Another development in the law has emphasized the fact that inferior courts shall

not lose jurisdiction over ejectment cases solely because the issue of ownership
is interwoven with the issue of possession. Under the 1983 Rules on Summary
Procedure, as amended by a resolution of this Court that took effect on
November 15, 1991, all forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases shall be tried
pursuant to the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, regardless of whether
or not the issue of ownership of the subject property is alleged by a party. 23 In
other words, even if there is a need to resolve the issue of ownership, such fact
will not deprive the inferior courts of jurisdiction over ejectment
cases 24 that shall be tried summarily.

When the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts was expanded, thereby amending Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, by virtue of Republic Act No. 7691 that took effect on April
15, 1994, the jurisdiction of said courts over ejectment cases was retained. Thus,
in Hilario v. Court of Appeals this Court said:

. . . . As the law now stands, inferior courts retain jurisdiction over ejectment
cases even if the question of possession cannot be resolved without passing
upon the issue of ownership; but this is subject to the same caveat that the
issue posed as to ownership could be resolved by the court for the sole
purpose of determining the issue of possession.

Thus, an adjudication made therein regarding the issue of ownership should be

regarded as merely provisional and, therefore, would not bar or prejudice an
action between the same parties involving title to the land. The foregoing doctrine
is a necessary consequence of the nature of forcible entry and unlawful detainer
cases where the only issue to be settled is the physical or material possession
over the real property, that is, possession de facto and not possession de jure.

In other words, inferior courts are now "conditionally vested with adjudicatory
power over the issue of title or ownership raised by the parties in an ejectment
suit." 25 These courts shall resolve the question of ownership raised as an
incident in an ejectment case where a determination thereof is necessary for a
proper and complete adjudication of the issue of possession. Considering the
difficulties that are usually encountered by inferior courts as regards the extent of
their power in determining the issue of ownership, in Sps. Refugia v. Court of
Appeals, the Court set out guidelines to be observed in the implementation of
the law which, as stated at the outset, has recently been restated in the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. The guidelines pertinent to this case state:

1. The primal rule is that the principal issue must be that of possession, and that
ownership is merely ancillary thereto, in which case the issue of ownership
may be resolved but only for the purpose of determining the issue of possession.
Thus, . . ., the legal provision under consideration applies only where the inferior
court believes and the preponderance of evidence shows that a resolution of the
issue of possession is dependent upon the resolution of the question of
ownership.

2. It must sufficiently appear from the allegations in the complaint that what the
plaintiff really and primarily seeks is the restoration of possession. Consequently,
where the allegations of the complaint as well as the reliefs prayed for clearly
establish a case for the recovery of ownership, and not merely one for the
recovery of possession de facto, or where the averments plead the claim of
material possession as a mere elemental attribute of such claim for ownership,
or where the issue of ownership is the principal question to be resolved, the
action is not one for forcible entry but one for title to real property.

xxx xxx xxx

5. Where the question of who has the prior possession hinges on the question of
who the real owner of the disputed portion is, the inferior court may resolve the
issue of ownership and make a declaration as to who among the contending
parties is the real owner. In the same vein, where the resolution of the issue of
possession hinges on a determination of the validity and interpretation of the
document of title or any other contract on which the claim of possession is
premised, the inferior court may likewise pass upon these issues. This is
because, and it must be so understood, that any such pronouncement made
 affecting ownership of the disputed portion is to be regarded merely as
provisional, hence, does not bar nor prejudice an action between the same
parties involving title to the land. Moreover, Section 7, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court expressly provides that the judgment rendered in an action for forcible
entry or unlawful detainer shall be effective with respect to the possession only
and in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building. 26
(Emphasis supplied.)

In the case at bar, petitioners clearly intended recovery of possession over the
Gilmore property. They alleged in their complaint for unlawful detainer that their
claim for possession is buttressed by the execution of the Deed of Sale with
Assumption of Mortgage, a copy of which was attached as Annex "A" to the
complaint and by the issuance of TCT No. 67990 that evidenced the transfer of
ownership over the property. 27 Because metropolitan trial courts are
authorized to look into the ownership of the property in controversy in ejectment
cases, it behooved MTC Branch 41 to examine the bases for petitioners' claim of
ownership that entailed interpretation of the Deed of Sale with Assumption of
Mortgage.

G.R. No. 125766 October 19, 1998

FELICIDAD L. ORONCE and ROSITA L. FLAMINIANO, petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PRICILIANO B. GONZALES
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

The issue of ownership may be passed upon by the MTC to settle the issue of
possession. 15 Such disposition, however, is not final insofar as the issue of
ownership is concerned, 16 which may be the subject of another proceeding
brought specifically to settle that question.

G.R. No. 137650 April 12, 2000

GUILLERMA TUMLOS, petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES MARIO FERNANDEZ and LOURDES FERNANDEZ

CITING:

15 Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. —

xxx xxx xxx

2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful

detainer: Provided, That when, in such cases, the defendant raises the question
of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be
resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall
be resolved only to determine the issue of possession; (Sec. 33, B.P. 129).

Sec. 16. Resolving defense of ownership. — When the defendant raises the
defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot
be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership
shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession. (Sec. 16, Rule 70,
1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure)

16 For an extensive discussion of the subject matter, see Refugia v. CA, 258
SCRA 347, July 5, 1996. See also Dizon v. CA 264 SCRA 391, November 19,
1996.

All amounts so paid to the appellate court shall be deposited with said court or
authorized government depositary bank, and shall be held there until the final disposition
of the appeal, unless the court, by agreement of the interested parties, or in the absence
of reasonable grounds of opposition to a motion to withdraw, or for justifiable reasons,
shall decree otherwise. Should the defendant fail to make the payments above prescribed
from time to time during the pendency of the appeal, the appellate court, upon motion of
the plaintiff, and upon proof of such failure, shall order the execution of the judgment
appealed from with respect to the restoration of possession, but such execution shall not
be a bar to the appeal taking its course until the final disposition thereof on the merits.
G.R. No. 179161 January 22, 2010

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner,

vs.
DKS INTERNATIONAL, INC. Respondents.

88888888888888

Case records readily disclosed that the ownership of the subject lot belongs
to the late Arsenio E. Concepcion, married to herein Plaintiff-Appellee Nenita
S. Concepcion, as evidenced by the Transfer Certificate of Title No. 12892
(Annex ”A” in the complaint for Unlawful Detainer). This Certificate of Title
shall be received as evidence in all courts of the Philippines and shall be
conclusive as to all matters contained therein principally, the identity of the
owner of the land covered thereby except as provided in the Land
Registration Act. Said title can be attacked only for fraud within one year
after the date of the issuance of the decree of registration. Such attack must
be direct and not by a collateral proceeding. The title represented by the
certificate cannot be changed, altered, modified, enlarged or diminished in a
collateral proceeding such as this instant appeal from the decision rendered
by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City in an ejectment case.
As should be known by Appellant Soriente through counsel, no title to
registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession. Prescription is unavailing not
only against the registered owner Arsenio E. Concepcion but also against his
hereditary successors because the latter merely steps into the shoes of the
decedent by operation of law and are merely the continuation of the
personalities of their predecessors-in-interest (Barcelona v. Barcelona, 100
Phil 251; PD 1529, Sec. 47). x x x

xxxx

Noteworthy to mention in the case at bar is the ruling laid down in Calubayan
v. Pascual, 21 SCRA 146, where the Supreme Court [held] that a person
who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission,
without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied
promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for
ejectment is the proper remedy against [him]. x x x [19]

ANGELINA SORIENTE and ALLG.R. No. 160239

OTHER PERSONS CLAIMING RIGHTS
UNDER HER, Present:

Petitioners, CORONA, J., Chairperson,

- versus - CHICO-NAZARIO,

THE ESTATE OF THE LATE ARSENIOVELASCO, JR.,

E. CONCEPCION, represented by
NENITA S. CONCEPCION, NACHURA, and

Respondents. crared PERALTA, JJ.

Promulgated:

November 25, 2009

Tenants are never allowed to deny the title of their landlord, nor set up a title against him,
acquired by the tenant during the tenancy which is hostile in its character to that which he
acknowledged in accepting the demise, the rule being that whenever the possession is
acquired under any species of tenancy, whether the action be assumpsit, debt, covenant,
or ejectment, the tenant is estopped from denying the title of the landlord. Taylor, Land.
and Ten., secs. 629, 705; Jackson v. Harper, 5 Wend. (N.Y.) 246; Sharp v. Kelley, 5 Den.
(N.Y.) 431; Doe v. Smythe, 4 M. & S. 347

Williams v. Morris, 95 U.S. 444 (1877)

In the instant case, the Court of Appeals correctly relied on the transfer certificate
of title in the name of the respondent. 10 As registered owner, respondent had the
right to the possession of the property; which is one of the attributes of his
ownership thereof. Petitioners' argument that respondent is not the true owner of
the land is a collateral attack on his title, which is not allowed. Respondent's title
can only be challenged in a direct action, for it is well settled that a certificate of
title cannot be subject to collateral attack and can be altered, modified or
cancelled only in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. Having obtained a
valid title over the subject lot, respondent is entitled to protection against indirect
attacks against his title.11

Anent, the issue of whether petitioner's occupancy of the premises was by mere
tolerance of respondent, suffice it to state that this has been settled by the
Metropolitan Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals.
Moreover, the issue boils down to a question of fact, which is beyond the
province of this Court. Factual findings of the appellate court are generally
conclusive on this Court which is not a trier of facts. It is not the function of the
Supreme Court to analyze or weigh evidence all over again. 12

Considering that petitioners were in possession of the subject property by sheer

tolerance of its owners, they knew that their occupation of the premises may be
terminated any time. Persons who occupy the land of another at the latter's
tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily
bound by an implied promise that they will vacate the same upon demand, failing
in which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them. 13

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals

dated October 5, 2001 in CA-G.R. SP No. 38739 is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr ., C .J ., Vitug, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ ., concur.

Footnotes

1
Penned by Associate Justice Cancio C. Garcia; concurred in by Associate Justices Hilarion L. Aquino and Edgardo P.
Cruz.

2
Rollo, pp. 37-44.

3
Rollo, p. 45; penned by Judge Virgilio N. Jiro.

4
Rollo, p. 50.

5
Id., p. 26.

6
Id., p. 164.

7
Id., p. 33.

8
Id., p. 16.

9
G.R. No. 126638, 6 February 2002.
 Embrado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 51457, 27 June 1994, 233 SCRA 335, see also Republic v. Court of Appeals,
10

G.R. No. 108998, 24 August 1994, 235 SCRA 567.

11
Tan v. Philippine Banking Corp., G.R. No. 137739, 26 March 2001.

12
Mendezona v. Ozamiz, G.R. No. 143370, 6 February 2002.

13
Pada-Kilario v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 134329, 19 January 2000.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

This is so because the respondent's title can only be challenged in a direct action, for it is
well settled that a certificate of title cannot be subject to collateral attack and can be
altered, modified or cancelled only in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. G.R. No. 23

146513 July 30, 2004

LUCIA G. MIRANDA, petitioner,

vs.
ESPERANZA B. BESA, respondent.

On this score, it has been ruled that certificate of title is conclusive evidence not only of
ownership of the land referred to but also its location (Odsigue vs. Court of Appeals, 233
SCRA 626).

A certificate of title is a conclusive evidence of ownership. It does not even matter if the
title is questionable, the instant action being an ejectment suit. (Dizon vs. Court of
Appeals, 264 SCRA 391 [1996

The defense interposed by the defendants, particularly Felipe

Raymundo and Pedro Garcia, is that they, on the contrary and not the
plaintiff, are the respective owners of Lots 3 and 2 of the San
Francisco del Monte Subdivision, having been purchased from the
mutual loan and savings association "Tiyaga at Pagtitipid" composed
exclusively of employees of the said Francisco del Monte
Subdivision, and to this effect they exhibited the receipts for
installment payment (Exhs. 1, 1-A and 1-B) issued by "Tiyaga at
Pagtitipid" in favor of defendant Felipe Raymundo as well as the tax
declaration and a certificate of tax payment of Lot 3; that said
defendants have been in possession openly, continuously and in
concept of owner for more than 30 years, and that all these fact were
known to the plaintiff as he was their co-employee in the "Tiyaga at
Pagtitipid", reason which they were never asked by him to vacate the
premises in question until he filed the present action.

This being an ejectment case, the Court believes and so hold, that
the only question to be determined is whether the plaintiff is the
registered owner of the lots under litigation whether the defendants
unlawfully entered into possession of said lots. While on one hand,
the plaintiff presented Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 70981 and
68207, which shows that he is the absolute owner of the land in
litigation, the defendants on their part failed to introduce any evidence
or document with color of title. The possession of the plaintiff is an
attribute ownership, and the contention of the defendants that they
purchased said lots from "Tiyaga at Pagtitipid" without having been
issued any valid title to the property, cannot in any way operate to
legalize the occupation and enjoyment thereafter of the premises by
said defendants who are mere intruders in the land. Hence,
conformably with an owner's right to possess his property, plaintiff, as
the registered owner, has the right to possess and enjoy subject land
to the exclusion of the defendants. Their efforts to amend the answer
to allege that said titles were obtained thru fraud, cannot be brought
up as an issue in the present case, this being a mere action for
ejectment. That issue would be brought in an independent action.
 In the instant case, the Court of Appeals correctly relied on the transfer
certificate of title in the name of the respondent. 1[10]
As registered owner,
respondent had the right to the possession of the property, which is one of the
attributes of his ownership thereof. Petitioners’ argument that respondent is not
the true owner of the land is a collateral attack on his title, which is not allowed.
Respondent’s title can only be challenged in a direct action, for it is well settled
that a certificate of title cannot be subject to collateral attack and can be altered,
modified or cancelled only in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. Having
obtained a valid title over the subject lot, respondent is entitled to protection
against indirect attacks against his title.
2[11]

[G.R. Nos. 150820-21. April 30, 2003]

SPOUSES ANTONIO and GENOVEVA BALANON-ANICETE and

SPOUSES ANDRES and FILOMENA BALANON-
MANANQUIL, petitioners, vs. PEDRO BALANON
(Represented by his legal heir JEAN BALANON
QUIAMBAO), respondent.
The crux of the controversy centers on the propriety of the unlawful
detainer suit. In unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession
thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession
under any contract, express or implied.3[27] In such case, the possession was
originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or termination of the
right to possess; hence, the issue of rightful possession is decisive for, in
such action, the defendant is in actual possession and the plaintiff’s cause of
action is the termination of the defendant’s right to continue in possession.4[28]

Forum-shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are

present, namely: (a) identity of parties or at least such as representing the
same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity in
the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in one
would, regardless of which party is successful, amounts to res judicata in the
other.5[23]

1
2
3
4
5
 Petitioner and respondent are the same parties in the annulment and
ejectment cases. The issue of ownership was likewise being contended, with
same set of evidence being presented in both cases. However, it cannot be
inferred that a judgment in the ejectment case would amount to res judicata
in the annulment case, and vice-versa.

This issue is hardly a novel one. It has been laid to rest by heaps of
cases iterating the principle that a judgment rendered in an ejectment case
shall not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land or
building nor shall it be conclusive as to the facts therein found in a case
between the same parties upon a different cause of action involving
possession.6[24]

It bears emphasizing that in ejectment suits, the only issue for

resolution is the physical or material possession of the property involved,
independent of any claim of ownership by any of the party litigants.
However, the issue of ownership may be provisionally ruled upon for the
sole purpose of determining who is entitled to possession de facto.7[25]
Therefore, the provisional determination of ownership in the ejectment case
cannot be clothed with finality.

Corollarily, the incidental issue of whether a pending action for

annulment would abate an ejectment suit must be resolved in the negative.

A pending action involving ownership of the same property does not

bar the filing or consideration of an ejectment suit, nor suspend the
proceedings. This is so because an ejectment case is simply designed to
summarily restore physical possession of a piece of land or building to one
who has been illegally or forcibly deprived thereof, without prejudice to the
settlement of the parties' opposing claims of juridical possession in
appropriate proceedings.8[26]

6
7
8
 The crux of the controversy centers on the propriety of the unlawful
detainer suit. In unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession
thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession
under any contract, express or implied.9[27] In such case, the possession was
originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or termination of the
right to possess; hence, the issue of rightful possession is decisive for, in
such action, the defendant is in actual possession and the plaintiff’s cause of
action is the termination of the defendant’s right to continue in possession. 10
[28]

Well-entrenched is the rule that a Certificate of Title is generally a

conclusive evidence of [ownership] of the land. There is that
strong and solid presumption that titles were legally issued
and that they are valid. It is irrevocable and indefeasible and
the duty of the Court is to see to it that the title is maintained
and respected unless challenged in a direct proceeding. xxx
The title shall be received as evidence in all the Courts and
shall be conclusive as to all matters contained therein.
SEVENTH DAY ADVENTIST G.R. No.
150416
CONFERENCE CHURCH OF
SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES, INC.,
and/or represented by MANASSEH
C. ARRANGUEZ, BRIGIDO P.
GULAY, FRANCISCO M.
LUCENARA,
DIONICES O. TIPGOS, LORESTO
C. MURILLON, ISRAEL C. NINAL,
GEORGE G. SOMOSOT, JESSIE
T. ORBISO, LORETO PAEL and
JOEL BACUBAS,
Petitioners, Present:

PUNO, J., Chairperson,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- versus - CORONA,
AZCUNA and
GARCIA, JJ.

NORTHEASTERN MINDANAO
MISSION OF SEVENTH DAY
ADVENTIST, INC., and/or
represented by JOSUE A. LAYON,
WENDELL M. SERRANO,
FLORANTE
9
10
P. TY and JETHRO CALAHAT
and/or SEVENTH DAY
ADVENTIST
CHURCH [OF] NORTHEASTERN
MINDANAO MISSION,*
Respondents. Promulgated:

July 21, 2006

******************************************************************

In Valdez v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that where the complaint did not satisfy the
19

jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the municipal trial court had
no jurisdiction over the case. Thus:

To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the plaintiff’s supposed acts of
tolerance must have been present right from the start of the possession which is later sought
to be recovered. Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from the start, an action for
unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy. As explained in Sarona v. Villegas:

But even where possession preceding the suit is by tolerance of the owner, still, distinction
should be made.

If right at the incipiency defendant’s possession was with plaintiff’s tolerance, we do not
doubt that the latter may require him to vacate the premises and sue before the inferior court
under Section 1 of Rule 70, within one year from the date of the demand to vacate.

xxxx

A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word "tolerance" confirms our view
heretofore expressed that such tolerance must be present right from the start of possession
sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer - not of
forcible entry. Indeed, to hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous doctrine. And for two
reasons:First. Forcible entry into the land is an open challenge tothe right of the possessor.
Violation of that right authorizes the speedy redress – in the inferior court - provided for in the
rules. If one year from the forcible entry is allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then the
remedy ceases to bespeedy; and the possessor is deemed to have waived his right to seek
relief in the inferior court. Second,if a forcible entry action in the inferior courtis allowed after
the lapse of a number of years, then the result may well be that no action of forcible entry
can really prescribe. No matter how long such defendant is in physical possession, plaintiff
will merely make a demand, bring suit in the inferior court – upon a plea of tolerance to
prevent prescription to set in - and summarily throw him out of the land. Such a conclusion is
unreasonable. Especially if we bear in mind the postulates that proceedings of forcible entry
and unlawful detainer are summary in nature, and that the one year time-bar to suit is but in
pursuance of the summary nature of the action. (Italics and underscoring supplied)

It is the nature of defendant’s entry into the land which determines the cause of action,
whether it is forcible entry or unlawful detainer. If the entry is illegal, then the action which
may be filed against the intruder is forcible entry. If, however, the entry is legal but the
possession thereafter becomes illegal, the case is unlawful detainer.

Indeed, to vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant, it is necessary
that the complaint should embody such a statement of facts as brings the party clearly within
the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are
summary in nature. The complaint must show enough on its face the court jurisdiction
without resort to parol testimony.

The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to
aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how
entry was affected or how and when dispossession started, the remedy should either be an
accion publicianaor an accion reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial court. Thus, in Go, Jr.
v. Court of Appeals, petitioners filed an unlawful detainer case against respondent alleging
that they were the owners of the parcel of land through intestate succession which was
occupied by respondent by mere tolerance of petitioners as well as their deceased mother.

*
Resolving the issue on whether or not petitioners’ case for unlawful detainer will prosper, the
court ruled:

Petitioners alleged in their complaint that they inherited the property registered under TCT
No. C-32110 from their parents; that possession thereof by private respondent was by
tolerance of their mother, and after her death, by their own tolerance; and that they had
served written demand on December, 1994, but that private respondent refused to vacate
the property. x x x

It is settled that one whose stay is merely tolerated becomes a deforciant illegally occupying
the land the moment he is required to leave. It is essential in unlawful detainer cases of this
kind, that plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of
the possession which is later sought to be recovered. This is where petitioners’ cause of
action fails. The appellate court, in full agreement with the MTC made the conclusion that the
alleged tolerance by their mother and after her death, by them, was unsubstantiated. x x x

The evidence revealed that the possession of defendant was illegal at the inception and not
merely tolerated as alleged in the complaint, considering that defendant started to occupy
the subject lot and then built a house thereon without the permission and consent of
petitioners and before them, their mother. xxx Clearly, defendant’s entry into the land was
effected clandestinely, without the knowledge of the owners, consequently, it is categorized
as possession by stealth which is forcible entry. As explained in Sarona vs. Villegas, cited in
Muñoz vs. Court of Appeals[224 SCRA 216 (1992)] tolerance must be present right from the
start of possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of
unlawful detainer not of forcible entry x x x.

xxxx

In the instant case, the allegations in the complaint do not contain any averment of fact that
would substantiate petitioners’ claim that they permitted or tolerated the occupation of the
property by respondents. The complaint contains only bare allegations that "respondents
without any color of title whatsoever occupies the land in question by building their house in
the said land thereby depriving petitioners the possession thereof." Nothing has been said on
how respondents’ entry was effected or how and when dispossession started. Admittedly, no
express contract existed between the parties. This failure of petitioners to allege the key
jurisdictional facts constitutive of unlawful detainer is fatal. Since the complaint did not satisfy
the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the municipal trial court
had no jurisdiction over the case.It is in this light that this Court finds that the Court of
Appeals correctly found that the municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over the complaint.
(Emphasis supplied.)

The complaint in this case is similarly defective as it failed to allege how and when entry was
effected. The bare allegation of petitioner that "sometime in May, 2007, she discovered that
the defendants have enterep the subject property and occupied the same", as correctly
found by the MCTC and CA, would show that respondents entered the land and built their
houses thereon clandestinely and without petitioner's consent, which facts are constitutive of
forcible entry, not unlawful detainer. Consequently, the MCTC has no jurisdiction over the
case and the RTC clearly erred in reversing the lower court's ruling and granting reliefs
prayed for by the petitioner.

Lastly, petitioner's argument that the CA gravely erred in nullifying a final and executory
judgment of the RTC deserves scant consideration.

It is well-settled that a court's jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings,
even on appeal. The reason is that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it affects the
very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the
action. Indeed, a void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the
20

source of any right nor the creator of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all
claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final and any writ
of execution based on it is void.21

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated June 20, 2012 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 123195 is hereby AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice

G.R. No. 202354 September 24, 2014

AMADA C. ZACARIAS, Petitioner,

vs.
VICTORIA ANACAY, EDNA ANACAY, CYNTHIAANACAYGUISIC, ANGELITO ANACAY,
JERMIL ISRAEL, JIMMY ROY ISRAEL and all other persons claiming authority under
them, Respondents.

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
Associate Justice

ATT E STATI O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

PRESBITEO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

C E RTI F I CATI O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
Rollo, pp. 30-43. Penned by Associate Justice Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo and
concurred in by Associate Justices Franchito N. Diamante and Edwin D. Sorongon.

2
Id. at 100-107. Penned by Acting Presiding Judge Emma S. Young.

3
Id. at 66-87. Penned by Presiding Judge Ma. Victoria N. Cupin-Tesorero.

4
Records, pp. 1-6.

5
Id. at 54-56.

6
Rollo, p. 87.

7
Id. at 107.
 8
Records, p. 202.

9
Id. at 203-209, 212-229.

10
Rollo, p. 42.

11
Pagadora v. Ilao, G.R. No. 165769, December 12, 2011, 662 SCRA 14, 30.

12
SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. − Subject to the provisions
of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or
building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee,
or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully
withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of
any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such
lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after
such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper
Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or
depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the
restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs.

Pagadora v. Ilao, supra note 11, at 30-31, citing Delos Reyes v. Odones, G.R. No.
13

178096, March 23, 2011, 646 SCRA 328, 334 and Sarmienta v. Manalite
Homeowners Association, Inc. (MAHA), G.R. No. 182953, October 11, 2010, 632
SCRA 538, 545-546.

14
Del Rosario v. Sps. Manuel, 464 Phil. 1053, 1057 (2004).

15
604 Phil. 59, 66 (2009).

16
As cited in Canlas v. Tubil, 616 Phil. 915, 925 (2009).

17
Records, pp. 2-3.

Canlas v. Tubil, supra note 16, at 924, citing Valdez v. Court of Appeals, 523 Phil.
18

39, 46 (2006).

19
Id. at 47-51.

20
Sales v. Barro, 594 Phil. 116, 123 (2008), citing Figueroa v. People, 580 Phil. 58, 76
(2008).

21
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v. Alejo, 417 Phil. 303, 318 (2001).

*********************
Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who illegally
withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under
any contract, express or implied. The possession by the defendant in unlawful detainer is
originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to
possess. 29

August 24, 2016

G.R. No. 213187

HAIDE BULALACAO-SORIANO, Petitioner

vs.
ERNESTO PAPINA, represented by ROSEMARY PAPINA-ZABALA, Respondent

CITING: Republic v. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation, G.R. No. 194880, June 20,
2012, 674 SCRA 320, 341,

Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. – Subject to the provisions of the next
succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against
whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or
termination of the rightto hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or
the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person,
may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons
unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under
them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs. (Emphasis
supplied)

The complaint must further allege the plaintiff’s compliance with the jurisdictional requirement
of demand as prescribed by Section 2, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, viz:

Section 2. Lessor to proceed against lessee only after demand. — Unless otherwise
stipulated, suchaction by the lessor shall be commenced only after demand to pay orcomply
with the conditions of the lease and to vacate is made upon the lessee, or by serving written
notice of such demand upon the person found on the premises, or by posting such notice on
the premises if no person be found thereon, and the lessee fails to comply therewith after
fifteen (15) days in the case of land or five (5) days in the case of buildings.

For the action to come under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC, therefore, the
complaint must allege that: (a) the defendant originally had lawful possession of the property,
either by virtue of a contract or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (b) the defendant’s possession of
the property eventually became illegal or unlawful upon notice by the plaintiff to the
defendant of the expiration or the termination of the defendant’s right of possession; (c) the
defendant thereafter remained in possession of the property and thereby deprived the
plaintiff the enjoyment thereof; and (d) the plaintiff instituted the action within one year from
the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession. 31

31
Delos Reyes v. Odones, G.R. No. 178096, March 23, 2011, 646 SCRA 328, 334-335.

**************

Jurisdiction is based on the allegations in the complaint.

On the first issue, the allegations in the complaint determine the nature of an action and
jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction does not depend on the complaint’s caption. Nor is
5 6

jurisdiction changed by the defenses in the answer; otherwise, the defendant may easily
delay a case by raising other issues, then, claim lack of jurisdiction.7

To make a case for unlawful detainer, the complaint must allege that: (a) initially, the
defendant lawfully possessed the property, either by contract or by plaintiff’s tolerance; (b)
the plaintiff notified the defendant that his right of possession is terminated; (c) the
defendant remained in possession and deprived plaintiff of its enjoyment; and (d) the
plaintiff filed a complaint within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the
property. 8

SPOUSES HERMINIO E. ERORITA and EDITHA C. ERORITA, Petitioners,

vs.
SPOUSES LIGAYA DUMLAO and ANTONIO DUMLAO, Respondents.

January 25, 2016

G.R. No. 195477

CITING: Spouses Flores-Cruz v. Spouses Goli-Cruz, G.R. No. 172217, September 18,
5

2009, 600 SCRA 545.

6
Hilario v. Heirs of Salvador, G.R. No. 160384, April 29, 2005, 457 SCRA 815.

7
Spouses Cruz v. Spouses Torres, G.R. No. 121939, October 4, 1999, 316 SCRA
193; Larano v. Calendacion, G.R. No. 158231, June 19, 2007, 525 SCRA 57.

8
Corpuz v. Spouses Agustin, G.R. No. 183822, January 18, 2012, 663 SCRA 350 citing
Canlas v. Tubil, G.R. No. 184285, September 25, 2009, 601 SCRA 147.
**********************************

THE COURT'S RULING

We affirm the dismissal of the subject ejectment complaint.

DISCUSSION

It is immediately observable that the petition ill persuades. While the petition rhapsodizes on the
supposed merits of the subject Complaint for Unlawful. Detainer with Damages as an action for
unlawful detainer viz, "We believe that the elements of unlawful detainer have been sufficiently, if
not substantially, established by Petitioner in the case below", 33 it does not refer to any specific
averment in said complaint to support this critical point.

Such failure is fatal. What is at issue before this Court is the jurisdiction of the MCTC over the
complaint at bar. The basic rule is that what determines the nature of an action, as well as the court
which has jurisdiction over it, are the allegations in the complaint. 34 In ejectment complaints, such
allegations must correspond to the classes of actions defined and provided for in Section 1, Rule
70 of the Rules of Court, namely forcible entry and unlawful detainer. 35

The complaint at bar identifies itself as an unlawful detainer suit. In Cabrera v. Getaruela,36 the
Court held that a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the
following:

1. That initially, the possession of the property by the defendant was by contract with or by
tolerance of the plaintiff;

2. That eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the
termination of the latter's right of possession;
3. That thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the
plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
4. That within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the
plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.37

These averments are jurisdictional and must appear on the face of the complaint. 38 As demonstrable
on its face, the subject complaint fails to aver, at the very least, the first and the second recitals.
We thus agree with both the RTC and the CA that it fails to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of
an action for unlawful detainer, following which, the MCTC could not exercise jurisdiction over it.

Incidentally, we agree with the appellate court that the recitals in the complaint are more in tune
with those in a complaint for forcible entry. In Zacarias v. Anacay,39 we gave this observation on the
supposed "unlawful detainer" complaint subject of that case:

The bare allegation of petitioner that "sometime in May, 2007" she discovered that the defendants
have entered the subject property and occupied the same," as correctly found by the MCTC and CA,
would show that respondents entered the land and built their houses thereon clandestinely and
without petitioner's consent, which facts are constitutive of forcible entry, not unlawful detainer. 40

We likewise agree with the conclusion that the MCTC would still not be able to validly exercise
jurisdiction over the subject complaint even if it were to be treated as an action for forcible entry.
That said, we cannot agree with how CA reached this conclusion. To recall, according to the
appellate court, the subject complaint could not be deemed a viable action for forcible entry
because it did not aver a date as to when respondent had entered the premises of Cadastral Lot No.
77. Such rationale is not consistent with our above quoted observation in Zacarias v. Anacay. To
this Court's mind, then, the proper basis lies in the subject ejectment complaint's failure to be filed
on time. In Nuñez v. Slteas Phoenix Solutions, Inc.,41we held:

The one-year period within which to bring an action for forcible entry is generally counted from the
date of actual entry on the land, except that when the entry is through stealth, the one-year period
is counted from the time plaintiff learned thereof.42

In the present case, petitioner discovered respondent's entry "Sometime on January

2005."43 Hence, he had until January 2006 within which to file the necessary ejectment suit. He filed
the present complaint over a year later, on 8 December 2006.

Given the foregoing, the rest of the arguments in the petition warrant little consideration. Suffice it
to say that the petition also raises a question of fact that the Court cannot entertain under Rule 45.

A note in passing. We are aware that with the dismissal of the present petition, the controversy
between the parties may or may not still subsist. In similar vein, we have previously observed that
when the complaint fails to aver the facts constitutive of forcible or unlawful detainer, as where it
does not state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession started, the remedy should
either be accion publiciana or an accion reinvindicatoria44 filed before the proper RTC. Should any
controversy still subsist between the parties, they may review their options and decide on their
proper recourses. For now, the recourse of the petitioner to ejectment must be dismissed. 45
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated 6 March 2012 and the
Resolution dated 31 May 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 120649 are
hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Bersamin, Leonen, and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 202217, April 25, 2018

PABLO C. HIDALGO, Petitioner, v. SONIA VELASCO, Respondent.

DECISION

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that on April 25, 2018 a Decision, copy attached hereto, was rendered by the
Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office on May
23, 2018 at 10:58 a.m.

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITAN

Division Clerk of Court

Endnotes:

Rollo, pp. 3-25; Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

1

2
Id. at 26-38; penned by Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican, and concurred in by Associate
Justices Aurora C. Lantion and Ramon A. Cruz.

3
Id. at 39-40.

4
Id. at 161-162; Resolution dated 16 July 2012; Id. at 25; Resolution dated 25 February 2013.

5
Id. at 163-165; Comment.

6
Id. at 186-189; Reply.

7
ld. at 79.

8
Id. at 27-28.

9
Id. at 41-45.

10
Id. at 6-7.

11
Id. at 51-53.

12
Id. at 79.

13
Id. at 54-76.

14
Id. at 78-87.
15
Id. at 81-83.

16
Id. at 83.

17
Id. at 85.

18
Id. at 79.

19
Id. at 86.

20
Id. at 87.

21
Id. at 88-91.

22
Id. at 89 90.

23
ld. at 98-103.

24
Id. at 100.

25
Id. at 103.

26
Id. at 104-109

27
Id. at 111; Order dated 11 July 2011.

28
Id. at 36-37.

29
Id. at 14.

30
Id. at 19.

31
Id.

32
Id. at 21.

33
Rollo, p. 14.

34
Cf. Zacarias v. Anacay, 744 Phil. 201, 207 (2014).

35
Id. at 207-208

36
604 Phil. 59 (2009).

37
Id. at 66.

38
C.f. Zacarias vs Anacay, supra note 34 at 211.

39
Supra note 34.

40
Id. at 213.

41
632 Phil. 143 (2010).

42
Id. at 153.

43
Rollo, p. 42.

44
Serdoncillo v. Benolirao, 358 Phil. 83, 95 (1998) citing Sarmiento v. CA, 320 Phil. 146, 156 (1995)

45
Cf. Quijano v. Amante, 745 Phil. 40, 53 (2014).

Article 151 of the Family Code provides:

Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear
from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been
made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were, in fact, made,
the case must be dismissed.
This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the
Civil Code.

The phrase "members of the family" must be construed in relation to Article 150 of the Family
Code, to wit:

Art. 150. Family relations include those:

(1) Between husband and wife;

(2) Between parents and children;

(3) Among other ascendants and descendants; and

(4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-blood.

Article 151 of the Family code must be construed strictly, it being an exception to the general
rule. Hence, a sister-in-law or brother-in-law is not included in the enumeration. 22

******************
a party's failure to comply with this provision before filing a complaint against a family member
31
would render such complaint premature;
Martinez v. Martinez, 500 Phil. 332, 339 (2005),
888

Generally, the court should only look into the facts alleged in the complaint to determine
whether a suit is within its jurisdiction. 20

G.R. No. 199133 September 29, 2014

ESPERANZA TUMPAG, substituted by her son, PABLITO TUMPAG BELNAS,

JR., Petitioner,
vs.
SAMUEL TUMPAG, R

888888888

It is a hornbook doctrine that the court should only look into the facts alleged in the
complaint to determine whether a suit is within its jurisdiction. According to the case
28

of Spouses Cruz v. Spouses Cruz, et al., only these facts can be the basis of the court's
29

competence to take cognizance of a case, and that one cannot advert to anything not set
forth in the complaint, such as evidence adduced at the trial, to determine the nature of the
action thereby initiated. 30

November 29, 2017

G.R. No. 221815

GLYNNA FORONDA-CRYSTAL, Petitioner

vs.
ANIANA LAWAS SON, Respondent

Citing:
28
Tumpag v. Tumpag, G.R. No. 199133, September 29, 2014, 737 SCRA 62, 69.

29
616 Phil. 519 (2009).

30
Id. at 523-524.

888
Jurisprudence has consistently held that "[j]urisdiction is defined as the power and authority
of a court to hear, try, and decide a case. In order for the court or an adjudicative body to
have authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it must acquire, among others,
jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter is
the power to hear and determine the general class to which the proceedings in question
belong; it is conferred by law and not by the consent or acquiescence of any or all of the
parties or by erroneous belief of the court that it exists. Thus, when a court has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter, the only power it has is to dismiss the action." Perforce, it is
23

important that a court or tribunal should first determine whether or not it has jurisdiction over
the subject matter presented before it, considering that any act that it performs without
jurisdiction shall be null and void, and without any binding legal effects. The Court's
pronouncement in Tan v. Cinco, is instructive on this matter, to wit:
24

A judgment rendered by a court without jurisdiction is null and void and may be attacked
anytime. It creates no rights and produces no effect. It remains a basic fact in law that the
1âwphi1

choice of the proper forum is crucial, as the decision of a court or tribunal without jurisdiction
is a total nullity. A void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. All acts
performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. 25

April 24, 2017

G.R. No. 189950 *

BERNADETTE S. BILAG, ERLINDA BILAGSANTILLAN, DIXON BILAG, REYNALDO B.

SUELLO, HEIRS OF LOURDES S. BILAG, HEIRS OF LETICIA BILAG-HANAOKA, and
HEIRS OF NELLIE BILAG, Petitioners,
vs.
ESTELA AY-AY, ANDRES ACOP, JR., FELICITAS AP-AP, SERGIO AP-AP, JOHN
NAPOLEON A. RAMIREZ, JR., and MA. TERESA A. RAMIREZ, Respondents

Citing: Mitsubishi Motors Philippines Corporation v. Bureau of Customs, G.R. No. 209830,
23

June 17, 2015, 759 SCRA 306, 311-312. Citations omitted.

24
See G.R. No. 213054, June 15, 2016.

25
Id., citing Tiu v. First Plywood Corporation, 629 Phil. 120, 133 (2010).

***************************
To write finis to this controversy, therefore, it is imperative that we first determine the real
nature of respondent's principal action, as well as the relief sought in its Complaint, which we
1quote in haec verba:

An analysis of the factual and material allegations in the Complaint shows that there is
nothing therein which would support a conclusion that respondent's Complaint is one for
specific performance or rescission of contract. It should be recalled that the principal
obligation of petitioners under the Remarkable Laundry Dealership Contract is to act as
respondent's dealer outlet. Respondent, however, neither asked the RTC to compel
petitioners to perfom1 such obligation as contemplated in said contract nor sought the
rescission thereof. The Complaint's body, heading, and relief are bereft of such allegation. In
fact, neither phrase appeared on or was used in the Complaint when, for purposes of clarity,
respondent's counsels, who are presumed to be learned in law, could and should have used
any of those phrases to indicate the proper designation of the Complaint. To the contrary,
respondent's counsels designated the Complaint as one for "Breach of Contract &
Damages," which is a misnomer and inaccurate. This erroneous notion was reiterated in
respondent's Memorandum wherein it was stated that "the main action of CEB 39025 is one
30

for a breach of contract." There is no such thing as an "action for breach of contract."
31

Rather, "[b]reach of contract is a cause of action, but not the action or relief itself" Breach
32 33

of contract may be the cause of action in a complaint for specific performance or rescission
of contract, both of which are incapable of pecuniary estimation and, therefore, cognizable
by the RTC. However, as will be discussed below, breach of contract may also be the cause
of action in a complaint for damages.
*************

As explicated in the case of Pagadora v. Ilao, "[t]he invariable rule is that what determines
43

the nature of the action, as well as the court which has jurisdiction over the case, are the
allegations in the complaint. In ejectment cases, the complaint should embody such
statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for which [Section 1,
Rule 70 of the Rules of Court] provides a summary remedy, and must show enough on its
face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence. Hence, in forcible entry, the
complaint must necessarily allege that one in physical possession of a land or building has
been deprived of that possession by another through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or
stealth. It is not essential, however, that the complaint should expressly employ the language
of the law, but it would suffice that facts are set up showing that dispossession took place
under said conditions. In other words, the plaintiff must allege that he, prior to the
defendant’s act of dispossession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, had been
in prior physical possession of the property. This requirement is jurisdictional, and as long as
the allegations demonstrate a cause of action for forcible entry, the court acquires jurisdiction
over the subject matter."44

****************
The invariable rule is that what determines the nature of the action, as well as the court
which has jurisdiction over the case, are the allegations in the complaint. In ejectment cases,
the complaint should embody such statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the
class of cases for which Section 165 of Rule 70 provides a summary remedy, and must show
enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence. 66

EDITO PAGADORA, Petitioner,

vs.
JULIETA S. ILAO, G.R. No. 165769 December 12, 2011

Citing: 65 SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. − Subject to the provisions
of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building
by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person
against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the
expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or
implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other
person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons
unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under
them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs.

66
Delos Reyes v. Odones, G.R. No. 178096, March 23, 2011.