REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.
expired on July 12, 1951, the expiration of the term
HONORABLE DOMINGO IMPERIAL and HONORABLE
RODRIGO D. PEREZ, Respondents.
G.R. No. L-8684 March 31, 1955
Topic: Staggering of terms
Facts: According to the Solicitor General, the first
commissioners of Elections were duly appointed and
qualified on July 12, 1945, with the following terms
of office:
Hon. Jose Lopez Vito, Chairman, for 9
years, expiring on July 12, 1954.
Hon. Francisco Enage, Member, for 6
years, expiring on July 12, 1951.
Hon. Vicente Vera, Member, for 3 years,
expiring on July 12, 1948;
Chairman Vito died in May 1947 and Member
Vicente de Vera was promoted Chairman to serve
until July 12, 1954, when the original term of Vito
will expire (this is in accordance with the ruling of
the Court in Nacionalista Party vs. Vera and
Nacionalista Party vs. Felix Angelo Bautista that
successors should only serve for the remaining
unexpired term of his predecessor).
Chairman Vera then died in August, 1951, before the
expiration of the maximum term of nine years (on
July 12, 1954) of Vito. Respondent Imperial was
appointed Chairman to succeed Vera "for a term
expiring July 12, 1960". The Solicitor General argues
that the term for which Imperial could legally serve
as Chairman legally expired on July 12, 1954, that is,
the expiration of the nine-year term for which the
first Chairman, Honorable Jose Lopez Vito, was
appointed.
The respondent Perez on the other hand was
appointed Member of the Commission on December
8, 1949, for "a term of nine years expiring on
November 24, 1958", when Enage retired on
November, 1949. The Solicitor General also argues
that the term of office of respondent Perez legally
of six years of Commissioner Enage.
The Solicitor General concludes that the respondents
Commissioners Imperial and Perez have ceased to
have any legal or valid title to the positions of
Chairman and Member, respectively, of the
Commission on Elections, and that therefore, their
positions should be declared vacant.
Issue: Whether or not the terms respondents
Imperial and Perez have expired.
Ruling: The legal terms of office of the respondents
Perez and Imperial have not as yet expired.
Section 1, paragraph 1, of Article X of the
Constitution reads as follows:
SEC. 1. There shall be an
independent Commission on
Elections composed of a Chairman
and two other Members to be
appointed by the President with
the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, who shall hold
office for a term of nine years and
may not be reappointed. Of the
Members of the Commission first
appointed, one shall hold office for
nine years, another for six years,
and the third for three years. The
Chairman and the other Members
of the Commission on Elections
may be removed from office only
by impeachment in the manner
provided in this Constitution.
The provision that of the first three commissioners
appointed, "one shall hold office for 9 years, another
for 6 years, and the third for 3 years," when taken
together with the prescribed term of office for 9
years, without reappointment, evidences a
deliberate plan to have a regular rotation or cycle in
the membership of the commission, by having
subsequent members appointable only once every
three years.
The operation of the rotational plan requires two
conditions: (1) that the terms of the first three
commissioners should start on a common date; and
(2) that any vacancy due to death, resignation or
disability before the expiration of the term should
only be filled only for the unexpired balance of the
term.
The fact that such appointments would make the
appointees serve for less than 9 years in case of
death or resignation does not mean that the nine-
year term can be lifted out of context and
independently of the provision limiting the terms of
the terms of the first commissioners to nine, six and
three years. In filling the vacancy, only the tenure of
the successor is shortened, but not the term of
office.
The court then ruled that the terms of the
commissioners should begin on the organization of
the Commission on Elections under Commonwealth
Act 657, on June 21, 1941, since said act
implemented and completed the organization of the
Commission that under the Constitution "shall be"
established.
Therefore:
Hon. Jose Lopez Vito, Chairman, nine-
year term, from June 21, 1941 to June 20,
1950.
Hon. Francisco Enage, Member, six year
term, from June 21, 1941 to June 20, 1947.
The first 3 year term, from June 21, 1941
to June 20, 1944, was not filled.
Thereafter, since the first three-year term had
already expired, the appointment (made on July 12,
1945) of the Honorable Vicente de Vera must be
deemed for the full term of nine years, from June 21,
1944, to June 20, 1953.
The first vacancy occurred by expiration of the initial
6-year term of Commissioner Enage on June 21,
1947 (although he served as de facto Commissioner
until 1949). His successor, respondent Rodrigo Perez,
was named for a full nine-year term. However, on
the principles heretofore laid, the nine-year term of
Commissioner Perez should be held to have started
in June 21, 1947, to expire on June 20, 1956.
The second vacancy happened upon the death of
Chairman Vito on May 1947. Commissioner Vicente
de Vera was appointed to succeed Vito. Such
appointment could legally be only for the unexpired
period of the Lopez Vito's term, up to June 20, 1950.
To fill the vacancy created by Vera's assumption of
the Chairmanship, Commissioner Leopoldo Rovira
was appointed on May 1947. Pursuant to the
principles laid down, Rovira could only fill out the
balance of Vera's term, until June 20, 1953.
Commissioner Vera's tenure as Chairman expired, as
we have stated, on June 20, 1950, the end of Lopez
Vito's original term. A vacancy, therefore, occurred
on that date that Vera could no longer fill, since his
reappointment was expressly prohibited by the
Constitution. The next Chairman was respondent
Commissioner Domingo Imperial, whose term of
nine years must be deemed to have begun on June
21, 1950, to expire on June 20, 1959.
The vacancy created by the legal expiration of
Rovira's term on June 20, 1953 is unfilled up to the
promulgation of the decision of the case (1955). The
time elapsed is counted against his successor, whose
legal term is for nine years, from June 21, 1953 to
June 20, 1962.
GAMINDE vs. COA
G.R. No. 140335, December 13, 2000
Facts: Thelma Gaminde was appointed by the
President of the Philippines as Commissioner of the
Civil Service Commission, ad interim and assumed
office on June 22, 1993 after oath of office. The
Commission on Appointments (COA) and the
Congress of the Philippines confirmed the
appointment on September 7, 1993. Gaminde, on
February 24, 1998, sought the Office of the President
for clarification on the expiry date of her term of
office. In response to her request, the Chief
Presidential Legal Counsel opined that her term
office will expire on February 2, 2000 instead of
February 2, 1999. Relying on said advisory opinion,
Gaminde remained in office after February 2, 1999.
However, on February 4, 1999, Chairman Corazon
Alma de Leon wrote COA requesting opinion
whether or not Gaminde and her co-terminus staff
may be paid their salaries notwithstanding the
expiration of their appointments on February 2,
1999. The General Counsel of COA issued an opinion
on February 18, 1999 that “the term of
Commissioner Gaminde has expired on February 2,
1999 as stated in her appointment conformably with
the constitutional intent.” Consequently, on March
24, 1999, CSC Resident Auditor Flovitas Felipe issued
a Notice of Disallowance, disallowing in audit the
salaries and emoluments of Gaminde and her co-
terminus staff effective February 2, 1999. Gaminde
appealed COA’s disallowance but it was dismissed,
and affirmed the propriety of the disallowance; and
held that the issue of Gaminde’s office term may be
properly addressed by mere reference to her
appointment paper which set the expiration date of
February 2, 1999, and that the Commission was
bereft of power to recognize an extension of her
term, not even with the implied acquiescence of the
Office of the President. Gaminde moved for
reconsideration, but was denied by COA.
Issue: Whether the term of office of Thelma
Gaminde, as Commissioner, Civil Service
Commission, to which she was appointed on June
11, 1993, expired on February 2, 1999, as stated in
the appointment paper, or on February 2, 2000, as
claimed by her.
Held: The term of office of Thelma P. Gaminde as the
CSC Commissioner, as appointed by President Fidel
V. Ramos, expired on February 2, 1999. However,
she served as de-facto officer in good faith until
February 2, 2000. The term of office of the Chairman
and members of the Civil Service Commission is
prescribed in the 1987 Constitution under Article IX-
D, Section 1 (2):
“The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be
appointed by the President withthe consent of the
Commission on Appointments for a term of seven
years without reappointment. Of those first
appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for
seven years, a Commissioner for five years, and
another Commissioner for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be
only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In
no case shall any Member be appointed
or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.”
Therefore, COA erred in disallowing in audit such
salary and other emoluments. Gaminde and her co-
terminus staff are entitled to receive their salary and
other emoluments for actual service rendered.
DENNIS A. B. FUNA, PETITIONER, VS. THE
CHAIRMAN, COA, REYNALDO A. VILLAR
G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012
FACTS: Funa challenges the constitutionality of the
appointment of Reynaldo A. Villar as Chairman of
the COA.
Following the retirement of Carague on February 2,
2008 and during the fourth year of Villar as COA
Commissioner, Villar was designated as Acting
Chairman of COA from February 4, 2008 to April 14,
2008. Subsequently, on April 18, 2008, Villar was
nominated and appointed as Chairman of the COA.
Shortly thereafter, on June 11, 2008, the
Commission on Appointments confirmed his
appointment. He was to serve as Chairman of COA,
as expressly indicated in the appointment papers,
until the expiration of the original term of his office
as COA Commissioner or on February 2, 2011.
Challenged in this recourse, Villar, in an obvious bid
to lend color of title to his hold on the chairmanship,
insists that his appointment as COA Chairman
accorded him a fresh term of 7 years which is yet to
lapse. He would argue, in fine, that his term of office,
as such chairman, is up to February 2, 2015, or 7
years reckoned from February 2, 2008 when he was
appointed to that position.
Before the Court could resolve this petition, Villar,
via a letter dated February 22, 2011 addressed to
President Benigno S. Aquino III, signified his
intention to step down from office upon the
appointment of his replacement. True to his word,
Villar vacated his position when President Benigno
Simeon Aquino III named Ma. Gracia Pulido-Tan
(Chairman Tan) COA Chairman. This development
has rendered this petition and the main issue
tendered therein moot and academic.
Although deemed moot due to the intervening
appointment of Chairman Tan and the resignation of
Villar, We consider the instant case as falling within
the requirements for review of a moot and academic
case, since it asserts at least four exceptions to the
mootness rule discussed in David vs Macapagal
Arroyo namely:
a. There is a grave violation of the Constitution;
b. The case involves a situation of exceptional
character and is of paramount public interest;
c. The constitutional issue raised requires the
formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar and the public;
d. The case is capable of repetition yet evading
review.
The procedural aspect comes down to the question
of whether or not the following requisites for the
exercise of judicial review of an executive act obtain
in this petition, viz:
a. There must be an actual case or justiciable
controversy before the court
b. The question before it must be ripe for
adjudication;
c. The person challenging the act must be a proper
party; and
d. The issue of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest opportunity and must be the very litis mota
of the case
ISSUES:
a. WON the petitioner has Locus Standi to bring the
case to court
b. WON Villar’s appointment as COA Chairman, while
sitting in that body and after having served for four
(4) years of his seven (7) year term as COA
commissioner, is valid in light of the term limitations
imposed under, and the circumscribing concepts
tucked in, Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution
HELD:
Issue of Locus Standi: This case before us is of
transcendental importance, since it obviously has
“far-reaching implications,” and there is a need to
promulgate rules that will guide the bench, bar, and
the public in future analogous cases. We, thus,
assume a liberal stance and allow petitioner to
institute the instant petition.
In David vs Macapagal Arroyo, the Court laid out the
bare minimum norm before the so-called “non-
traditional suitors” may be extended standing to sue,
thusly:
a. For taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal
disbursement of public funds or that the tax
measure is unconstitutional;
b. For voters, there must be a showing of obvious
interest in the validity of the election law in question
c. For concerned citizens, there must be a showing
that the issues raised are of transcendental
importance which must be settled early; and
d. For legislators, there must be a claim that the
official action complained of infringes their
prerogatives as legislators.
On the substantive issue:
Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution provides
that:
(2) The Chairman and Commissioners [on Audit] shall
be appointed by the President with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments for a term of
seven years without reappointment. Of those first
appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven
years, one commissioner for five years, and the
other commissioner for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be
only for the unexpired portion of the term of the
predecessor. In no case shall any member be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity.
Petitioner now asseverates the view that Sec. 1(2),
Art. IX(D) of the 1987 Constitution proscribes
reappointment of any kind within the commission,
the point being that a second appointment, be it for
the same position (commissioner to another position
of commissioner) or upgraded position
(commissioner to chairperson) is a prohibited
reappointment and is a nullity ab initio.
The Court finds petitioner’s position bereft of merit.
The flaw lies in regarding the word “reappointment”
as, in context, embracing any and all species of
appointment. The rule is that if a statute or
constitutional provision is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation.
The first sentence is unequivocal enough. The COA
Chairman shall be appointed by the President for a
term of seven years, and if he has served the full
term, then he can no longer be reappointed or
extended another appointment. In the same vein, a
Commissioner who was appointed for a term of
seven years who likewise served the full term is
barred from being reappointed. In short, once the
Chairman or Commissioner shall have served the full
term of seven years, then he can no longer be
reappointed to either the position of Chairman or
Commissioner. The obvious intent of the framers is
to prevent the president from “dominating” the
Commission by allowing him to appoint an additional
or two more commissioners.
On the other hand, the provision, on its face, does
not prohibit a promotional appointment from
commissioner to chairman as long as the
commissioner has not served the full term of seven
years, further qualified by the third sentence of Sec.
1(2), Article IX (D) that “the appointment to any
vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of
the term of the predecessor.” In addition, such
promotional appointment to the position of
Chairman must conform to the rotational plan or the
staggering of terms in the commission membership
such that the aggregate of the service of the
Commissioner in said position and the term to which
he will be appointed to the position of Chairman
must not exceed seven years so as not to disrupt the
rotational system in the commission prescribed by
Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).
In conclusion, there is nothing in Sec. 1(2), Article
IX(D) that explicitly precludes a promotional
appointment from Commissioner to Chairman,
provided it is made under the aforestated
circumstances or conditions.
The Court is likewise unable to sustain Villar’s
proposition that his promotional appointment as
COA Chairman gave him a completely fresh 7- year
term––from February 2008 to February 2015––given
his four (4)-year tenure as COA commissioner
devalues all the past pronouncements made by this
Court. While there had been divergence of opinion
as to the import of the word “reappointment,” there
has been unanimity on the dictum that in no case
can one be a COA member, either as chairman or
commissioner, or a mix of both positions, for an
aggregate term of more than 7 years. A contrary
view would allow a circumvention of the aggregate
7-year service limitation and would be
constitutionally offensive as it would wreak havoc to
the spirit of the rotational system of succession.
In net effect, then President Macapagal-Arroyo could
not have had, under any circumstance, validly
appointed Villar as COA Chairman, for a full 7- year
appointment, as the Constitution decrees, was not
legally feasible in light of the 7-year aggregate rule.
Villar had already served 4 years of his 7-year term
as COA Commissioner. A shorter term, however, to
comply with said rule would also be invalid as the
corresponding appointment would effectively
breach the clear purpose of the Constitution of
giving to every appointee so appointed subsequent
to the first set of commissioners, a fixed term of
office of 7 years. To recapitulate, a COA
commissioner like respondent Villar who serves for a
period less than seven (7) years cannot be appointed
as chairman when such position became vacant as a
result of the expiration of the 7-year term of the
predecessor (Carague). Such appointment to a full
term is not valid and constitutional, as the appointee
will be allowed to serve more than seven (7) years
under the constitutional ban.
To sum up, the Court restates its ruling on Sec. 1(2),
Art. IX(D) of the Constitution, viz:
1. The appointment of members of any of the three
constitutional commissions, after the expiration of
the uneven terms of office of the first set of
commissioners, shall always be for a fixed term of
seven (7) years; an appointment for a lesser period is
void and unconstitutional. The appointing authority
cannot validly shorten the full term of seven (7)
years in case of the expiration of the term as this will
result in the distortion of the rotational system
prescribed by the Constitution.
2. Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain
causes (death, resignation, disability or
impeachment) shall only be for the unexpired
portion of the term of the predecessor, but such
appointments cannot be less than the unexpired
portion as this will likewise disrupt the staggering of
terms laid down under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).
3. Members of the Commission, e.g. COA, COMELEC
or CSC, who were appointed for a full term of seven
years and who served the entire period, are barred
from reappointment to any position in the
Commission. Corollarily, the first appointees in the
Commission under the Constitution are also covered
by the prohibition against reappointment.
4. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the
Commission for less than seven years is eligible for
an appointment to the position of Chairman for the
unexpired portion of the term of the departing
chairman. Such appointment is not covered by the
ban on reappointment, provided that the aggregate
period of the length of service as commissioner and
the unexpired period of the term of the predecessor
will not exceed seven (7) years and provided further
that the vacancy in the position of Chairman resulted
from death, resignation, disability or removal by
impeachment. The Court clarifies that
“reappointment” found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means
a movement to one and the same office
(Commissioner to Commissioner or Chairman to
Chairman). On the other hand, an appointment
involving a movement to a different position or
office (Commissioner to Chairman) would constitute
a new appointment and, hence, not, in the strict
legal sense, a reappointment barred under the
Constitution.
5. Any member of the Commission cannot be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity.
Modesto Agyao vs. CSCGR No. 182591January 18,
2011FACTS:
Petitioner was re-appointed, following the expiration
of his previous temporary appointment, to
PEZADirector II by the PEZA Director-General de
Lima. The appointment was submitted to the Civil
ServiceCommission. The re-appointment was
invalidated by the CSC as petitioner lacked the
prescribed CareerExecutive Service Office/Career
Service Executive Examination (CESO/CSEE)
qualifications. The CSC ruledthat the position of
PEZA Director II is above the Division Chief level,
which falls properly under level 3, orCareer
Executive Service. Petitioner appealed to the Court
of Appeals, which sustained the ruling of theCSC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PEZA Director II falls under level 3 or
Career Executive Service, of the AdministrativeCode.
HELD:
Petition is impressed with merit.It has been held in a
long line of Jurisprudence that for a position to fall
under Career Executive Service,the appointing
authority must be the President of the Philippines.
The Administrative code makes thisclassification
based on the Constitutional powers granted to the
President. As such, any deviation ofinterpretation
would not only be against the prevailing law (i.e.
Administrative Code), but also beunconstitutional.
The position of PEZA Director II is appointed by the
PEZA Director-General, not by thePresident of the
Philippines. Hence, the CESO/CSEE requirements are
not needed by the appointee.
DIMAANDAL V COA
Petitioner: Dimaandal
Respondent: COA
Ponente: Martinez
FACTS:
 Dimaandal
 Held position as Supply Officer III in
Batangas
 Designated Acting Assistant Provincial
Treasurer by Batangas Governor Mayo in
1993.
 Dimaandal filed a claim for the difference in
salary and Representation and Transportation
Allowance (RATA) for the whole year of 1993.
 Provincial Auditor disallowed the claim.
  On appeal to COA, COA also disallowed the claim.
Ratio:
(1) Dimaandal was merely designated, thus he
was not entitled to receive additional
salary.
(2) The governor was not the “duly competent
authority” who can designate him to such
position under Sec 471 of LGC (note: in
1994 he was eventually appointed by Sec of
Finance).
ISSUE: WON an Dimaandal is entitled to the
difference between the regular position and higher
position to which he was designated.
HELD: NO.
RATIO:
 Arguments of Dimaandal:
 Jurisprudence laid down the rule that de
facto officers are entitled to salary for
services actually rendered.
(1) Defective Designation
 Law provides:
 LGC Section 471: Assistant Treasurers. -
(a) An assistant treasurer may be
appointed by the Secretary of Finance from
a list of at least three (3) ranking eligible
recommendees of the governor or mayor,
subject to civil service law, rules and
regulations.
 Section 2077 of the Revised Administrative
Code: In case of the temporary absence or
disability of a provincial officer or in case of
a vacancy in a provincial office, the
President of the Philippines or officer having
the power to fill such position may, in his
discretion, order the payment of
compensation, or additional compensation,
to any Government officer or employee
designated or appointed temporarily to fill
the place, but the total compensation paid
shall not exceed the salary authorized by
law for the position filled.
 Law does not authorize Provincial Governor to
appoint, nor even designate one temporarily in
cases of temporary absence/disability/vacancy in
a provincial office. Power resides with President
or Sec of Finance.
 Dimaandal’s designation is defective. Thus, it
confers no right. No ground for violation of
constitutional right, nor impairment of the
obligation of contracts.
(2) Mere designation, not appointment.
 Difference between designation and
appointment:
 Appointment: selection by the proper the
selection by the proper authority of an
individual who is to exercise the powers and
functions of a given office
 Designation: merely connotes an
imposition of additional duties, usually by
law, upon a person already in the public
service by virtue of an earlier appointment;
simply the mere imposition of new or
additional duties on the officer or employee
to be performed by him in a special manner;
it does not entail payment of additional
benefits or grant upon the person so
designated the right to claim the salary
attached to the position. As such, there
being no appointment issued, designation
does not entitle the officer designated to
receive the salary of the position. For the
legal basis of an employee’s right to claim
the salary attached thereto is a duly issued
and approved appointment to the position.
(3) He cannot be considered a de facto officer.
 De Facto Officer: one who derives his
appointment from one having colorable
authority to appoint, if the office is an appointive
office, and whose appointment is valid on its
face; one who is in possession of an office, and is
discharging its duties under color of authority, by
which is meant authority derived from an
appointment, however irregular or informal, so
that the incumbent be not a mere volunteer; one
who is in possession of an office in the open
exercise of its functions under color of an
election or an appointment, even though such
election or appointment may be irregular.
 Precedents are inapplicable.
 Menzon v. Petilla: In Menzon, what was
extended was an appointment to
 the vacant position of Vice-Governor, in
petitioner’s case, he was designated. The
appointment of Menzon had the color of
validity.
 Cui v. Ortiz: “Petitioners’ appointments on
December 1 and 12, 1955 by the then
mayor of the municipality were legal and in
order, the appointing mayor still in
possession of his right to appoint. For such
appointments to be complete, the approval
of the President of the Philippines is
required. The law provides that pending
approval of said appointment by the
President, the appointee may assume office
and receive salary for services actually
rendered. Accordingly, therefore, in that
duration until the appointment is finally
acted upon favorably or unfavorably, the
appointees may be considered as ‘de facto’
officers and entitled to salaries for services
actually rendered.”

 Lastly, the 1999 appointment by Sec of Finance

does not confirm the claim of petitioner that his
appointment is retroactive.

JUDGMENT: