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CASES REPORTED
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* THIRD DIVISION.
2
2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporationvs. Commissioner of
Customs
4
6
court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have
been tried or are actually pending before the same judge.—It has
been held that the doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom
and discretion of the courts; however, the power to take judicial
notice is to be exercised by the courts with caution; care must be
taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable
doubt upon the subject should be promptly resolved in the
negative. As a general rule, courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases, even
when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court,
and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been tried
or are actually pending before the same judge. However, this rule
is subject to the exception that in the absence of objection and
as a matter of convenience to all parties, a court may properly
treat all or any part of the original record of the case filed in its
archives as read into the records of a case pending before it, when
with the knowledge of the opposing party, reference is made
to it, by name and number or in some other manner by which it is
sufficiently designated. Thus, for said exception to apply, the
party concerned must be given an opportunity to object before the
court could take judicial notice of any record pertaining to other
cases pending before it.
Procedural Rules and Technicalities; It is wellsettled that
procedural rules are designed to facilitate the adjudication of
cases.—It is wellsettled that procedural rules are designed to
facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are
enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. While it is true that
litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that
every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed
procedure to ensure an orderly and speedy administration of
justice. Partylitigants and their counsel are well advised to abide
by, rather than flaunt, procedural rules for these rules illumine
the path of the law and rationalize the pursuit of justice.
Taxation; Customs Duties; The entry of imported goods at the
custom house consists in submitting them to the inspection of the
revenue officers, together with a statement or description of such
goods, and the original invoices of the same, for the purpose of
estimating the duties to be paid thereon.—Generally, in customs
law, the term “entry” has a triple meaning, to wit: (1) the
documents filed at the customs house; (2) the submission and
acceptance of the docu
7
8
10
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that time and again, the
Supreme Court (SC) has held that it is a very desirable and
necessary judicial practice that when a court has laid down a
principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will
adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which
the facts are substantially the same. Stare decisis et non quieta
movere.—It bears stressing that the basic facts of the present case
and those of Chevron Philippines, Inc. v. Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs, 561 SCRA 710 (2008), which the Court follows
as precedent, are practically the same. As in Chevron, the
imported crude oil subject of the present case arrived in the
Philippines and was discharged from the carrying vessels prior to
the effectivity of RA 8180. The import entries in both cases were
filed beyond the 30day period required under Section 1301 of the
TCCP. In fact, it is on the basis of the facts obtaining in these
importations of petitioner and Chevron (then known as Caltex
Phils., Inc.) that only one civil suit for collection of the dutiable
value of the imported articles was filed by the BOC against these
two corporations as defendants. It is from this factual backdrop
and the ensuing demand by the BOC to collect the dutiable value
of the importations that the case of Chevron reached this Court
and was ultimately decided in favor of the BOC. Thus, since the
present case and the case of Chevron basically arise from the
same factual circumstances, it is the Court’s duty to apply the
ruling in Chevron to the present case. In Chinese Young Men’s
Christian Association of the Philippine Islands v. Remington Steel
Corporation, 550 SCRA 180 (2008), this Court ruled as follows:
Time and again, the Court has held that it is a very desirable and
necessary judicial practice that when a court has laid down a
principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will
adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which
the facts are substantially the same. Stare decisis et non quieta
movere. Stand by the decisions and disturb not what is settled.
Stare decisis simply means that for the sake of certainty, a
conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those that
follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the
parties may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of
justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations,
like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same
questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the
parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and
decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisisis a bar to
any attempt to relitigate the same issue.
11
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13
VOL. 812, DECEMBER 5, 2016 13
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporationvs. Commissioner of
Customs
15
PEREZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
seeking to reverse and set aside the 13 May 2010 Decision1
and the 22 February 2011 Resolution2 rendered by the
Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) Former En Banc in C.T.A. E.B.
No. 472 which dismissed petitioner’s petition, and
accordingly affirmed with modification as to the additional
imposition of legal interest the 19 June 2008 Decision3 of
the CTA Former First Division (CTA in Division) ordering
petitioner to pay the amount of P936,899,883.90,
representing the total dutiable value of its 1996 crude oil
importation, which was considered as abandoned in favor
of the government by operation of law.
The Facts
The factual antecedents of the case are as follows:
On 16 April 1996, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8180,4
otherwise known as the “Downstream Oil Industry
Deregulation Act of 1996” took effect. It provides, among
others, for the reduction of the tariff duty on imported
crude oil from ten percent (10%)
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16
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5 Rollo, p. 452.
17
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18
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CODIFY THE TARIFF AND CUSTOMS LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES), and by R.A. No.
7651 (AN ACT TO REVITALIZE AND STRENGTHEN THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS,
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE CERTAIN SECTIONS OF THE TARIFF AND CUSTOMS
CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AS AMENDED).
14 Rollo, p. 473.
15 Id., at p. 136.
19
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16 Id.
17 Id., at pp. 136137.
18 Id., at p. 137.
19 Id.
20
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21
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26 Id., at pp. 351352; citing pertinent portion of the Memorandum
dated 2 February 2001 issued by the Investigation and Prosecution
Division (IPD) of the BOC.
27 Id., at p. 352.
28 SEC. 5. Answer.—
x x x x
(b) Transmittal of Records.—The respondent x x x Commissioner of
Customs, x x x within ten days after his answer, x x x shall certify and
forward to the Court all the records of the case in their possession, with
the pages duly numbered, and, if the records are in separate folders, then
the folders will also be numbered. If there are no records, such fact shall
be manifested to the Court within the same period of ten days. The Court
may, on motion, and for good cause shown, grant an extension of time
within which to submit the aforesaid records of the case. Failure to
transmit the records within the time prescribed herein or within the time
allowed by the Court may constitute indirect contempt of court.
22
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23
Furthermore, citing the case of Eastern Shipping Lines,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals and Mercantile Insurance
Company, Inc.,33 the CTA Former En Banc imposed an
additional legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum on
the total dutiable value of P936,899,883.90, accruing from
the date said decision was promulgated until its finality;
and afterwards, an interest rate of twelve percent (12%) per
annum shall be applied until its full satisfaction.34
Not satisfied, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration thereof which was denied in the assailed
Resolution dated 22 February 2011.
Consequently, this Petition for Review wherein
petitioner seeks the reversal and setting aside of the
aforementioned Decision and Resolution dated 13 May
2010 and 22 February 2011, respectively, and accordingly
prays that a decision be rendered finding: (a) that
petitioner has already paid the proper duties on its
importation and therefore not liable anymore; and (b) that
petitioner is not deemed to have abandoned its subject
shipment; or, in the alternative, (c) that respondent’s
attempt to collect is devoid of any legal and factual basis
considering that the right to collect against petitioner
relating to its subject shipment has already prescribed.
In support of its petition, petitioner posits the following
assigned errors:
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24
I
THE CTA FORMER EN BANC ERRED WHEN IT HELD IN
THE QUESTIONED DECISION THAT PETITIONER PSPC IS
DEEMED TO HAVE IMPLIEDLY ABANDONED THE SUBJECT
SHIPMENT AND, THUS, IS LIABLE FOR THE ENTIRE
VALUE OF THE SUBJECT SHIPMENT, PLUS INTEREST,
DESPITE THE FACT THAT SUCH CLAIM, IF ANY AT ALL,
HAS ALREADY PRESCRIBED, ESPECIALLY BECAUSE
PETITIONER PSPC DID NOT COMMIT ANY FRAUD.
II
THE CTA FORMER EN BANC ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO
RECOGNIZE THAT THE GOVERNMENT DID NOT SUFFER
ANY DAMAGE OR REVENUE LOSS SINCE ALL TARIFF
DUTIES IMPOSABLE ON THE SUBJECT SHIPMENT WERE
ALREADY PAID TO THE GOVERNMENT, SUCH THAT TO
ALLOW RESPONDENT COMMISSIONER TO RECOVER THE
ENTIRE VALUE OF THE SUBJECT SHIPMENT WOULD BE
CONFISCATORY AND AMOUNT TO UNJUST ENRICHMENT
ON THE PART OF THE GOVERNMENT.
III
THE CTA FORMER EN BANC ERRED WHEN IT
CONSIDERED THE SUBJECT SHIPMENT AS IMPLIEDLY
ABANDONED, DEPRIVING PETITIONER PSPC OF ITS RIGHT
TO DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW,
CONSIDERING:
A. RESPONDENT COMMISSIONER DID NOT OBSERVE THE
DUE NOTICE REQUIREMENT UNDER SECTION 1801 OF
THE TCCP OR COMPLIED WITH THE RULES THAT BOC
HAD PROMULGATED, WHICH DUE NOTICE IS
MANDATORY IN THE ABSENCE OF FRAUD AS HELD IN
THE CHEVRON CASE.
25
26
V
THE CTA [FORMER] EN BANC ERRED IN FAILING TO
RECOGNIZE THAT THERE IS NO STATUTORY PROVISION
EMPOWERING RESPONDENT COMMISSIONER TO
SUBSTITUTE ITS CLAIMS FOR THE ABANDONED GOODS
WITH THE VALUE THEREOF.
VI
THE CTA [FORMER] EN BANC GROSSLY MISAPPRECIATED
THE FACTS AND MISAPPLIED THE RULING OF THE
HONORABLE COURT IN THE CHEVRON CASE WHEN IT
HELD THAT PRESCRIPTION IS NOT A DEFENSE AND THAT
THE NOTICE REQUIREMENT UNDER SECTION 1801 OF
THE TCCP AND THE BOC’S OWN RULES AND
REGULATIONS DO NOT APPLY EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF
FRAUD. QUITE THE CONTRARY, THE CHEVRON CASE
CLEARLY RECOGNIZED THAT THE PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD
OF THE FINALITY OF THE LIQUIDATION UNDER SECTION
1603 OF THE TCCP IS A DEFENSE IN THE ABSENCE OF
FRAUD AND THE NOTICE REQUIREMENT WAS SET ASIDE
DUE TO THE FINDING OF FRAUD AGAINST CHEVRON.
MOREOVER, UNLIKE IN CHEVRON CASE WHERE THE
HONORABLE COURT FOUND CHEVRON TO HAVE
BENEFITED FROM ITS DELAY AND WAS GUILTY OF
FRAUD, THE QUESTIONED DECISION AND RESOLUTION
BOTH DID NOT FIND FRAUD ON THE PART OF
PETITIONER PRPC.35
Petitioner asseverates that: (a) in the absence of fraud,
the right of respondent to claim against petitioner,
assuming there is any, has already prescribed since an
action involving payment of customs duties demanded after
a period of one (1) year from the date of final payment of
duties shall not suc
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27
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28
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29
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30
Tersely put, when an importer after due notice fails to file
an Import Entry and Internal Revenue Declaration within
an unextendible period of thirty (30) days from the
discharge of
31
We rule that in this case, Section 1603 is squarely
applicable. The finality of liquidation which arises one (1)
year after the date of the final payment of duties, which is
in this case 23 May 1996, renders inoperable the provisions
of Section 1801.
Discussion
At the outset, it bears emphasis that the determination
of the issues presented in this case requires a
comprehensive assessment of the pronouncements made in
the case of Chevron Philippines, Inc. v. Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs;39 thus, we find it imperative to
reproduce hereunder the points there considered which are
germane to the controversy under review.
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32
33
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34
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35
In the Chevron case, we explained that the term “ipso
facto” is defined as “by the very act itself” or “by mere act.”
Hence, there is no need for any affirmative act on the part
of the government with respect to abandoned imported
articles given that the law itself categorically provides that
said articles shall ipso facto be deemed the property of the
government. By using the term “ipso facto” in Section 1802
of the TCCP, as amended by R.A. No. 7651,42 the
legislature re
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36
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goods have been abandoned by the importers and that the latter shall be
given notice of said declaration before any abandonment of the articles
becomes effective.
37
Since it is undisputed that the Import Entry and
Internal Revenue Declaration was belatedly filed by
petitioner on 23 May 1996, or more than 30 days from the
last day of discharge of its importation counted from 10
April 1996, the importation may be considered impliedly
abandoned in favor of the government. Petitioner argues
that before Section 1802 can be applied and the ipso facto
provision invoked, the requirement of due notice to file
entry and the determination of the intent of the importer
are essential in order to consider the subject imported
crude oil of petitioner impliedly abandoned in favor of the
government. It further asserts that, in the Chevron case, it
was conceded that as a general rule, due notice is indeed
required before any imported article can be considered
impliedly abandoned, but Chevron’s nonentitlement to
such prior notice was legally justified because of the finding
of fraud established against it, rendering it impossible for
the BOC to comply with the due notice requirement under
the prevailing rules. Consequently, it is petitioner’s
conclusion that such finding of fraud is indispensable in
order to waive the “due notice requirement” that would
eventually consider the subject imported crude oil
impliedly abandoned in favor of the government.
In Chevron, we observed that:
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38
39
40
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41
42
The foregoing having been said, we must with equal
concern, go to the other timeline which is provided for in
Section 1603 of the TCCP, to wit:
Petitioner insists that, in the absence of fraud, the right
of respondent to claim against it has already prescribed
considering that an action involving the entry and payment
of customs duties involving imported articles demanded
after a period of one (1) year from the date of final payment
of duties, shall not succeed, pursuant to the clear provision
of Section 1603. It therefore contends that even if the
subject imported crude oil of petitioner is by law deemed
abandoned by operation of law under Section 1801(b), in
relation to Section 1301, of the Code, respondent’s right to
claim abandonment had already lapsed since fraud is
wanting in this case. On the other hand, respondent
counters that since there was a factual finding of fraud
committed by petitioner in the filing of its Import Entry
and Internal Revenue Declaration beyond the 30day
period prescribed under Section 1301 of the TCCP, the 1
year prescriptive period under Section 1603 therefore does
not apply.
At this point, it bears emphasis that in a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
only ques
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43
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46 Salcedo v. People, 400 Phil. 1302, 1304; 347 SCRA 499, 504505
(2000).
47 The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, 472
Phil. 11, 22; 428 SCRA 79, 8586 (2004).
48 Borromeo v. Sun, 375 Phil. 595, 602; 317 SCRA 176, 182 (1999).
49 The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals,
supra.
44
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45
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46
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57 Dizon v. Court of Tax Appeals, 576 Phil. 111, 128; 553 SCRA 111,
126 (2008); Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 547 Phil. 332, 339; 524 SCRA 73, 111
112 (2007); and Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Manila Mining
Corporation, 505 Phil. 650, 664; 468 SCRA 571, 588589 (2005).
58 AN ACT CREATING THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS.
59 AN ACT EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS
(CTA), ELEVATING ITS RANK TO THE LEVEL OF A COLLEGIATE COURT WITH
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE LAW CREATING THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES.
47
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48
court,62 this does not permit the trial court to consider the
same in view of the fact that the Rules prohibit it. The
reasoning forwarded by the CTA in Division in its
Resolution dated 24 February 2009, that the apparent
purpose of transmittal of the records is to enable it to
appreciate and properly review the proceedings and
findings before an administrative agency, is misplaced.
Unless any of the party formally offered in evidence said
Memorandum, and accordingly, admitted by the court a
quo, it cannot be considered as among the legal and factual
bases in resolving the controversy presented before it.
By analogy, in Dizon v. CTA,63 this Court underscored
the importance of a formal offer of evidence and the
corresponding admission thereafter. We quote:
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49
Per the records of this case, the BIR was directed to present its
evidence in the hearing of February 21, 1996, but BIR’s counsel
failed to appear. The CTA denied petitioner’s motion to consider
BIR’s presentation of evidence as waived, with a warning to BIR
that such presentation would be considered waived if BIR’s
evidence would not be presented at the next hearing. Again, in
the hearing of March 20, 1996, BIR’s counsel failed to appear.
Thus, in its Resolution dated March 21, 1996, the CTA considered
the BIR to have waived presentation of its evidence. In the same
Resolution, the parties were directed to file their respective
memorandum. Petitioner complied but BIR failed to do so. In all
of these proceedings, BIR was duly notified. Hence, in this case,
we are constrained to apply our ruling in Heirs of Pedro Pasag v.
Parocha:
50
Clearly therefore, evidence not formally offered during
the trial cannot be used for or against a partylitigant by
the trial court in deciding the merits of the case. Neither
may it be taken into account on appeal. Since the rule on
formal offer of evidence is not a trivial matter, failure to
make a formal offer within a considerable period of time
shall be deemed a waiver to submit it. Consequently, any
evidence that has not been offered and admitted thereafter
shall be excluded and rejected.
Moreover, even if not submitted as a contention herein,
We find it apropos to rule that the CTA likewise cannot
motu proprio justify the existence of fraud committed by
petitioner by applying the rules on judicial notice.
Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts which
judges may properly take and act on without proof because
they already know them.64 Under the Rules of Court,
judicial
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64 People v. Tundag, 396 Phil. 873, 887; 342 SCRA 704, 716 (2000).
51
RULE 129
What Need Not Be Proved
Section 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory.—A court shall
take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the
existence and territorial extent of states, their political history,
forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of
nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their
seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the
official acts of legislative, executive and judicial departments of
the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the
geographical divisions.
Section 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary.—A court may
take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or
are capable to unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be
known to judges because of their judicial functions.
Section 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary.—During
the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party,
may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter
and allow the parties to be heard thereon.
After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper
court, on its own initiative or on request of a party, may take
judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard
thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case.
x x x x
In relation thereto, it has been held that the doctrine of
judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the
courts; however, the power to take judicial notice is to be
exercised by the courts with caution; care must be taken
that the requisite
52
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65 Republic v. Court of Appeals, 194 Phil. 476, 495; 107 SCRA 504, 523
(1981).
66 Tabuena v. Court of Appeals, 274 Phil. 51, 57; 196 SCRA 650, 655
656 (1991).
67 Id., citing United States v. Claveria, 29 Phil. 527, 532 (1915).
53
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54
The above provision speaks of entry and passage free of
duty or settlements of duties. Generally, in customs law, the
term “entry” has a triple meaning, to wit: (1) the
documents filed at the customs house; (2) the submission
and acceptance of the documents and (3) the procedure of
passing goods through the customs house.69 As explained in
the Chevron case, it specifically refers to the filing and
acceptance of the Import Entry and Internal Revenue
Declaration of the imported article. Simply put, the entry of
imported goods at the custom house consists in submitting
them to the inspection of the revenue officers, together with
a statement or description of such goods, and the original
invoices of the same, for the purpose of estimating the
duties to be paid thereon.70 The term “duty” used therein
denotes a tax or impost due to the government upon the
importation or exportation of goods. It means that the
duties on imports signify not merely a duty on the act of
importation, but a duty on the thing imported. It is not
confined to a duty levied while the article is entering the
country, but extends to a duty levied after it has entered
the country.71
Based on the foregoing definitions, it is commonsensical
that the finality of liquidation referred to under Section
1603 covers the propriety of the submission and acceptance
of the Import Entry and Internal Revenue Declaration
covering the imported articles being brought in the country
for the sole
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69 Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, 318 Phil. 313, 325; 248 SCRA 288,
297 (1995).
70 Black’s Law Dictionary, p. 369, 6th edition.
71 Id., at p. 349.
55
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56
57
Basic is the rule that provisions of the law should be
read in relation to other provisions therein. A statute must
be interpreted to give it efficient operation and effect as a
whole avoiding the nullification of cognate provisions.
Statutes are read in a manner that makes it wholly
operative and effective, consistent with the legal maxim ut
res magis valeat quam pereat.
This maxim applied, we read Sections 1301, 1801, and
1802, together with Section 1603 of the TCCP. Thus,
should there be failure on the part of the owner, importer,
consignee or interested party, after due notice of the arrival
of its shipment (except in cases of knowledgeable owners or
importers), to file an entry within the nonextendible period
of 30 days from the date of discharge of the last package
(shipment) from the vessel, such owner, importer,
consignee or interested party is deemed to have abandoned
said shipment in favor of the government. As imperative,
however, is the strict compliance with Section 1603 of the
TCCP, which should be read as we have ruled. Any action
or claim questioning the propriety of the entry and
settlement of duties pertaining to such shipment made
beyond the 1year prescriptive period from the date of
payment of final duties, is barred by prescription. In the
present case, the failure on the part of respondent to timely
question the propriety of the entry and settlement of duties
by petitioner involving the subject shipment, renders such
entry and settlement of duties final and conclusive against
both parties. Hence, respondent cannot any longer have
any claim from petitioner. Sections 1301, 1801, and 1802 of
the TCCP have been rendered inoperable by reason of the
lapse of the period stated in Section 1603 of the same Code.
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58
CONCURRING OPINION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
I register my concurrence with the ponencia.
The Latin maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere
means stand by the thing and do not disturb the calm — a
bar from any attempt at relitigating the same issues. It
requires that high courts must follow, as a matter of sound
policy, their own precedents, or respect settled
jurisprudence absent compelling
59
Notwithstanding these glaring similarities, it cannot
hastily be concluded that Chevron is on all fours with the
case at bar; the two cases are diametrically opposed
insofar as the issue of fraud on the part of the
importer is concerned. While the Court’s ruling in
Chevron was that the existence of fraud therein was
sufficiently established, no
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1 Ting v. VelezTing, G.R. No. 166562, March 31, 2009, 582 SCRA 694.
2 G.R. No. 178759, August 11, 2008, 561 SCRA 710.
3 Dissenting Opinion, p. 67.
60
Pursuant to the above quoted provision, the attendance
of fraud would remove the case from the ambit of the
statute of limitations, and would consequently allow the
government to exercise its power to assess and collect
duties even beyond the oneyear prescriptive period,
rendering it virtually imprescriptible.
Exhaustively discussed by the ponencia was that no
scintilla of proof was ever offered in evidence by respondent
Commissioner of Customs to reinforce the claim that
Pilipinas Shell acted in bad faith, then a fortiori, in a
fraudulent manner, in its settlement of duties on its
imported crude oil. The February 2, 2001 Memorandum on
which the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), both in division and
En Banc, chiefly anchored the finding of fraudulent intent
was never formally offered, but was instead merely
included in the records of the proceedings before the
Bureau of Customs.
Respondent was remiss in presenting this crucial piece
of evidence in the de novo proceeding before the CTA. Much
has already been said by the ponencia about the adverse
effect of
61
It is this lack of proof of fraud that substantially alters
the terrain of the case, thereby precluding the applicability
of the doctrine of stare decisis. Though the circumstance
appears to be merely tangential, it is nevertheless the
critical element in resolving the issue on prescription.
Absent fraud, the government, through the BOC, is under
legal compulsion to assess and collect customs duties
within a strict oneyear period. As brought to fore by the
ponencia, respondent was regrettably remiss in complying
with the statutory mandate of Sec. 1603 of the TCC:5
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62
Upon expiration of the prescriptive period, respondent
was barred from further collecting from petitioner the
dutiable value of its imported crude oil. The hands of the
Court are then constrained. There is no other course of
action for us to take other than to grant the instant
petition.
Notably, Justice Peralta never questioned the finding of
the ponencia as regards respondent’s procedural lapse.
However, it is his postulation that the presence or even the
absence of fraud is irrelevant since Sec. 1603 of the TCC
does not find application in cases wherein the government
exercises its right over abandoned imported articles, rather
than its power to assess and collect taxes.
Unfortunately, I cannot join the dissent. I am perplexed
at the contradiction of how the argument is raised in the
same breath as the invocation of stare decisis. The irony
lies in the discussion in Chevron of the very same issue of
prescription and the coverage of Sec. 1603.
Aside from the presence or absence of fraud, it is
admitted that there is significant identity as to the factual
milieu of Chevron and the case at bar. Both are concerned
with the treatment of abandoned imported articles, and the
collection by the Commissioner of Customs of the dutiable
value pertaining thereto. In Chevron, we have categorically
ruled that “due to the presence of fraud, the prescriptive
period of the
63
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1 Ty v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, 689 Phil. 603, 613;
675 SCRA 339, 350 (2012).
2 Chinese Young Men’s Christian Association of the Philippine Islands
v. Remington Steel Corporation, 573 Phil. 320, 336; 550 SCRA 180, 197
198 (2008).
64
65
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3 The BOC’s Complaint was filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 25 and was docketed as Civil Case No. 02103239; Rollo,
pp. 724730.
4 Penned by Associate Justice Caesar A. Casanova, with the
concurrence of Presiding Justice Ernesto D. Acosta and Associate Justice
Lovell R. Bautista; id., at pp. 341353.
5 Id., at pp. 354358.
6 Penned by Associate Justice Olga PalancaEnriquez, with the
concurrence of Presiding Justice Ernesto D. Acosta and Associate Justices
Juanito C. Castañeda, Jr., Lovell R. Bautista and Erlinda P. Uy; id., at pp.
131156.
66
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67
Time and again, the Court has held that it is a very desirable
and necessary judicial practice that when a court has laid down a
principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will
adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which
the facts are substantially the same. Stare decisis et non quieta
movere. Stand by the decisions and disturb not what is settled.
Stare decisis simply means that for the sake of certainty, a
conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those
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that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though
the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of
justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations,
like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same
questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the
parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and
decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis a bar to any
attempt to relitigate the same issue.13
Nonetheless, petitioner contends that the ruling in
Chevron does not apply to the present case and relies on
the provisions of Section 1603 of the TCCP, which provides
as follows:
On the other hand, Sections 1301, 1801 and 1802 of the
TCCP, as amended by Republic Act No. 7651 (RA 7651),14
also provide:
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72 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporationvs. Commissioner of
Customs
The ponencia sustains petitioner’s contention and rules
that the provisions of Sections 1301, 1801 and 1802 of the
TCCP should be read in relation to Section 1603 to make
the whole statute wholly operative and effective. I agree
that a statute must be read or construed as a whole or in
its entirety and that all parts, provisions, or sections, must
be read, considered or construed together, and each must
be considered with respect to all others, and in harmony
with the whole.22 However, it would be error to rely on
petitioner’s fallacious premise that, under Section 1603 of
the TCCP, the government’s right to claim abandonment
and recover the dutiable value of the abandoned
importation is dependent on whether or not it (petitioner)
is guilty of fraud, and its subsequent
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the importers to work for the early release of cargo, thus decongesting all
ports of entry; (e) to facilitate the release of goods and thereby promoting
trade and commerce; and (f) to minimize the pilferage of imported cargo at
the ports of entry. (Emphasis ours)
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