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CALIMUTAN V.

PEOPLE

Lesson: Proof beyond reasonable doubt, Defense of Stranger, Proximate Cause, intentional felonies
and culpable felonies

Laws Applicable: Art. 3, Art. 4, Par. 1

FACTS:
 February 4, 1996 around 10 am: Cantre and witness Sañano, together with two other
companions, had a drinking spree at a videoke bar but as they were headed home, they
crossed paths with Calimutan and Michael Bulalacao.
 Cantre, 26 years old and 5 ft. 9 inches, had a grudge against Bulalacao, a 15 year-old
boy of 5ft. for suspecting that he threw stones at the his house on a previous night so he
punched him
 Seeking to protect Bulalacao and to stop Cantre, Calimutan picked a stone, as big as a
man’s fist and hitting Cantre at the left side of his back not noticing that Bulalacao was
already able to ran away.
o Cantre stopped for a moment and held his back and Calimutan desisted from any
other act of violence
 Witness Sañano then brought Cantre home where he complained of backache and also
of stomach ache and was unable to eat
 By night time, he felt cold then warm then he was sweating profusely and his entire body
felt numb
o Having no vehicle, they could not bring him to a doctor so his mother just continue
to wipe him with a piece of cloth and brought him some food when he asked.
o After eating a little, he vomited.
o Shortly after complaining again of his backache and stomach ache, he died.
 The Post-Mortem Examination Report and Certification of Death, issued and signed by
Dr. Ulanday, stated that the cause of death of victim Cantre was cardio-respiratory arrest
due to suspected food poisoning
 With the help of the Lingkod Bayan-Circulo de Abogadas of the ABS-CBN Foundation,
an autopsy was done by Dr. Ronaldo B. Mendez which showed that there was internal
hemorrhage and massive accumulation of blood in his abdominal cavity due to his
lacerated spleen caused by a blunt object like a stone.
 RTC issued a warrant of arrest and during arraignment Calimutan pleaded not guilty to
the crime of homicide
 RTC: Essentially adopting the prosecution’s account of the incident, held that Calimutan
was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide with a penalty of imprisonment from 8
years of Prision Mayor as minimum, to 12 years and 1 day of Reclusion Temporal as
maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of Philip Cantre the sum of P50,000 as
compensatory damages and the sum of P50,000 as moral damages
o NOT defense of stranger , because after the boxing Bulalacao, he was able to run
thereby the unlawful aggression by Cantre ceased
o The act of throwing a stone from behind which hit the victim at his back on the left
side was a treacherous
o criminally liable for all the direct and natural consequences of this unlawful act
even if the ultimate result had not been intended
 CA: Affirmed RTC
 Calimutan filed a petition for review on certiorari contending that the dissimilar findings
on the cause of death constituted reasonable doubt
ISSUE: W/N he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide

HELD: NO. MODIFIED Calimutan is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide, under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, and is accordingly
sentenced to imprisonment for a minimum period of 4 months of arresto mayor to a maximum period
of two years and one day of prision correccional. Petitioner Calimutan is further ORDERED to pay
the heirs of the victim Cantre the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the latter’s death and
P50,000.00 as moral damages

 Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires only a moral certainty or that degree of proof
which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind (NOT absolute certainty and the
exclusion of all possibility of error)
o Dr. Mendez’s testimony as an expert witness is evidence, and although it does not
necessarily bind the courts, it is accorded great weight and probative value
 may sufficiently establish the causal relationship between the stone thrown
by the Calimutan and the lacerated spleen of the Cantre which resulted in
the latter’s death
 Proximate cause - cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and WITHOUT which the result would
NOT have occurred
o Prosecution was able to establish that the proximate cause of the death of the
Cantre was the stone thrown at him by petitioner Calimutan.
 Comparing the limited autopsy conducted by Dr. Ulanday and her unconfirmed
suspicion of food poisoning of the victim Cantre, as opposed to the exhaustive autopsy
performed by Dr. Mendez and his definitive finding of a ruptured spleen as the cause of
death, then the latter, without doubt, deserves to be given credence by the courts
 Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code classifies felonies according to the means by which
they are committed, in particular:
o (1) intentional felonies - existence of malicious intent
 act is performed with deliberate intent (with malice)
o (2) culpable felonies - absence of malicious intent
 act or omission of the offender is NOT malicious
 the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or
lack of skill
 Absence of intent, Calimutan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the culpable felony of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
o Reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to
do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of
precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act,
taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence,
physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and

MANUEL V. PEOPLE

Lesson: Felony, Bigamy, Judicial Declaration of Presumptive Death, malice, good faith as a valid
defense
· Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea

Laws Applicable: Art. 3 par 2 RPC, Art. 349 RPC, Art. 41 FC

FACTS:
· July 28, 1975: Eduardo married Rubylus Gaña before Msgr. Feliciano Santos in Makati
o Rubylus was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned
o Eduardo only visited 3 times and never saw her again
· January 1996: Eduardo met Tina B. Gandalera, 21 year old computer secretarial
student, in Dagupan City while she looked for a friend during her 2 days stay
· Later, Eduardo visited Tina, they went to a motel together and he proposed marriage
and introduced her to his parents who assures that he is single
· April 22, 1996: Eduardo married Tina before Judge Antonio C. Reyes, the Presiding
Judge of the RTC of Baguio City and they were able to build a home after
· 1999: Eduardo only visited their home twice or thrice a year and whenever jobless Tina
would ask for money, he would slap her
· January 2001: Eduardo packed his things and left and stopped giving financial support
· August 2001: Tina through inquiries from the National Statistics Office (NSO) in Manila
and was embarrassed and humiliated to learn that Eduardo was previously married
· Eduardo claimed that he did NOT know that he had to go to court to seek for the
nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina
· RTC: Eduardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy and sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of from 6 years and 10 months, as minimum, to 10 years, as
maximum and P200,000.00 by way of moral damages, plus costs of suit
o Eduardo’s belief, that his first marriage had been dissolved because of his first
wife’s 20-year absence, even if true, did not exculpate him from liability for
bigamy
· Eduardo appealed to the CA contending that he did so in good faith and without any
malicious intent whereas under Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, there must be
malice for one to be criminally liable for a felony
· CA: affirming the decision of the RTC stating that Article 41 of the Family Code should
apply that there should have been a judicial declaration of Gaña’s presumptive death as
the absent spouse and modified minimum to 2 years and four months

ISSUE: W/N Eduardo is guilty of Bigamy, a felony by dolo (deceit).

HELD: YES. petition is DENIED. CA affirmed

· Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who
shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been
legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
o The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to preserve and ensure the
juridical tie of marriage established by law.
o Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code has made the dissolution of marriage
dependent not only upon the personal belief of parties, but upon certain objective
facts easily capable of accurate judicial cognizance, namely, a judgment of the
presumptive death of the absent spouse
· For the accused to be held guilty of bigamy, the prosecution is burdened to prove the
felony:
o (a) he/she has been legally married; and
o (b) he/she contracts a subsequent marriage without the former marriage having
been lawfully dissolved.
§ The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or
subsequent marriage
· Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is deceit when the
act is performed with deliberate intent
o Malice -a mental state or condition prompting the doing of an overt act WITHOUT
legal excuse or justification from which another suffers injury
o When the act or omission defined by law as a felony is proved to have been done
or committed by the accused, the law presumes it to have been intentional
o For one to be criminally liable for a felony by dolo, there must be a confluence of
both an evil act and an evil intent.
§ Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea
· GR: mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a
felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal intent.
· EX: ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the
law.
o Ignorantia legis neminem excusat
· burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he married he was of the well-
grounded belief that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for
more than 20 years since 1975
o failed to discharge his burden since no judicial declaration as proof
· Article 41 of the Family Code amended the rules on presumptive death on Articles 390
and 391 of the Civil Code which states that before the spouse present may contract a
subsequent marriage, he or she must institute summary proceedings for the declaration
of the presumptive death of the absentee spouse, without prejudice to the effect of the
reappearance of the absentee spouse.
· moral damages may be awarded under Article 2219 in relation to Articles 19, 20 and 21
of the Civil Code for being against public policy as they undermine and subvert the family
as a social institution, good morals and the interest and general welfare of society

PEOPLE V. GONZALES

TOPIC:

“Act” as used in Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code; There must be shown an “act”
committed by appellant which would have inflicted any harm to the body of the
victim that produced his death.

While the prosecution accuses and the two lower courts both found that the appellant
has committed a felony in the killing of Lloyd, there was however, lack of proof as
to what act was performed by the appellant.

It has been said that “act” as used in Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, must be
understood as “any bodily movement tending to produce some effect in the external
world.”
In this instance, there must be therefore be shown an “act” committed by the
appellant which would have inflicted any harm to the body of the victim that
produced his death.

Yet, even Huntoria admitted quite candidly that he did not see who stabbed or
hacked the victim. Thus, this principal witness did not say, because he could not,
whether the appellant indeed hacked or stabbed the victim.

CASE:
DOCKET No:
FACTS:

This lack of specificity then makes the case fall short of the test laid down by Article
3 of the Revised Penal Code previously discussed.

People v. Custodio Gonzales


G.R. 80762, March 19, 1990

In a previous decision in the Regional Trial Court, the Court found the accused-appellants
Gonzales et al. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as defined under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code.

Through their counsel, all the accused filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s decision.
However, during the pendency of appeal, all accused-appellants except Custodio Gonzales Sr.
withdrew their appeal and chose instead to pursue their respective applications for parole before the
then Ministry now Department of Justice Parole Division.
Thus, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision on Gonzales’ appeal. It modified the appealed
decision in that the lone appellant was sentenced to reclusion perpetua and indemnification of the heirs
of Lloyd in the amount of P30,000.00.
The antecedent facts show that:

At around 9pm on February 1981, the barangay captain of Barangay Tipacla Iloilo was awakened
from his sleep by the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales. Augusto informed Paja that his wife had
just killed their landlord Lloyd Penacerrada and thus would like to surrender to the authorities. Seeing
Augusto still holding the knife allegedly used in the killing and Fausta with her dress smeared in blood,
Paja immediately ordered his nephew to take the spouses to the police authorities at their municipal
hall.
Thus, an investigation was made behind the killing, and two days after the said incident, Augusto
appeared before the police station and voluntarily surrendered for detention and protective custody for
“having been involved” in the killing of Lloyd. He requested that he be taken in the same headquarters
where his wife Fausta was detained.
During arraignment, the spouses entered a plea of ‘not guilty’. Before trial however, Huntoria,
who claimed to have witnessed the killing, presented himself to Nanie Penacerrada—the victim’s
widow, and volunteered to testify for the prosecution.
***

A reinvestigation was therefore conducted, and the prosecution’s case rested on Huntoria’s
alleged eyewitness account of the incident, who alleges to have seen the incident.

The Court of Appeals affirmed Huntoria’s testimony and found lone accused-appellant Custodio
Gonzales guilty, who, among all the accused-appellants, did not seek for parole before the Department
of Justice.
***

ISSUE:

On appeal, the issue raised in this case was whether or not Custodio Gonzales is guilty of
murder, based on Hustoria’s account where the prosecution’s case rested.

COURT RULING:

The Supreme Court found that the prosecution’s stand is insufficient to convict Custodio
Gonzales guilty of the crime charged.
1. The investigation conducted by the police authorities leave much to be desired. During
investigation, there were conflicts as to where the scene of the crime was. While the sketch
indicated are the alleged various blood stains and their locations relative to the scenes of the
crime, there was however no indication as to their quantity. Considering there were two
versions where the killing was carried out, the extent of blood stains found would have
provided a definite clue as to which version was more credible.

2. The police also failed to state the reason of Augusto Gonzales’ surrender. Further, Augusto
never mentioned the participation of other persons in the killing of the victim.

3. Furthermore, the autopsy report would show that the killing would have been caused by two
or more bladed instrument, but opined that one bladed instrument is still possible. And insofar
as Dr. Rojas’ testimony was concerned, while Huntoria admitted that he saw six persons
taking turns in killing the victim, he however could not determine who among the six accused
did the stabbing and what particular weapon was used.

Considering the abovesaid facts, Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides how criminal
liability is incurred:

a.) By any person committing a felony (delitos) although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended,
b.) By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were
it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishments or on account of the employment
of inadequate or ineffectual means.

Further, Article 3 defines how felony is committed—which is either by means of deceit (dolo) or
by means of fault (culpa). Thus there is deceit when the act performed is by deliberate intent, while
there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of
skill.

In this case, while the prosecution accuses and the two lower courts both found that the appellant
has committed felony in Lloyd’s death, there is paucity of proof as to what act was performed by the
appellant.
Yet, Huntoria, as earlier emphasized, admitted candidly that he failed to see who stabbed or
hacked the victim. In fact, he does not even know what specific act was performed in the killing. This
lack of specificity then makes the case fall short of the test laid down by Article 3 of the Revised Penal
Code.

Moreover, Huntoria’s credibility as witness is tarnished by the fact that he only came out eight
months since he allegedly saw the incident. He also failed to explain satisfactorily the reason for his
long delay in revealing what he allegedly witnessed.

YAPYUCO V. SB

DIEGO V. CASTILLO
Lessons Applicable: malice, bigamy

Laws Applicable: Article 204[7] RPC,

FACTS:
· January 9, 1965: Crescencia Escoto contracted marriage with Jorge de Perio, Jr., both
Filipinos, solemnized before then Mayor Liberato Reyna of Dagupan City
· February 15, 1978: Jorge filed a Decree of Divorce in Texas
· June 4, 1987: Crescencia Escoto using the name Lucena Escoto married Manuel P.
Diego before the Rev. Fr. Godoy, parish priest of Dagupan City
· The sister of Manuel P. Diego filed a criminal case of bigamy against Escoto
· RTC: Acquittal since state failed to prove guilt beyond whisper of a doubt and gave
credence to the defense of the accused that she acted without any malicious intent for
believing in good faith that her marriage was already annulled by a foreign judgment
· An administrative case is filed against Judge Silverio Q. Castillo for Knowingly rendering
an unjust judgment under Article 204[7] of the Revised Penal Code

ISSUE: W/N Castillo should be liable against Article 204[7] of the Revised Penal Code

HELD: NO. Regional Trial Court Judge Silverio Q. Castillo is FINED P10,000 with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely
· The law requires that
o (a) the offender is a judge;
o (b) he renders a judgment in a case submitted to him for decision;
o (c) the judgment is unjust;
o (d) he knew that said judgment is unjust
· even assuming that a judge erred in acquitting an accused, he still cannot be
administratively charged lacking the element of bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose
· As a matter of public policy then, the acts of a judge in his official capacity are not
subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous.
· Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations are
sufficient defenses in which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge.
· error committed by respondent Judge being gross and patent, the same constitutes
ignorance of the law of a nature sufficient to warrant disciplinary action

US V. AH CHONG
The United States, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Ah Chong, defendant-appellant.

En Banc

Carson, March 19, 1910

Topic: Mental element (Mens rea) - Deliberate intent (Dolo) - Mistake of fact

Facts:

The defendant Ah Chong was a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort McKinley, Rizal Province
Pascual Gualberto, deceased, works at the same place as a house boy or muchacho
"Officers' quarters, No. 27" was a detached house some 40 meters from the nearest building
No one slept in the house except the two servants who jointly occupied a small room toward the rear of
the building, the door of which opened upon a narrow porch running along the side of the building
This porch was covered by a heavy growth of vines for its entire length and height
The door of the room was not furnished with a permanent bolt or lock; the occupants, as a measure of
security, had attached a small hook or catch on the inside of the door, and were in the habit of
reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of fastening the door by placing against it a chair
On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10:00 pm, the defendant was suddenly awakened by some
trying to force open the door of the room
He called out twice, "Who is there?"
He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed open by
someone bent upon forcing his way into the room
The defendant warned the intruder "If you enter the room, I will kill you."
Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at the
intruder (when he entered the room) who turned out to be his roommate Pascual
Pascual ran out upon the porch heavily wounded
Recognizing Pascual, the defendant called to his employers who slept in the next house and ran back to
his room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds
Pascual died from the effects of the wound the following day
The roommates appear to have been in friendly and amicable terms prior to the incident, and had an
understanding that when either returned at night, he should knock that the door and acquaint his
companion with his identity
The defendant alleges that he kept the knife under his pillow as personal protection because of
repeated robberies in Fort McKinley
Defendant admitted to stabbing his roommate, but said that he did it under the impression that Pascual
was "a ladron (thief)" because he forced open the door of their sleeping room, despite the defendant's
warnings
Defendant was found guilty by the trial court of simple homicide, with extenuating (mitigating)
circumstances, and sentenced to 6 years and 1 day presidio mayor, the minimum penalty prescribed by
law
Issue:
Whether or not the defendant can be held criminally responsible
Holding:
No.
Ratio:
By reason of a mistake as to the facts, the defendant did an act for which he would be exempt from
criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be (i.e. if Pascual was actually a thief, he will
not be criminally liable/responsible because it would be self-defense), but would constitute the crime of
homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts (i.e. if he knew that it was
actually Pascual, he would be guilty of homicide/assassination)
The defendant's ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith
"The act itself foes not make man guilty unless his intention were so"
The essence of the offense is the wrongful intent, without which it cannot exist
"The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him."
If one has reasonable cause to believe the existence of facts which will justify a killing, if without fault or
carelessness he does believe them, he is legally guiltless of the homicide
The defendant was doing no more than exercise his legitimate right of self-defense
He cannot be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into
his mistake as to the facts
RTC's decision is reversed. The defendant is acquitted.

HERNAN V. SB

OPHELIA HERNAN v. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN


GR No. 217874 December 5, 2017

TOPIC: Reopening of case, malversation of public funds

PONENTE: Peralta

FACTS:

Petitioner Hernan worked as a Supervising Fiscal Clerk at DOTC-CAR in Baguio City. By


virtue of his position, she was designated as cashier, disbursement and collection officer.

As such, petitioner received cash and other collections from customers and clients for the
payment of telegraphic transfers, toll fees, and special message fees. The collections she
received were deposited at the bank account of the DOTC at the Land Bankof the
Philippines (LBP), Baguio City Branch.

On December 17, 1996, a cash examination of accounts handled by Hernan was


conducted. It was found out that the deposit slipsdated September 19, 1996 and
November 29, 1996 bearing the amounts of P11,300.00 and P81,348.20, respectively, did
not bear a stamp receipt by LBP nor was it machine validated. Petitioner was then
informed that the two aforesaid remittances were not acknowledged by the bank. The
auditors then found that petitioner duly accounted for the P81,348.20 remittance but not
for the P11,300.00.

Accused-petitioner was charged with malversation of public funds with the amount of
P11,300.00. RTC found the accused guilty. Petitioner appealed to CA which affirmed her
conviction but modified the penalty imposed. Upon motion, however, the CA set aside its
decision on the finding that it has no appellatejurisdiction over the case.

Petitioner appealed the case to Sandiganbayan which affirmed RTC’s decision but
modified the penalty imposed. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was
denied in a Resolution dated August 31, 2010. On June 26, 2013, the Resolution denying
petitioner’s MR became final and executory.

On July 26, 2013, accused filed an Urgent Motion to Reopen the Case with Leave of Court
and with Prayer to Stay the Execution. Sandiganbayan denied the same and directed the
execution of the judgment of conviction.

Thereafter, petitioner filed her Petition for Reconsideration with Prayer for Recall of
Entry of Judgment in lieu of the Prayer for the Stay of Execution of Judgement on January
9, 2014 which was likewise denied.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of malversation
of public funds.
2. Whether or not the case may be reopened for further reception of evidence.
HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: YES.

The Court affirmed the finding of guilt of accused for the crime of malversation of
public funds.

The elements of malversation of public funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) are: (1) that the offender is a public officer; (2) that he had the custody or control
of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; (3) that those funds or property
were public funds or property for which he was accountable; and (4) that he appropriated,
took, misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted
another person to take them. This article establishes a presumption that when a public
officer fails to have duly forthcoming any public funds with which he is chargeable, upon
demand by any duly authorized officer, it shall be prima facie evidence that he has put
such missing funds to personal uses.

As duly found by the trial court, and affirmed by the Sandiganbayan, petitioner’s defense
that she, together with her supervisor Cecilia Paraiso, went to the LBP and handed the
subject P11,300.00 deposit to the teller Ngaosi and, thereafter, had no idea as to where
the money went failed to overcome the presumption of law.

For one, Paraiso was never presented to corroborate her version. For another, when
questioned about the subject deposit, not only did petitioner fail to make the same readily
available, she also could not satisfactorily explain its whereabouts. Indeed, in the crime
of malversation, all that is necessary for conviction is sufficient proof that the accountable
officer had received public funds, that she did not have them in her possession when
demand therefor was made, and that she could not satisfactorily explain her failure to do
so. Thus, even if it is assumed that it was somebody else who misappropriated
the said amount, petitioner may still be held liable for malversation.

SECOND ISSUE: NO, but the instant case was nevertheless reopened ONLY to modify
the penalty imposed in view of the enactment of an amendatory law favorable to the
accused.

The Court upheld Sandiganbayan’s ruling that the absence of the first requisite that
the reopening must be before the finality of a judgment of conviction already cripples the
Motion to Reopen the Case. The records of the case clearly reveal that the August 31, 2010
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration had
already become final and executory and, in fact, was already recorded in the Entry Book
of Judgments on June 26, 2013.

Requirements for reopening of the case (Section 24, Rule 119 of Rules of
Court)

1. The reopening must be before the finality of a judgment of conviction;


2. The order is issued by the judge on his own initiative or upon motion;
3. The order is issued only after a hearing is conducted;
4. The order intends to prevent a miscarriage of justice; and
5. The presentation of additional and/or further evidence should be terminated within thirty
days from the issuance of the order

However, the Court held that it is still necessary to reopen the instant case
and recall the Entry of Judgment dated June 26, 2013 of the Sandiganbayan,
not for further reception of evidence, however, as petitioner prays for, but in
order to modify the penalty imposed by said court.

The general rule is that a judgment that has acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is
meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the
court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. When, however, circumstances
transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable,
the Court may sit en banc and give due regard to such exceptional circumstance
warranting the relaxation of the doctrine of immutability.

To the Court, the recent passage of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10951 which accordingly
reduced the penalty applicable to the crime charged herein is an example of such
exceptional circumstance.

Pursuant to the aforequoted provision, therefore, we have here a novel situation wherein
the judgment convicting the accused, petitioner herein, has already become final and
executory and yet the penalty imposed thereon has been reduced by virtue of the passage
of said law. Because of this, not only must petitioner’s sentence be modified respecting
the settled rule on the retroactive effectivity of laws, the sentencing being favorable to the
accused, she may even apply for probation, as long as she does not possess any ground
for disqualification, in view of recent legislation on probation, or R.A. No. 10707.

Thus, in order to effectively avoid any injustice that petitioner may suffer as well as a
possible multiplicity of suits arising therefrom, the Court deems it proper to reopen the
instant case and recall the Entry of Judgment dated June 26, 2013 of the Sandiganbayan,
which imposed the penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum,
to eleven (11) years, six (6) months, and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor, as
maximum. Instead, since the amount involved herein is P11,300.00, which does not
exceed P40,000.00, the new penalty that should be imposed is prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods, which has a prison term of two (2) years, four (4) months,
and one (1) day, to six (6) years.

The Court also held that when exceptional circumstances exist, such as the
passage of the instant amendatory law imposing penalties more lenient and
favorable to the accused, the Court shall not hesitate to direct the reopening
of a final and immutable judgment, the objective of which is to correct not so
much the findings of guilt but the applicable penalties to be imposed.

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