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a. Verba legis – whenever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their
ordinary meaning, except where technical terms are employed.
b. Ratio legis est anima – the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with
the intent of the framers.
c. Ut magis valeat quam pereat – the Constitution has to be interpreted as a whole. (Francisco,
Jr. vs. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003)
AMENDMENT REVISION
Definition An addition or change within the lines A change that alters a basic principle
of the original constitution as will in the Constitution. (Lambino vs.
effect an improvement, or better Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
carry out the purpose for which it was 174153, October 25, 2006)
framed.
Scope Envisages a change of only a few Involves alterations of different
specific provisions. portions of the entire document.
(Sinco, Philippine Political Law, 1935)
Intention To improve specific parts or to add To determine how and to what extent
new provisions deemed necessary to a document should be altered.
meet new conditions or to suppress (Sounding Board, Philippine Daily
specific portions that may have Inquirer, April 3, 2006)
become obsolete or that are judged
to be dangerous.
Who may propose? A People’s Initiative may propose only Only the Congress or a Constitutional
amendments to the Constitution. Convention may propose revisions to
the Constitution. (Lambino vs.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
174153, October 25, 2006)
BY PROPOSAL RATIFICATION
AMENDMENTS Congress (as By a vote of ¾ of ALL Via a plebiscite, 60-90
Constituent Assembly) its members days after submission of
Constitutional Either by a 2/3 vote of the amendments.
Convention all the members of the
Congress, or (if such
vote is not obtained) by
a majority vote of all
the members of
Congress
Peoples’ Initiative A Petition of at least
12% of the total
number of registered
voters, of which every
legislative district must
be represented by at
least 3% of the
registered voters
therein.
REVISIONS Congress (as By a vote of ¾ of ALL Via a plebiscite, 60-90
Constituent Assembly) its members days after submission of
Constitutional Either by a 2/3 vote of the revisions.
Convention all the members of the
Congress, or (if such
vote is not obtained) by
a majority vote of all
the members of
Congress
a. No amendment within five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution;
b. No amendment through People’s Initiative more often than once every five (5) years after the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution; and
c. People’s Initiative applies only to an amendment. (Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political Law,
2016)
a. What are the maritime zones under the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Seas (UNCLOS), in relation to the territory of the Philippines?
6. The Congress enacted Republic Act No. 9552 (or the Baselines Law) classifying the
Kalayaan Island Group and Bajo de Masinloc (Scarborough Shoal) as regimes of
islands. Petitioners, in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers, assailed the
constitutionality of the said law as it reduces Philippine maritime territory in violation
of Art. 1 of the 1987 Constitution. Is R.A. No. 9552 unconstitutional as it alter the
national territory?
No. The Supreme Court upheld Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9522 as constitutional and discussed the
following points in relation to territory:
1. R.A. No. has merely demarcated the country’s maritime zones and continental shelves in
accordance with United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) III.
2. The framework of the regime of islands suggested by the law is not incongruent with the
Philippines’ enjoyment of territorial sovereignty over the areas of Kalayaan group of Islands
and the Scarborough.
3. The claims over Sabah remained even with the adoption of the amendments.
4. The Baseline Laws are mere mechanisms for the UNCLOS III to precisely describe the
delimitations. It serves as a notice to the international family of states and it is no way
affecting or producing any effect like enlargement or diminution of territories.
5. Moreover, the argument that R.A. No. 9522 has converted the internal waters into
archipelagic waters is untenable. The political branches of the Government can pass
domestic laws that will aid in the competent security measures and policies that will
regulate innocent passage – as innocent passage is a right based on customary law – no
State can validly invoke sovereignty to deny a right acknowledged by modern states.
(Magallona vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 187167, July 16, 2011)
7. Discuss (a) Right of Innocent Passage and (b) Right to Sealane or Air Route.
a. Innocent passage is a concept in the law of the sea that allows for a vessel to pass
through the territorial waters of another state, subject to certain restrictions. Passage is
innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal
State. Such passage shall take place in conformity with this Convention and with other
rules of international law. (Art. 19, UNCLOS)
b. Archipelagic sealanes passage means the exercise in accordance with the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of the right of navigation in the normal mode
solely for the purpose of continuous, expeditious, and unobstructed transit between one
part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or
an exclusive economic zone. While the right of innocent passage may be suspended in
certain circumstances, the right of archipelagic sealanes passage cannot be suspended by
an archipelagic State. (Art. 53, UNCLOS)
8. In line with Memorandum No. 171-C, the Department of Health (DOH), issued a
Memorandum No. 209 inviting accredited drug companies, including Pharmarich, to a
meeting. In the meeting, the DOH Undersecretary handed them copies of the report of
Food and Drugs Authority, which detailed violations relative to the products of the
invited drug companies. After giving Pharmarich a chance to reply, and the latter
having failed to do so, its accreditation was suspended for two years, effective
immediately. Pharmarich filed before the Regional Trial Court a Complaint seeking to
declare null and void certain administrative issuances with prayer for damages and
injunction against DOH officials. Can Pharmarich file a suit against DOH and its
officials?
No. An unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of its own
enjoys immunity from suit because it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty.
Accordingly, a claim for damages against the agency cannot prosper; otherwise, the Doctrine of
Sovereign Immunity is violated. Conversely, when the Government Agency has a charter of its own,
and if its charter provides that it has the right to sue and be sued, it is an express consent and it
is suable. (Department of Health vs. Phil Pharmawealth, Inc (G.R. No. 182358, February 20, 2013
[J. Del Castillo])
9. X filed an action against the Republic of the Philippines seeking payment for a parcel
of land which the national government utilized for a road-widening project. Can X
garnish public funds to satisfy his claims for payment?
No, X cannot garnish public funds to satisfy his claim for payment. Sec. 7 of Act No. 3083 prohibits
execution upon any judgment against the government. Even if the government may be sued, it
does not follow that its properties may be seized under execution. This rule, however, is subject
to exceptions, to wit:
1. Where the law or ordinance has already been enacted appropriating a specific amount to
pay a valid governmental obligation;
2. Funds belonging to government corporations, which can sue and be sued, that are
deposited with a bank. (Republic of the Philippines vs. Palacio, G.R. No. L-20322, May 29,
1969; and University of the Philippines vs. Dizon, G.R. No. 171182, 679 SCRA 54, August
23, 2012)
The intentional harm on the life of either the mother of the child is never justified to bring about a
"good" effect. In a conflict situation between the life of the child and the life of the mother, the
doctor is morally obliged always to try to save both lives. However, he can act in favor of one (not
necessarily the mother) when it is medically impossible to save both, provided that no direct harm
is intended to the other. If the above principles are observed, the loss of the child's life or the
mother's life is not intentional and, therefore, unavoidable. Hence, the doctor would not be guilty
of abortion or murder. The mother is never pitted against the child because both their lives are
equally valuable. (Imbong vs. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014)
11. What are the unconstitutional provisions in Republic Act No. 10354 (Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012) and its counterpart provisions in its
implementing rules and regulations?
a. Section 7: (a) requiring private health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and
hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency
or life-threatening case, to another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and (b)
allowing minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem
methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s;
b. Section 23(a)(l): punishing any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to
disseminate information regarding programs and services on reproductive health
regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
c. Section 23(a)(2)(i): allowing a married individual, not in an emergency or life-
threatening case, to undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of the
spouse;
d. Section 23(a)(2)(ii): limiting the requirement of parental consent only to elective
surgical procedures;
e. Section 23(a)(3): punishing any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to
refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case to another health care service
provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his
or her religious beliefs;
f. Section 23(b): punishing any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health
programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health
program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
g. Section 17: rendering of pro bono reproductive health service in so far as they affect the
conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and
h. Section 3.01(a) and Section 3.01(j) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations:
adding the qualifier "primarily" in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are
ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of Republic Act No.
10354 and violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. (Imbong vs. Ochoa, G.R. No.
204819, April 8, 2014)
The Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) is a treaty. As held in BAYAN vs. Zamora (G.R. No. 138570,
October 10, 2000), the VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has been recognized
as a treaty by the United States (US) as attested and certified by the duly authorized representative
of the US government. The VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of US troops and
personnel visiting the Philippines to promote “common security interests” between the US and the
Philippines in the region. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits of military personnel,
and further defines the rights of the US and the Philippine government in the matter of criminal
jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials
and supplies.
a. Is it constitutionally infirm?
No. The role of the Senate in relation to treaties is essentially legislative in character; the
Senate, as an independent body possessed of its own erudite mind, has the prerogative to
either accept or reject the proposed agreement, and whatever action it takes in the
exercise of its wide latitude of discretion, pertains to the wisdom rather than the legality
of the act. In this sense, the Senate partakes a principal, yet delicate, role in keeping the
principles of separation of powers and of checks and balances alive and vigilantly ensures
that these cherished rudiments remain true to their form in a democratic government such
as ours. The Constitution thus animates, through this treaty-concurring power of the
Senate, a healthy system of checks and balances indispensable toward our nation’s pursuit
of political maturity and growth. True enough, rudimentary is the principle that matters
pertaining to the wisdom of a legislative act are beyond the ambit and province of the
courts to inquire. (BAYAN vs. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000)
13. Petitioners requested assistance from the Government of the Philippines in filing a
claim against the Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the
establishment of the “comfort women” stations in the Philippines during the Japanese
Occupation. However, the Executive Department refused to give them assistance
ratiocinating possible tarnishing of its good foreign relations with Japan. Can the court
interfere with the said decision?
No. The Constitution has entrusted to the Executive Department the conduct of foreign relations
for the Philippines. The Supreme Court cannot interfere with or question the wisdom of the conduct
of foreign relations by the Executive Department. (Vinuya vs. Romulo (G.R. No. 162230, April 28,
201 [J. Del Castillo])
On one hand, initiative is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or
to propose and enact legislation through an election called for the purpose. There are three (3)
systems of initiative, namely: (a) Initiative on the Constitution, (b) Initiative on statutes, and (c)
Initiative on local legislation. On the other hand, Referendum is the power of the electorate to
approve or reject legislation through an election called for the purpose. It may be of two (2) classes,
namely: (a) Referendum on statutes and (b) Referendum on local laws. (Nachura, Outline Reviewer
in Political Law, 2016)
a. No. If Congress cannot require a candidate for Senator to meet such additional
qualification, the Commission on Elections, to be sure, is also without such power. The
right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by
unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution. The
unconstitutionality of this requirement is rooted on its having infringed the constitutional
provision defining the qualification or eligibility requirements for one aspiring to run for
and serve as Senator.
b. Yes. The constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing
for students emanates primarily from the waiver by the students of their right to privacy
when they seek entry to the school, and from their voluntarily submitting their persons to
the parental authority of school authorities.
c. Yes. In the case of private and public employees, the constitutional soundness of the
mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing proceeds from the reasonableness of
the drug test policy and requirement.
d. No. In the case of persons charged with a crime before the Prosecutor’s Office, a
mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness
and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made Defendants in a criminal
complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. When
persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are
impleaded against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being hailed
before the Prosecutor’s Office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that
be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to
privacy. To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness
a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of
Republic Act No. 9165. (Social Justice Society vs. Dangerous Drugs Board, G.R. No.
157870, November 3, 2008)
17. Parameters to guide the Commission on Elections in determining who may participate
in the Party-List elections.
a. Three (3) different groups may participate in the Party-List system, namely: (1) national
parties or organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations;
b. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to
organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized or under-
represented” sector;
c. Political Parties can participate in Party-List elections provided they register under the
Party-List system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections;
d. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and under-represented” or
“lacking well-defined political constituencies”;
e. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
“marginalized and under-represented” must belong to the “marginalized and under-
represented” sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties
or organizations that lack “well-defined constituencies”, either must belong to their
respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy of their respective sectors;
f. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of
their nominees are disqualified, provided they have at least one (1) nominee who remains
qualified. (Atong-Paglaum, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 203766, April 2,
2013)
The Commission on Elections may motu proprio or upon a verified complaint of any interested
party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional, or
sectoral party, organization, or coalition on any of the following grounds: (a) it is a religious sect
or denomination organization, or association organized for religious purposes; (b) it advocates
violence or unlawful means to seek its goal; (c) it is a foreign party or organization; (d) it is receiving
support from ay foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether
directly or through any of its officers or members, or indirectly through third parties, for partisan
election purposes; (e) it violates or fails to comply with laws, rules, and regulations relating to
elections; (f) it declares untruthful statements in its petition; (g) it has ceased to exist for at least
one (1) year; (h) it fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections; or (i) it fails to obtain
at least 2% of the votes cast under the Party-List system in the two (2) preceding elections for the
constituency in which it has registered. ( Sec. 6, Party-List System ACt)
19. Ladies and Lads Party is an organization composed of men and women who identify
themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and transgendered individuals. It first applied
its Party-List accreditation before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), however,
the same was denied for failure to acquire substantial membership. The Party refiled
its application and interposed that its community represents a marginalized
community and those disadvantaged due to their sexual orientation. Once again, in
denying the application, the COMELEC cited Ang Bagong Bayani case, such that the
segment represented by the said Party is not included in the marginalized sectors
enumerated in the 1987 Constitution. Is the COMELEC correct in denying their
accreditation as a Party-List?
No. COMELEC mistakenly opines that the ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani – OFW Labor Party vs.
Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 147589, June 26, 2001) stands for the proposition that only
those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As
the Supreme Court explicitly ruled in the aforesaid case, the enumeration of marginalized and
under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial element is not whether a sector is
specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of
the Constitution and Republic Act No. 7941, or the guidelines laid down in the aforesaid case. (Ang
Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010 [J. De Castillo])
20. Antonio Trillanes was charged with a coup d’état offense, a non-bailable offense. Four
(4) years later, Trillanes, who has remained in detention, won a seat in the Senate with
a 6-year term. Now a Senator, Trillanes filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) an
Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be allowed to attend Senate sessions. The RTC
denied the same. Was the RTC correct?
Yes. The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators or members of the House of
Representatives has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The Rules on Criminal Procedure
provides that no person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless
of the stage of the criminal action. Election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal
law enforcement as the functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions, which lift
one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an
excuse to free a person validly in prison. As discussed in the case of People of the Philippines vs.
Jalosjos (G.R. No. 132875m February 3, 2000), allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional
sessions and committee meetings for five (5) days or more in a week will virtually make him a free
man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates
accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of
the correction system. (Trillanes IV vs. Pimentel, G.R. 179817, June 27, 2008)
No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment
in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat.
Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments
thereof increased during the term for which he was elected. (Sec. 13, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)
The first part of this section refers to what are known as incompatible offices, which may not be
held by the legislator during his tenure in Congress. The purpose is to prevent him from owing
loyalty to another branch of the government, to the detriment of the independence of the
legislature and the doctrine of separation of powers. But even if a member of Congress is willing
to forfeit his seat therein, he may not be appointed to any civil office in the government that has
been created or the emoluments thereof have been increased while he was incumbent in the
legislature. Such a position is a forbidden office. The purpose is to prevent trafficking in public
office.
An enrolled bill is one duly introduced and finally passed by both Houses, authenticated by the
proper officers of each House, and approved by the President. The enrolled bill is conclusive upon
the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President.
The court is bound under the Doctrine of Separation of Powers by the contents of a duly
authenticated measure of legislature. (United States vs. Pons, G.R. No. L-11530, August 12, 1916;
Mabanag vs. Vito, G.R. No. L-1123, March 5, 1947; Arroyo vs. De Venecia, G.R. No. 127255, August
14, 1997)
23. Differentiate the jurisdiction of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) over election contests. What are the requisites to
oust the COMELEC of jurisdiction?
The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) may take cognizance of any matter raised
by a losing candidate related to the election, returns, and qualifications as soon as the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) proclaims the winning candidate and the latter shall have taken his oath
as a member of the House of Representatives. To be considered a member of Congress, there
must be concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation; (2) a proper oath; and
(3) assumption to duty. The following requisites would bring the election contest under the
jurisdiction of the HRET. Absent any of the foregoing, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction over said
contest. (Reyes v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013)
a. Senate President – acts as ex officio chairman who shall not vote except in case of a tie;
b. Twelve (12) Senators and twelve (12) Representatives (Sec. 18, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)
The Senators and Representatives are elected by each house on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties, as well as parties and organizations registered under the
party-list system. For the Senate, a political party must have at least (2) senator members to be
entitled to one seat in the Commission on Appointments. Rounding off is not allowed. It is also not
mandatory to elect twelve (12) Senators as what the Constitution only requires that majority of the
entire membership is filled. (Guingona v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 106971, October 20, 1992; Madrigal
vs. Villar, G.R. No. 183055, July 31, 2009)
25. Petitioners alleged that Sec. 14 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9006 entitled “An Act to
Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful, and Credible Elections through
Fair Election Practices”, insofar as it repeals sec. 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is
unconstitutional for being in violation of the constitutional requirement that every law
should have only one subject which should be expressed in its title. The Petitioners
allege that the repeal of Sec. 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is thus not embraced in
the title, nor germane to the subject matter of R.A. No. 9006. Are Petitioners correct?
No. The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Republic Act No. 9006 are
comprehensive enough to include the repeal of Sec. 67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its
contemplation. To require that the said repeal of Sec. 67 of the Omnibus Election Code be
expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a complete index of its content. The purported
dissimilarity of Sec. 67 of the Omnibus Election Code and the Sec. 14 of the R.A. No. 9006 does
not violate "One Subject-One Title Rule". The Supreme Court has held that an act having a single
general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse
they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may
be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying
out the general subject. (Farinas v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 147387, December 10, 2003)
BICAMERALISM UNICAMERALISM
Definition The practice of having two The practice of having only one
legislative or parliamentary legislative or parliamentary
chambers. chamber.
Passing of the Bill Every Bill must pass two (2) Every Bill must pass by only a
Houses of Congress to become a single House of Congress to
law. become a law.
Organization There is an Upper House that Simplicity of organization
looks at problems which form the resulting in economy and
national perspective and, thus, efficiency.
serves as a check on the
parochial tendency of a body
elected by District.
Legislation Allows for a more careful study Facility in pinpointing
of legislation. responsibility for legislation,
avoidance of duplication, and
strengthening of the Legislature in
relation to the Executive.
Vulnerability Less vulnerable to attempts of Drawing from the recent
the Executive to control the experience with People power,
Legislature. there is greater responsiveness to
the needs of the masses because
the Representatives are forced to
interact more intensely with their
limited and clearly identifiable
constituencies.
29. What are the acts and practices that were declared unconstitutional in relation to the
Disbursement Acceleration Program in the case of Araullo vs. Aquino III (G.R. No.
209287, July 1, 2014)?
a. The withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the implementing agencies, and the
declaration of the withdrawn allotments and unreleased appropriations as savings prior to
the end of the fiscal year without complying with the statutory definition of savings
contained in the General Appropriations Act (GAA); and
b. The cross-border transfer of the savings of the Executive to augment the appropriations
of other offices outside the Executive.
c. The funding of projects, activities and programs that were not covered by any
appropriation in the GAA; and
d. The use of unprogrammed funds despite the absence of a certification by the National
Treasurer that the revenue collections exceeded the revenue targets for non-compliance
with the conditions provided in the relevant GAA.
a. What are the kinds of lump sum discretionary funds under the Pork Barrel
System?
Impoundment refers to a refusal by the President, for whatever reason, to spend funds made
available by Congress. It is the failure to spend or obligate budget authority of any type. (Philippine
Constitution Association vs. Enriquez, G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994)
Under Sec. 25(2) of the 1987 Constitution, “No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the
general appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein. Any
such provision or enactment shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates."
Explicit is the requirement that a provision in the Appropriations Bill should relate specifically to
some "particular appropriation" therein. (Gonzales vs. Macaraig, Jr., G.R. No. 87636, November
19, 1990)
Cross-border transfers refer to the movement of funds from one branch of government to
another. It is not allowed. For instance, the use of Disbursement Acceleration Program
funds to augment funds of the Commission on Audit (for its information technology
infrastructure program) and the House of Representatives (for its legislative library and
archives building or e-library) violated the 1987 Constitution because funds appropriated
by the General Appropriations Act for the Executive were being transferred to the
Legislative and other non-Executive agencies. (Araullo vs. Aquino III, G.R. No. 209569 July
1, 2014)
a. During his Presidency, Joseph Estrada was charged with the crimes of plunder,
bribery, and graft and corruption case. He is invoking presidential immunity
from suit. Can he validly do so?
No. The cases filed against Joseph Estrada are criminal in character. By no stretch of
imagination can these crimes be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-
sitting president. He cannot cite any Decision of the Supreme Court licensing the President
to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. The
rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who
acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any trespasser. (Estrada
vs. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001)
Executive privilege is the power of the Government to withhold information from the public, the
courts, and the Congress. Similarly, it also defined as the right of the President and high level
executive branch officers to withhold information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately the
public. (Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, G.R. No.
180643, March 25, 2008) The necessity of withholding the information must be of such a high
degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case. (Senate
of the Philippines vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006).
a. What are the elements for communications to fall under the Presidential
Communications Privilege?
1. State Secret Privilege – invoked on the ground that the information is of such
nature that its disclosure would subvert crucial military or diplomatic objectives;
2. Informer’s Privilege – the privilege of the Government not to disclose the
identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers
charged with the enforcement of that law; and
3. Generic Privilege for Internal Deliberations – attaches to intra-
governmental documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations, and
deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and
policies are formulated. (Senate of the Philippines vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777,
April 20, 2006)
37. What are the requirements before someone may be held liable under the Doctrine of
Command Responsibility?
Under the Doctrine of Command Responsibility, any government official or supervisor, or officer of
the Philippine National Police, or that of any law enforcement agency shall be held accountable for
neglect of duty if he has knowledge of a crime or offense shall be committed, is being committed
by his subordinates, or by others within his area of responsibility and, despite such knowledge, he
did not take preventive or corrective action either before, during, or immediately after its
commission. (Sec. 1, Executive Order No. 226, February 17, 1995)
a. Noriel Rodriguez was abducted by military men and was tortured repeatedly
when he refused to confess his membership in the New People’s Army. When
released, Rodriguez filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Petition for the
Writ of Habeas Data against former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (PGMA).
Can PGMA be included as Respondent?
Yes. While a President cannot be included as a respondent in a Petition for the Writ of
Amparo or for the Writ of Habeas Data while currently sitting as President, he or she may
no longer be protected by Presidential immunity from suit after his or her incumbency. To
hold someone liable under the Doctrine of Command Responsibility, the following elements
must obtain:
The president, being the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces, necessarily possesses
control over the military that qualifies him as a superior within the purview of the Doctrine
of Command Responsibility. On the issue of knowledge, such may be established through
circumstantial evidence. Meanwhile, as to the issue of failure to prevent or punish, it is
important to note that as the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, the President has
the power to effectively command, control, and discipline the military. However, proving
that the former President is responsible or accountable is another matter entirely and
should be proven with substantial evidence. (Rodriguez vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No.
191805, November 15, 2011)
On one hand, ad interim appointments are appointments made by the President while
Congress is not in session or doing recess. An ad interim appointment is permanent in
nature and takes effect immediately. Thus, one who was issued an ad interim appointment
may immediately enter upon the discharge of his functions. An ad interim appointment
ceases to be valid upon disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or, if not
confirmed, until the next adjournment of Congress. On the other hand, a by-passed
appointment is one, which receives neither approval nor rejection from the Commission.
(Matibag vs. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002)
No. The prohibition on midnight appointments only applies to presidential appointments. It does
not apply to appointments made by the local chief executives. There is no law that prohibits local
elective officials from making appointments during the last days of his or her tenure. Nonetheless,
the Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the Government, may establish
rules and regulations to promote efficiency and professionalism in the civil service. ( Provincial
Government of Aurora vs. Marco, G.R. No. 202331, April 22, 2015)
41. State the Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency or the Alter Ego Principle.
Under this Doctrine which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executives and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various
executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and except in case where
the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the
situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of
the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the
Secretaries of such departments performed and promulgated in the regular course of business are,
unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief
Executive. (Department of Environmental and Natural Resources [DENR] vs. DENR Region XII
Employees, G.R. No. 149724, August 19, 2003)
Sec. 17, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution states that “The President shall have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.”
The obligation to see to it that laws are faithfully executed necessitates the corresponding power
in the President to conduct investigations into the conduct of officials and employees in the
executive department. (Biraogo vs. Philippine Truth Commission, G.R. No. 192935, December 7,
2010).
43. What are the Military or War Powers of the President? Explain briefly.
a. Calling-out Power – the President may summon the armed forces to aid him in
suppressing lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion; this involves ordinary police action.
(David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006);
b. Power to suspend the privilege of writ of habeas corpus – in cases of invasion or
rebellion, when the public safety requires it, the President may, for a period not exceeding
sixty (60) days, suspend the privilege of writ of habeas corpus. (Sec. 18, Art. VII, 1987
Constitution); and
c. Power to declare martial law – invoked as an extreme measure, and rests upon the
basic principle that every state has the power of self-preservation, a power inherent in all
states, because neither the state nor society would exist without it.
44. Three members of the International Committee of the Red Cross were kidnapped in
the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol of Marawi. Gov. Abdusakur Tan declared a state of
emergency and called upon the armed forces through Proclamation No. 1, and
established implementing guidelines for it. Are Proclamation No. 1 and its
implementing guidelines ultra vires acts and unconstitutional?
Yes, they are ultra vires acts and unconstitutional. Governor Salvador is not endowed with the
power to call upon the armed forces, the police, and his own civilian emergency force at his own
bidding. The calling-out powers contemplated under Art, VII of the Constitution is exclusive to the
President. An exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and
may not be justified by the invocation of Sec. 465 (regarding powers and functions) of the Local
Government Code. In describing the calling out power, as exercised by the President, the Supreme
Court ruled that the only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that “whenever it
becomes necessary,” the President may call the armed forces “to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion.” (Kulayan vs. Tan, G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012)
45. What are the parameters for review to determine whether there exists factual basis
for the proclamation of Martial Law? What is the standard of proof required in
determining such?
The parameters for determining the sufficiency of factual basis are as follows: (a) actual rebellion
or invasion; (2) public safety requires it; and 3) there is probable cause for the President to believe
that there is actual rebellion or invasion. The first two requirements must concur. The President
needs only to satisfy probable cause as the standard of proof in determining the existence of
either invasion or rebellion for purposes of declaring Martial Law. To require him to satisfy a higher
standard of proof would restrict the exercise of his emergency powers. ( Lagman, et. al. vs.
Medialdea, GR No. 231658, July 4, 2017 [J. Del Castillo])
a. The hostilities were reported only in Marawi City, but the President has declared
Martial Law on the whole of Mindanao. Is this valid?
1. Public safety requires the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao. The President
was convinced that the atrocities escalated to a level that risked public safety.
The President receives vital, relevant, classified, and live information which equip
and assist him in making decisions. President believes that there is probable
cause that actual rebellion exists and public safety warrants the issuance of
Proclamation No. 216. In turn, the Supreme Court notes that the President, in
arriving at such a conclusion, relied on the facts and events included in the
Report, which it find sufficient.
2. The Constitution grants to the President the discretion to determine the
territorial coverage of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus. He may put the entire Philippines or only a part thereof under
Martial Law.
3. Public safety is an abstract term; it does not take any physical form. Plainly, its
range, extent or scope could not be physically measured by metes and bounds.
Moreover, the President's duty to maintain peace and public safety is not limited
only to the place where there is actual rebellion; it extends to other areas where
the present hostilities are in danger of spilling over. It is not intended merely to
prevent the escape of lawless elements from Marawi City, but also to avoid
enemy reinforcements and to cut their supply lines coming from different parts
of Mindanao. (Lagman, et. al. vs. Medialdea, GR No. 231658, July 4, 2017 [J.
Del Castillo])
46. In the wake of the Oakwood Incident, the President issued Proclamation No. 427 and
General Order No. 4, both declaring a state of rebellion and calling-out the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to suppress the rebellion. After hours-long negotiations,
the Oakwood Occupation ended and the President lifted the declaration of a state of
rebellion. In the interim, the Petitions were filed assailing the declaration. Petitioners
contended that Sec. 18, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution does not require the
declaration of state of rebellion to call-out the AFP; that there is no factual basis for
such declaration; that the presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of
emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any such power to the President;
and that it “opens the door to the unconstitutional implementation of warrantless
arrests” for the crime of rebellion. Are Petitioners correct?
No. In calling out the armed forces, the declaration of a state of rebellion is an utter superfluity. At
most, it only gives notice to the nation that such a state exists and that the armed forces may be
called to prevent or suppress it. The Supreme Court finds that such a declaration is devoid of any
legal significance. For all legal intents, the declaration is deemed not written. Nor by any stretch of
the imagination can the declaration constitute an indirect exercise of emergency powers, which
exercise depends upon a grant of Congress. The mere declaration of a state of rebellion cannot
diminish or violate constitutionally protected rights. Indeed, if a state of Martial Law does not
suspend the operation of the Constitution or automatically suspend the privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus, then it is with more reason that a simple declaration of a state of rebellion could
not bring about these conditions. The argument that the declaration of a state of rebellion amounts
to a declaration of martial law is a leap of logic. There is no indication that military tribunals have
replaced civil courts in the theater of war or that military authorities have taken over the functions
of civil government. There is no allegation of curtailment of civil or political rights. There is no
indication that the President has exercised judicial and legislative powers. In short, there is no
illustration that the President has attempted to exercise or has exercised martial law power.
(Sanlakas vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004)
a. Pardon – an act of grace which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed from the
punishment that the law inflicts for the crime he has committed;
b. Commutation – the reduction or mitigation of the penalty;
c. Reprieve – the postponement of a sentence or stay of execution;
d. Parole – the release from imprisonment but without full restoration of liberty as parolee
is still in the custody of the law although not in confinement;
e. Remission of fines and forfeitures – prevents the collection of fines or the confiscation
of forfeited property and it cannot have the effect of returning properly which has been
vested in third parties or money ion the public treasury; and
f. Amnesty – an act of grace concurred in by the legislature and usually extended to groups
of persons who committed political offenses, and which puts into oblivion the offense itself.
(Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political Law, 2016)
48. What are the limitations on the exercise of the pardoning power?
a. It cannot be granted in cases of impeachment (Sec. 19, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution );
b. It cannot be granted in cases of violation of election laws without the favorable
recommendation of the Commission on Elections (Sec. 5, Art. IX-C, 1987 Constitution);
c. It can be granted only after conviction by final judgment (People of the Philippines vs.
Salle, Jr., G.R. No. 103567, December 4, 1995, reiterated in People of the Philippines vs.
Bacang, G.R. No. 116512, July 30, 1996);
d. It cannot be granted in cases of legislative or civil contempt;
e. It cannot absolve the convict of civil liability (People of the Philippines vs. Nacional, G.R.
Nos. 111294-95, September 7, 1995); and
f. It cannot restore public offices forfeited (Monsanto vs. Factoran, G.R. No. 78239, February
9, 1989).
PARDON AMNESTY
Judicial notice Private act of the President upon Public act of the President that
which there can be no judicial courts may take judicial notice of
scrutiny; it must be pleaded and
proved
To whom granted; when Granted to an individual after Granted to classes of persons or
conviction communities before the institution
of criminal prosecution or
sometimes after conviction
Concurrence by the No need for the concurrence of Need the concurrence of the
Congress the Congress Congress
Acceptance Acceptance is necessary No need for distinct act of
acceptance
Offense Generally granted for infractions Addressed to political offenses
of peace of the state
Effect Looks forward and relieves the Looks backward and abolishes and
offender from the consequences puts into oblivion the offense itself,
of an offense of which he has as if no offense was committed.
been convicted. (Barrioquinto vs. Fernandez, G.R.
No. L-1278, January 21, 1949)
Under the present Constitution, a pardon, being a presidential prerogative, should not be
circumscribed by legislative action. Thus, the exercise of the pardoning power is discretionary in
the President and may not be interfered with by Congress or the Court, except only when it exceeds
the limits provided for by the Constitution. (Risos-Vidal vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
206666, January 21, 2015)
51. What are the requisites for the validity of transferring savings between Departments?
The President shall nominate a Vice President from among the members of the Senate and the
House of Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all the
Members of both Houses of Congress voting separately. (Sec. 9, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution)
V. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
It is the privilege against disclosure of information or communication to enable the members of the
Court to “freely discuss the issues without fear of criticism for holding unpopular positions” or fear
of humiliation for one’s comments. Philippine laws, rules, and jurisprudence prohibit the disclosure
of privileged information under well-defined rules. At the most basic level, and subject to the
Principle of Comity, members of the Court and Court officials and employees may not be compelled
to testify on matters that are part of the internal deliberations and actions of the Court in the
exercise of its adjudicatory functions and duties. (In Re: Production of Court Records and
Documents and the Attendance of Court Officials and Employees as Witnesses under the
Subpoenas of February 10, 2012 and the Various Letters from the Impeachment Prosecution Panel
dated January 19 and 25, 2012)
55. What is the expanded judicial power to review under the 1987 Constitution?
Sec. 1, Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution expanded the concept of judicial power by granting the
courts the power to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government. (Araullo vs. Aquino III, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014)
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical value. (Abdul vs.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. NO. 184496, December 2, 2013 [J. Del Castillo]; Antolin vs. Domondon,
G.R. No. 165036, July 5, 2010 [J. Del Castillo])
Political questions are those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or (to the) executive branch of the government (Mamba vs. Lara, G.R.
No. 165109, December 14, 2009 [J. Del Castillo])
President Rodrigo Duterte's decision to have the remains of Former President Marcos
interred at the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB) involves a political question that is not a
justiciable controversy. In the exercise of his powers under the Constitution and the
Executive Order No. 292 to allow the interment of Marcos at the LNMB, which is a land of
the public domain devoted for national military cemetery and military shrine purposes,
President Duterte decided a question of policy based on his wisdom that it shall promote
national healing and forgiveness. There being no taint of grave abuse in the exercise of
such discretion, President Duterte's decision on that political question is outside the ambit
of judicial review. (Ocampo vs. Enriquez, G.R. No. 225973, November 8, 2016)
a. Ex-Officio members: (a) Chief Justice, as Chairman; (b) Secretary of Justice; and (c) a
Representative of Congress;
b. Regular members: (a) Representative from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; (b)
Professor of Law; (c) Retired Justice of the Supreme Court; and (d) Representative of the
private sector; and
c. Secretary ex-officio: Clerk of the Supreme Court
61. Republic Act No. 10660, recently enacted on April 16, 2015, created two (2) more
Divisions of the Sandiganbayan with three (3) Justices each, thereby resulting in six
(6) vacant positions. The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) submitted to the President six
(6) clustered and separate shortlists for the 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, and 21st Associate
Justices of the Sandiganbayan. The President appointed nominees from one cluster to
a different position from which they were nominated for, such that the 21st nominee
of the JBC was appointed as the 16th Associate Justice, therefore offending the order
of preference and seniority. Can the President validly do this?
Yes. It should be stressed that the power to recommend of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)
cannot be used to restrict or limit the President’s power to appoint as the latter’s prerogative to
choose someone whom he/she considers worth appointing to the vacancy in the Judiciary is still
paramount. As long as in the end, the President appoints someone nominated by the JBC, the
appointment is valid. The JBC cannot, by clustering of the nominees, designate a numerical order
of seniority of the prospective appointees. The numerical order of the seniority or order of
preference of the Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan is determined pursuant to law by the
date and order of their commission or appointment by the President. Evidently, based on law, rules,
and jurisprudence, the numerical order of the Sandiganbayan Associate Justices cannot be
determined until their actual appointment by the President. It bears to point out that part of the
President's power to appoint members of a collegiate court, such as the Sandiganbayan, is the
power to determine the seniority or order of preference of such newly appointed members by
controlling the date and order of issuance of said members' appointment or commission papers.
(Aguinaldo vs. Aquino III, G.R. No. 224302, February 21, 2017)
The “unanimity requirement” under Sec. 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 states that in case the integrity of
an applicant (not otherwise disqualified) to the Judiciary, to the position of Ombudsman, or his
Deputies, is challenged, the affirmative vote of all the members of the Judicial and Bar Council
must be obtained for the favorable consideration of his nomination, imposing a higher voting
requirement. It follows then that the "unanimity rule" only comes into operation when the moral
character of a person is put in issue. It finds no application where the question is essentially
unrelated to an applicant’s moral uprightness. (Jardeleza vs. Sereno, G.R. No. 213181, August 19,
2014)
64. Can the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission be included in the Board of
Trustees/Directors of the Government Service Insurance System, Philippine Health
Insurance Corporation, Employees’ Compensation commission, and, Home
Development Mutual Fund without violating the independence of the Constitutional
Commission?
No. Apart from violating the prohibition against holding multiple offices, the designation of the
Chairman of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) as member of the governing Boards of the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), Philippine Health Insurance Corporation
(PhilHealth), Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC), and Home Development Mutual Fund
(HDMF) impairs the independence of the CSC. Under Sec. 17, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, the
President exercises control over all government offices in the Executive Branch. An office that is
legally not under the control of the President is not part of the Executive Branch. As provided in
their respective charters, PhilHealth and ECC have the status of a government corporation and are
deemed attached to the Department of Health and the Department of Labor and Employment,
respectively. On the other hand, GSIS and HDMF fall under the Office of the President. The
corporate powers of the GSIS, PhilHealth, ECC, and HDMF are exercised through their governing
Boards, members of which are all appointed by the President of the Philippines. Undoubtedly, the
GSIS, PhilHealth, ECC, and HDMF and the members of their respective governing Boards are under
the control of the President. As such, the CSC Chairman cannot be a member of a government
entity that is under the control of the President without impairing the independence vested in the
CSC by the 1987 Constitution. (Funa vs. Duque, G.R. No. 191672, November 25, 2014)
65. The Philippine National Police (PNP) Regional Office 10 appointed Police Officer 1
(PO1) with a temporary status. He took the Career Service Professional Examination-
Computer Assisted Test (CSP-CAT) given by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) and
passed the same. Thereafter, he was conferred permanent status as PO1. The CSC-
Caraga informed PO1 about certain alleged irregularities relative to the CSP-CAT which
he took. A Preliminary Investigation was then scheduled by CSC. PO1 then argued that
it is the National Police Commission which has sole authority to conduct entrance and
promotional examinations for police officers to the exclusion of the CSC. Is PO1
correct?
No. Sec. 28, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations specifically confers upon
the Civil Service Commission (CSC) the authority to take cognizance over any irregularities or
anomalies connected with the examinations. Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the CSC acted
within its jurisdiction when it initiated the conduct of a preliminary investigation on the alleged civil
service examination irregularity committed by PO1. This is to be distinguished from ordinary
proceedings intended to discipline a bona fide member of the system, for acts or omissions that
constitute violations of the law or the rules of the service. ( Capablanca vs. Civil Service Commission,
G.R. No. 179370, November 18, 2009 [J. Del Castillo]; Balasbas vs. Monayao, G.R. No. 190524,
February 17, 2014 [J. Del Castillo]; Catipon, Jr. vs. Japson, G.R. No. 191787, June 22, 2015 [J.
Del Castillo])
66. On February 15, 2001, the President appointed X as the Chairman of the Commission
of Audit for a term of seven (7) years, whose term of office started on February 2, 2001
to end on February 2, 2008. In the interim, on February 7, 2004, Y was appointed as a
member of the said Commission for a term of seven (7) years, starting from February
2, 2004 until February 2, 2011. Upon retirement of X, Y was then appointed as COA
Chairman on April 18, 2008 and was to serve until the expiration of his original term of
office as Commissioner (or on February 2, 2011). Y contends in the proper forum that
a “fresh period” should apply to him – that is, he should be allowed to serve the full
seven (7) years. Is Y correct?
No. In no case can one be a member of the Commission on Audit (COA), either as Chairman or
Commissioner, or a mix of both positions, for an aggregate term of more than seven (7) years. A
contrary view would allow a circumvention of the aggregate 7-year service limitation. Where the
Constitution or, for that matter, a statute, has fixed the term of office of a public official, the
appointing authority is without authority to specify in the appointment a term shorter or longer
than what the law provides. If the vacancy calls for a full seven-year appointment, the President is
without discretion to extend a promotional appointment for more or for less than seven (7) years.
(Funa vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012)
70. X failed the National Medical Admission Test three times and was barred from taking
it the fourth time because of the three-flunk rule. He files a Petition in court alleging
that such rule is unconstitutional as it impairs his constitutional right to education. Is
he right with his contention?
No. While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional right
to be a doctor. This is true of any other calling in which the public interest is involved; and the
closer the link, the longer the bridge to one's ambition. The State has the responsibility to harness
its human resources and to see to it that they are not dissipated or not used at all. These resources
must be applied in a manner that will best promote the common good while also giving the
individual a sense of satisfaction. (Department of Education vs. San Diego, G.R. No. 89572,
December 21, 1989)
Yes. The Equal Protection Clause does not imply that the same treatment be accorded all and
sundry. It applies to things or persons identically or similarly situated. It permits of classification of
the object or subject of the law provided classification is reasonable or based on substantial
distinction, which make for real differences, and that it must apply equally to each member of the
class. What is required under the Equal Protection Clause is the uniform operation by legal means,
so that all persons under identical or similar circumstance would be accorded the same treatment
both in privilege conferred and the liabilities imposed. (Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. vs.
Board of transportation, G.R. No. L-59234, September 30, 1982)
72. Can establishments claim as tax deductions the Senior Citizen Discounts that they
give?
Yes. As a form of reimbursement, the law provides that business establishments extending the
twenty percent discount to senior citizens may claim the discount as a tax deduction. The law is a
legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has general
welfare for its object. (Manila Memorial Park, Inc. vs. Secretary of Department of Social Welfare
and Development, G.R. No. 175356, December 3, 2013 [J. Del Castillo])
It is an action to recover just compensation from the State or its expropriating agency. It has the
objective to recover the value of property taken in fact by the government, even though no formal
exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the taking agency. As regard
damages, inverse condemnation, on one hand, is an action to recover, while on the other hand,
payment for damages is predicated on statutory enactments and emanates from a transgression
of a right. (National Power Corporation vs. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay, G.R. No. 165828, August
24, 2011)
75. X’s lot was taken by the government in line with the road-widening project in Manila
in 1981. Upon full payment to him in 1983, he alleges that the amount paid was
insufficient as the valuation should be based on the value of the lot when the payment
is made. Is he right with his contention?
No. For the purposes of determining just compensation, the fair market value of an expropriated
property is determined by its character and its price at the time of taking, or the time when the
landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property, such as when the title is transferred
in the name of the beneficiaries. (City of Iloilo vs. Contreras-Besana, G.R. No. 168967, February
12, 2010 [J. Del Castillo]; Landbank of the Philippines vs. Livioco, G.R. No. 170685, September
22, 2010 [J. Del Castillo]; Landbank of the Philippines vs. Heirs of Maximo Puyat, G.R. No.
175055, June 27, 2012 [J. Del Castillo]; National Power Corporation vs. Zabala, G.R. No. 173520,
January 30, 2013 [J. Del Castillo]; Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Galle, G.R. No. 171836,
August 11, 2014 [J. Del Castillo]; National Power Corporation vs. Samar, G.R. No. 197329,
September 8, 2014 [J. Del Castillo]; Spouses Mercado vs. Landbank of the Philippines, G.R. No.
196707, June 17, 2015 [J. Del Castillo]; Landbank of the Philippines vs. Spouses Chu, G.R. No.
192345, March 29, 2017 [J. Del Castillo])
Public use, as an eminent domain concept, has now acquired an expansive meaning to include any
use that is of "usefulness, utility, or advantage, or what is productive of general benefit (of the
public)." If the genuine public necessity – the very reason or condition as it were – allowing, at the
first instance, the expropriation of a private land ceases or disappears, then there is no more cogent
point for the government’s retention of the expropriated land. The same legal situation should hold
if the government devotes the property to another public use very much different from the original
or deviates from the declared purpose to benefit another private person. It has been said that the
direct use by the state of its power to oblige landowners to renounce their productive possession
to another citizen, who will use it predominantly for that citizen’s own private gain, is offensive to
our laws. The expropriator should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in
the Petition for expropriation filed, failing which, it should file another Petition for the new purpose.
If not, it is then incumbent upon the expropriator to return the said property to its private owner,
if the latter desires to reacquire the same. (Vda. de Ouano vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No.
168770, February 9, 2011)
77. X was granted a franchise by several Municipal Councils and the National Electrification
Administration to operate an electric light and power service in the Province of Laguna.
Upon enactment of the Local Government Code, the Provincial Governments issued a
tax ordinance imposing franchise tax. X paid under protest and claims for refund
because of the duplicity with an existing law. X contend that the imposition of franchise
tax under the provincial ordinance is violative of the non-impairment clause since the
franchise tax it had paid and continued to pay to the National Government already
included the franchise tax imposed by the Provincial Tax Ordinance. Is X correct?
No. A franchise partakes the nature of a grant which is beyond the purview of the non-impairment
clause of the Constitution. Sec. 11, Art. XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution is explicit that no
franchise for the operation of a public utility shall be granted, except under the condition that such
privilege shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by Congress as and when the
common good so requires. (Manila Electric Company vs. Province of Laguna, G.R. No. 13159, May
5, 1999)
78. What are the aspects of due process and its requisites?
A law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application. (Spouses Romualdez v. Commission and Elections, G.R. No. 167011,
April 30, 2008)
83. After several Committee Hearings and consultations with various stakeholders, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City enacted Ordinance No. 0309-07 to impose a
ban against aerial spraying as an agricultural practice by all agricultural entities within
Davao City. The City Mayor approved the Ordinance and took effect after its publication
in a newspaper circulating in Davao City. The Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters’
Association and its members, filed a Petition in the Regional Trial Court to challenge
the constitutionality of the Ordinance for being violative of, among others, Equal
Protection Clause when (a) it prohibits the use of aerial spray per se regardless of the
substance or the level of concentration of the chemicals to be applied, and (b) it
imposes the 30-meter buffer zone in all agricultural lands in Davao City regardless of
sizes of the landholding. Is it unconstitutional?
Yes. A ban against aerial spraying does not weed out the harm that the Ordinance seeks to achieve.
In the process, the Ordinance suffers from being "underinclusive" because the classification does
not include all individuals tainted with the same mischief that the law seeks to eliminate. A
classification that is drastically “underinclusive” with respect to the purpose or end appears as an
irrational means to the legislative end because it poorly serves the intended purpose of the law.
Further, the establishment and maintenance of the buffer zone will become more burdensome to
the small agricultural landholders because: (1) they have to reserve the 30-meter belt surrounding
their property; (2) that will have to be identified through Global Positioning System; (3) the metes
and bounds of the buffer zone will have to be plotted in a survey plan for submission to the local
government unit; and (4) will be limited as to the crops that may be cultivated therein based on
the mandate that the zone shall be devoted to "diversified trees" taller than what are being grown
therein. (Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters’ Association , G.R. No. 189185,
August 16, 2016)
Within these zones, any form of intrusion is impermissible, unless excused by law and in accordance
with customary legal process. The meticulous regard accorded to these zones arises not only from
the conviction that the right to privacy is a "constitutional right" and "the right most valued by
civilized men", but also from the adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which
mandates that "no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy" and "everyone
has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks. (In the Matter of the
Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of Camilo L. Sabio vs. Gordon , G.R. No. 174340,
October 17, 2006)
1. Sec. 2, Art. III: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose.
2. Sec. 3, Art. III: Renders inviolable the "privacy of communication and
correspondence" and further cautions that "any evidence obtained in violation
of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding."
Where a search warrant charged violations of two (2) special laws, it was considered a scatter-
shot warrant, and was declared null and void. Sec. 3 of Rule 126 of Rules of Court prohibits the
issuance of a search warrant for more than one specific offense. (Tambasen vs. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 89103, July 14, 1995)
Yes. In People of the Philippines vs. Dichoso (G.R. No. 101216-18, June 4, 1993), it was
held that the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law that deals with dangerous drugs
which are subsumed into prohibited and regulated drugs, and defines and penalizes
categories of offenses which are closely related or which belong to the same class or
species; thus, one search warrant may be validly issued for several violations thereof. This
is reiterated in People of the Philippines vs. Salanguit (G.R. No. 133254-55, April 19, 2001).
a. In flagrante delicto: When, in the presence of the arresting officer, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
(Sec. 5[a], Rule 113, Rules of Court);
b. Hot Pursuit Doctrine: When an offense has just been committed and the arresting
officer has probable cause to believe, based on his personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances, that the person to be arrested has committed it. (Sec. 5[b], Rule 113,
Revised Rules of Court);
c. Escape Rule: When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another. (Sec. 5c, Rule 113, Rules of Court);
d. Abscond Rule: An accused released on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of
a warrant if he attempts to depart from the Philippines without permission of the court
where the case is pending. (Sec. 23[2], Rule 114, Rules of Court); and
e. When the right is voluntarily waived (People of the Philippines vs. Navarro, G.R. No.
130644, March 13, 1998)
a. When the right is voluntarily waived (People of the Philippines vs. Omaweng, G.R. No.
99050, September 2, 1992);
b. Where the search (and seizure) is an incident to a lawful arrest (Sec. 3, Rule 126, Rules of
Court);
c. Search of vessels and aircraft (People of the Philippines vs. Johnson, G.R. No. 138881,
December 18, 2000);
d. Search of moving vehicles (Caballes vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136292, January 15,
2002); and
e. Search and seizure under exigent and emergency circumstances (Spouses Veroy vs.
Layague, G.R. No. L-95630, June 18, 1992)
88. What is “Stop and Frisk”?
In the landmark United States case, Terry vs. Ohio (392 U.S. 1 [1968]), it was defined as the
vernacular designation of the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate
him, and pat him for weapons whenever he observes unusual conduct which leads him to conclude
that criminal activity may be afoot. In People of the Philippines vs. Sy Chua (G.R. Nos. 136066-67,
February 4, 2003), the Supreme Court said that for a “stop and frisk” situation, the police officer
should properly introduced himself and make initial inquiries, approach and restrain a person who
manifests unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to check the latter’s outer clothing for possibly
concealed weapons. The apprehending police officer must have a genuine reason, in accordance
with the police officer’s experience and the surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the
person to be held has weapons or contraband and concealed about him. It should, therefore, be
emphasized that a search and seizure should precede the arrest for the principle to apply.
Objects in the “plain view” of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view
are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. It is usually applied where the police
officer is not searching for evidence against the Accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes
upon an incriminating object. It has the following requisites: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on
the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official
duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who has the right to be where
they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and (d) “plain view” justified the seizure
of the evidence without any further search. (People of the Philippines vs. Musa, G.R. No. 96177,
January 27, 1993)
90. Senior Police Officer (SPO) 1 Cardo Dalisay went to X’s residence, introduced himself
to the latter, informed him of his authority and purpose, and showed him a search
warrant. However, SPO1 Dalisay was denied entrance. In this light, SPO1 Dalisay broke
in and conducted his search. X filed a case contending that the search was unlawful. Is
X correct?
No. The officer, if refused admittance to the place of directed search after giving notice of his
purpose and authority, may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house or any part
of a house or anything therein to execute the warrant or liberate himself or any person lawfully
aiding him when unlawfully detained therein. (People of the Philippines vs. Huang Zhen Hua and
Jogy Lee, G.R. No. 139301, September 29, 2004)
91. X was riding a jeepney on his way home when the jeepney driver, in a checkpoint,
made a signal to the police informing the latter that X was carrying marijuana. The
police officer approached X and asked about the contents of his bag. When asked if the
police can open his bag, X kept his silence. When asked for the bag, X handed it to the
police. Thereafter, the police saw marijuana; hence, X was arrested. Was there a valid
search?
No. The situation does not fall under the conditions where a warrantless search is allowed. The
police officer should not adopt the suspicion initiated by another person. This is necessary to justify
that the person suspected be stopped and reasonably searched. Anything less than this would be
an infringement upon one’s basic right to security of one’s person and effects. (People of the
Philippines vs. Cogaed, G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014)
92. X’s counsel wants to admit into evidence an audio recording involving X and Y in a
heated discussion. Y’s counsel contested this because Y did not know that their
conversation was being recorded. However, X’s counsel argued that only one party’s
consent is needed for the recording to be admissible. Is X’s counsel correct?
No. The Anti-Wiretapping Law (Republic Act No. 4200) provides that all parties in a private
communication need to give their consent for it to be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-
judicial, legislative, or administrative hearing or investigation. Further, the exclusionary rule as
enshrined in Sec. 3(1)(2), Art. III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, prohibits the admission of
pieces of evidence that are in violation of the privacy of communications in any proceeding.
(Salcedo-Ortanez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110062, August 4, 1994)
93. AB Development & Resources, Inc. (owned by Spouses A and B) filed a case for
Injunction and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction or Temporary Restraining
Order against the Spouses X and Y. The Spouses A and B claimed that Spouses X and Y
constructed a fence without a valid permit and that it would destroy the walls of their
building. The court denied the application for lack of evidence. So in order to get pieces
of evidence for the case, Spouses A and B illegally set-up two (2) video surveillance
cameras facing Spouses X and Y’s property. The former’s employees even took pictures
of the said construction of the fence. Spouses X and Y then filed a case against the
Spouses A and B for violating their right to privacy. The Regional Trial Court (RTC)
issued an order granting the application and directed Spouses A and B to remove the
video surveillance cameras they installed. Spouses A and B appealed the case to the
Court of Appeals, which annulled and set aside the RTC Decision. Spouses X and Y
elevated the case to the Supreme Court with this legal question: Is the installation of
the two video surveillance cameras of Spouses A and B violated their right to privacy?
Yes. Such act of the Spouses A and B violated the right of privacy of Spouses X and Y under Art.
26(1) of the Civil Code prohibiting the “prying into the privacy of another’s residence.” Although it
is a business office and not a residence, the owner has the right to exclude the public or deny them
access. (Spouses Hing vs. Choachuy, Sr., G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013 [J. Del Castillo])
On one hand, under the content-based regulations, the evil consequences sought to be prevented
must be substantive, extremely serious, and the degree of imminence is extremely high. Only when
the challenged act has overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional
muster, with the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.
On the other hand, content-neutral regulations are concerned with the incidents of the speech, or
one that merely controls the time, place, and manner. It must pass the substantial interest test.
(Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political Law, 2016)
95. X contends that Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 violates the due process and eminent domain
provision of the 1987 Constitution, by taking airtime from radio and television
broadcasting stations without payment of just compensation. He further claims that
the primary source of revenue of radio and television stations is the sale of airtime to
advertisers, and that to require these stations to provide free airtime is to authorize
taking which is not a “de minimis temporary limitation or restraint upon the use of
private property”. Is X correct?
No. All broadcasting, whether by radio or by television stations, is licensed by the government.
Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast than
there are frequencies to assign. A franchise is thus a privilege subject, among other things, to
amendment by Congress in accordance with the constitutional provision that “any such franchise
or right granted . . . shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress when the
common good so requires. (Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines vs.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 132922, April 21, 1998)
96. X, a senatorial candidate, filed a Complaint before the court alleging the
unconstitutionality of Sec. 9(a) of Resolution No. 9615 of the Commission on Elections
limiting the broadcast and radio advertisement of candidates and political parties for
national elections to an aggregate total of 120 minutes and 180 minutes, respectively.
He contends that such restrictive regulation on allowable broadcast time violates
freedom of the press, impairs the people’s right to suffrage, as well as their right to
information relative to the exercise of their right to choose who to elect during the
forthcoming elections. Is X correct?
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the assailed rule on “aggregate-based” airtime limits is
unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and political
parties to reach out and communicate with the people. Here, the adverted reason for imposing the
“aggregate-based” airtime limits – leveling the playing field – does not constitute a compelling state
interest which would justify such a substantial restriction on the freedom of candidates and political
parties to communicate their ideas, philosophies, platforms and programs of government. And, this
is specially so in the absence of a clear-cut basis for the imposition of such a prohibitive measure.
(GMA Network vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205357, September 2, 2014)
97. Several pre-taped episodes of the TV program “Ang Tuwid na Daan” of a religious group
were rated “X” – that is, not for public viewing – by the Movie and Television Review
and Classification Board. This TV program allegedly offended and constituted an attack
against other religions, which is expressly prohibited by law. The religious group which
airs the said program filed a case in court alleging that there is grave abuse of
discretion in classifying their program as X-Rated. Is their contention correct?
Yes. The Supreme Court, in finding grave abuse of discretion, gave the following reasons:
a. Any act that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and should be
greeted with furrowed brows. It is the burden of the Movie and Television Review and
Classification Board (MTRCB) to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this
burden, its act of censorship will be struck down. It failed in the case at bar.
b. An examination of the evidence will show that the so-called "attacks" are mere criticisms
of some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions. The videotapes were not
viewed by the court as they were not presented as evidence. Yet they were considered by
the as indecent, contrary to law and good customs.
c. The MTRCB rely on the ground "attacks against another religion" in x-rating the religious
program. Even a side-glance at the relevant law will reveal that it is not among the grounds
to justify an order prohibiting the broadcast of a television program. It runs smack against
the hoary doctrine that administrative rules and regulations cannot expand the letter and
spirit of the law they seek to enforce.
d. In x-rating the TV program, the court and the MTRCB failed to apply the clear and present
danger rule. The records show that the decision of the MTRCB is completely bereft of
findings of facts to justify the conclusion that the subject video tapes constitute
impermissible attacks against another religion. There is no showing whatsoever of the type
of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened
harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by
hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil which has
taken the life of a reality already on ground. (Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 119673, July 26, 1996)
98. Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile filed a case against Ayer Productions for the projected
production and filming of “The Four Day Revolution”, which relates to the non-bloody
change of government that took place at EDSA, for its intrusion upon his right to
privacy. Is the projected motion under the guaranty of protected speech?
No. The Supreme Court upheld the primacy of freedom of expression over Sen. Enrile’s right to
privacy because he was a “public figure” and a public figure’s right to privacy is narrower than that
of an ordinary citizen. Besides, the movie “A Dangerous Life” would not have been historically
faithful without including therein the participation of Enrile in the EDSA Revolution. Thus, the
intrusion into Enrile’s right to privacy is not unreasonable. (Ayer Productions vs. Capulong, G.R.
No. 82380, April 29, 1988)
The Overbreadth Doctrine decrees that a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means
which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. ( Estrada
vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560. November 19, 2001)
a. Gag Law – it was inappropriate to bar media reporting on a criminal case prior to the trial
itself, except in matters where a "clear and present danger" existed that would impede the
process of a fair trial. (Nebraska Press Association vs. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 [1976])
b. Sub Judice Rule – restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to judicial proceedings
to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of
justice. It applies not only to the parties to the case, but also to the public in general,
including the media. (Romero et al. vs. Estrada et al., G.R. No. 174105, April 2, 2009)
c. Shield Law (Republic Act No. 1477) – designed to shield journalists from being forced to
reveal the sources of information they gathered or obtained in confidence.
a. Whether the average person, applying contemporary standards would find that the work,
taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest;
b. Whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and
c. Whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value. (Miller vs. California, 413 U.S. 15, June 21, 1973 cited in Fernando vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 159751, December 6, 2006)
103. X posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound housing the San Sebastian
Cathedral of Bacolod. The first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA RH LAW!”,
referring to the Reproductive Health (RH) Law; and the second tarpaulin contains the
heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either “Anti-RH/Team Buhay” with
a check-mark, or “Pro-RH/Team Patay” with an x-mark, clearly referring to how the
politicians vote on the adoption of the RH Law. Can the Commission on Elections
assume jurisdiction on the matter?
No. While the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named candidates and political
parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for
or posted "in return for consideration" by any candidate, political party, or party-list group.
(Diocese of Bacolod vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015)
104. X, a chief of an executive agency, filed and charged Y, author/writer, with the crime
of libel because the latter wrote an article indicating the former as an extortionist, a
corrupt public official, smuggler, and having acquired his wealth illegally. Y contested
that her article is protected as qualified privileged communication and should not be
convicted with libel. Is Y correct?
No. The exercise of press freedom must be done consistent with good faith and reasonable care.
This was clearly abandoned by Y when she wrote the subject articles. This is no case of mere
error or honest mistake, but a case of a journalist abdicating her responsibility to verify her story
and instead misinforming the public. Journalists may be allowed an adequate margin of error in
the exercise of their profession, but this margin does not expand to cover every defamatory or
injurious statement they may make in the furtherance of their profession, nor does this margin
cover total abandonment of responsibility. (Tulfo vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 161032,
September 16, 2008)
105. The host of a prime-time show – rated “G” for general viewership – managed by a
certain religious group made obscene remarks against members of another religious
group. Offended by these remarks, some members and officials of the latter religious
group went to the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB) to
ask for the former’s television program. The MTRCB granted their prayer. Aggrieved
with the suspension, the former religious group filed a case contending that the State
cannot regulate one’s right. Is the contention correct?
No. The suspension of the television program did not constitute prior restraint, but partook of
the nature of subsequent punishment for statements which were contextually violative of the
program’s “G” rating that should be suitable for all ages. The vulgar language used on prime
time television was inappropriate for children. (Soriano vs. Laguardia, G.R. No. 164785, April 29,
2009)
Under the Free Speech Clause (Sec. 4, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution), the government may
not silence speech based on the reaction (or anticipated reaction) of a hostile audience, unless
there is a "clear and present danger" of grave and imminent harm.
If the assembly is to be held in a public place, a permit for the use of such place, and not for the
assembly itself, may be validly required. But the power of local officials in this regard is merely
one of regulation, not prohibition. However, a permit to hold a public assembly shall not be
necessary where the meeting is to be held (a) in a private place, (b) in the campus of a
government-owned or –operated educational institution, or (c) in a freedom park. Where permit
is required, the written application shall be filed with the Mayor’s office at least five (5) days
before the scheduled meeting and shall be acted upon within two (2) days, otherwise the permit
shall be deemed granted. Denial of the permit may be justified only upon clear and convincing
evidence that the public assembly will create a clear and present danger to public order, safety,
convenience, morals, or health. Action on the application shall be communicated within 24 hours
to the applicant, who may appeal the same to the appropriate court. The law permits law
enforcement to detail a contingent under a responsible officer at least 100 meters away from the
assembly, in case it becomes necessary to maintain order. (Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political
Law, 2016)
108. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) refused to recognize Ang Ladlad LGBT
Party, an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as
lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs), as a party list based
on moral grounds, saying that it is in violation of the principles laid down in the Bible
and the Koran. Can the COMELEC refuse recognition on the aforesaid ground without
violating constitutional precepts?
No. The non-establishment clause calls for government neutrality in religious matters. Clearly,
governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality. It was
a grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the Commission on Elections to utilize the
Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad LGBT Party. (Ang Ladlad LGBT Party
vs. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010 [J. De Castillo])
a. Exemption from taxation of properties actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious
purposes (Sec. 28[3], Art. VI, 1987 Constitution);
b. Citizenship requirement of ownership of educational institutions, except those established
by religious groups and mission boards (Sec. 4[2], Art. XIV, 1987 Constitution);
c. Optional religious instruction in public elementary and high schools (Sec. 3[3], Art. XIV,
1987 Constitution); and
d. Appropriation allowed where minister or ecclesiastic is employed in the armed forces, in a
penal institution, or in a government-owned orphanage or leprosarium (Sec. 29[2], Art.
VI, 1987 Constitution)
Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and interests but
at the same time strive to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible
constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent
neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not
offend compelling state interests. (Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
190582, April 8, 2010 [J. Del Castillo])
The Supreme Court, citing Lemon vs. Kurtzman (403 U.S. 602 [1971]), said that a regulation is
constitutional when (a) it has a secular legislative purpose; (b) it neither advances nor inhibits
religion; and (c) it does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.
Yes. However, the students’ right not to participate in the flag ceremony does not give them a
right to disrupt such patriotic exercises. If they quietly stand at attention during flag ceremony
while their classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the
patriotic pledge, the Supreme Court does not see how such conduct may possibly disturb the
peace, or pose a grave and present danger of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public
health, or any legitimate public interest that the State has a right and duty to prevent. (Ebralinag
vs. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu, G.R. No. 95770, March 1, 1993)
113. X inherited a piece of land that was ascertained by the National Historical Institute
(NHI) to have been the birth site of Felix Manolo, the founder of Ang Tuwid na Daan.
NHI issued a Resolution declaring it to be a National Historical Landmark. Later, the
State filed an action to expropriate the land. Julio filed a Complaint alleging that the
expropriation should not proceed as the act would constitute an application of public
funds in favor of a religious group which is contrary to constitutional mandate on the
Separation of Church and State. Is Julio correct with his contention?
No. The purpose is essentially to recognize the distinctive contribution of the late Felix Manalo to
the culture of the Philippines, rather than to commemorate his founding and leadership of the
Iglesia ni Cristo. The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by members of the
Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others could well be true but such a peculiar advantage still remains
to be merely incidental and secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few would actually benefit
from the expropriation of property does not necessarily diminish the essence and character of
public use. (Manosca vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106440, January 29, 1996)
114. Justice X initiated the holding of masses in the Hall of Justice. Justice Y filed a
Complaint against the former contending that such act is unconstitutional being that
the separation of the Church and State should be inviolable. Is Justice Y correct?
No. The holding of Religious Rituals in the Hall of Justice does not amount to the union of Church
and State. The 1987 Constitution provides that the separation of Church and the State shall be
inviolable; if further provides that the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. Allowing religion to
flourish is not contrary to the principle of separation of Church and state. In fact, these two
principles are in perfect harmony with each other. (In Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano, Holding
of Religious Rituals at the Hall of Justice Building in Quezon City , A.M. No. 10-4-19 SC, March 7,
2017)
No. Grave and overriding considerations of public interest justify restrictions even if made against
fundamental rights. Specifically on the freedom to move from one place to another, jurisprudence
provides that this right is not absolute. As the 1987 Constitution itself reads, the State may
impose limitations on the exercise of this right, provided that they: (1) serve the interest of
national security, public safety, or public health; and (2) are provided by law. The stated purposes
of the Curfew Ordinances, specifically the promotion of juvenile safety and prevention of juvenile
crime, inarguably serve the interest of public safety. The restriction on the minor's movement
and activities within the confines of their residences and their immediate vicinity during the
curfew period is perceived to reduce the probability of the minor becoming victims of or getting
involved in crimes and criminal activities. As to the second requirement, i.e., that the limitation
"be provided by law", our legal system is replete with laws emphasizing the State's duty to afford
special protection to children. (Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan et al. vs. Quezon City
et al., G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017)
a. What are the restrictions to right to travel?
In Manotoc vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. L-62100, May 30, 1986), the Supreme Court
held that a lawful order is also a valid restriction on the right to travel.
116. Reconcile the cases of Ople vs. Torres (G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998) and Kilusang
Mayo Uno vs. National Economic Development Authority Director-General (G.R. No.
167789, April 19, 2006) in relation to National ID System vis-à-vis right to privacy.
On one hand, in Ople vs. Torres (G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998), the Supreme Court ruled that
the Administrative Order No. 308, which establishes for the first time a National Computerized
Identification Reference System, was a violation of the right to privacy because it does not
provide in clear and categorical terms how the information to be gathered shall be handled. It
does not provide who shall control and access the data, under what circumstances, and for what
purpose. It falls short of assuring that personal information which will be gathered about our
people will only be processed for unequivocally specified purposes. On the other hand, in Kilusang
Mayo Uno vs. National Economic Development Authority Director-General (G.R. No. 167798, April
19, 2006), the Supreme Court ruled that no constitutional infirmity on the right of privacy was
shown by Executive Order No. 420, which streamlines and harmonizes the existing ID system
within each government agency. It limits the data to be collected and recorded under the uniform
ID system, and it applies only to government entities that already maintain ID systems and issue
ID cards pursuant to their regular functions under existing laws. It does not grant such
government entities any power that they do not already possess under existing laws.
117. What are some of the recognized exception on the right to information?
a. In Chavez vs. Philippine Commission on Good Governance (G.R. No. 130716, December 9,
1998), the Supreme Court ruled that there is a privilege against disclosure on certain
matters involving State secrets regarding the military, diplomatic, and other national
security matters.
b. In Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority (G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002), the Supreme Court
ruled that secrets involving military, diplomatic, and national security matters, and
information on investigations of crimes by law enforcement agencies before the
prosecution of the accused were exempted from the right to information. The right to
information does not also extend to presidential conversations, correspondences, and
discussion in closed-door cabinet meetings.
c. Executive Order No. 02, series of 2016 categorized the recognized exceptions submitted
by the Department of Justice and Office of Solicitor General as follows: (a) information
covered by Executive Privilege; (b) privileged information relating to national security,
defense, or international relations; (c) information concerning law enforcement and
protection of public and personal safety; (d) information deemed confidential for the
protection of the privacy of persons and certain individuals, such as minors, victims of
crimes, or the accused; (e) information, documents, or records known by reason of official
capacity and are deemed as confidential, including those submitted or disclosed by entities
to government agencies, tribunals, board, or officers, in relation to the performance of
their functions, or to inquiries or investigation conducted by them in the exercise of their
administrative, regulatory, or quasi-judicial powers; (f) prejudicial premature disclosure;
(g) records of proceedings or information from proceedings which, pursuant to law or
relevant rules and regulation, are treated as confidential or privileged; (h) matters
considered confidential under banking and finance laws, and their amendatory laws; and
(i) other exceptions to the right to information under laws, jurisprudence, and
implementing rules and regulations.
To warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges
have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. (Webb
vs. De Leon, G.R. No. 121234, August 23, 1995 citing Martelino vs. Alejandro, G.R. No. L-30894,
March 25, 1970)
There is substantial impairment (a) when the law changes the terms of a legal contract between
the parties, either in the time or mode of performance, or (b) imposes new conditions, or (c)
dispenses with those expressed, or authorizes for its satisfaction something different from that
provided in its terms. (Clements vs. Nolting, G.R. No. L-17959, January 24, 1922)
120. X was accused of qualified rape committed against his 13-year old daughter. One of
the witnesses for the prosecution was Y, a barangay tanod. Y testified that after his
assistance was sought earlier, he proceeded to X’s house and found that the latter
wearing only his underwear. He invited X to the police station, to which X obliged. At
the police outpost, X admitted to him that he raped his daughter. The confession was
offered in court. X contested the admissibility in evidence of his alleged confession
with Y, arguing that even if he, indeed, confessed to Y the confession, the same was
inadmissible in evidence because he was not assisted by a lawyer, and there was no
valid waiver of such requirement. Rule on the admissibility of X’s confession.
It is inadmissible. Sec. 2(d) of Republic Act No. 7438 provides that any extrajudicial confession
made by a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall be in writing and
signed by such person in the presence of his counsel, or in the latter's absence, upon a valid
waiver, and in the presence of any of the parents, elder brothers and sisters, his spouse, the
municipal mayor, the municipal judge, district school supervisor, or priest or minister of the
gospel as chosen by him; otherwise, such extrajudicial confession shall be inadmissible as
evidence in any proceeding.
No. Under the Constitution and the rules laid down pursuant to law and jurisprudence, a
confession to be admissible in evidence must satisfy four (4) fundamental requirements: (a) the
confession must be voluntary; (b) the confession must be made with the assistance of competent
and independent counsel; (c) the confession must be express; and, (d) the confession must be
in writing. Among all these requirements none is accorded the greatest respect than an accused's
right to counsel to adequately protect him in his ignorance and shield him from the otherwise
condemning nature of a custodial investigation. The person being interrogated must be assisted
by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions
from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation for the commission of the offense. ( People
of the Philippines vs. Ordono, G.R. No. 132154, June 29, 2000)
123. On June 5, 2014, Sen. X was charged with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis
of his purported involvement in the Priority Development Assistance Fund Scam.
Initially, Sen. X, in an Omnibus Motion, requested to post bail, which the
Sandiganbayan denied. On July 3, 2014, a warrant for Sen. X's arrest was issued,
leading to his voluntary surrender. He again asked the Sandiganbayan in a Motion to
Fix Bail which was heard by the Sandiganbayan on the grounds of his advanced age
and voluntary surrender and that he is not a flight risk due to his age and physical
condition. Sandiganbayan denied this in its assailed resolution. Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise denied. Was the Sandiganbayan correct in denying his
motion?
No. The Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to ensure the appearance of the
accused during the trial; and unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing of the fragile health
and advanced age of Enrile. His social and political standing and his having immediately
surrendered to the authorities upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight
or escape from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal disposition from the onset of his
indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for the legal
processes of this country. Further, bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of
the crime charged, should be allowed independently of the merits of the charge, provided his
continued incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life.
Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling his health and life would not serve the true objective
of preventive incarceration during the trial. (Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 213847, August
18, 2015)
124. Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) were charged with violation
of Articles of War (AW) 67 (Mutiny), AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a
Gentleman) and AW 94 (Various Crimes) in relation to Art. 248 of the Revised Penal
Code (Murder). They were questioning the conduct of the pre-trial investigation
conducted where a Motion to Bail was filed but was denied. They applied for
provisional liberty and preliminary injunction before the court which was granted.
However, the Court Marshall refused to release them for provisional liberty pending
the resolution of the appeal he has taken before the court invoking that military
officers are an exemption from the right to bail guaranteed by the Constitution.
Decision was rendered reiterating the release for provisional liberty of the AFP
members with the court stating that there is a mistake in the presumption of the
Court Marshall that bail does not apply among military men facing court martial
proceeding. Is the Court Marshall’s argument meritorious?
Yes. The bail invoked by Petitioners is not available in the military as an exception to the general
rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. Thus, the right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in
the military where the right to bail does not exist. Justification to this rule involves the unique
structure of the military and national security considerations which may result to damaging
precedents that mutinous soldiers will be released on provisional liberty giving them the chance
to continue their plot in overthrowing the government. (Commendador vs. De Villa, G.R No.
93177, August 2, 1991; Arula vs. Espino, G.R. No. L-28949, June 23, 1969)
125. Auditors of ABC Bank conducted an audit where they found some questionable
transactions. X, an employee of the bank, was summoned by the Vice President for
an administrative hearing. When he arrived, he was surprised to see that there were
other people in the Office of the Vice President: two lawyers and two policemen. He
was asked to sign a written statement and was threatened to be brought to the
precinct should he not sign, so he signed it. The paper he signed turned out to be a
confession. During trial, his counsel contends that the written statement should be
declared inadmissible for X was deprived of his rights in a custodial investigation. Is
X’s counsel correct?
No. The rights of a person to remain silent, have competent and independent counsel and to be
informed of the two mentioned are present only in custodial investigation. Such rights are not
present in an administrative investigation. (Tanenggee vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
179448, June 26, 2013)
126. What judicial action may the Supreme Court perform if the President suspends the
privilege of writ of habeas corpus or declare Martial Law?
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency
of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within
thirty days from its filing. (Sec. 18, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution)
No. A writ of amparo may lie against a private individual or entity. But even if the person sought
to be held accountable or responsible in an amparo petition is a private individual or entity, still,
government involvement in the disappearance remains an indispensable element. (Navia vs.
Pardico, G.R. No. 184467, June 19, 2012 [J. Del Castillo])
128. What is the Strategic Lawsuit against Public Participation in relation to Writ of
Kalikasan?
Strategic Lawsuit against Public Participation (SLAPP) is a legal action filed to harass, vex, exert
undue pressure or stifle any legal recourse that any person, institution or the government has
taken or may take in the enforcement of environmental laws, protection of the environment or
assertion of environmental rights. (Sec. 1, Rule 6, A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC)
a. Every law that makes criminal an action done before the passing of the law and which was
innocent when done, and punishes such action.
b. Every law that aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when committed.
c. Every law that changes punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed
to the crime when committed.
d. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony
than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the
offender.
e. Every law which, assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes a
penalty or the deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful.
f. Every law which deprives persons accused of a crime some lawful protection to which they
have become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a
proclamation of amnesty. (Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political Law, 2016)
a. Bill of Attainder – It is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. Its essence
is the substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. ( People of the
Philippines vs. Ferrer, G.R. Nos. L-32613-14, December 27, 1972)
b. Bill of Pains and Penalties – It is a special act of the legislature which inflicts a
punishment less than death upon persons supposed to be guilty of high offenses. ( People
of the Philippines vs. Ferrer, G.R. Nos. L-32613-14, December 27, 1972)
VIII. CITIZENSHIP
135. X was born to a Filipina mother on February 14, 1973. He elected Filipino citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority – which was obviously done after January 17,
1973. Is X a natural-born Filipino citizen even if he did not elect Filipino citizenship
prior January 17, 1973?
Yes. The intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution in defining a natural-born Filipino citizen
was to equalize the position of Filipino fathers and Filipino mothers as to their children becoming
natural-born Filipino citizens. Those born to Filipino mothers prior to January 17, 1973 must still
elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, in order to be deemed natural-
born Filipino citizens. The election may be made before or after January 17, 1973. This
interpretation appears to be in consonance with the fundamental purpose of the Constitution to
protect and enhance the people’s individual interests, and to foster equality among Filipinos. (Co
vs. House of Representative Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 92191-92, July 30, 1991)
Those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire
or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with
Paragraph (3) of Sec. 1, Art. IV shall be deemed natural-born citizens. (Sec. 2, Art. IV, 1987
Constitution)
It includes:
a. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines, under the jus sanguinis
principle;
b. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching majority age;
c. Those former natural born citizens who reacquire Philippine citizenship through
repatriation;
d. Foundlings who, as a class, are treated by law as natural-born citizens. (Poe-Llamanzares
vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016 [J. Del Castillo])
The Supreme Court pronounced that foundlings are as a class, natural born-citizens as based on
the deliberations of the 1935 Constitutional Convention, wherein though its enumeration is silent
as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language either to definitely exclude the foundlings to be
natural born citizens. Foundlings are automatically conferred with the natural-born citizenship as
to the country where they are being found, as covered and supported by the principle that a
foundling is presumed born of citizens of the country where he is found, contained in Art. 2 of
the 1961 United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness ( Poe-Llamanzares vs.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016 [J. Del Castillo])
Citizenship conferred on (a) wife of naturalized husband; (b) minor children of naturalized
person; or (c) alien woman upon marriage to a national. (Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political
Law, 2016)
a. Vests citizenship on wife if she herself may be lawfully naturalized (Mo Ya Lim Yao vs.
Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-21289, October 4, 1971);
b. Minor children born in the Philippines before the naturalization shall be considered citizens
of the Philippines;
c. Minor child born outside the Philippines who was residing in the Philippines at the time of
naturalization shall be considered a Filipino citizen;
d. Minor child born outside the Philippines before parent’s naturalization shall be considered
Filipino citizen inly during minority, unless he begins to reside permanently in the
Philippines;
e. Child born outside the Philippines after parent’s naturalization shall be considered a Filipino,
provided that he registers as such before any Philippine consulate within one year after
attaining majority age, and tales his oath of allegiance. (Nachura, Outline Reviewer in
Political Law, 2016)
143. What does the phrase “lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation” signify?
The qualification of "some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation" means "not
only that the person having the employment gets enough for his ordinary necessities in life. It
must be shown that the employment gives one an income such that there is an appreciable
margin of his income over his expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate support in the
event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and thus avoid one’s becoming the object
of charity or a public charge." His income should permit "him and the members of his family to
live with reasonable comfort, in accordance with the prevailing standard of living, and consistently
with the demands of human dignity, at this stage of our civilization. (Republic of the Philippines
vs. Lao, G.R. No. 175430, June 18, 2012 [J. Del Castillo]; Republic of the Philippines vs.
Batuigas, G.R. No. 183110, October 7, 2013 [J. Del Castillo]; Republic of the Philippines vs.
Huang Te Fu, G.R. No. 200983, March 18, 2015 [J. Del Castillo])
145. What are the age requirements for Administrative Naturalization (under Republic Act
No. 9139) and Judicial Naturalization (under Commonwealth Act No. 473)?
On one hand, the rule for Administrative Naturalization (under Republic Act No. 9139) is that the
applicant must not be less than eighteen (18) years of age at the time of filing his/her petition.
It covers native-born aliens who lived in the Philippines all their lives, who never saw any other
country, and all along thought they were Filipino; who have demonstrated love and loyalty to
the Philippines and affinity to the customs and traditions. On the other hand, the rule for Judicial
Naturalization is that the applicant must be twenty-one (21) years of age on the day of the
hearing of the Petition. It covers all aliens regardless of class. (So vs. Republic of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 170603, January 29, 2007)
If a person has more than one nationality, he shall, within a third State, be treated as if he had
only one; the third State shall recognize exclusively either the nationality of the State in which
he is habitually and principally resident, or the nationality of the State with which he appears in
fact to be most closely connected. (Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political Law, 2014)
An individual may be compelled by municipal law to retain his original nationality even if he has
already renounced or forfeited it under the laws of the second State whose nationality he has
acquired. (Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political Law, 2016)
149. Who are qualified for repatriation under Republic Act No. 8171?
Republic Act No. 8171 (lapsed into law on October 23, 1995) governs the repatriation of Filipino
women who may have lost Filipino citizenship by reason of marriage to aliens, as well as the
repatriation of former natural-born Filipino citizens who lost Filipino citizenship on account of
political or economic necessity, including their minor children, provided the applicant is not a
person:
a. opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons
who uphold and teach doctrines opposing organized government;
b. defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or
assassination for the predominance of his ideas;
c. convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude; or
d. suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious disease. Repatriation is effected
by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration
in the proper Civil Registry and in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. (Nachura,
Outline Reviewer in Political Law, 2014)
150. X is a natural-born Filipino citizen. He was naturalized as a citizen of the United States
of America (USA) and lost his Filipino citizenship. In 2009, he applied for repatriation
under Republic Act No. 9225, before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San
Francisco, USA, took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, and
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship. In 2009, he filed a
Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Mayor in Bustos, Bulacan, Y, another candidate for
the same position, filed a Petition to disqualify or to cancel X’s COC on the ground
that the latter is a foreigner. To support his claim, Y presented X’s travel record
indicating that he has been using his US Passport in entering and departing the
Philippines even after renouncing his American citizenship. Is X disqualified from
running?
Yes. X’s continued exercise of his rights as a citizen of the USA, through using his US passport
after the renunciation of his USA citizenship, reverted him to his earlier status as a dual citizen.
Such reversion disqualified him from being elected to public office in the Philippines pursuant to
Sec. 40(d) of the Local Government Code. A candidate is ineligible if he is disqualified to be
elected to office, and he is disqualified if he lacks any of the qualifications for elective office.
Even if it made no finding that X had deliberately attempted to mislead or to misinform as to
warrant the cancellation of his CoC, the Commission on Elections could still declare him
disqualified for not meeting the requisite eligibility under the Local Government Code. ( Agustin
vs. Commission on Election, G.R No. 207105, November 10, 2015)
Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead
modest lives. (In Re: Anonymous Letter-Complaint on the Alleged Involvement and for Engaging
in the Business of Lending Money and Usurious Rates of Interests of Ms. Dolores T. Lopez, SC
Judicial Staff Officer, and Mr. Fernando M. Montalvo, SC Supervising Judicial Staff Officer, Checks
Disbursement Division, Fiscal Management, and Budget Office, A.M. No. 2010-21-SC, September
30, 2014)
a. By appointment – the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual
who is to perform the functions of a given office (Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political
Law Review, 2016);
b. By election – the means by which the people choose their officials for a definite and fixed
period and to whom they entrust for the time being the exercise of the powers of the
government (Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political Law Review, 2016); and
c. By being a de facto officer – one who has the reputation of being the officer that he
assumes to be, and yet is not a good officer in point of law. ( Torres vs. Ribo, G.R. No. L-
2051, May 21, 1948)
a. No candidate who lost in an election shall, within one year after such election, be appointed
to any office in the Government. (Sec. 6, Art. IX-B)
b. No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any
public office or position during his tenure. (Sec. 7[1], Art. IX-B)
c. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary function of his position, no appointive
official shall hold any other position in Government. (Sec 7[2], Art. IX-B)
d. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants
shall not, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure. (Sec. 13, Art VII)
e. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or
employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations of their subsidiaries, during his
term for which he was elected. (Sec. 13, Art. VI; Adaza vs. Pacana, G.R. No. L-68159,
March 18, 1985)
f. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be
designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions. (Sec. 12,
Art. VIII; In Re: Designation of Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano as Member of Ilocos Norte
Provincial Committee on Justice, A.M. No. 88-7-1861-RTC, October 5, 1988)
g. No Member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure, hold any other office
or employment (Sec. 2, Art IX-A). The same disqualification applies to the Ombudsman
and his Deputies. (Sec. 8, Art. XI)
h. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall not be qualified to run for any office in the election
immediately succeeding their cessation from office. (Sec. 11, Art. XI)
i. Members of constitutional Commissions, the Ombudsman and his Deputies must not have
been candidates for any elective position in the election immediately preceding their
appointment. (Sec. 1, Art. IX-B; Sec. 1, Art IX-C; Sec. 1, Art IX-D; Sec. 8, Art. IX)
j. Members of Constitutional Commissions, the Ombudsman and his Deputies are appointed
to a term of seven (7) years, without reappointment. (Sec. 1[2], Art. IX-B; Sec. 1[2], Art
IX-C; Sec. 1[2], Art. IX-D; Sec. 11, Art XI)
k. The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the
President shall not during his tenure be appointed as members of the Constitutional
Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries,
chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled
corporations. (Sec. 13, Art. VII)
a. No officer or employee of the civil service shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any
electioneering or political campaign. (Sec. 2[4], Art. IX-B, 1987 Constitution)
b. No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or
indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept without the
consent of the Congress, any present, emolument, office or title of any kind from any
foreign government. (Sec. 8, Art. IX-B, 1987 Constitution)
c. No loan, guaranty, or other form of financial accommodation for any business purpose may
be granted, directly or indirectly, by any government-owned or –controlled bank or
financial institution to the President, the Vice President, the Members of the Cabinet, the
Congress, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman, or to
any firm or entity in which they have controlling interest. (Sec. 16, Art. XI, 1987
Constitution)
d. No public officer or employee shall be assigned to perform clerical duties.
e. No detail or re-assignment shall be made within three (3) months before nay election
without the approval of the Commission on Elections.
f. All appointments made in favor of a relative of the appointing or recommending authority,
or of the chief of the bureau or office, or of the persons exercising immediate supervision
over him, are prohibited. (Laurel V vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 71562, October
28, 1991)
159. Can a Reserved Officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines engage in any
electioneering or partisan political campaign despite the constitutional prohibition to
do so?
No. Sec. 2, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that “Officers and employees in the Civil
Service, including members of the armed forces, shall not engage directly or indirectly in partisan
political activities or take part in any election except to vote." It was evident that the intention
was to continue by incorporation in the Constitution the then existing prohibition against officers
and employees of the civil service from engaging in political or electoral activities, except to vote,
for the reason that public officers and employees in the Civil Service "are servants of the State
and not the agents of any political group". (Cailes vs. Bonifacio, G.R. No. L-45937 February 25,
1938)
160. X, Vocational School Administrator of ABC College of Arts and Trade was found guilty
of nepotism by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) after the appointment of his two
sons as driver and utility worker of the school, respectively, and their assignment
under his immediate supervision and control. On appeal, the decision of the CSC was
reversed on the ground that it is the person who recommends or appoints who should
be sanctioned as it is he who performs the prohibited act. The CSC reversed the
decision finding it immaterial who the appointing or recommending authority is. It
suffices that an appointment is extended or issued in favor of a relative within the
third degree of consanguinity or affinity of the chief of the bureau or office, or the
person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee. Is X guilty of nepotism?
Yes. One is guilty of nepotism if an appointment is issued in favor of a relative within the third
civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of the following: (a) appointing authority; (b)
recommending authority; (c) chief of the bureau or office, and (d) person exercising immediate
supervision over the appointee. In the last two mentioned situations, it is immaterial who the
appointing or recommending authority is. (Civil Service Commission vs. Dacoycoy, G.R. No.
135805, April 29, 1999);
161. Who should file his/her Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net worth?
a. Constitutional and national elective officials, with the national office of the Ombudsman;
b. Senators and Congressmen, with the Secretaries of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, respectively; Justices, with the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court;
Judges, with the Court Administrator; and all national executive officials with the Office of
the President;
c. Regional and local officials and employees, with the Deputy Ombudsman in their respective
regions;
d. Officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, with the Office of
the President, and those below said ranks, with the Deputy Ombudsman in their respective
regions; and
e. All other public officials and employees, defined in Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
with the Civil Service Commission. (Sec. 8, Republic Act No. 6713)
162. When should a public officer file his/her Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net
worth?
MINISTERIAL DISCRETIONARY
As to discharge Discharge is imperative and it must be Public officer may do whichever way he
done by the public officer. wants provided it is in accordance with
law and must not be whimsical;
otherwise it is subject to judicial review.
Applicability of Can be compelled by mandamus. Cannot be compelled by mandamus
Mandamus except when there is a grave abuse of
discretion.
Delegability Can be delegated. Cannot be delegated, unless otherwise
provided by law.
When a vacancy occurs, employees next-in-rank should be considered for promotion (Sec. 21,
Civil Service Law). The person next-in-rank shall be given preference in promotion when the
position immediately above his is vacated. But the appointing authority still exercises discretion
and is not bound by this rule, although he is required the special reasons for not appointing the
officer next-in-rank. This means that the one who is next-in-rank is given only preferential
consideration for promotion; but it does not necessarily follow that he alone and no one else can
be appointed. (Panis vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 102948, February 2, 1994)
For this rule to apply, the following must concur: (a) there must be a series of promotions; (b)
all promotional appointments are simultaneously submitted to the Civil Service Commission; and
(c) the Civil Service Commission disapproves the appointment of a person to a higher position.
(Divinagracia vs. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 110954, May 31, 1995)
In the absence of any express or implied constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary, the
public officer is entitled to hold his office until his successor shall have been duly chosen and
shall have qualified. The purpose of the hold-over principle is to prevent hiatus in public service.
(Lecaroz vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 130872, March 25, 1999)
169. Did the Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada really resign? If so, how is this
confirmed by the Supreme Court?
In Estrada vs. Macapagal-Arroyo (G.R. No. 146738, March 2, 2001), the Supreme Court said that
the resignation of President Estrada could not be doubted as confirmed by his leaving
Malacañang. In the press release containing his final statement, (a) he acknowledged the oath-
taking of the Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo; (b) he emphasized he was leaving the palace for the sake
of peace and in order to begin the healing process (he did not say that he was leaving due to
any kind of disability and he was going to reassume the Presidency as soon as the disability
disappears); (c) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them as
President; (d) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come in the
same service of the country; and (e) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of
constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
According to Sec. 3(5), Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution, no impeachment proceedings shall be
initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed
against the same official within a one year period. (Francisco, Jr. vs. House of Representatives,
G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003)
a. Original – office is created and no one has been appointed to fill it;
b. Constructive – incumbent has no legal right or claim to continue in office and can be
legally replaced by another functionary;
c. Accidental – incumbent having died, resigned, or removed, there is no one in ease
discharging the duties of the office; and
d. Absolute – term of an incumbent has expired, and the latter not having held over, no
successor is in being, who is legally qualified to assume the office.
No. Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive suspension
should not be considered an interruption that allows an elective officials stay in office beyond
three terms. A preventive suspension cannot simply be a term interruption because the
suspended official continues to stay in office although he is barred from exercising the functions
and prerogatives of the office within the suspension period. The best indicator of the suspended
officials’ continuity in office is the absence of a permanent replacement and the lack of the
authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists. (Aldovina vs. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 184836, December 23, 2009)
Yes. A reprimand usually carries a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be
dealt with more severely. Under normal circumstances, an employee who is reprimanded is never
prevented from reporting to work. He continues to work despite the warning. Thus, in the case
at bar, since X’s penalty is a reprimand, the Supreme Court deems it proper and equitable to
affirm the award of backwages. (National Power Corporation vs. Olandesca, G.R. No. 171434,
April 23, 2010)
175. May an officer be specified as legally demoted when she was appointed as Bank
Executive Officer II with Salary Grade 24 after originally being appointed as Account
Officer with Salary Grade 24?
Yes. A demotion in office, i.e., the movement from one position to another involving the issuance
of an appointment with diminution in duties, responsibilities, status, or rank which may or may
not involve a reduction in salary, is tantamount to removal, if no cause is shown for it.
Consequently, before a demotion may be effected pursuant to a reorganization, the observance
of the rules on bona fide abolition of public office is essential. (Bautista vs. Civil Service
Commission, G.R. No. 185215, July 22, 2010 [J. Del Castillo])
176. Does the administrative jurisdiction cease upon the resignation of a public officer?
No. The resignation of a public servant does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability
to which he or she shall still be answerable. Even if the most severe of administrative sanctions
that of separation from service may no longer be imposed xxx there are other penalties which
may be imposed xxx namely, the disqualification to hold any government office and the forfeiture
of benefits. (Office of the Court Administrator vs. Kasilag, A.M. No. P-08-2573, June 19, 2012)
177. Mayor A sought re-election but lost to Mayor B. Outgoing Mayor A promoted several
city hall employees and regularized another set of city hall employees. Mayor B
publicly announced that he will not honor said appointments. The Civil Service
Commission (CSC) resolved that the said appointments are invalid on the ground that
these were mass appointments made by an outgoing local chief executive. Mayor A
maintained that CSC does not have authority to issue regulations prohibiting mass
appointments at the local government level. Are mass appointment prohibited?
Not all appointments issued after the elections by defeated officials are invalid. CSC Resolution
No. 010988 does not purport to nullify all mass appointments. However, it must be shown that
the appointments have undergone the regular screening process; that the appointee is qualified;
that there is a need to fill up the vacancy immediately; and that the appointments are not in
bulk. (Nazareno vs. City of Dumaguete, G.R. No. 181559, October 2, 2009 (J. Del Castillo))
The Ombudsman's recommendation is not merely advisory in nature but is actually mandatory
within the bounds of law. (Fajardo vs. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 173268, August 23, 2012 [J. Del
Castillo])
As a general rule, no. The Ombudsman is given a wide latitude of investigatory and
prosecutory powers on offenses committed by public officers free from legislative,
executive, or judicial intervention. The Ombudsman is empowered to determine, based on
the sufficiency of the complaint, whether there exist reasonable grounds to believe that a
crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof, and file the
corresponding information with the appropriate courts. In contrast, if the Ombudsman
finds the Complaint insufficient in form or substance, it may also dismiss the Complaint.
Such prerogative is beyond the ambit of the Court to review the Ombudsman's exercise of
discretion in prosecuting or dismissing a Complaint filed before it, except when the exercise
thereof is tainted with grave abuse of discretion. (King vs. Robles, G.R. Nos. 197096-97,
December 7, 2015 [J. Del Castillo])
Any act or omission of any public official or employee can result in criminal, civil, and
administrative liability. (Regidor vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 166086-92, February 13,
2009)
180. Is a law fixing the terms of local elective officials, other than barangay officials, to
six (6) years constitutional? (Bar Exam 2006)
The law is unconstitutional and not valid. Under Sec. 8, Art. X, Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution,
"the term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined
by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms." The law clearly goes against the aforesaid constitutional requirement of three year terms
for local officials except for barangay officials.
X. ADMINSTRATIVE LAW
a. Where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine;
b. Where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction;
c. Where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the
complainant;
d. Where the amount involved is relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and
oppressive;
e. Where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the
courts of justice;
f. Where judicial intervention is urgent;
g. When its application may cause great and irreparable damage;
h. Where the controverted acts violate due process;
i. When the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot;
j. When there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy;
k. When strong public interest is involved; and
l. In quo warranto proceedings. (Republic of the Philippines vs. Lacap, G.R. No. 158253,
March 2, 2007).
QUALIFICATIONS DISQUALIFICATIONS
Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the a. Any person sentenced by final judgment
Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, to suffer imprisonment of not less than
who are at least 18 years of age, and who shall one year;
have resided in the Philippines for at least one b. Any person adjudged by final judgment
(1) year, and in the place wherein they propose of having committed any crime involving
to vote, for at least six (6) months immediately disloyalty to the government or any
preceding the election. No literacy, property, or crime against national security; and
other substantive requirement shall be imposed c. Insane or incompetent persons as
on the exercise of suffrage. (Sec. 1, Art. V, 1987 declared by competent authority. (Sec.
Constitution) 118, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881)
185. Is the Resolution of the Commission on Elections providing for the deactivation of
the registration records of those who failed to submit themselves to mandatory
biometrics pursuant to Republic Act No. 10367 valid and constitutional?
No. The Supreme Court held that biometrics validation is not a “qualification” to the exercise of
the right of suffrage, but a mere aspect of the registration procedure, of which the State has the
right to reasonably regulate. Thus, although one is deemed to be a “qualified elector,” he must
nonetheless still comply with the registration procedure in order to vote. Unless it is shown that
a registration requirement rises to the level of a literacy, property or other substantive
requirement as contemplated by the Framers of the Constitution – that is, one which propagates
a socio-economic standard which is bereft of any rational basis to a person’s ability to intelligently
cast his vote and to further the public good, the same cannot be struck down as unconstitutional,
as in this case. (Kabataan Party-List vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 221318, December
16, 2015)
186. Period of registration.
The personal filing of application of registration of voters shall be conducted daily in the office of
the Election Officer during regular office hours. No registration shall, however, be conducted
during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and ninety
(90) days before a special election. (Sec. 8, Republic Act No. 8189)
a. Sentenced by final judgment to suffer imprisonment for not less than 1 year (unless
granted plenary pardon or amnesty);
b. Adjudged by final judgment for having committed any crime involving disloyalty to the duly
constituted government (e.g. rebellion, sedition, violation of the firearms law) or any crime
against national security (unless restored to full civil and political rights in accordance with
law) shall automatically reacquire the right to vote upon the expiration of five (5) years
after the service of sentence;
c. Insane or incompetent persons as declared by competent authority;
d. Did not vote in the two (2) successive preceding regular elections (excluding Sangguniang
Kabataan elections);
e. Registration has been ordered excluded by the Court; and
f. Loss of Filipino citizenship. (Sec. 27, Voters’ Registration Act of 1996)
QUALIFICATIONS DISQULAIFICATIONS
All citizens of the Philippines abroad, who are not Those who:
otherwise disqualified by law, at least 18 years of
age on the day of elections may vote for a. have lost their Filipino citizenship in
president, vice-president, senators and party-list accordance with Philippine laws;
representatives (Sec. 4, Republic Act No. 9189) b. have committed and are convicted in a
final judgment by a court or tribunal of
an offense punishable by imprisonment
of not less than one (1) year, including
those who have committed and been
found guilty of disloyalty as defined
under Article 137 of the Revised Penal
Code;
c. are immigrant or a permanent resident
who is recognized as such in the host
country, unless he/she executes, upon
registration, an affidavit prepared for
the purpose by the Commission
declaring that: (a) he/she shall resume
actual physical permanent residence in
the Philippines not later than three (3)
years from approval of his/her
registration, and (b) he/she has not
applied for citizenship in another
country; and
d. have been previously declared insane or
incompetent by competent authority in
the Philippines or abroad, as verified by
the Philippine embassies, consulates, or
foreign service establishments
concerned. (Sec. 5, Republic Act No.
9189)
190. Can a person not physically present in the polling place be able to vote?
There is now an exception to the residence qualification of a voter under Sec. 1, Art. V of the
1987 Constitution, and that is, with respect to overseas Filipinos, permanent residents of a foreign
country under Republic Act No. 9189 (The Absentee Voters Act of 2003). Under the said Act,
overseas Filipinos, permanent residents in a foreign country, are now allowed to register and
vote before our embassies and consulates abroad for President, Vice-President, Senators, and
Party-list Representative. There is a clear intent on the part of the framers of our Constitution
to enfranchise as many of our overseas countrymen in recognition of their tremendous
contributions to the national economy in terms of dollar remittances. It is but fair that their
voices should be heard on who should be our national leaders. (Makalintal vs. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2013; Executive Order No. 157 [dated March 30, 1987])
No, The determination of the Metropolitan Trial Court in the exclusion proceedings as to the right
of X to be included or excluded from the list of voters in the precinct is within its territorial
jurisdiction, but does not preclude the Commission on Elections, in the determination of his
qualification as a candidate, to pass upon the issue of compliance with the residency requirement.
Except for the right to remain or be excluded in the list of voters, a decision in inclusion/ exclusion
proceedings does not acquire the nature of res judicata and is not conclusive on the COMELEC.
(Domino vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 134015, July 19, 1999)
Qualifications prescribed by law are continuing requirements and must be possessed for the
duration of the officer’s active tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title to
the office may be seasonably challenged. (Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
120295, June 28, 1996; Labo vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989)
Under the 1987 Constitution Three-term limit for local elective officials (Sec. 8, Art. X)
Under the Omnibus Election Code a. Declared incompetent or insane by competent
authority (Sec. 12);
b. Sentenced by final judgment for: (a) subversion,
insurrection, rebellion; (b) any offense for which he
has been sentenced to a penalty of more than 18
months imprisonment; or (c) a crime involving moral
turpitude (Sec. 12);
c. Given money or other material consideration to
influence, induce, or corrupt voters of public officials
performing electoral functions (Sec. 68);
d. Committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy
(Sec. 68);
e. Spent in his election campaign an amount in excess
of that allowed (Sec. 68);
f. Solicited, received or made prohibited contributions
(Sec. 68);
g. Permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign
country unless he has waived such statues (Sec. 68);
h. Engaged in election campaign or partisan political
activity outside the campaign period and not pursuant
to a political party nomination (Sec. 80);
i. Removed, destroyed, defaced lawful election
propaganda (Sec. 83);
j. Engaged in prohibited forms of election propaganda
(Sec. 85);
k. Violated election rules and regulation of election
propaganda through mass media (Sec. 86);
l. Coerced, intimidated, or influenced any of his
subordinates, members, or employees to aid,
campaign or vote for or against any candidate or
aspirant for the nomination or selection of candidates
(Sec. 261[d]);
m. Threatened, intimidated, caused, inflicted or
produced any violence, injury, punishment, damage,
loss or disadvantage upon any person or of the
immediate members of his family, his honor or
property, or used fraud to compel, induce or prevent
the registration of any voter, or the participation in
any campaign, or the casting of any vote, or any
promise of such registration, campaign, vote, or
omission therefrom (Sec. 261[e]);
n. Unlawful electioneering (Sec. 261[k]);
o. Violated the prohibition against release, disbursement
or expenditure of public funds 45 days before a
regular election or 30 days before a special election
(Sec. 261[v]); and
p. Violated Sec. 261(cc).
Under the Local Government Code a. Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense
involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable
by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two
(2) years after serving sentence;
b. Those removed from office as a result of an
administrative case;
c. Those convicted by final judgment for violating the
oath of allegiance to the Republic;
d. Those with dual citizenship;
e. Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases
here or abroad;
f. Permanent residents in a foreign country or those
who have acquired the right to reside abroad and
continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity
of this Code; and
g. The insane or feeble-minded. (Sec. 40)
196. X, currently a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines commissioned at Camp
Bagong Diwa, files his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Municipal
Mayor at his hometown. Upon losing the election, he then returned to Camp Bagong
Diwa, but he was informed that he was already resigned from service. He files a
Complaint questioning his dismissal from service. Can he be reinstated?
No. Any person holding an appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned and –controlled
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy. Such resignation is irrevocable. (Sec. 66, Omnibus Election Code)
No. Any elective official, whether national or local, who has filed a Certificate of Candidacy
for the same or any other office, shall not be considered resigned from his office ( Sec. 26,
COMELEC Resolution No. 3636)
197. Instances when the Commission on Elections may go beyond the face of the
Certificate of Candidacy.
a. If its shown that the Certificate of Candidacy was filed (a) to put the election process in
mockery or disrepute; (b) to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the
names of the registered candidates; or (c) by other circumstances or acts which clearly
demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which
the Certificate of Candidacy has been filed, and thus, prevent faithful determination of the
true will of the electorate;
b. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a Certificate of Candidacy; and
c. A disqualification based on any of the grounds enumerated in Sec. 68 of Omnibus Election
Code. (Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political Law, 2016)
After the last day of the filing of Certificate a. Only a person belonging to, and certified
of Candidacy, an official candidate dies, by, the same political party may file a
withdraws, or is disqualified for any cause certificate of candidacy to replace the
candidate who died, withdrew or was
disqualified. The substitute candidate
nominated by the political party concerned
may file his certificate of candidacy for the
office affected in accordance with the
preceding sections not later than mid-day
of the day of the election. (Sec. 77,
Omnibus Election Code)
b. No substitute shall be allowed for any
independent candidate. (Recabo vs.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
134293, June 21, 1999)
c. A candidate whose Certificate of Candidacy
has been cancelled or not given due course
cannot be substituted by another
belonging to the same political party. (Ong
vs. Alegre, G.R. No. 163295, January 23,
2006)
If death, withdrawal or disqualification The Certificate of Candidacy may be filed (a) with
should happen between the day before the any Board of Election Inspectors in the political
election and mid-day of the election day subdivision where he is a candidate; or (b) with the
Commission on Elections, if it is a national position.
(Sec. 77, Omnibus Election Code)
Substitution on the day of the election itself Only on death and disqualification shall substitution
may take place upon the start of the campaign
period until mid-day of the election. (Sec. 77,
Omnibus Election Code)
However, if the electorate is fully aware in fact and in law of a candidate’s disqualification so as
to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety but would nonetheless cast their votes in
favor of the ineligible candidate, votes cast for the candidate shall not be counted. (Grego vs.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 125955, June 19, 1997)
200. Distinguish Petition for Disqualification from Petition to Deny Due Course to a
Certificate of Candidacy.
On one hand, a disqualification case under Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code is hinged on
either (1) a candidate’s possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country or (2) his
commission of certain acts of disqualification. It must be stressed that one who is disqualified
under Sec. 68 is still technically considered to have been a candidate, albeit proscribed to
continue as such only because of supervening infractions which do not, however, deny his or her
statutory eligibility. On the other hand, a denial of due course to or cancellation of a Certificate
of Candidacy proceeding under Sec. 78 is premised on a person’s misrepresentation of any of
the material qualifications required for the elective office aspired for. It is not enough that a
person lacks relevant qualification; he or she must have also made a false representation of the
same in the Certificate of Candidacy. (Tagolino vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,
G.R. No. 202202, March 19, 2013)
201. X, Miss Universe 2018 and a renowned actress, during a Guilty-or-Not Guilty portion
in Vice Ganda’s late night show, announces her intention to run for 2019 elections
and talks about her advocacy on ending poverty in the country. The video went viral.
Later, it was used against her as constituting an act of early campaign, which clearly
violates the law. Upon filing her Certificate of Candidacy, the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) cancels the same and disqualifies her from running for the
election. Was the cancellation and disqualification made by the COMELEC proper?
No. The Supreme Court, citing the case of Penera vs. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 181613,
November 25, 2009), held that the election campaign or partisan activity, which constitute the
prohibited premature campaigning, should be designed to promote the election or defeat of a
particular candidate or candidates. Under present election laws, while a person may have filed
his/her Certificate of Candidacy within the prescribed period for doing so, said person shall not
be considered a candidate until the start of the campaign period. Thus, prior to the start of the
campaign period, there can be no election campaign or partisan political activity designed to
promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate to public office because there is no
candidate to speak of. (Lanot vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 164858, November 16,
2006)
No. The acts conducted after filing of the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) prior to the
campaign period constitute premature campaigning. When the campaign period starts and
a person proceeds with his/her candidacy, his/her acts, after the filing of his/her COC and
prior to the campaign period, as the promotion of his/her election as a candidate, constitute
premature campaigning, for which s/he may be disqualified. But in this case, there is no
act of premature campaign since the act was made prior to her filing of certificate of
candidacy or even the campaign period. (Penera vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
181613, November 25, 2009)
202. X is an avid blogger and travel enthusiast and a supporter of a particular candidate
who, incidentally, was a member of the Constitutional Convention as Lone District
Representative in North Cotabato. Being constrained to show her support via
blogging due to regulation of what is-called COMELEC Space (under Sec. 12[f] of
1971 Constitutional Convention Act), she files a Petition before the court praying that
the said provision be declared unconstitutional as it denies private individuals their
freedom of speech and of the press. As it is, outside this COMELEC Space, it shall be
unlawful to print and publish any comment or article unless all the names of other
candidates are mentioned with equal prominence. Is she correct?
No. The underlying issue is the contested restriction provided under Section 12(f), where the
moneyed candidate or individual who can afford to pay for advertisements, comments, or articles
in favor of his candidacy or against the candidacy of another or which mention his name and the
fact of his candidacy, is required to mention all the other candidates in the same district with
equal prominence, to exempt him from the penal sanction of the law. The evident purpose of
the limitation is to give the poor candidates a fighting chance in the election. The restriction is
only one of the measures devised by the law to preserve suffrage pure and undefiled and to
achieve the desired equality of chances among all the candidates. Considering the foregoing
limitation in Section 12(f) designed to maximize, if not approximate, equality of chances among
the various candidates in the same district, the said restriction on the freedom of expression
appears too insignificant to create any appreciable dent on the individual’s liberty of expression.
The limitation in Section 12(f) is a reasoned and reasonable judgment on the part of Congress.
It is not unconstitutional. (Badoy vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 32546, October 17, 1970)
Unless otherwise fixed by the Commission on Elections in special cases, the election period shall
commence ninety (90) days before the day of election and shall end thirty (30) days thereafter
(Sec. 9, Art. IX-C, 1987 Constitution). The election period is distinguished from the campaign
period in that the latter cannot extend beyond election day (Peralta vs. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 47771, March 11, 1978). In fact, it ends two (2) days before the election. (Cruz,
Philippine Political Law, 2014)
204. X runs for the position of District Representative in 2010 but fails to submit his
Statement of Contributions and Expenses (SOCE). In 2013, he decided to run again
for the same position, but he later withdrew his candidacy. When the 2016 election
came, he wishes to run again but the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
disqualifies him for failure to submit SOCE for two consecutive elections, and
imposed on him perpetual disqualification. He comes to the court questioning the
imposition of perpetual disqualification as constituting grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the COMELEC. Decide.
The allegation of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) for imposing upon X the penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public office is
hollow. In imposing the penalty, the COMELEC clearly acted within the bounds of its jurisdiction
in view of the clear language of Sec. 14 of Republic Act No. 7166. Nonetheless, X submits that
he only failed to submit his Statement of Contributions and Expenses (SOCE) once in 2010. He
pleads good faith because he thought that he was no longer required to submit his SOCE for the
2013 elections because of his having withdrawn from the mayoral race in that year. His plea of
good faith is undeserving of consideration. X should have paid heed to the 1995 ruling in Pilar v.
Commission of Elections (G.R. No. 115245, July 11, 1995), where the Supreme Court ruled that
every candidate, including one who meanwhile withdraws his candidacy, is required to file his
SOCE. Accordingly, X could not invoke good faith on the basis of his having withdrawn his
candidacy a day before the 2013 elections. (Maturan vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
227155, March 28, 2017)
205. Composition and Powers of Board of Election Inspectors and Board of Canvassers
No person shall be appointed watcher unless he is a qualified voter of the city or municipality, of
good reputation and shall not have been convicted by final judgment of any election offense or
of any other crime, must know how to read and write Pilipino, English, Spanish or any of the
prevailing local dialects, and not related within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity
to the chairman or any member of the board of election inspectors in the polling place where he
seeks appointment as a watcher. (Sec. 178, Omnibus Election Code)
207. What are the grounds for the cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy?
208. What are the instances where failure of election may be declared?
a. The election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes;
b. The election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the
closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other
analogous causes; or
c. After the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in
the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on account of
force majeure, violence, terrorism , fraud, or other analogous causes. (Sison vs.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 134096, March 3, 1999)
a. No voting took place in the precinct or precincts on the date fixed by law, or even if there
was voting, the election resulted in failure to elect;
b. The votes not cast would have affected the results of the election; and
c. The cause of such failure of election should have been force majeure, violence, terrorism,
fraud or other analogous causes. (Pasandalan vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
150312, July 18, 2002)
Any question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the board if canvassers which may be
raised by any candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of political parties before
the board or directly with the Commission, or any matter raised under Secs. 233 (election returns
are delayed, lost, or destroyed), 234 (material defects in the election returns), 235 (election
returns appeared to be tampered or falsified), and 236 (discrepancies in election returns) in
relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election
returns. (Sec. 241, Omnibus Election Code)
A pre-proclamation controversy is summary in character. Indeed, it is the policy of the law that
pre-proclamation controversies be promptly decided so as not to delay canvass and proclamation.
The Board of Canvassers will not look into allegations of irregularity that are not apparent on the
face of the election returns (ERs) that appear otherwise authentic and duly accomplished. The
allegations that the election returns were obviously manufactures must be evident from the face
of the said documents to justify the exclusion of the said election returns and to fall within the
ambit of the issues that can be raised in pre-proclamation controversy. (Saño vs. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 182221, February 3, 2010 [J. Del Castillo])
212. X, a balikbayan, decided to run for Mayor during the 2013 elections. She has a group
of friends which volunteered to be her campaign manager and poll watchers for the
said election. They even made a manual tally of votes of avid supporters for each
precinct, which assures them that she will win. But she lost in the margin of ten (10)
votes as reflected in the election return. X's side contests the result and requests for
the review of the election return. Will it prosper?
No. It is the over-all policy of the law to place a premium on an election return, which appears
regular on its face, by imposing stringent requirements before the certificate of votes may be
used to convert the election return’s authenticity, and operate as an exception to the general
rule that, in a pre-proclamation controversy, the inquiry is limited to the four corners of the
election return. In the absence of clearly convincing evidence, the validity of the election returns
must be upheld. Any plausible explanation, one which is acceptable to a reasonable man in the
light of experience and of the probabilities of the situation, should suffice to avoid outright
nullification, which results in disenfranchisement of those who exercised their right of suffrage.
Where the Commission on Elections disregards the principle requiring “extreme caution” before
rejecting election returns, and proceeds with undue haste in concluding that the election returns
are tampered, it commits a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
(Doromal vs. Biron, G.R. No. 181809, February 17, 2010 [J. Del Castillo])
Tribunal
Official Appellate Court
(Original and Exclusive)
President and Vice President Supreme Court, as Presidential Supreme Court, via Petition for
Electoral Tribunal Review on Certiorari (under Rule
Senator Senate Electoral Tribunal
Representative House of Representative 65): Within thirty (30) days from
Electoral Tribunal receipt of a copy of the decision.
Regional, Provincial, or City Commission on Elections Supreme Court, via Petition for
officials Review on Certiorari (under Rule
64, in relation to Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court): Within thirty
(30) days from receipt of a copy
of the decision.
Municipal officials Regional Trial Court Commission on Elections, whose
Barangay Municipal (or Metropolitan) Trial decision shall be final, executory,
Court and not appealable: Within five
(5) days from promulgation or
receipt of a copy of the decision.
The doctrine of statistical improbability is applied only where the unique uniformity of tally of all
the votes cast in favor of all the candidates belonging to one party and the systematic blanking
of all the candidates of all the opposing parties appear in the election return. The bare fact that
a candidate for public office received no votes in one or two precincts, standing alone and without
more, cannot adequately support a finding that the subject election returns are statistically
improbable. Verily, a zero vote for a particular candidate in the election returns is but one strand
in the web of circumstantial evidence that the electoral returns were prepared under duress,
force and intimidation. The Doctrine of Statistical Improbability must be restrictively viewed, with
the utmost care being taken lest in penalizing fraudulent and corrupt practices which is truly
called for innocent voters become disenfranchised, a result that hardly commends itself. (Suhuri
vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 181869, October 2, 2009)
a. Must be filed by a candidate who has filed a Certificate of Candidacy and has been voted
upon for the same office;
b. Hinged on the grounds of fraud, terrorism, irregularities, or illegal acts committed before,
during, and after the casting and counting of votes; and
c. Filed within ten (10) days from proclamation of the results of the election. (Nachura,
Outline Reviewer in Political Law, 2016)
No. Election offenses are generally mala prohibita. Proof of criminal intent is not necessary; good
faith, ignorance, or lack of malice is not a defense; the commission of the prohibited act is
sufficient. (Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political Law, 2016)
No. Pilot testing is not a mandatory requirement for the enactment of a fully Automated Election
System (AES). The mechanism of the machines does not infringe on the constitutional right of
the people to secrecy of the ballot enshrined in Sec. 2, Art. V of the 1987 Constitution. The plain
wordings of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9369 (that amended R.A. No. 8436) commands that the
2010 elections shall be fully automated, and such full automation is not conditioned on “pilot
testing” in the May 2007 elections. Congress merely gave the Commission on Elections the
flexibility to partially use the AES in some parts of the country for the May 2007 elections. Any
lingering doubt on the issue of whether or not full automation of the 2010 regular elections can
validly proceed without a pilot run of the AES should be put to rest with the enactment in March
2009 of R.A. No. 9525, in which Congress appropriated Php 11.301 Billion to automate the 2010
elections. (Roque vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 188456, September 10, 2009)
221. Does the enactment of the Election Automation Law circumvent the 1987
Constitution, not being germane to its subject matter regarding the Poll Automation
and Canvassing of Votes?
No, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9369 does not violate Sec. 26(1), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution. In
the case of Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency vs. Commission
on Elections (G.R. No. 177508, August 7, 2009), the Petitioner alleges that the title of R.A. No.
9369 is misleading because it speaks of poll automation but contains substantial provisions
dealing with the manual canvassing of election returns. Likewise, Petitioner alleges that Secs.
34, 37, 38, and 43 are neither embraced in the title nor germane to the subject matter of R.A.
No. 9369. Both the Commission on Elections and the Office of the Solicitor General maintain that
the title of R.A. No. 9369 is broad enough to encompass topics which deal not only with the
automation process but with everything related to its purpose encouraging a transparent,
credible, fair, and accurate elections. The constitutional requirement that every bill passed by
the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof has
always been given a practical rather than a technical construction. The requirement is satisfied
if the title is comprehensive enough to include subjects related to the general purpose which the
statute seeks to achieve. The title of a law does not have to be an index of its contents and will
suffice if the matters embodied in the text are relevant to each other and may be inferred from
the title.
It is the use of an appropriate technology which has been demonstrated in voting, counting, and
the consolidation, canvass, and transmission of election results, and other electoral processes.
(Sec. 2[1], Republic Act No. 9369)
It is a body politic established by law partly as an agency of the State to assist in the civil
government of the country, chiefly to regulate and administer the local or internal affairs of the
city, town or district which is incorporated (Social Security Service Employees Association vs.
Soriano, GR No. L-1808, November 18, 1963). Municipal corporations are agencies of the State
for the promotion and maintenance of local self-government and as such are endowed with police
powers in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation
(Rural Bank of Makati vs. Municipality of Makati, GR No. L- 150763, July 2, 2004).
It has the following elements: (a) The law creating or authorizing the creation or incorporation
of a municipal corporation; (b) The name by which the corporation shall be know; (c) The people
residing in the territory of the corporation; and (d) The land mass where the inhabitants reside,
together with the internal and external waters, and the air space above the land and waters.
(Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political Law, 2016)
Every local government unit created or recognized under this Code is a body politic and corporate
endowed with powers to be exercised by it in conformity with law. As such, it shall exercise
powers as a political subdivision of the national government and as a corporate entity
representing the inhabitants of its territory. (Sec. 15, Local Government Code)
a. Constituent function (Public or Governmental) – it acts as an agent of the state for the
government of the territory and the inhabitants;
b. Ministrant function (Private or Proprietary) – it acts as an agent of the community in
the administration of local affairs. (Lidasan vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-28089,
October 25, 1967)
228. What are the municipal corporations in the Philippines and what are its roles?
229. What are the requisites for the creation and conversion of a local government unit?
a. Income – it must be sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to provide for all essential
government facilities and services and special functions commensurate with the size of its
population, as expected of the local government unit concerned;
b. Population – it shall be determined as the total number of inhabitants within the territorial
jurisdiction of the local government unit concerned; and
c. Land Area – it must be contiguous, unless it comprises two or more islands or is separated
by a local government unit independent of the others; properly identified by metes and
bounds with technical descriptions; and sufficient to provide for such basic services and
facilities to meet the requirements of its populace.
Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be attested to by the Department of Finance, the
National Statistics Office, and the Lands Management Bureau of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources. (Sec. 7, Local Government Code)
A local government unit may be abolished when its income, population, or land area has been
irreversibly reduced to less than the minimum standards prescribed for its creation under the
Local Government Code, as certified by the Department of Finance, National Statistics Office,
and the Land Management Bureau of the Department of Environmental and Natural Resources
to Congress or to the Sangguniang concerned, as the case may be.
The law or ordinance abolishing a local government unit shall specify the province, city,
municipality, or barangay with which the local government unit sought to be abolished will be
incorporated or merged. (Sec. 9, Local Government Code)
No. Sec. 10 of the Local Government Code states that “The power to create, divide, merge,
abolish or substantially alter boundaries of local government units belongs to Congress.” The
creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government
units involve a common denominator – material change in the political and economic rights of
the local government units directly affected as well as the people therein. It is precisely for this
reason that the Constitution requires the approval of the people in the political units directly
affected. (Miranda vs. Aguirre, G.R. No. 133064, September 16, 1999)
Devolution refers to the act by which the national government confers power and authority upon
the various local government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities (Sec. 17,
Local Government Code). It includes "the transfer to local government units of the records,
equipment, and other assets and personnel of national agencies and offices corresponding to the
devolved powers, functions and responsibilities. (Republic of the Philippines vs. Daclan, G.R. No.
197115, March 23, 2015 [J. Del Castillo])
235. Fundamental powers of the State as exercised by the local government units.
236. Is the power to tax of the local government units allowed to be regulated by the
Congress?
Yes. The power of local government to impose taxes and fees is always subject to limitations
which Congress may provide by law. Local Governments have no power to tax instrumentalities
of the National Government, and is therefore exempt from local taxes. (Basco vs. Philippine
Amusements and Gaming Corporation, G.R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991)
a. Can the Secretary of Justice review the tax imposition of the local government
units?
Yes. Sec. 187, Republic Act No. 7160, which authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review
the constitutionality or legality of a tax ordinance and if warranted, to revoke it on either
or both grounds – is valid, and does not confer the power of control over the local
government units in the Secretary of Justice, as even if the latter can set aside a tax
ordinance, he cannot substitute his own judgment for that of the local government unit.
(Drilon vs. Lim, G.R. No. L-112497, August 4, 1994)
ORDINANCE RESOLUTION
As to its nature It is a law. It is merely a declaration of the
sentiment or opinion of a
lawmaking body on a specific
matter.
239. The city’s traffic management group observed the very unbearable traffic situation
in one of the city’s thoroughfare. They found out that the traffic is due to people lining
up to bet in a lotto outlet, probably because of the big jackpot prize. The City Mayor
issued an Ordinance considering lotto as gamble and, thus, ordered the removal of
the said lotto outlet. Is the Resolution valid?
No. The legality of the operation in lotto is legal considering the authority to operate given by
the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, which in turn had been granted a franchise to operate
the lotto by the Congress. The game of lotto is a game of chance duly authorized by the national
government through an Act of Congress, via Republic Act 1169, as amended by Batas Pambansa
Blg. 42. A local government unit cannot issue a resolution or an ordinance that would seek to
prohibit permits. Stated otherwise, what the national legislature expressly allows by law, such as
lotto, a provincial board may not disallow by ordinance or resolution. (Lina vs. Paño, G.R. No.
129093, August 30, 2001; Dela Cruz vs. Paras, G.R. Nos. L-42571-72, July 25, 1983)
a. The taxes, fees, or charges shall not be unjust, excessive, oppressive, confiscatory or
contrary to declared national policy.
b. The ordinance shall not be enacted without any prior public hearing conducted for the
purpose.
c. Within ten (10) days after their approval, certified true copies of all provincial, city and
municipal tax ordinances or revenue measures shall be published in full for three (3)
consecutive days in a newspaper of local circulation. However, in provinces cities, or
municipalities where there are no newspapers of local circulation, the same may be posted
in at least two (2) conspicuous and publicly accessible places.
d. Copies of all provincial, city and municipal and barangay tax ordinances and revenue
measures shall be furnished the respective local treasurers for public dissemination. (Sec.
186, Local Government Code)
241. Can a license be taken from the licensee (owner) without due process of law?
Yes. The license to operate is not a property but a mere privilege that may be revoked when
public interests so require. In addition, a license is not property of which the holder may not be
deprived without due process of law.” (Du vs. Jayoma, G.R. No. 175042, April 23, 2012 [J. Del
Castillo])
242. Due to a pending case between the Municipality of Tiwi and a private corporation,
the Sanggunian passed a Resolution authorizing its Municipal Mayor to hire the
services of a legal counsel to represent them. Due to this Resolution, a legal contract
of service has been executed. Likewise, the contract allows a contingent fee for
remuneration. May the Mayor validly enter into such contract?
Yes. A Municipal Mayor has the power to enter into contracts. As provided for under Sec.
444(b)(1)(vi) of the Local Government Code provides: “Upon authorization by the Sangguniang
Bayan, the mayor may represent the municipality in all its business transactions and sign on its
behalf all bonds, contracts, and obligations, and such other documents made pursuant to law or
ordinance; the municipal mayor is required to secure the prior authorization of the Sangguniang
Bayan before entering into a contract on behalf of the municipality. (Municipality of Tiwi vs.
Betito, G.R. No. 171873, July 9, 2010 [J. Del Castillo])
a. X filed a case for collection against the National Power Corporation (NPC).
Appearing as counsel for X is Atty. Y, who then the incumbent Vice Mayor. NPC
filed a Motion for Inhibition of Atty. Y arguing that he is prohibited under sec.
90(b)(1) of the Local Government Code to appear as a counsel. The Regional
Trial Court (RTC) ruled in favor of Atty. Y arguing that government-owned and
–controlled corporations are not included in the prohibition. Likewise the RTC
opined that should the framers of the law intended so, they would have
expressly so stated in the law. On appeal, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
Petition for lack of merit. Can Atty. Y appear as counsel against NPC?
No. Sec. 90 (b)(1) of the Local Government Code provides that Sanggunian Members may
practice their profession or engage in any occupation or teach in schools, except during
session hours, provided when the Member is also a member of the Bar, he shall not appear
as counsel before any court in any civil case where the local government unit or any office,
agency or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party. Further, Sec. 2(10) of
the Revised Administrative Code defined “instrumentality” which includes regulatory
agencies, chartered institutions and government-owned or controlled corporations. With
the foregoing provisions, it is clear without any ambiguity that NPC is a government
instrumentality.
Local government units and their officials are not exempt from liability for death or injury to
persons or damage to their property. ( Sec. 24, Local Government Code)
A municipality may become obligated upon an implied contract to pay the reasonable value of
the benefit accepted or appropriated by it as to which it has the general power to contract
(Province of Cebu vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72841, January 29, 1987). It applies
to all cases where money or other property of a party is received under such circumstances that
the general law, independent of an express contract, implies an obligation to do justice with
respect to the same.
Boundary disputes between and among local government units shall, as much as possible, be
settled amicably. To this end:
a. Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more barangays in the same city or
municipality shall be referred for settlement to the sangguniang panlungsod or
sangguniang bayan concerned.
b. Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more municipalities within the same
province shall be referred for settlement to the sangguniang panlalawigan concerned.
c. Boundary disputes involving municipalities or component cities of different
provinces shall be jointly referred for settlement to the sanggunians of the province
concerned.
d. Boundary disputes involving a component city or municipality on the one hand and
a highly urbanized city on the other, or two (2) or more highly urbanized cities,
shall be jointly referred for settlement to the respective sanggunians of the parties.
e. In the event the sanggunian fails to effect an amicable settlement within sixty (60) days
from the date the dispute was referred thereto, it shall issue a certification to that effect.
Thereafter, the dispute shall be formally tried by the sanggunian concerned which shall
decide the issue within sixty (60) days from the date of the certification referred to above.
(Sec. 118, Local Government Code)
Within the time and manner prescribed by the Rules of Court, any party may elevate the decision
of the sanggunian concerned to the proper Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the area
in dispute. The Regional Trial Court shall decide the appeal within one (1) year from the filing
thereof. Pending final resolution of the disputed area prior to the dispute shall be maintained and
continued for all legal purposes. (Sec. 119, Local Government Code)
On one hand, Local Initiative is the legal process whereby the registered voters of a local
government unit may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance. It may be exercised by
all registered voters of the province, cities, municipalities, and barangays. On the other hand,
Local Referendum is the process whereby the registered voters of the local government units
may approve, amend, or reject any ordinance enacted by the Sanggunian. (Nachura, Outline
Reviewer in Political Law, 2016)
250. May a Vice Mayor who succeeded the term of the deceased incumbent Mayor on its
third term still qualified to run for Mayoralty position?
Yes. It is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local
official. He must have also been elected to the same position for the same number of times
before the disqualification can apply. (Adormeo vs. Commission on Election, G.R. No. L-147927,
February 4, 2004)
All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces
of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural
resources shall not be alienated. ( Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution)
An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an
occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for such possession
would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or
that it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest (Cho vs. Director of
Lands, G.R. No. L-48321, August 31, 1946).
The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income,
and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation
for the benefit of the people; and an expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of
life for all, especially the underprivileged. (Sec. 1, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution)
253. Petitioner is the President of Boracay West Cove. The company applied for a zoning
compliance with the municipal government of Malay, Aklan. The application sought
the issuance of a building permit covering the construction of a three-storey hotel
over a parcel of land covered by a Forest Land Use Agreement for Tourism Purposes
(FLAgT) issued by the department of Environment and Natural Resources in favor of
Boracay West Cove. The Municipal Zoning Administrator denied Petitioner’s
application on the ground that the proposed construction site was within the “No-
Build Zone” demarcated in Municipal Ordinance 2000-131. A Cease and Desist Order
was issued by the municipal government, and then the Office of the Mayor of Malay
ordered the closure and demolition of Boracay West Cove’s hotel. Petitioner alleges
that the order was issued and executed with grave abuse of discretion. Is Petitioner
correct?
No. The Office of the Mayor has quasi-judicial powers to order the closing and demolition of
establishments. The fact that the building to be demolished is located within a forestland under
the administration of the DENR is of no moment, for what is involved herein, strictly speaking, is
not an issue on environmental protection, conservation of natural resources, and the
maintenance of ecological balance, but the legality or illegality of the structure. Thus, it should
not be treated as an environmental issue, but one of compliance. (Aquino vs. Municipality of
Malay, Aklan, G.R. No. 211356, September 29, 2014)
255. Are service contracts allowing foreign corporations to explore, develop, and exploit
petroleum resources in the Philippines to the detriment of the ecosystem
constitutional? If so, what are the rules on allowing service contracts of such nature?
Yes. In La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association, Inc. vs. Ramos (G.R. No. 127882, December 1, 2004),
the Supreme Court held that the deletion of the words “service contracts” in the 1987 Constitution
did not amount to a ban on service contracts per se. The following are the safeguards
enumerated in the aforesaid case with respect to service contracts allowing foreign corporations
to explore, develop, and exploit Philippine resources:
a. The service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a general law that will set standard
or uniform terms, conditions and requirements, presumably to attain a certain uniformity in
provisions and avoid the possible insertion of terms disadvantageous to the country.
b. The President shall be the signatory for the government because, supposedly before an
agreement is presented to the President for signature, it will have been vetted several times
over at different levels to ensure that it conforms to law and can withstand public scrutiny.
c. Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President shall report it to Congress to
give that branch of government an opportunity to look over the agreement and interpose
timely objections, if any. (Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascapes of Tañon
Strait vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 180771, April 21, 2015)
a. Hereditary succession (Testate Estate of Jose Ramirez vs. Vda. de Ramirez, G.R. No. L-
27952, February 15, 1982);
b. A natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a
transferee of private lands, subject to limitations provided by law (Sec. 8, Art. XII, 1987
Constitution);
c. Americans and American-owned and –controlled corporations hold valid title to private
lands against private persons under the Parity Agreement (Republic of the Philippines vs.
Quasha, G.R. No. L-30299, August 17, 1972). However, this ruling was effectively modified
by Sec. 11, Art. XVII of the 1973 Constitutions, which reads: “Titles to private lands
acquired by such persons before such date (July 3, 1974) shall be valid as against private
persons only.” Thus, a previous owner may no longer recover the land from an American
buyer who succeeded in obtaining title over the land. Only the State has the superior right
to the land, through the institution of escheat proceedings, or through an action for
reversion.
257. Does voluntary surrender require court authorization to be considered as a mode of
extinguishment of tenancy relationship?
No. Voluntary surrender, as a mode of extinguishment of tenancy relations, does not require any
court authorization considering that it involves the tenant's own volition. The voluntary surrender
of the landholding by an agricultural lessee should be due to circumstances more advantageous
to him and his family. In all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties is
at a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness,
tender age or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection. ( Buada vs. Cement
Center, Inc., G.R. No. 180374, January 22, 2010 [J. Del castillo])
Tenancy relationship is a juridical tie which arises between a landowner and a tenant once they
agree, expressly or impliedly, to undertake jointly the cultivation of a land belonging to the
landowner, as a result of which relationship the tenant acquires the right to continue working on
and cultivating the land. The existence of a tenancy relationship cannot be presumed and
allegations that one is a tenant do not automatically give rise to security of tenure. For tenancy
relationship to exist, the following essential requisites must be present:
259. Does the mere occupation or cultivation of an agricultural land automatically convert
a tiller or farmworker into an agricultural tenant recognized under agrarian laws?
No. It is settled that mere occupation or cultivation of an agricultural land does not automatically
convert a tiller or farm worker into an agricultural tenant recognized under agrarian laws. It is
essential that, together with the other requisites of tenancy relationship, the agricultural tenant
must prove that he transmitted the landowners share of the harvest. (Adriano vs. Tanco, G.R.
No. 168164, July 5, 2010 [J. Del Castillo])
260. Lazaro Gallardo’s land was placed under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27 and Porferio Soliman was instituted as a
qualified farmer tenant-transferee thereof. Under the Deed between Lazaro and
Porferio, the latter (as sole farmer-beneficiary and in consideration for the transfer
of the whole of the land in his favor) obliged himself to pay the former, but he failed
to do so. Is the landownder entitled to just compensation?
Yes. When one party enters into a covenant with another, he must perform his obligations with
fealty and good faith. This becomes more imperative where such party has been given a grant,
such as land, under the land reform laws. While the tenant is emancipated from bondage to the
soil, the landowner is entitled to his just compensation for the deprivation of his land. ( Heirs of
Lazaro Gallardo vs. Soliman, G.R. No. 178952, April 10, 2013 [J. Del Castillo])
261. The deceased X owned a farm. As tiller of the farm, Y was issued a Certificate of Land
Transfer (CLT) under the Agricultural Land Reform Code (Republic Act [R.A.] No.
3844). In 1980, X threatened to kill Y if he did not leave the farm. His standing crops
and house were bulldozed. For fear of his life, Y left. In 1993, X died. Y then returned
to the farm and filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) a Petition against X’s estate praying that his possession and cultivation of
the farm be respected. The administrator of X’s estate moved to dismiss the Petition,
contending that Y’s cause of action has prescribed beyond the 3-year prescription
period under R.A. No. 3844. Y argued that his tenure should be deemed uninterrupted
since his departure was due to threats, force, and intimidation. Is Y correct?
Yes. The farm has been placed under the coverage of Republic Act No. 3844 (Agricultural Land
Reform Code). It is also undisputed that a tenancy relation existed between X and Y. In fact, a
Certificate of Land Transfer had been issued in favor of the Y; thus, Y already had an expectant
right to the farm. His certificate proves inchoate ownership of an agricultural land. It is issued in
order for the tenant farmer to acquire the land he was tilling. (Coderias vs. Estate of Juan Chioco,
G.R. No. 180476, June 26, 2013 [J. Del Castillo])
a. Should Y be evicted?
No. Since the farm is considered expropriated and placed under the coverage of the
Agricultural Land Reform Code, X had no right to evict Y and enter the property. The Court
cannot sanction the use of force to evict beneficiaries of land reform. Eviction using force
is reversion to the feudal system, where the landed elite have free rein over their poor
vassals. (Coderias vs. Estate of Juan Chioco, G.R. No. 180476, June 26, 2013 [J. Del
Castillo])
b. Can the administrator of X’s estate claim that Y’s cause of action had already
prescribed?
No. The administrator of X’s estate had no right to claim that Y’s cause of action had
prescribed. Security of tenure is a legal concession to agricultural lessees, which they value
as life itself, and deprivation of their landholdings is tantamount to deprivation of their only
means of livelihood. Perforce, as provided under our Agrarian Reform Law, the termination
of the leasehold relationship can take place only for causes provided by law. Here, the
termination was unlawful, thus the prescriptive period was deemed interrupted. (Coderias
vs. Estate of Juan Chioco, G.R. No. 180476, June 26, 2013 [J. Del Castillo])
In order to qualify as an agrarian dispute, there must exist a tenancy relation between the parties.
A case involving agricultural land does not immediately qualify it as an agrarian dispute. The
mere fact that the land is agricultural does not ipso facto make the possessor an agricultural
lessee or tenant; there are conditions or requisites before he can qualify as an agricultural lessee
or tenant, and the subject matter being agricultural land constitutes simply one condition. For
the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board to acquire jurisdiction over a case, there
must exist a tenancy relation between the parties. In order for a tenancy agreement to take hold
over a dispute, it is essential to establish all its indispensable elements, to wit: (1) that the parties
are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) that the subject matter of the
relationship is an agricultural land; (3) that there is consent between the parties to the
relationship; (4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5)
that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) that the
harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. ( Bumagat vs.
Arribay, G.R. No. 194818, June 9, 2014 [J. Del Castillo])
The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interest so requires. No
combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed. (Sec. 19, Art. XII, 1987
Constitution) A monopoly is “a privilege or peculiar advantage vested in one or more persons or
companies, consisting in the exclusive right (or power) to carry on a particular business or trade,
manufacture a particular article, or control the sale of a particular commodity”.
Monopolies are not per se prohibited by the Constitution, but may be permitted to exist to
aid the government in carrying on an enterprise or to aid in the performance of various
services and functions in the interest of the public. However, because monopolies are
subject to abuses that can inflict severe prejudice to the public, they are subjected to a
higher level of State regulation than an ordinary business undertaking (Agan, Jr. vs.
Philippine International Airport Terminals Co., Inc., G.R. No. 155001, May 5, 2003).
264. What is the foreign equity requirement under the 1987 Constitution in relation to the
case of Rappler, Inc.?
The foreign equity restriction of the Philippine Constitution under Art. XVI, Sec. 11(1) states that
"The ownership and management of mass media shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines,
or to corporations, cooperatives or associations, wholly-owned and managed by such citizens."
The constitutional and statutory foreign equity restrictions in mass media must be related to the
broader state policy in Sec. 19 of Art. II of the 1987 Constitution which declares that: “The State
shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.
The foreign equity restriction is very clear. Anything less than 100% Filipino control is a violation.
Conversely, anything more than exactly 0% foreign control is a violation. (In Re: Rappler, Inc.
and Rappler Holdings Corporation, SEC Resolution 437, July 8, 2017)
For purposes of compliance with the nationalization laws, the Supreme Court ruled in Heirs
of Wilson Gamboa vs. Teves (G.R. No. 176579, October 9, 2012) that the word “capital”
in Sec. 11, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote.
Human rights are generally characterized as (a) inherent, (b) fundamental, (c) inalienable, (d)
imprescriptible, (e) indivisible, (f) universal, and (g) interdependent. (Coquia, Human Rights,
2012)
a. To investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human roights
violations involving civil and political rights (Cariño vs. Commission on Human Rights, G.R.
No. 96681, December 2, 1991);
b. To adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for
violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court (Simon vs. Commission on Human
Rights, G.R. No. 100150 January 5, 1994);
c. To provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons
within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for ppreventive
measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been
violated or need protection;
d. Exercise visitorial powers over jail, prisons, or detention facilities;
e. Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect
for the primacy of human rights;
f. Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide
for compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their families;
g. Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on
human rights;
h. Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of
documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any
investigation conducted by it or under its authority;
i. Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance
of its functions;
j. Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and
k. Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law. (Sec. 18, Art. XIII,
1987 Constitution)
Likewise, the Supreme Court said, in Quisumbing vs. Commission on Human Rights (G.R. No.
209283, March 11, 2015), that the power to initiate an investigation and to refer the matter to
the Office of the Ombudsman is within the power of the Commission on Human Rights as an
entity with its own distinct personality and is recognized by no less than the Constitution.
269. Is Sec. 5, Art. XIV of the 1987 Constitution (i.e., highest budgetary priority to
education) mandatory or directory?
While it is true that under Sec. 5(5) of Art. XIV of the 1987 Constitution Congress is mandated
to "assign the highest budgetary priority to education" in order to "insure that teaching will attract
and retain its rightful share of the best available talents through adequate remuneration and
other means of job satisfaction and fulfillment," it does not thereby follow that the hands of
Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the
national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives. Congress is certainly
not without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to provide an appropriation that can
reasonably service our enormous debt, the greater portion of which was inherited from the
previous administration. It is not only a matter of honor and to protect the credit standing of the
country. More especially, the very survival of our economy is at stake. (Guingona vs. Carague,
G.R. No. G.R. No. 94571, April 22, 1991).
270. Petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, the Board of Medical
Education, and the Center for educational Measurement from enforcing an act which
requires the taking and passing of the National Medical Admission Test as a condition
for securing Certificate of Eligibility for admission to medical schools. The Petitioners
invoke Sec. 1, Art. XIV of the 1987 Constitution which states that “the State shall
protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education at all levels and take
appropriate steps to make such education accessible to all.” Are the Petitioners
correct?
No. Republic Act (R.A.) No. 2382, as amended by R.A. Nos. 4224 and 5946, known as the Medical
Act of 1959, defines its basic objectives to govern (a) the standardization and regulation of
medical education; (b) the examination for registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision,
control and regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines. The Statute created a Board
of Medical Education and prescribed certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical
schools. The State is not really enjoined to take appropriate steps to make quality education
accessible to all who might for any number of reasons wish to enroll in a professional school but
rather merely to make such education accessible to all who qualify under “fair, reasonable and
equitable admission and academic requirements.” (Tablarin vs. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 78164, July
31, 1987)
271. Discuss the constitutional right of every citizen to select a profession or course of
study.
The Supreme Court has upheld the constitutional right of every citizen to select a profession or
course of study subject to a fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic
requirements. But like all rights and freedoms, their exercise may be so regulated pursuant to
the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and
general welfare of the people. Thus, persons who desire to engage in the learned professions
requiring scientific or technical knowledge may be required to take an examination as a
prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers. It must be stressed, nevertheless, that the
power to regulate the exercise of a profession or pursuit of an occupation cannot be exercised
by the State or its agents in an arbitrary, despotic, or oppressive manner. A political body that
regulates the exercise of a particular privilege has the authority to both forbid and grant such
privilege in accordance with certain conditions. Such conditions may not, however, require giving
up ones constitutional rights as a condition to acquiring the license. (Professional Regulation
Commission vs. De Guzman, G.R. No. 144681, June 21, 2004).
273. ABC College, a private educational institution, was founded in 1981 for the avowed
purpose of producing physicians who will “emancipate Muslim citizens from age-old
attitudes on health”. The unstable peace and order situation in Mindanao led to the
establishment of ABC College in Rizal, instead of Zamboanga City, where it was
originally supposed to be located. Later, the Department of Education and Board of
Medical Education authorized the Commission on Medical education to conduct a
study of all medical schools in the Philippines. The report of the Commission showed
that ABC College fell very much short of the minimum standards set for medical
schools. The Commission thus recommended the closure of the said school. ABC
College went to the court and filed a civil case against the Secretary of Education for
grave abuse of discretion. Is ABC College correct?
No. It is a matter of law that the Secretary of Education exercises the power to enjoin compliance
with the requirements laid down for medical schools and to mete out sanctions where he finds
that violations thereof have been committed. (Board of Medical Education vs. Alfonso, G.R. No.
88259, August 10, 1989)
274. What are the legal requisites in order for teachers to acquire permanent
employment?
275. Can the Courts interfere with the policy of the school on conferment of honors?
No. It is an accepted principle that schools of learning are given ample discretion to formulate
rules and guidelines in the granting of honors for purposes of graduation. This is part of academic
freedom. Within the parameters of these rules, it is within the competence of universities and
colleges to determine who are entitled to the grant of honors among the graduating students.
Its discretion on this academic matter may not be disturbed much less controlled by the courts
unless there is grave abuse of discretion in its exercise. (University of San Carlos vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 79237, October 18, 1988).
a. Obligations erga omnes – those obligations which, by virtue of their nature and
importance, are the concern of all States and for whose protection all States have a legal
interest (Belgium vs. Spain, 1970 I.C.J. 3, February 5, 1970). It is a Latin phrase literally
means “towards everyone”. In International Law, the concept refers to specifically
determined obligations that states have towards the international community as a whole.
b. Jus cogens – norms accepted and recognized by the international community of States
as a whole as norms from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified
only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character
(Ocampo vs. Abando, GR. No. 176830, February 11, 2014). It means “compelling law” and
is also called peremptory norm.
c. Ex aequo et bono – basis for decision by an international tribunal on the grounds of
justice and fairness. It is an alternate means of decision-making in place of the normally
employed legal rules of treaties and custom (Art. 38, Statute of International Court of
Justice). It is a Latin term which means “what is just and fair or according to equity and
good conscience” (Bernas, International Law, 2009).
d. Opinio juris – the belief that a certain form of behavior is obligatory. (Bernas,
International Law, 2009)
e. Pacta sunt servanda – every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must
be performed by them in good faith. (Art. 26, Vienna Convention on the Law on Treaties)
f. Rebus sic stantibus – a fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with
regard to those existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and which was not
foreseen by the parties. (Art. 62, Vienna Convention on the Law on Treaties)
g. Par in parem non habet imperium – even the strongest State cannot assume
jurisdiction over another State, no matter how weak, or question the validity of its acts in
so far as they are made to take effect within its own territory. (Cruz, International Law,
2003)
h. Restitutio in integrum – a Latin phrase meaning "returning everything to the state as
it was before". This principle is commonly followed by courts while awarding damages in
common law negligence cases. The amount of damages awarded should be sufficient bring
the plaintiff back to the position as if no tort has been committed. (Germany vs. Poland,
P.C.I.J. Ser. A, No. 9 [1927])
279. Theoretical approaches to the relationship of municipal law and international law.
280. Rules in resolving conflicts between international law and municipal law.
From the point of view municipal tribunal International Law vs. Constitution: Uphold
the Constitution
Constitution vs. Treaty: Uphold the constitution
International vs. Statute: What comes last in
time will usually be upheld by the municipal
tribunal (Bernas, International Law, 2009)
From the point of view of international Since the rights and obligations of a State in its
tribunal international relations are determined by
international law, it is this law, and not the
municipal law of the State, which provides the
standards by which to determine the legality of its
conduct (Briggs, The Law of Nations, 1982)
282. How does the Doctrine of Incorporation operate in the Philippines in relation to
treaties?
In the case of treaties as international law, they become part of the law of the land when
concurred in by the Senate in accordance with Sec. 21, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution which
sets down the mechanism for transforming a treaty into binding municipal law. With regard to
customary law and treaties which have become customary law, by saying that the Philippines
“adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land,” the
Constitution manifests its adherence to the “dualist” theory and at the same time adopts the
incorporation theory and thereby makes international law part of domestic law. This provision
makes the Philippines one of the states which make a specific declaration that international law
has the force also of domestic law. (Bernas, International Law, 2009)
Primary Sources
a. Treaties or conventions – must be concluded by a sizable number of states and thus
reflect the will or at least the consensus of the family of nations (Cruz, International Law,
2003);
b. Customs – practice which has grown up between states and has come to be accepted as
binding by the mere fact of persistent usage over a long period of time (Fenwick,
International Law, 1948); and
c. General principles of law – derived from the law of nature and are observed by the
majority of States because they are believed to be good and just (Cruz, International Law,
2003)
Secondary Sources
a. Decisions of courts (Art. 38, Statute of International Court of Justice);
b. Writings of publicists (Cruz, International Law, 2003)
The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a
permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into
relations with the other states or sovereignty. (Art. 1, Montevideo Convention on the Rights and
Duties of States)
To be valid, a treaty must: (a) be entered into by parties with treaty-making capacities; (b)
through their authorized representatives; (c) without the attendance of duress, fraud, mistake,
or other vices of consent; (d) on any lawful subject matter; and (e) in accordance with their
respective constitutional processes. (Cruz, International Law, 2003)
On one hand, a State may be defined as a group of people living together in a definite territory
under an independent government organized for political ends and capable of entering into
international relations. State is a legal concept. On the other hand, nation indicates a relation of
birth or origin and implies a common race, usually characterized by community of language and
customs (Hackworth, Digest of International Law, 1943). It is only a racial or ethnic concept.
(Cruz, International Law, 2003)
a. Negotiation – the State Representative discusses the terms and provisions of the treaty.
b. Adoption – when the form and content have been settled by the negotiating States, the
treaty is adopted. This is only preparatory to (a) the authentication of the text of the treaty
and (b) the signing thereof. (Art. 9, Vienna Convention on the Law on Treaties)
c. Authentication – a definitive text of the treaty is established as the correct and authentic
one (Art. 10, Vienna Convention on the Law on Treaties)
d. Expression of consent – the State Parties express their consent to be bound by the
terms of the treaty.
e. Registration – the treaty is then registered with the secretariat of the United Nations. If
not registered, the treaty may not be invoked before any United Nations Organ (Art.
102[2], United Nations Charter)
290. How may a treaty be terminated?
a. Error;
b. Fraud;
c. Corruption of the representative of a State;
d. Coercion of a representative of a State;
e. Coercion of a State by the threat of force;
f. Conflict with peremptory norms (Arts. 48-53, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties)
Absent the concurrence of Senate, the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement is in the form
of an Executive Agreement as validly entered into by the President pursuant to the power of
granted to the executive to administer affairs of the state. (Saguisag vs. Ochoa, G.R. Nos. 212426
and 212444, January 12, 2016)
No. The President, may enter into an executive agreement on foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities, if: (a) it is not the instrument that allows the presence of foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities; or (b) it merely aims to implement an existing law or
treaty. The prohibition on entry of foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the
Philippine Territory in Sec. 25, Art. XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, refers solely to the initial
entry of the foreign military bases, troops, or facilities and not the supplement of an
existing law or treaty. (Saguisag vs. Ochoa, G.R. Nos. 212426 and 212444, January 12,
2016)
a. That which is established by the inhabitants who rise in revolt against and depose the
legitimate regime;
b. That which is established in the course of war by the invading forces of one belligerent in
the territory of the other belligerent, the government of which is also displaced; and
c. That which is established by the inhabitants of a state who secede therefrom without
overthrowing its government. (Co Kim Chan vs. Valdez Tan Keh, G.R. No. L-5, September
17, 1945)
a. Full diplomatic relations are established, except where the government recognized is de
facto (Fenton Textiles Association vs. Krassin, 38 T.L.R. 289 [1921]);
b. The recognized state or government acquires the right to sue in the courts of the
recognizing state;
c. The recognized state or government has a right to the possession of the properties of its
predecessor in the territory of the recognizing state (De Haber vs. Queen of Portugal, 17
Q.B. 171 [1851]); and
d. All acts of the recognized state or government are validated retroactively, preventing the
recognizing state from passing upon their legality in its own courts. (Cruz, International
Law, 2003)
a. Revolution;
b. Unification;
c. Secession;
d. Assertion of independence;
e. Agreement; and
f. Attainment of civilization (Cruz, International Law, 2003)
From the moment of its creation, the State continues as a juristic being notwithstanding changes
in its circumstances, provided only that they do not result in loss of any of its essential elements
(Cruz, International Law, 2003). Once its identity as an international person has been fixed and
its position in the international community established, the State continues to be the same
corporate person whatever changes may take place in its international operation and government
(Fenwick, International Law, 1948)
The Drago Doctrine is, however, not applicable when the debtor State refuses or neglects
to reply to an offer of arbitration, or, after accepting the offer, prevents any compromis
from being agreed on, or, after the arbitration, fails to submit to the award. (Art. 1, Hague
Convention of 1907)
303. Give a summary of West Philippine Sea Arbitration between Philippines and China.
(Republic of the Philippines vs. People’s Republic of China, PCA Case No. 2013-19)
a. As to jurisdiction
Art. 288 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea states that “In the event
of a dispute as to whether a court or tribunal has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled
by decision of that court or tribunal.”
b. As to Nine-Dash Line
The Tribunal concludes that, as between the Philippines and China, the Convention defines
the scope of maritime entitlements in the South China Sea, which may not extend beyond
the limits imposed therein. As between the Philippines and China, China’s claims to historic
rights, or other sovereign rights or jurisdiction, with respect to the maritime areas of the
South China Sea encompassed by the relevant part of the ‘nine-dash line,’ are contrary to
the Convention and without lawful effect to the extent that they exceed the geographic
and substantive limits of China’s maritime entitlements under the Convention. The Tribunal
concludes that the Convention superseded any historic rights or other sovereign rights or
jurisdiction in excess of the limits imposed therein.
The right of the state to send and receive diplomatic missions, which enables States to carry on
friendly intercourse. This is also known as Diplomatic Intercourse. (Bernas, International Law,
2009)
Statelessness is the status of having no nationality, as a consequence of being born without any
nationality, or as a result of deprivation or loss of nationality. (Labo vs. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989)
These are persons not considered as nationals by any state under the operation of its laws.
Stateless persons are those who do not have a nationality. They are either de jure or de
facto stateless. De jure stateless persons are those who have lost their nationality, if they
had one, and have not acquired a new one. De facto stateless persons are those who have
a nationality but to whom protection is denied by their state when out of the state. (Bernas,
International Law, 2009)
1. No state can intervene or complain on behalf of a stateless person for any wrong
suffered by him through the act or omission of another state for no international
delinquency is committed in inflicting injury upon him. Any wrong suffered by him
through the act or omission of a state would be damnum absque injuria for, in theory,
no other state had been offended and no international delinquency committed as a
result of the damage caused upon him;
2. He cannot be expelled by a state if he is lawfully in its territory, except on grounds of
national security or public order; and
3. He cannot avail himself of the protection and benefits of citizenship, like securing for
himself a passport or visa and personal documents. (Bernas, International Law, 2009)
A refugee is an individual who is outside his or her country of nationality or habitual residence
who is unable or unwilling to return due to a well-founded fear of persecution based on his or
her race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group. (Sec.
1[A][2], 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees )
No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to
the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. (Art. 33[1], 1951
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees)
1. Territorial Asylum – seeking asylum in another country for fear of being persecuted.
This exists only when stipulated in a treaty or justified by established usage. It may
depend on the liberal attitude of the Receiving State on the ground of “territorial
supremacy”.
2. Diplomatic Asylum – An asylum granted by a State not on its physical territory. It is
granted only when stipulated in a treaty or where established usage allows it, but
within “narrowest limits” or when the life or liberty of a person is threatened by
imminent violence. The asylum may be in the premises of legation building (e.g.,
embassy), warships, or international institutions. (Bernas, International Law, 2009)
313. What is Yogyakarta Principles? Does it have binding effect in the Philippines?
The Yogyakarta Principles on the Application of International Human Rights Law in relation to
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity is a set of international principles relating to sexual
orientation and gender identity, intended to address documented evidence of abuse of rights of
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) individuals. It contains 29 Principles adopted by
human rights practitioners and experts, together with recommendations to governments,
regional intergovernmental institutions, civil society, and the United Nations.
The Supreme Court enunciated that, at this time, the Philippines is not prepared to declare that
the Yogyakarta Principles contain norms that are obligatory on the Philippines. There are
declarations and obligations outlined in said Principles which are not reflective of the current
state of international law, and do not find basis in any of the sources of international law
enumerated under Art. 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
Not everything that society – or a certain segment of society – wants or demands is automatically
a human right. This is not an arbitrary human intervention that may be added to or subtracted
from at will.
Using even the most liberal of lenses, these Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of a declaration
formulated by various international law professors, are – at best – de lege ferenda – and do not
constitute binding obligations on the Philippines. Indeed, so much of contemporary international
law is characterized by the "soft law" nomenclature, i.e., international law is full of principles that
promote international cooperation, harmony, and respect for human rights, most of which
amount to no more than well-meaning desires, without the support of either State practice or
opinio juris. (Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010
[J. De Castillo])
Under this Doctrine, a state may be held responsible for an international delinquency, directly or
indirectly imputable to it, which causes injury to the national of another state. Liability will attach
to the State where its treatment of the alien falls below the international standard of justice or
where it is remiss in according him the protection or redress that is warranted by the
circumstances. Its function is to assure the traveler that when his rights are violated in a foreign
State, he will not be denied any remedy simply because he is not one of its nationals. The idea,
in other words, is to encourage more intercourse among the peoples of the world through inter-
visitation of their respective countries. (Cruz, International Law, 2003)
Some writers describe it as the standard of the reasonable State, that is, referring to the
ordinary norms of official conduct observed in civilized jurisdictions. It is deemed not
satisfied if the laws of a State are intrinsically unjust. (Cruz, International Law, 2003)
Where the laws of the State fall below the international standards of justice, it is no defense
that they are not applicable not only to aliens but as well, and equally, to the nationals of
the State. The relations of that State with its own nationals are purely municipal;
international law is involved in its relations with the nationals of other States. (Cruz,
International Law, 2003)
This is a stipulation by which the alien waives or restricts his right to appeal to his own State in
connection with any claim arising from the contract and agrees to limit himself to the remedies
available under the laws of the local State. The Calvo Clause may be enforced as a lawful
condition of the contract. However, it may not be interpreted to deprive the alien’s State of the
right to protect or vindicate his interest in case they are injured in another State as such waiver
can legally be made not by him but by his own State. (North American Dredging Co. [United
States of America] vs. United States of Mexico, General Claims Commission, 1926)
a. Territoriality Principle – As a general rule, a State has jurisdiction over all persons and
property within its territory. The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is
necessary, exclusive, and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitations not imposed by itself.
(The Schooner Exchange vs. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116 [1812])
b. Nationality Principle – A court has jurisdiction if the offender is a national of the State.
c. Protective Principle – A court is vested with jurisdiction if a national interest or policy is
injured or violated. The international community has strictly construed the reach of this
doctrine to those offenses posing a direct, specific threat to national security.
d. Universality Principle – Jurisdiction is asserted with respect to acts considered
committed against the whole world. (People of the Philippines vs. Lol-lo, G.R. No. L-17958,
February 27, 1922)
e. Passive Personality Principle – A court has jurisdiction if the victim of the act is a
national of the Forum State. (France v. Turkey, Permanent Court of International Justice,
1927)
318. How may a Signatory State withdraw from the International Criminal Court?
Art. 127 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court provides:
EXTRADITION DEPORTATION
Definition It is the surrender of a fugitive by one It is the expulsion of an alien who is
State to another where he is wanted considered undesirable by the local
for prosecution or, if already State, usually but not necessarily to
convicted, for punishment. The his own State.
surrender is made at the request of
the latter State on the basis of an
extradition treaty.
Who effects It is effected on the basis of an Effected on account of the unilateral
extradition treaty or upon the request act of the local State.
of another state.
Basis Based on offenses generally Based on causes arising in the local
committed in the State of origin. State.;
Implementation Call for the return of the fugitive to the An undesirable alien may be deported
State of origin. Extradition requires to a State other than his own or the
the transfer of an individual from the State of origin
sending State to the requesting State
on the basis of a treaty obligation.
For whose benefit Effected for the benefit of the State to Effected for the protection of the State
which the person being extradited will expelling an alien because his
be surrendered because he is a presence is not conducive to the
fugitive in that State. public good.
Receiving State The alien will be surrendered to the The undesirable alien may be sent to
state asking for his extradition. any state willing to accept him. (Cruz,
International Law, 2003)
Extradition means the surrender of a person by one state to another state where he is wanted
for prosecution or, if already convicted, for punishment. The process is as follows:
1. A request for extradition is presented through diplomatic channels to the state of
refuge with the necessary papers for identification.
2. The request is received by the state of refuge.
3. A judicial investigation is conducted by the state of refuge to ascertain if the crime is
covered by the extradition treaty and if there is a prima facie case against the fugitive
according to its own law.
4. If there is a prima facie case, a warrant of surrender will be drawn and the fugitive will
be delivered to the state of origin (Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465,
January 18, 2000)
a. First Generation of Human Rights – It covers civil and political rights. It conceives of
human rights more in negative (“freedom from…”). It favors the abstention rather than
the intervention of the government in the exercise of freedoms and in the quest for human
dignity.
b. Second Generation of Human Rights – It covers economic, social, and cultural rights.
It conceives of human rights more in positive terms (“right to…”). They are the
fundamental claims to social equality.
c. Third Generation of Human Rights – It covers collective rights. (Coquia, Human Rights,
2012)
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through
international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of
its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights
recognized in the to strive for the promotion and observance of the rights recognized in the
International Convention on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights by all appropriate means,
including particularly the adoption of legislative measures. (Art. 2, International Convention on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights)
In cases not covered by other international agreements, civilians and combatants remain under
the protection and authority of the principles of international law derived from established
custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience. (Bernas,
International Law, 2009)
a. Principle of Distinction – persons fighting in armed conflict must, at all times, distinguish
between civilians and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives;
b. Principle of Military Necessity – the belligerents may employ any amount and kind of
force to compel the complete submission of the enemy with the least possible loss of lives,
time, and money;
c. Principle of Humanity – prohibits the use of any measure that is not absolutely
necessary for the purposes of the war;
d. Principle of Chivalry – requires the belligerents to give proper warning before launching
a bombardment or prohibits the use of perfidy in the conduct of hostilities; and
e. Principle of Proportionality – attacks which may be expected to cause incidental loss
to civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which
would be excessive in relation to concrete and direct military advantage anticipated, are
prohibited. (Cruz, International Law, 2003)
a. Precautionary Principle – a moral and political principle which states that if an action
might cause severe or irreversible harm to the public and to the environment, and in the
absence of scientific proof that such harm shall not follow, the one advocating the action
shall have the burden of proof. Where there is good reason to believe that there is a threat
of serious or irreversible damage to the environment, a lack of full scientific certainty shall
not be a valid excuse to postpone employing cost-effective measures to prevent the
damage.
b. Polluter-Pay Principle – the polluting party pays for the damage done to the natural
environment.
c. Principle of Sustainable Development – a pattern of resources that aims to meet
human needs while preserving the environment so that these needs are met not only in
the present, but in the indefinite future.
d. Principle of Subsidiarity – things that an individual can do himself, should not be
transferred to society. If the individual is not capable of solving certain problems, the
society is obliged to give aid.
e. Principle of Common-but-Differentiated Responsibilities – recognizes historical
differences in the contributions of developed and developing States to global environmental
problems, and differences in their respective economic and technical capacity to tackle
these problems.
f. Principle of Good Neighborliness – prohibits States from using or permitting the use
of its territory in a manner that is injurious to another State, or that other State’s persons
or property. (Bernas, International Law, 2009)
327. May a State who caused transboundary pollution be held responsible by another
State?
Yes. It is the responsibility of the State to protect other states against harmful act by individuals
from within its jurisdiction at all times. No state has the right to use or permit the use of the
territory in a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties
or persons therein as stipulated under the principles of international law. ( U.S. vs. Canada, 33
AJIL 182 [1939] and 35 AJIL 684 [1941])