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P.P.

Plaintiff-Appellee, versus JERRY SANTOS y MACOL and RAMON CATOC y


PICAYO, Accused-Appellants. 2008 Jun 26

For the successful prosecution of offenses involving the illegal sale of drugs
under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, the following elements must be proven: (1)
the identity of the buyer and seller, object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing
sold and the payment therefor.[51] What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of
dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti.[52]

In the present case, all the elements of the crime have been sufficiently
established. The prosecution witnesses PO3 Luna and SPO3 Matias consistently testified that
a buy-bust operation did indeed take place, and the shabu subject of the sale was presented
and duly identified in open court. PO3 Luna, being the poseur-buyer, positively identified
appellants Santos and Catoc as the persons who sold the sachet containing a white crystalline
substance,[53] which was later confirmed by a chemical analysis thereof to be shabu.[54]

The claim of appellants that their warrantless arrests were illegal also lacks merit.
The Court notes that nowhere in the records did we find any objection by appellants to the
irregularity of their arrests prior to their arraignment. We have held in a number of cases that
the illegal arrest of an accused is not a sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment
rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error; such arrest does not negate
the validity of the conviction of the accused. It is much too late in the day to complain about
the warrantless arrest after a valid information has been filed, the accused arraigned, trial
commenced and completed, and a judgment of conviction rendered against him.[68]

Nevertheless, our ruling in People v. Cabugatan [69] provides that:

The rule is settled that an arrest made after an entrapment does not require a
warrant inasmuch as it is considered a valid warrantless arrest pursuant to Rule 113, Section
5(a) of the Rules of Court, which states:

SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.

There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement


concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. The same degree of proof
necessary to prove the crime is required to support a finding of criminal conspiracy. Direct
proof, however, is not essential to show conspiracy.[72] It need not be shown that the parties
actually came together and agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue a common
design. Proof of concerted action before, during and after the crime, which demonstrates their
unity of design and objective is sufficient.[73] As correctly held by the trial court, the act of
appellant Santos in receiving the marked money from PO3 Luna and handing the same to
appellant Catoc, who in turn gave a sachet containing shabu to appellant Santos to give the
policeman, unmistakably revealed a common purpose and a community of interest indicative
of a conspiracy between the appellants.[74]
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P.P., Plaintiff-Appellee, versus NORBERTO DEL MONTE y GAPAY @ OBET, Accused-
Appellant. Apr 23, 2008

Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires
the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without such
objection he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal.

The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs are (1) the identity
of the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold
and the payment therefor.[24] What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous
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drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation
in court of evidence of corpus delicti.[25]
Frame-up, like alibi, is generally viewed with caution by this Court, because it is easy to
contrive and difficult to disprove. Moreover, it is a common and standard line of defense in
prosecutions of violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.[29] For this claim to prosper, the
defense must adduce clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that
government officials have performed their duties in a regular and proper manner.[30] This,
appellant failed to do. The presumption remained unrebutted because the defense failed to
present clear and convincing evidence that the police officers did not properly perform their
duty or that they were inspired by an improper motive.

SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered


Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take
charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following
manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs, shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in
the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

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P.P., Appellee, versus ANSON ONG a.k.a. ALLAN CO, Appellant.2008 Feb 6

In determining the credibility of prosecution witnesses regarding the conduct of buy-bust


operation, the “objective test,” as laid down in People v. Doria,[28] is utilized. It has been
held that it is the duty of the prosecution to present a complete picture detailing the buy-bust
operation—from the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to
purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration, until the consummation of the sale by
the delivery of the illegal subject of sale. The manner by which the initial contact was made,
the offer to purchase the drug, the payment of the buy-bust money, and the delivery of the
illegal drug must be the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding citizens
are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense.
The Constitution mandates that an accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. While appellant’s defense engenders suspicion
that he probably perpetrated the crime charged, it is not sufficient for a conviction that the
evidence establishe a strong suspicion or probability of guilt. It is the burden of the
prosecution to overcome the presumption of innocence by presenting the quantum of evidence
required.
In the case at bar, the basis of acquittal is reasonable doubt, the evidence for the
prosecution not being sufficient to sustain and prove the guilt of appellants with moral certainty.
By reasonable doubt is not meant that which of possibility may arise but it is that doubt
engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability, after such an investigation,
to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt. An acquittal based on reasonable doubt will
prosper even though the appellants' innocence may be doubted, for a criminal conviction rests
on the strength of the evidence of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the evidence of
the defense.[57] Suffice it to say, a slightest doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused.
[58]

With the failure of the prosecution to present a complete picture of the buy-bust
operation, as highlighted by the disharmony and incoherence in the testimonies of its
witnesses, acquittal becomes ineluctable.
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P.P., Plaintiff-Appellee, versus MARILYN MIRANDA y RAMA,
Accused-Appellant.2007 Oct 2

From the foregoing, it is patently clear that the prosecution succeeded in establishing,
with moral certainty, all the elements of the illegal sale of shabu, to wit: (1) the identity of the
buyer and seller, object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment therefor.[25] The presence of these elements is sufficient to support appellant’s
finding of guilt and is not negated by the police’s failure to find any other contraband in her
house.

Moreover, appellant failed to present any plausible reason or ill motive on the part of the
arresting officers to falsely impute to her such a serious and unfounded charge.[26] From her
testimony, it can easily be discerned that she did not know any one of the members of the buy-
bust team who arrested her. She even referred to them as Mazo’s “companions.” This fact
supports the Court of Appeals’ holding that –

Then too, the rule is settled that the testimony of a law enforcer carries with it
the presumption of regularity in the performance of his official functions. When a police
officer has no motive for testifying falsely against the accused, courts are inclined to uphold the
presumption of regularity in the performance of his duty. Here, no evidence whatsoever was
presented which would suggest any improper motive on the part of PO1 Valenzuela. We must
accord great respect to and treat with finality the findings of the trial court on the matter of his
credibility.[27]
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P.P., Appellee, versus SANNY CABACABA y GAYOSO, Appellant.2008 Jul 9

Briefly stated, the issues for our resolution now are: (1) Was there a valid arrest on the
accused? and (2) Was the accused’s guilt proven beyond reasonable doubt?

Appellant argues that at the time of his arrest, he had not committed, was not
committing, and was not about to commit any crime. Hence, he contends that none of the
circumstances justifying an arrest without a warrant under Section 5[16] of Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court was present.[17]

Appellee for its part, points out that time and again, a buy-bust operation has been held
as a legitimate mode of apprehending drug pushers. Although appellant was previously under
surveillance, no search warrant was needed in this case since the buy-bust operation
conducted was an entrapment and not a search.[18]

We agree with the appellee. This Court has already ruled repeatedly that a buy-bust
operation is a form of entrapment which has repeatedly been accepted to be a valid means of
arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law.[19] An arrest made after entrapment does not
require a warrant inasmuch as it is considered a valid warrantless arrest pursuant to Rule 113,
Section 5(a), of the Rules of Court.[20]

Case law teaches that the defense of frame-up is frowned upon as it can easily be
concocted, even as it is commonly employed by the accused as a standard line of defense in
most prosecutions arising from violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. Unless there is clear
and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by some

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improper motive, or were not properly performing their duty, their testimonies with respect to
the buy-bust operation deserve full faith and credit. Without proof of motive to falsely impute
such a serious crime against appellant, as in this case, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty and the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses
shall prevail over his claim of having been framed. This teaching equally applies to the
accused-appellant’s allegation on extortion.

Moreover, in the prosecution of the offense for illegal sale of prohibited drugs, what is
essential is proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation
in court of the corpus delicti as evidence. It suffices to show that the accused is in possession
of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or a regulated drug; that such possession is
not authorized by law; and that the accused has freely and consciously possessed the
prohibited drug. Possession of dangerous drugs constitutes prima facie evidence of
knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of a
satisfactory explanation of such possession. Hence, the burden of evidence is shifted to the
accused to explain away the absence of knowledge or animus possidendi. This, the accused
herein, under the circumstances heretofore related, miserably failed to do.

Nor is it necessary to establish how the accused-appellant and the informant met, or
how the police officer was introduced to the accused-appellant. Drug dealers are known to sell
their goods even to strangers. They ply their wares [wherever] prospective customers are
found. They have indeed become increasingly daring and openly defiant of the law.

Indeed, in this case the police officers were able to prove the factuality of the transaction
between PO2 Ocampo and the accused-appellant, and they were moreover able to present in
court the substance seized from the latter which, after chemical examination, was found to
contain methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. PO2 Ocampo’s testimony was coherent,
straightforward and candid even under intense cross-examination by the defense counsel. It
bears the badges of truth, such that it is extremely difficult for a rational mind not to find it
credible.

The constitutional presumption of innocence can be accorded to the accused only in


the absence of evidence to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In the case at bench,
that constitutional presumption cannot be upheld, in the face of the overwhelming and
incontrovertible evidence for the prosecution irresistibly pointing to the conclusive culpability of
the accused-appellant.[28]

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