THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 138822. January 23, 2001.]

EVANGELINE ALDAY , petitioner, vs . FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION ,

respondent.

Cruz Durian Alday & Cruz-Matters for petitioner.

Jacinto Jimenez for respondent.

SYNOPSIS

On 5 May 1989, respondent FGU Insurance Corporation led a complaint with the
Regional Trial Court of Makati alleging that petitioner Evangeline K. Alday owed it
P114,650.76 representing unliquidated cash advances, unremitted costs of her work as an
insurance agent for respondent. Petitioner led her answer and by way of counterclaim,
asserted her right for the payment of P104,893.45, representing direct commissions,
pro t commissions, and contingent bonuses earned from 1 July 1986 to 7 December
1986, and for accumulated premium, reserves amounting to P500,000. In addition,
petitioner prayed for attorney's fees, litigation expenses, moral damages and exemplary
damages for the allegedly unfounded action led by respondent. On 11 April 1990,
respondent led a motion top dismiss petitioner's counterclaim, contending that the trial
court never acquired jurisdiction over the same because of the non-payment of docket
fees by petitioner. In response, petitioner asked the trial court to declare her counterclaim
as exempt from payment of docket fees since it is compulsory and that respondent be
declared in default for having failed to answer such counterclaim. The trial court granted
respondent's motion to dismiss petitioner's counterclaim and consequently denied
petitioner's motion. The court found petitioner's counterclaim to be merely permissive in
nature and held that petitioner's failure to pay docket fees prevented the court from
acquiring jurisdiction over the same. The Court of Appeals sustained the trial court's
findings. Hence, this petition. cHCIDE

The Court ruled that petitioner's counterclaim for commissions, bonuses, and
accumulated premium reserves is merely permissive. The evidence required to prove
petitioner's claim differred from that needed to establish respondent's demands for the
recovery of cash accountabilities from petitioner, such as cash advances and costs of
premium. The recovery of respondent's claim is not contingent or dependent upon
establishing petitioner's counterclaim, such that conducting separate trials will not result
in the substantial duplicate of the time and effort of the court and the parties. However,
petitioner's claims for damages, allegedly suffered as a result of the ling by respondent
of its complaint, are compulsory. There is no need for petitioner to pay docket fees for her
compulsory counterclaim. On the other hand, in order for the trial court to acquire
jurisdiction over her permissive counterclaim, petitioner is bound to pay the prescribed
docket fees. There is obviously no need to le an answer until petitioner has paid the
prescribed docket fees for only then shall the court acquire jurisdiction over such claim.
Meanwhile, the compulsory counterclaim of petitioner for damages based on the ling by
respondent of an allegedly unfounded and malicious suit need not be answered since it is
inseparable from the claims of respondent. If respondent will not answer the compulsory
counterclaim of petitioner, it would merely result in the former pleading the same facts
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 raised in its complaint. ADaSEH

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; COURTS; JURISDICTION; ESTOPPEL; NOT APPLICABLE

WHEN THE PARTY ASSAILING THE TRIAL COURT'S JURISDICTION RAISED IT WITH THE
TRIAL COURT ITSELF EVEN BEFORE THE PRESENTATION OF ANY EVIDENCE. — Estoppel
by laches arises from the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable
time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or
declined to assert it. In the case at bar, respondent cannot be considered as estopped
from assailing the trial court's jurisdiction over petitioner's counterclaim since this issue
was raised by respondent with the trial court itself — the body where the action is pending
— even before the presentation of any evidence by the parties and de nitely, way before
any judgment could be rendered by the trial court. cEaDTA

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLICABLE WHEN THE PARTY RAISING IT HAS ACTIVELY
TAKEN PART IN THE VERY PROCEEDING WHICH HE QUESTIONS; CASE AT BAR. —
Meanwhile, respondent questions the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the appeal
led by petitioner from the 18 September 1990 and 28 February 1991 orders of the trial
court. It is signi cant to note that this objection to the appellate court's jurisdiction is
raised for the rst time before this Court; respondent never having raised this issue before
the rst time before the appellate court. Although the lack of jurisdiction of a court may be
raised at any stage of the action, a party may be estopped from raising such question if he
has actively taken part in the very proceedings which he questions, belatedly objecting to
the court's jurisdiction in the event that that the judgment or order subsequently rendered
is adverse to him. In this case, respondent actively took part in the proceedings before the
Court of Appeals by ling its appellee's brief with the same. Its participation, when taken
together with is failure to object to the appellate court's jurisdiction during the entire
duration of the proceedings before such court, demonstrates a willingness to abide by the
resolution of the case by such tribunal and accordingly, respondent is now most decidedly
estopped from objecting to the Court of Appeals' assumption of jurisdiction over
petitioner's appeal.
3. ID.; CIVIL PROCEDURE; PLEADINGS; COUNTERCLAIM; COMPULSORY
COUNTERCLAIM; DEFINED. — A compulsory counterclaim is one which, being cognizable
by the regular courts of justice, arises out of or is connected with the transaction or
occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not
require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction. caSEAH

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; TESTS WHETHER IT IS COMPULSORY OR PERMISSIVE. — In

Valencia v. Court of Appeals , this Court capsulized the criteria or tests that may be used in
determining whether a counterclaim is compulsory or permissive, summarized as follows:
1. Are the issue of fact and law raised by the claim and counterclaim largely the same? 2.
Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant's claim absent the compulsory
counterclaim rule? 3. Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff's
claim as well as defendant's counterclaim? 4. Is there any logical relation between the
claim and the counterclaim? Another test, applied in the recent case of Quintanilla v. Court
of Appeals, is the "compelling test of compulsoriness" which requires "a logical
relationship between the claim and counterclaim, that is, where conducting separate trials
of the respective claims of the parties would entail a substantial duplication of effort and
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 time by the parties and the court."
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PERMISSIBLE COUNTERCLAIM; DEFENDANT IS BOUND TO
PAY THE PRESCRIBED DOCKET FEES IN ORDER FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO ACQUIRE
JURISDICTION. — Petitioner's counterclaim for commission, bonuses, and accumulated
premium reserves is merely permissive. The evidence required to prove petitioner's claims
differs from that needed to establish respondent's demands for the recovery of cash
accountabilities from petitioner, such as cash advances and costs of premiums. The
recovery of respondent's claims is not contingent or dependent upon establishing
petitioner's counterclaim, such that conducting separate trials will not result in the
substantial duplication of the time and effort of the court and the parties. One would
search the records in vain for a logical connection between the parties' claims. This
conclusion is further reinforced by petitioner's own admissions since she declared in her
answer that respondent's cause of action, unlike her own, was not based upon the Special
Agent's Contract. . . . In order for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over her permissive
counterclaim, petitioner is bound to pay the prescribed docket fees. EHTIDA

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM; NO NEED FOR DEFENDANT

TO PAY DOCKET FEES. — [P]etitioner's claims for damages, allegedly suffered as a result
of the ling by respondent of its complaint, are compulsory. There is no need for petitioner
to pay docket fees for her compulsory counterclaim.
7. ID.; LEGAL FEES; RULE ON PAYMENT OF FILING FEES. — The rule on the
payment of ling fees has been laid down by the Court in the case of Sun Insurance O ce,
Ltd. v. Hon. Maximiano Asuncion — 1. It is not simply the ling of the complaint or
appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a
trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the ling
of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may
allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period. 2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims,
third-party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered led until and
unless the ling fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may allow payment of said fee
within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period. 3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the ling
of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed ling fee but, subsequently, the
judgment awards a claim not speci ed in the pleading, or if speci ed the same has been
left for determination by the court, the additional ling fee therefor shall constitute a lien
on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized
deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee. cTECIA

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; NON-PAYMENT DOES NOT RESULT IN THE AUTOMATIC

DISMISSAL OF THE CASE PROVIDED THE DOCKET FEES ARE PAID WITHIN THE
APPLICABLE PRESCRIPTIVE OR REGLEMENTARY PERIOD. — The above mentioned ruling
i s Sun Insurance has been reiterated in the recent case of Suson v. Court of Appeals . In
Suson, the Court explained that although the payment of the prescribed docket fees is a
jurisdictional requirement, its non-payment does not result in the automatic dismissal of
the case provided the docket fees are paid within the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — Coming now to the case at
bar, it has not been alleged by respondent and there is nothing in the records to show that
petitioner has attempted to evade the payment of the proper docket fees for her
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 permissive counterclaim. As a matter of fact, after respondent led its motion to dismiss
petitioner's counterclaim based on her failure to pay docket fees, petitioner immediately
led a motion with the trial court, asking it to declare her counterclaim as compulsory in
nature and therefore exempt from docket fees and, in addition, to declare that respondent
was in default for its failure to answer her counterclaim. However, the trial court dismissed
petitioner's counterclaim. Pursuant to this Court's ruling in Sun Insurance, the trial court
should have instead given petitioner a reasonable time, but in no case beyond the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period, to pay the ling fees for her permissive
counterclaim.
10. ID.; CIVIL PROCEDURE; PLEADINGS; COUNTERCLAIM; PERMISSIVE
COUNTERCLAIM; NO NEED TO FILE AN ANSWER UNTIL THE DEFENDANT HAS PAID THE
PRESCRIBED DOCKET FEES. — Insofar as the permissive counterclaim of petitioner is
concerned, there is obviously no need to le an answer until petitioner has paid the
prescribed docket fees for only then shall the court acquire jurisdiction over such claim. ASHICc

11. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM; DAMAGES BASED ON THE
FILING OF AN ALLEGEDLY UNFOUNDED AND MALICIOUS SUIT NEED NOT BE ANSWERED.
— The compulsory counterclaim of petitioner for damages based on the ling by
respondent of an allegedly unfounded and malicious suit need not be answered since it is
inseparable from the claims of respondent. If respondent were to answer the compulsory
counterclaim of petitioner, it would merely result in the former pleading the same facts
raised in its complaint.

DECISION

GONZAGA-REYES , J : p

On 5 May 1989, respondent FGU Insurance Corporation led a complaint with the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, 1 alleging that petitioner Evangeline K. Alday owed it
P114,650.76, representing unliquidated cash advances, unremitted costs of premiums and
other charges incurred by petitioner in the course of her work as an insurance agent for
respondent. 2 Respondent also prayed for exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and costs
of suit. 3 Petitioner led her answer and by way of counterclaim, asserted her right for the
payment of P104,893.45, representing direct commissions, pro t commissions and
contingent bonuses earned from 1 July 1986 to 7 December 1986, and for accumulated
premium reserves amounting to P500,000.00. In addition, petitioner prayed for attorney's
fees, litigation expenses, moral damages and exemplary damages for the allegedly
unfounded action led by respondent. 4 On 23 August 1989, respondent led a "Motion to
Strike Out Answer With Compulsory Counterclaim And To Declare Defendant In Default"
because petitioner's answer was allegedly led out of time. 5 However, the trial court
denied the motion on 25 August 1989 and similarly rejected respondent's motion for
reconsideration on 12 March 1990. 6 A few weeks later, on 11 April 1990, respondent led
a motion to dismiss petitioner's counterclaim, contending that the trial court never
acquired jurisdiction over the same because of the non-payment of docket fees by
petitioner. 7 In response, petitioner asked the trial court to declare her counterclaim as
exempt from payment of docket fees since it is compulsory and that respondent be
declared in default for having failed to answer such counterclaim. 8
In its 18 September 1990 Order, the trial court 9 granted respondent's motion to
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 dismiss petitioner's counterclaim and consequently, denied petitioner's motion. The court
found petitioner's counterclaim to be merely permissive in nature and held that petitioner's
failure to pay docket fees prevented the court from acquiring jurisdiction over the same. 1 0
The trial court similarly denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration on 28 February
1991. DCcAIS

On 23 December 1998, the Court of Appeals 1 1 sustained the trial court, nding that
petitioner's own admissions, as contained in her answer, show that her counterclaim is
merely permissive. The relevant portion of the appellate court's decision 1 2 is quoted
herewith —
Contrary to the protestations of appellant, mere reading of the allegations
in the answer a quo will readily show that her counterclaim can in no way be
compulsory. Take note of the following numbered paragraphs in her answer:
"(14) That, indeed, FGU's cause of action which is not supported
by any document other than the self-serving 'Statement of Account' dated
March 28,1988 . . .

(15) That it should be noted that the cause of action of FGU is

not the enforcement of the Special Agent's Contract but the alleged cash
accountabilities which are not based on written agreement . . . .
xxx xxx xxx

(19) . . . A careful analysis of FGU's three-page complaint will

show that its cause of action is not for speci c performance or
enforcement of the Special Agent's Contract rather, it is for the payment of
the alleged cash accountabilities incurred by defendant during the period
form [sic] 1975 to 1986 which claim is executory and has not been rati ed.
It is the established rule that unenforceable contracts, like this purported
money claim of FGU, cannot be sued upon or enforced unless rati ed, thus
it is as if they have no effect. . . . ."
To support the heading "Compulsory Counterclaim" in her answer and give
the impression that the counterclaim is compulsory appellant alleged that "FGU
has unjusti ably failed to remit to defendant despite repeated demands in gross
violation of their Special Agent's Contract . . . ." The reference to said contract was
included purposely to mislead. While on one hand appellant alleged that
appellee's cause of action had nothing to do with the Special Agent's Contract, on
the other hand, she claim that FGU violated said contract which gives rise of [sic]
her cause of action. Clearly, appellants cash accountabilities cannot be the
offshoot of appellee's alleged violation of the aforesaid contract.

On 19 May 1999, the appellate court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration,
1 3 giving rise to the present petition.
Before going into the substantive issues, the Court shall rst dispose of some
procedural matters raised by the parties. Petitioner claims that respondent is estopped
from questioning her non-payment of docket fees because it did not raise this particular
issue when it led its rst motion — the "Motion to Strike out Answer With Compulsory
Counterclaim And To Declare Defendant In Default" — with the trial court; rather, it was only
nine months after receiving petitioner's answer that respondent assailed the trial court's
lack of jurisdiction over petitioner's counterclaims based on the latter's failure to pay
docket fees. 1 4 Petitioner's position is unmeritorious. Estoppel by laches arises from the
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 negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert
it. 1 5 In the case at bar, respondent cannot be considered as estopped from assailing the
trial court's jurisdiction over petitioner's counterclaim since this issue was raised by
respondent with the trial court itself — the body where the action is pending — even before
the presentation of any evidence by the parties and de nitely, way before any judgment
could be rendered by the trial court. DaTEIc

Meanwhile, respondent questions the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the
appeal filed by petitioner from the 18 September 1990 and 28 February 1991 orders of the
trial court. It is signi cant to note that this objection to the appellate court's jurisdiction is
raised for the rst time before this Court; respondent never having raised this issue before
the appellate court. Although the lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage
of the action, a party may be estopped from raising such questions if he has actively taken
part in the very proceedings which he questions, belatedly objecting to the court's
jurisdiction in the event that the judgment or order subsequently rendered is adverse to
him. 1 6 In this case, respondent actively took part in the proceedings before the Court of
Appeals by ling its appellee's brief with the same. 1 7 Its participation, when taken
together with its failure to object to the appellate court's jurisdiction during the entire
duration of the proceedings before such court, demonstrates a willingness to abide by the
resolution of the case by such tribunal and accordingly, respondent is now most decidedly
estopped from objecting to the Court of Appeals' assumption of jurisdiction over
petitioner's appeal. 1 8
The basic issue for resolution in this case is whether or not the counterclaim of
petitioner is compulsory or permissive in nature. A compulsory counterclaim is one which,
being cognizable by the regular courts of justice, arises out of or is connected with the
transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing party's claim
and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court
cannot acquire jurisdiction. 1 9
In Valencia v. Court of Appeals, 2 0 this Court capsulized the criteria or tests that may
be used in determining whether a counterclaim is compulsory or permissive, summarized
as follows:
1. Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and counterclaim
largely the same?
2. Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant's claim
absent the compulsory counterclaim rule?
3. Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff's
claim as well as defendant's counterclaim?
4. Is there any logical relation between the claim and the
counterclaim?

Another test, applied in the more recent case of Quintanilla v. Court of Appeals, 2 1 is the
"compelling test of compulsoriness" which requires "a logical relationship between the
claim and counterclaim, that is, where conducting separate trials of the respective
claims of the parties would entail a substantial duplication of effort and time by the
parties and the court."
As contained in her answer, petitioner's counterclaims are as follows:
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 (20) That defendant incorporates and repleads by reference all the
foregoing allegations as may be material to her Counterclaim against FGU.
(21) That FGU is liable to pay the following just, valid and legitimate
claims of defendant:
(a) the sum of at least P104,893.45 plus maximum interest
thereon representing, among others, direct commissions, pro t
commissions and contingent bonuses legally due to defendant; and
(b) the minimum amount of P500,000.00 plus the maximum
allowable interest representing defendant's accumulated premium reserve
for 1985 and previous years,

which FGU has unjusti ably failed to remit to defendant despite repeated
demands in gross violation of their Special Agent's Contract and in contravention
of the principle of law that "every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith."

(22) That as a result of the ling of this patently baseless, malicious

and unjusti ed Complaint, and FGU's unlawful, illegal and vindictive termination
of their Special Agent's Contract, defendant was unnecessarily dragged into this
litigation and to defense [sic] her side and assert her rights and claims against
FGU, she was compelled to hire the services of counsel with whom she agreed to
pay the amount of P30,000.00 as and for attorney's fees and stands to incur
litigation expenses in the amount estimated to at least P20,000.00 and for which
FGU should be assessed and made liable to pay defendant. IEDHAT

(23) That considering further the malicious and unwarranted action of

defendant in ling this grossly unfounded action, defendant has suffered and
continues to suffer from serious anxiety, mental anguish, fright and humiliation.
In addition to this, defendant's name, good reputation and business standing in
the insurance business as well as in the community have been besmirched and
for which FGU should be adjudged and made liable to pay moral damages to
defendant in the amount of P300,000.00 as minimum.
(24) That in order to discourage the ling of groundless and malicious
suits like FGU's Complaint, and by way of serving [as] an example for the public
good, FGU should be penalized and assessed exemplary damages in the sum of
P100,000.00 or such amount as the Honorable Court may deem warranted under
the circumstances. 2 2

Tested against the abovementioned standards, petitioner's counterclaim for

commissions, bonuses, and accumulated premium reserves is merely permissive. The
evidence required to prove petitioner's claims differs from that needed to establish
respondent's demands for the recovery of cash accountabilities from petitioner, such as
cash advances and costs of premiums. The recovery of respondent's claims is not
contingent or dependent upon establishing petitioner's counterclaim, such that conducting
separate trials will not result in the substantial duplication of the time and effort of the
court and the parties. One would search the records in vain for a logical connection
between the parties' claims. This conclusion is further reinforced by petitioner's own
admissions since she declared in her answer that respondent's cause of action, unlike her
own, was not based upon the Special Agent's Contract. 2 3 However, petitioner's claims for
damages, allegedly suffered as a result of the ling by respondent of its complaint, are
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 compulsory. 2 4
There is no need for petitioner to pay docket fees for her compulsory counterclaim.
25 On the other hand, in order for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over her permissive
counterclaim, petitioner is bound to pay the prescribed docket fees. 2 6 The rule on the
payment of ling fees has been laid down by the Court in the case of Sun Insurance O ce,
Ltd. v. Hon. Maximiano Asuncion 2 7
1. It is not simply the ling of the complaint or appropriate initiatory
pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with
jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the ling of the
initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court
may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party

claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered led until and unless
the ling fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may allow payment of said fee
within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.

3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the ling
of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed ling fee but,
subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not speci ed in the pleading, or if
speci ed the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional
ling fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the
responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said
lien and assess and collect the additional fee.

The above mentioned ruling in Sun Insurance has been reiterated in the recent case
of Suson v. Court of Appeals. 2 8 In Suson, the Court explained that although the payment of
the prescribed docket fees is a jurisdictional requirement, its non-payment does not result
in the automatic dismissal of the case provided the docket fees are paid within the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. Coming now to the case at bar, it has not
been alleged by respondent and there is nothing in the records to show that petitioner has
attempted to evade the payment of the proper docket fees for her permissive
counterclaim. As a matter of fact, after respondent led its motion to dismiss petitioner's
counterclaim based on her failure to pay docket fees, petitioner immediately led a motion
with the trial court, asking it to declare her counterclaim as compulsory in nature and
therefore exempt from docket fees and, in addition, to declare that respondent was in
default for its failure to answer her counterclaim. 2 9 However, the trial court dismissed
petitioner's counterclaim. Pursuant to this Court's ruling in Sun Insurance, the trial court
should have instead given petitioner a reasonable time, but in no case beyond the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period, to pay the ling fees for her permissive
counterclaim.
Petitioner asserts that the trial court should have declared respondent in default for
having failed to answer her counterclaim. 3 0 Insofar as the permissive counterclaim of
petitioner is concerned, there is obviously no need to le an answer until petitioner has
paid the prescribed docket fees for only then shall the court acquire jurisdiction over such
claim. 3 1 Meanwhile, the compulsory counterclaim of petitioner for damages based on the
ling by respondent of an allegedly unfounded and malicious suit need not be answered
since it is inseparable from the claims of respondent. If respondent were to answer the
compulsory counterclaim of petitioner, it would merely result in the former pleading the
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 same facts raised in its complaint. 3 2
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 23
December 1998 and its 19 May 1999 Resolution are hereby MODIFIED. The compulsory
counterclaim of petitioner for damages led in Civil Case No. 89-3816 is ordered
REINSTATED. Meanwhile, the Regional Trial Court of Makati (Branch 134) is ordered to
require petitioner to pay the prescribed docket fees for her permissive counterclaim
(direct commissions, pro t commissions, contingent bonuses and accumulated premium
reserves), after ascertaining that the applicable prescriptive period has not yet set in. 3 3
SO ORDERED. TCDHaE

Melo, Vitug, Panganiban and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1. Branch 134.
2. Docketed as Civil Case No. 89-3816.
3. Rollo, 42-44.
4. Ibid., 53-63.
5. RTC Records, 37-39.
6. Ibid., 46, 93.
7. Ibid., 96-102.
8. Ibid., 110-125.
9. Judge Ignacio M. Capulong
10. Rollo, 105.
11. Fourth Division, composed of Justices Jesus M. Elbinias, ponente and Chairman;
Eugenio S. Labitoria; and Marina L. Buzon.
12. Rollo, 36-39.
13. Ibid., 41.
14. Ibid., 332.
15. Philippine National Construction Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,
307 SCRA 218 (1999).

16. National Steel Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 302 SCRA 522 (1999).
17. CA Records, 88-115.
18. ABS-CBN Supervisors Employees Union Members v. ABS-CBN Broadcasting
Corporation, 304 SCRA 489. See also Stilianopulos v. City of Legaspi, 316 SCRA 523
(1999); Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 224 SCRA 477 (1993).

19. Rule 6, section 7; BA Finance v. Co, 224 SCRA 163 (1993); Javier v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 171 SCRA 609 (1989).
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 20. 263 SCRA 275 (1996).
21. 279 SCRA 397 (1997).
22. Rollo, 61-62.
23. Ibid., 58-59, 60.
24. Santo Tomas University Hospital v. Surla, 294 SCRA 382 (1998); Intestate Estate of
Amado B. Dalisay v. Marasigan, 257 SCRA 509 (1996).
25. Quintanilla v. Court of Appeals, supra.
26. Suson v. Court of Appeals, 278 SCRA 284 (1997).
27. 170 SCRA 274 (1989).
28. Supra. See also Cabaero v. Cantos, 271 SCRA 391 (1997).
29. RTC Records, 110-125.

30. Rollo, 342-343.

31. Gegare v. Court of Appeals, 297 SCRA 587 (1998).
32. Ballecer v. Bernardo, 18 SCRA 291(1966); Navarro v. Bello, 102 Phil 1019 (1958).
33. Suson v. Court of Appeals, supra.

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