s resolution, he
dismissed the criminal cases on the basis of a decision of the SC in
another case with different accused 2 days ​after the SC issued a
TRO against him.
4. Third, Judge Anghad said Miranda’s constitutional rights were
violated regarding the issuance of the warrant of arrest Judge
Tumaliuan daw relied solely on the prosecutor’s certification BUT
this is untrue. The Joint Order even indicated the contrary
(“personally evaluating the records”)
5. Fourth, Judge Anghad said the SPO2 Maderal’s confession was
incredible because
a. It was given after almost 2 years in the custody of the NBI
b. Given by someone who rendered himself untrustworthy
for being a fugitive for 5 years
c. Given in exchange for an obvious reward of discharge
d. Given during the election period amidst a politically
charged scenario
6. BUT SC said there’s no reason to disturb the findings of probable
cause of Judge Tumaliuan.
Dismissing a criminal case on the basis of a decision of the SC in another
case with different accused constitutes GAD
1. Judge Anghad quashed the warrant of arrest on the ground that
there was a petition for review of the assistant prosecutor’s
resolution before the SOJ
2. But after the SOJ affirmed the prosecutor’s resolution, Judge
Anghad summarily dismissed the 2 criminal cases because:
a. Maderal was one of the accused in another criminal case
in which he pinpointed to Miranda as the mastermind
3. There is GAD because Judge Anghad had no right to twist the
SC’s decision and interpret it to the discredit of SPO2 Maderal
who was still at large when the evidence of the prosecution in the
other case was presented.
4. A decision acquitting the accused therein of a crime cannot be the
basis of the dismissal of criminal case against different accused for
the same crime
5. Plus, the accused was acquitted in the other case based on
reasonable doubt; the SC never said that no crime happened.
6. Also, the accused in that other case had no motive to kill Virgilio’s
son whereas petitioners here had been implicated in the testimony
of Virgilio before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee.
PS: Other criminal case is ​Leaño
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Nullification of a proceeding necessarily carries with it the reinstatement

of the orders set aside by the nullified proceeding

1. Whether the CA ordered the issuance of new warrants of arrest or

merely ordered the reinstatement of the warrants is just a matter of
semantics -- the slight inaccuracy should not be allowed to affect
the dispositions on the merits
2. First, the CA reinstated Judge Tumaliuan’s issuance of warrants of
arrest
3. Second, the CA likewise declared the proceedings conducted by
Judge Anghad void
4. So, the declaration of nullity of proceedings should be deemed to
carry with it the reinstatement of the orders set aside by the
nullified proceedings.

No double jeopardy in the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed

before arraignment

1. Petitioners must’ve forgotten that Virgilio’s Petition for certiorari,

prohibition and mandamus were not filed with the CA but with the
SC
2. The CA decided the case because the SC referred it to them.
3. The reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before
arraignment does not constitute double jeopardy. Double
jeopardy cannot be invoked where the accused has not been
arraigned and it was upon his express motion that the case was
dismissed

RULING: petition is DENIED. CA decision and resolution are

AFFIRMED.

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6. Gamas v. Oco (Mika)
March 17, 2004 | Carpio, J | Rule 116 Section 1- Arraignment
PETITIONER​​: Antonio Gamas and Florencio Sobio
RESPONDENTS​​: Judge Orlando Oco and PNP SP04 Willie Adulacion
SUMMARY​​: Gamas and Sobrio arrested for theft of corn. They were told by
SPO4 Adulacion, police prosecutor, to plead guilty so they can get minimum
penalty, apply for probation and avoid imprisonment. They were presented to
Judge Oco, to whom they pleaded guilty. They signed a document with the
assurance that they will be considered as star witnesses. This was done without
the presence of any lawyer. They later found out that what they signed was an
order finding them guilty of theft and sentencing them to imprisonment for 6
months. After procuring a counsel and asking for a re-arraignment, they
contend that Judge Oco should be held administratively liable for rendering
judgment against them without the benefit of an arraignment and in violation
of their right counsel. Judge Oco’s defense is he knew that they wanted to plea
guilty to get a minimum sentence and to avoid imprisonment. He contends that
he informed the both of them of their rights, such as their right to counsel, but
both accused still insisted on pleading guilty. However the SC found that there
was no valid of waiver of their right to counsel. In determining whether the
accused can make a valid waiver, the court must take into the educational
attainment of the accused, considering that they were both tricycle drivers. SC
also found that Judge Oco failed to comply with the requirements for a valid
arraignment as discussed in Rule 116.
DOCTRINE:
Section 1(a) of Rule 116 requires that the arraignment should be made in
open court by the judge himself or by the clerk of court
1. furnishing the accused a copy of the complaint or information
with the list of witnesses stated therein, then
2. reading the same in the language or dialect that is known to him,
and
3. asking him what his plea is to the charge.
FACTS: ​(Administrative Case)
Facts regarding the crime are from the narration of Judge Oco
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1. Gamas and Sobrio have long pending warrants of arrest for the
crime of theft of corn worth P4,500. They were caught with their 2
relatives hauling 3 or 4 tricycle loads of corn.
2. SPO4 Adulacion, a police prosecutor, brought Gamas and
Sobrio to Judge Oco.
Facts by the Court
1. Gamas and Sobria allege that they are accused in a case for theft
which was pending in the sala of Judge Oco. As the latter had
issued warrants for their arrest, the former went to MTC Polomok
to post bail.
2. Gamas and Sobrio alleged that SPO4 Adulacion enticed them
to plead guilty to the charge, apply for probation and thus
avoid imprisonment.
3. They allege that Adulacion, who had allegedly prepared a draft
decision embodying his suggestion, conferred with Judge Oco, and
handed the draft decision to the latter.
4. After reading the document, Judge Oco signed it, told
complainants "O, plead guilty man kamo" ("O, you're pleading
guilty"), and handed the document to a clerk. Judge Oco told the
clerk to read the contents of the decision to complainants and to
instruct them on what to do. The clerk read the contents of the
document to complainants and asked them to sign it.
5. Gamas and Sobrio signed the document upon Adulacion's
assurance that once the police apprehend the rest of the
accused, the police will revive the case and Adulacion will
present complainants as "star witnesses."
6. Complainants later found out that what they signed was an Order
("3 October 1996 Order") finding them guilty of theft and
sentencing them each to imprisonment for 6 months and 1 day.
7. Because of this, Gamas and Sobrio sought the assistance of a
lawyer and upon their motion, Judge Oco vacated his 3 October
1996 Order, on the ground that they entered improvident guilty
pleas. They were scheduled a re-arraignment.
8. They also contend that Judge Oco is administratively liable for
rendering judgment against them without the benefit of an
arraignment and in violation of their right to be represented by
counsel.
Defense of Judge Oco:
1. He asked Gamas and Sobrio if what Adulacion said was true and
they replied yes. From that moment, he knew that Gamas and
Sobrio wanted things done instantly so they won’t be locked in jail.
2. He read the records thoroughly in front of both the accused and
even asked them why they were released with the tricycles in spite
of this apprehension, but he didn't get an answer.
3. He knows that what Gamas and Sobria wants is to plead guilty,
get a minimum sentence, be allowed on probation, and they be
released on recognizance. Because of this, he began discoursing
their rights as accused. (Right to counsel, be given free of
charge if they cannot afford to solicit services of one, to
confront the witnesses and cross examine and because they had
voluntarily articulated the desire to plead guilty)
4. Thereafter, he arraigned them. He read to them in the dialect they
understand the accusation and informed them [of] the nature of the
evidence arrayed but they pleaded guilty, always begging that they
be sentenced with the most minimum penalty, allowed probation
and released immediately in their recognizance. Thus, there was
arraignment and their plea of guilt was voluntary.
5. He wrote the decision in long hand in their very presence then
handed it to the typist who typed it. He signed [the 3 October 1996
Order], then required his court interpreter to read the whole
decision in the language they know. He said that both accused
looked satisfied that what the interpreter was reading corresponded
with what they proposed and what we discussed. After the reading,
Gamas and Sobrio signed the decision.
6. In sum, he said he counselled both of their rights and gave the
exact penalty. There was no lawyer but it was not his problem
and since they were caught, the lawyer would not have much
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use. Although, he suggested on giving them a PAO lawyer but
still Gamas and Sobrio insisted on just pleading guilty.
Findings of Investigating Judge
1. Gamas and Sobrio did not satisfactorily waive their right to
counsel
2. Gamas and Sobrio were not properly arraigned
3. Gamas and Sobrio failed to adduce evidence that Adulacion was
the one who prepared the the 3 October 1996 Order.
4. Judge Oco is liable for simple neglect of duty and a P10,000 fine
OCA’s Evaluation and Recommendation:
1. Judge Oco is liable not for mere simple neglect of duty but for
gross ignorance of the law. Fine of P20,000
ISSUES:
1. WON Judge Oco failed to Properly Apprise Complainants of
their Right to Counsel. YES
2. WON failed to comply with requirements for valid
arraignment. YES.
3. WON Judge’s acts constitute gross ignorance of the law. YES
RATIO:
Judge Oco failed to properly apprise Gamas and Sobria of their right
to counsel.
1. Sec. 6 of Rule 116 means When a defendant appears [at the
arraignment] without [an] attorney, the court has four
important duties to comply with:
1. It must inform the defendant that it is his right to have
[an] attorney before being arraigned;
2. After giving him such information the court must ask
him if he desires the aid of attorney;
3. If he desires and is unable to employ attorney, the
court must assign [an] attorney de officio to defend
him; and
4. If the accused desires to procure an attorney of his
own the court must grant him a reasonable time
therefor.
2. The only instance when the court can arraign an accused without
the benefit of counsel is if the accused waives such right and the
court finding the accused capable, allows him to represent
himself in person.
3. However, to be a valid waiver, the accused must make the
waiver voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. In
determining whether the accused can make a valid waiver, the
court must take into the educational attainment of the accused.
4. In the present case, Judge Oco did not properly apprise
complainants of their right to counsel prior to their arraignment.
Consequently, there was no basis for both accused’s alleged waiver
of such right.
5. Judge Oco does not deny that there was no lawyer present during
arraignment. He even said that the lawyer was their problem and it
wouldn't be of much use. ​Although he informed them that they
can have a PAO lawyer, Judge Oco did not appoint a PAO
lawyer despite being informed that both accused could not
afford one.
6. SC held that his actions do not amount to compliance with Sec.
6 of Rule 116. Judge Oco is grossly mistaken in saying that
securing a "lawyer was their (complainants') problem." ​Once
the accused informs the judge that he cannot afford a lawyer
and the court has not allowed the accused to represent himself,
or the accused is incapable of representing himself, the judge
has the duty to appoint a counsel de officio​​.
7. Judge Oco knew that both accused are mere tricycle drivers.
He could not have expected complainants to be conversant with
the rules on criminal procedure. Judge Oco should not only
have followed Sec. 6 of Rule 116 to the letter, but should also
have ascertained that complainants understood the import of
the proceedings.
8. SC also found out that Gamas and Sobria did not even know
what “plead guilty” means. ​The latter did not ask anymore what
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it meant because Adulacion added that they will be given a lighter

sentence.
Highly Irregular Arraignment
1. Section 1(a) of Rule 116 requires that the arraignment should
be made in open court by the judge himself or by the clerk of
court
i. furnishing the accused a copy of the complaint
or information with the list of witnesses stated
therein, then
ii. reading the same in the language or dialect
that is known to him, and
iii. asking him what his plea is to the charge.
2. The requirement that the reading be made in a language or
dialect that the accused understands and knows is a mandatory
requirement, just as the whole of said Section 1 should be
strictly followed by trial courts. This the law affords the
accused by way of implementation of the all-important
constitutional mandate regarding the right of an accused to be
informed of the precise nature of the accusation leveled at him
and is, therefore, really an avenue for him to be able to hoist
the necessary defense in rebuttal thereof. It is an integral
aspect of the due process clause under the Constitution.
3. Gamas and Sobria both deny the Judge's claim that he arraigned
the latter by "reading to them [the information] in the dialect they
understand and informing them of the nature of the evidence
arrayed against them. However, there is no disputing that Judge
Oco failed to furnish complainants a copy of the information with
the list of the witnesses.
Judge Oco was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law w/ a fine of P20k.
They have no jurisdiction over SPO4 Adulacion since this is an
administrative case.

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7. People v. Apatay (Jaya)
July 7, 2004 | Per Curiam | Sec. 3, Rule 116 - When accused pleads guilty to
a capital offense
PETITIONER: ​PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee
RESPONDENTS:​​ REY APATAY y BALO, appellant.
SUMMARY:
Catalina Baluran, 77 years old, was left alone in her house after her niece was
rushed to the hospital. Rey Apatay, 24 years old, knew that Catalina was alone.
Apatay entered the house of Catalina and raped her. Apatay was recognized by
Catalina so he decided to kill Catalina by strangulation and by striking her with a
firewood several times in the head and face. A search was conducted the
following day wherein Apatay joined the search. 2 days after, Catalina’s body
was found.
Apatay surrendered himself to the police because he was overwhelmed by his
conscience. He voluntarily executed a sworn statement with the assistance of his
counsel, after he was informed of his constitutional rights. Upon arraignment he
pleaded guilty. A searching inquiry was conducted by the RTC judge.
RTC found Apatay guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
The case was elevated to SC for automatic review.
SC found that the trial court has lawfully complied with the procedure under
Sec. 3 of Rule 116 in cases when an accused pleads guilty to a capital offense.
Hence, the trial court did not err in its decision.
DOCTRINE:
There is no hard and fast rule as to how a judge may conduct a "searching
inquiry," or as to the number and character of questions he may ask the accused,
or as to the earnestness with which he may conduct it, since each case must be
measured according to its individual merit. The singular barometer is that the
judge must, in all cases, fully convince himself that:
1. the accused, in pleading guilty, is doing so voluntarily — meaning, he
was not coerced or threatened of physical harm, or placed under a state
of duress; and
2. that he is truly guilty on the basis of his testimony.
FACTS:
1. On October 20, 2000 at around 7:30 pm, Rey Apatay knew that
Caridad would go to the hospital.
2. Caridad (niece of Catalina) and her mother named Toribia went to
the hospital together with their neighbors Odelion and Buchan.
Thus, Catalina Baluran, 77 years old, was left alone in the house.
3. Apatay saw Catalina alone in the sala. Apatay entered the house
thru the broken sink in the kitchen. He put off the lights and forced
Catalina to the room. He sexually abused Catalina by inserting his
penis into her vagina.
4. Catalina tried to stop Apatay and said “Ayaw lagi, Rey” (Don’t
Rey).
5. Afraid that Catalina recognized him, Apatay strangled Catalina
until she had no voice. He then proceeded to get a firewood and
used it to hit Catalina’s head and face several times until she was
motionless.
6. Afterwards, Apatay carried Catalina to the abandoned toilet in the
upper ground of the house and dropped her into the hole.
7. The next day, Buchan and Odelion learned that Catalina could not
be found. They went inside the house of Catalina to look for her
but only saw drops of blood and a piece of wood. They
immediately conducted a search for Catalina. Apatay joined the
search.
8. On October 22, 2000 (two days after), the body of Catalina was
found. Dr. Romulo Villaflor conducted a post-mortem
examination. The post-mortem report provides that Catalina had
vaginal lacerations at 6, 9 and 12 o’clock positions indicating that
she was a victim of a forcible sexual assault, and that she died due
to hemorrhage secondary to multiple skull fracture.
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9. On October 24, 2000, Apatay was bothered by his conscience so
he surrendered to the Sikatuna Police Station, Tagbiliran City. He
was assisted by PAO counsel Atty. Adriano Damalerio when he
voluntarily executed his sworn statement in the Visayan dialect
after he has been informed of his constitutional rights.
10. An information charging Apatay of rape with homicide was filed
in RTC-Tagbiliran.
11. Upon arraignment, Apatay pleaded guilty. The judge asked Apatay
searching questions and confirmed the details of his extra-judicial
confession. Apatay was asked if he wants to present evidence on
his behalf but he opted not to.
12. RTC found Apatay guilty beyond reasonable doubt and ordered
him to pay P100,000 as civil indemnity.
13. The case was elevated to Supreme Court for automatic review.
Apatay assailed the RTC decision contending that
a. the trial court failed to conduct a searching inquiry into
the voluntariness and full comprehension by hims of the
consequences of his plea
b. that the trial court did not ask him if he wants to present
evidence on his behalf
14. OSG brief says that the trial court did not commit any error in
convicting Apatay.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the trial court failed to comply with the procedure under Sec.
3 of Rule 116 in case an accused pleads guilty to a capital offense.
-​ NO
RATIO:
1. Sec. 3, Rule 116 provides that when the accused pleads guilty to a
capital offense, the court shall
a. conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea
b. require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise
degree of culpability
c. The accused may present evidence in his behalf.
2. With regard to the searching inquiry, SC said that there is no hard
and fast rule as to how a judge may conduct a "searching inquiry,"
or as to the number and character of questions he may ask the
accused, or as to the earnestness with which he may conduct it,
since each case must be measured according to its individual merit.
The singular barometer is that the judge must, in all cases, fully
convince himself that:
a. the accused, in pleading guilty, is doing so voluntarily —
meaning, he was not coerced or threatened of physical
harm, or placed under a state of duress; and
b. that he is truly guilty on the basis of his testimony.
3. Here, the above jurisprudential guidelines were faithfully complied
with by the trial judge. Records show that during the arraignment,
the Information was read to appellant in the Visayan dialect which
he speaks and understands. After he entered a plea of guilty, the
trial judge properly conducted a searching inquiry translated by the
court interpreter into his Visayan dialect.
4. Records of the case show that Apatay’s answers to the trial judge's
questions are spontaneous and categorical. He declared that his
confession (that he committed the crime) is voluntary and that
nobody forced him to do so. He also manifested full understanding
of the consequences of his plea, specifically that the imposable
penalty upon him is death. Yet, he would not change his plea.
5. After the prosecution present its witnesses Dr. Villaflor, Buchan
and Odelion, the trial court asked Apatay if he wanted to present
evidence on his behalf but the defense opted not to considering
Apatay’s plea of guilty.
6. Hence, SC finds that the trial court correctly found appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of rape with homicide and properly
imposed upon him the death penalty. It is clear from the appellant's
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extra-judicial confession and the evidence for the prosecution that

he had carnal knowledge of Catalina Baluran through force.
7. SC affirmed the decision of trial court with modification ordering
Apatay to pay the heirs of Catalina P75,000 as moral damages and
P25,000 as temperate damages in addition to the trial court's award
of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity.

SEPARATE OPINIONS: None

CONCURRING: None

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8. People v. Ong y Li (Cassie)
June 21, 2004 | Puno J. | Rule 116 Sec. 3
PETITIONERS: ​People of the Philippines
RESPONDENTS: ​ William Ong y Li and Ching De Ming @ Robert Tiu
SUMMARY: ​Based on prosecution through the testimony of SPO1 Rodolfo S.
Gonzales, in the afternoon of July 23, 1998, a confidential informant (CI) of the
Special Operations Division (SOD), PNP Narcotics Group, reported to Chief
Inspector Albert Ignatius D. Ferro about the alleged illicit drug activities of
accused William Ong and Ching De Ming @ Robert Tiu. As per order of Chief
Inspector Ferro, a team of eight decided to conduct a buy-bust operation. Once,
CI confirmed the meeting time and venue with the drug dealer, and exchanges of
gift-wrapped packages rendered of one (1) sealed plastic bag with a white
crystalline substance by the accused Ong and boodle money placed in a “W.
Brown” plastic bag by SPO1 Gonzales, thereafter, the latter arrested Ong while
the CI and the back-up agents arrested co-accused De Ming. The two (2) accused
were brought to the police office where the corresponding booking sheets and
arrest report were prepared. The plastic bag containing the illegal drug
substance, was referred to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime
Laboratory for examination, positive for methyl amphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu, a regulated drug. However, the appellants denied the story of the
prosecution.
The issue before the SC is whether or not the accused are guilty of the crime
charged. The Court held no because of violation of Rule 116 of the Rules of
Court. From the records, it was clear that appellants only knew the Chinese
language, however the appellants were arraigned on an information written in
the English language. The requirement that the information should be read in a
language or dialect known to the accused is mandatory. It must be strictly
complied with as it is intended to protect the constitutional right of the accused
to be informed of the nature and cause the of the accusation against him. The
constitutional protection is part of due process. Failure to observe the rules
necessarily nullifies the arraignment. After the arraignment and in the course of
the trial, the lower court had to secure the services of a certain Richard Ng Lee
as Chinese interpreter.
DOCTRINE​​: The requirement that the information should be read in a language
or dialect known to the accused is ​mandatory. It must be strictly complied with
as it is intended to protect the constitutional right of the accused to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The constitutional
protection is part of due process. Failure to observe the rules necessarily nullifies
the arraignment.
FACTS:
1. Accused William Ong y Li and Ching De Ming @ Robert Tiu
were charged with violation of Sec. 15 Article III in relation to
Section 2 Article I of RA No. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972.
2. The information states that the two accused “did then and there
willfully and unlawfully sell or offer for sale 980.50 grams of
Methyl Amphetamine Hydrochloride, which is a regulated drug.”
3. The records did not show whether they had sufficient knowledge
of English language but during the course of the trial, the two
accused were given the service of a Chinese interpreter.
4. On July 1998, at around 5:00 pm, a confidenital informant of the
Special Operations Division (SOD), PNP Narcotics Group,
reported to Chief Inspector Ferro about illicit drug activities of a
certain William Ong and an unidentified Chinese male partner.
5. A buy-bust operation was conducted. The confidential informant
(CI) called up the alleged pusher, placed an order for one kilo of
shabu and agreed to a P600K consideration. They agreed to meet
on July 24, 1998 at 6th St. cor. Gilmore Avenue, New Manila,
Quezon City, between 4:00 to 5:00 am.
6. The CI received a call from the drug dealer changing the meeting
time between 2-3:00 pm.
7. Ong approached the car of the team. The CI introduced him to
SPO1 Gonzales who told accused Ong in broken Tagalog to get in
the car. When Ong inquired about the money in payment of the
shabu, SPOI Gonzales showed him the slightly opened plastic bag
containing the boodle money.
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8. When SPO1 Gonzales asked to see the shabu, Ong went out of the
car, walked a few steps and then waved his right to somebody.
While waiving, Gonzales saw a green Toyota Corolla coming.
Ching De Ming @ Robert Tiu alighted, approached Ong and
handed to him a gift-wrapped package.
9. Gonzales opened it and inside was one sealed plastic bag with a
white crystalline substance. SPO1 Gonzales handed the money in a
plastic bad and thereafter signaled his back-up team by turning on
the hazard lights of the car.
10. Gonzales himself arrested Ong while the CI and back-up agents
arrested De Ming.
ONG’S VERSION:
1. William Ong, a Chinese citizen from the People’s Republic of
China, claimed that he came to Philippine in 1997 to look for a job.
2. He was able to work in a pancit canton factory in QC upon
recommendation of a friend. He then stopped working at the
factory in June 1998 and hunted for another job. Two weeks prior
to his arrest, Ong was introduced by his friend Kian Ling to Ong
Sin for a possible job as a technician in a bihon factory owned by
Ong Sin.
3. Ong Sn called up and set a meeting at the Tayuman branch of
Jollibee. Ong Sin called Ong saying that he could not meet him
and that his twp-workers would pick him.
4. Ong joined the two men in the yellow car and upon reaching a
certain place, the driver reached for his cellphone and called up
someone. Ong Sin was on the line and informed him that the driver
would accompany him to the bihon factory.
5. The driver went out of the car and Ong followed him. Upon
returning to the car after picking up something, the companion of
the driver poked a gun at him, arrested, blindfolded and brought
him to an undisclosed place.
6. Several hours after, he was taken to the police station where he met
Ching De Ming for the first time.
CHING DE MING’S VERSION:
1. He testified that he is a legitimate businessman engaged in the
RTW business.
2. While waiting inside his car for his girlfriend and her mother who
just went in a townhouse on that fateful day and place, he was
approached by persons unknown to him.
3. They asked what he was doing there and a person pointed at him
saying “maybe he is the one.”
4. He was then dragged out of his car and brought to the other car.
They took his clutch bag, blindfolded and brought him to a place.
They removed his blindfold at Camp Crame. He dnied knowing
Ong and the charge of conspiring with him to deliver shabu in New
Manila QC.
5. Avelina Cardoz, the mother of his girlfriend who is a divine healer,
corroborated his story. She asked the accused to accompany her in
that place to cure a patient but when she and her daughter returned
to the car, the accused was nowhere to be found.
RTC: convicted appellants and imposed on them penalty of death. The case
went directly to the SC on automatic review.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused are guilty of the crime charged
RULING: NO.
1. Rule 116, Section 1(a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides:
SECTION 1. Arraignment and plea; how made. —
(a) The accused must be arraigned before the court where the
complaint or information was filed or assigned for trial. ​The
arraignment shall be made in open court by the judge or clerk by
furnishing the accused with a copy of the complaint or
information, reading the same in the language or dialect known
to him, and asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty. The
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prosecution may call at the trial witnesses other than those named
in the complaint or information.
2. The arraignment of appellants violated the above rule. Appellants
are Chinese Nationals. Their Certificate of Arraignment states that
they were informed of the accusations against them. ​It does not,
however, indicate whether the Information was read in the
language or dialect known to them.
3. Neither does the August 4, 1998 Order of Judge Diosdado M.
Peralta of RTC-Br. 95, Quezon City, disclose compliance with the
rule on arraignment. It merely stated in part that "[w]hen both
accused William Ong y Li and Ching De Ming @ Robert Tiu were
arraigned, assisted by counsel de parte, both accused entered a plea
of not guilty
4. From the records, it is clear that appellants only knew the Chinese
language.
5. After arraignment and in the course of the trial, the lower court had
to secure the services of a certain Richard Ng Lee as Chinese
interpreter.
6. What leaps from the records of the case is the inability of
appellants to fully or sufficiently comprehend any other language
than Chinese and any of its dialect. Despite this inability, however,
the appellants were arraigned on an Information written in the
English language
7. We again emphasize that the requirement that the information
should be read in a language or dialect known to the accused is
mandatory. It must be strictly complied with as it is intended to
protect the ​constitutional right of the accused to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The
constitutional protection is part of due process. Failure to observe
the rules necessarily nullifies the arraignment.
8. More important than the invalid arraignment of the appellants, ​we
find that the prosecution evidence failed to prove that
appellants willfully and unlawfully sold or offered to sell
shabu.
9. Appellants' conviction is based on the lone testimony of SPO1
Gonzales​​. He was the designated poseur-buyer in the team formed
for the buy-bust operation. But a careful reading of his testimony
will reveal that ​he was not privy to the sale transaction that
transpired between the CI and appellant William Ong​​, the
alleged pusher. It is beyond contention that a contract of sale is
perfected upon a meeting of the minds of the parties on the object
and its price.
10. Not all elements of the sale were established by the testimony
of SPO1 Gonzales
11. It is abundantly clear that it was the CI who made the initial
contact, albeit only through the telephone, with the pusher. ​The
CI was likewise the one who closed the deal with appellant Ong as
to the quantity of shabu to be purchased and its price. He also set
the venue and time of the meeting when the sale would take
place.
12. It is therefore understandable that in his account of his meeting
with appellant William Ong, SPO1 Gonzales made no reference to
any further discussion of the price and the quantity of the shabu.
13. Since ​only the CI had personal knowledge of the offer to
purchase shabu, the acceptance of the offer and the
consideration for the offer​​, we hold ​that SPO1 Gonzales is, in
effect, not the "poseur-buyer" but merely the delivery man.
14. The Court also held that the prosecution failed to establish its
claim of entrapment. The Court stressed the ​“objective” test in
buy-bust operations. The prosecution must present a complete
picture detailing the transaction, which "​must start from the
initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the
offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration
until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal
drug subject of the sale.
15. In the case at bar, the prosecution evidence about the buy-bust
operation is incomplete. The confidential informant who had sole
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knowledge of how the alleged illegal sale of shabu started and how
it was perfected was not presented as a witness.
16. SPO1 Gonzales' testimony is hearsay and possesses no probative
value unless it can be shown that the same falls within the
exception to the hearsay rule.
17. Should the confidential informant be presented in Court? YES. In
the case at bar, the crime charged the appellants is capital in
character and can result in the imposition of the death penalty.
Where the testimony of the informer is indispensable, it should be
disclosed.

39