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ALVAREZ VS. IAC

GR No. 68053 May 7, 1990

FACTS:

Aniceto Yanes owned 2 parcels of land Lot 773-A and Lot 773-B. Aniceto Yanes was survived by his children, Rufino, Felipe and
Teodora. Herein private respondents, Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, are the children of Rufino who died in 1962 while the other
private respondents, Antonio and Rosario Yanes, are children of Felipe. Teodora was survived by her child, Jovita (Jovito) Albib. It is
established that Rufino and his children left the province to settle in other places as a result of the outbreak of World War II.
According to Estelita, from the "Japanese time up to peace time", they did not visit the parcels of land in question but "after
liberation", when her brother went there to get their share of the sugar produced therein, he was informed that Fortunato Santiago,
Fuentebella (Puentevella) and Alvarez were in possession of Lot 773. After Fuentebella's death, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella sold
said lots for P6,000.00 to Rosendo Alvarez.

On May 26, 1960, Teodora Yanes and the children of her brother Rufino filed a complaint against Fortunato Santiago, Arsenia Vda.
de Fuentebella, Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental for the "return" of the ownership and possession of Lots 773
and 823. During the pendency of said case, Alvarez sold the Lots for P25,000.00 to Dr. Rodolfo Siason. CFI rendered judgment
ordering defendant Rosendo Alvarez to reconvey to plaintiffs the lots.

ISSUE:

WON the liability of Rosendo Alvarez arising from the sale of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B could be legally passed or transmitted by
operation of law to the petitioners without violation of law and due process.

RULING:

The doctrine obtaining in this jurisdiction is on the general transmissibility of the rights and obligations of the deceased to his
legitimate children and heirs. The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not altered by the provision of
our Rules of Court that money debts of a deceased must be liquidated and paid from his estate before the residue is distributed
among said heirs (Rule 89). The reason is that whatever payment is thus made from the estate is ultimately a payment by the heirs
or distributees, since the amount of the paid claim in fact diminishes or reduces the shares that the heirs would have been entitled
to receive.

"Under our law, therefore, the general rule is that a party's contractual rights and obligations are transmissible to the successors.
The rule is a consequence of the progressive 'depersonalization' of patrimonial rights and duties. From the Roman concept of a
relation from person to person, the obligation has evolved into a relation from patrimony to patrimony, with the persons occupying
only a representative position, barring those rare cases where the obligation is strictly personal, in consideration of its performance
by a specific person and by no other. . . ."Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot escape the legal
consequences of their father's transaction, which gave rise to the present claim for damages.

RABADILLA vs. CA
GR No. 113725 June 29, 2000

FACTS:
In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest
of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of a parcel of land. The said Codicil, which was duly
probated before the then CFI of Negros Occidental. Pursuant to the same Codicil, the subject land was transferred to the deceased,
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and the Transfer Certificate of Title thereto was issued in his name.Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died and was survived by
his wife Rufina and children Johnny (petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all surnamed Rabadilla.
Respondent brought a complaintbefore the RTC in Bacolod City, against the above-mentioned heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to enforce
the provisions of subject Codicil. The Complaint alleged that the defendant-heirs violated the conditions of the Codicil.
The plaintiff then prayed for the reconveyance/return of the subject land to the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza, because it is
alleged that petitioner failed to comply with the terms of the will; that since 1985, Johnny failed to deliver the fruits; and that the
the land was mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank, which is a violation of the will.
In his defense, Johnny avers that the term “near descendants” in the will of Aleja pertains to the near descendants of Aleja and not
to the near descendants of Dr. Rabadilla, hence, since Aleja had no near descendants at the time of his death, no can substitute Dr.
Rabadilla on the obligation to deliver the fruits of the devised land.

ISSUE:
WON the testamentary institution of Dr. Rabadilla is a modal institution.
HELD:
YES. The Court of Appeals erred not in ruling that the institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is in the nature
of a modal institution and therefore, Article 882 of the New Civil Code is the provision of law in point.From the provisions of the
Codicil litigated upon, it can be gleaned unerringly that the testatrix intended that subject property be inherited by Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla. It is likewise clearly worded that the testatrix imposed an obligation on the said instituted heir and his successors-in-
interest to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar to the herein private respondent, Marlena Coscolluela Belleza, during the lifetime of
the latter. However, the testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla’s inheritance and the effectivity of his institution as a devisee,
dependent on the performance of the said obligation. It is clear, though, that should the obligation be not complied with, the
property shall be turned over to the testatrix’s near descendants. The manner of institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject
Codicil is evidently modal in nature because it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without, however, affecting the efficacy of
such institution.

ALVAREZ VS. IAC

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GR No. 68053 May 7, 1990

FACTS:

Aniceto Yanes owned 2 parcels of land Lot 773-A and Lot 773-B. Aniceto Yanes was survived by his children, Rufino, Felipe and
Teodora. Herein private respondents, Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, are the children of Rufino who died in 1962 while the other
private respondents, Antonio and Rosario Yanes, are children of Felipe. Teodora was survived by her child, Jovita (Jovito) Albib. It is
established that Rufino and his children left the province to settle in other places as a result of the outbreak of World War II.
According to Estelita, from the "Japanese time up to peace time", they did not visit the parcels of land in question but "after
liberation", when her brother went there to get their share of the sugar produced therein, he was informed that Fortunato Santiago,
Fuentebella (Puentevella) and Alvarez were in possession of Lot 773. After Fuentebella's death, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella sold
said lots for P6,000.00 to Rosendo Alvarez.

On May 26, 1960, Teodora Yanes and the children of her brother Rufino filed a complaint against Fortunato Santiago, Arsenia Vda.
de Fuentebella, Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental for the "return" of the ownership and possession of Lots 773
and 823. During the pendency of said case, Alvarez sold the Lots for P25,000.00 to Dr. Rodolfo Siason. CFI rendered judgment
ordering defendant Rosendo Alvarez to reconvey to plaintiffs the lots.

ISSUE:

WON the liability of Rosendo Alvarez arising from the sale of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B could be legally passed or transmitted by
operation of law to the petitioners without violation of law and due process.

RULING:

The doctrine obtaining in this jurisdiction is on the general transmissibility of the rights and obligations of the deceased to his
legitimate children and heirs. The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not altered by the provision of
our Rules of Court that money debts of a deceased must be liquidated and paid from his estate before the residue is distributed
among said heirs (Rule 89). The reason is that whatever payment is thus made from the estate is ultimately a payment by the heirs
or distributees, since the amount of the paid claim in fact diminishes or reduces the shares that the heirs would have been entitled
to receive.

"Under our law, therefore, the general rule is that a party's contractual rights and obligations are transmissible to the successors.
The rule is a consequence of the progressive 'depersonalization' of patrimonial rights and duties. From the Roman concept of a
relation from person to person, the obligation has evolved into a relation from patrimony to patrimony, with the persons occupying
only a representative position, barring those rare cases where the obligation is strictly personal, in consideration of its performance
by a specific person and by no other. . . ."Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot escape the legal
consequences of their father's transaction, which gave rise to the present claim for damages.

RABADILLA vs. CA
GR No. 113725 June 29, 2000

FACTS:
In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest
of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of a parcel of land. The said Codicil, which was duly
probated before the then CFI of Negros Occidental. Pursuant to the same Codicil, the subject land was transferred to the deceased,
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and the Transfer Certificate of Title thereto was issued in his name.Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died and was survived by
his wife Rufina and children Johnny (petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all surnamed Rabadilla.
Respondent brought a complaintbefore the RTC in Bacolod City, against the above-mentioned heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to enforce
the provisions of subject Codicil. The Complaint alleged that the defendant-heirs violated the conditions of the Codicil.
The plaintiff then prayed for the reconveyance/return of the subject land to the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza, because it is
alleged that petitioner failed to comply with the terms of the will; that since 1985, Johnny failed to deliver the fruits; and that the
the land was mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank, which is a violation of the will.
In his defense, Johnny avers that the term “near descendants” in the will of Aleja pertains to the near descendants of Aleja and not
to the near descendants of Dr. Rabadilla, hence, since Aleja had no near descendants at the time of his death, no can substitute Dr.
Rabadilla on the obligation to deliver the fruits of the devised land.

ISSUE:
WON the testamentary institution of Dr. Rabadilla is a modal institution.
HELD:
YES. The Court of Appeals erred not in ruling that the institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is in the nature
of a modal institution and therefore, Article 882 of the New Civil Code is the provision of law in point.From the provisions of the
Codicil litigated upon, it can be gleaned unerringly that the testatrix intended that subject property be inherited by Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla. It is likewise clearly worded that the testatrix imposed an obligation on the said instituted heir and his successors-in-
interest to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar to the herein private respondent, Marlena Coscolluela Belleza, during the lifetime of
the latter. However, the testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla’s inheritance and the effectivity of his institution as a devisee,
dependent on the performance of the said obligation. It is clear, though, that should the obligation be not complied with, the
property shall be turned over to the testatrix’s near descendants. The manner of institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject
Codicil is evidently modal in nature because it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without, however, affecting the efficacy of
such institution.
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National Housing Authority v. Almeida

G.R. No. 162784 June 22, 2007

FACTS:
On June 1959, the Land Tenure Administration (LTA) awarded to Margarita Herrera several portions of land in San Pedro,
Laguna. Margarita had two children: Beatriz Herrera-Mercado and Francisca Herrera. Beatriz predeceased Margarita and left heirs.
On October 1971, Margarita passed away.
On August 1974, Francisca executed a Deed of Self-Adjudication claiming that she is sole surviving daughter of Margarita
and her exclusive heir. The Deed was based on a Sinumpaang Salayay dated October 1960 executed by Margarita conveying the
subject portions of land to Francisca upon her death. It turned out that the subject land was paid by Francisca with the LTA. It was
signed by two witnesses and notarized. The surviving heirs of Beatriz filed a case for annulment of the Deed before the Court of First
Instance of Laguna. The said court declared the Deed null and void.
However, during the trial, Francisca filed an application with the Petitioner National Housing Authority (NHA) to purchase
the subject land by submitting the Deed. The NHA granted the application on the basis that the Sinumpaang Salaysay proved that
Margarita waived or transferred all her rights to Francisca. Private Respondent Seguna Almeida (heir of Beatriz) appealed to the
Office of the President only to affirm the decision of the NHA. When Francisca died, her heirs executed for the settlement of her
estate which was approved by the NHA. The NHA issued deeds of sale in favor of Francisca’s heirs.
Aggrieved, the Private Respondent filed for the cancellation of the titles in favor of Francisca’s heirs with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Laguna. The RTC later on ruled in favor of Private Respondent, setting aside the decision of the NHA and the Office of
the President. It ruled that the Sinumpaang Salaysay was not an assignment of rights but a disposition of property which shall take
effect upon death.
After their motion for considerations were denied, both NHA and Francisca’s heirs appealed before the Court of Appeals.
The CA affirmed the RTC decision by ruling that the Sinumpaang Salaysay of Margarita was a will and not an assignment of rights.
The NHA acted arbitrarily when it awarded the subject land to Francisca’s heir when the RTC upheld that the Sinumpaang Salaysay
involved a disposition of property which shall take effect upon death.
Hence, the NHA filed a petition before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not arbitrarily in awarding the subject land to Francisca’s heir.
HELD:
YES. The Supreme Court held that when the NHA received the Sinumpaang Salaysay, it should have noted that the
effectivity of the document commences at the time of the death of Margarita. The said document contained the words “sakaling
ako’y bawian na ng Dios ng aking buhay…” Hence, all the interest of the person should cease to hers and shall be in the possession
of the estate until they are transferred to her heirs under Art. 774 of the Civil Code. The NHA gave due course to the application of
Francisca without regard that death would transfer the property of Margarita to the estate. Even assuming that the Court sustained
NHA’s position that the document is not a will, the interests of Margarita should transfer by virtue of an operation of law. They
should have considered the estate of the decedent as the next person likely to stand in to fulfill the obligation to pay the rest of the
purchase price.

ESTATE OF HEMADY vs. LUZON SURETY

100 PHIL 39 (1956)
FACTS:
Luzon Surety filed a claim against the estate of K.H. Hemady based on indemnity agreements (counterbonds) subscribed by
distinct principals and by the deceased K.H. Hemady as surety (solidary guarantor). As a contingent claim, Luzon Surety prayed for
the allowance of the value of the indemnity agreements it had executed. The lower court dismissed the claim of Luzon Surety on the
ground that “whatever losses may occur after Hemady’s death, are not chargeable to his estate, because upon his death he ceased
to be a guarantor.”
ISSUES:
What obligations are transmissible upon the death of the decedent? Are contingent claims chargeable against the estate?
HELD:
Under the present Civil Code (Article 1311), the rule is that “Contracts take effect only as between the parties, their assigns
and heirs, except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by
stipulation or by provision of law.” While in our successional system the responsibility of the heirs for the debts of their decedent
cannot exceed the value of the inheritance they receive from him, the principle remains intact that these heirs succeed not only to
the rights of the deceased but also to his obligations. Articles 774 and 776 of the New Civil Code expressly so provide, thereby
confirming Article 1311.
In Mojica v. Fernandez, the Supreme Court ruled — “Under the Civil Code the heirs, by virtue of the rights of succession are
subrogated to all the rights and obligations of the deceased (Article 661) and can not be regarded as third parties with respect to a
contract to which the deceased was a party, touching the estate of the deceased x x x which comes in to their hands by right of
inheritance; they take such property subject to all the obligations resting thereon in the hands of him from whom they derive their
rights.” The third exception to the transmissibility of obligations under Article 1311 exists when they are ‘not transmissible by
operation of law.’ The provision makes reference to those cases where the law expresses that the rights or obligations are
extinguished by death, as is the case in legal support, parental authority, usufruct, contracts for a piece of work, partnership and
agency. By contrast, the articles of the Civil Code that regulate guaranty or suretyship contain no provision that the guaranty is
extinguished upon the death of the guarantor or the surety.
The contracts of suretyship in favor of Luzon Surety Co. not being rendered intransmissible due to the nature of the undertaking, nor
by stipulations of the contracts themselves, nor by provision of law, his eventual liability therefrom necessarily passed upon his
death to his heirs. The contracts, therefore, give rise to contingent claims provable against his estate. A contingent liability of a
deceased person is part and parcel of the mass of obligations that must be paid if and when the contingent liability is converted into
a real liability. Therefore, the settlement or final liquidation of the estate must be deferred until such time as the bonded
indebtedness is paid.
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BELAMALA vs. POLINAR

GR No. L-24093 18 Nov 1967
FACTS:
This is an appeal from judgment of the Court of First Instance allowing a money claim of appellee Belamala against the
estate of the deceased Mauricio Polinar, for damages caused to the claimant. The claimant Buenaventura Belamala is the same
offended party in Criminal Case against the same Mauricio Polinar for Frustrated Murder; COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BOHOL
rendered a decision thereof, convicting the said Mauricio Polinar of the crime of serious physical injuries and sentenced him to pay
to the offended party Buenaventura Belamala. The accused (the late Mauricio Polinar) appealed, however, while the appeal of said
Mauricio Polinar was pending before the Court of Appeals, he died; and no Notice or Notification of his death has ever been filed in
the said Court of Appeals. The CA then affirmed the decision of the CFI. The appellant, contended that the claim should have
been prosecuted by separate action against the administrator, and not to be enforced by filing a claim against the estate.
ISSUE:
W/N the appellant Polinar’s contention is correct.
HELD:
Yes. The appellant, however, is correct in the contention that the claim should have been prosecuted by separate action
against the administrator, as permitted by sections 1 and 2 of Revised Rule 87, since the claim is patently one "to recover damages
for an injury to person or property" (Rule87, sec. 1). Belamala's action cannot be enforced by filing a claim against the estate under
Rule 86,because section 5 of that rule explicitly limits the claims to those for funeral expenses, expenses for last sickness, judgments
for money and "claims against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied;" and this last category (the other three being
inapposite) includes only "all purely personal obligations other than those which have their source in delict or tort" (Leung Ben vs.
O'Brien, 38 Phil.182, 189-194) and Belamala's damages manifestly have a tortious origin.

SEANGIO vs REYES
508 SCRA 177
FACTS:
Alfredo Seangio et. al filed for the settlement of the intestate estate of the late Segundo Seangio. Petitioners opposed said
petition, contending that Segundo left a holographic will disinheriting Alfredo for cause. The reason for the disinheritance was due to
Alfredo’s maltreatment to his father Segundo. In view of the purported holographic will, petitioners averred that in the event the
decedent is found to have a will, the intestate proceedings are to be automatically suspended and replaced by the proceedings of
the will. PRs moved for the dismissal of the probate proceedings contending that the alleged will of Segundo does not contain any
disposition of the estate of the deceased and that all other compulsory heirs were not named nor instituted as heir. Devisee or
legatee hence there is preterition which would result to intestacy. Petitioners countered that the rule on preterition does not apply
because Segundo’s will does not constitute a universal heir or heirs to the exclusion of one or more compulsory heirs. They argued
that the testator intended all his compulsory heirs, petitioners and PRs alike, with the sole exception of Alfredo, to inherit his estate.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the compulsory heirs in the direct line were preterited in the will
HELD:
No. The compulsory heirs in the direct line were not preterited in the will. According to the SC, it was Segundo’s last
expression to bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs with the sole exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not institute an
heir to the exclusion of his other compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the name of one of the petitioners, Virginia, in the
document did not operate to institute her as the universal heir. Her name was included only as a witness to the altercation between
Segundo and his son, Alfredo.

VITUG vs CA
188 SCRA 755
FACTS:
This case is a chapter in an earlier suit decided by this Court involving the probate of the two wills of the late Dolores
Luchangco Vitug, who died in New York, U. S.A. naming private respondent Rowena Faustino-Corona executrix. In said decision, the
court upheld the appointment of Nenita Alonte as co-special administrator of Mrs. Vitug’s estate with her (Mrs. Vitug’s) widower,
petitioner Romarico G. Vitug, pending probate.
Romarico G. Vitug filed a motion asking for authority from the probate court to sell certain shares of stock and real
properties belonging to the estate to cover allegedly his advances to the estate, plus interests, which he claimed were personal
funds. As found by the CA the alleged advances were spent for the payment of estate tax, deficiency estate tax, and “increment
thereto.” Rowena Corona opposed the motion to sell on the ground that the same funds withdrawn were conjugal partnership
properties and part of the estate, and hence, there was allegedly no ground for reimbursement. She also sought his ouster for failure
to include the sums in question for inventory and for “concealment of funds belonging to the estate.” Vitug insists that the said
funds are his exclusive property having acquired the same through a survivorship agreement executed with his late wife and the
bank.
The trial courts upheld the validity of such agreement.
On the other hand, the CA held that the survivorship agreement constitutes a conveyance mortis causa which “did not comply with
the formalities of a valid will as prescribed by Article 805 of the Civil Code,” and secondly, assuming that it is a mere donation inter
vivos, it is a prohibited donation under the provisions of Article 133 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
W/N the survivorship agreement between the spouses Vitug constitutes a donation?
HELD:
NO. The conveyance in question is not, first of all, one of mortis causa, which should be embodied in a will. A will has been
defined as “a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a capacitated person disposes of his property and rights and
declares or complies with duties to take effect after his death.” In other words, the bequest or device must pertain to the testator. In
this case, the monies subject of savings account No. 35342-038 were in the nature of conjugal funds In the case relied on, Rivera v.
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People’s Bank and Trust Co., we rejected claims that a survivorship agreement purports to deliver one party’s separate properties in
favor of the other, but simply, their joint holdings.
There is no showing that the funds exclusively belonged to one party, and hence it must be presumed to be conjugal, having been
acquired during the existence of the marital relations.
Neither is the survivorship agreement a donation inter vivos, for obvious reasons, because it was to take effect after the
death of one party. Secondly, it is not a donation between the spouses because it involved no conveyance of a spouse’s own
properties to the other.
It is also our opinion that the agreement involves no modification petition of the conjugal partnership, as held by the Court
of Appeals, by “mere stipulation” and that it is no “cloak” to circumvent the law on conjugal property relations. Certainly, the
spouses are not prohibited by law to invest conjugal property, say, by way of a joint and several bank account, more commonly
denominated in banking parlance as an “and/or” account. In the case at bar, when the spouses Vitug opened savings account No.
35342-038, they merely put what rightfully belonged to them in a money-making venture. They did not dispose of it in favor of the
other, which would have arguably been sanctionable as a prohibited donation.
The conclusion is accordingly unavoidable that Mrs. Vitug having predeceased her husband, the latter has acquired upon
her death a vested right over the amounts under savings account No. 35342-038 of the Bank of America. Insofar as the respondent
court ordered their inclusion in the inventory of assets left by Mrs. Vitug, we hold that the court was in error. Being the separate
property of petitioner, it forms no more part of the estate of the deceased.

ENRIQUEZ vs ABADIA
GR No. L-7188 9 Aug 1954

FACTS
On September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia executed a document purporting to be his Last Will and Testament. Resident of the City of Cebu, he died
on January 14, 1943. He left properties estimated at P 8,000 in value. On October 2, 1946, one Andres Enriquez, one of the legatees, filed a petition for its
probate in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Some cousins and nephews who would inherit the estate of the deceased if he left no will,
filed opposition. During the hearing, it was established that Father Sancho wrote out the will in longhand in Spanish which the testator spoke and
understood, and that he signed on the left hand margin of the front page of each of the three folios or sheets of which the document is
composed, and numbered the same with Arabic numerals, and that he signed his name at the end of his writing at the last page. All this
was done in the presence of the three attesting witnesses after telling that it was his last will. The said three witnesses signed their names on the last page after
the attestation clause in his presence and in the presence of each other. The trial court found and declared the will to be a holographic will. Although at the
time it was executed and at the time of the testator's death, holographic wills were not permitted by law, still, because at the time of the hearing and when the
case was to be decided the new Civil Code was already in force, which Code permitted the execution of holographic wills, under a liberal view,
and to carry out the intention of the testator which according to the trial court is the controlling factor and may override any defect
inform, said trial court by order dated January 24, 1952, admitted to probate the will as the Last Will and Testament of Father Sancho Abadia. The
oppositors appealed from that decision, and because only questions of law are involved in the appeal, the case was certified to the Supreme Court by
the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE
What law should apply as to the validity of the holographic will: the old Civil Code when the will was executed or the new
Civil Code which could have validated the will?

RULING
It should be the old Civil Code. The new Civil Code, which took effect August 30, 1950, provides in Art. 795: “The validity of a
will as to its form depends upon the observance of the law in force at the time it is made.” Here, the validity of the holographic will is
to be judged not by the law enforced at the time when the petition is decided by the court but at the time the instrument was
executed. When one executes a will which is invalid for failure to observe and follow the legal requirements at the time of its
execution, just like in this case, then upon his death he should be regarded and declared as having died intestate. This is because the
general rule is that the Legislature cannot validate void wills.

JIMENEZ vs FERNANDEZ
GR No. L-46364 6 Apr 1990

FACTS:
The eastern portion of a land, belonging to the decedent, is the subject of this case. The decedent, Fermin Hernandez, had 2
sons in which Fortunato (other child), predeceased the decedent. On the other hand, Fortunato also had one child, Sulipicia Jimenez,
the petitioner in this case. Upon registration of the land, it was under the name of Sulpicia and the alive child of the decedent, Carlos
Jimenez, in equal shares. The latter (Carlos), had an illegitimate child, named Melecia Jimenez. The latter sold the eastern portion to
Cagampan and Grado. Upon the death of Carlos, Sulpicia executed and Affidavit of Adjudication as the sole heir of the deceased
uncle. She filed a recovery of the eastern portion occupied by Grado, the person whom Melecia sold that portion of the land.
The lower court held that Grado is the owner of the Land. Such decision is affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the decision of CA in affirming the decision in favor of Grado is correct.
HELD:
The lower courts erred in declaring that Sulpicia does not own the property in question. Melecia Jimenez, an illegitimate
child, is not the daughter of Carlos Jimenez and therefore, had no right in the property in question. Even assuming that she was
proven to be an illegitimate child, she HAD NO RIGHT TO SUCCEED Carlos Jimenez and could have not validly acquired nor legally
transferred to buyers that portion of the property.
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The right to inheritance of a person who died with or without will, before the effectivity of the New Civil Code (1950), shall
be governed by the Civil Code of 1889. Carlos Jimenez died on Jul 9, 1936 before the effectivity of the New Civil Code so it must be in
accordance with Civil Code of 1889. In the former Civil Code, a child must either be a legitimate, legitimated, or adopted, or else an
acknowledged natural child- for an illegitimate not natural is DISQUALIFIED TO INHERIT. She cannot be considered an acknowledged
natural child because Carlos Jimenez was legally married to Susana Abalos at that time. She is to be considered an ILLEGITIMATE
SPURIOUS CHILD and not entitled to any successional right in the estate of Carlos, in the absence of any voluntary conveyance to her
by Carlos.

Miciano v. Brimo
G.R. No. L-22595, 1 November 1927
FACTS:
The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this case.
The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased,
opposed it. The court, however, approved it.
The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph G.
Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation
of article 10 of the Civil Code. But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testamentary dispositions are not in
accordance with the Turkish laws.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the disposition shall be made in accordance with Philippine Laws.

RULING:
No. The said condition is void, being contrary to law and should be considered unwritten. The institution of legatees in said
will is unconditional and consequently valid and effective. It results that the second clause of the will regarding the law which shall
govern it, and to the condition imposed upon the legatees, is null and void.
All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and requests are perfectly valid and effective it
not appearing that said clauses are contrary to the testator's national laws.
Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the distribution of this estate be made in such a
manner as to include appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees, and the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial
administrator is approved in all other respects.

CAYETANO vs LEONIDAS
129 SCRA 522
Facts:
The decedent at the time of her death was an american citizen. Her father, being the only compulsory heir adjudicated the
entire estate to himself. However, the sister of the decedent filed a petition for the reprobate of a will of the deceased which was
allegedly executed in the United States and for her appointment as administratrix of the estate of the deceased testatrix. The
reprobated will was allowed.
Issue:
Whether or not the reprobation of the will is invalid for it divested the father of his legitime which was reserved by the law
for him and the same would work injustice and injury to him.
Held:
No, the reprobation of the will is valid. Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner and thus,
the respondent judge should have denied its reprobate outright, the private respondents have sufficiently established that
Adoracion was, at the time of her death, an American citizen and a permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A. The
order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration. It is therefore evident that whatever public
policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession
of foreign nationals.

BALTAZAR vs LAXA

G.R. No. 174489 April 11, 2012.

FACTS
Paciencia Laxa was a 78 year old spinster at the time she executed her will. The same was executed in the house of a
certain retired Judge Limpin, was read to Paciencia twice, was signed by her, and was attested to by three credible witness.
Petitioner Rosie Mateo, daughter of the first cousin of testatrix, testified that the latter was “magulyan” or “forgetful” because she
would sometimes leave her wallet in the kitchen then start looking for it moments later.
ISSUE
Whether or not forgetfulness is equivalent to being unsound mind, hence lack of testamentary capacity.
RULING
NO. The state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to execute
a will. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind. Article 799 of the Civil Code provides for the criteria for soundness
of mind. In this case, apart from the testimony of Rosie pertaining to Paciencia’s forgetfulness, there is no substantial evidence,
medical or otherwise, that would show that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the will. The law
presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary.
A scrutiny of the Will discloses that [Paciencia] was aware of the nature of the document she executed. She specially requested that
the customs of her faith be observed upon her death.
 7

BAGTAS vs PAGUIO

NEYRA vs NEYRA

ALSUA-BETTS vs CA
GR Nos. l-46430-31 30 July 1979

FACTS
Don Jesus Alsua and his wife, Doña Tinay, together with all their living children, entered into a duly notarized agreement,
for the inventory and partition of all the spouses present and existing properties. In said extra judicial partition, each of the four
children was allotted with the properties considered as their share in the estate or as inheritance left by the deceased where they
will be the absolute owner of the properties assigned in case of death of one of the spouses.
Spouses also separately executed holographic will with exactly the same terms and conditions in conformity with the
executed extra judicial partition naming each other as an executor without having to post any bond. That in case new properties be
acquired same shall be partitioned one half to the surviving spouse and the other half to children of equal parts.
Spouses subsequently executed separately a codicil of exactly the same terms and conditions, amending and
supplementing their holographic wills stating that they reserved for themselves the other half not disposed of to their legitimate
heirs under the agreement of partition and mutually and reciprocally bequeathed each other their participation as well all properties
which might be acquired subsequently.
Doña Tinay died, in effect, Don Jesus by order of the probate court was name as executor. Before Don Jesus died he
cancelled his holographic will in the presence of his bookkeeper and secretary and instructed his lawyer to draft a new will. This was
a notarial will and testament of 3 essential features as follows;
1. It expressly cancelled revoked and annulled all the provisions of his holographic will and codicil.
2. It provided for the collation of all his properties donated to his four living children by virtue of the Escritura de Partition
Extra judicial”.
3. It instituted his children as legatees / devisees of specific properties, and as to the rest of the properties and whatever
may be subsequently acquired in the future, before his death, were to be given to Francisca and Pablo naming Francisca as executor
to serve without a bond.

ISSUE:
1. W/N oppositors to the probate of the will, are in estoppel to question the competence of testator Don Jesus Alsua.
2. Whether testator Don Jesus can or cannot revoke his previous will.
HELD:
1. The principle of estoppel is not applicable in probate proceedings. Probate proceedings involve public interest, and the
application therein of the rule of estoppel, when it will block the ascertainment of the truth as to the circumstances surrounding the
execution of a testament, would seem inimical to public policy. Over and above the interest of private parties is that of the state to
see that testamentary dispositions be carried out if, and only if, executed conformably to law.
2. We rule that Don Jesus was not forever bound of his previous holographic will and codicil as such, would remain
revokable at his discretion. Art. 828 of the new Civil Code is clear: "A will may be revoked by the testator at any time before his
death. Any waiver or restriction of this right is void." There can be no restriction that may be made on his absolute freedom to
revoke his holographic will and codicil previously made. This would still hold true even if such previous will had as in the case at bar
already been probated . For in the first place, probate only authenticates the will and does not pass upon the efficacy of the dispositions
therein. And secondly, the rights to the succession are transmitted only from the moment of the death of the decedent
In fine, Don Jesus retained the liberty of disposing of his property before his death to whomsoever he chose, provided the
legitime of the forced heirs are not prejudiced, which is not herein claimed for it is undisputed that only the free portion of the
whole Alsua estate is being contested.

ABANGAN vs ABANGAN
40 PHIL 476 (1919)
FACTS:
On September 1917, the CFI of Cebu admitted to probate Ana Abangan's will executed on July 1916. It is from this decision
which the opponent appealed. It is alleged that the records do not show the testatrix knew the dialect in which the will was written.

ISSUE: Whether or not the will was validly probated

HELD:
YES. The circumstance appearing on the will itself, that it was executed in Cebu City and in the dialect of the place where
the testarix is a resident is enough to presume that she knew this dialect in the absence of any proof to the contrary. On the
authority of this case and that of Gonzales v Laurel, it seems that for the presumption to apply, the following must appear: 1) that
the will must be in a language or dialect generally spoken in the place of execution, and, 2) that the testator must be a native or
resident of the said locality

Suroza v. Honrado
110 SCRA 388 (1981)

FACTS:

Spouses Mauro Suroza and Marcelina Salvador, who were childless, reared a boy named Agapito. Agapito and his wife Nenita de
 8

Vera had a daughter named Lilia. Nenita became Agapito’s guardian when he became disabled. A certain Arsenia de la Cruz also
wanted to be his guardian in another proceeding but it was dismissed. Arsenia then delivered a child named Marilyn Sy to Marcelina
who brought her up as a supposed daughter of Agapito. Marilyn used the surname Suroza although not legally adopted by Agapito.
When Marcelina (who was an illiterate) was 73 years old, she supposedly executed a notarial will which was in English and
thumbmarked by her. In the will, she allegedly bequeathed all her properties to Marilyn. She also named as executrix her
laundrywoman, Marina Paje. Paje filed a petition for probate of Marcelina’s will. Judge Honrado appointed Paje as administratrix
and issued orders allowing the latter to withdraw money from the savings account of Marcelina and Marilyn, and instructing the
sheriff to eject the occupants of testatrix’s house, among whom was Nenita. She and the other occupants filed a motion to set aside
the order ejecting them, alleging that Agapito was the sole heir of the deceased, and that Marilyn was not the decedent’s
granddaughter. Despite this, Judge Honrado issued an order probating Marcelina’s will.

Nenita filed an omnibus petition to set aside proceedings, admit opposition with counter-petition for administration and preliminary
injunction, and an opposition to the probate of the will and a counter-petition for letters of administration, which were dismissed by
Judge Honrado. Instead of appealing, Nenita filed a case to annul the probate proceedings but Judge Honrado dismissed it. The
judge then closed the testamentary proceeding after noting that the executrix had delivered the estate to Marilyn, and that the
estate tax had been paid.

Ten months later, Nenita filed a complaint before the SC, charging Judge Honrado with having probated the fraudulent will of
Marcelina. She reiterated her contention that the testatrix was illiterate as shown by the fact that she affixed her thumbmark to the
will and that she did not know English, the language in which the will was written. She further alleged that Judge Honrado did not
take into account the consequences of the preterition of testatrix’s son, Agapito. Judge Honrado in his comment did not deal
specifically with the allegations but merely pointed to the fact that Nenita did not appeal from the decree of probate and that in a
motion, she asked for a thirty day period within which to vacate the house of the testatrix. Nenita subsequently filed in the CA a
petition for certiorari and prohibition against Judge Honrado wherein she prayed that the will, the decree of probate and all the
proceedings in the probate case be declared void. The CA dismissed the petition because Nenita’s remedy was an appeal and her
failure to do so did not entitle her to resort to the special civil action of certiorari. Relying on that decision, Judge Honrado filed a
MTD the administrative case for having allegedly become moot and academic.

ISSUE:

W/N disciplinary action be taken against respondent judge for having admitted to probate a will, which on its face is void because it
is written in English, a language not known to the illiterate testatrix, and which is probably a forged will because she and the
attesting witnesses did not appear before the notary as admitted by the notary himself.

HELD:

YES. Respondent judge, on perusing the will and noting that it was written in English and was thumbmarked by an obviously illiterate
testatrix, could have readily perceived that the will is void. In the opening paragraph of the will, it was stated that English was a
language “understood and known” to the testatrix. But in its concluding paragraph, it was stated that the will was read to the
testatrix “and translated into Filipino language”. That could only mean that the will was written in a language not known to the
illiterate testatrix and, therefore, it is void because of the mandatory provision of article 804 of the Civil Code that every will must be
executed in a language or dialect known to the testator.

The hasty preparation of the will is shown in the attestation clause and notarial acknowledgment where Marcelina Salvador Suroza
is repeatedly referred to as the “testator” instead of “testatrix”. Had respondent judge been careful and observant, he could have
noted not only the anomaly as to the language of the will but also that there was something wrong in instituting the supposed
granddaughter as sole heiress and giving nothing at all to her supposed father who was still alive. Furthermore, after the hearing
conducted by the deputy clerk of court, respondent judge could have noticed that the notary was not presented as a witness. In
spite of the absence of an opposition, respondent judge should have personally conducted the hearing on the probate of the will so
that he could have ascertained whether the will was validly executed.

TESTATE ESTATE OF ABADA vs. ABAJA

G. R. no. 14714531 January 2005
FACTS:
Abada and his wife Toray died without legitimate children. Abaja, filed with CFI of Negros Occidental a petition for probate
of the will of Abada. The latter allegedly named as his testamentary heirs his natural children, Eulogio Abaja and Rosario
Cordova.(respondent Abaja was the son of Eulogio) One Caponong opposed the position on the ground that Abaja left no will when
he died and if such was really executed by him it should be disallowed for the following reasons:
(1) it was not executed and attested as required by law;
(2) it was not intended asthe last will of the testator; and
(3) it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiaries. Citing the same grounds
invoked by Caponong, the alleged intestateheirs of Abada, Joel Abada et. al. alsoopposed the petition. The oppositors are
thenephews, nieces and grandchildren of Abada and Toray. Respondent Abaja filed another petition for the probate will of
Toray.Caponong and Joel Abada et. al opposed thepetition on the same grounds. Caponong likewise filed a petition praying for the
issuance in his name of letters of administration of the intestate estate of Abada and Toray.RTC admitted the probate will of
Toraysince the oppositors did not file any motion for reconsideration, the order allowing the probate of Toray’s will became final
andexecutory. The court also assigned one Caponong-Noble as special administratix of the estate of Abada and Toray.
 9

Caponong –Noble moved for the dismissal of the petition for the probate will of Abada which wasdenied by the Court.During the
proceeding, the judge found out that the matter on hand wasal ready submitted for decision by another judge admitting the probate
will of abada. Since proper notices to the heirs has beencomplied with as well as other requirements, the judge ruled in favor of the
validity of theprobate will. RTC ruled only on the issue raised bythe oppositors in their motions to dismiss the petition for probate
that is whether the will of Abada has an attestation clause as required by law. It held that the failure of theoppositors to raise any
other matterforecloses all other issues. Caponong-Noble filed a notice of appeal. CA affirmed RTC’sdecision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA ruled in sustaining the RTC admitting the probate will of Abada.

HELD:
No, CA is correct. Caponong-Noble proceeds to point out several defects in the attestation clause. Caponong-Noble alleges
that the attestation clause fails to state the number of pages on which the will is written. The allegation has no merit." which means
"in the left margin of each and every one of the two pages consisting of the same" shows that the will consists of two pages.
Caponong-Noble further alleges that the attestation clause fails to state expressly that the testator signed the will and its every page
in the presence of three witnesses.
Shethen faults the Court of Appeals for applying to the present case the rule on substantial compliance found in Article 809
of the New Civil Code. The first sentence of the attestation clause reads: "Subscribed and professed by the testator Alipio Abada as
his last will and testament in our presence, the testator having also signed it in our presence on the left margin of each and every
one of the pages of the same." The attestation clause clearly states that Abada signed the will and its every page inthe presence of
the witnesses

Matias vs. Salud

G.R. L-10907 June 29, 1957

FACTS:
This case is an appeal from a CFI Cavite order denying the probate of the will of Gabina Raquel. The document consist of 3
pages and it seems that after the attestation clause, there appears the siganture of the testatrix 'Gabina Raquel', alongside is a
smudged in violet ink claimed by the proponents as the thumbmark allegedly affixed by the tetratrix. On the third page at the end of
the attestation clause appears signatures on the left margin of each page, and also on the upper part of each left margin appears the
same violet ink smudge accompanied by the written words 'Gabina Raquel' with 'by Lourdes Samonte' underneath it.
The proponent's evidence is to the effect that the decedent allegedly instructed Atty. Agbunag to drat her will and brought
to her on January 1950. With all the witnesses with her and the lawyer, the decedent affixed her thumbmark at the foot of the
document and the left margin of each page. It was also alleged that she attempted to sign using a sign pen but was only able to do
so on the lower half of page 2 due to the pain in her right shoulder. The lawyer, seeing Gabina unable to proceed instructed Lourdes
Samonte to write 'Gabina Raquel by Lourdes Samonte' next to each thumbmark, after which the witnesses signed at the foot of the
attestation clause and the left hand margin of each page.
The probate was opposed by Basilia Salud, the niece of the decedent.
The CFI of cavite denied the probate on the ground that the attestation clause did not state that the testatrix and the
witnesses signed each and every page nor did it express that Lourdes was specially directed to sign after the testatrix.

ISSUE: Whether or not the thumbprint was sufficient compliance with the law despite the absence of a description of such in the
attestation clause

HELD: YES
The absence of the description on the attestation clause that another person wrote the testatrix' name at her request is not a fatal
defect, The legal requirement only ask that it be signed by the testator, a requirement satisfied by a thumbprint or other mark
affixed by him.

As to the issue on the clarity of the ridge impression, it is held to be dependent on the aleatory circumstances. Where a testator
employs an unfamiliar way of signing and that both the attestation clause and the will are silent on the matter, such silence is a
factor to be considered against the authenticity of the testament. However, the failure to describe the signature itself alone is not
sufficient to refuse probate when evidence fully satisfied that the will was executed and witnessed in accordance with law.

GARCIA vs LACUESTA
90 PHIL 489
FACTS:
Antero Mercado left a will dated January 3, 1943. The will appears to have been signed by Atty. Florentino Javier as he
wrote the name of Antero Mercado and his name for the testatior on the will. HOWEVER, immediately after Antero Mercado’s will,
Mercado himself placed an “X” mark.
The attestation clause was signed by three instrumental witnesses. Said attestation clause states that all pages of the will
were “signed in the presence of the testator and witnesses, and the witnesses in the presence of the testator and all and each and
every one of us witnesses.” The attestation clause however did not indicate that Javier wrote Antero Mercado’s name.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the will is valid.
2. W/N the placing of the “X” mark is the same as placing Antero’s thumb mark.
HELD:
No. The attestation clause is fatally defective for failing to state that Antero Mercado caused Atty. Florentino Javier to write
the testator’s name under his express direction, as required by Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
 10

No. It’s not the same as placing the testator’s thumb mark. It would have been different had it been proven that the “X” mark was
Antero’s usual signature or was even one of the ways by which he signs his name. If this were so, failure to state the writing by
somebody else would have been immaterial, since he would be considered to have signed the will himself.

NOBLE vs ABAJA
450 SCRA 265
FACTS:
The case is about the probate of the will of Alipio Abada (Not respondent Abaja). Petitioner Belinda Noble is the
administratrix of the estate of Abada. Respondent Alipio Abaja filed a petition for the probate of Abada’s will. Petitioner Noble
moved for dismissal of the petition for probate.
Caponong-Noble points out that nowhere in the will can one discern that Abada knew the Spanish language. She alleges that such
defect is fatal and must result in the disallowance of the will.
ISSUE:
Should it be expressly stated in the will that it (the will) was in a language known by the testator?
HELD:
No. There is no statutory requirement to state in the will itself that the testator knew the language or dialect used in the
will. This is a matter that a party may establish by proof aliunde. In this case, Alipio testified that Abada used to gather Spanish-
speaking people in their place. In these gatherings, Abada and his companions would talk in the Spanish language. This sufficiently
proves that Abada speaks the Spanish language.
Azuela v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 122880 (2006)

FACTS:
Petitioner Felix Azuela sought to admit to probate the notarial will of Eugenia E. Igsolo. However, this was opposed by
Geralda Castillo, who was the attorney-in-fact of “the 12 legitimate heirs” of the decedent. According to her, the will was forged,
and imbued with several fatal defects. Particularly, the issue relevant in this subject is that the will was not properly acknowledged.
The notary public, Petronio Y. Bautista, only wrote “Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng Hunyo 10 (sic), 1981 dito sa Lungsod
ng Maynila.”

ISSUE: Whether or not the will is fatally defective as it was not properly acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
witnesses as required by Article 806 of the Civil Code.

RULING:
Yes, the will is fatally defective. By no manner of contemplation can those words be construed as an acknowledgment. An
acknowledgement is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be
his act or deed. It involves an extra step undertaken whereby the signore actually declares to the notary that the executor of a
document has attested to the notary that the same is his/her own free act and deed.
It might be possible to construe the averment as a jurat, even though it does not hew to the usual language thereof. A jurat
is that part of an affidavit where the notary certifies that before him/her, the document was subscribed and sworn to by the
executor.
Yet even if we consider what was affixed by the notary public as a jurat, the will would nonetheless remain invalid, as the
express requirement of Article 806 is that the will be “acknowledged,” and not merely subscribed and sworn to. The will does not
present any textual proof, much less one under oath,that the decedent and the instrumental witnesses executed or signed the will
as their own free act or deed. The acknowledgment made in a will provides for another all-important legal safeguard against
spurious wills or those made beyond the free consent of the testator.

Barut v. Cabacungan
21 P 461
FACTS:
Barut applied for the probate of the will of deceased, Maria Salomon. The testatrix stated in the will that being unable to
read or write, the will was read to her by Ciriaco Concepcion and Timotea Inoselda and that she had instructed Severo Agayan to
sign her name to it as testatrix. The probate was contested by a number of the relatives of the deceased on various grounds.
The probate court found that the will was not entitled to probate because “the handwriting of the person who it is alleged
signed the name of the testatrix to the will for and on her behalf looked more like the handwriting of one of the other witnesses to
the will than to the person whose handwriting it was alleged to be” (i.e. The probate court denied probate because the signature
seemed to not have been by Severo Agayan but by another witness).
ISSUE:
Was the dissimilarity in handwriting sufficient to deny probate of the will?
HELD:
No. The SC found that the mere dissimilarity in writing is sufficient to overcome the uncontradicted testimony of all the
witnesses that the signature of the testatrix was written by Severo Agayan. It is also immaterial who writes the name of the testatrix
provided it is written at her request and in her presence and in the presence of all the witnesses to the execution of the will.
Based on Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is clear that with respect to the validity of the will, it is unimportant
whether the person who writes the name of the testatrix signs his own or not. The important thing is that it clearly appears that the
name of the testatrix was signed at her express direction in the presence of 3 witnesses and that they attested and subscribed it in
her presence and in the presence of each other. It may be wise that the one who signs the testator’s name signs also his own; but
that is not essential to the validity of the will.
The court also held that the 3 cases cited by the lower court was not applicable. In those cases, the person who signed the
will for the testator wrote his own name instead of the testator’s, so that the testator’s name nowhere appeared in the will, and
were thus wills not duly executed.
 11

Balonan vs. Abellana

GR No. L-15153, August 31, 1960

Facts:
A 2-page Will and Testament by the testatrix Anacleta Abellana was sought to be probated at rhe CFI of Zamboanga City.
ON the second page, which is the last page of the Will, on the left margin appears the signature of Juan Bello under whose name
appears handwritten the following phrase 'Por la Testadora Anacleta Abellana' (for the tetattrix Anacleta Abellana). (The CFI
admitted the probate of the will. Hence, this appeal, the petitioner contending that the signature of Juan A. Abello on top of the
phrase ‘por la tetadora Anacleta Abellana did not comply with the requirements of the law prescribing the manner in which it ill be
executed.)
ISSUE:
Whether or not the signature of Dr. Juan A. Abello comply with the requirements of the law prescribing the manner in
which a will shall be executed?
HELD:
The present law, Article 805 of the Civil Code, in part provides as follows:
"Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name
written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible
witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another."
The name of the testatrix, Anacleta Abellana, does not appear written under the will by said Abellana herself, or by Dr. Juan
Abello. There is, therefore, a failure to comply with the express requirement in the law that the testator must himself sign the will,
or that his name be affixed thereto by Some other person in his presence and by his express direction.
It appearing that the above provision of the law has not been complied with, we are constrained to declare that the said
will of the deceased Anacleta Abellana may not be admitted to probate.

Nera v. Rimando
G.R. L-5971 February 27, 1911

Facts:
At the time the will was executed, in a large room connecting with a smaller room by a doorway where a curtain hangs
across, one of the witnesses was in the outside room when the other witnesses were attaching their signatures to the instrument.
The trial court did not consider the determination of the issue as to the position of the witness as of vital importance in
determining the case. It agreed with the ruling in the case of Jaboneta v. Gustillo that the alleged fact being that one of the
subscribing witnesses was in the outer room while the signing occurred in the inner room, would not be sufficient to invalidate the
execution of the will.
The CA deemed the will valid.
Issue:
Whether or not the subscribing witness was able to see the testator and other witnesses in the act of affixing their
signatures.
HELD:
YES. The Court is unanimous in its opinion that had the witnesses been proven to be in the outer room when the testator
and other witnesses signed the will in the inner room, it would have invalidated the will since the attaching of the signatures under
the circumstances was not done 'in the presence' of the witnesses in the outer room. The line of vision of the witness to the testator
and other witnesses was blocked by the curtain separating the rooms.
The position of the parties must be such that with relation to each other at the moment of the attaching the signatures,
they may see each other sign if they chose to.
In the Jaboneta case, the true test of presence is not whether or not they actualy saw each other sign but whether they
might have seen each other sign if they chose to doso considering their physical, mental condition and position in relation to each
other at the moment of the inscription of the signature.
Taboada vs. Rosal
GR L-36033 November 5, 1982
FACTS
Petitioner Apolonio Taboada filed a petition for probate of the will of the late Dorotea perez. The will consisted of two
pages, the first page containing all the testamentary dispositions of the testator and was signed at the end or bottom of the page by
the testatrix alone and at the left hand margin by the three instrumental witnesses. The second page consisted of the attestation
clause and the acknowledgment was signed at the end of the attestation clause by the three witnesses and at the left hand margin
by the testatrix. The trial court disallowed the will for want of formality in its execution because the will was signed at the bottom of
the page solely by the testatrix, while the three witnesses only signed at the left hand margin of the page. The judge opined that
compliance with the formalities of the law required that the witnesses also sign at the end of the will because the witnesses attest
not only the will itself but the signature of the testatrix. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE
Was the object of attestation and subscription fully when the instrumental witnesses signed at the left margin of the sole
page which contains all the testamentary dispositions?
HELD
On certiorari, the Supreme Court held that the objects of attestation and subscription were fully met and satisfied in the
present case when the instrumental witnesses signed at the left margin of the sole page which contains all the testamentary
dispositions, especially so when the will was properly identified by a subscribing witness to be the same will executed by the
testatrix; Also, that the failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages used in writing the will would have been a fatal
defect were it not for the fact that it is really and actually composed of only two pages duly signed by the testatrix and her
instrumental witnesses.
 12

Icasiano vs. Icasiano

G.R. No. L-18979 June 30, 1964
Facts:
Celso Icasiano, filed a petition for the probate of the will of Josefa Villacorte and for his appointment as executor thereof. It
appears from the evidence that the testatrix died on September 12, 1958. She executed a will in Tagalog, and through the help of
her lawyer, it was prepared in duplicates, an original and a carbon copy.
On the day that it was subscribed and attested, the lawyer only brought the original copy of the will while the carbon
duplicate (unsigned) was left in Bulacan. One of the witnesses failed to sign one of the pages in the original copy but admitted he
may have lifted 2 pages simultaneously instead when he signed the will. Nevertheless, he affirmed that the will was signed by the
testator and other witnesses in his presence.
Issue:
Whether or not the failure of one of the subscribing witnesses to affix his signature to a page is sufficient to deny probate of
the will
HELD
No, the failure to sign was entirely through pure oversight or mere inadvertence. Since the duplicated bore the required
signatures, this proves that the omission was not intentional. Even if the original is in existence, a duplicate may still be admitted to
probate since the original is deemed to be defective, then in law, there is no other will be the duly signed carbon duplicate and the
same can be probated.
The law should not be strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of the inadvertence of a single
witness over whose conduct she has no control of. Where the purpose of the law is to guarantee the identity of the testament and
its component pages, and there is no intentional or deliberate deviation existed.
Note that this ruling should not be taken as a departure from the rules that the will should be signed by the witnesses on
every page. The carbon copy duplicate was regular in all respects.

CAGRO vs CAGRO

Cruz v. Villasor
G.R. L-32213 November 26, 1973

FACTS:
The CFI of Cebu allowed the probate of the last will and testament of the late Valenti Cruz. However, the petitioner
opposed the allowance of the will alleging that it was executed through fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, and undue influence. He
further alleged that the instrument was executed without the testator having been informed of its contents and finally, that it was
not executed in accordance with law.
One of the witnesses, Angel Tevel Jr. was also the notary before whom the will was acknowledged. Despite the objection,
the lower court admitted the will to probate on the ground that there is substantial compliance with the legal requirements of
having at least 3 witnesses even if the notary public was one of them.
Issue: Whether or not the will is valid in accordance with Art. 805 and 806 of the NCC
HELD:
NO.
The will is not valid. The notary public cannot be considered as the third instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge
before himself his having signed the said will. An acknowledging officer cannot serve as witness at the same time.
To acknowledge before means to avow, or to own as genuine, to assent, admit, and 'before' means in front of or
proceeding in space or ahead of. The notary cannot split his personality into two so that one will appear before the other to
acknowledge his participation int he making of the will. To permit such situation would be absurd.
Finally, the function of a notary among others is to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangements, a function defeated
if he were to be one of the attesting or instrumental witnesses. He would be interested in sustaining the validity of the will as it
directly involves himself and the validity of his own act. he would be in an inconsistent position, thwarting the very purpose of the
acknowledgment, which is to minimize fraud.

GABUCAN vs MANTA
GR No. L-51546 Jan 28, 1980
FACTS:
In 1977, Judge Luis Manta dismissed a probate proceeding because the notarial will presented in the said case lacked a
documentary stamp. Judge Manta ruled that the lack of of documentary stamp made the will inadmissible in evidence and as such
there is no will and testament to probate.
Jose Gabucan, a party in the said case, thereafter affixed the required documentary stamp and then moved for
reconsideration but the judge refused to reconsider his ruling. Hence, Gabucan filed a petition for mandamus to compel the judge to
admit the notarial will.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a notarial will presented in court which originally has no documentary stamp may still be admitted after
the required documentary stamp was affixed.
HELD:
Yes. It is true that the law (the [old] Tax Code – now Sec. 201 of R.A. 8424) requires a notarial will to have a documentary
stamp:
 13

SEC. 238. Effect of failure to stamp taxable document. — An instrument, document, or paper which is required by law to be
stamped and which has been signed, issued, accepted, or transferred without being duly stamped, shall not be recorded, nor shall it
or any copy thereof or any record of transfer of the same be admitted or used in evidence in any court until the requisite stamp or
stamps shall have been affixed thereto and cancelled. xxx
Thus, a notarial will without a documentary stamp may not be admitted in evidence. However, once the said documentary
stamp is affixed, then the deficiency is cured and it can now be admitted in evidence. The documentary stamp may be affixed at the
time the taxable document is presented in evidence.

Javellana vs. Ledesma

G.R. No. L-7179
Facts:
The CFI of Iloilo admitted to probate a will and codicil executed by the deceased Apolinaria Ledesma in July 1953. This
testament was deemed executed on May 1950 and May 1952. The contestant was the sister and nearest surviving relative of the
deceased. She appealed from this decision alleging that the will were not executed in accordance with law.
The testament was executed at the house of the testatrix. One the other hand, the codicil was executed after the
enactment of the New Civil Code (NCC), and therefore had to be acknowledged before a notary public. Now, the contestant, who
happens to be one of the instrumental witnesses asserted that after the codicil was signed and attested at the San Pablo hospital,
that Gimotea (the notary) signed and sealed it on the same occasion. Gimotea, however, said that he did not do so, and that the act
of signing and sealing was done afterwards.
One of the allegations was that the certificate of acknowledgement to the codicil was signed somewhere else or in the
office of the notary. The ix and the witnesses at the hospital, was signed and sealed by the notary only when he brought it in his
office.
Issue:
Whether or not the signing and sealing of the will or codicil in the absence of the testator and witnesses affects the validity
of the will
HELD:
NO. Unlike in the Old Civil Code of 1899, the NCC does not require that the signing of the testator, the witnesses and the
notary be accomplished in one single act. All that is required is that every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the
testator and witnesses. The subsequent signing and sealing is not part of the acknowledgement itself nor of the testamentary act.
Their separate execution out of the presence of the testator and the witnesses cannot be a violation of the rule that testaments
should be completed without interruption.

Guerrero vs Bihis
G.R. No. 174144 April 17, 2007
Facts:
Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura, mother of petitioner Bella A. Guerrero and respondent Resurreccion A. Bihis, died. Guerrero
filed for probate in the RTCQC. Respondent Bihis
opposed her elder sister’s petition on the following
grounds: the will was not executed and attested as required by law; its attestation clause and acknowledgment did not comply with
the requirements of the law; the signature of the testatrix was procured by fraud and petitioner and her children procured the will
through undue and improper pressure and influence. The trial court denied the probate of the will ruling that Article 806 of
the Civil Code was not complied with because the will was “acknowledged” bythe testatrix and the witnesses at the testatrix’s
residence at No. 40 Kanlaon
Street, Quezon City before Atty. Macario O. Directo who was a commissioned notary public for and in Caloocan City.
ISSUE:
Did the will “acknowledged” by the testatrix and the instrumental witnesses before a notary public acting outside the place
of his commission satisfy the requirement under Article 806 of the Civil Code?
HELD:
No. One of the formalities required by law in connection with the execution of a notarial will is that it must be
acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. This formal requirement is one of the indispensable
requisites for the validity of a will. In other words, a notarial will that is not acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and
the instrumental witnesses is void and cannot be accepted for probate.
The jurisdiction of a notary public in a province shall be co-extensive with the province. The jurisdiction of a notary public in
the City of Manila shall be co-extensive with said city. No notary shall possess authority to do any notarial act beyond the limits of
his jurisdiction. SinCe Atty. Directo was not a commissioned notary public for and in QuezonCity, he lacked the authority to take the
acknowledgment of the testratix and the instrumental witnesses. In the same vain, the testratix and the instrumental witnesses
could not have validly acknowledged the will before him. Thus, Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura’s last will and testament was, ineffect,
not acknowledged as required by law

Ortega v. Valmonte
478 SCRA 247
FACTS:
Two years after the arrival of Placido from the United States and at the age of 80 he wed Josefina who was then 28 years
old. But in a little more than two years of wedded bliss, Placido died. Placido executed a notarial last will and testament written in
English and consisting of 2 pages, and dated 15 June 1983¸but acknowledged only on 9 August 1983.
The allowance to probate of this will was opposed by Leticia, Placido’s sister. According to the notary public who notarized
the testator’s will, after the testator instructed him on the terms and dispositions he wanted on the will, the notary public told them
to come back on 15 August 1983 to give him time to prepare.
 14

The testator and his witnesses returned on the appointed date but the notary public was out of town so they were
instructed by his wife to come back on 9 August 1983. The formal execution was actually on 9 August 1983. He reasoned he no
longer changed the typewritten date of 15 June 1983 because he did not like the document to appear dirty. According to
petitioner, the time of the execution of the notarial will Placido was already 83 years old and was no longer of sound mind and
Josefina conspired with the notary public and the 3 attesting witnesses in deceiving Placido to sign it. Deception is allegedly reflected
in the varying dates of the execution and the attestation of the will.

ISSUE: W/N Placido has testamentary capacity at the time he allegedly executed the will.
W/N the signature of Placido in the will was procured by fraud or trickery.
HELD:

YES. Despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately the kinds of property he owned, the extent of his
shares in them and even their location. As regards the proper objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that he identified his wife as
sole beneficiary. The omission of some relatives from the will did not affect its formal validity. There being no showing of fraud in its
execution, intent in its disposition becomes irrelevant.
NO. Fraud is a trick, secret devise, false statement, or pretense, by which the subject of it is cheated. It may be of such
character that the testator is misled or deceived as to the nature or contents of the document which he executes, or it may relate to
some extrinsic fact, in consequence of the deception regarding which the testator is led to make a certain will which, but for fraud,
he would not have made. The party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the existence of fraud at the time of its
execution. The burden to show otherwise shifts to the proponent of the will only upon a showing of credible evidence of fraud.
Omission of some relatives does not affect the due execution of a will. Moreover, the conflict between the dates appearing on the
will does not invalidate the document, “because the law does not even require that a notarial will be executed and acknowledged on
the same occasion. The variance in the dates of the will as to its supposed execution and attestation was satisfactorily and
persuasively explained by the notary public and instrumental witnesses.

GUERRERO vs BIHIS
GR No. 174144 17 April 2007
Facts:
On February 19, 1994, Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura, mother of petitioner Bella A. Guerrero and respondent Resurreccion
A. Bihis, died at the Metropolitan Hospital
On May 24, 1994, petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the last will and testament of the decedent... petition alleged
the following: petitioner was named as executrix in the decedent's will and she was legally qualified to act as such; the decedent was
a citizen of the Philippines at the time of her death; at the time of the execution of the will, the testatrix was 79 years... old, of sound
and disposing mind, not acting under duress, fraud or undue influence and was capacitated to dispose of her estate by will.
Respondent opposed her elder sister's petition on the following grounds: will was not executed and attested as required by
law; its attestation clause and acknowledgment did not comply with the requirements of the law; the signature of the testatrix was
procured by fraud and petitioner and her children procured the will through undue and improper pressure and influence petitioner
special administratrix of the decedent's estate
Respondent opposed petitioner's appointment but subsequently withdrew her opposition
On January 17, 2000, after petitioner presented her evidence, respondent filed a demurrer thereto alleging that petitioner's
evidence failed to establish that the decedent's will complied with Articles 804 and 805... trial court denied the probate of the will
ruling that Article 806 of the Civil Code was not complied with because the will was "acknowledged" by the testatrix and the
witnesses at the testatrix's, residence at No. 40 Kanlaon Street,... Quezon City before Atty. Macario O. Directo who was a
commissioned notary public for and in Caloocan City... acknowledged by the testatrix and the witnesses at the testatrix's residence
in Quezon City before Atty. Directo and that, at that time, Atty. Directo was a commissioned notary public for and in Caloocan City.
She, however, asserts that the... fact that the notary public was acting outside his territorial jurisdiction did not affect the
validity of the notarial will.
Issues:
Did the will "acknowledged" by the testatrix and the instrumental witnesses before a notary public acting outside the place of his
commission satisfy the requirement under Article 806 of the Civil Code?
Ruling:
ART. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall
not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of Court.
One of the formalities required by law in connection with the execution of a notarial will is that it must be acknowledged
before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses.
This formal requirement is one of the indispensable requisites for the validity of a will.
An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent officer and declaring it to be his act
or deed.[8] In the case of a notarial will, that competent officer is the notary public.
The acknowledgment of a notarial will coerces the testator and the instrumental witnesses to declare before an officer of
the law, the notary public, that they executed and subscribed to the will as their own free act or deed.[9] Such declaration is under
oath and under pain of perjury, thus paving the way for the criminal prosecution of persons who participate in the execution of
spurious wills, or those executed without the free consent of the testator.
It also provides a further degree of assurance that the testator is of a certain mindset in making the testamentary
dispositions to the persons instituted as heirs or designated as devisees or legatees in the will. A notary public is authorized to
perform notarial acts, including the taking of acknowledgments, within that territorial jurisdiction only. Outside the place of his
commission, he is bereft of power to perform any notarial act; he is not a notary public. Any notarial act outside... the limits of his
jurisdiction has no force and effect.
 15

Garcia v. Vasquez
G.R. No. L-26808 March 28, 1969

Facts:
Gliceria del Rosario executed 2 wills, one in June 1956, written in Spanish, a language she knew an spoke. The other will was
executed in December 1960 consisting of only one page, and written in Tagalog. The witnesses to the 1960 will declared that the will
was first read 'silently' by the testatrix before signing it. The probate court admitted the will.
The oppositors alleged that the as of December 1960, the eyesight of the deceased was so poor and defective that she
could not have read the provisions contrary to the testimony of the witnesses.
Issue:
Whether or not the will is valid
HELD:
The will is not valid. If the testator is blind, Art. 808 of the New Civil Code (NCC) should apply.If the testator is blind or
incapable of reading, he must be apprised of the contents of the will for him to be able to have the opportunityto object if the
provisions therein are not in accordance with his wishes.
The testimony of her opthalmologist established that notwithstanding an operation to remove her cataract and being fitted
with the lenses, this did not improve her vision. Her vision remained mainly for viewing distant objects and not for reading. There
was no evidence that her vision improved at the time of the execution of the 2nd will. Hence, she was incapable of reading her own
will. The admission of the will to probate is therefore erroneous.

ALVARADO vs. GAVIOLA

226 SCRA 348

FACTS:
The testator did not read the final draft of the will himself. Instead, private respondent, as the lawyer who drafted the 8-
paged document, read the same aloud in the presence of the testator, the 3 instrumental witnesses and the notary public. The latter
4 followed the reading with their own respective copies previously furnished them.
Said will was admitted to probate. Later on, a codicil was executed, and by that time, the testator was already suffering
from glaucoma. But the disinheritance and revocatory clauses were unchanged. As in the case of the notarial will, the testator did
not personally read the final draft of the codicil. Instead, it was private respondent who read it aloud in his presence and in the
presence of the three instrumental witnesses (same as those of the notarial will) and the notary public who followed the reading
using their own copies.
ISSUE:
Was there substantial compliance to the reading of the will?
HELD:
Article 808 not only applies to blind testators, but also to those who, for one reason or another, are incapable of reading
their wills. Hence, the will should have been read by the notary public and an instrumental witness. However, the spirit behind the
law was served though the letter was not. In this case, there was substantial compliance. Substantial compliance is acceptable
where the purpose of the law has been satisfied, the reason being that the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills are
intended to protect the testator from all kinds of fraud and trickery but are never intended to be so rigid and inflexible as to destroy
the testamentary privilege.
In this case, private respondent read the testator's will and codicil aloud in the presence of the testator, his three
instrumental witnesses, and the notary public. Prior and subsequent thereto, the testator affirmed, upon being asked, that the
contents read corresponded with his instructions. Only then did the signing and acknowledgement take place.

ALVARADO v GAVIOLA
GR No. 74695 September 14, 1993

FACTS
A79-year old Brigido Alvarado executed a notarial will entitled "Huling Habilin" wherein he disinherited an illegitimate son
(petitioner Cesar Alvarado) and expressly revoked a previously executed holographic will at the time awaiting probate.
At the execution of the "Huling Habilin", the testator did not read the final draft of the will himself. Instead, his lawyer
Bayani Ma. Rino who drafted the document, read the same aloud in the presence of the testator, the 3 instrumental witnesses and
the notary public. The latter 4 followed the reading with their own respective copies.
The same month, a codicil entitled "Kasulatan ng Pagbabago sa Ilang Pagpapasiya na Nasasaad sa Huling Habilin na May
Petsa Nobiembre 5, 1977 ni Brigido Alvarado" was executed changing some dispositions in the notarial will to generate cash for the
testator's eye operation. Brigido was then suffering from glaucoma. But the disinheritance and revocatory clauses were unchanged.
As in the case of the notarial will, the testator did not personally read the Final draft of the codicil. Instead, it was his lawyer who
read it aloud in his presence and in the presence of the 3 instrumental witnesses (same as those of the notarial will) and the notary
public who followed the reading using their own copies.
A petition for the probate of the notarial will and codicil was filed upon the testator's death by Atty. Rino, as executor, with
the CFI of Siniloan, Laguna. Cesar filed an Opposition on the ground, among others, that the will was not executed and attested as
required by law. A Probate Order was issued from which an appeal was made to the IAC. The main thrust of the appeal was that the
deceased was blind within the meaning of the law at the time his "Huling Habilin" and the codicil were executed; that since the
reading required by Art. 808 of the CC was admittedly not complied with, probate of the deceased's last will and codicil should have
been denied. The CA found that Brigido Alvarado was not blind at the time his last will and codicil were executed; that assuming his
blindness, the reading requirement of Art. 808 was substantially complied.
 16

ISSUES
1. WON Brigido Alvarado was blind for purposes of Art. 808 at the time his "Huling Habilin" and its codicil were executed.
2. WON the double reading requirement of said article was complied with.

HELD
1. YES.
The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the testator if he is blind or incapable of reading the will himself
(as when he is illiterate), is to make the provisions thereof known to him, so that he may be able to object if they are not in
accordance with his wishes. [Garcia vs. Vasquez]
It is clear from the foregoing that Art. 808 applies not only to blind testators but also to those who, for one reason or
another, are incapable of reading their will. Since Brigido Alvarado was incapable of reading the final drafts of his will and codicil on
the separate occasions of their execution due to his "poor," "defective," or 'blurred" vision, there can be no other course but to
conclude that Brigido Alvarado comes within the scope of the term "blind" as it is used in Art. 808. Unless the contents were read to
him, he had no way of ascertaining whether or not the lawyer who drafted the will and codicil did so conformably with his
instructions.
2. YES.
Substantial compliance is acceptable where the purpose of the law has been satisfied, the reason being that the solemnities
surrounding the execution of wills are intended to protect the testator from all kinds of fraud and trickery but are never intended to
be so rigid and inflexible as to destroy the testamentary privilege.
Atty. Rino read the testator's will and codicil aloud, in the presence of the testator, his 3 instrumental witnesses, and the
notary public. Prior and subsequent thereto, the testator affirmed, upon being asked, that the contents read corresponded with his
instructions. Only then did the signing and acknowledgement take place. There is no evidence that the contents of the will and
codicil were not sufficiently made known and communicated to the testator.
Moreover, the notary public and the 3 instrumental witnesses likewise read the will and codicil, albeit silently. With four
persons following the reading word for word with their own copies, it can be safely concluded that the testator was reasonably
assured that what was read to him were the terms actually appearing on the typewritten documents. This is especially true when we
consider the fact that the 3 instrumental witnesses were persons known to the testator, one being his physician and another being
known to him since childhood.
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid the
substitution of wills and testament and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore, the laws on the subject should be
interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not
the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already given assures
such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and
frustration of the testator's will, must be disregarded. [Abangan v. Abangan]

CANEDA vs CA
222 SCRA 781
FACTS:
On December 5, 1978, Mateo Caballero, a widower without any children and already in the twilight years of his life,
executed a last will and testament at his residence before 3 witnesses.
He was assisted by his lawyer, Atty. Emilio Lumontad.
In the will, it was declared that the testator was leaving by way of legacies and devises his real and personal properties to
several people all of whom do not appear to be related to the testator.
4 months later, Mateo Caballero himself filed a case seeking the probate of his last will and testament, but numerous
postponements pushed back the initial hearing of the probate court regarding the will.
On May 29, 1980, the testator passed away before his petition could finally be heard by the probate court. Thereafter one
of the legatees, Benoni Cabrera, sought his appointment as special administrator of the testator’s estate.
Thereafter, the petitioners, claiming to be nephews and nieces of the testator, instituted a second petition for intestate
proceedings. They also opposed the probate of the testator’s will and the appointment of a special administrator for his estate.
Benoni Cabrera died and was replaced by William Cabrera as special administrator and gave an order that the testate
proceedings for the probate of the will had to be heard and resolved first.
In the course of the proceedings, petitioners opposed to the allowance of the testator’s will on the ground that on the alleged date
of its execution, the testator was already in poor state of health such that he could not have possibly executed the same. Also the
genuineness of the signature of the testator is in doubt.
On the other hand, one of the attesting witnesses and the notary public testified that the testator executed the will in
question in their presence while he was of sound and disposing mind and that the testator was in good health and was not unduly
influenced in any way in the execution of his will.
Probate court then rendered a decision declaring the will in question as the last will and testament of the late Mateo Caballero.
CA affirmed the probate court’s decision stating that it substantially complies with Article 805. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
W/N the attestation clause in the will of the testator is fatally defective or can be cured under the art. 809.
HELD:
No. It does not comply with the provisions of the law.
Ordinary or attested wills are governed by Arts. 804 to 809. The will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the
testator and the attesting witnesses. The attestation clause need not be written in a language known to the testator or even to the
attesting witnesses.
It is a separate memorandum or record of the facts surrounding the conduct of execution and once signed by the witnesses
it gives affirmation to the fact that compliance with the essential formalities required by law has been observed.
 17

The attestation clause, therefore, provides strong legal guaranties for the due execution of a will and to insure the
authenticity thereof.
It is contended by petitioners that the attestation clause in the will failed to specifically state the fact that the attesting
witnesses witnessed the testator sign the will and all its pages in their presence and that they, the witnesses, likewise signed the will
and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other. And the Court agrees.
The attestation clause does not expressly state therein the circumstance that said witnesses subscribed their respective
signatures to the will in the presence of the testator and of each other.
The phrase, “and he has signed the same and every page thereof, on the space provided for his signature and on the left hand
margin,” obviously refers to the testator and not the instrumental witnesses as it is immediately preceded by the words” as his last
will and testament.”
Clearly lacking is the statement that the witnesses signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator
and of one another. That the absence of the statement required by law is a fatal defect or imperfection which must necessarily
result in the disallowance of the will that is here sought to be probated.
Also, Art. 809 does not apply to the present case because the attestation clause totally omits the fact that the attesting witnesses
signed each and every page of the will in the presence of the testator and of each other. The defect in this case is not only with
respect to the form or the language of the attestation clause. The defects must be remedied by intrinsic evidence supplied by the
will itself which is clearly lacking in this case.
Therefore, the probate of the will is set aside and the case for the intestate proceedings shall be revived.
Article 809 cannot be used to cure the defects of the will when it does not pertain to the form or language of the will. This is because
there is not substantial compliance with Article 805.

CALDE vs CA
G.R. No. 93980 June 27, 1994

Facts:
Decedent (Calibia Lingdan Bulanglang) left behind nine thousand pesos (P9,000.00) worth of property. She also left a Last
Will and Testament, dated October 30, 1972, and a Codicil thereto, dated July 24, 1973. Both documents contained the thumbmarks
of decedent. They were also signed by three (3) attesting witnesses each, and acknowledged before Tomas A. Tolete, then the
Municipal Judge and Notary Public Ex-Officio of Bauko, Mt. Province.
Nicasio Calde, the executor named in the will, filed a Petition for its allowance before the RTC of Bontoc, Mt. Province, Br.
36. 2 He died during the pendency of the proceedings, and was duly substituted by petitioner. Private respondents, relatives of
decedent, opposed the Petitioner filed by Calde, on the following grounds: that the will and codicil were written in Ilocano, a dialect
that decedent did not know; that decedent was mentally incapacitated to execute the two documents because of her advanced age,
illness and deafness; that decedent’s thumbmarks were procured through fraud and undue influence; and that the codicil was not
executed in accordance with law.
On June 23, 1988, the trial court rendered judgment on the case, approving and allowing decedent’s will and its codicil. The
decision was appealed to and reversed by the respondent Court of Appeals. It held:
The will and codicil could pass the safeguards under Article 805 of the New Civil Code but for one crucial factor of
discrepancy in the color of ink when the instrumental witnesses affixed their respective signatures. When subjected to cross-
examination, Codcodio Nacnas as witness testified as follows:
Two (2) of the six (6) witnesses testified that only one ballpen was used in signing the two testamentary documents and
were subscribed and attested by the instrumental witnesses during a single occasion. However, on the face of the document, the
signatures of some of the attesting witnesses in the decedent’s will and its codicil were written in blue ink while the others were in
black. In addition, Judge Tomas A. Tolete testified in narration as to how the documents in question were subscribed and attested,
starting from decedent’s thumb-marking thereof, to the alleged signing of the instrumental witnesses thereto in consecutive order.
Issue:
Whether or not, based on the evidence submitted, respondent appellate court erred in concluding that both decedent’s
Last Will and Testament, and its Codicil were subscribed by the instrumental witnesses on separate occasions.
Held:
Evidence may generally be classified into three (3) kinds, from which a court or tribunal may properly acquire knowledge for
making its decision, namely: real evidence or autoptic preference, testimonial evidence and circumstantial evidence.
In the case at bench, the autoptic proference contradicts the testimonial evidence produced by petitioner. Thus, it was not
erroneous nor baseless for respondent court to disbelieve petitioner’s claim that both testamentary documents in question were
subscribed to in accordance with the provisions of Art. 805 of the Civil Code. Neither did respondent court err when it did not accord
great weight to the testimony of Judge Tomas A. Tolete since nowhere in Judge Tolete’s testimony is there any kind of explanation
for the different-colored signatures on the testaments. The petition for review is denied. The Supreme Court affirmed in toto the
Decision of the Court of Appeals.
Lopez v. Lopez,
G.R. No. 189984, November 12, 2012.

FACTS
The RTC disallowed the probate of the will for failure to comply with the required statement in the attestation clause as to
the number of pages used upon which the will is written. While the acknowledgment portion stated that the will consists of 7 pages
including the page on which the ratification and acknowledgment are written, the RTC observed that it has 8 pages including the
acknowledgment portion. As such, it disallowed the will for not having been executed and attested in accordance with law.
ISSUE
Whether or not the discrepancy between the number of pages in the attestation clause and the actual number of pages in
the will that would warrant its disallowance.
 18

HELD
YES. The provisions of the Civil Code on Forms of Wills, particularly, Articles 805 and 809 of the Civil Code provide that the
attestation must state the number of pages used upon which the will is written. The purpose of the law is to safeguard against
possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and prevent any increase or decrease in the pages. Here, the will
actually consists of 8 pages including its acknowledgment which discrepancy cannot be explained by mere examination of the will
itself but through the presentation of evidence aliunde.

Gonzales v. CA
G.R. No. L-37453 May 25, 1979

FACTS:
Petitioner Rizalina Gonzales and Lutgarda Santiago (Private respondent) are the nieces of the deceased Isabel Gabriel who
died a widow. A will was thereafter submitted to probate. The said will was typewritten, in Tagalog and appeared to have been
executed in April 1961 or two months prior to the death of Isabel. It consisted of 5 pages including the attestation and
acknowledgment, with the signature of testatrix on page 4 and the left margin of all the pages.
Lutgarda was named as the universal heir and executor. The petitioner opposed the probate.
The lower court denied the probate on the ground that the will was not executed and attested in accordance with law on
the issue of the competency and credibility of the witnesses.
Issue: Whether or not the credibility of the subscribing witnesses is material to the validity of a will
HELD: No. The law requires only that witnesses posses the qualifications under Art. 820 (NCC) and none of the disqualifications of
Art. 802. There is no requirement that they are of good standing or reputation in the community, for trustworthiness, honesty and
uprightness in order that his testimony is believed and accepted in court. For the testimony to be credible, it is not mandatory that
evidence be established on record that the witnesses have good standing in the the community. Competency is distinguished from
credibility, the former being determined by Art. 820 while the latter does not require evidence of such good standing. Credibility
depends on the convincing weight of his testimony in court.

ROXAS vs. DE JESUS, JR.

G.R. No. L-38338 January 28, 1985
FACTS:
After the death of spouses Andres G. de Jesus and Bibiana Roxas de Jesus, Special Proceeding case was filed by petitioner,
the brother of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus. On March 26, 1973, petitioner Simeon R. Roxas was appointed administrator.
After Letters of Administration had been granted to the petitioner, he delivered to the lower court a document purporting to be the
holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus. On May 26, 1973, respondent Judge set the hearing of the probate of the
holographic Will on July 21, 1973. Petitioner testified that after his appointment as administrator, he found a notebook belonging to
the deceased and that on pages 21, 22, 23 and 24 thereof, a letter-will addressed to her children and entirely written and signed in
the handwriting of the deceased Bibiana R. de Jesus was found.
Respondent Luz R. Henson, another compulsory heir filed an "opposition to probate" assailing the purported holographic
Will of Bibiana R. de Jesus because a it was not executed in accordance with law, (b) it was executed through force, intimidation
and/or under duress, undue influence and improper pressure, and (c) the alleged testatrix acted by mistake and/or did not intend,
nor could have intended the said Will to be her last Will and testament at the time of its execution.
On August 24, 1973, respondent Judge Jose C. Colayco issued an order allowing the probate of the holographic Will. On
December 10, 1973, respondent Judge Colayco reconsidered his earlier order and disallowed the probate of the holographic Will on
the ground that the word "dated" has generally been held to include the month, day, and year.

ISSUE: W/N the date "FEB./61 " appearing on the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus is a valid compliance with
the Article 810 of the Civil Code

HELD:
Yes, if the testator, in executing his Will, attempts to comply with all the requisites, although compliance is not literal, it is
sufficient if the objective or purpose sought to be accomplished by such requisite is actually attained by the form followed by the
testator.

As a general rule, the "date" in a holographic Will should include the day, month, and year of its execution. However, when as in the
case at bar, there is no appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue influence and pressure and the authenticity of the Will is established
and the only issue is whether or not the date "FEB./61" appearing on the holographic Will is a valid compliance with Article 810 of
the Civil Code, probate of the holographic Will should be allowed under the principle of substantial compliance.

Kalaw v. Relova
132 SCRA 237

FACTS:

On September 1, 1971,Gregorio Kalaw, claiming to be the sole heir of his deceased sister, Natividad Kalaw, filed a petition for the
probate of her holographic Will executed on December 24, 1968.

The holographic Will, as first written, named Rosa Kalaw, a sister of the testatrix as her sole heir. She opposed probate alleging that
the holographic Will contained alterations, corrections, and insertions without the proper authentication by the full signature of the
testatrix as required by Article 814 of the Civil Code reading: Art. 814. In case of any insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration in a
holographic will the testator must authenticate the same by his full signature.
 19

ROSA’s position was that the holographic Will, as first written, should be given effect and probated so that she could be the
sole heir thereunder.Trial Court denied petition to probate the holographic will. Reconsideration denied.

ISSUE:
W/N the original unaltered text after subsequent alterations and insertions were voided by the Trial Court for lack of
authentication by the full signature of the testatrix, should be probated or not, with Rosa as sole heir.
HELD:
Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the testator in a holographic Will litem not
been noted under his signature, … the Will is not thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the particular words
erased, corrected or interlined.
However, the holographic Will in dispute had only one substantial provision, which was altered by substituting the original
heir with another, but which alteration did not carry the requisite of full authentication by the full signature of the testator, the
effect must be that the entire Will is voided or revoked for the simple reason that nothing remains in the Will after that which could
remain valid. To state that the Will as first written should be given efficacy is to disregard the seeming change of mind of the
testatrix. But that change of mind can neither be given effect because she failed to authenticate it in the manner required by law by
affixing her full signature.

. Kalaw v. Relova
132 SCRA 237

FACTS:
On September 1, 1971,Gregorio Kalaw, claiming to be the sole heir of his deceased sister, Natividad Kalaw, filed a petition
for the probate of her holographic Will executed on December 24, 1968.
The holographic Will, as first written, named Rosa Kalaw, a sister of the testatrix as her sole heir. She opposed probate
alleging that the holographic Will contained alterations, corrections, and insertions without the proper authentication by the full
signature of the testatrix as required by Article 814 of the Civil Code reading: Art. 814. In case of any insertion, cancellation, erasure
or alteration in a holographic will the testator must authenticate the same by his full signature.
ROSA’s position was that the holographic Will, as first written, should be given effect and probated so that she could be the
sole heir thereunder.
Trial Court denied petition to probate the holographic will. Reconsideration denied.
ISSUE:
W/N the original unaltered text after subsequent alterations and insertions were voided by the Trial Court for lack of
authentication by the full signature of the testatrix, should be probated or not, with Rosa as sole heir.
HELD:
Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the testator in a holographic Will litem not
been noted under his signature, … the Will is not thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the particular words
erased, corrected or interlined.
However, when as in this case, the holographic Will in dispute had only one substantial provision, which was altered by
substituting the original heir with another, but which alteration did not carry the requisite of full authentication by the full signature
of the testator, the effect must be that the entire Will is voided or revoked for the simple reason that nothing remains in the Will
after that which could remain valid. To state that the Will as first written should be given efficacy is to disregard the seeming change
of mind of the testatrix. But that change of mind can neither be given effect because she failed to authenticate it in the manner
required by law by affixing her full signature,
The ruling in Velasco, supra, must be held confined to such insertions, cancellations, erasures or alterations in a holographic
Will, which affect only the efficacy of the altered words themselves but not the essence and validity of the Will itself. As it is, with
the erasures, cancellations and alterations made by the testatrix herein, her real intention cannot be determined with certitude.

Labrador v. CA
184 SCRA 170

FACTS:
Melecio died leaving behind a parcel of land to his heirs. However, during probate proceedings, Jesus and Gaudencio filed
an opposition on the ground that the will has been extinguished by implication of law alleging that before Melecio’s death, the land
was sold to them evidenced by TCT No. 21178. Jesus eventually sold it to Navat.
Trial court admitted the will to probate and declared the TCT null and void. However, the CA on appeal denied probate on the
ground that it was undated.

ISSUE:
W/N the alleged holographic will is dated, as provided for in Article 810 of CC.
HELD:
YES. The law does not specify a particular location where the date should be placed in the will. The only requirements are
that the date be in the will itself and executed in the hand of the testator.
The intention to show March 17 1968 as the date of the execution is plain from the tenor of the succeeding words of the
paragraph. It states that “this being in the month of March 17th day, in the year 1968, and this decision and or instruction of mine is
the matter to be followed. And the one who made this writing is no other than Melecio Labrador, their father.” This clearly shows
that this is a unilateral act of Melecio who plainly knew that he was executing a will.
 20

Gan v. Yap
104 P 509

FACTS:
Felicidad Yap died of a heart failure, leaving properties in Pulilan, Bulacan, and in Manila.
Fausto E. Gan, her nephew, initiated the proceedings in the Manila CFI with a petition for the probate of a holographic will allegedly
executed by the deceased.
The will was not presented because Felicidad’s husband, Ildefonso, supposedly took it. What was presented were witness
accounts of relatives who knew of her intention to make a will and allegedly saw it as well. According to the witnesses, Felicidad did
not want her husband to know about it, but she had made known to her other relatives that she made a will.
Opposing the petition, her surviving husband Ildefonso Yap asserted that the deceased had not left any will, nor executed any
testament during her lifetime.
After hearing the parties and considering their evidence, the Judge refused to probate the alleged will on account of the
discrepancies arising from the facts. For one thing, it is strange that Felicidad made her will known to so many of her relatives when
she wanted to keep it a secret and she would not have carried it in her purse in the hospital, knowing that her husband may have
access to it. There was also no evidence presented that her niece was her confidant.
In the face of these improbabilities, the trial judge had to accept the oppositor’s evidence that Felicidad did not and could not have
executed such holographic will.

ISSUE:
1. May a holographic will be probated upon the testimony of witnesses who have allegedly seen it and who declare that it
was in the handwriting of the testator?
2. W/N Felicidad could have executed the holographic will.
HELD:
1. No. The will must be presented.
The New Civil Code effective in 1950 revived holographic wills in its arts. 810-814. “A person may execute a holographic will which
must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form and may be made in or
out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.”
2. No. Even if oral testimony were admissible to establish and probate a lost holographic will, we think the evidence
submitted by herein petitioner is so tainted with improbabilities and inconsistencies that it fails to measure up to that “clear and
distinct” proof required by Rule 77, sec. 6.

Rodelas v. Aranza
119 SCRA 16

FACTS:
Rodelas filed a petition with the CFI of Rizal for the probate of the holographic will of Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance of
letters testamentary in her favor.
Aranza, et al. filed a MTD on the grounds of:
Rodelas was estopped from claiming that the deceased left a will by failing to produce the will within twenty days of the
death of the testator as required by Rule 75, section 2 of the Rules of Court;
The copy of the alleged holographic will did not contain a disposition of property after death and was not intended to take
effect after death, and therefore it was not a will, it was merely an instruction as to the management and improvement of the
schools and colleges founded by the decedent;
The hollographic will itself, and not an alleged copy thereof, must be produced, otherwise it would produce no effect
because lost or destroyed holographic wills cannot be proved by secondary evidence unlike ordinary wills.
The deceased did not leave any will, holographic or otherwise, executed and attested as required by law.
MTD was denied. Aranza et al. filed an MR, Rodelas filed an opposition.
The CFI set aside its order and dismissed the petition for the probate of the will stating that “in the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104
Phil. 509, 522, the Supreme Court held that ‘in the matter of holographic wills the law, it is reasonable to suppose, regards the
document itself as the material proof of authenticity of said wills.”
And that the alleged holographic will was executed on January 25, 1962 while Ricardo B. Bonilla died on May 13, 1976. The
lapse of more than 14 years from the time of the execution of the will to the death of the decedent and the fact that the original of
the will could not be located shows to that the decedent had discarded the alleged holographic will before his death.
Rodelas filed an MR which was denied. Rodelas appealed to the CA. Aranza et al. moved to forward the case to the SC as it
involves a question of law not of fact.

ISSUE:
W/N a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be proved by means of a photostatic copy.

HELD:
If the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will cannot be probated because the
best and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said will. It is necessary that there be a comparison between sample
handwritten statements of the testator and the handwritten will.
But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be made by the probate court
with the standard writings of the testator. The probate court would be able to determine the authenticity of the handwriting of the
testator.
 21

In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 PHIL. 509, the Court ruled that “the execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic
will may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. The will itself must be presented;
otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The law regards the document itself as material proof of authenticity.” But, in Footnote 8 of
said decision, it says that “Perhaps it may be proved by a photographic or photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon copy;
or by other similar means, if any, whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited and tested before
the probate court,”

Codoy v. Calugay
312 SCRA 333

FACTS:
On 6 April 1990, Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas, devisees and legatees of the holographic will
of the deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal, filed a petition for probate of the said will. They attested to the genuineness and
due execution of the will on 30 August 1978.
Eugenio Ramonal Codoy and Manuel Ramonal filed their opposition claiming that the will was a forgery and that the same
is even illegible. They raised doubts as regards the repeated appearing on the will after every disposition, calling the same out of the
ordinary. If the will was in the handwriting of the deceased, it was improperly procured.
Evangeline Calugay, etc. presented 6 witnesses and various documentary evidence.
The first witness was the clerk of court of the probate court who produced and identified the records of the case bearing the
signature of the deceased.
The second witness was election registrar who was made to produce and identify the voter’s affidavit, but failed to as the
same was already destroyed and no longer available.
The third, the deceased’s niece, claimed that she had acquired familiarity with the deceased’s signature and handwriting as
she used to accompany her in collecting rentals from her various tenants of commercial buildings and the deceased always issued
receipts. The niece also testified that the deceased left a holographic will entirely written, dated and signed by said deceased.
The fourth witness was a former lawyer for the deceased in the intestate proceedings of her late husband, who said that
the signature on the will was similar to that of the deceased but that he can not be sure.
The fifth was an employee of the DENR who testified that she was familiar with the signature of the deceased which appeared in the
latter’s application for pasture permit. The fifth, respondent Evangeline Calugay, claimed that she had lived with the deceased since
birth where she had become familiar with her signature and that the one appearing on the will was genuine.
Codoy and Ramonal’s demurrer to evidence was granted by the lower court. It was reversed on appeal with the Court of
Appeals which granted the probate.

ISSUE:
1. W/N Article 811 of the Civil Code, providing that at least three witnesses explicitly declare the signature in a contested
will as the genuine signature of the testator, is mandatory or directory.
2. Whether or not the witnesses sufficiently establish the authenticity and due execution of the deceased’s holographic will.

HELD:
1. YES. The word “shall” connotes a mandatory order, an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of
discretion and that the presumption is that the word “shall”, when used in a statute, is mandatory.
In the case at bar, the goal to be achieved by the law, is to give effect to the wishes of the deceased and the evil to be prevented is
the possibility that unscrupulous individuals who for their benefit will employ means to defeat the wishes of the testator.
The paramount consideration in the present petition is to determine the true intent of the deceased.
2. NO. We cannot be certain that the holographic will was in the handwriting of the deceased.
The clerk of court was not presented to declare explicitly that the signature appearing in the holographic will was that of the
deceased.
Article 811, paragraph 1. provides: “In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at least one witness who
knows the handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the
testator. If the will is contested, at least three of such witnesses shall be required.”

Unson v. Abella
G.R No. 17857 12 June 1922
FACTS
Pedro Unson, executor of Dona Josefa Zalamea’s last will, filed a petition for theprobate of the will of the latter. Attached
on the said will is an inventory of allthe properties of Dona Josefa.
Opposition was made thereto by Antonio, Ignacia and Avivencia Abella and Santiago Vito on the ff. grounds:-
will is not paged correlatively in letters rather it is in Arabic numerals- There is no attestation clause in the inventory attached to the
will-Will was not signed by the testatrix and the witnesses in the presence of eachother.Note: only the two witnesses namely
Gonzalo Avaya and Eugenio Zalamea testifiedas to the authenticity of the will. The third witness, Pedro de Jesus, was
notpresented because he was hostile with Unson and has been meeting with the oppositors since the filing of the
petition for the probate of the will of Josefa.

ISSUE:
WON the will is valid?
 22

HELD: YES!
It might be said that the object of the law in requiring that the paging be made in letters is to make falsification more
difficult, but it should be noted that since all the pages of the testament are signed at the margin by the testatrix and
the witnesses, the difficulty of forging the signatures in either case remains the same. In other words the more or less degree of
facility to imitate the writing of the letters A, B, C, etc., does not make for the easiness to forge the signatures.
The inventory is referred to in the will as an “integral part” of it so the inventory need not have an
additional attestation clause at the end.
3. The actuation of the proponents in NOT bringing to court Pedro de Jesus does not render the will invalid. Where opposition is
made to the probate of a will, the attesting witnesses must be produced.
Exceptions:
a. when a witness is dead
b. cannot be served with pro cess of the court,
c. his reputation for truth has been q uestioned
d. He appears hostile to the cause of the proponent.

Maloto v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 76464 February 29, 1988

Facts:
Petitioners and respondents are the neices/nephews or Adriana Maloto who died in 1963. The four heirs believed that the
deceased did not leave a will, hesnce they filed an intestate proceeding. However, the parties executed an extrajudicial settlement
of the estate dividing it into four equal parts.
In 1967, Atty. Sulpicio Palma, ex-associate of the deceased's counsel allegedly discovered her last will which was
purportedly dated 1940, inside a cabinet. Hence the annulment of the proceedings and a probate petition was filed by the devisees
and legatees. The said will was allegedly burned by the househelp under the instruction of the deceased
The lower court denied the probate on the ground that the animus revocandi in the burning of the will was sufficiently
proven.

Issue: Whether or not there was valid revocation of the will

HELD:
No, there was no revocation. For a valid revocation to occur,the 'corpus' and 'animus' must concur, one without the other
will not produce a valid revocation. The physical act of destruction of a will must come with an intention to revoke (animus
revocandi). In this case, there's paucity of evidence to comply with the said requirement. The paper burned was not established to
be the will and the burning though done under her express direction was not done in her presence.
Under Art. 830, the physical act of destruction, in this case the burning of the will, does not constitute an effective
revocation, unless it is coupled with animus revocandi on the part of the testator. Since animus is a state of mind, it has to be
accompanied by an overt physical act of burning, tearing, obliterating or cancelling done by the testator himself or by another under
his express direction and presence.

Gago vs. Mamuyac

G.R. No. L-26317 January 29, 1927

FACTS
Previously, Francisco Gago filed a petition for the probate of a will of Miguel Mamuyac executed on July 27, 1918. The
oppositors alleged that the said will was already annulled and revoked. It appeared that on April 16, 1919, the deceased executed
another will. The lower court denied the probate of the first will on the ground of the existence of the second will.
Another petition was filed to seek the probate of the second will. The oppositors alleged that the second will presented was
merely a copy. According to the witnesses, the said will was allegedly revoked as per the testimony of Jose Tenoy, one of the
witnesses who typed the document. Another witness testified that on December 1920 the original will was actually cancelled by the
testator.
The lower court denied the probate and held that the same has been annulled and revoked.

Issue: Whether or not there was a valid revocation of the will

HELD
Yes. The will was already cancelled in 1920. This was inferred when after due search, the original will cannot be found.
When the will which cannot be found in shown to be in the possession of the testator when last seen, the presumption is that in the
absence of other competent evidence, the same was deemed cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption applies when it is
shown that the testator has ready access to the will and it can no longer be found after his death.

Molo vs. Molo

G.R. No. L-2538 September 21, 1951
Facts:
Marcos Molo executed 2 wills, one in August 1918 and another in June 1939. The latter will contained a revocation clause
which expressly revoked the will in 1918. He died without any forced heirs but he was survived by his wife, herein petitioner Juana.
The oppositors to the probate were his nephews and nieces.
Only a carbon copy of the second will was found. The widow filed a petition for the probate of the 1939 will. It was
admitted to probate but subsequently set aside on ground that the petitioner failed to prove its due execution.
 23

As a result, the petitioner filed another petition for the probate of the 1918 will this time. Again the oppositors alleged that said will
had already been revoked under the 1939 will. They contended that despite the disallowance of the 1939 will, the revocation clause
is valid and thus effectively nullified the 1918 will.

Issue: Whether or not the 1918 ‘will’ can still be valid despite the revocation in the subsequent disallowed 1939 will

HELD:
Yes. The court applied the doctrine laid down in Samson v. Naval that a subsequent will, containing a clause revoking a
previous will, having been disallowed for the reason that it was not executed in accordance with law cannot produce the effect of
annulling the previous will, inasmuch as the said revocatory clause is void.
There was no valid revocation in this case. No evidence was shown that the testator deliberately destroyed the original
1918 will because of his knowledge of the revocatory clause contained in the will executed in 1939.The earlier will can still be
probated under the principle of dependent relative revocation.The doctrine applies when a testator cancels or destroys a will or
executes an instrument intended to revoke a will with the intention to make a new testamentary disposition as substitute for the
old, and the new disposition fails of effect for some reason.

Dy Yieng Seangio vs Hon. Amor Reyes

G.R. No. 140371-72 November 27, 2006
FACTS:
There was a petition for the probate of an alleged holographic will which was denominated as “Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng
mana.” The private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate proceedings primarily on the ground that the document
purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo did not contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus did not meet
the definition of a will under Article 783 of the Civil Code.
The RTC issued an order dismissing the petition for probate proceedings, hence, a petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: whether the document executed by Segundo can be considered as a holographic will.

Held:
The document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of a
holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand of the testator himself. Intent to dispose mortis causa
(Article 783) can be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the
latter’s property, the disinheritance of the son nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results
in the disposition of the property of the testator in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of the eldest son.

Holographic wills, being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the law should be construed more liberally than the
ones drawn by an expert, taking into account the circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument and the intention of
the testator. In this regard, the document, even if captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-alis ng Mana, was intended by the testator to be
his last testamentary act and was executed by him in accordance with law in the form of a holographic will. Unless the will is
probated, the disinheritance cannot be given effect.

Gallanosa v. Arcangel
83 SCRA 676

Facts:
Florentino Gallanosa executed a will in 1938 when he was 80 years old. He owned 61 parcels of and at that time. He died in
1939 childless and survived by his brother Leon. In his will, he bequethed his 1/2 share of the conjugal estate to his second wife
Tecla and if she predecease him (as what occurred), the said share shall be assigned to the spouses Gallanosa (Pedro & Corazon).
Pedro is Tecla's son by her 1st marriage. He also gave 3 parcels of land to Adolfo, his protege.
The said will was admitted to probate with Gallanosa as executor. In 1952, thjhe legal heirs filed an action for the recovery
of said 61 parcels of land. The action was dismissed on the ground of res judicata. Then, 28 years after probate, another acton
agaisnt Gallanosa for annulment of the will, recovery of the lands alleging fraud and deceit, was filed. As a result, the lower court set
aide the 1939 decree of probate.

Issue: Whether or not a will which has been probated may still be annulled
HELD:
No. A final decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution of the will. Due execution means that the testator was of
sound and disposing mind at the time of the execution and that he was not acting under duress, menace, fraud or undue influence.
Finally, that it was executed in accordance with the formalities provided by law.
The period for seeking relief under Rule 38 has already expired, hence the judgment may only be set aside on the grounds
of, 1) lack of jurisdiction or lack of due process of law, and 2) the judgment was obtained by means of extrinsic collateral fraud
(which must be filed within 4 years from the discovery). Finally, Art. 1410 cannot apply to wills and testament.

Dela Cerna v. Potot Digest

28 SCRA 44

Facts:
The spouses Bernabe Dela Serna and Gerasisa Rebabca executed a joint will where they gave two (2) parcels of land to
manuela Rebaca, a niece, as they didn't have their own child. When Bernabe died, the said will was probated in 1939.
 24

Another petition for probate of the same will insofar as Gervasia was concerned was filed in 1952 but due to the failure of
the petitioner (Manuela) to appears, the same was dismissed in 1954.
The CFI held the petition (Bernabe probate) to be null and void as it is contrary to law. While the Court of Appeals reversed
and held that the decree of probate in 1939 was issued by a court of probate jurisdiction and conclusive as to the due execution of
the will. Hence this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the will is valid

HELD:
The Supreme Court affirmed the CA decision and held that Once a decree of probate becomes final in accordance with the
rules of procedure, it is res judicata. THe final decree of probate entered in 1939 in the CFI of Cebu is conclusive as to the last will of
Bernabe despite the fact that even then the Civil Code already decreed the invalidity of joint wills.
The probate court committed an error of law which should have been corrected on appeals but which did not affect the
jurisdiction of the probate court, nor the conclusive effect of its final decision. A decision which is binding upon the whole world.
Nevertheless, the probate in 1939 only affected the share of Bernabe and could not include the disposition of the share of
his wife which was still alive then, her properties were still not within the jurisdiction of the court. Hence, the validity of the will with
respect to her, must be on her death, be re-examined and adjudicated de novo -- since a joint will is considered a separate will of
each testator.

MANINANG vs. CA
G.R No. L-57848 June 19, 1982

FACTS:
Clemencia, left a holographic will which provides that all her properties shall be inherited by Dra. Maninang with whose family
Clemencia has lived continuously for the last 30 years. The will also provided that she does not consider Bernardo as his adopted
son. Bernardo, as the adopted son, claims to be the sole heir of decedent Clemencia Aseneta, instituted intestate proceedings.

ISSUE:
Was Bernardo preterited?
HELD:
In the instant case, a crucial issue that calls for resolution is whether under the terms of the decedent's Will, private
respondent had been preterited or disinherited, and if the latter, whether it was a valid disinheritance. Preterition and
disinheritance are two diverse concepts.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not
mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Disinheritance is a
testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heirs of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law.
By virtue of the dismissal of the testate case, the determination of that controversial issue has not been thoroughly
considered. The conclusion of the trial court was that Bernardo has been preterited. The SC is of opinion, however, that from the
face of the will, that conclusion is not indubitable. Such preterition is still questionable. The Special Proceeding is REMANDED to the
lower court.
PASTOR vs CA
122 SCRA 885
FACTS:
Spouses Alvaro Pastor, Sr. and Sofia Bossio were survived by their two legitimate and an illegitimate child. Illegitimate child
filed a petition for the probate and allowance of an alleged holographic will of Pastor Sr. with the CFI which contained
only one testamentary disposition: a legacy in favor of her consisting of 30% of Pastor Sr.’s 42% share in the
operation by ATLAS.
The probate court issued an order allowing the will to probate. The order was affirmed by CA and on petition for review,
the SC dismissed the petition and remanded the same to the probate court after denying reconsideration. For two years after
remand of the case to the probate court, all pleadings of both parties remained unacted upon. Not long after, the probate court set
the hearing on the intrinsic validity of the will but upon objection of Pastor Jr.and Sofia on the ground of pendency of the
reconveyance suit, no hearing was held. Instead, the probate court required the parties to submit their respective
position papers. While the reconveyance suit was still pending in another court, the probate court issued Order of Execution and
Garnishment. The oppositors sought reconsideration the probate court ordered suspension of payment of all royalties due Pastor
Jr. and/or his assignees until after resolution of oppositor’s motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Probate Order resolved with finality the questions of ownership and intrinsic validity.
HELD:
In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and large is restricted to the extrinsic validity of the will. As a
rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve with finality.
The Probate Court did not resolve the question of ownership of the properties listed in the estate inventory, considering
that the issue of ownership was the very subject of controversy in the reconveyance suit that was still pending. It was, therefore,
error for the assailed implementing Orders to conclude that the Probate Order adjudged with finality the question of ownership of
the mining properties and royalties, and that, premised on this conclusion, the dispositive portion of the said Probate Order directed
special administrator to pay the legacy in dispute
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Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals

139 SCRA 206

Facts:
Martin Hugo died on 1974 and he left a will wherein he instituted Sofia Nepomuceno as the sole and only executor. It was
also provided therein that he was married to Rufina Gomez with whom he had 3 children.
Petitioner (Sofia) filed for the probate of the will but the legal wife and her children opposed alleging that the will was
procured through improper and undue influence and that there was an admission of concubinage with the petitioner.
The lower court denied the probate on the ground of the testator's admission of cohabitation, hence making the will invalid
on its face. The Court of Appeals reversed and held that the will is valid except the devise in favor of the petitioner which is null and
void in violation of Art. 739 and 1028.

Issue: Whether or not the court can pass on the intrinsic validity of a will

HELD:
Yes, as an exception. But the general rule is that the court's area of inquiry is limited to the an examination and resolution
of the extrinsic validity of the will. This general rule is however not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the
probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and may pass upon certain provisions of the will. The will
itself admitted on its face the relationship between the testator and the petitioner.
The will was validly executed in accordance with law but the court didn't find it to serve a practical purpose to remand the
nullified provision in a separate action for that purpose only since in the probate of a will, the court does not ordinarily look into the
intrinsic validity of its provisions.
The devisee is invalid by virtue of Art. 739 which voids a donation made between persons guilty of adultery/concubinage at
the time of the donations. Under Art, 1028 it is also prohibited.

Dorotheo v. CA
GR No. 108581, December 8, 1999

FACTS:
Aniceta Reyes died in 1969 without her estate being settled. Thereafter, her husband Alejandro also died. In 1977, Lourdes
Dorotheo filed a special proceeding for the probate of Alejandro’s last will and testament. The children of spouses filed their
opposition. The RTC ruled that Lourdes being not the wife of Alejandro the will is intrinsically void; the oppositors are the only heir
entitled to the estate. Lourdes filed a Motion for Consideration arguing that she is entitled to some compensation since she took
care of Alejandro prior to his death although they were not legally married to each other. This was denied by the trial court. The CA
dismissed her appeal for her failure to wile the same within the extended period.
ISSUE:
May a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared intrinsically void in an order that has become final and
executor still be given effect?
HELD:
No. A final and executor decision or order can no longer be disturbed or reopened no matter how erroneous it may be.
The Supreme Court ruled that the will of Alejandro was extrinsically valid but the intrinsic provisions thereof are void.
Alejandro gave all the property to the concubine. Such is invalid because one cannot dispose what he does not own. In this case, the
whole property is the conjugal property of Alejandro and Aniceta. Such has become final and executor. The only instance where a
party interested in probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances
beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence with circumstances do not concur herein.

THELMA M. ARANAS v. TERESITA V. MERCADO, GR No. 156407, 2014-01-15

Facts:
Emigdio S. Mercado died intestate on January 12, 1991, survived by his second wife, Teresita V. Mercado and their five
children, namely: Allan V. Mercado, Felimon V. Mercado, Carmencita M. Sutherland, Richard V. Mercado, and Maria Teresita M.
Anderson; and... his two children by his first marriage, namely: respondent Franklin L. Mercado and petitioner Thelma M. Aranas
On June 3, 1991, Thelma filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City a petition for the appointment of Teresita as the
administrator of Emigdio's estate. The RTC granted the petition considering that there was no opposition. As the administrator,
Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate of Emigdio for the consideration and approval by the RTC. She indicated in the
inventory that at the time of his death, Emigdio had "left no real properties but only personal properties" Claiming that Emigdio had
owned other properties that were excluded from the inventory, Thelma moved that the RTC direct Teresita to amend the inventory,
and to be examined regarding it. The RTC granted Thelma's motion through the order of January 8, 1993.
Teresita filed a compliance with the supporting her inventory with copies of three certificates of stocks, the deed of
assignment executed by involving real properties and the certificate of stock for 300 shares of stock of Cebu Emerson.
Thelma again moved to require Teresita to be examined under oath on the inventory, and that she be allowed 30 days
within which to file a formal opposition to or comment on the inventory and the supporting documents Teresita had submitted.
RTC issued on March 14, 2001 an order finding and holding that the inventory submitted by Teresita had excluded
properties that should be included

Issues:
Did the CA properly determine that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in directing the inclusion of certain properties in the inventory notwithstanding that such properties had been either transferred by
sale or exchanged for corporate shares in Mervir Realty by the decedent during his lifetime?
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HELD:
There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is special and limited. The trial court cannot
adjudicate title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate but are claimed to belong to third parties by title adverse to that of
the decedent... and the estate, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the decedent. All that the trial court can do regarding
said properties is to determine whether or not they should be included in the inventory of properties to be administered by the
administrator. Such determination is provisional and may be still revised.
The RTC strictly followed the directives of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence relevant to the procedure for preparing
the inventory by the administrator. The directive to include the properties in question in the inventory rested on good and valid
reasons, and thus was far from whimsical, or arbitrary, or capricious.
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