People v Audine (G.R. No.

168649)

FACTS:

Jose Alvizo Audine guilty of two (2) counts of rape committed against his fourteen-year old daughter, AAA and sentencing
him to suffer the capital punishment for each count. The information provide that: (1)That on or about the 24th day of
December 1999, in the City of Marikina, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, who is the father of the minor victim, by means of force, coercion and intimidation, with the use of small knife
which is a bladed weapon, and with lewd design or intent to cause or gratify his sexual desire upon complainant AAA, a
minor and fifteen (15) years old, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with said
complainant against her will and consent which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of said child
as a human being; (2) That on or about the 8th day of January 2000, in the City of Marikina, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, who is the father of the minor victim, by means of force,
coercion and intimidation, with the use of a small knife which is a bladed weapon, and with lewd design or intent to cause
or gratify his sexual desire upon complainant AAA, a minor and fifteen (15) years old, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with said complainant against her will and consent which debases,
degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of said child as a human being.

The Court of Appeals rendered its decision affirming the conviction made by the trial court of accused-appellant, together
with the imposition of the death penalty for each count of rape, but modified the awards of civil indemnity and damages

ISSUE:

WON the lower court erred in imposing of death penalty against the accused-appellant?

HELD:

Yes, the lower court erred in imposing of death penalty against the accused-appellant. The pertinent provisions of
the Revised Penal Code relative to the case on hand are Articles 266-A and 266-B, which read: Art. 266-A. Rape; When
and How Committed. – Rape is committed – 1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances: a) Through force, threat, or intimidation; Art. 266-B. Penalties. – The death penalty shall also be
imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances: 1) When the
victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.

For one to be convicted of qualified rape, at least one of the aggravating/qualifying circumstances mentioned in
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code must be alleged in the information and duly proved during the trial In the instant
case, since the special qualifying circumstances of the victim’s minority and her relationship with the offender have been
properly alleged in the informations and established during trial, the imposition of the death penalty for each count of rape
is justified. However, of Republic Act No. 9346 entitled, "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the
Philippines," the imposition of the supreme penalty of death has been prohibited. Pursuant to Section 2 thereof, the
penalty to be meted on accused-appellant shall be reclusion perpetua.

People v. Mondigo (G.R. No. 167954)

FACTS:

On September 27 1998, appellant, Damaso Delima (Damaso), Damaso’s son Delfin and three other unidentified
individuals were having a drinking spree in Ligas, Malolos, Bulacan. Anthony (damaso’s another son) joined the group. At
around 6:00 p.m., Mondigo, using a "jungle bolo," suddenly hacked Anthony on the head, causing him to fall to the ground
unconscious. Appellant next attacked Damaso. A witness who was in the vicinity, Lolita Lumagi, hearing shouts coming
from the scene of the crime, rushed to the area and there saw appellant repeatedly hacking Damaso who was lying on his
back, arms raised to ward off appellant’s blows. Damaso later died from the injuries he sustained. Anthony sustained
wound on his left temporal area.Appellant was charged before the RTC with Murder and Frustrated Murder. TheRTC
found appellant guilty of Murder for the killing of Damaso and Serious Physical Injuries for the hacking of Anthony,
mitigated by intoxication.

ISSUE:

Whether the trial court erred in giving credence of alternative circumstance of intoxication to mitigate the crime?
HELD:

The trial court erred in crediting appellant with the circumstance of intoxication as having mitigated his crimes because
"the stabbing incident ensued in the course of a drinking spree." For the alternative circumstance of intoxication to be
treated as a mitigating circumstance, the defense must show that the intoxication is not habitual, not subsequent to a plan
to commit a felony and the accused’s drunkenness affected his mental faculties. Here, the only proof on record on this
matter is appellant’s testimony that before Damaso, Anthony, and Delfin attacked him, he drank "about 3 to 4 bottles of
beer." The low alcohol content of beer, the quantity of such liquor appellant imbibed, and the absence of any independent
proof that appellant’s alcohol intake affected his mental faculties all negate the finding that appellant was intoxicated
enough at the time he committed the crimes to mitigate his liability.

People Vs Janjalani (G.R. No. 188314)

FACTS:

On Feb 14 2005, a bus was going from Navotas to Alabang. Two men got on the bus. Both seemed suspicious according
to Elmer Andales, the conductor. The two men alighted in Ayala Ave. and the bus exploded. After the explosion, the
spokesperson for abu sayyaff announced over radio that the explosion was a valentine’s gift. Accused Asali, member of
abu sayaff, gave a television interview, confessing that he had supplied the explosive devices for the 14 February 2005
bombing. The bus conductor identified the accused Baharan and Trinidad, and confirmed that they were the two men who
had entered the RRCG bus on the evening of 14 February. Asali testified that he had given accused Baharan and
Trinidad the TNT used in the bombing incident in Makati City. Accused contend that the testimony of Asali is inadmissible
pursuant to Sec. 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Members of the Abu Sayyaf Group namely Khaddafy Janjalani,
Gamal B. Baharan, Angelo Trinidad, Gappal Bannah Asali, Jainal Asali, Rohmat Abdurrohim a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky,
and other John and Jane Does were then charged with multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder. Only Baharan,
Trinidad, Asali, and Rohmat were arrested, while the other accused remain at-large.

After being discharged as state witness, accused Asali testified that while under training with the Abu Sayyaf in 2004,
Rohmat, a.k.a Abu Jackie or Zaky, and two other persons taught him how to make bombs and explosives.

ISSUE:

WON Asali’s testimony admissible?

HELD:

Yes. It is true that under the rule, statements made by a conspirator against a co-conspirator are admissible only
when made during the existence of the conspiracy. However, as the Court ruled in a case, if the declarant repeats the
statement in court, his extrajudicial confession becomes a judicial admission, making the testimony admissible as to both
conspirators.[27] Thus, in jurisprudence, the Court held the following: We must make a distinction between extrajudicial
and judicial confessions. An extrajudicial confession may be given in evidence against the confessant but not against his
co-accused as they are deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine him. A judicial confession is admissible against the
declarant’s co-accused since the latter are afforded opportunity to cross-examine the former. Section 30, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court applies only to extrajudicial acts or admissions and not to testimony at trial where the party adversely
affected has the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Mercene’s admission implicating his co-accused was given
on the witness stand. It is admissible in evidence against appellant Palijon. Moreover, where several accused are tried
together for the same offense, the testimony of a co-accused implicating his co-accused is competent evidence against
the latter.

The Court upholds the finding of guilt against Rohmat. Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code reads: Art. 17.
Principals. The following are considered principals: 1.Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act; 2.Those
who directly force or induce others to commit it; 3.Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act
without which it would not have been accomplished. Accused Rohmat is criminally responsible under the second
paragraph, or the provision on principal by inducement. The instructions and training he had given Asali on how to make
bombs coupled with their careful planning and persistent attempts to bomb different areas in Metro Manila and Rohmats
confirmation that Trinidad would be getting TNT from Asali as part of their mission prove the finding that Rohmats co-
inducement was the determining cause of the commission of the crime. Such command or advice [was] of such nature
that, without it, the crime would not have materialized. Further, the inducement was so influential in producing the criminal
act that without it, the act would not have been performed.

People v Dulay (G.R. No. 193854)

FACTS:

On 3 July 2005, AAA was introduced to the accused during the wake of a relative of AAA. Thereafter, the accused convinced
AAA to accompany her at a wake at GI San Dionisio, Paranaque City. However, before they went to the wake, they went to
look for the boyfriend of the accused. They went to Bulungan Fish Port were they found the boyfriend of the accused. They
proceeded to the kubuhan, located at the back of the Bulungan Fish Port. Upon arrival, the accused suddenly pulled AAA
inside a room where a man known only as “Speed” was waiting. AAA saw “Speed” give the accused some money, then the
latter left. “Speed” wielded a knife and tied AAA’s hands to the papag and raped her. AAA asked for appellant’s help when
she saw the latter peeping into the room while she was being raped, but appellant did not do so. After the rape, “Speed”
and appellant told AAA not to tell anyone what had happened or else they would get back at her. AAA, accompanied by her
sister and mother filed a complaint for Rape. The RTC rendered a decision finding the accused guilty as a co-principal by
indispensable cooperation for the crime of Rape.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused should be held liable as a co-principal for the crime of Rape

HELD:

No, in order to be considered as a principal by indispensable cooperation, one must participate in the criminal resolution, a
conspiracy or unity in criminal purpose and cooperation in the commission of the offense by performing another act without
which it would not have been accomplished. The Supreme Court held that the accused did not participate in the criminal
resolution of the crime of Rape but merely delivered AAA to “Speed”

However, the accused is still liable for violation of Section 5 (a), Article III of R.A. 7610 or a) Those who engage in or
promote, facilitate or induce child prostitution which include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) Acting as a procurer of
a child prostitute.