G.R. No.

L-32820-21 January 30, 1976

DOROTEA DE OCAMPO VDA. DE DELIZO and her nine (9) children, named REGINO, CRISPINA,
CARMEN, BASILIO, HILARIO, MACARIO, SENDON MARCIANO and HERMOGENES, all surnamed
DELIZO y OCAMPO, petitioners-appellants,

vs.

URBANA DELIZO, assisted by her husband, AMBROCIO FLORA, SEVERINO DELIZO and the Heirs of
FRANCISCO DELIZO, namely, RANCIVILLANO SOLTRIFILO, JOSEFINA, EUPROCINA, AUREA, EDITA
and FE all surnamed DELIZO, and ROSENDA GENOVE VDA. DE DELIZO, respondents-appellees.

FACTS:

Nicolas Delizo married Rosa Villasfer in 1981. She died in Dec. 7, 1909 or a period of 18 years.

He remarried. The second marriage with Dorotea de Ocampo lasted 46 years (1911-1957) until Nicolas’ death.

The action for partition was instituted on April 15, 1957 by a daughter and a son of the first marriage

all against their father, Nicolas Delizo, and his second wife, Dorotea de Ocampo, and their nine (9) children, the herein
petitioners-appellants.

Involved are the properties acquired by Nicolas Delizo, among which are sixty-six (66) hectares of agricultural lands in
San Jose City, Nueva Ecija; fifty-eight (58) hectares of riceland in Muñoz of the same province; and a square meter lot at
1056-M P. Campa, Sampaloc, Manila.

Defendants opposed to the partition claiming that the properties described in the complaint were those of the second
marriage.

Ruling of the CA: Point of contention was Caanawan lands in Nueva Ecija. Other lands belong to second marriage

No proof property owned by second marriage

Testimony of Dorotea not persuasive

Moises Patricio places acquisition sometime after the revolution: Rosa was stillalive at this time

LC: conjugal partnership of first marriage transformed into co-ownership by Nicolasand his children, thus fruits belong to
co-ownership.

CA disagrees with LC: HOWEVER, IT WAS DOROTEA AND NICOLAS WHOCULTIVATED THE LAND, HENCE
THE FRUITS OF THE LAND SHOULD GO TO THESECOND MARRIAGE
ISSUE:

Whether or not a parcel of land acquired by way of homestead is a conjugal property of the first or the second marriage.

RULING:

Under Act 926, which was then the applicable law, the right of the homesteader to the patent does not become absolute
until after he has complied with all the requirements of the law.

One of the most important requirements is that the "person filing the application shall prove by two credible witnesses
that he has resided upon and cultivated the land for the term of five years immediately succeeding the time of filing the
application aforesaid, and shall make affidavit that no part of said land has been alienated or encumbered.

Prior to the fulfillment of such requirement, the- applicant has no complete equitable estate over the homestead which he
can sell and convey, mortgage for lease. Until a homestead right is established and registered under Section 3 of Act 926,
there is only an inchoate right to the property and it has not ceased to be a part of the public domain and, therefore, not
susceptible to alienation as such.

It is not necessarily the time of the issuance of the homestead patent but the time of the fulfillment of the requirements of
the public land law for the acquisition of such right to the patent.

Considering that Nicolas Dacquel must have been in possession of his homestead for barely a year when he transferred
his rights in 1906, Mariano Antolin for about two years with respect to his homestead in 1907, and Francisco Pascua for
about three years in 1908 as regards to his homestead, at the time of their respective conveyances to Nicolas Delizo, it is,
therefore, obvious that not one of them could have complied with the requirements of Act No. 926 to entitle any one of
them to the issuance of a homestead patent before they sold or assigned their rights to Nicolas Delizo. The law was quite
specific, that "No certificate shall be given or patent issued for the land applied for until the motion of five year.

Having neither legal nor equitable title thereon, what was transferred by them to Nicolas Delizo were, therefore, not
rights of ownership, but inchoate rights as applicants for homesteads over portions of the public domain.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby modified as herein indicated.
TSHIATE L. UY and RAMON UY, petitioners,

vs.

THE COURT OF APPEALS, NATIVIDAD CALAUNAN-UY, and THE ESTATE OF MENILO B. UY, SR.,
REPRESENTED BY MENILO C. UY, JR., NILDA C. UY, MELVIN C. UY and MERLITO C. UY, respondents.

FACTS:

Private respondent Natividad Calaunan-Uy was the common-law wife of the late Menilo B. Uy, Sr., for about thirty-six
(36) years. Their union bore four children

On 31 October 1990, soon after the death of Menilo Uy, Sr., herein petitioners Tshiate Uy and Ramon Uy initiated
Special Proceedings "In the Matter of the Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Menilo B. Uy, Sr."

Petitioner Tshiate Uy alleging that by virtue of a Hong Kong marriage, she was the surviving legal spouse of Menilo, Sr.
She prayed that she and her son Ramon Uy be allowed to intervene in the civil case. The intervenors contended, among
other things, that the judgment upon the compromise was a patent nullity. A petition for certiorari was filed with
respondent appellate court.

CA Ruling: granted the petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the private respondent has the right over theestate of Menilo B. Uy.

RULING:

The action for partition is predicated on an alleged co-ownership between private respondent Natividad Calaunan-Uy and
deceased Menilo, Sr., of property evidently acquired during the period of their common-law relationship.

The governing provisions, applicable to their case, are now found in Article 147 and Article 148 of the Family Code,
considering that Menilo Uy, Sr., died on 27 September 1990, well after the effectivity of Executive Order No. 209 (The
Family Code of the Philippines) on 03 August 1988.

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other
as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall
be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to
have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For
purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property
shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the
care and maintenance of the family and of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during
cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their
cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the
co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all
of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the
forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.

Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both
of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their
contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply
to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.

If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the
absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad
faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last
paragraph of the preceding Article.

G.R. No 176556 July 4, 2012

BRIGIDO B. QUIAO, Petitioner,

vs.
RITA C. QUIAO, KITCHIE C. QUIAO, LOTIS C. QUIAO, PETCHIE C. QUIAO, represented by their mother
RITA QUIAO, Respondents.

FACTS:

On October 26, 2000, herein respondent Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation against herein
petitioner Brigido B. Quiao

RTC rendered a decision in favor of the petition of the respondent and ordering that all the except for the personaland real
properties already foreclodes, all the remaining properties shall be divided equally between herein respondents and
petitioner subject to the legitimes of the children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities. And further ordered
that the Petitioner’s share, of the profits earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children.

Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the period provided for under Section 17(a) and (b) of
the Rule on Legal Separation.

After more than nine months, Brigido filed a motion for clarification asking the RTC to define “Nets
Profits Earned.” In answer, the court held that the phrase denotes “the remainder of the properties of
the parties after deducting the separate properties of each of the spouses and debts.”

Upon a motion for reconsideration, it initially set aside its previous decision stating that net profit
earned shall be computed in accordance with par. 4 of Article 102 of the Family Code. However, it
later reverted to its original Order, setting aside the last ruling.

ISSUE:

1. What law governs the property relations between husband and wife who got married in 1977.

2. Whether or not the computation of net profits earned in the conjugal partnership of gains the
same with the computation of net profits earned in the absolute community.

RULING:

1. Article 129 of the Family Code applies to the present case since the parties' property relation is governed by the
system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains.

First. Petitioner and the respondent tied the marital knot on January 6, 1977. Since at the time of the exchange of marital
vows, the operative law was the Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386) and since they did not agree on a marriage
settlement, the property relations between the petitioner and the respondent is the system of relative community or
conjugal partnership of gains. Article 119 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative community of
property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the absence of marriage
settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as
established in this Code, shall govern the property relations between husband and wife.
It is clear that what governs the property relations of the petitioner and of the respondent is conjugal partnership of gains.

And under this property relation, "the husband and the wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate property
and the income from their work or industry.

Second. Since at the time of the dissolution of the petitioner and the respondent's marriage the operative law is already the
Family Code, the same applies in the instant case and the applicable law in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership assets and liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family
Code. The latter provision is applicable because according to Article 256 of the Family Code "This Code shall have
retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code
or other law."

2. Article 102(4) of the Family Code, since it expressly provides that for purposes of computing the net profits subject to
forfeiture under Article 43, No. (2) and Article 63, No. (2), Article 102(4) applies. In this provision, net profits "shall be

the increase in value between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage

and the market value at the time of its dissolution."

Without any iota of doubt, Article 102(4) applies to both the dissolution of the absolute community regime under Article

102 of the Family Code, and to the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime under Article 129 of the Family Code.

On Absolute Community Regime:

When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the wife becomes joint owners of all the
properties of the marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the marriage, and those acquired during the
marriage

form the common mass of the couple's properties. And when the couple's marriage or community is dissolved, that
common mass is divided between the spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in the proportion the parties have
established, irrespective of the value each one may have originally owned.

On Conjugal Partnership Regime:

The husband and the wife place in common fund the fruits of their separate property and income from their work or
industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained
indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage." From the foregoing provision, each of the couple has his and her
own property and debts. The law does not intend to effect a mixture or merger of those debts or properties between the
spouses. Rather, it establishes a complete separation of capitals.
G.R. Nos. 78583-4 March 26, 1990
BENIGNO TODA, JR., petitioner, 


vs.


COURT OF APPEALS and ROSE MARIE TUASON-TODA, respondents.

G.R. Nos.78696-7 March 26,1990

ROSE MARIE TUASON-TODA, petitioner, 


vs.


BENIGNO TODA, JR., respondent.

FACTS:

 Benigno Toda, Jr and Rose Marie Tuason-Toda were married on June 9, 1951. Individual differences and the
alleged infidelity of Benigno, however, marred the conjugal union thereby prompting Rose Marie to file on
December 18, 1979, a petition for termination of conjugal partnership for alleged mismanagement and dissipation
of conjugal funds against Benigno.

 The parties in order to avoid further "disagreeable proceedings," filed on 1981 a joint petition for judicial approval
of dissolution of conjugal partnership under Article 191 of the Civil Code. This petition which was signed by the
parties on March 30, 1981, embodied a compromise agreement allocating to the spouses their respective shares in
the conjugal partnership assets and dismissing the previous appeals made before the CA and SC. The said petition
and the compromise agreement therein were approved by the trial court in its order of June 9, 1981.

 Further, the trial court issued several orders pertaining to the interpretation
and implementation of the said compromise agreement which spawned two new
petitions, with each party initiating one against the other. Thus, illustrative of the saying that a solution which
creates another problem is no solution, the contradictory interpretations placed by the parties on some provisions of
the agreement resulted in appeals to respondent court

 Rose Marie contends that that the compromise agreement of the parties herein became effective only
after its execution on March 30,1981 and not upon its judicial approval on June 9, 1981.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the compromise agreement takes effect on the time when it
was approved by the trial court

RULING:
Yes. The award of cash dividends basically depends on the date of effectivity of the compromise agreement as this will
determine whether the same is conjugal property or separate property of the spouses.

We are in agreement with the holding of the Court of Appeals that the compromise agreement became effective only on
June 9, 1981, the date when it was approved by the trial court, and not on March 30,1981 when it was signed by the
parties.

Article 190 of the Civil Code, "(i)n the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation of
property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial order."

Hence, the separation of property is not effected by the mere execution of the contract or agreement of the parties, but by
the decree of the court approving the same. It, therefore, becomes effective on y upon judicial approval, without which it
is void.

Furthermore, Article 192 of said Code explicitly provides that the conjugal partnership is dissolved only upon the
issuance of a decree of separation of property.

ROMANA LOCQUIAO VALENCIA and CONSTANCIA L. VALENCIA, petitioners,

vs.

BENITO A. LOCQUIAO, now deceased and substituted by JIMMY LOCQUIAO, TOMASA MARA and the
REGISTRAR OF DEEDS OF PANGASINAN, respondents.

x----------------------------x

CONSTANCIA L. VALENCIA, petitioner,

vs.

BENITO A. LOCQUIAO, now deceased and substituted by JIMMY LOCQUIAO, respondent.

FACTS:

1. On May 22, 1944, Herminigildo and Raymunda Locquiao executed a deed of donation propter nuptias which was
written in the Ilocano dialect, denominated as Inventario Ti Sagut9 in favor of their son, respondent Benito Locquiao and
his prospective bride, respondent Tomasa Mara. They were giifted with four parcels of land, including the land in
question.
2. The donees took their marriage vows on June 4, 1944 and the fact of their marriage was inscribed at the back of
O.C.T. No. 18383.

3. With the permission of respondents Benito and Tomasa, petitioner Romana Valencia
took possession and cultivated the subject land and was eventually took over by her daughter petitioner Constancia
Valencia, and since then, has been possession of the land.

4. Respondents Benito and Tomasa registered the Inventario Ti Sagut with the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Pangasinan on May 15, 1970. and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 84897 was issued in the name of the respondents
Benito and Tomasa.

5. On March 18, 1973, the heirs of the Locquiao spouses, including respondent Benito and petitioner Romana,
executed a Deed of Partition with Recognition of Rights. Contained in the deed is a statement that respondent Benito and
Marciano Locquiao, along with the heirs of Lucio Locquiao,"have already received our shares in the estates of our
parents, by virtue of previous donations and conveyances"

6. Sometime in 1983, petitioner Constancia filed an action for annulment of title against the respondents. Petitioners
alleged that the issuance of the transfer certificate of title was fraudulent; that the Inventario Ti Sagut is spurious;

that the donation did not observe the form required by law as there was no written acceptance on the document itself or in
a separate public instrument.

7. On December 13, 1983, respondent Benito filed a Complaint seeking the ejectment of petitioner Constancia from the
subject property to which the Municipal Trial Court rendered a Decision, ordering the defendant in the case, petitioner
Constancia, to vacate the land in question.

8. Both the RTC and CA affirmed the decision of MTC.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not acceptance of the donation by the donees is required. If so in what form hsould the acceptance appear?

2. Which formal requirements should be applied with respect to the donation propter nuptias at hand. Those under the
Old Civil Code or the New Civil Code?

RULING:

1. Unlike ordinary donations, donations propter nuptias or donations by reason of marriage are those "made before its
celebration, in consideration of the same and in favor of one or both of the future spouses.

Under the Old Civil Code, donations propter nuptias must be made in a public instrument in which the property donated
must be specifically described. However, Article 1330 of the same Code provides that "acceptance is not necessary to
the validity of such gifts"
In other words, the celebration of the marriage between the beneficiary couple, in tandem with compliance with the
prescribed form, was enough to effectuate the donation propter nuptias under the Old Civil Code.

Under the New Civil Code, the rules are different. Article 127 thereof provides that the form of donations propter nuptias
are regulated by the Statute of Frauds. Article 1403, paragraph 2, which contains the Statute of Frauds requires that the
contracts mentioned thereunder need be in writing only to be enforceable. However, as provided in Article 129, express
acceptance "is not necessary for the validity of these donations." Thus, implied acceptance is sufficient.

2. It is settled that only laws existing at the time of the execution of a contract are applicable thereto and not later statutes,
unless the latter are specifically intended to have retroactive effect. Consequently, it is the Old Civil Code which applies
in this case since the donation propter nuptias was executed in 1944 and the New Civil Code took effect only on August
30, 1950.

As a consequence, applying Article 1330 of the Old Civil Code in the determination of the validity of the questioned
donation, it does not matter whether or not the donees had accepted the donation. The validity of the donation is
unaffected in either case.
ANTONIO A. S. VALDEZ, petitioner,

vs.

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 102, QUEZON CITY, and CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-VALDEZ,
respondents.

FACTS:
1. Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05 January 1971 and begot five children.

2. On 22 June 1992, Valdez sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family code to
which the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the nullification of their marriage and directied the petitioner and the
respondent to start proceedings on the liquidation of their common properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family
Code, and to comply with the provisions of Articles 50, 51, and 52 of the same code.

3. Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision directing compliance with Articles 50, 51 and 52
of the Family Code. She asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of
common property in "unions without marriage."

4. RTC made a clarification in considering that Art. 147 of the Family Code xplicitly provides that the property acquired
by both parties during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through the
joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and defendant will own their "family
home" and all their properties for that matter in equal shares. And also decided that the propert regime of the petitioner
and respondent shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

5. Petitioner, Antonio Valdez, argues that:

A. Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are
psychological incapacitated;

B. Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code govern the
disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab initio,
including a marriage declared void by reason of the psychological incapacity of the spouses;

C. Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declared void ab initio on the
ground of the psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same may be read consistently with
Article 129.

ISSUE:

Whether Art 147 FC is the correct law governing the disposition of property in the case at bar.

RULING:

Yes. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties
during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148,
such as the case may be, of the Family Code.

Art. 147 provides,

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other
as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be
owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall
be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have
been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes
of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be
deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof in the former's efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during
cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their
cohabitation.
 When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the
ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of
the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the
forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the cohabitation.

This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment to marry each
other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage.

Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the
rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained
through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having
contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household." Unlike
the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate property are not included in the co-ownership.

When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they do not live exclusively with each
other (as husband and wife), only the property acquired by both of them through their actual joint contribution of money,
property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their respective contributions.

Such contributions and corresponding shares, however, are prima facie presumed to be equal.

If the party who has acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner
already heretofore expressed.
 G.R. No. L-22383 October 6, 1924

THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

MARGARITA QUINTOS E YPARRAGUIRRE and ANGEL A. ANSALSO, defendants-appellants.

FACTS:

The plaintiff seeks to recover of the defendants the sum of P31,785.96, the amount of an alleged overdraft against them
and in favor of the plaintiff bank, with interest thereon at 8 per cent per annum.

It appears from the evidence that in a document dated June 20, 1918, the Philippine National Bank granted the defendants
a credit to the amount of P31,284, and to secure the payment thereof, as well as the interest and costs, the defendants
mortgaged and pledged to the bank several certificates of shares of stock.

A complaint was filed because between April 2, 1921, and July 22, 192, the defendant Mr. Ansaldo was several times
required to pay his debt, the securities given having been found to be insufficient to secure the payment of his obligations,
but the defendants failed to give the new additional securities demanded.

The defendants discuss in the first place the nature of the obligation sued on, maintaining that the same is not of a
solidary nature because there is nothing in it that expressly determines said character, and therefore it binds only those
who have contacted the same to the extent of their share in said obligation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the obligation evidence by said document is solidary between the defendants.

RULING:

No. The oligation is jointly and not solidary between the defendants.

By express provision of the Civil Code, the conjugal partnership begins to exist at the celebration of the marriage, and the
separation of the properties between the spouses shall take place (article 1432) only when it is expressly stipulated in the
marriage settlement, or is judicially decreed, or in the case provided in article 50 of the Code.

This conjugal partnership however, is confined to the properties mentioned in article 1401 of the Civil Code, to wit:
 (a) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common property whether the
acquisition is made for the community or for only one of them;

(b) those obtained by the industry, salary or labor of the spouses or any of them;

(c) the fruits, rents or interest received or accruing during the marriage, from the common or the private property
of each of the spouses.

The partnership does not produce the merger of the properties of each spouse. Each of them, or by purchase with his or
her money.

Anent to the issue imposed, the legal provisions about conjugal partnership, contained in chapter 5, title 3, book 4, of the
Civil Code, do not give an adequate answer to this question.

The case now before us requires a resort to the rule on the contract of partnership, prescribed in article 1698, which
provides that the partners are not solidarily liable with respect to the debt of the partnership, and none can bind the others
by a personal act, if they have not given him any power therefor.

Solidarity will exist only when it is expressly determined in the title thereof, giving them such a character. Therefore if
solidarity exists only by stipulation, or by law, it is evident that the partner cannot be solidarity liable for the debts of the
partnership, because, as Manresa says, there is no legal provision imposing such burden upon him, and because the same
is not only not authorized by the contract of partnership, but is contrary to the nature thereof, for gain being the
consideration of the obligation, the latter cannot be extended beyond the interest that the partner may have therein which
is proportional to his share.

Taking into account that the contract of pledge signed by the defendants does not show that they have contracted a
solidary obligation, the properties given as pledge being insufficient, the properties of the conjugal partnership of the
defendants are liable for the debt to the plaintiff, and in default thereof, they are jointly liable for the payment
thereof.

METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY and ROGELIO T. UY, Petitioners,

v.

JOSE B. TAN and ELIZA GO TAN, Respondents.

FACTS:

Upon application of the Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank)

for extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage, the Office of the Provincial Sheriff
issued a “Sheriff‘s Notice of Sale” setting on the sale at public auction of four
mortgaged parcels of land registered in the name of Jose B. Tan. Before the
scheduled public auction, Spouses Jose B. Tan and Eliza Go Tan filed a
complaint against Metrobank for removal of cloud on the title in question and
injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental.

Eliza Go Tan avers that she never gave her consent or conformity to encumber
the title in question. The real estate mortgages are null and void because Jose
B. Tan had already fully paid the obligations secured by the mortgages. On the
other hand, Metrobank alleged that the Spouses Tan, together with their two
sons, obtained a credit line from which they made availments from time to
time. Consequently, the line was gradually increased.

The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Spouses Tan. Metrobank appealed

before the Court of Appeals. By Decision the CA affirmed the
trial court‘s decision and accordingly dismissed the appeal. A Motion for
Reconsideration was filed but the same has been dismissed. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lack of respondent Eliza Go Tan‘s consent to the mortgage
covering the title in question would render the encumbrance void

HELD:

As for the claim that respondent Eliza Go Tan did not give her consent to the
mortgage of the title in question, the same is belied by her signature on Real
Estate Mortgage which is annotated as Entry No. 174644 at the back of the title.
Her bare denial that the signature was forged, without more, does not lie.

In any event, lack of respondent Eliza Go Tan‘s consent to the mortgage

covering the title in question would not render the encumbrance void under
the second paragraph of Article 124 of the Family Code. For proof is wanting
that the property covered by the title is conjugal — that it was acquired during
respondents‘ marriage which is what would give rise to the presumption that it
is conjugal property. The statement in the title that the property is “registered
in accordance with the provisions of Section 103 of the Property Registration
Decree in the name of JOSE B. TAN, of legal age, married to Eliza Go Tan”
does not prove or indicate that the property is conjugal.

The presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code that properties acquired
during the marriage are presumed to be conjugal cannot apply in the instant
case. Before such presumption can apply, it must first be established that the
property was in fact acquired during the marriage. In other words, proof of
acquisition during the marriage is a condition sine qua non for the operation of
the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership. No such proof was offered nor
presented in the case at bar.
G.R. No. L-57757 August 31, 1987

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PRAGMACIO VITUG AND MAXIMO VITUG, respondents.

FACTS:

During the lifetime of Clodualdo Vitug he married two times. His first wife was Gervacia Flores with whom he had 3
children. The second wife of Clodualdo Vitug was Donata Montemayor with whom he had 8 children, namely, Pragmacio,
Maximo, Jesus, Salvador, Prudencio and Anunciacion, all surnamed Vitug, the late Enrique Vitug

and the late Francisco Vitug.

On November 28, 1952, Donata Montemayor, through her son, Salvador M. Vitug, mortgaged to the Philippine National
Bank (PNB) several parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 2289

to guarantee the loan granted by the PNB to Salvador Jaramilla and Pedro Bacani in the amount of P40,900.00
On December 1, 1963, Donata Montemayor also mortgaged in favor of PNB certain properties covered by TCT Nos. 2887
and 2888 to guarantee the payment of the loan account of her son Salvador Vitug in the amount of P35,200.00

Both Salvador Vitug and Salvador Jaramilla and Pedro Bacani failed to settle their accounts which led the PNB to
foreclose the properties mortgaged to them which were sold in a public auction in which the PNB was the highest bidder.

On March 21, 1970 Pragmacio Vitug and Maximo Vitug filed an action for partition and reconveyance with damages
against Marcelo Mendiola, special administrator of the intestate estate of Donata Montemayor who died earlier, Jesus
Vitug, Sr., Salvador, Natalia, Prudencia, Anunciacion, all surnamed Vitug, Antonio, Francisco, Aurora, Pedro, Honorio,
Corazon, Anselmo, Benigno, Eligio Jesus and Luz, all surnamed Fajardo and the PNB.

The respondents claims that the 30 parcels of land belong to the conjugal property of the spouses Donata Montemayor and
Clodaulo Vitug. Assailed that the mortgage to the PNB and the public auction of the properties as null and void.

ISSUE:

Wheteher or not the land belongs to the conjugal property of the spouses Donata Montemayor and Clodaulo Vitug.

RULING:

No. The land is part of the paraphernalia of the wife, Donata Montemayor.

When the subject properties were mortgaged to the PNB they were registered in the name of Donata Montemayor, widow.
Relying on the torrens certificate of title covering said properties the mortgage loan applications of Donata were granted by
the PNB

In processing the loan applications of Donata Montemayor, the PNB had the right to rely on what appears in the certificates
of title and no more. On its face the properties are owned by Donata Montemayor, a widow. The PNB had no reason to
doubt nor question the status of said registered owner and her ownership thereof.

The well-known rule in this jurisdiction is that a person dealing with a registered land has a right to rely upon the face of the
torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further, except when the party concerned has actual
knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man make such inquiry.

Article 160 of the Civil Code provides as follows:

Art. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.

The presumption applies to property acquired during the lifetime of the husband and wife. In this case, it appears on the face
of the title that the properties were acquired by Donata Montemayor when she was already a widow. When the property is
registered in the name of a spouse only and there is no showing as to when the property was acquired by said spouse, this is
an indication that the property belongs exclusively to said spouse.

The PNB is a mortgagee in goodfaith for at the time the mortgages covering said properties were constituted the PNB was
not aware to any flaw of the title of the mortgagor. If the PNB knew of the conjugal nature of said properties it would not
have approved the mortgage applications covering said properties of Donata Montemayor without requiring the consent of
all the other heirs or co-owners thereof.

DIOSDIDIT, BALDOMERO, FILOMENO, ELPIDIO, AIDA, all surnamed CUENCA, petitioners,

vs.

RESTITUTO CUENCA, MELADORA CUENCA and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

FACTS:

Private respondents Restituto Cuenca and Meladora Cuenca filed a complaint for recovery of real property and damages
against the petitioners

The lower court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners. The lower court dismissed the complaint.

The private respondents appealed the decision to the then Intermediate Appellate Court which reversed the order t=of the
trial court and rendered a decision declaring plaintiff Restituto Cuenca the absolute and exclusive owner of that parcel of
land and declared in the name of Restituto Cuenca as conjugal partnership property of deceased spouses Agripino Cuenca
and Maria Bangahon in effect declaring one half portion of said parcel of conjugal partnership property the share of the
deceased Maria Bangahon to be divided exclusively share and share alike between the plaintiffs Restituto Cuenca and
Meladora Cuenca as the heirs of Maria Bangahon.

The petitioners field a motion for reconsideration to which the same was denied.

Contentions of the respondents: Claimed ownership over the subject parcels of land on the ground that they are the
legitimate children of Agripino Cuenca and Maria Bangahon, both deceased, owners of the subject parcels of land. They
alleged that some of the parcels are paraphernal property of Maria while all the others are conjugal properties of Maria
and Agripino They also alleged that Agripino Cuenca and Engracia Basadre were not legally married because at the time
they lived together Agripino was married to a certain Jesusa Pagar.

Contentions of the petitioners: Denied the legitimacy of the marriage between Agripino Cuenca and Maria Bangahon as
well as the legitimacy of the plaintiffs as children of the couple. They claimed that Agripino Cuenca and their mother
Engracia Basadre were legally married and that they are the legitimate children of the couple. They contend that the
subject parcels of lands are conjugal properties of Agripino and Engracia.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subject parcels of land are paraphernal property of Maria.

RULING:

Parcel of agricultural land situated in Pinamangculan Butuan, Agusan, planted to coconut belongs exclusively to Maria
Bangahon during her lifetime and which property is separate from the conjugal property of the marriage of said Maria
Bangahon and Agripino Cuenca.

That parcel of land planted to rice with irrigation under the present possession of the heirs and that parcel of land
planted to coconut, under the present possession of the heirs belong to Maria Bangahon as her inheritance from her
parents.

This declaration against interest is further reiterated by Agripino Cuenca in that judicial settlement and sale executed by
him on October 19, 1950. These two documents, are ample proofs that the properties in question

belong exclusively to Maria Bangahon as her paraphernal property, a fact declared by no less than the husband himself in
a declaration against his interest.

These public documents carry sufficient evidentiary weight to prove the origin of the properties in question and the nature
of their ownership as properties brought into the marriage by Maria Bangahon to Agripino Cuenca as against the bare
testimony of the defendants and their witnesses.

The ownership of Maria Bangahon of the three parcels of land was testified to further by Adel Ras that the three parcels
of land in question were inherited by Maria Bangahon from her parents; that Maria Bangahon later married Agripino
Cuenca bringing into their marriage the properties which she inherited from her father, Isidro Bangahon. These pieces of
evidence established the fact that the plaintiffs are the forced heirs of Maria Bangahon and Agripino Cuenca, who by law
should succeed to the possession and ownership of the properties in question.

We find convincing evidence to show that Agripino Cuenca and Maria Bangahon were legally married with Restituto
Cuenca and Meladora Cuenca as their issues; that Maria Bangahon brought properties into her marriage; that the couple
acquired properties during the marriage; that by virtue of the extrajudicial settlement executed by Agripino Cuenca and
his children, Restituto is the absolute owner of the parcels of land that one half of the land belongs to Agripino Cuenca
and the other half to Maria Bangahon the same having been acquired by Agripino Cuenca and Maria Bangahon during
their marriage-conjugal partnership property. Therefore, upon the dissolution of the conjugal relationship by the death of
spouses Agripino Cuenca and Maria Bangahon, one half goes to Agripino Cuenca which portion after the death of
Agripino Cuenca goes to his alleged third wife, Engracia Basadre-Cuenca together with the plaintiffs as forced heirs of
Agripino Cuenca.

G.R. No. L-28589 January 8, 1973

RAFAEL ZULUETA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.

PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, INC., defendant-appellant.

FACTS:

On October 23, 1964, the spouse Rafael Zulueta and Telly Albert Zulueta – hereinafter referred to as
plaintiff andMrs. Zulueta, respectively – as well as their daughter, Carolinda Zulueta – hereinafter referred
to as Miss Zulueta –were passengers aboard a PANAM plane, on Flight No. 841-23, from Honolulu to
Manila, the first leg of which wasWake Island.

As the plane landed on said Island, the passengers were advised that they could disembark for
astopover of about 30 minutes. Shortly before reaching that place, the flight was, according to the
plaintiffs, “veryrough.”

Testifying for PANAM its purser, Miss Schmitz, asserted, however, that it was “very calm”; but her notes,
– prepared upon the request of Captain Zentner, on account of the incident involved in this case –
statethat there was “unusually small amount of roughness,” which His Honor, the Trial Judge,
considered properly as“an admission that there was roughness, only the degree thereof is in dispute.”

In any event, plaintiff testified that, having found the need to relieve himself, he went to the men’s
comfort roomat the terminal building, but found it full of soldiers, in view of which he walked down the
beach some 100 yardsaway.Meanwhile, the flight was called and when the passengers had boarded the
plane, plaintiff’s absence was noticed.

The take-off was, accordingly, delayed and a search for him was conducted by Mrs. Zulueta, Miss
Zulueta andother persons.

Minutes later, plaintiff was seen walking back from the beach towards the terminal.
Headingtowards the ramp of the plane, plaintiff remarked, “You people almost made me miss
your flight. You have adefective announcing system and I was not paged.”

In the claim for damages, Mrs. Zulueta filed a motion alleging that she had, for m ore than two (2)
years, beenactually living separately from her husband, plaintiff Rafael Zulueta, and that she had
decided to settle separately with P ANAM through co mp ro mise agreement and had reached a
full and co mplete settlement o f all her differences with said defendant, and praying accordingly,
that this case be dismissed insofar as she is concerned,Required to comment on said motion, PANAM
expressed no objection thereto.

Upon the other hand, plaintiff prayed that the motion be denied, upon the ground that the case at bar
is one fordamages for breach of a contract of carriage, owing to the off-loading of plaintiff Rafael
Zulueta, the husband andadministrator of the conjugal partnership, with the funds of which the PANAM
had been paid under said contract;

ISSUE:

Whether or not Zulueta is required to pay for damages.

RULING:

The payment is effective, insofar as it is deductible from the award, and, because it is due (or part of the amount due)
from the defendant, with or without its compromise agreement with Mrs. Zulueta.

What is ineffective is the compromise agreement, insofar as the conjugal partnership is concerned. Mrs. Zulueta's motion
was for the dismissal of the case insofar as she was concerned, and the defense cited in support thereof Article 113 of
said Code, pursuant to which "(t)he husband must be joined in all suits by or against the wife except: ... (2) If they have in
fact been separated for at least one year."

This provision, We held, however, refers to suits in which the wife is the principal or real party in interest, not to
the case at bar, "in which the husband is the main party in interest, both as the person principally aggrieved and as
administrator of the conjugal partnership ... he having acted in this capacity in entering into the contract of carriage with
PANAM and paid the amount due to the latter, under the contract, with funds of the conjugal partnership," to which the
amounts recoverable for breach of said contract, accordingly, belong.

The damages suffered by Mrs. Zulueta were mainly an in accident of the humiliation to which her husband had
been subjected. The Court ordered that said sum of P50,00 paid by PANAM to Mrs. Zulueta be deducted from the
aggregate award in favor of the plaintiffs herein for the simple reason that upon liquidation of the conjugal partnership, as
provided by law, said amount would have to be reckoned with, either as part of her share in the partnership, or as part of
the support which might have been or may be due to her as wife of Rafael Zulueta.
In this connection, it is noteworthy that, for obvious reasons of public policy, she is not allowed by law to waive her share
in the conjugal partnership, before the dissolution thereof. 17 She cannot even acquire any property by gratuitous title,
without the husband's consent, except from her ascendants, descendants, parents-in-law, and collateral relatives within the
fourth degree.
EFREN R. MENDOZA and INOCENCIA R. DE MENDOZA, petitioner,

vs.

PONCIANO S. REYES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

G.R. No. L-31625 August 17, 1983

JULIA R. DE REYES, petitioner,

vs.

PONCIANO S. REYES and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

FACTS:

Ponciano Reyes and Julia de Reyes were married in 1915. The properties in question were bought from J. M. Tuason &
Co., represented by Gregorio Araneta, Inc. on installment basis.
The spouses were always in arrears in the payment of the installments to Araneta due to lack of money so they had to
borrow money from the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation on November 26, 1948, they jointly obtained a loan of
P12,000.00 from the RFC for the following exclusive purposes only: 'to complete the construction of one-storey
residential building and to pay the balance of the price of the lot offered as security'.

The spouses secured an additional loan of P8,000.00 from the RFC 'to pay the balance of the lot herein offered

as additional security, and to defray the expenses incurred in the repairs of the building' as the deed of mortgage so recites

From the amount of this loan, the sum of P7,719.60, was paid and the deed of absolute sale was forthwith executed by
Araneta In the deed of sale, the vendee named is 'Julia de Reyes'. Her signatures appear over the caption vendee and those
of Ponciano under the phrase: 'with my marital consent.

The spouses built a house and later a camarin on the two lots. The camarin was leased to Mr. and Mrs. Mendoza,
appellees, for ten years at P600.00 a month for the first year and P700.00 for the remaining nine years. The contract of
lease was signed by Julia as lessor, with the marital consent of Ponciano. The camarin was converted into a movie house
and used as such by the lessees.

In spite of the good rentals they had been receiving for the building, the spouses failed to pay seasonably their obligations
to the RFC, On March 3, 1961, while Ponciano was absent attending his farm in Arayat, Pampanga, Julia sold absolutely
the lots in question, together with their improvements to appellees Mendozas for the sum of P80,000.00 without the
knowledge and consent of Ponciano At the same time the spouses were living separately and were not in speaking
terms. By virtue of such sale, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 561 10 and 56111 were subsequently issued in the name
of the Mendozas.

Ponciano S. Reyes filed a complaint for the annulment of a deed of sale of two parcels of land with their improvements,
executed by his wife, Julia R. De Reyes as vendor and the spouses Efren V. Mendoza and Inocencia R. De Mendoza, as
vendees.

Contention of Ponciano: Ponciano S. Reyes averred that said properties were conjugal properties of himself and his wife
and that she had sold them to petitioners "all by herself" and without his knowledge or consent.

Contention of the petitioners: Petitioners Efren V. Mendoza and Inocencia R. De Mendoza alleged in their answer that
the properties were paraphernal properties of Julia R. de Reyes and that they had purchased the same in good faith and for
adequate consideration. In a separate answer, petitioner Julia R. De Reyes, supported the spouses Mendozas' contentions.

ISSUE:

1 . Whether or not the two parcels of land subject to the sale is a conjugal property of Julia Reyes and Ponciano Reyes.

2.Whether or not the funds used to buy the lot and build the improvements is at the expense of the common funs

RULING:

1. The applicable provision of law is Article 153 of the Civil Code which provides:

ART. 153. The following are conjugal partnership property:

(1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether
 the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;

The presumption found in Article 160 of the Civil Code must also be overcome by one who contends that the disputed
property is paraphernal Article 160 provides:

ART. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved
that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.

There is no question that the disputed property was acquired by onerous title during the marriage, theredore it is part of
the conjugal property.

The records show that the funds came from loans obtained by the spouses from the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation.
Under Article 161 of the Civil Code, all debts and obligations contracted by the husband and the wife for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership are liabilities of the partnership.

Mrs. Reyes' testimony about a loan from Mrs. Rosa Borja, the sale of a lot in Cabiao, Nueva Ecija given by her mother,
and the loan from PNB only emphasize the conjugal nature of the disputed properties because she stated that these sums
were also used to put up their gravel and sand business, a poultry farm, and a banana plantation plus a jeepney
transportation line although according to her, every business venture handled by her husband failed.

Property acquired during a marriage is presumed to be conjugal and the fact that the land is later registered in the name of
only one of the spouses does not destroy its conjugal nature.

If the fact that property acquired during marriage was registered in the name of the husband alone does not affect its
conjugal nature, neither does registration in the name of the wife. Any person who buys land registered in the married
name of the wife is put on notice about its conjugal nature.

The mortgage contractsmexecuted by the spouses Ponciano S. Reyes and Julia Reyes in favor of RFC were duly
registered in the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City which were issued in the name of Julia Reyes "married to Ponciano
Reyes".