Robert Full MSJ With Exhibits and Statement

https://ecf.hid.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/Dispatch.pl?
121787865403277
Notices
1:18-cv-00125-HG-KSC Roberts vs. Ballard; et al.
U.S. District Court
District of Hawaii
Notice of Electronic Filing
The following transaction was entered by Stamboulieh, Stephen on 11/9/2018 at 4:27 PM HST and filed on
11/9/2018
Case Name: Roberts vs. Ballard; et al.
Case Number: 1:18-cv-00125-HG-KSC
Filer: Andrew Namiki Roberts
Document Number: 34
Docket Text:
NOTICE by Andrew Namiki Roberts Entry of Admissions Andrew Namiki Roberts.
(Attachments: # (1) Declaration Declaration of Stephen D. Stamboulieh, # (2) Certificate of
Service Certificate of Service)(Stamboulieh, Stephen)
1:18-cv-00125-HG-KSC Notice has been electronically mailed to:
Alan A. Beck ngord2000@yahoo.com, Alan.alexander.beck@gmail.com
John M. Cregor , Jr John.M.Cregor@hawaii.gov, Caron.M.Inagaki@hawaii.gov,

Jethro.G.Arcilla@Hawaii.gov, Marnie.A.Goo@hawaii.gov
Nicolette Winter nwinter@honolulu.gov, debra.haraguchi@honolulu.gov, dkasashima2@honolulu.gov,

nicolette@nicolettewinter.com, semoto@honolulu.gov
Stephen D. Stamboulieh stephen@sdslaw.us
1:18-cv-00125-HG-KSC Notice will not be electronically mailed to:
The following document(s) are associated with this transaction:
Document description:Main Document

Original filename:n/a
Electronic document Stamp:
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Document description:Certificate of Service Certificate of Service
1 of 2
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Case 1:18-cv-00125-HG-KSC Document 34 Filed 11/09/18 Page 1 of 3 PageID #: 188
Alan Alexander Beck

Law Office of Alan Beck
2692 Harcourt Drive
San Diego, CA 92123
(619) 905-9105
Hawaii Bar No. 9145
Alan.alexander.beck@gmail.com
Stephen D. Stamboulieh
Stamboulieh Law, PLLC
P.O. Box 4008
Madison, MS 39130
(601) 852-3440
stephen@sdslaw.us
MS Bar No. 102784
*Admitted Pro Hac Vice
Attorneys for Plaintiff

ANDREW NAMIKI ROBERTS
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
ANDREW NAMIKI ROBERTS ) Civil Action No. 1:18-cv-00125-HG-KSC

)
) PLAINTIFF’S ENTRY OF ADMISSIONS
) INTO EVIDENTIARY RECORD OF
Plaintiff, ) CASE; DECLARATION OF
) STEPHEN D. STAMBOULIEH;
v. ) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
)
SUSAN BALLARD, et al. )
)
)
Defendants. ) TRIAL: July 23, 2019 – 9:00 AM
_______________________________)
PLAINTIFF’S ENTRY OF ADMISSIONS INTO EVIDENTIARY RECORD

OF CASE
Pursuant to Rules 36(a)(3) and 36(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Plaintiff Andrew Namiki Roberts enters the following matters into evidence in this
case:
1. Tasers and stun guns are less than lethal weapons.
2. Defendants are not aware of any deaths attributable to a stun gun.
3. As part of Hawaii law enforcement training for Tasers, some officers are
voluntarily exposed to the devices.
4. Defendants know of no law enforcement officer that has ever been killed with
a Taser or stun gun.
5. Tasers and stun guns are commonly used for self-defense.
6. Tasers and stun guns are appropriate in certain circumstances to be used for
self-defense.
7. Tasers are not dangerous and unusual.
8. Stun guns are not dangerous and unusual.
9. The Second Amendment protects stun guns and Tasers.
10. There is less of a public safety interest in banning stun guns and Tasers than
handguns.
11. Stun guns and Tasers are less dangerous than handguns.
2
12. There are over 4.7 million electric arms owned by civilians for lawful
purposes in the United States of America.
13. Attorney General Russell A. Suzuki, in his official capacity, is a proper party
in this lawsuit.
14. Defendant Al Cummings, in his official capacity, is a proper party in this
lawsuit.
Dated: Madison, Mississippi, November 9th, 2018.
Respectfully submitted,
Counsel for Plaintiff
/s/ Alan Beck

Alan Alexander Beck
/s/ Stephen D. Stamboulieh

3
Case 1:18-cv-00125-HG-KSC Document 34-1 Filed 11/09/18 Page 1 of 3 PageID #: 191


)
)
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) DECLARATION OF STEPHEN D.
) STAMBOULIEH
)
)
_______________________________)
DECLARATION OF STEPHEN D. STAMBOULIEH
I, Stephen D. Stamboulieh, declare as follows:
1. I am an attorney with the law firm of Stamboulieh Law, PLLC, counsel for
Plaintiff in the above-captioned action. I am admitted pro hac vice in this matter.
2. I am authorized and competent to testify to the matters contained in this
declaration, and unless otherwise indicated, I make this declaration based upon
personal knowledge.
3. On September 27, 2018, Plaintiff served Defendants with Plaintiff’s First
Request for Admissions.
4. A copy of the postal receipt is attached to this Declaration and shows that the
mailing would have been received by Defendants on October 1, 2018.

5. As of November 9, 2018, Defendants have not responded to Plaintiff’s First
6. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746(2), I declare under penalty of perjury that the
foregoing is true and correct.

2
Alan Alexander Beck

2692 Harcourt Drive
San Diego, CA 92123
(619) 905-9105
Hawaii Bar No. 9145
P.O. Box 4008
Madison, MS 39130
(601) 852-3440
stephen@sdslaw.us
MS Bar No. 102784



)
)
)
Plaintiff, )
)
)
)
)
_______________________________)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the date noted below, the foregoing document was
duly served on the Defendants through this Court’s ECF system, which generated a
notice of filing and delivered a copy of the foregoing to all counsel of record.

2
Stephen Stamboulieh
From: hid_resp@hid.uscourts.gov
Sent: Friday, November 9, 2018 8:36 PM
To: hawaii_cmecf@hid.uscourts.gov
Subject: Activity in Case 1:18-cv-00125-HG-KSC Roberts vs. Ballard; et al. Motion for Summary
Judgment
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U.S. District Court
District of Hawaii
The following transaction was entered by Stamboulieh, Stephen on 11/9/2018 at 4:35 PM HST and filed on 11/9/2018
Document Number: 35
Docket Text:
MOTION for Summary Judgment Stephen D. Stamboulieh appearing for Plaintiff Andrew
Namiki Roberts (Attachments: # (1) Memorandum Memorandum in Support, # (2) Certificate of
Service Certicificate of Service)(Stamboulieh, Stephen)
John M. Cregor , Jr John.M.Cregor@hawaii.gov, Caron.M.Inagaki@hawaii.gov, Jethro.G.Arcilla@Hawaii.gov,

Marnie.A.Goo@hawaii.gov

1
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1ac9b6dd122b668dacd0d27babbb336eef1ed7b059c803db5041f9044b5a7]]
Document description:Memorandum Memorandum in Support
] [7c0f19661509f7c33eec937020310de1b336a320be6bd4397aba031ab8a8d99eb25
055600ace5cc20aa33f02b7f4e64bca354cac0720ff8dcc4b7cda19f114c5]]
Document description:Certificate of Service Certicificate of Service
] [50859c9f719d624da07b3cdd6bc5d54eee031cc8ea73d7bf04cff2914b8aaea9d21
110a295674244a0e017195ed98fe4593695068215c9a9cb66873bdfefd757]]
2
Alan Alexander Beck

2692 Harcourt Drive
San Diego, CA 92123
(619) 905-9105
Hawaii Bar No. 9145
P.O. Box 4008
Madison, MS 39130
(601) 852-3440
stephen@sdslaw.us
MS Bar No. 102784



)
) PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
) SUMMARY JUDGMENT;
Plaintiff, ) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
) MOTION; CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
v. )
)
)
)
____________________________)
Plaintiff Andrew Namiki Roberts Motion for Summary Judgment
Plaintiff Andrew Namiki Roberts, by and through counsel, moves this Court
for an order granting summary judgment in his favor on both counts as contained in
Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint.
Plaintiff brings this Motion under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and Local Rule 56.1. Plaintiff bases this Motion upon the attached
Memorandum in Support of Motion, the Separate Concise Statement of Facts filed
contemporaneously herewith (and its attached declarations and exhibits), the record,
and oral argument that will be presented by counsel at the hearing.

Alan Alexander Beck

Case 1:18-cv-00125-HG-KSC Document 35-1 Filed 11/09/18 Page 1 of 31 PageID #:
198
Alan Alexander Beck

2692 Harcourt Drive
San Diego, CA 92123
(619) 905-9105
Hawaii Bar No. 9145
P.O. Box 4008
Madison, MS 39130
(601) 852-3440
stephen@sdslaw.us
MS Bar No. 102784



)
)
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. )
)
)
_______________________________)
PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT
199
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction………………………………………………………………….1
II. Legal Standard……………………………………………….……..……….4
III. Electric Arms Are Protected by the Second Amendment..…….……….…..4
a. Electric Arms Are in Common use………………………………….......7
b. The Second Amendment Applies Outside the Home to Lawful Self-

Defense……………………………………………………......................9
IV. This Court Should Find Hawaii’s Electric Ban Categorically

Unconstitutional………………………………………………………...….11
a. Strict Scrutiny Should Apply……………………………………..….…15
b. Under Intermediate Scrutiny Hawaii’s Electric Arm Ban is

Unconstitutional………………………………………………….……..20
V. Conclusion……..…………………………………………………...…...….26
ii
200
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Avitabile v. Beach, 1:16-cv-1447, N.D.N.Y ..............................................................5

Bateman v. Perdue 881 F.Supp.2d 709 (2012) ........................................................17
Binderup v. Att’y Gen., 836 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc) ..............................24
Broussard v. Univ. of Cal. at Berkeley, 192 F.3d 1252 (9th Cir. 1999) ....................4
Caldwell v Moore, 968 F.2d 595 (6th Cir. 1992) ......................................................6
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986) ..4
Crystal Wright v. District of Columbia, No. 1:16-cv-01556-JEB (D.D.C. Sept. 26,
2016) .....................................................................................................................12
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) ...................................... passim
Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426 (3d Cir. 2013) ...........................................................10
Duncan v. Becerra, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1106, 1120, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101549,
*28, 2017 WL 2813727 ................................................................................. 20, 22
Ezell v. City of Chicago (“Ezell II”), 846 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2017) ........................19
Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011) .................................... 18, 19
Fisher v. Kealoha, 855 F.3d 1067, 1071, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 8007, *9, 2017
WL 1753271 .........................................................................................................16
Fletcher v. Haas, 851 F. Supp. 2d 287 (D. Mass. 2012) .................................. 20, 23
Ford v. City of New Orleans, No. 2:16-cv16433-MVL-KWR (E.D. La. Dec. 14,
2016) .....................................................................................................................12
Fyock v. City of Sunnyvale, 779 F.3d 991, 998, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 3471 .....4, 8
Gould v. Morgan, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 31129 (1st Cir. 2018) ...........................14
Hatfield v. Sessions, No. 3:16-cv-00383-JPG-RJD, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70431
(S.D. Ill. Apr. 26, 2018) ........................................................................................19
Heller v. District of Columbia, 419 U.S. App. D.C. 287, 801 F.3d 264 (2015)......25
iii
201
Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1261, 399 U.S. App. D.C. 314, 331,
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 20130 ................................................................................9
Hulbert v. Pantelides, No. 1:16-cv-04121-JFM (D. Md. March 3, 2017) ..............12
Ill. Ass’n of Firearms Retailers v. City of Chicago, 961 F. Supp. 2d 928 (N.D. Ill.
2014) .....................................................................................................................19
Jackson v. City & County of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 964, 2014 U.S. App.
LEXIS 5498, *21-22, 2014 WL 1193434 ............................................................16
Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2012) ...........................10
Keyes v. Sessions, 282 F. Supp. 3d 858 (M.D. Pa. 2017) ................................. 24, 25
McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) ................................................ 5, 12, 25
Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012) ............................................ 10, 14
Morris v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 60 F. Supp. 3d 1120 (D. Idaho
2014) .....................................................................................................................14
Murphy v. Robert Guerrero, et al., 1:14-CV-00026, 2016 WL 5508998, (D.N. Mar.
Is. Sept. 28, 2016) .................................................................................................23
N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242 (2d Cir. 2015)..............8, 22
Palmer v. District of Columbia, 59 F. Supp. 3d 173 (D.D.C. 2014) .......................15
People v. Aguilar, 2 N.E.3d 321 (Ill. 2013) ...................................................... 10, 14
People v. Yanna, 297 Mich. App. 137, 145, 824 N.W.2d 241, 245, 2012 Mich.
App. LEXIS 1269 ...................................................................................... 7, 12, 13
Ramirez v. Commonwealth, 479 Mass. 331, 337, 94 N.E.3d 809, 815, 2018 Mass.
LEXIS 237 ............................................................................................. 5, 7, 12, 13
Richmond v. Peraino, 128 F. Supp. 3d 415 (D. Mass. 2015) ..................................14
Second Amendment Society v. Porrino, No. 3:16-cv-04906-DEA (D.N.J. Nov. 16,
2016) .....................................................................................................................12
Silvester v. Harris, 843 F.3d 816 (9th Cir. 2016) ............................................. 11, 20
State v. DeCiccio, 315 Conn. 79, 105 A.3d 165 (Conn. 2014) ...............................22
iv
202
State v. Giltner, 56 Haw. 374, 537 P.2d 14 (1975)....................................................1

State v. Herrmann, 2015 WI App 97, 366 Wis. 2d 312, 873 N.W.2d 257..............23
State v. Montalvo, 077331, 2017 WL 2471030 (N.J. June 8, 2017) .......................14
State v. Ogata, 572 P.2d 1222 (Haw. 1977) ..............................................................2
Taylor v. City of Baton Rouge, 39 F. Supp. 3d 807 (M.D. La. 2014) .....................18
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. JULIO CHAIREZ,
Appellee., 2018 IL 121417, 2018 WL 652814 .....................................................23
Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind.do Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) .......17
Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 837 F.3d 678 (6th Cir. 2016) (en banc) .. 23,
24
United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2013)...................... 14, 15, 16, 20
United States v. Henry, 688 F.3d 637, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 16615, *6-7, 2012
WL 3217255 .......................................................................................................5, 6
Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013) .............................................11
Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 2017) ................. 10, 11, 15
Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044, 1068, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 20525 .... 10, 11, 15
Statutes
18 U.S.C. § 922…………………………………..…………………….6, 15, 16, 24

H.R.S. §123-10.5......................................................................................................17
H.R.S. §134-16.......................................................................................................1, 2
H.R.S. §134-51.................................................................................................. 1, 2, 9
Rules
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)...................................................................................................4
v
203
I. Introduction
Plaintiff, Mr. Andrew Roberts moves for summary judgement in his challenge
to the State of Hawaii’s ban on the possession of electric arms. Plaintiff wished to
purchase a “stun gun or Taser for self-defense and other lawful purposes in his
home” and would “acquire, possess, carry and where appropriate use a Taser or stun
gun to protect himself and his home.” [Docket No. 17-1, Declaration of Andrew
Namiki Roberts]. He would further carry one on his person for purposes of lawful
self-defense. Id. at ¶3.
H.R.S. §134-16 provides that “It shall be unlawful for any person, including
a licensed manufacturer, licensed importer, or licensed dealer, to possess, offer for
sale, hold for sale, sell, give, lend, or deliver any electric gun. …” This provision
serves to outlaw the possession and use of Tasers and other electronic arms such as
stun guns even within home. H.R.S. §134-51 provides that “[a]ny person, not
authorized by law, who carries concealed upon the person's self or within any vehicle
used or occupied by the person or who is found armed with any dirk, dagger,
blackjack, slug shot, billy, metal knuckles, pistol, or other deadly or dangerous
weapon shall be guilty of a misdemeanor”. Dangerous and deadly weapons are “one
designed primarily as a weapon or diverted from normal use and prepared for
combat”. State v. Giltner, 56 Haw. 374, 537 P.2d 14 (1975). H.R.S. § 134-51 does
not require that weapons be "concealed" within a car or while carrying it in order to
1
204
violate the statute. See State v. Ogata, 572 P.2d 1222, 1223 (Haw. 1977) (“HRS §
134-51 may be violated by the carrying of deadly or dangerous weapons, whether
concealed or unconcealed”) As electric arms are designed primarily for use as a self-
defense weapon, Mr. Roberts believe that they could fall within, H.R.S. § 134-51’s
definition of a deadly or dangerous weapon. Mr. Roberts seeks a declaration that
H.R.S. §134-16 and H.R.S. § 134-51 are unconstitutional both facially and as applied
to him. If this Court believes that electric arms do not qualify as a deadly or
dangerous weapon per H.R.S. § 134-51, then Mr. Roberts requests a declaration to
that effect.
Mr. Roberts has never been convicted of a crime, either misdemeanor or
felony and has never been convicted of a crime of domestic violence. See Exhibit
“2”, ¶ 3. He has never been deemed by a mental health professional to have a mental
illness. Id. at ¶ 4. He wants to purchase an electric arm for self-defense inside and
outside his home. Id. at ¶ 5. He stated in his Declaration that he wants to “purchase,
own, possess and carry a Taser [because] a Taser is considered less than lethal
force…” and Mr. Roberts wants to use the “smallest amount of force necessary to
repel an attack rather than use lethal force when lethal force may not be the best
option.” Id. at ¶ 9. Mr. Roberts stated that current Hawaii law mandates that his
firearm be kept locked up at home because his minor daughter lives with him. Id. at
¶ 11. Mr. Robert believes a Taser is the “most effective form of less than lethal self-
2
205
defense” for him. Id. at ¶ 12. Mr. Roberts stated that he routinely transports in his
“vehicle and on [his] person thousands of dollars’ worth of camera gear” for his job
and that he is often “in remote places and on remote land, that does not have a police
presence, where [he] would be forced to defend [himself] without the assistance of
any law enforcement.” Id. at ¶ 10.
Michael A. Brave is employed as Director, Conducted Electrical Weapon,
Legal, for Axon Enterprises, Inc. (formerly TASER International, Inc.). See Exhibit
“1”, ¶ 2. Mr. Brave is a “former Chief of the Intelligence and Investigative
Operations Unit, Office of Enforcement Operations (“OEO”), Criminal Division, for
the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) in Washington, D.C. (1997-2001); former
Deputy Director for International Operations of the Federal Witness Security
Program; and a former OEO Use-of-Force and Firearms Training Officer.” Id. at ¶
5. Mr. Brave is a certified TASER Master Instructor and is authorized “to train and
certify other instructors in the proper use and deployment of TASER[] brand
weapons.” Id. at ¶ 7. Mr. Brave is “intimately familiar with medical, scientific,
electrical, engineering, modelling, and epidemiological studies and published
literature concerning CEWs and their physiological, metabolic, and other effects,
risks and limitations, as well as TASER’s product warnings based on these risks.”
Id. at ¶ 10. He has also been “designated as TASER’s [Person Most Knowledgeable]
concerning the literature and its’ product warnings.” Id.
3
206
Mr. Brave provided his Declaration regarding his experience with Tasers and
conducted electrical weapons and has deployed conducted electrical weapons
[Taser] “on students who voluntarily undergo exposure to the device” and has “never
witnessed a significant injury in the course of training Instructors or end users.” Id.
at ¶ 12. Mr. Brave testified in his Declaration that these devices are not “designed
to kill or cause permanent injury.” Id. at ¶ 13. Mr. Brave stated that the detailed
instruction manual included with a Taser is “sufficient for instructing the civilian
user to use the [Taser] reasonably safely and effectively.” Id. at ¶ 17.
II. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is proper where there is no genuine issue of material fact
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
Rule 56(a) mandates summary judgment "against a party who fails to make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to the party's
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986); see also
Broussard v. Univ. of Cal. at Berkeley, 192 F.3d 1252, 1258 (9th Cir. 1999). See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
III. Electric Arms Are Protected by the Second Amendment
The Second Amendment protects bearable arms “commonly possessed by
law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes”. See Fyock v. City of Sunnyvale, 779 F.3d
4
207
991, 998, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 3471, *16. Forty-seven (47) states currently allow
electric arms possession. The parties have stipulated that there are 4.7 million
electric arms owned by private citizens for the lawful purpose of self-defense. Post-
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) and McDonald v. Chicago, 561
U.S. 742 (2010) Hawaii’s ban cannot withstand constitutional muster. Three (3)
states already have had their electric arm bans enjoined by court order 1. This is
because as established by the record and the legal arguments made below, electric
arms are "in common use today" for the "lawful purpose" of self-defense. Thus, they
are protected by the Second Amendment. Further, under any of the tests this Court
may apply, Hawaii’s ban cannot survive constitutional muster.
As a preliminary matter, electric arms are not “dangerous and unusual”
weapons. In United States v Henry, the Ninth Circuit held:
An object is "dangerous" when it is "likely to cause serious bodily

harm." Black's Law Dictionary 451 (9th ed. 2009). Congress defines
"machinegun" as "any weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or
can be readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot,
without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger." 26
1
The other states that still ban electric arms are Rhode Island and New York. Shortly
after the Massachusetts Supreme Court struck the State of Massachusetts ban in
Ramirez v. Commonwealth No. SJC-12340, 2018 Mass. LEXIS 237 (Apr. 17, 2018)
a bill was put before the Rhode Island legislature to legalize electric arms. See
https://www.wpri.com/news/local-news/west-bay/ri-rep-reintroduces-bill-
allowing-stun-gun-ownership/1129244566 (last visited 11/5/2018). In New York,
litigation is proceeding in challenging its ban on electric arms. See Avitabile v.
Beach, 1:16-cv-1447, N.D.N.Y. A complete list of the electric arms litigation is
included later in the brief.
5
208
U.S.C. § 5845(b). The machine gun was first widely used during World
War I, where it "demonstrated its murderously effective firepower over
and over [**7] again." William Rosenau, Book Note, The Origins of
the First Modern Weapon, TECH. REV., Jan. 1987, at 74, (reviewing
John Ellis, The Social History of the Machine Gun (1986). A modern
machine gun can fire more than 1,000 rounds per minute, allowing a
shooter to kill dozens of people within a matter of seconds. See George
C. Wilson, Visible Violence, 12 NAT'L J. 886, 887 (2003). Short of
bombs, missiles, and biochemical agents, we can conceive of few
weapons that are more dangerous than machine guns.
A machine gun is "unusual" because private possession of all new

machine guns, as well as all existing machine guns that were not
lawfully possessed before the enactment of § 922(o), has been unlawful
since 1986. Outside of a few government-related uses, machine guns
largely exist on the black market.
United States v. Henry, 688 F.3d 637, 640, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS
16615, *6-7, 2012 WL 3217255.
Unlike machine guns, electric arms are less-than-lethal weapons that are
designed to incapacitate but not kill an assailant. As described more fully below, in
the rare occasion where people have died from exposure to electric arms, it is
because they had preexisting medical conditions or were on drugs. Thus, they are
less dangerous than handguns which the Heller court found to be the “quintessential
self-defense weapon” and thus not dangerous and unusual. See District of Columbia
v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 629, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2818 (2008). See also Caldwell v
Moore, 968 F.2d 595, 602 (6th Cir. 1992) (“It is not unreasonable for the jail officials
to conclude that the use of a stun gun is less dangerous for all involved than a hand
to hand confrontation”).
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Both courts to rule on this issue have agreed that electric arms are not
dangerous or unusual. “Having received guidance from the Supreme Court in
Caetano II, we now conclude that stun guns are ‘arms’ within the protection of the
Second Amendment”. Ramirez v. Commonwealth, 479 Mass. 331, 337, 94 N.E.3d
809, 815, 2018 Mass. LEXIS 237, *11, 2018 WL 1801917. See also, People v.
Yanna, 297 Mich. App. 137, 145, 824 N.W.2d 241, 245, 2012 Mich. App. LEXIS
1269, *9-10, 2012 WL 2401400:
The prosecution also argues that stun guns and Tasers are so dangerous
that they are not protected by the Second Amendment. However, it is
difficult to see how this is so since Heller concluded that handguns are
not sufficiently dangerous to be banned. Tasers and stun guns, while
plainly dangerous, are substantially less dangerous than handguns.
Therefore, tasers and stun guns do not constitute dangerous weapons
for purposes of Second Amendment inquiries.
Thus, electric arms are not dangerous weapons because they are not capable of
killing many people at one time like a machinegun and are much less dangerous than
handguns which the Supreme Court has already found to not be a “sufficiently”
dangerous weapon.
a. Electric Arms Are in Common use
To develop a fuller record on how many electric arms are in possession of
private citizens, Mr. Roberts has solicited sales data from several electric arms
companies. He has established, and Defendant has agreed to stipulate that there are
300,000 Tasers and 4,478,330 stun guns currently owned by private civilians in the
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United States of America. However, this is not a complete number as many of the
electric arms companies contacted were unwilling to provide their private sales data.
The actual number is likely many millions more than this. However, combining the
numbers yields at least 4,778,330 electric arms owned by private citizens and that
number is easily enough to establish electric arms are in common use for the lawful
purpose of self-defense. Circuit precedent suggests but does not hold that this
number is enough to find an arm is in common use. For instance, in Fyock v. City
of Sunnyvale, 779 F.3d 991, 998, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 3471, *13-16, the court
stated:
Fyock presented evidence that magazines, including some meeting

Sunnyvale's definition of large-capacity magazines, are frequently
offered for commercial sale and marketed for self-defense. He also
presented sales statistics indicating that millions of magazines, some of
which again were magazines fitting Sunnyvale's definition of large-
capacity magazines, have been sold over the last two decades in the
United States. Because Fyock relies primarily on marketing materials
and sales statistics, his evidence does not necessarily show that large-
capacity magazines are in fact commonly possessed by law-abiding
citizens for lawful purposes.
In N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242 (2d Cir. 2015), the
court found a comparable number made AR-15s in common use and stated:
[p]laintiffs argue that the weapons at issue are owned in large numbers
by law-abiding Americans. They present statistics showing that nearly
four million units of a single assault weapon, the popular AR-15, have
been manufactured between 1986 and March 2013… Even accepting
the most conservative estimates cited by the parties and by amici, the
assault weapons and large-capacity magazines at issue are "in common
use" as that term was used in Heller. The D.C. Circuit reached the same
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conclusion in its well-reasoned decision in Heller II, which upheld the

constitutionality of a District of Columbia gun-control act substantially
similar to those at issue here. Id at 255.
And in Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1261, 399 U.S. App.
D.C. 314, 331, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 20130, *43-44, the D.C. Court of Appeals
stated:
We think it clear enough in the record that semi-automatic rifles and

magazines holding more than ten rounds are indeed in "common use,"
as the plaintiffs contend. Approximately 1.6 million AR-15s alone have
been manufactured since 1986, and in 2007 this one popular model
accounted for 5.5 percent of all firearms, and 14.4 percent of all rifles,
produced in the U.S. for the domestic market. As for magazines, fully
18 percent of all firearms owned by civilians in 1994 were equipped
with magazines holding more than ten rounds, and approximately 4.7
million more such magazines were imported into the United States
between 1995 and 2000. There may well be some capacity above which
magazines are not in common use but, if so, the record is devoid of
evidence as to what that capacity is; in any event, that capacity surely
is not ten.
Because circuit precedent suggests, and other circuit’s have held, that the
4,778,330 figure is sufficient, this Court should find that electric arms are in common
use for lawful self-defense. For that reason, they are protected by the Second
Amendment. Per Heller, the Second Amendment protects arm inside the home. As
Mr. Roberts challenge is also to H.R.S. 134-51’s ban on the carry of electric arms
outside the home, the next step in the analysis is to establish that the Second
Amendment applies outside the home.
b. The Second Amendment Applies Outside the Home to Lawful Self-

Defense
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In Young v. Hawaii, the Ninth Circuit found “the Second Amendment
encompasses a right to carry a firearm openly in public for self-defense. Because
section 134-9 restricts Young in exercising such right to carry a firearm openly, it
burdens conduct protected by the Second Amendment”. Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d
1044, 1068, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 20525, *50. In doing so it joined with every
other Circuit in finding that the Second Amendment applies to armed self defense
outside the home. The First Circuit in Gould v. Morgan, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS
31129 (1st Cir. 2018), sustained a “good cause” requirement under Massachusetts
law, but in so holding, stated that “we view Heller as implying that the right to carry
a firearm for self-defense guaranteed by the Second Amendment is not limited to the
home.” (Slip op. at *22).
Similarly, the 7th Circuit in Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 935-37 (7th Cir.
2012), found the Second Amendment applies outside the home and in doing so
struck a general ban on handgun carry under the Second Amendment. That decision
was followed in People v. Aguilar, 2 N.E.3d 321, 327 (Ill. 2013). Finally, in Wrenn
v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 2017) the D.C. Court of Appeals
found that the Second Amendment right applies outside the home to armed self-
defense in striking the District of Colombia’s good cause requirement for handgun
carry. To be sure, the Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits in Kachalsky v. County of
Westchester, 701 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2012); Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426 (3d Cir.
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2013); and Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013), have all sustained
the “good cause” carry statutes at issue in those cases. Yet, in sustaining a “good
cause” requirement, each of these decisions also expressly “assumed … that the
Amendment covered some carrying.” Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650,
663 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (emphasis in original).
Based upon Circuit precedent and a consensus among the federal courts this
Court should find that the Second Amendment right applies outside the home to
armed self-defense. Thus, the next step is to determine what level of scrutiny to apply
to Hawaii’s ban on the ownership and carry of electric arms.
IV. This Court Should Find Hawaii’s Electric Ban Categorically

Unconstitutional
This Circuit employs a two-step test to determine what level of scrutiny to
apply to a Second Amendment challenge. Here, a court should look at:
(1) how close the law comes to the core of the Second Amendment
right, and (2) the severity of the law's burden on the right… We treat
this approach as a "sliding scale." Silvester v. Harris, 843 F.3d 816, 821
(9th Cir. 2016). On one end, "[a] law that imposes such a severe
restriction on [a] core right [of the Amendment] that it 'amounts to a
destruction of the . . . right,' is unconstitutional under any level of
scrutiny." Jackson, 746 F.3d at 961 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 629).
On the other end of the spectrum, intermediate scrutiny is appropriate
if the challenged law "does not implicate a core Second Amendment
right, or does not place a substantial burden on the Second Amendment
right." Id. Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044, 1068, 2018 U.S. App.
LEXIS 20525, *50-51.
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Here, this Court should strike Hawaii’s ban on the ownership and carry of
electric guns applying the categorical approach. This is because Hawaii’s ban
amount to a destruction of the right to self-defense especially outside the home as
applied to Mr. Roberts. This is because due to his status as a resident alien, he is
prevented from applying for a handgun carry permit under Hawaii law. Even inside
the home, his right to self-defense is destroyed in circumstances not warranting
lethal force.
Many other Courts have either struck down bans on electric arms or presided
over settlements where electric arm ban have been repealed.2 The two Courts that
2
See People v. Yanna, 824 N.W.2d 241, 243 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012) (striking down
a Michigan statute criminalizing possession of electronic weapons), Second
Amendment Society v. Porrino, No. 3:16-cv-04906-DEA (D.N.J. Nov. 16, 2016)
Doc. No. 30 (consent decree where the Court found New Jersey’s complete ban on
electric arms is unconstitutional), (“Pursuant to the holdings in Heller, McDonald
and Caetano, N.J. Stat. Ann . § 2C:39- 3(h), to the extent this statute outright
prohibits, under criminal penalty, individuals from possessing electronic arms, is
declared unconstitutional in that it violates the Second Amendment to the United
States Constitution and shall not be enforced”); See, Crystal Wright v. District of
Columbia, No. 1:16-cv-01556-JEB (D.D.C. Sept. 26, 2016) Doc. No. 18 (stipulating
to a stay of a motion for preliminary injunction pending new legislation and agreeing
not to enforce ban against plaintiffs); Ford v. City of New Orleans, No. 2:16-
cv16433-MVL-KWR (E.D. La. Dec. 14, 2016) Doc. Nos. 17, 19-20 (stipulating that
the city will not enforce the ban against plaintiff and consenting to a stay of litigation
pending enactment of legislation that decriminalized possession of stun
guns); Hulbert v. Pantelides, No. 1:16-cv-04121-JFM (D. Md. March 3, 2017) Doc.
No. 16 (letter from the City of Annapolis informing the court that the City Council
passed an emergency ordinance eliminating all restrictions on ownership and
possession of electronic weapons for personal defense); Ramirez v. Commonwealth
No. SJC-12340, 2018 Mass. LEXIS 237 (Apr. 17, 2018) (striking Mass. ban on stun
guns).
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issued written decisions on this issue struck their respective bans without the need
to look to tiered scrutiny. In Ramirez v. Commonwealth No. SJC-12340, 2018 Mass.
LEXIS 237 (Apr. 17, 2018), the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court stated as
follows:
Having received guidance from the Supreme Court ..., we now

conclude that stun guns are "arms" within the protection of the Second
Amendment. Therefore, under the Second Amendment, the possession
of stun guns may be regulated, but not absolutely banned. Restrictions
may be placed on the categories of persons who may possess them,
licenses may be required for their possession, and those licensed to
possess them may be barred from carrying them in sensitive places,
such as schools and government buildings. But the absolute prohibition
... that bars all civilians from possessing or carrying stun guns, even in
their home, is inconsistent with the Second Amendment and is therefore
unconstitutional. Id at 337-338.
And in People v. Yanna, 824 N.W.2d 241 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012) the Michigan
Court of Appeals held that:
[b]ecause tasers and stun guns do not fit any of the exceptions to the
Second Amendment enumerated in Heller, we find that they are
protected arms. Heller found unconstitutional a law which completely
banned the possession of protected arms in the home. 554 U.S. at 628–
629. We therefore hold that a complete ban on tasers and stun guns in
the home violates the Second Amendment. See Yanna at 246.
This Court should apply a categorical approach in finding that a complete ban
on a class of arms, i.e. electric arms, is unconstitutional. This was the approach taken
in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) when confronted with a
complete ban on handguns. Electric arms are also a class of arms. Pursuant to Heller
I, “complete prohibition[s]” of Second Amendment rights are always invalid. Id. at

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629. It is appropriate to strike down such “total ban[s]” without bothering to apply
tiers of scrutiny because no such analysis could ever sanction obliterations of an
enumerated constitutional right. Id. Per Heller, this Court could strike down
Hawaii’s electric arm ban without the need to look to scrutiny analysis. This is the
approach that many other courts have taken in other contexts when dealings with
severe restrictions on the Second Amendment.
The State Supreme Court of New Jersey also applied no scrutiny test in
finding a conviction for possession of a machete in the home violated the litigant’s
Second Amendment right. See State v. Montalvo, 077331, 2017 WL 2471030 (N.J.
June 8, 2017). In Wesson v. Town of Salisbury, 13 F. Supp. 3d 171 (D. Mass. 2014)
and Richmond v. Peraino, 128 F. Supp. 3d 415 (D. Mass. 2015), the court found that
a ban on firearms ownership based on decades old marijuana convictions was
unconstitutional without the need to apply scrutiny.
The court in Morris v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 60 F. Supp. 3d
1120 (D. Idaho 2014) found the U.S. Corps of Engineers’ ban on firearms carry for
self-defense was categorically invalid. The 7th circuit also invalidated Illinois’ total
ban on any carrying of firearms in public as categorically unconstitutional. Moore v.
Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 940 (7th Cir. 2012). The Illinois Supreme Court followed
suit in People v. Aguilar, 2 N.E.3d 321, 327 (Ill. 2013) and found the Class 4 form
of section 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A), (d) of the Illinois aggravated unlawful use of
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weapons statute (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A), (d)) violated the Second
Amendment without a scrutiny analysis. Same as to the District of Colombia’s ban
on handgun carry in Palmer v. District of Columbia, 59 F. Supp. 3d 173 (D.D.C.
2014). And again, later regarding DC’s licensing scheme put in place post-Palmer
in Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 665 (D.C. Cir. 2017). Most recently,
the Ninth Circuit in Young v. Hawaii, No. 12-17808, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 20525
(9th Cir. July 24, 2018) recently found that the County of Hawaii’s effective ban on
handgun carry for self-defense was categorically unconstitutional. This Court should
follow the lead of these Courts in finding that Hawaii’s complete ban on electric
arms is unconstitutional without the need to look to tiered scrutiny. However, if a
level of scrutiny is required, Ninth Circuit precedent suggests that strict scrutiny
should be applied.
a. Strict Scrutiny Should Apply
Post-Heller, the Ninth Circuit has developed a body of case law which
supports the application of strict scrutiny where a law places a substantial burden on
the core right to self-defense of a law-abiding person. “Unlike Fisher, however,
Chovan never argued that section [18 U.S.C.] 922(g)(9) was unconstitutional as
applied to him because California (Chovan's state of conviction) provided too few
of the restoration mechanisms listed in section 921(a)(33)(B)(ii). See [United States
v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1137-42 (9th Cir. 2013)]. Indeed, in Chovan, we applied
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‘intermediate’ rather than ‘strict’ judicial scrutiny in part because section 922(g)(9)'s
‘burden’ on Second Amendment rights was ‘lightened’ by those mechanisms.” See
Fisher v. Kealoha, 855 F.3d 1067, 1071, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 8007, *9, 2017 WL
1753271. Similarly, if this Court decides not to apply a categorical approach, it
should apply strict scrutiny. This position finds support in other Ninth Circuit
precedent. In Jackson v. City & County of San Francisco the Ninth Circuit stated:
Section 4512 does not impose the sort of severe burden imposed by the
handgun ban at issue in Heller that rendered it unconstitutional. Id.
Unlike the challenged regulation in Heller, id. at 629, section 4512 does
not substantially prevent law-abiding citizens from using firearms to
defend themselves in the home. Rather, section 4512 regulates how San
Franciscans must store their handguns when not carrying them on their
persons. This indirectly burdens the ability to use a handgun, because
it requires retrieving a weapon from a locked safe or removing a trigger
lock. But because it burdens only the "manner in which persons may
exercise their Second Amendment rights," Chovan 735 F.3d at 1138,
the regulation more closely resembles a content-neutral speech
restriction that regulates only the time, place, or manner of speech.
Jackson v. City & County of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 964, 2014
U.S. App. LEXIS 5498, *21-22, 2014 WL 1193434
Here, the electric ban at issue does not “leave open alternative channels for
self-defense”. Id at *13-14, This is because Mr. Robert’s right to self-defense is
completely foreclosed outside the home. And inside the home, he has no reasonable
access to effective less lethal self-defense in the form of a Taser.3 Thus, Hawaii’s
3
Hawaii law mandates that Mr. Roberts secure his firearms in a locked box or other
container if a minor resides in his home. Mr. Roberts’ daughter is a minor, therefore,
Mr. Roberts must either carry his firearm, on his person, in his home 24/7 or must
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ban is more analogous to a content-based speech restriction than the one at issue in
Jackson. Thus, strict scrutiny applies, and the State of Hawaii must demonstrate a
compelling government interest to banning these arms that is narrowly tailored to
achieve that interest. See Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind.do Employment Sec. Div.,
450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981) (“The state may justify an inroad on religious liberty by
showing that it is the least restrictive means of achieving some compelling state
interest.”). This is the approach that was taken by the Court in Bateman v. Perdue
881 F.Supp.2d 709 (2012) in evaluating North Carolina’s ban on carrying firearms
during an emergency.
There is no dispute that defendants have a compelling interest in public

safety and general crime prevention. See Schenck v. Pro-Choice
Network of Western New York, 519 U.S. 357, 376, 117 S.Ct. 855, 137
L.Ed.2d 1 (recognizing "significant governmental interest in public
safety"). "`[P]rotecting the community from crime' by keeping guns out
of the hands of dangerous persons is an important governmental
interest." United States v. Carter, 669 F.3d 411, 417 (2012).
The problem here is that the emergency declaration statutes, are not
narrowly tailored to serve the government's interest in public safety.
They do not target dangerous individuals or dangerous conduct. Nor do
they seek to impose reasonable time, place and manner restrictions by,
for example, imposing a curfew to allow the exercise of Second
Amendment rights during circumscribed times. Rather, the statutes here
excessively intrude upon plaintiffs' Second Amendment rights by
effectively banning them (and the public at large) from engaging in
conduct that is at the very core of the Second Amendment at a time
when the need for self-defense may be at its very greatest. See
secure his firearm in a locked box or container when he is not carrying it on his
person. See H.R.S. § 123-10.5.
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Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2799 ("[A]mericans understood the `right of self-

preservation' as permitting a citizen to `repe[l] force by force' when `the
intervention of society in his behalf, may be too late to prevent an
injury.'" (quoting 1 Blackstone's Commentaries 145-146, n.42 (1803))
(second alteration in original)). Consequently, the emergency
declaration laws are invalid as applied to plaintiffs.
This Court should apply strict scrutiny as well because Hawaii’s electronic
arms ban intrude upon Mr. Robert's Second Amendment rights by effectively
banning him (and the public at large) from engaging in conduct that is at the very
core of the Second Amendment. A district court in Louisiana also applied strict
scrutiny in striking a law banning firearms from the parking lot of any store that sells
alcohol. See Taylor v. City of Baton Rouge, 39 F. Supp. 3d 807 (M.D. La. 2014).
In Ezell, the 7th circuit applied “not quite strict scrutiny” to Chicago’s
prohibition on live-fire training ranges—in part because Chicago required residents
to undergo such training to obtain a license to possess firearms at all. Ezell v. City of
Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 689 (7th Cir. 2011). It found:
[t]o be appropriately respectful of the individual rights at issue in this

case, the City bears the burden of establishing a strong public-interest
justification for its ban on range training: The City must establish a
close fit between the range ban and the actual public interests it serves,
and also that the public's interests are strong enough to justify so
substantial an encumbrance on individual Second Amendment rights.
Stated differently, the City must demonstrate that civilian target
practice at a firing range creates such genuine and serious risks to public
safety that prohibiting range training throughout the city is justified. Id.
at 708-709.
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A district court in Hatfield v. Sessions, No. 3:16-cv-00383-JPG-RJD, 2018
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70431 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 26, 2018) followed this approach in finding
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) unconstitutional as applied to the litigant. Another district
court enjoined the City of Chicago’s ban on guns stores using this approach in Ill.
Ass’n of Firearms Retailers v. City of Chicago, 961 F. Supp. 2d 928, 930 (N.D. Ill.
2014) And in Ezell v. City of Chicago (“Ezell II”), 846 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2017), the
7th Circuit enjoined Chicago’s zoning regulations at issue in that case which so
“severely limit[ed] where shooting ranges may locate” that “no publicly accessible
shooting range yet exist[ed] in Chicago.” Id. at 894. As a result, the zoning
regulations, “though not on their face an outright prohibition of gun ranges,
nonetheless severely restrict the right of Chicagoans to train in firearm use at a
range.” Id.
Hawaii has similarly curtailed Mr. Robert’s Second Amendment rights. This
Court should apply true strict scrutiny and find that the State of Hawaii does not
have a compelling governmental interest in banning electric arms. And even if it
does, a complete ban on electric arms is not narrowly tailored in achieving that goal.
In the alternative, it should employ the Ezell approach and find Hawaii has not
demonstrated electric arm ownership presents such a risk to public safety that
prohibiting electric arm ownership throughout the State is justified. However, the
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State of Hawaii’s ban is so nonsensical that even if intermediate scrutiny applies this
Court should rule in Mr. Robert’s favor.
b. Under Intermediate Scrutiny Hawaii’s Electric Arm Ban is

Unconstitutional
Even if this Court finds intermediate scrutiny is appropriate to the instant case,
Hawaii’s ban on electric arms cannot withstand constitutional muster. Our
intermediate scrutiny test under the Second Amendment requires that (1) the
government's stated objective . . . be significant, substantial, or important; and (2)
there . . . be a 'reasonable fit' between the challenged regulation and the asserted
objective." Silvester v. Harris, 843 F.3d 816, 821-22 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting
Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1139). Under the second prong "intermediate scrutiny does not
require the least restrictive means of furthering a given end." Id. at 827 (quoting
Jackson, 746 F.3d at 969. See Duncan v. Becerra, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1106, 1120, 2017
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101549, *28, 2017 WL 2813727). In enjoining Hawaii’s ban on
possession of firearms by resident aliens, Judge Seabright recently held:
Nevertheless, HRS § 134-2(d), as applied to Fotoudis fails to "pass

constitutional muster regardless of whether intermediate scrutiny or
strict scrutiny applies." Fletcher, 851 F. Supp. 2d at 303. See United
States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 683 (4th Cir. 2010) (applying
intermediate scrutiny — "substantially related to an important
government objective"— to a Second Amendment challenge); United
States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 800-02 (10th Cir. 2010) (observing that
Heller "indicated only that the rational basis test is not appropriate" and
that "we must apply some level of heightened scrutiny").Here,
assuming § 134-2(d)'s general permit requirement implements an
"important government objective" (intermediate scrutiny) or a
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"compelling state interest" (strict scrutiny), it is neither "substantially

related" nor "narrowly tailored" to such interests Fotoudis v. City &
County of Honolulu, 54 F. Supp. 3d 1136, 1144, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
130525, *16-17
The same reasoning should apply here. Even under intermediate scrutiny there
simply is not an important government interest in banning electric arms when Heller
holds that the government cannot ban handguns. And even if there is a government
interest, a complete ban is not a reasonable fit. In preliminarily enjoining a law
banning the ownership of magazines capable of holding more than ten rounds, Judge
Benítez found that a complete ban did not have a reasonable fit to the government
interest of public safety because:
[a] reasonable fit as a means to protect citizens and law enforcement

from gun violence and crime, in a state with numerous military bases
and service men and service women, would surely permit the honorably
discharged member of the Armed Forces who has lawfully maintained
a magazine holding more than 10 rounds for more than twenty years to
continue to keep and use his magazine. These citizens are perhaps the
best among us. They have volunteered to serve and have served and
sacrificed to protect our country. They have been specially trained to
expertly use firearms in a conflict. Oppo. Gordon Declaration, Exh. 102
at 389 (Washington Post, Jan. 30, 2013, Transcript of Senate Judiciary
Committee Hearing on Gun Violence), Senator J. Johnson remarks: "It
is my understanding talking with my associates in the military, that
public policing mirrors much of what the military does." They have
proven their good citizenship by years of lawfully keeping firearms as
civilians. What possibly better citizen candidates to protect the public
against violent gun-toting criminals? Similarly, a reasonable fit as a
means to protect citizens and law enforcement from gun violence and
crime, would surely make an exception for a Department of Justice-
vetted, privately trained citizen to whom the sheriff has granted a permit
to carry a concealed weapon, and whom owns a magazine holding more
than 10 rounds. California's statute does not except such proven, law-
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abiding, trustworthy, gun-owning individuals. Quite the opposite.

Under the statute, if not enjoined, all of these worthy individuals will
become outlaws on July 1, 2017, should they not dispossess themselves
of magazines holding 10+ rounds they currently own. Duncan v.
Becerra, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1106, 1134, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101549,
*64-68, 2017 WL 2813727.
Hawaii’s ban on electric arms is also analogous to the seven-round load limit
that was struck by the Second Circuit in N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Cuomo.
There the Court applied intermediate scrutiny and found:
[o]n the record before us, we cannot conclude that New York has
presented sufficient evidence that a seven-round load limit would best
protect public safety. Here we are considering not a capacity restriction,
but rather a load limit. Nothing in the SAFE Act will outlaw or reduce
the number of ten-round magazines in circulation. It will not decrease
their availability or in any way frustrate the access of those who intend
to use ten-round magazines for mass shootings or other crimes. It is
thus entirely untethered from the stated rationale of reducing the
number of assault weapons and large capacity magazines in circulation.
New York has failed to present evidence that the mere existence of this
load limit will convince any would-be malefactors to load magazines
capable of holding ten rounds with only the permissible seven.
[footnote omitted]. Id. at 264.
The State of Hawaii simply cannot present evidence that a complete ban on
electric arms protects public safety. In fact, Defendants’ failure to answer Plaintiff’s
discovery is a tacit admission of sorts that its ban cannot be justified. In any event,
many Courts have struck similar or less restrictive laws based on intermediate
scrutiny. The Connecticut Supreme Court applied intermediate scrutiny in State v.
DeCiccio, 315 Conn. 79, 108-150, 105 A.3d 165, 185-210 (Conn. 2014), and found
that a Connecticut statute criminalizing the transport of dirk knives and police batons
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in a motor vehicle was unconstitutional. The District Court for the Northern
Marianas Islands recently struck several of its weapons laws applying intermediate
scrutiny including its ban on “assault weapons”. See Murphy v. Robert Guerrero, et
al., 1:14-CV-00026, 2016 WL 5508998, (D.N. Mar. Is. Sept. 28, 2016). In THE
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. JULIO CHAIREZ, Appellee.,
2018 IL 121417, 2018 WL 652814, the Illinois Supreme Court found that found the
State of Illinois’ ban on carrying a handgun within 1000 feet of public parks violated
the Second Amendment. In Fletcher v. Haas, 851 F. Supp. 2d 287 (D. Mass. 2012),
the court applied intermediate scrutiny and struck Massachusetts’ respective bans on
permanent resident aliens owning firearms.
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals in State v. Herrmann, 2015 WI App 97, 366
Wis. 2d 312, 873 N.W.2d 257 found a complete ban on switchblades failed
intermediate scrutiny. (“Consequently, while banning possession of switch-blades
in other settings might be substantially related to the State’s cited objective of
protecting the public from surprise attacks, prohibiting individuals from possessing
switchblades in their own homes for their own protection is not”).
In Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 837 F.3d 678 (6th Cir. 2016) (en
banc) the Sixth Circuit sitting en banc ruled that a person who “has been adjudicated
intellectually disabled” or “has been committed to a mental institution” is not
permanently barred from possessing firearms. Judge Julia Gibbons wrote that under
23
226
intermediate scrutiny, the burden of justification is demanding and it rests entirely
on the State and “in discharging this burden, the government can rely on a wide
range of sources, including legislative history, empirical evidence, case law, and
even common sense, but it may not 'rely upon mere anecdote and
supposition”' (Tyler, No. 13-1876, slip op. at 20). In Tyler, according to Judge
Gibbons, the government had not presented sufficient evidence of the continued risk
presented by persons who were previously committed (id. p. 24). Thus, the statute,
as applied, given the evidence supplied, failed intermediate scrutiny.
In Binderup v. Att’y Gen., 836 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc) the Third
Circuit sitting en banc applied intermediate scrutiny in finding 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)
unconstitutional as applied to the litigants.
But whether we apply intermediate scrutiny or strict scrutiny…the

Government bears the burden of proof on the appropriateness of the
means it employs to further its interest. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of State
Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989); Johnson v. California,
543 U.S. 499, 505, 506 n.1 (2005). Here the Government falls well
short of satisfying its burden—even under intermediate scrutiny. The
record before us consists of evidence about the Challengers’
backgrounds, including the time that has passed since they last broke
the law. It contains no evidence explaining why banning people like
them (i.e., people who decades ago committed similar misdemeanors)
from possessing firearms promotes public safety. Id at 353-354.
Keyes v. Sessions, 282 F. Supp. 3d 858 (M.D. Pa. 2017) follows Binderup and
is an as-applied challenge to § 924(g)(4). There, the Court held “[w]e have been
presented with no evidence to indicate that disarming those who went through a
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227
period of mental illness and suicide attempts over a decade ago and who have
regularly carried firearms in their professional capacity since that time reasonably
fits within the governmental interest to promote safety. As such, 18 U.S.C. §
924(g)(4) cannot withstand intermediate scrutiny in the face of Keyes’ as-applied
challenge.” Id at 878. Finally, the D.C. Court of Appeals in Heller v. District of
Columbia, 419 U.S. App. D.C. 287, 801 F.3d 264 (2015) struck four registration
laws applying intermediate scrutiny in Heller III. There, the Court found that a
requirement that an individual brings his or her firearm to the police department to
register it; a requirement that individuals re-register their firearms every three years
and pay additional fees; a requirement that individuals pass a knowledge test of local
firearm laws to register any firearm; and a prohibition against registering more than
one handgun in a 30-day period. Id. at 281.
The D.C. Court of appeals enjoined the knowledge test requirement
“[b]ecause the District has offered no evidence from which the court can infer it
reasonably concluded that knowledge of its gun laws, as shown by passing its test,
will promote public safety, on this record the requirement must be held
constitutionally invalid.” Id. at 279. Similarly, the State of Hawaii cannot offer
evidence from which this Court can reasonably infer that the State concluded public
safety will be promoted by banning the ownership and carry of electric arms. And
even if it can, a complete ban on both ownership and carry simply is not a reasonable
25
228
fit to fulfill that government interest. This Court should find that Hawaii law is
unconstitutional even if it decides to apply intermediate scrutiny.
V. Conclusion
Post-Heller, McDonald and Caetano, Hawaii’s ban on electric arms is
unconstitutional. It simply cannot be that the government cannot ban handguns
without violating the Second Amendment, but it may ban an entire class of less-than-
lethal arms. Removing Hawaii’s ban on electric arms will promote public safety
because it will give Mr. Roberts and other similarly situated persons an intermediate
level of force that they can look to prior to using a firearm. There is no government
interest in maintaining this ban. For the foregoing reasons, including the declarations
of Mr. Roberts and Mr. Brave, and the documents attached to the Separate Concise
Statement of Facts and the Entry of Admissions into the Evidentiary Record, this
Court should enjoin the State of Hawaii’s electric arm ban and declare the ban on
the ownership and carry of electric arms unconstitutional.
Respectfully submitted, this the 9th day of November, 2018.
/s/ Alan Beck

Alan Alexander Beck

26
Alan Alexander Beck

2692 Harcourt Drive
San Diego, CA 92123
(619) 905-9105
Hawaii Bar No. 9145
P.O. Box 4008
Madison, MS 39130
(601) 852-3440
stephen@sdslaw.us
MS Bar No. 102784



)
)
)
Plaintiff, )
)
)
)
)
_______________________________)

2
Stephen Stamboulieh
From: hid_resp@hid.uscourts.gov
Sent: Friday, November 9, 2018 8:41 PM
To: hawaii_cmecf@hid.uscourts.gov
Subject: Activity in Case 1:18-cv-00125-HG-KSC Roberts vs. Ballard; et al. Concise Statement of
Facts
This is an automatic e-mail message generated by the CM/ECF system. Please DO NOT RESPOND to this e-mail
because the mail box is unattended.
***NOTE TO PUBLIC ACCESS USERS*** Judicial Conference of the United States policy permits attorneys of record and
parties in a case (including pro se litigants) to receive one free electronic copy of all documents filed electronically, if
receipt is required by law or directed by the filer. PACER access fees apply to all other users. To avoid later charges,
download a copy of each document during this first viewing. However, if the referenced document is a transcript, the
free copy and 30 page limit do not apply.
U.S. District Court
District of Hawaii
The following transaction was entered by Stamboulieh, Stephen on 11/9/2018 at 4:40 PM HST and filed on 11/9/2018
Document Number: 36
Docket Text:
CONCISE STATEMENT of Facts re [35] MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Andrew
Namiki Roberts. (Attachments: # (1) Declaration Declaration of Michael Brave, # (2) Declaration
Declaration of Andrew Namiki Roberts, # (3) Declaration Declaration of Stephen D.
Stamboulieh, # (4) Certificate of Service Certificate of Service)(Stamboulieh, Stephen)
John M. Cregor , Jr John.M.Cregor@hawaii.gov, Caron.M.Inagaki@hawaii.gov, Jethro.G.Arcilla@Hawaii.gov,

Marnie.A.Goo@hawaii.gov

1

] [417f1236fa1ee2f13a8a6ef4b45a05dee61f79637dcee04be14a756b067b351e24e
d7ddabdbb30b7599b4eb3ade2cd0fa107f76ec8dbfc5e8efa01f850b7f2db]]
Document description:Declaration Declaration of Michael Brave
] [262e4ef1621a125e98500859975ab222e3a5c9e914c3042cd118915845a8168c976
dd419e20b820848c7c5367efe0c64e234f200187b4cfb1678bed9216954a5]]
Document description:Declaration Declaration of Andrew Namiki Roberts
] [31672feff1bfcba9b163e59705a4c8ddbab05324ad475b5bc6e9e7cc91d607e63eb
bd96fa5b694a81ed1d9c3a33b69f1a4b0608b7f6a25d0379ab3aefff0b65e]]
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5ba0db9cea310e75f24bc2ba429df1bce40d0951fd0ac446927ae1cf0d5ce]]
2
Alan Alexander Beck

2692 Harcourt Drive
San Diego, CA 92123
(619) 905-9105
Hawaii Bar No. 9145
P.O. Box 4008
Madison, MS 39130
(601) 852-3440
stephen@sdslaw.us
MS Bar No. 102784



)
) PLAINTIFF’S SEPARATE CONCISE
) STATEMENT OF FACTS IN SUPPORT
Plaintiff, ) OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY
)JUDGMENT; DECLARATION OF
v. ) DECLARATION OF ANDREW NAMIKI
) ROBERTS; EXHIBITS; CERTIFICATE
SUSAN BALLARD, et al. ) OF SERVICE
)
)
_______________________________)
PLAINTIFF’S SEPARATE CONCISE STATEMENT OF FACTS IN

SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
In accordance with Rule 56.1 of the Local Rules for the United States District
Court for the District of Hawaii, Plaintiff Andrew Namiki Roberts submits his
concise statement of undisputed facts in support of his concurrently-filed Motion for
Summary Judgment.
FACT EVIDENTIARY SUPPORT
1. Plaintiff is a lawful permanent Dec. of Andrew Namiki Roberts ¶2; Ex “2”

resident of the United States of
America and a citizen of the
United Kingdom.
2. Plaintiff is an adult male. Dec. of Andrew Namiki Roberts ¶1; Ex “2”
3. Plaintiff has never been Dec. of Andrew Namiki Roberts ¶3; Ex “2”
convicted of a crime which
would dispossess him of his
Second Amendment rights; has
never been convicted of a
felony; has never been convicted
of a misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence and is not
prohibited from owning
firearms.
4. Plaintiff has not been deemed to Dec. of Andrew Namiki Roberts ¶4; Ex “2”
have a mental illness from any
mental health professional.
5. Plaintiff wants to purchase, own, Dec. of Andrew Namiki Roberts ¶5; Ex “2”
possess and carry an electric arm
(Taser/stun gun) for self-defense
outside and inside his home.
6. Under current Hawaii law, Dec. of Andrew Namiki Roberts ¶8; Ex “2”;
Plaintiff cannot possess, own, or See also H.R.S. §134-16
carry an electric arm.
2
7. Plaintiff wants access to own, Dec. of Andrew Namiki Roberts ¶9, ¶11; Ex
carry and possess an electric arm “2”
because he believes it to be less-
than-lethal.
8. Plaintiff wants to utilize an Dec. of Andrew Namiki Roberts ¶9; Ex “2”
electric arm to “use the smallest
amount of force necessary to
repel an attack rather than use
lethal force..”
9. Plaintiff propounded discovery, Dec. of Stephen D. Stamboulieh ¶3; Ex “1”
including Interrogatories,
Requests for Admissions and
Request for Production of
Documents on September 27,
2018.
10.To this day, no responses to the Dec. of Stephen D. Stamboulieh ¶5; Ex “1”
written discovery have been
received.
11.Tasers and stun guns are less Request for Admission No. 1.; [Docket No.
than lethal weapons. 34]
12.Defendants are not aware of any Request for Admission No. 2.; [Docket No.
death attributable to a stun gun. 34]
13.As part of Hawaii’s law Request for Admission No. 3.; [Docket No.
enforcement training on the 34]
Taser, some officers are
voluntarily exposed to the Taser.
14.Defendants know of no law Request for Admission No. 4.; [Docket No.
enforcement officer who has 34]
ever been killed with a Taser or
stun gun.
15.Tasers and stun guns are Request for Admission No. 5.; [Docket No.
commonly used for self-defense. 34]
16.Tasers and stun guns are Request for Admission No. 6.; [Docket No.
appropriate in certain 34]
circumstances to be used for
self-defense.
17.Taser and stun guns are not Request for Admission Nos. 7 & 8.; [Docket
dangerous and unusual. No. 34]
3
18.The Second Amendment Request for Admission No. 9.; [Docket No.
protects stun guns and Tasers. 34]
19.Defendants have less of a public Request for Admission No. 10.; [Docket No.
safety interest in banning stun 34]
guns and Tasers than handguns.
20.There are over 4.7 million Request for Admission No. 12.; [Docket No.
electric arms owned by civilians 34]
for lawful purposes in the United
States of America.
21.Defendant Attorney General Request for Admission No. 13.; [Docket No.
Russell A. Suzuki, in his official 34]
capacity, is a proper party in this
lawsuit.
22.Defendant Al Cummings, in his Request for Admission No. 14.; [Docket No.
official capacity, is a proper 34]
party in this lawsuit.
23.Michael A. Brave, a Taser Dec. of Michael A. Brave, ¶12; Exhibit “1”
Master Instructor, has deployed
a Taser on students who
voluntarily undergo exposure to
the Taser and has never
witnessed a significant injury in
the course of training instructors
or end users.
24.Conducted Electrical Weapons Dec. of Michael A. Brave, ¶ 13; Exhibit “1”
(CEW) are not designed to kill
or cause permanent injury.
/s/ Alan Beck

Alan Alexander Beck

4
235
DECLARATION UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY OF MICHAEL A. BRAVE

Michael A. Brave under penalty of perjury, deposes and states as follows:
1. My name is Michael A. Brave. I am making this declaration for submission
to the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii in the case of Andrew Namiki
Roberts vs. Susan Ballard, in her Official Capacity as the Chief of Police of Honolulu
County and Russell Suzuki, in his Official Capacity as the Attorney General of the State of
Hawaii and Al Cummings in his Official Capacity as the State Sheriff Division
Administrator, Civil No. 18-00125 HG-KSC.
2. I am a competent adult over the age of 18 and have personal knowledge of

the following facts.
3. I am employed as Director, Conducted Electrical Weapon, Legal, for Axon

Enterprise, Inc. (“Axon”), (formerly TASER International, Inc. (“TASER”) headquartered
in Scottsdale, Arizona. I have been employed by Axon/TASER since June 2005, and served
as a paid Consultant prior to being employed.
4. I earned a Bachelor’s Degree in Business Administration (1978) and a

Master’s Degree in Management Technology (1990) from the University of Wisconsin –
Stout, and a Juris Doctor degree from Hamline University School of Law in St. Paul,
Minnesota (1987).
5. I am a former Chief of the Intelligence and Investigative Operations Unit,

Office of Enforcement Operations (“OEO”), Criminal Division, for the U.S. Department
of Justice (“DOJ”) in Washington, D.C. (1997-2001); former Deputy Director for
International Operations of the Federal Witness Security Program; and a former OEO Use-
of-Force and Firearms Training Officer.
6. I have been a sworn law enforcement officer (Wisconsin) since 1983 and a
certified law enforcement trainer in over 20 subject areas. I have testified as an expert
witness in state and federal court civil rights cases involving use of force, including deadly
and less-lethal force, batons, pepper spray, physical force, and conducted electrical
weapons (“CEWs”), among other force tools and tactics; sudden unexpected death;
positional asphyxia; and law enforcement policy, training and supervision. I have also
testified CEW-temporal events and subsequent deaths in Crown Coroners’ Inquests in the
United Kingdom and Canada.
7. I am a certified TASER Master Instructor (“Master Instructor”) authorized

to train and certify other instructors in the proper use and deployment of TASER ® brand
Page 1 of 4
Exhibit "1"
236
weapons. I have been a TASER Master Instructor since May 2003 and have been recertified
every two years thereafter.
8. I served as Legal Advisor to TASER’s Training Advisory Board. The Training

Board, formed in May 2003, meets approximately quarterly to provide guidance on
TASER’s training program. The Training Board consists of seven active or retired law
enforcement officers of various ranks from different parts of the United States and Canada.
TASER’s Director of Training, Chief Instructor and I also sat on the Board to July 2017. I
am intimately familiar with TASER’s training program, certification requirements, training
materials and protocols, and the release of various training versions over the past decade. I
have been designated as TASER’s Person Most Knowledgeable (PMK) concerning TASER
training.
9. I also serve as Legal Advisor to TASER’s Scientific and Medical Advisory

Board (“SMAB”), formed in May 2004 to ensure TASER stays current with the generally
recognized and prevailing best scientific and medical knowledge regarding CEWs and their
risks. From its inception, TASER’s SMAB members have included prominent cardiac
electrophysiologists and Ph.D. electrical and biomedical scientists. The SMAB was
expanded in October 2007 to include an emergency physician and forensic pathologist.
Today, leading CEW researcher and TASER Medical Director Dr. Jeffrey Ho chairs the
SMAB and invites other researchers and scientists who have published CEW-related
literature to present at its’ meetings. The SMAB meets approximately semi-annually.
10. I am intimately familiar with medical, scientific, electrical, engineering,

modelling, and epidemiological studies and published literature concerning CEWs and
their physiological, metabolic, and other effects, risks and limitations, as well as TASER’s
product warnings based on these risks. I have been designated as TASER’s PMK
concerning the literature and its’ product warnings.
11. The TASER Master Instructor certification has evolved over time. Generally,
it is a two-year certification that requires minimum classroom instruction of five days (40
hours) from TASER’s Master TASER Instruction Program. The five-day program is
required for both initial certification and for recertification. Areas of emphasis include legal
updates, medical research, safety considerations, scenario-based training, training drills,
familiarity with all TASER products, CEW maintenance, incident scene investigation
following CEW use, instructor development, a review of any new information contained
in the end user training curriculum, and other information. During the course, participants
conduct multiple drills and scenarios which include numerous discharging of TASER
CEWs during drills and force-on-force encounters.
Page 2 of 4
237
12. The role of the Master Instructor is both to train law enforcement, security
professionals, and military personnel to instruct end users on TASER CEWs and to train
end users. I have experienced several exposures to CEWs, as well as other electronic
weapons, without significant injury. I have also deployed the device on students who
voluntarily undergo exposure to the device. I have never witnessed a significant injury in
the course of training Instructors or end users.
13. This is not to suggest that a CEW exposure, just like any use of force or force
option, is risk free. The CEW is sometimes classified as an intermediate weapon such as
pepper spray, hard hands-on physical force, grounding, tackling, etc. but has certain well
known advantages over pepper spray and other force options, including pain compliance
techniques. CEWs are not designed to kill or cause permanent injury. However, like any
force option, injury can occur from a CEW exposure. Most notably injuries following a
CEW exposure tend to occur as a result of a CEW dart contacting a person’s eye, impact
with the ground, or ignition of flammables. CEWs are certainly less dangerous than other
force options such as firearms, knives, striking implements, bean bags, hands on physical
force, etc.
14. Like any force option, CEWs should only be employed where their use is
legally justified and where the use of the CEW is reasonably appropriate to the totality of
the circumstances of the incident as reasonably perceived by the CEW user. For example,
in a civilian self-defense context, use of a CEW in the course of a pushing match by either
party would likely not be justified, while it most likely would be justified to defend against
someone presently attempting a sexual assault or a violent attack with personal weapons
(including hands and feet).
15. The CEW end-user course of instruction for law enforcement and private
security is a minimum of six-hours. Coursework includes the current TASER CEW User
PowerPoint®, updates to instructional materials, warnings, and completion of a
waiver/release. The class includes discussion of items in the instructor notes, drills, and
functional demonstrations. There is also a written exam specific to the device for which the
end user is being certified. In addition, the end user must pass a functional test which
includes deploying two CEW cartridges into preferred target zones.
16. It is to be emphasized that the training for law enforcement use of a CEW
needs to be significantly more rigorous than for a civilian user. This is because the role of
the CEW for law enforcement is significantly different than for civilians. For law
enforcement, the CEW is part of an integrated set of force option choices designed to
respond to a myriad of needs and options. For the civilian, the CEW is solely a self-defense
tool designed for deployment and discharge to avoid or thwart an immediate serious threat
Page 3 of 4
238
of harm. Law enforcement training necessarily includes such subjects as how to handle a
suspect after CEW exposure, documentation of use of force, data download from the CEW,
and cartridge replacement. On the other hand, in the case of civilian use, the recommended
protocol is for the user to abandon the CEW, escape the incident to safety, and notify law
enforcement for response. TASER has a replacement policy when the CEW is used by a
civilian for self-defense, left at the scene, and reported to law enforcement authorities.
17. TASER supplies a detailed instruction manual for training civilians. I am

familiar with the contents of these manuals. My review of the instruction materials indicate
that they are sufficient for instructing the civilian user to use the CEW reasonably safely
and effectively. For the court's information, I am attaching a copy of the manual for the
TASER Pulse civilian model, the more affordable CEW model designed for civilian use.
The training material for the TASER X26C CEW, and other higher end civilian models, is
comparable in its coverage.
18. I have considerable training and experience with firearms including

instructing new shooters. In my opinion based on my experience and training, it is generally
easier for a civilian to learn to use a TASER CEW effectively than a firearm. New shooters
tend to have difficulty with the noise and recoil from a firearm which are not factors with
TASER CEWs.
The above statement, given under penalty of perjury, is true and correct to the best
of my knowledge information and belief.
Dated: November 8, 2018
Page 4 of 4
239
TASER Pulse CEW

User Manual
IMPORTANT SAFETY INSTRUCTIONS

Read all warnings and instructions. Save these instructions.
The most up-to-date warnings and instructions are available
at www.TASER.com
MMU0062 Rev: A
240
Contents
1 Chapter 1: Warnings
1 Important Safety and Health Information
2 Chapter 2: General Information

2 What Is the TASER Pulse CEW?
2 Neuro Muscular Incapacitation (NMI)
2 Basic Pulse Electrical Theory
4 Chapter 3: TASER Pulse CEW and Cartridge Features

4 Safety Switch
5 Power Supply
6 Trigger Switch
6 Spark Duration
6 Electrodes
7 LASER and LED Flashlight
7 High Visibility Sights
7 Holsters
7 The TASER Pulse Cartridge
8 Avoiding Unintentional Discharge
8 Protective Anti-Felon Identification (AFID) Tags
9 Load the Pulse Cartridges
10 Unloading Cartridges
10 Practicing with the Pulse CEW
11 Aiming and Probe Placement
12 Using the Pulse CEW
12 Deployment Instructions for Self-Defense
13 “Silence is Golden”
13 Potential Causes of Reduced or No Effectiveness
i
241
TASER Pulse CEW User Manual
13 What if I Miss?
13 TASER Safe Escape
14 Contact Stun (Drive-Stun) Backup
15 Chapter 4: Maintenance and Care

15 General Concepts
15 Function Test
16 Changing the Battery
18 Chapter 5: Ownership
19 Chapter 6: Additional Items
19 TASER Online Troubleshooting Guide
19 Legality
19 Warranty
19 Warnings
Contents ii
242
Chapter 1: Warnings
Important Safety and Health Information

The safety warnings posted at www.TASER.com are for your protection as well as the safety of others. Disregarding
this information could result in death or serious injury.
WARNING
Read and Obey

Significant differences exist between different TASER CEW (Conducted Electrical Weapon) models. Do
not use or attempt to use any CEW model unless you have read, understood, and are following all cur-
rent instructions, warnings, and relevant TASER training materials before using TASER CEWs. Failure to
do so could increase the risk of death or serious injury to the user or others.
Obey Applicable Laws
Use of CEWs must be legally justified and comply with applicable federal, state, and local laws and
regulations.
Store in a Secure Location
CEWs and cartridges are weapons and, as with any weapon, follow safe weapon-handling practices
and store your CEW securely. Store CEWs, cartridges, and accessories in secure locations inaccessible
to children and other unauthorized persons to prevent inappropriate access or use.
For a complete list of product warnings, go to www.TASER.com.
1
243
Chapter 2: General Information
What Is the TASER Pulse CEW?

The TASER Pulse CEW is a self-defense conducted electrical weapon manufactured by TASER International, Inc.
TASER-brand CEWs are designed to use propelled wires or direct contact to conduct energy to affect the sensory
and/or motor functions of the nervous system.
The Pulse CEW uses a replaceable cartridge containing compressed nitrogen to deploy two small probes that are
attached to the Pulse cartridge by insulated conductive wires with a maximum length of 15 feet (4.6 meters). The
Pulse CEW transmits electrical pulses along the wires and into the body, which if used successfully will affect the
sensory and motor functions of the peripheral nervous system to immobilize the body.
The Pulse CEW has an estimated useful life of five years.
Neuro Muscular Incapacitation (NMI)

TASER technology is designed to use electrical pulses similar to those in your body’s nervous system to cause
stimulation that affects the sensory and motor nerves. Neuro Muscular Incapacitation (NMI) occurs when a CEW
is able to cause involuntary stimulation of both the sensory nerves and the motor nerves to render an attacker
temporarily unable to control movement. It is not dependent on pain and can be effective on subjects with a high
level of pain tolerance.
Previous generations of generic stun guns could primarily affect the sensory nerves only, resulting in pain compli-
ance. An attacker with a very high tolerance to pain (e.g., a drug abuser, person in serious psychological distress,
or a trained, focused fighter) may not be affected by the pain or might be able to fight through the pain of a tra-
ditional stun gun.
A CEW may cause NMI if probes are within sufficient proximity to complete a circuit, the probes have a sufficient
spread, and an adequate circuit is completed and maintained.
Basic Pulse Electrical Theory

• Electricity must be able to flow between the probes or the electrodes to deliver an electrical charge and will
generally follow the path of least resistance.
• The greater the spread between the probes on the target, generally the greater the NMI effectiveness.
• Electricity will generally not pass to others in contact with the subject unless contact is made directly between
or on the probes or the wires are touched.
• Exposure to water will not cause electrocution or increase the power to the subject (the electrical charge is fixed
inside the TASER CEW, and will not increase significantly even with environmental changes).
2
244
• Medical studies have found that modern pacemakers and implanted cardiac defibrillators withstand external
electrical defibrillators many orders of magnitude stronger than the TASER conducted energy pulses.
Chapter 2: General Information 3

245
Chapter 3: TASER Pulse CEW and Cartridge Features
Pulse Cartridge Cartridge Release Tab
Mechanical Sights
Probe
Blast Door Safety Switch
AFIDs
Trigger Switch
LED Flashlight
LASER
Safety Switch
down (SAFE) up (ARMED)
4
246
Ambidextrous safety switch can be operated from either side of the CEW.
• Safety switch down (SAFE).
• Safety switch up (ARMED) and ready to deploy.
• If the Pulse CEW’s safety switch is left in the up (ARMED) position for more than 20 minutes, the system will shut
down to preserve battery life.
• To re-arm the Pulse CEW, shift the safety switch to the down (SAFE) position, then back to the up (ARMED)
position
Power Supply
The Pulse CEW’s battery has enough power for approximately 50 30-second firings depending on temperature,
environment, and other factors. The battery will deplete faster in colder weather than in warm weather. Left to
itself in normal storage conditions, the battery has a two-year life.
The power LED is located below the rear sight. An illuminated LED indicates the trigger switch is ARMED. A green
LED indicates a “good” battery.
An orange LED indicates a “low” battery. In some conditions, especially low temperature (−4 °F/−20 °C) the LED
may display orange even if the battery has sufficient charge left.
Chapter 3: TASER Pulse CEW and Cartridge Features 5

247
Trigger Switch
Unlike a firearm trigger, the pulse trigger is a momentary electrical switch. The trigger is operational only when the
safety switch is in the up (ARMED) position.
In the event of an unintentional discharge, immediately move the safety switch to the down (SAFE) position to
stop the discharge cycle.
Spark Duration
When the Pulse CEW is deployed with a single push of the trigger switch, it delivers an approximately 30-second
Shaped Pulse energy burst of short-duration electrical pulses. This sparking will continue for 30 seconds unless the
safety switch is moved to the down (SAFE) position.
Electrodes
The front of the Pulse CEW has two metal electrodes. These electrodes direct the charge to the electrodes on the
cartridge to initiate deployment of the probes. In addition, the electrodes provide the ability to use the Pulse CEW
in a “drive-stun” mode as a traditional stun gun.

248
LASER and LED Flashlight

The LED flashlight illuminates whenever the safety switch is in the up (ARMED) position. In addition, the optional
LASER provides assistance for aiming and indicates the approximate orientation of the top probe.
High Visibility Sights

The mechanical sights on the TASER Pulse CEW provide manual aiming. The mechanical sights are set to coincide
with a top probe’s trajectory at a 15-foot (4.6-meter) distance.
Holsters
All Pulse kits come with a soft protective cover, and additional styles may be purchased at buy.taser.com.
The TASER Pulse Cartridge
Fifteen-foot (4.6-meter) cartridges are available for the Pulse CEW at buy.taser.com in both standard (black) and
simulation (blue). TASER pulse cartridges have a service life of five years.
Pulse simulation cartridges are identifiable by their blue color. Simulation cartridges are intended for practice only.
WARNING: DO NOT use a Pulse CEW loaded with a simulation cartridge for self-defense.

249
Simulation cartridges use non-conductive nylon line and will not transmit electrical pulses to the probes. A simu-
lation cartridge will have no NMI effect on an attacker.
Although they are designed not to conduct electricity, simulation cartridges deploy probes and must be han-
dled with the same precautions as other cartridges.
Use Pulse standard cartridges, which are black in color, for self-defense.
Avoiding Unintentional Discharge

Never attempt to open or modify a Pulse cartridge. Tampering with a live Pulse cartridge could cause it to
discharge or malfunction, which may result in serious injury.
Handle all Pulse cartridges with care.
Additionally, the firing sequence for all Pulse cartridges is designed to be initiated by an electrostatic discharge
delivered by the TASER CEW. This is an important design and functional element for the Pulse CEW and cartridge.
However, an electrostatic discharge can come from many other sources such as rubbing cloth (e.g., nylon jacket
liner) across a cartridge in an environment known to create static shocks. When an electrostatic discharge, regard-
less of the source, contacts the front of a Pulse cartridge, it is possible for the cartridge to discharge (and even
to discharge when not inserted into the CEW). Therefore, avoid contact between static electricity and the Pulse
cartridge because static electricity can cause unexpected discharge.
Do not hold a Pulse cartridge near the Pulse CEW when discharging the Pulse CEW. If a cartridge is held within two
inches (five centimeters) of the CEW when the CEW is discharged, the cartridge may deploy.
Occasionally, cartridge blast doors will be knocked off the front of a cartridge. Because those cartridges cannot
be relied upon to discharge, TASER International recommends disposing of these cartridges. TASER CEW operators
should not attempt to fire a cartridge with no blast doors on it unless they are facing an immediate threat and
do not have the time or option to reload. Attempting to deploy a cartridge with no blast doors could result in a
charge being created and held in the wires. Any conductive material that comes into contact with the front of the
cartridge, even after the cycle has ended, could draw the charge to the ignition pin and deploy the probes.
Protective Anti-Felon Identification (AFID) Tags

Every time a Pulse cartridge is deployed, 20–30 small confetti-like AFID tags are ejected. Each AFID tag is printed
with the serial number of the cartridge. This revolutionary technology allows TASER to assist law enforcement in
arresting criminals who would use our weapons for nefarious purposes.

250
Load the Pulse Cartridges

Never place your hands, fingers, or any part of your body in front of the cartridge. This is especially important
when loading or unloading the cartridge. When loading and unloading, always hold the cartridge on the sides.
1 Point the CEW in a safe direction.
2 Ensure that the safety switch is in the down (SAFE) position.
3 Remove the cartridge cover.
4 Keeping your hand away from the blast doors, place the cartridge into the front of the CEW, until is it ap-
proximately 90 percent inserted.

251
5 Gently press the cartridge against a firm, flat surface until it locks into place. Do not slam the CEW against
the surface; doing so may damage the cartridge
6 Confirm that the cartridge is secure by gently pulling on the sides of the cartridge.
Unloading Cartridges
The Pulse cartridge is designed to ensure a secure fit when inserted in the Pulse CEW. The placement of the wire
bundles behind the insertion tabs aids in providing a secure fit. It may be very difficult to remove a cartridge with
the wire in place (that is, when the cartridge has not been deployed). To remove a live cartridge, follow these steps:
1 Ensure that the front of the Pulse CEW is pointed in a safe direction.
2 Ensure that the safety switch is in the down (SAFE) position. Do not place any part of your hands or other
body parts in front of the Pulse CEW.
3 Depress both tabs until the cartridge releases. Note that it might take two hands to depress the tabs.
4 Re-install the clear cartridge cover on the cartridge.
Removal of an expended cartridge does not require as much force because the wires are no longer behind the
tabs.
The cartridges for the Pulse CEW are specifically designed so there is no “up” or “down” position – enabling you to
quickly reload one in a stressful situation without worrying about putting it in upside down.
Practicing with the Pulse CEW

TASER recommends practicing with your Pulse CEW to become familiar with its functions and how it deploys.
Be aware of your surroundings when deciding where to place your training target. Ensure that the target has a firm
backing (for example, cardboard or a foam board) that will allow the probes to stick and not bounce off and strike
an unintended person or object. Do not use a wooden backing. Do not place the target anywhere a probe that
misses or penetrates the target could cause damage or injury.

252
Do not discharge Pulse cartridges without using a target. Probes that do not strike a target may recoil back at you.
We recommend using TASER conductive targets available at buy.taser.com and a thick, penetrable backing.
Training cartridges with blue blast doors and non-conductive wire are available for purchase through TASER Inter-
national, but standard cartridges can be used with the conductive targets so that the sparking effect may be seen.
Safety first! Always treat your Pulse CEW as if it were loaded.
• Never put your hands or other body parts in front of the CEW, especially when changing the cartridges.
• Do not inadvertently point any cartridges at yourself or at anyone when loading.
• Cartridge covers must be removed prior to attempting to load.
1 Point your Pulse CEW in a safe direction; load the blue Pulse simulation cartridge as described in the sec-
tion in this manual while keeping your fingers away from the blast doors.
2 Point your Pulse CEW towards the training target and shift the safety switch to the up (ARMED) position.
3 Aim your Pulse CEW at the training target; keep in mind that the LASER is within 2 to 3 inches (5 to 7.6
centimeters) of the point of impact for the top probe. Aim at the target’s center of mass – to improve the
accuracy of the bottom probe, avoid canting or tilting the CEW.
4 Remember that the bottom probe comes out at an 8-degree downward angle. The bottom probe will drop
1 foot (0.3 m) below the top probe for every 7 feet (2.1 m) that it travels away from the CEW. Stand about 10
feet (3 m) from your target. This will result in a probe spread of about 18 inches (0.46 m). Place the LASER
high enough on the target so the bottom probe will hit the target.
5 Press the trigger switch once to discharge the blue Pulse simulation cartridge and activate the 30-second
cycle. Remember that you can discontinue the discharge at any time by shifting the safety switch to the
down (SAFE) position.
6 After the TASER discharge cycle ends, and the safety switch is in the down (SAFE) position, unload the
expended blue Pulse simulation cartridge as described in the Unloading Cartridges section of this manual.
Aiming and Probe Placement
For most deployments, hold the CEW level. Do not tilt the CEW unless it is necessary to align the CEW with the
attacker.
Normally, aim the LASER at one of the large muscle groups (center of mass) such as the torso or thigh areas, etc.
Avoid head, face, throat, chest, or groin exposure unless your safety or the situation dictates otherwise.
The top probe impacts the target near the LASER beam; however, the probe impact distance from the LASER beam
can vary depending on numerous factors, including, but not limited to the distance, movement of the user or
253
attacker, and environmental factors.

Be sure not to fire at a subject who is more than 15 feet or 4.6 meters away (measure 15 feet or 4.6 meters to see
how far this is – it will probably be further than you think). If you do deploy at someone more than 15 feet or 4.6
meters away, the probes will not have sufficient wire to reach them and may recoil back at you.
Using the Pulse CEW

The Pulse CEW is a serious, state-of-the-art defensive weapon and should be treated accordingly. Although the
CEW is designed to be as nonviolent as possible in stopping a combatant, its use can result in injuries, including
but not limited to, a probe embedded in an eye or secondary injuries related to falling.
For a full list of warnings, see www.TASER.com.
The CEW is to be used only for lawful purposes, including lawful self-defense or in the defense of others. Check
your state and local laws for applicable regulations. Depending on local and state laws, the Pulse CEW may be
kept in the house for home protection, or carried in a car, purse, or backpack for personal protection when away
from home. Be sure to research each state’s applicable laws prior to possessing or transporting the CEW (including
the transporting of the CEW across state lines and into other states where laws may vary). For a list of known laws
related to CEWs, go to www.TASER.com.
A CEW is not a substitute for other preventive self-protection actions such as ensuring doors are locked, and park-
ing in well-lighted areas.
Deployment Instructions for Self-Defense

DO NOT use simulation (blue) cartridges for self-defense. A simulation cartridge will have no NMI effect on an
attacker.
1 Remove the Pulse CEW from its holster and ensure that the Pulse cartridge is installed.
2 If a person approaches in a suspicious or threatening manner, move the safety switch to the up (ARMED)
position.
3 Aim the LASER beam at the attacker’s body. Avoid intentionally aiming at a sensitive body location such as
the head, face, throat, chest, or groin.
4 Shout verbal commands to “get away,” if feasible. It is possible that the person will flee based on the verbal
commands and LASER.
5 If you determine that you need to deploy the Pulse CEW in self-defense, ensure that you are within 15 feet
(4.6 meters) of the attacker.
6 Press the trigger switch.
7 The TASER Safe Escape: Immediately put the Pulse down and escape to safety. The TASER Pulse CEW is un-
like most weapons in that it is built for you to escape to safety. After connecting with the target, the Pulse
will continue to administer electricity for 30 seconds (and if used properly NMI will continue for 30 seconds)
regardless of whether you are still holding the weapon. Therefore, put the Pulse on the ground and run
to safety, grab your children, call police, or do whatever you need to do to ensure your safety with the 30
seconds the TASER Pulse CEW has given you.
8 As soon as it is safe to do so, call 911 and report the specific location of the threat.
9 See TASER Safe Escape, below, for how to get your TASER CEW replaced for free when used in self-defense
and left at the scene.

254
“Silence is Golden”
The TASER CEW’s electrical current is relatively quiet when both probes make direct contact with a human or
animal and an electrical circuit is completed and maintained. In contrast, an open circuit or some practice conduc-
tive targets produce a loud sound when used because the energy is arcing in the air across the Pulse CEW’s fixed
electrodes.
If the electrical current is loud during field deployment, and the subject is not reacting as expected, the current
may be shorting out and may not be effective. Deploy a second cartridge or consider other options in that situa-
tion.
Potential Causes of Reduced or No Effectiveness

• Loose or Thick Clothing. If the probes lodge in clothing and are too far away from the attacker, CEW effective-
ness is reduced and can be eliminated.
• Miss or Single Probe Hit. The electrical current must pass between the two probes in a completed and main-
tained circuit. If one probe misses, reload with a second cartridge and deploy it if practical. Also, using the Pulse
CEW in the drive-stun mode as described below may also complete the circuit between the single probe and
the CEW electrode. You may also consider upgrading to the TASER X2 Professional Series (available on buy.taser.
com), a two-shot device which fires a second cartridge immediately with a second trigger pull.
• Low Nerve or Muscle Mass. If the probes impact in an area where there is very little muscle mass (e.g., the side
of the rib cage), the effectiveness can be significantly diminished.
• Limited Probe Spread. Small probe spreads (including drive-stun) result in little or no effect from NMI. They will
however still function as a pain-compliance device.
• Wires Break. If a wire breaks (e.g., during a struggle), the current will not flow to the probes. Drive-stun may still
be available.
What if I Miss?
The LASER sight is an extremely valuable aid for proper aiming. However, there is always the chance for a missed
shot, especially in a dynamic, stressful situation, and you must be prepared to take alternative actions to protect
yourself in case of a missed shot or reduced effectiveness. In the event that you shoot and miss, you can also use
your Pulse CEW as a direct contact stun (drive-stun) device, which is designed for pain compliance.
TASER Safe Escape

Do not hesitate to place the Pulse CEW on the ground and leave it at the scene of the attempted assault. At TASER,
we value your life more than a piece of plastic and metal. If you successfully deploy your TASER Pulse CEW to de-
fend yourself, leave it at the scene and take advantage of the 30 seconds to escape.
TASER International will replace the TASER Bolt, C2, X26C, M26C, Pulse, X2, or X26P CEW free of charge, with the
same product or a like product, at TASER International’s option, if the Purchaser provides, within one year following
the event, the following information to TASER International, 17800 North 85th Street, Scottsdale, Arizona 85255
Attn: Customer Service:
• a copy of the official police report documenting the incident and the loss of the product;
• proof of purchase of the product (receipt, purchase order, or invoice);
• check or a credit authorization for the shipping and handling fees; and
• purchaser’s name, physical address (no PO Boxes allowed), and phone number of where to send the replaced
item.
Purchaser is responsible for any expedited shipping or handling costs for the replacement CEW. A replacement
product assumes the remaining warranty of the original product or 90 days from the date of replacement, which-
ever provides longer coverage to the Purchaser.
255
TASER Safe Escape is not available or applicable: (a) on any international (Non-United States) sales or uses of TASER
Citizen Products; or (b) to any Purchaser who uses the CEW for a commercial purpose.
Contact Stun (Drive-Stun) Backup

Contact stun (also known as drive-stun) is the use of the TASER Pulse CEW as a stun gun, rather than by firing darts.
You can contact stun either with an already fired cartridge or without a cartridge installed. Probe deployment is
usually considered more desirable if incapacitation is the desired objective, even at close range, because the drive-
stun is only a pain-compliance use.
When using the drive-stun, push the trigger switch and push (drive) the front of the CEW firmly against the body
of the attacker. Simply “touching” the Pulse CEW against the person is not sufficient to achieve neuro muscular
incapacitation. The subject is likely to recoil from the painful shock and try to get away from the stun electrodes.
If the drive-stun is not effective, evaluate the location of the drive-stun and consider an additional cycle to a dif-
ferent pressure point

256
Chapter 4: Maintenance and Care
General Concepts
The Pulse CEW is a sensitive piece of electronic equipment, and should be handled with care. Avoid dropping a
Pulse CEW. Do not use a Pulse CEW that has a cracked handle.
• Check the battery regularly by confirming the LED on the back of the CEW is green. See Power Supply (Chapter
3) for more information.
• Perform a function test regularly.
• Check the expiration of the Pulse cartridges (the five-year expiration is listed on the base of the cartridge). Do
not use an expired Pulse cartridge.
• Secure the Pulse CEW in the protective cover when not in use.
• Avoid exposing the Pulse CEW to excessive moisture or water.
• See the troubleshooting guide at buy.taser.com for additional instructions.
Function Test
A function test should be conducted every 30–60 days. The reasons for the function test include:
• To verify the Pulse CEW is working.
• To verify that the battery is in good condition.
To perform a function test:
1 Ensure that the safety switch is in the down (SAFE) position.
2 Safely unload the Pulse cartridge. See Unloading Cartridges (Chapter 3) for more information.
3 Point the CEW in a safe direction (such as the floor) and ensure that your fingers and no part of your body
are in front of the CEW.
4 Shift the safety switch to the up (ARMED) position.
5 Press the trigger and confirm sparking across the electrodes at a rapid rate. You do not need to function
test the CEW for the full 30 seconds.
6 Shift the safety switch to the down (SAFE) position.
15
257
Changing the Battery

To install or change the battery:
1 Shift the safety switch to the down (SAFE) position.
2 Safely remove the Pulse cartridge.
3 Slide the battery cap out.
4 Place your finger on the wires above the connectors. Hold the wires against the battery well
5 Pull the battery downward to disconnect it from the wires in the battery well.
Note: Do not yank on the battery. Pressing the wires against the battery well should make it easier to dis-
Chapter 4: Maintenance and Care 16

258
connect the battery.

6 Plug the wires from the new battery into the wires in the battery well.
The connectors make a click when they fit together.

7 Push the battery into the battery well.
8 Slide the battery cap back into place.
Chapter 4: Maintenance and Care 17

259
Chapter 5: Ownership
Do not point the CEW at any law enforcement officer or do anything that would cause law enforcement officers to
feel threatened by your use of the CEW. Because the TASER CEW is able to incapacitate a person, law enforcement
officers may be justified to use lethal force to protect themselves.
Although the Pulse CEW incorporates yellow components to distinguish it as a non-firearm, it could be mistaken
for a firearm. Take appropriate care in carrying and displaying the Pulse CEW. Do not modify the Pulse CEW or do
anything to the CEW to make it look like a firearm.
Do not give a TASER CEW away as a gift or sell it without completing the transfer notice at http://communities.
taser.com. For more information, see Legality (Chapter 6).
Taking a TASER-brand CEW into a state or municipality where CEWs are prohibited (see Chapter 6 Additional
Items for a current list) or out of the United States (US) without the proper export license is prohibited by law (sim-
ilar prohibitions may exist in other countries).
DO NOT carry a TASER CEW, TASER CEW battery or battery pack (which contains lithium), or cartridge on a com-
mercial aircraft. According to the 2012 IATA Dangerous Goods Regulations for commercial airplanes, TASER CEWs,
battery packs, and cartridges ARE NOT ALLOWED on your person, in your carry-on baggage, or in your checked
baggage aboard commercial aircraft. Please check with the TSA for the most recent regulations.
It is recommended that you carry the Pulse CEW only in a manufacturer approved holster or carrying case. Do not
carry uncovered Pulse cartridges in your pockets as they can be fired by electrostatic discharge (static electricity).
18
260
Chapter 6: Additional Items
TASER Online Troubleshooting Guide

A troubleshooting guide is available by visiting buy.taser.com. If you need product support on accessories or have
any other questions, please contact consumer customer service at:
team@taser.com
+1.800.978.2737
To return a TASER product for service, first follow the procedures at buy.taser.com.
If the TASER CEW has been exposed to bodily fluids or other biohazards, contact TASER’s service department at
+1.800.978.2737 or +1.480.905.2000 for specific instructions BEFORE returning the weapon.
Legality
The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives has classified our TASER CEWs as non-firearms because
they use compressed gas (inert nitrogen), rather than explosives to launch the projectiles. Because TASER CEWs
are not firearms, they may be carried without a permit in certain jurisdictions (check state and local laws for permit
requirements in your area). Currently the TASER CEW is restricted from possession by citizen users in the follow-
ing states: Hawaii, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Washington DC, and certain cities and
counties. Check our website at www.TASER.com for a list of known state and local laws concerning TASER CEWs.
Because state and local laws may change frequently, be sure to research the applicable laws in your area prior to
using, possessing or transporting the CEW.
Warranty
Please see the product warranty which came with your CEW. TASER’s current product warranties are also available
on www.TASER.com.
Warnings
See the current product warnings that came with your CEW, for more information about your TASER product. TAS-
ER’s current product warnings are also available on www.TASER.com
19
261
C2, M26C, X2, X26C, X26P, TASER, TASER Bolt, TASER Pulse, ©, and ® are trademarks of TASER International, Inc., some of which are
registered in the US. For more information visit www.TASER.com/legal. All rights reserved. © 2015, TASER International, Inc.
MMU0062 Rev: A

ANDREW NAMIKI ROBERTS )

)
Plaintiff, )
) Civil Action No. 1:18-cv-00125-HG-KSC
v. )
)
SUSAN BALLARD, et al. ) DECLARATION OF ANDREW NAMIKI
) ROBERTS
Defendants. )
_________________________________)
COMES NOW, Andrew Namiki Roberts, and states as follows:
1. I am an adult male resident of the State of Hawaii and reside in Honolulu County.
2. I am not a citizen of the United States of America. I am however, a lawful permanent

resident of the United States of America. I am a citizen of the United Kingdom.
3. I have never been convicted of any crime which would dispossess me of my Second
Amendment rights. I have never been convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor crime of domestic
violence and I am not prohibited from owning firearms either at the state or federal level.
4. I have also not been deemed by any mental health professionals to have a mental illness or
otherwise have mental health issues.
5. I want to purchase, own, possess and carry an electric arm, a Taser/stun gun, for self-
defense both in my home and outside my home.
6. Even though I am a resident of Hawaii and a lawful permanent resident of the United States
of America, because I am not a citizen, I am not allowed pursuant Hawaii law to apply for a permit
to carry a firearm.
7. Because I cannot even apply for a firearm carry permit, I am effectively stripped of my
Second Amendment rights outside my home. As such, I want to carry a Taser for self-defense
outside my home and would carry outside my home, but I am unable to because of Hawaii’s laws.
8. Additionally, I am unable to purchase an electric arm, a Taser or a stun gun, because Hawaii
law forbids the purchase and possession of electric arms.
Exhibit "2"
9. One of the reasons I wish to purchase, own, possess and carry a Taser is that a Taser is
considered less than lethal force, and I would rather use the smallest amount of force necessary to
repel an attack rather than use lethal force when lethal force may not be the best option.
10. Additionally, I routinely transport in my vehicle and on my person thousands of dollars’

worth of camera gear as one of my professions is that of a photographer. In doing so, I am often
in remote places and on remote land, that does not have police presence, where I would be forced
to defend myself without the assistance of any law enforcement.
11. In addition, it would be safer for me to keep and carry a Taser at home, for home and self-
defense, than carrying a firearm. For instance, my firearms are kept locked at home pursuant to
Hawaii law because my daughter, who is a minor, lives at home. This requirement renders my
firearm inaccessible until I can retrieve it if the need arises to be used for self-defense.
12. However, with a Taser, I would be able to keep it charged and loaded with a cartridge,
ready to use at a moments notice if the need arises without having to fear that a someone in my
home may accidentally harm themselves with it. A Taser, for me, would be the most effective form
of less than lethal self-defense.
13. Because Hawaii bans these devices, I have not purchased one because I do not want to
break the law and because I do not want to be prosecuted for violations of Hawaii law.
FURTHER, DECLARANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on November 8th, 2018.
__________________________
Andrew Namiki Roberts

264


)
)
)
Plaintiff, )
)
) STAMBOULIEH
)
)
_______________________________)
personal knowledge.
Request for Admissions; Request for Production of Documents and First Set of
Interrogatories.
Exhibit "3"
265
5. As of November 9, 2018, Defendants have not responded to any discovery.
6. Based on Defendants’ failure to respond to the Plaintiff’s Request for
Admissions, Plaintiff filed the Entry of Admissions into Evidentiary Record of Case
[Docket No. 34], a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit “A”.

2
266
267
Notices
1:18-cv-00125-HG-KSC Roberts vs. Ballard; et al.
U.S. District Court
District of Hawaii
The following transaction was entered by Stamboulieh, Stephen on 11/9/2018 at 4:27 PM HST and filed on
11/9/2018
Document Number: 34
Docket Text:
NOTICE by Andrew Namiki Roberts Entry of Admissions Andrew Namiki Roberts.
(Attachments: # (1) Declaration Declaration of Stephen D. Stamboulieh, # (2) Certificate of
Service Certificate of Service)(Stamboulieh, Stephen)
John M. Cregor , Jr John.M.Cregor@hawaii.gov, Caron.M.Inagaki@hawaii.gov,

Jethro.G.Arcilla@Hawaii.gov, Marnie.A.Goo@hawaii.gov


] [696bdd5417f72390e8d056c00679ac0b2c365f1eddf9002694bbaea5a93fdccce78
faa701bd383a813bae9790c4c1f7e36fa7a23f0964c0bb4c99b7bb5ad23e6]]
] [058f5c36c6dd3b9fabbba957b7a9867d52547561c7bfcc0d54127a54dc2d8b959ed
004ee919b5cec3d0dae68f443e51c28b4da1ab3f23509548f3f69a224b1a1]]
Exhibit "A"
1 of 2
268
] [3a2f509636df177a886372f535939b7f2ef598702c34a6fe07eee91ce56c4e60c8f
4410fb1ad0d37dd4b3ea3e5fe492786de94cc6f3e9d44b9b9e14b82cb33ea]]
2 of 2
Case
Case1:18-cv-00125-HG-KSC
1:18-cv-00125-HG-KSC Document
Document34
36-3Filed
Filed
11/09/18
11/09/18Page
Page
1 of
63of 13PageID
PageID
#: 188
#:
269
Alan Alexander Beck

2692 Harcourt Drive
San Diego, CA 92123
(619) 905-9105
Hawaii Bar No. 9145
P.O. Box 4008
Madison, MS 39130
(601) 852-3440
stephen@sdslaw.us
MS Bar No. 102784



)
) PLAINTIFF’S ENTRY OF ADMISSIONS
) INTO EVIDENTIARY RECORD OF
Plaintiff, ) CASE; DECLARATION OF
)
)
)
_______________________________)
Case
Document34
36-3Filed
Filed
11/09/18
11/09/18Page
Page
2 of
73of 13PageID
PageID
#: 189
#:
270
PLAINTIFF’S ENTRY OF ADMISSIONS INTO EVIDENTIARY RECORD

OF CASE
Pursuant to Rules 36(a)(3) and 36(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Plaintiff Andrew Namiki Roberts enters the following matters into evidence in this
case:
1. Tasers and stun guns are less than lethal weapons.
2. Defendants are not aware of any deaths attributable to a stun gun.
3. As part of Hawaii law enforcement training for Tasers, some officers are
voluntarily exposed to the devices.
4. Defendants know of no law enforcement officer that has ever been killed with
a Taser or stun gun.
5. Tasers and stun guns are commonly used for self-defense.
6. Tasers and stun guns are appropriate in certain circumstances to be used for
self-defense.
7. Tasers are not dangerous and unusual.
8. Stun guns are not dangerous and unusual.
9. The Second Amendment protects stun guns and Tasers.
10. There is less of a public safety interest in banning stun guns and Tasers than
handguns.
11. Stun guns and Tasers are less dangerous than handguns.
2
Case
Document34
36-3Filed
Filed
11/09/18
11/09/18Page
Page
3 of
83of 13PageID
PageID
#: 190
#:
271
12. There are over 4.7 million electric arms owned by civilians for lawful
purposes in the United States of America.
13. Attorney General Russell A. Suzuki, in his official capacity, is a proper party
in this lawsuit.
14. Defendant Al Cummings, in his official capacity, is a proper party in this
lawsuit.
/s/ Alan Beck

Alan Alexander Beck

3
Case
Document34-1
36-3 Filed
Filed11/09/18
11/09/18 Page
Page1 9ofof3 13 PageID
PageID
#: 191
#:
272


)
)
)
Plaintiff, )
)
) STAMBOULIEH
)
)
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personal knowledge.

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5. As of November 9, 2018, Defendants have not responded to Plaintiff’s First

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Alan Alexander Beck

2692 Harcourt Drive
San Diego, CA 92123
(619) 905-9105
Hawaii Bar No. 9145
P.O. Box 4008
Madison, MS 39130
(601) 852-3440
stephen@sdslaw.us
MS Bar No. 102784



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Alan Alexander Beck

2692 Harcourt Drive
San Diego, CA 92123
(619) 905-9105
Hawaii Bar No. 9145
P.O. Box 4008
Madison, MS 39130
(601) 852-3440
stephen@sdslaw.us
MS Bar No. 102784



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)
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Plaintiff, )
)
)
)
)
_______________________________)


Robert Full MSJ With Exhibits and Statement

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U.S. District Court

Notice of Electronic Filing

1:18-cv-00125-HG-KSC Notice has been electronically mailed to:

Alan A. Beck ngord2000@yahoo.com, Alan.alexander.beck@gmail.com

John M. Cregor , Jr John.M.Cregor@hawaii.gov, Caron.M.Inagaki@hawaii.gov,

Nicolette Winter nwinter@honolulu.gov, debra.haraguchi@honolulu.gov, dkasashima2@honolulu.gov,

Stephen D. Stamboulieh stephen@sdslaw.us

1:18-cv-00125-HG-KSC Notice will not be electronically mailed to:

The following document(s) are associated with this transaction:

Document description:Main Document

Alan Alexander Beck

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

ANDREW NAMIKI ROBERTS ) Civil Action No. 1:18-cv-00125-HG-KSC

PLAINTIFF’S ENTRY OF ADMISSIONS INTO EVIDENTIARY RECORD

1. Tasers and stun guns are less than lethal weapons.

2. Defendants are not aware of any deaths attributable to a stun gun.

voluntarily exposed to the devices.

a Taser or stun gun.

5. Tasers and stun guns are commonly used for self-defense.

7. Tasers are not dangerous and unusual.

8. Stun guns are not dangerous and unusual.

9. The Second Amendment protects stun guns and Tasers.

purposes in the United States of America.

14. Defendant Al Cummings, in his official capacity, is a proper party in this

Dated: Madison, Mississippi, November 9th, 2018.

Counsel for Plaintiff

/s/ Alan Beck

/s/ Stephen D. Stamboulieh

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

ANDREW NAMIKI ROBERTS ) Civil Action No. 1:18-cv-00125-HG-KSC

DECLARATION OF STEPHEN D. STAMBOULIEH

I, Stephen D. Stamboulieh, declare as follows:

2. I am authorized and competent to testify to the matters contained in this

3. On September 27, 2018, Plaintiff served Defendants with Plaintiff’s First

Request for Admissions.

mailing would have been received by Defendants on October 1, 2018.

5. As of November 9, 2018, Defendants have not responded to Plaintiff’s First

Request for Admissions.

6. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746(2), I declare under penalty of perjury that the

foregoing is true and correct.

Dated: Madison, Mississippi, November 9th, 2018.

Counsel for Plaintiff

/s/ Stephen D. Stamboulieh

Alan Alexander Beck

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

ANDREW NAMIKI ROBERTS ) Civil Action No. 1:18-cv-00125-HG-KSC

Dated: Madison, Mississippi, November 9th, 2018.

Counsel for Plaintiff

/s/ Stephen D. Stamboulieh

U.S. District Court

Notice of Electronic Filing

1:18-cv-00125-HG-KSC Notice has been electronically mailed to:

Alan A. Beck ngord2000@yahoo.com, Alan.alexander.beck@gmail.com

John M. Cregor , Jr John.M.Cregor@hawaii.gov, Caron.M.Inagaki@hawaii.gov, Jethro.G.Arcilla@Hawaii.gov,

Nicolette Winter nwinter@honolulu.gov, debra.haraguchi@honolulu.gov, dkasashima2@honolulu.gov,

Stephen D. Stamboulieh stephen@sdslaw.us

1:18-cv-00125-HG-KSC Notice will not be electronically mailed to:

The following document(s) are associated with this transaction:

Alan Alexander Beck

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT