Tolentino vs.

Baylosis

Tolentino and Baylosis were opposing counsels in a civil case. It appears that Tolentino’s
clients died and he petitioned for attorney’s fees in the amount of P10,000.00. Baylosis
opposed the same where he stated that his clients are not to suffer for the death of Tolentino’s
clients for it is not their fault but rather “their cause of their death may be due to the will of
God, or due to the heavy expenses which they may have suffered from their leader and
counsel (Tolentino)”, that Tolentino is not entitled to a P10,000.00 attorneys fees because he
is not that competent. Baylosis went on to show that Tolentino has struggled to pass the bar
as he failed numerous times; that he has many losing cases; that he perspires a lot during
arguments in court; that his lowly stature as a lawyer only entitles him to a P500.00 attorneys
fees. He also said that Tolentino “must be certainly not of his usual mind, otherwise with his
old age, and long practice of law” when he made his allegations.
Tolentino then filed a libel case against Baylosis.
ISSUE: Whether or not the libel case should prosper.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court said that the statements where Baylosis showed that
Tolentino isn’t that competent as a lawyer is not libelous for they are privileged
communication. They are privileged because they were made in pertinence to the civil case
where they are opposing counsels.
But the statements where Baylosis said that the death of Tolentino’s cleinet “may be due to
the will of God, or due to the heavy expenses which they may have suffered from their leader
and counsel” and “must be certainly not of his usual mind, otherwise with his old age, and
long practice of law” do not fall within privileged communication for they were not pertinent to
the civil case. But still, Baylosis cannot be charged with libel because the court found out that
Tolentino did not come to court with clean hands as he himself resorted to libelous acts
against Baylosis.

Cruz vs. Atty.Cabrera

Facts:

Complainant alleges that he is a fourth year law student; since the latter part of 2001,
he instituted several actions against his neighbors; he appeared for and in his behalf in
his own cases; he met respondent who acted as the counsel of his neighbors; during a
hearing on January 14, 2002, in one case before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 112,
Pasay City, presided by Judge Caridad Cuerdo.

Respondent’s imputations were uncalled for and the latter’s act of compelling the
court to ask complainant whether he is a lawyer or not was intended to malign him
before the public, inasmuch as respondent knew that complainant is not a lawyer,
having appeared for and in his behalf as a party litigant in prior cases; respondent’s
imputations of complainant’s misrepresentation as a lawyer was patently with malice
to discredit his honor, with the intention to threaten him not to appear anymore in
cases respondent was handling; the manner, substance, tone of voice and how the
words “appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna!” were uttered were totally with the
intention to annoy, vex and humiliate, malign, ridicule, incriminate and discredit
complainant before the public.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent violated Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility

Whether or not complainant is not precluded from litigating personally his cases

Whether or not complainant is engaged in the practice of law

Ruling:

1. We hold that respondent’s outburst of “appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna”

does not amount to a violation of Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Such single outburst, though uncalled for, is not of such magnitude as
to warrant respondent’s suspension or reproof. It is but a product of impulsiveness or
the heat of the moment in the course of an argument between them. It has been said
that lawyers should not be held to too strict an account for words said in the heat of
the moment, because of chagrin at losing cases, and that the big way is for the court to
condone even contemptuous language.

2. Nonetheless, we remind respondent that complainant is not precluded from

litigating personally his cases. A party’s right to conduct litigation personally is
recognized by Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court: SEC. 34. By whom
litigation conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his
litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that
purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his
litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either
personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.

3. The practice of law, though impossible to define exactly, involves the exercise of a
profession or vocation usually for gain, mainly as attorney by acting in a
representative capacity and as counsel by rendering legal advise to others. Private
practice has been defined by this Court as follows:
x x x. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or
customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent
habitual exercise. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute [referring to
the prohibition for judges and other officials or employees of the superior courts or of
the Office of the Solicitor General from engaging in private practice] has been
interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one’s self out to the public, as a
lawyer and demanding payment for such services. x x x.

Clearly, in appearing for herself, complainant was not customarily or habitually

holding herself out to the public as a lawyer. Neither was she demanding payment for
such services. Hence, she cannot be said to be in the practice of law.

On the other hand, all lawyers should take heed that lawyers are licensed officers of
the courts who are empowered to appear, prosecute and defend; and upon whom
peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence.
Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain obligations. Mandated to maintain
the dignity of the legal profession, they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly.
Though a lawyer’s language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be
dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of
intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial
forum.

Laput vs Romatigue

Legal Ethics – Attorney’s Lien

Laput used to be the counsel for Nieves Barrera until the latter discharged her because she
lost trust and confidence in him due to dubious transactions that Laput handled while
representing her in a testate proceeding. One of the lawyers retained by Barrera to replace
Laput was Remotigue. In September 1957, Remotigue, without notice to Laput, asked the
court to direct Laput to turn over certain documents and titles to Barrera so that the latter may
properly disposed some estate properties. The court granted the same. But Laput stubbornly
kept the said documents as he claimed that said estate properties are subject to his lien and
that he needs to be paid first.
ISSUE: Whether or not Laput has the right to keep said documents.
HELD: No. It turns out that Laput’s attorney’s fees were already significantly paid while he
was still the counsel for Barrera (as backed by evidence presented by Remotigue) hence he
no longer has a lien to the properties of the estate. Therefore, he cannot retain the certificates
of title in question. On another note, he cannot now charge Remotigue with malice and bad
faith when the latter filed without notice of Laput motions to direct Laput to surrender said
certificates because as records proved, even though no notice was sent to him, he had
regularly checked on the record of this case hence he would have come across the same.

Paflu vs binnalbagan
AFLU, Entila and Tenazas v. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co., Court of Industrial Relations and Quentin
Muning

Facts: Petitioners PAFLU, Entila and Tenazas were complainants in Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo in the
Court of Industrial Relations. The complainants were represented by Cipriano Cid & Associates thru
Atty. ANastacio Pacis and Quentin Muning, a non-layer. After trial, the court rendered a decision in
favour of the complainants; a portion of that order granted respondent Quentin Muning, a non-
laywer attorney’s fees for professional service. Thus a petition was filed seeking review of the order
made by the Court of Industrial Relations in Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo

.Issue: May a non-lawyer recover attorney’s fees for legal services rendered?

Holding: Order under review is set aside.Ratio: Lawyer-client relationship is only possible if one is a
lawyer. Since respondent Muning is not one, he cannot establish an attorney-client relationship
with Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenezas or with PAFLU and he cannot therefore, recover
attorney’s fees.Public policy demands that legal work in representation of party litigants should
be entrusted only to those possessing tested qualifications for the protection of the courts, clients
and the public. The permission ofa non-lawyer to represent a party litigant in court does not by itself
entitle the representation to compensation. For Section 24 Rule 138, of the Rules of Court
provides: Sec. 24. Compensation of Attorney’s Agreement as to Fees –An attorney shall be entitled to
have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his
services,imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition for recovery of
attorney’s fees

Del roy vs ca

157 SCRA 757 – Legal Ethics – Lawyer’s Duty – Keep Abreast of Latest Jurisprudence
De Roy was the owner of a burnt building. The firewall of said building collapsed on the house
of Luis Bernal thereby killing his daughter. Bernal sued De Roy. Bernal won in the trial court.
Eventually, De Roy appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
De Roy received a copy of the decision on August 25, 1987. Under the Rules, they have 15
days to file a motion for reconsideration.
On September 9, 1987, the last day for them to file said MFR, De Roy’s counsel filed a motion
for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals ruled that pursuant to the case of Habaluyas Enterprises vs
Japzon (August 1985), the fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a motion for
reconsideration cannot be extended.
De Roy assailed the denial as she alleged that her counsel was ignorant of the rule laid down
in the Habaluyas Case; that said rule should not be made to apply to the case at bar owing
to the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette.
ISSUE: Whether or not De Roy’s contention is correct.
HELD: No. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast
of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently
reiterated, and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G.R.s) and in
such publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.

Julian Penilla vs. Atty. Quintin P. Alcid Jr. A.C. No. 9149 September 4, 2013

Facts: Plaintiff brought his favorite Volkswagen beetle to a repair shop. Despite full payment, the

shop failed to repair the beetle. This prompted Julian to hire respondent Atty. Alcid, and gave him

P30,000 as attorneyâs fees and P10,000 as filing fees. Atty. Alcid sent a demand letter, but the shop

failed to return the payment. He filed an estafa case before the Quezon City Prosecutorâs Office,

which was then dismissed. He filed a motion for reconsideration. This was denied for lack of merit.

Atty. Alcid then presented the option of filing a case for specific performance. Plaintiff gave another

P10,000 for the filing fee. Despite repeated attempts, plaintiff failed to see respondent Atty Alcid

again. He learned that the case for specific performance was dismissed. He also found out that the

filing fee was only P2,440 and not P10,000, as earlier stated by Quintin. Julian filed before the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) an administrative case

against Quintin for gross negligenc

e. Issue: Is respondent guilty of gross negligence?

Ruling: Yes, the Court ruled that respondent, Atty. Alcid, committed professional negligence under

Canon 18 and Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He also violated Canon 17 and

Rule 18.03 of the Code and the Lawyerâs Oath. The Court held that a lawyer may be disbarred or

suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent disregard of his duties, or an odious deportment

unbecoming an attorney. A lawyer must at no time be wanting in probity and moral fibers which are

not only conditions precedent to his entrance to the Bar, but are likewise essential demands for his

continued membership therein. The Court stated that Atty. Alcid failed to serve his client with

competence and diligence when he filed a criminal case for estafa when the facts warranted the

filing of a civil case for breach of contract. To be sure, after the complaint for estafa was dismissed,
respondent committed another similar blunder by filing a civil case for specific performance and

damages before the RTC. The complaint, having an alternative prayer for payment of damages,

should have been filed with the Municipal Trial Court which has jurisdiction over complainantâs claim

which amounts to only P36,000. x x x. The errors committed by respondent x x x were so basic and

could have been easily averted had he been more diligent and circumspect in his role as counsel for

complainant.

Vs ca

ACTS:
Eulogio B. Reyes, now deceased, filed an action for damages against the Director of Public
Works and BR Sebastian Enterprises. Trial court found B.R. Sebastian liable for damages but
absolved other defendants. B.R. Sebastian, thru its counsel, the law firm of Baizas, Alberto
and Associates, timely appealed the adverse decision to the respondent Court of Appeals.
During the pendency of the appeal, Eulogio B. Reyes died and was substituted by his heirs.
On February 1974, B.R Sebastian, thru its counsel of record, received notice to file
Appellant’s Brief within 45 days from receipt thereof; however, it failed to comply. Court of
Appeals issued a Resolution requiring said counsel to show cause why the appeal should not
be dismissed for failure to file the Appellant’s Brief within the reglementary period. On
September 1974, Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal. On September 1974, petitioner,
this time thru the BAIZAS LAW OFFICE, filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution
dismissing its appeal alleging that as a result of the death of Atty. Crispin Baizas, senior
partner in the law firm. Atty. Rodolfo Espiritu, the lawyer who handled this case in the trial
court and who is believed to have also attended to the preparation of the Appellant’s Brief
but failed to submit it through oversight and inadvertence, had also left the firm. Court
denied the motion for reconsideration. No action was taken by petitioner from within the
period to file a petition for review, the same became final and executory, and the records of
the case were remanded. Trial court issued a writ of execution. But on November 1975,
petitioner filed with Court of Appeals a Motion to Reinstate Appeal with Prayer for Issuance
of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction but was subsequently denied. Petitioner filed prohibition
and mandamus, with prayer for preliminary injunction with the Supreme Court to Court of
Appeals denial of petitioner’s motion. SC required them to comment and soon after, some
amendments were made. Ultimately, the petition was denied. But on May 1976, petitioner
filed a motion for its reconsideration claiming that since it was deprived of the right to
appeal without fault on its part, the petition should be given due course. Supreme Court
reconsidered and required both parties to submit simultaneously their respective
Memoranda.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in denying
petitioner’s motion to reinstate its appeal, previously dismissed for failure to file the
Appellant’s Brief

HELD:
No. The Supreme Court held that no fraud is involved in the present case. What was present
was simple negligence on the part of petitioner’s counsel, which is neither excusable nor
unavoidable. Petitioner thus failed to demonstrate sufficient cause to warrant a favorable
action on its plea. Granting that the power or discretion to reinstate an appeal that had
been dismissed is included in or implied from the power or discretion to dismiss an appeal,
still such power or discretion must be exercised upon a showing of good and sufficient
cause, in like manner as the power or discretion vested in the appellate court to allow
extensions of time for the filing of briefs. There must be such a showing which would call
for, prompt and justify its exercise. Otherwise, it cannot and must not be upheld. The
“confusion” in the office of the law firm following the death of Atty. Crispin Baizas is not a
valid justification for its failure to file the Brief. With Baizas’ death, the responsibility of Atty.
Alberto and his Associates to the petitioner as counsel remained until withdrawal by the
former of their appearance in the manner provided by the Rules of Court. The law firm
should have re-assigned the case to another associate or, it could have withdrawn as
counsel in the manner provided by the Rules of Court so that the petitioner could contract
the services of a new lawyer. The rule is settled that negligence of counsel binds the client.
Moreover, petitioner itself was guilty of negligence when it failed to make inquiries from
counsel regarding its case.