People vs Guadalupe Zapata and Dalmacio
Bondoc
Facts:
 Complaint of adultery were charge by
Andres Bondoc the husband against
wife and paramour (respondents)
 1st charge was on 14 March 1946
 Another charge was again filed for
adultery 17 Sep 1948
 Defendants filed a motion to quash
contending that they are put in double
jeopardy – Granted
 RTC held that adulterous acts charged
1st and 2nd complaints are deemed one
continuous acts
Held:
 Adultery is a crime of result, not of
tendency
 Each sexual intercourse constitutes a
crime of adultery
 Unity does not exist
o Defendants perpetuate crime in
every sexual intercourse
Luis Araneta vs Hon. Concepcion and Emma
Araneta
Facts:
 Petitioner filed legal separation against
wife on the ground of adultery
 Defendant filed a petition to secure
custody of 3 children and demand
support
 Petitioner opposed stating the
defendant abandoned the children and
prayed that custody of children not
granted without evidence
 Petitioner also avers that the wife is
unfit to be a mother after having
committed adultery and abandoning
the children
 Respondent judged still favored the
respondent refusing the prayer of the
petitioner that evidence be submitted
 Respondent judge ratio was anchored in
the prohibition contained in Art 103 of
Civil Code “An action for legal
separation shall in no case be tried
before six months shall have elapsed
since the filing of the petition
 Hence introduction of evidence is
prohibited
 The intent of the law is to give chance
for the parties to reconcile
Held:
 It is conceded that the period of six
months fixed therein Article 103 (Civil
Code) is evidently intended as a cooling
off period to make possible a
reconciliation between the spouses. The
recital of their grievances against each
other in court may only fan their
already inflamed passions against one
another, and the lawmaker has imposed
the period to give them opportunity for
dispassionate reflection.
 But this does not have the effect of
overriding other provisions such as the
determination of custody of the
children and those found under Art 105.
This should be determined by the court
according to circumstances
 The rule is that all the provisions of the
law even if apparently contradictory,
should be allowed to stand and given
effect by reconciling them if necessary.
 Thus the determination of the custody
and alimony should be given effect and
force provided it does not go to the
extent of violating the policy of the
 cooling off period. That is, evidence not
affecting the cause of the separation,
like the actual custody of the children,
the means conducive to their welfare
and convenience during the pendency
of the case, these should be allowed
that the court may determine which is
best for their custody.
Pacete vs Cariaga
 Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on
October 1979, for the Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage between her
husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita
de la Concepcion, as well as for legal
separation between her and Pacete,
accounting and separation of property.
 She averred in her complaint that she
was married to Pacete on April 1938
and they had a child named Consuelo
 that Pacete subsequently contracted a
second marriage with Clarita de la
Concepcion and that she learned of
such marriage only on August 1979.
 Reconciliation between her and Pacete
was impossible since he evidently
preferred to continue living with Clarita.
The defendants were each served with
summons. They filed an extension within which
to file an answer, which the court partly
granted. Due to unwanted misunderstanding,
particularly in communication, the defendants
failed to file an answer on the date set by the
court. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion to
declare the defendants in default, which the
court forthwith granted. The court received
plaintiffs’ evidence during the hearings held on
February 15, 20, 21, and 22, 1980.
 Defendants were each served summons
on 15 Nov 1979 and they filed a motion
for an extension of 20 days from 30 Nov
1979 within which to file an answer –
Granted
 On 18 December 1979, with new
counsel again sought for extension of
30 days
 05 Feb 1980 again sought for another
30 day extension but the court denied
the motion on the ground that it was
filed after the original period given as
first extension had expired
 Plaintiff thereupon filed a motion to
declare them as default – granted
 After trial, the court rendered a
decision in favor of the plaintiff on
March 17,1980.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC gravely abused
its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion for
extension of time to file their answer, in
declaring petitioners in default and in rendering
its decision on March 17, 1980 which decreed
the legal separation of Pacete and Alanis and
held to be null and void the marriage of Pacete
to Clarita.
HELD:
 The Civil Code provides that “no decree
of legal separation shall be promulgated
upon a stipulation of facts or by
confession of judgment.
 In case of non-appearance of the
defendant, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to inquire whether
or not collusion between parties exists.
If there is no collusion, the prosecuting
attorney shall intervene for the State in
 order to take care that the evidence for
the plaintiff is not fabricated.”
 The above stated provision calling for
the intervention of the state attorneys
in case of uncontested proceedings for
legal separation (and of annulment of
marriages, under Article 88) is to
emphasize that marriage is more than a
mere contract.
 Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article
58 of the Family Code, further
mandates that an action for legal
separation must “in no case be tried
before six months shall have elapsed
since the filing of the petition,”
obviously in order to provide the parties
a “cooling-off” period. In this interim,
the court should take steps toward
getting the parties to reconcile.
 The significance of the above
substantive provisions of the law is
further or underscored by the inclusion
of a provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of
Court which provides that no defaults in
actions for annulments of marriage or
for legal separation. Therefore, “if the
defendant in an action for annulment of
marriage or for legal separation fails to
answer, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to investigate
whether or not a collusion between the
parties exists, and if there is no
collusion, to intervene for the State in
order to see to it that the evidence
submitted is not fabricated.”
Ocampo vs Florenciano
 Jose de Ocampo and Serafina
Florenciano were married in 1938.
 They begot several children who are
not living with plaintiff.
 In March 1951, latter discovered on
several occasions that his wife was
betraying his trust by maintaining illicit
relations with Jose Arcalas.
 Having found out, he sent the wife to
Manila in June 1951 to study beauty
culture where she stayed for one year.
 Again plaintiff discovered that the wife
was going out with several other man
other than Arcalas.
 In 1952, when the wife finished her
studies, she left plaintiff and since then
they had lived separately.
 In June 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife
in the act of having illicit relations with
Nelson Orzame.
 He signified his intention of filing a
petition for legal separation to which
defendant manifested conformity
provided she is not charged with
adultery in a criminal action.
 Accordingly, Ocampo filed a petition for
legal separation in 1955.
 Defendant made no answer so was
declared in default and then pursuant
to Art 101 as provincial fiscal to search
for collusion
ISSUE: Whether the confession made by
Florenciano constitutes the confession of
judgment disallowed by the Family Code.
HELD:
 Florenciano’s admission to the
investigating fiscal that she committed
adultery, in the existence of evidence of
adultery other than such confession, is
 not the confession of judgment
disallowed by Article 48 of the Family
Code.
 What is prohibited is a confession of
judgment, a confession done in court or
through a pleading.
 Where there is evidence of the adultery
independent of the defendant’s
statement agreeing to the legal
separation, the decree of separation
should be granted since it would not be
based on the confession but upon the
evidence presented by the plaintiff.
 What the law prohibits is a judgment
based exclusively on defendant’s
confession.
 The petition should be granted based
on the second adultery, which has not
yet prescribed.
Lucy Somosa-Ramos vs Hon. Vamenta and
Clemen Ramos
Facts:
 Petitioner filed for legal separation
against respondent on the ground of
concubinage
 Also sought for the issuance of writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction for
the the return of her paraphernal and
exclusive property
 Respondent opposed stating that
issuance of such would lessen the
chances of them reconciling
 Respondent judge granted the motion
by respondent on the ground of Art 103
Issue: Whether or not Article 103 of the
Civil Code prohibiting the hearing of an
action for legal separation before the lapse of
six months from the filing of the petition, would
likewise preclude the court from acting on a
motion for preliminary mandatory injunction
applied for as an ancillary remedy to such a suit
Held:
No
 The court where the action is pending
according to Article 103 is to remain
passive. It must let the parties alone in
the meanwhile. It is precluded from
hearing the suit. There is then some
plausibility for the view of the lower
court that an ancillary motion such as
one for preliminary mandatory
injunction is not to be acted on. If it
were otherwise, there would be a
failure to abide by the literal language
of such codal provision.
 That the law, however, remains
cognizant of the need in certain cases
for judicial power to assert itself is
discernible from what is set forth in the
following article. It reads thus: "After
the filing of the petition for legal
separation, the spouse shall be entitled
to live separately from each other and
managevtheir respective property. The
husband shall continue to manage the
conjugal partnership property but ifvthe
court deems it proper, it may
appoint another to manage said
property, in which case the
administrator shall have the same rights
and duties as a guardian and shall not
be allowed to dispose ofthe income or
of the capital except in accordance with
the orders of the court."
 There would appear to bethen a
recognition that the question of
management of their respective
property need not be left
 unresolved even during such six-
month period.
 An administrator may even be
appointed for the management of the
property of the conjugal partnership.
The absolute limitation from which the
court suffers under the preceding article
is thereby eased. The parties may in the
meanwhile be heard. There is
justification then for the petitioner's
insistence that her motion for
preliminary mandatory injunction
should not be ignored by the lower
court.
 There is all the more reason for this
response from respondent Judge,
considering that the husband whom she
accused of concubinage and an attempt
against her life would inthe meanwhile
continue in the management of what
she claimed to be her paraphernal
property, an assertion that was not
specifically denied by him
Diego De la Vina vs Antonio VIllareal
 September 17, 1917, Narcisa
Geopano filed a complaint in the
Court of First Instance of the
Province of Iloilo against Diego de
la Viña, alleging:
 (1) That she was a resident of the
municipality of Iloilo, Province of
Iloilo, and that the defendant was a
resident of the municipality of
Vallehermoso, Province of Oriental
Negros;
 (2) that she was the legitimate wife
of the defendant, having been
married to him in the municipality
of Guijulñgan, Province of Negros
Oriental, in the year 1988;
 (3) that since their said marriage
plaintiff and defendant had lived as
husband and wife and had nine
children, three of whom were living
and were already of age;
 (4) that during their marriage
plaintiff and defendant had
acquired property, real and
personal, the value of which was
about P300,000 and all of which
was under the administration of
the defendant;
 (5) that since the year 1913 and up
to the date of the complaint, the
defendant had been committing
acts of adultery with one Ana
Calog, sustaining illicit relations
with her and having her as his
concubine, with public scandal and
in disgrace of the plaintiff;
 (6) that because of said illicit
relations, the defendant ejected
the plaintiff from the conjugal
home, for which reason she was
obliged to live in the city of Iloilo,
where she had since established
her habitual residence; and
 (7) that the plaintiff, scorned by her
husband, the defendant, had no
means of support and was living
only at the expense of one of her
daughters. Upon said allegations
she prayed for (a) a decree of
divorce, (b) the partition of the
conjugal property, and (c)
alimony pendente lite in the sum of
P400 per month and a (d)
preliminary injuction for properties
which she allege was being
 alienated and encumbered by the
defendants
 Diego the petitioner tried to
oppose this stating that the court
has no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the cause nor over
the person of the defendant
 Respective judge overruled the
petitioner and granted the
preliminary injunction
 Hence petition
Issue: May a married woman ever acquire a
residence or domicile separate from that of her
husband during the existence of the marriage?
Held:
 It is true, as a general of law, that the
domicile of the wife follows that of her
husband.
 But the authorities are unanimous in
holding that this is not an absolute rule.
"Under modern laws it is clear that
many exceptions to the rule that the
domicile from of the wife is determined
by that of her husband must obtain.
Accordingly, the wife may acquire
another and seperate domicile from
that of her husband where the theorical
unity of husband and wife is is
dissolved, as it is by the institution of
divorce proceedings; or where the
husband has given cause for divorce; or
where there is a separation of the
parties by agreement, or a permanent
separation due to desertion of the wife
by the husband or attributable to cruel
treatment on the part of the husband;
or where there has been a forfeiture by
the wife of the benefit of the husband's
domicile.
 The matrimonial domicile of the wife is
usually that of the husband, but if she is
justified in leaving him because his
conduct has been such as to entitle her
to a divorce, and she thereupon does
leave him and go into another state for
the purpose of there permanently
residing, she acquires a domicile in the
latter state.
 If the wife can acquire a separate
residence when her husband consents
or acquiesces, we see no reason why
the law will not allow her to do so
when, as alleged in the present case,
the husband unlawfully ejects her from
the conjugal home in order that he may
freely indulge in his illicit relations with
another woman.
 In the case of property, it is a rule that
the husband is the administrator but
when that relation ceases and, in a
proper action, the wife seeks to dissolve
the marriage and to partition the
conjugal property, it is just and proper,
in order to protect the interests of the
wife, that the husband's power of
administration be curtailed, during the
pendency of the action, insofar as
alienating or encumbering the conjugal
property is concerned
Froilan Gandionco vs Penaranda and Teresita
Gandionco
Facts:
  Private respondent, Teresita Gandionco,
filed a complaint against herein
petitioner, Froilan Gandionco for legal
separation on the ground of
concubinage as a civil case.
 Teresita also filed a criminal complaint
of concubinage against her husband.
She likewise filed an application for the
provisional remedy of support
pendente lite which was approved and
ordered by the respondent judge.
 Petitioner moved to suspend the action
for legal separation and the incidents
consequent thereto such as the support
for pendent elite, in view of the criminal
case for concubinage filed against him.
 He contends that the civil action for
legal separation is inextricably tied with
the criminal action thus, all proceedings
related to legal separation will have to
be suspended and await the conviction
or acquittal of the criminal case.
ISSUE: Whether or not a civil case for legal
separation can proceed pending the resolution
of the criminal case for concubinage.
HELD:
 No
 A civil action for legal separation on the
ground of concubinage may proceed
ahead of, or simultaneously with, a
criminal action for concubinage,
because said civil action is not one to
enforce the civil liability arising from the
offense
 Even if both the civil and criminal
actions arise from or are related to the
same offense. Such civil action is one
intended to obtain the right to live
separately, with the legal consequences
thereof including the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership of gains, custody
of the children, support and
disqualifications from inheriting from
the innocent spouse.
 Decree of legal separation may be
issued upon proof by preponderance of
evidence, where no criminal proceeding
or conviction is necessary.
 Furthermore, the support pendente
lite, as a remedy, can be availed of in an
action for legal separation, and granted
at the discretion of the judge. If in
case, the petitioner finds the amount of
support pendente lite ordered as too
onerous, he can always file a motion to
modify or reduce the same.
Carmen Lapuz vs Eufemio Eufemio
Facts:
 Parties were married Sep 21, 1934
 Live together with no child until 1943
when husband left
 Petitioner discovered that in 1949,
husband was having affair with a
Chinese woman Go Hiok
 Petitioner filed for legal separation
against respondent August 1953 stating
that respondent should be deprived of
his share in the conjugal partnership
profit
 Respondent counterclaimed for the
DONOM with petitioner on the ground
of his prior and subsisting marriage with
Go Hiok
 Before the trial was to be concluded
and when the respondent was about to
adduce evidence, the petitioner died
May 1969
  Respondent moved to dismiss the
petition for legal separation stating that
said petition was filed beyond the one
year provided in Art 102 and the death
of petitioner abated the action for legal
separation
Issue: Whether the death of the plaintiff, before
final decree in an action for legal separation,
abate the action and will it also apply if the
action involved property rights
Held:
 Yes
 These rights are mere effects of decree
of separation and their source of rights
is the decree itself
 So before the finality of a decree, these
claims are only rights in expectation
 Death produces a more radical and
definitive separation thus expected
consequential rights and claims arising
from a pendency of an action would
remain unborn
 Any property rights acquired by either
party as a result of Article 144 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be
resolved and determined in a proper
action for partition by either the
appellee or by the heirs of the
appellant.
Luis Yangco vs William Rhode
Facts:
Held:
 Petitioner filed a writ of prohibition
alleging that complaint had been filed
by Victorina Obin against petitioner
praying that she be declared lawful wife
of yangco and that she be granted
divorce an allowance and attorney’s fee
during the pendency of the suit
 Respondent judge denied petitioner
stating that his marriage with Victorina
is valid although the question is not
clear nor without doubt
 Petitioner claims that he would be
unable to earn back the sum he’s
being compelled to imburse, and
that he’s been deprived of right of
appeal or any plain, speedy, or
adequate remedy.
 Petitioner filed a petition to render
judgment that the judge has acted in
excess of his jurisdiction in attempting
to oblige petitioner to pay Victorina the
allowance
 Respondent judge filed a motion to
dismiss on the grounds that the court
has no jurisdiction and the petition does
not state sufficient facts to constitute an
action
 "Nevertheless," he says, "this being so,
the said Victorina Obin acquired a right
to all conjugal rights, and in particular to
the allowance of alimony pendente lite."
And upon this supposition he cited
articles of the Civil Code as to rights
enjoyed by a married woman by virtue
of the marriage, and those which she
may further exercise by reason of
divorce pending litigation and those
granted to her finally in case of a
favorable judgment.
 The necessity of founding the action for
support or alimony on a title, and a title
supported by documentary evidence, is
 a consequence of the precepts of article
143 of the Civil Code cited by the
respondent judge himself. In this article
the right to support is granted (1) to
spouses inter se; (2) to legitimate
descendants and ascendants inter
se; (3) to parents and certain
legitimated and acknowledged natural
children; (4) to other illegitimate
children, and (5) to brothers and sisters.
In all these cases it is a civil status or a
juridical relation which is the basis of
the action for support the civil static of
marriage or that of relationship.
 it is necessary for her to prove
possession of the civil status of a spouse
that is, a marriage, without which one
has no right to the title of husband or
wife.
 Marriages before the effectivity of the
code must be proven by canonical
certificates
 The court below had jurisdiction to try
the divorce suit, but he was without
jurisdiction to grant alimony when the
right to claim alimony had not accrued
in accordance with the provisions of the
Civil Code. This Code only grants the
right to alimony to a wife. This status
not appearing by a final judgment, the
court is without jurisdiction to make any
order in the matter. Therefore
mandamus is the proper remedy upon
the facts related.
Sabalones vs CA
Held:
Facts:
 Petitioner Samson Sabalones left to his
wife the administration of some
conjugal properties for 15 years
because petitioner is a diplomat
assigned in different countries
 Petitioner retired as an ambassador in
1985 and came back to PH
 4 years later he filed an action for
judicial authorization to sell a building
and lot in San Juan stating that he is old
and sick hence the profit from the
selling will sustain his medication and
hospitalization
 Wife opposed authorization and filed
for counterclaim of legal separation
alleging that said house was occupied
by her and their 6 children and they
were depending support from rentals
from another conjugal property
 She also alleged that when petitioner
came back she went home not to his
family but to another woman with 3
children
 Wife asked the court to grant legal
separation and to liquidate conjugal
properties
 RTC decreed legal separation and
forfeiting petitioner’s share in the
conjugal properties after discovering he
had a bigamous marriage
 CA approved writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin petitioner from
interfering with the administration of
their properties and was GRANTED
 Petitioner opposed arguing that the law
provides for joint administration of
conjugal properties also citing Art 124
and Art 61 of FC
 Yes, preliminary injunction can still be
issued
 Pending the appointment of an
administration over the conjugal assets,
 the court justified in allowing the wife
to continue administration
 The law does indeed grant joint
administration over the conjugal
properties as clearly provided in Art
124 however Art 61 states that after the
petition for legal separation the trial
court in the absence of a written
agreement appoint either one of the
spouse or a 3rd party to be the
administrator
 The designation was implicit when the
court denied the petitioner any share in
the conjugal properties
 Purpose of preliminary injunction is to
preserve status quo
 Requirements are the existence of a
right and actual or threatened violation
 Let it be stressed that the injunction has
not permanently installed the
respondent wife as the administrator of
the whole mass of conjugal assets. It
has merely allowed her to continue
administering the properties in the
meantime without interference from
the petitioner, pending the express
designation of the administrator in
accordance with Article 61 of the Family
Code.
Lerma vs CA
 Teodoro E. Lerma and Concepcion Diaz
were married on May 19, 1951.
 On August 22,1969 the petitioner filed a
complaint for adultery against the
respondent and a certain Teodoro
Ramirez and on September 26, 1972 the
court of First Instance of Rizal decided
the adultery case of the respondent and
found her and her co-accused, Teodoro
Ramirez, guilty of thecharge, sentencing
them to a term of imprisonment.
 During the pendency of the adultery
caseagainst the respondent, wife On
November 18, 1969 the respondent
filed with the lower court,a complaint
against the petitioner for legal
separation and/or separation of
properties, custodyof their children and
support, with an urgent petition for
support pendente litefor her and their
youngest son, Gregory, who was then
and until now is in her custody. The
respondent's complaint for legal
separation is based on two grounds:
concubinage and attempt against
herlife.
 The application for support pendente
lite was granted.
 The petitioner filed his opposition to
the respondent's application for
support pendente lite setting up as
defense the adultery charge he had filed
against the respondent
 On March 12, 1970 the petitioner filed
with respondent Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction to annul the
aforementioned orders on the ground
that they were issued with grave abuse
of discretion.
 The next day the respondent court gave
due course to the petition and issued a
writ of preliminary injunction to stop
Judge Luciano from enforcing said
orders. The respondent court, in its
decision of October 8, 1970, set aside
the assailed orders andgranted the
petitioner an opportunity to present
evidence before the lower court in
support of his defense against the
application for support pendente lite
  The respondent moved to reconsider
the decision on the ground that the
petitioner had not asked that he be
allowed to present evidence in the
lower court. The respondent court, in its
resolution of January 20, 1971, set aside
the decision of October 8 and rendered
another dismissing the petition. This is
now the subject of the instant
proceeding for review.
ISSUE:
W/N the lower court acted with grave abused of
discretion in granting the
respondent’sapplication for support pendente
lite without giving the petitioner an opportunity
to present evidence in support of his defense
against the said application.
HELD:
Court of Appeals January 20, 1971 resolution
and the orders of respondent Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court herein complained of,
dated December 24, 1969 and February
15,1970, all are set aside and their enforcement
enjoined, without prejudice to such judgment
asmay be rendered in the pending action for
legal separation between the parties.
The right to separate support or maintenance,
even from the conjugal partnership
property,presupposes the existence of a
justifiable cause for the spouse claiming such
right to live separately.
This is implicit in Article 104 of the Civil Code,
which states that after the filing of the petition
for legal separation the spouses shall be entitled
to live separately from each other. A petition in
bad faith, such as that filed by one who is
himself or herself guilty of an act which
constitutes a ground for legal separation at the
instance of the other spouse, cannot be
considered as within the intendment of the law
granting separate support.
In fact under Article303 of the same Code the
obligation to give support shall cease "when the
recipient, be he aforced heir or not, has
committed some act which gives rise to
disinheritance;" and under Article 921 one of
the causes for disinheriting a spouse is "when
the spouse has given cause for legal
separation." The loss of the substantive right to
support in such a situation is incompatible with
any claim for support pendente lite
People vs Sensano and Marcelo Ramos
Facts:
 Respondents were sentenced for the
crime of adultery
 Ursula Sensano and Mariano Ventura
were married April 29 1919 and begot 1
child
 After birth of child, husband left wife to
go to province for 3 years without
writing to his wife or sending anything
for the support of herself and son
 Wife then met accused Marcelo Ramos
who took her and the child to live with
him
 Upon the return of the husband he filed
a case of adultery and both were found
guilty
 After completing sentence, wife went
back to husband and begged for pardon
but was denied
 Abandoned for the second time, she
went back to Marcelo
 After some years, husband upon coming
back from Hawaii again charged them of
adultery

Held:
 Apart from the fact that the husband in
this case was assuming a mere pose
when he signed the complaint as the
"offended" spouse, we have come to
the conclusion that the evidence in this
case and his conduct warrant the
inference that he consented to the
adulterous relations existing between
the accused and therefore he is not
authorized by law to institute this
criminal proceeding.
 We cannot accept the argument of the
Attorney-General that the seven years
of acquiescence on his part in the
adultery of his wife is explained by his
absence from the Philippine Islands
during which period it was impossible
for him to take any action against the
accused.
 There is no merit in the argument that it
was impossible for the husband to take
any action against the accused during
the said seven years.
 Judgment reversed
People vs Schneckenberger
Facts:
 May 15 1926 accused Rodolfo married
Elena Ramirez Cartagena
 After 7 years they agreed to live
separately and secured an agreement
 June 15, 1935 w/o leaving th PH
secured a divorce decree from civil
court in Mexico
 May 11, 1936 he contracted another
marriage with co accused Julia Madel
 Because of the nullity of the divorce
decree, complainant instituted two
actions, one for bigamy and one for
concubinage
 Accused was convicted for bigamy
 While the case was pending for
concubinage, Rodolfo interposed the
plea of double jeopardy but was denied
both in RTC and CA and then he was
convicted
Issue: Should accused be acquitted of
concubinage in view of the agreement executed
by Rodolfo and Elena
Held:
 Yes, the agreement constituted a
consent given by Elena to Rodolfo
 Concubinage is mere cohabitation by
the husband with a woman who is not
his wife
 He should have been acquitted because
the document executed by petitioner
and defendant was a valid consent to
the act of concubinage within the
meaning of Art 344 of RPC
 Previous jurisprudence provided that
the court held that the consent which
bars the offended party from instituting
a criminal prosecution in cases of
adultery, concubinage, seduction,
abducation, rape and acts of
lasciviousness is that which has been
given expressly or implied after the
crime has been committed
Bugayong vs Ginez
Facts:
 Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in
the US Navy was married with Leonila
 Ginez on August 1949 at Pangasinan
while on furlough leave.
 Immediately after the marriage, they
lived with the sisters of Bugayong in
said municipality before he went back
to duty.
 The couple came to an agreement that
Ginez would stay with his sisters who
later moved in Manila.
 On or about July 1951, she left the
dwelling of the sisters-in-law and
informed her husband by letter that she
had gone to Pangasinan to reside with
her mother and later on moved to
Dagupan to study in a local college.
 Petitioner then began receiving letters
from Valeriana Polangco, (plaintiff’s
sister-in-law) and some from
anonymous writers, which were not
produced at the hearing, informing him
of alleged acts of infidelity of his wife.
 He admitted that his wife informed him
by letter that a certain Eliong kissed
her. All these communications,
prompted him in October 1951 to seek
the advice of the Navy Chaplain who
asked him to consult with the navy legal
department.
 In August 1952, Bugayong went to
Pangasinan and looked for his wife.
They met in the house of the
defendant’s godmother. They
proceeded to the house of Pedro,
cousin of the plaintiff where they stayed
for 1 day and 1 night as husband and
wife.
 The next day, they slept together in
their own house. He tried to verify with
Leonila the truth on the information he
received but instead of answering, she
merely packed up and left which he
took as a confirmation of the acts of
infidelity. He then filed a complaint for
legal separation.
ISSUE: Whether there was condonation
between Bugayong and Ginez that may serve as
a ground for dismissal of the action.
HELD:
 Condonation is the forgiveness of a
marital offense constituting a ground
for legal separation.
 Yes. There was condonation because
the husband, Benjamin Bugayong,
actively searched for hiswife in
Pangasinan after she left the conjugal
home. The act of Benjamin in
persuading Leonizato come along with
him, and the fact that she went with
him and consented to be brought to
thehouse of his cousin and together
slept there as husband and wife and the
further fact that in thesecond night they
slept together in their house as
husband and wife all these facts have
no other meaning than that a
reconciliation between them was
effected and that there was
condonation of the wife by the
husband.
 A single voluntary act of marital
intercourse between the parties
ordinarily is sufficient to constitute
condonation and where the parties live
in the same house, it is presumed that
they live on terms of matrimonial
cohabitation.
 Furthermore, Art. 100 of the Civil Code
states that the legal separation may be
claimed only by the innocent spouse,
provided there has been no
condonation of or consent to the
adultery or concubinage

William Brown vs Justina Yambao
Facts:
 July 14, 1955 Petitioner filed a suit in
CFI to obtain legal separation from his
lawful wife Juanita Yambao
 He alleged that while interned by the
Japanese invaders in 1942-1945, the
wife engaged in adulterous acts with
Carlos Field whom she begot a baby girl
and learned of it only in 1945
 Brown prayed for confirmation of
liquidation agreement and custody of
children issued of the marriage
 Court declared Yambao in default for
failure to answer in due time despite
service of summons in accordance with
Art 101 if collusion exists
 In cross examination, it was found that
after liberation brown had lived
martially with another woman and
begotten children by her
 The court then rendered judgment
denying the legal separation asked on
the ground that while the wife’s
adultery was established brown had
incurred in a misconduct a similar
nature that barred his right of action
under Art 100
Issue: Should the petition for legal separation be
granted?
Held:
 No. It was correctly held that the action
was already barred because Brown did
not petition for legal separation
proceedings until 10 years after he
learned of his wife’s adultery
 In the case at bar, it is pursuant to the
second sentence of Art 100 that both of
them are offenders hence cannot grant
legal separation
 Contrary to Art 102, the petition was
filed 10 years after he learned of his
wife’s adultery
William Ong vs Lucita Ong
Facts:
 Parties were married for over 20 years
when lucita filed for a complaint for
legal separation under Art 55 Par 1 of FC
 Husband subjected her to physical
violence so lucita left the conjugal home
 Abusive behavior was corroborated by
her sister and her doctor
 RTC granted her petition for legal
separation
 William filed for petition for review
 He contends that he never inflicted
physical harm on her and their children
 He also alleged that the reason for filing
of legal separation was for the wife’s
family to prevent him from having
control in the conjugal property
 He also claimed that Lucita abandoned
the family home therefore she is also
given a ground for legal separation
Issue: should the legal separation be granted
Held:
 Yes
 The contentions of the husband is
absurd
 The reason why the wife left the
conjugal home because of the physical
violence imposed by the husband
 It was correctly done by the lower
courts to take cognizance of the
 witnesses’ testimonies and their
credibility
 The abandonment referred in the
Family code is abandonment without
justifiable cause for more than one year
Rosario Matute vs Hon. Higino Macadaeg
Facts:
 Armando Medel filed a petition for legal
separation against Petitioner on the
ground of adultery committed with his
brother Ernesto Medel
 Rosario was found guilty and the
custody of their 4 children awarded to
Armando
 Armando thereafter went to the US and
left the children under the care of his
sister
 Upon coming home they all saw each
other and joined in Cebu
 Rosario asked that she be granted to
take the children to the funeral of her
father and the children’s grandfather
 Armando allowed this with the
condition that she returns the children
after 2 weeks
 She did not return them and then filed a
petition that she be granted the custody
of the children and to order the father
to give support to children
 Motion was based upon the ground
that the three children who were above
7 years old did not want to go back to
their father because the father was
living with another woman
 Rosario filed a complaint holding the
petitioner in contempt for not returning
the children
Held:
 Since petitioner merely obtained the
husband's permission to bring theminor
children to Manila, for the purpose of
attending the funeral of their maternal
grandfather, petitionerobtained and has
the physical possession of the minors in
a precarious manner. She holds it in the
name,on behalf and by authority of
husband, whose agent she, in effect, is.
He may, therefore, demand theirreturn
at any time, and she is bound to comply
immediately with such demand. She
cannot even questionhis authority to
make it, although she is free to seek a
review of the order or decision
awarding thecustody of minors to him,
and to ask that they be placed under
her charge.
Quiao Vs Quiao
FACTS:
 Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for
legal separation against petitioner
Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido).
 RTC rendered a decision declaring the
legal separation thereby awarding
the custody of their 3 minor children in
favor of Rita and all remaining
properties shall be divided equally
between the spouses subject to the
respective legitimes of the children and
the payment of the
unpaid conjugal liabilities.
 Brigido’s share, however, of the net
profits earned by
the conjugal partnership is forfeited in
favor of the common children because
Brigido is the offending spouse.
 The petitioner filed before the RTC a
Motion for Clarification, asking the RTC
to define the term “Net Profits Earned.”
RTC held that the phrase “NET PROFIT EARNED”
denotes “the remainder of the properties of the
parties after deducting the separate properties
of each [of the] spouse and the debts.”
 It further held that after determining
the remainder of the properties, it shall
be forfeited in favor of
the common children because the
offending spouse does not have any
right to any share of the net profits
earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2)
and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code.
 The petitioner claims that the court a
quo is wrong when it applied Article 129
of the Family Code, instead of Article
102. He confusingly argues that Article
102 applies because there is no other
provision under the Family Code which
defines net profits earned subject of
forfeiture as a result of legal separation.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Art 102 on dissolution of absolute
community or Art 129
on dissolutionof conjugal partnership of gains is
applicable in this case. – Art 129 will govern.
2. Whether the offending spouse acquired
vested rights over½of the properties in
the conjugal partnership– NO.
3. Is the computation of “net profits” earned in
the conjugal partnership of gains the same with
the computation of “net profits” earned in the
absolute community? NO.
RATIO:
1. ART 129 should govern
First, since the spouses were married prior to
the promulgation of the current family code, the
default rule is that In the absence of marriage
settlements, or when the same are void, the
system of relative community
or conjugal partnership of gains as established
in this Code, shall govern the property relations
between husband and wife.
Second, since at the time of the dissolution of
the spouses’ marriage the operative law is
already the Family Code, the same applies in the
instant case and the applicable law in so far as
the liquidation of
the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is
concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in
relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code.
2. The petitioner is saying that since the
property relations between the spouses is
governed by the regime of Conjugal Partnership
of Gains under the Civil Code, the petitioner
acquired vested rights over half of the
properties of the Conjuga lPartnership of Gains,
pursuant to Article 143 of the Civil Code, which
provides: “All property of
the conjugal partnership of gains is owned
in common by the husband and wife.”
While one may not be deprived of his “vested
right,” he may lose the same if there is
due process and such deprivation is founded in
law and jurisprudence.
In the present case, the petitioner was accorded
his right to due process. First, he was well-aware
that the respondent prayed in her complaint
that all of the conjugal properties be awarded to
her. In fact, in his Answer, the petitioner prayed
that the trial court divide the community assets
between the petitioner and the respondent as
circumstances and evidence warrant after the
accounting and inventory of all the community
properties of the parties. Second, when the
decision for legal separation was promulgated,
the petitioner never questioned the trial court’s
ruling forfeiting what the trial court termed as
“net profits,” pursuant to Article 129(7) of the
Family Code. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim
being deprived of his right to due process.
3. When a couple enters into a regime of
absolute community, the husband and the wife
become joint owners of all the properties of the
marriage. Whatever property each spouse
brings into the marriage, and those acquired
during the marriage (except those excluded
under Article 92 of the Family Code) form
the common mass of the couple’s properties.
And when the couple’s marriage or community
is dissolved, that common mass
is divided between the spouses, or their
respective heirs, equally or in the proportion
the parties have established, irrespective of the
value each one may have originally owned.
In this case, assuming arguendo that Art 102 is
applicable, since it has been established that
the spouses have no separate properties, what
will be divided equally between them is simply
the “net profits.” And since the legal
separation½share decision of Brigido states that
the in the net profits shall be awarded to the
children, Brigido will still be left with nothing.
On the other hand, when a couple enters into
a regime of conjugal partnership of gains under
Article142 of the Civil Code, “the husband and
the wife place in common fund the fruits of
their separate property and income from their
work or industry, and divide equally, upon
the dissolution of the marriage or of the
partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained
indiscriminately by either spouse during the
marriage.” From the foregoing provision, each
of the couple has his and her own property and
debts. The law does not intend to effect a
mixture or merger of those debts or properties
between the spouses. Rather, it establishes a
complete separation of capitals.
In the instant case, since it was already
established by the trial court that the spouses
have no separate properties, there is nothing to
return to any of them. The listed properties
above are considered part of
the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what
remains in the above-listed properties should
be divided equally between the spouses and/or
their respective heirs. However, since the trial
court found the petitioner the guilty party, his
share from the net profits of
the conjugalpartnership is forfeited in favor of
the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2)
of the Family Code. Again, lest we be confused,
like in the absolute community regime, nothing
will be returned to the guilty party in
the conjugal partnership regime, because there
is no separate property which may be
accounted for in the guilty party’s favor.
Laperal vs Republic
Facts:
 The petitioner, a bona fide resident of
Baguio City, was married with Mr.
Enrique R. Santamaria on March 1939.
 However, a decree of legal separation
was later on issued to the spouses.
Aside from that, she ceased to live with
Enrique.
 During their marriage, she naturally
uses Elisea L. Santamaria. She filed this
petition to be permitted to resume in
using her maiden name Elisea Laperal.
 This was opposed by the City Attorney
of Baguio on the ground that it violates
Art. 372 of the Civil Code. She was
claiming that continuing to use her
 married name would give rise to
confusion in her finances and the
eventual liquidation of the conjugal
assets.

ISSUE: Whether Rule 103 which refers to

change of name in general will prevail over the
specific provision of Art. 372 of the Civil Code
with regard to married woman legally separated
from his husband.

HELD:

In legal separation, the married status is

unaffected by the separation, there being no
severance of the vinculum. The finding that
petitioner’s continued use of her husband
surname may cause undue confusion in her
finances was without basis. It must be
considered that the issuance of the decree of
legal separation in 1958, necessitate that the
conjugal partnership between her and Enrique
had automatically been dissolved and
liquidated. Hence, there could be no more
occasion for an eventual liquidation of the
conjugal assets.

Furthermore, applying Rule 103 is not a

sufficient ground to justify a change of the
name of Elisea for to hold otherwise would be
to provide for an easy circumvention of the
mandatory provision of Art. 372.