CHAPTERS

Analytic Epistemology

Introduction
Epistemology is the branch of philosophy concerned with the criteria of what
constitutes knowledge. The primary purpose of epistemological investigation is to
determine the legitimacy of any knowledge claim.
Epistemology presupposes metaphysics. No account of knowledge can
proceed without assuming that we already have some sample or example of it or of
the way the world works. Ifwe already know something, then we already have some
insight into reality. Depending upon what one believes the ultimate nature of reality
and the place of human beings within it to be, one will formulate a particular view
of what knowledge is. If epistemology presupposes metaphysics, then it cannot be
the function of epistemology to legitimate metaphysics. Rather, the role of the
epistemologist is to establish the consistency and coherence of one's epistemology
within one's metaphysics.
Just as we have identified three major but different metaphysical
orientations, so we shall identify three derivative epistemological orientations,
namely, Platonism, Aristotelianism, and Copernican ism. Given the different claims
about ultimate reality and the place of human beings within it, there will inevitably
be different accounts of knowledge. This chapter commences with a brief historical
overview of these competing epistemological accounts.
One of the values of a survey of this kind is that it will show the extent to
which analytic epistemology is part of an ongoing historical debate. More to the
point, we have argued that analytic philosophy is in large part informed by a version
of the Enlightenment Project. To the extent that it is, then it is a modem, secular,
truncated version of Aristotelianism. In order to understand significant parts of
analytic epistemology we shall show in what sense it evolved from and radically
altered the tradition of Aristotelian epistemology. Moreover, the previous chapter
identified special problems within analytic metaphysics, specifically the challenge
of presenting a coherent metaphysical vision without resorting to Hegel. Given the
relationship of epistemology to metaphysics, this chapter will show that the same
issue haunts epistemological discussions within analytic philosophy. Finally, it is
important to recognize wherein the alternative conceptions of epistemology differ
and what they have to offer in order to consider alternatives to analytic philosophy's
present landscape.

Classical Epistemology
Classical epistemology begins with a clear understanding of the intimate relationship
between metaphysics and epistemology. Despite differences, classical
epistemologists all agree that we have a direct grasp of reality. Therefore, classical
epistemology is largely focused on giving an account of error.

Platonism:
Plato was one of the first to formulate epistemological issues. The
background to his concern is his confrontation with the Sophists. The Sophists
N. Capaldi, The Enlightenment Project in the Analytic Conversation
© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1998
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denied the possibility of having objective knowledge about the world. In the moral
and social realm they went so far as to advocate a kind of cultural relativism, the
view that all norms are relative to time and place. They were led to conclude that no
norms are intrinsically superior to others. Protagoras had seemingly generalized this
to the thesis that "man is the measure of all things." Plato believed otherwise. He
believed that there were absolute and objective grounds for preferring some norms
to others.
Plato argued, first, that there is an ultimate and unchanging reality with a
permanent structure. If there is to be absolute and objective knowledge, then it must
be identical with this structure. Second, Plato believed that geometry (mathematics)
is an unquestionable example of this knowledge, and that geometry gave us a clear
example of what it meant to prove something, i.e., establish something as an
indisputable example of knowledge.
Platonism, as an epistemology, originated with Plato's choice of geometry
as his paradigm ofwha~ constitutes knowledge. What is geometry like as a form of
knowledge? It begins with definitions of key terms like 'point' and' line'. What is
peculiar about these definitions is that they are not empirical, that is they do not
define what we can imagine (picture in our mind). A "point," for example, has no
dimensions. We may draw a dot on a page, like the period at the end of this
sentence, and say that the dot "represents" the 'point'. But the dot is not itself a
point, no matter how small we draw it. We can conceive of a point, but conceiving
is not imagining (or picturing). So knowledge begins with concepts that are
conceivable but not experienceable. Sometimes this is described as an intuition.
With these intuitions we are able to construct axioms, that is, principles that cannot
be proved but are the starting points of all proofs. Once we formulate the axioms,
we are then able to derive (deduce, prove) a theorem. From this theorem we can
prove other theorems, etc.
There appear to be two different kinds of knowledge: first, the knowledge
that is proved or deduced from other knowledge; second, the knowledge that is
intuited and without which there would be no proof. Plato insisted that intuited
knowledge cannot be learned or acquired from experience. Before we can learn
anything from experience we must already possess some framework for interpreting
what we learn, and the framework cannot be learned or acquired the way we learn
from experience. Plato also insisted that intuited knowledge cannot be acquired by
proof, for otherwise we would have an infinite regress or a vicious circle. Finally,
there cannot be a criterion for distinguishing correct from incorrect intuitions for
such a criterion would either have to be proved (infinite regress or circle, again) or
itself be intuited.
There is a logical test that can be performed on an alleged first principle or
intuited truth in order to determine if it qualifies. The test is to try to conceive of the
opposite of that alleged first principle. If the opposite can be shown to be self-
contradictory, then we are secure in accepting the alleged first principle as an intuited
truth. Using a later technical terminology, the first principles that pass this test are
a priori true. To be a priori means two things: (a) non-empirical or independent of
experience; (b) the opposite is self-contradictory. Error is accounted for in a number
of ways. There is in Plato a doctrine of degrees of knowledge. But in the end, error