JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA vs.

SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS: Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and
Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as amended by RA 7659, wishes to impress upon us that the assailed law is so defectively
fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes
a stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality mainly because, according to him,
(a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and,
(c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code.

ISSUES:

(A) W/N it is vague (=because of the presences of and/or statements)

(B) W/N it does not account for “reasonable doubt” as is the standard in criminal prosecutions
(C) W/N it abolishes the element of mens rea (~intention to do crime) (=the abolishment of which means to presume that
the accused did the crime on purpose with full knowledge that it was illegal)

RULING: Held In Favor of Defendant.

(A) Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine, held no. A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the
statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects - it violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion
in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring to at least two (2) acts falling under different
categories of enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on the public treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and
fraudulent conveyance of assets belonging to the National Government under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (3).
On the other hand, to constitute a series, “there must be two or more overt or criminal acts falling under the same
category of enumeration found in Sec. 1, par. (d)” say, misappropriation, malversation, and raids on the public treasury, all of
which fall under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1).
Verily (~truly), had the legislature intended a technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and "series," it would
have taken greater pains in specifically providing for it in the law.
As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan that this term is sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in
relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2 -

x x x x under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a combination or series of overt or criminal acts enumerated
in subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is directed
towards a common purpose or goal which is to enable the public officer to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. And
thirdly, there must either be an 'overall unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy' to achieve said common goal. As commonly
understood, the term 'overall unlawful scheme' indicates a 'general plan of action or method' which the principal accused and
public officer and others conniving with him follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the alternative, if there is no such
overall scheme or where the schemes or methods used by multiple accused vary, the overt or criminal acts must form part of a
conspiracy to attain a common goal.

(B) Reasonable doubt, held no. It is thus plain from the foregoing that the legislature did not in any manner refashion the
standard quantum of proof in the crime of plunder. The burden still remains with the prosecution to prove beyond any
iota of doubt every fact or element necessary to constitute the crime.

What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form a combination
or series which would constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each
and every other act alleged in the Information to have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. To illustrate, supposing that the accused is charged in
an Information for plunder with having committed fifty (50) raids on the public treasury.

The prosecution need not prove all these fifty (50) raids, it being sufficient to prove by pattern at least two (2) of the raids
beyond reasonable doubt provided only that they amounted to at least P50,000,000.00.

A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction with Sec. 4, brings us to the logical conclusion that "pattern of overt or criminal acts
indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy" inheres in the very acts of accumulating, acquiring or
amassing hidden wealth. Stated otherwise, such pattern arises where the prosecution is able to prove beyond reasonable
doubt the predicate acts as defined in Sec. 1, par. (d). Pattern is merely a by-product of the proof of the predicate acts. This
conclusion is consistent with reason and common sense. There would be no other explanation for a combination or series of
overt or criminal acts to stash P50,000,000.00 or more, than "a scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill
gotten wealth." The prosecution is therefore not required to make a deliberate and conscious effort to prove pattern as it
necessarily follows with the establishment of a series or combination of the predicate acts.
(C) Mens rea, held no. As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is a malum in
se (naturally wrong act) which requires proof of criminal intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurring Opinion:

“Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for
plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed "willfully,
unlawfully and criminally." It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.”

Senator Taada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to commit plunder, the prosecution need not prove
each and every criminal act done to further the scheme or conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond reasonable doubt a
pattern of overt or ciminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far as the acts constituting the
pattern are concerned, however, the elements of the crime must be proved and the requisite mens rea must be shown.

The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to prosecutions under the Anti-
Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder since the degree of responsibility of the
offender is determined by his criminal intent.

As Justice Holmes said: "We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit, but there
is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean."
 ESTRADA VS. DISIERTO, G.R. No. 146710-15

FACTS:

In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. Some (10) million Filipinos voted for the petitioner believing he would rescue
them from lifes adversity. Both petitioner and the respondent were to serve a six-year term commencing on June 30, 1998.

From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by a plethora of problems that slowly but surely eroded
his popularity. His sharp descent from power started on October 4, 2000. Ilocos Sur Governos, Luis Chavit Singson, a longtime
friend of the petitioner, went on air and accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos
from jueteng lords.

The expos immediately ignited reactions of rage. Various calls for resignations came as more and more exposes emerged,
cabinet members were resigning left and right.

January 20 turned to be the day of surrender. At about 12:00 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to
respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. At 2:30 p.m., petitioner and his family hurriedly left Malacanang Palace.
On February 7, the Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the impeachment court is functus officio and has been
terminated.
After his fall from the pedestal of power, the petitioner’s legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed
against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion. He later reveals that he had a second letter which declared he
was not stepping down from office and he has delegated Arroyo as the Acting President on his behalf.
On February 5, petitioner filed with this Court GR No. 146710-15, a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in Case Nos.
OMB 0-00-1629, 1754, 1755, 1756, 1757 and 1758 or in any other criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after
the term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted.
Thru another counsel, petitioner, on February 6, filed GR No. 146738 for Quo Warranto. He prayed for judgment confirming
petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties
of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting
capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.
ISSUES:

(A) Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy.

(B) Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable controversy, whether petitioner Estrada is a President on leave while
respondent Arroyo is an Acting President.
(C) Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition precedent for the criminal prosecution of petitioner
Estrada. In the negative and on the assumption that petitioner is still President, whether he is immune from criminal
prosecution.
(D) Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined on the ground of prejudicial publicity.

RULING: Held in favor of Defendant.

(A) Is it a justiciable controversy, Yes. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, held that political questions refer to those
questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure. To a great degree, the 1987
Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review
of this court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government.

EDSA I was in defiance of the Constitution whereas EDSA II was still through it – thereby making it a judicial controversy
and therefore within the powers of the judiciary.
(B) Did he resign as President, Yes. Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and
its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of
relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can
be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.

On January 20, 2001, Congress has already passed multiple resolutions and acts concerning the instatement of Arroyo as
President. The question is whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary inability of petitioner
Estrada and thereafter revise the decision of both Houses of Congress recognizing respondent Arroyo as President of the
Philippines. Following Taada v. Cuenco, we hold that this Court cannot exercise its judicial power for this is an issue in regard
to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislative x x x branch of the government.

(C) Immunity from suit, No. Under any circumstance, however, the mysterious letter cannot negate the resignation of
the petitioner. If it was prepared before the press release of the petitioner clearly showing his resignation from the
presidency, then the resignation must prevail as a later act. If, however, it was prepared after the press release, still, it
commands scant legal significance.Petitioners resignation from the presidency cannot be the subject of a changing
caprice nor of a whimsical will especially if the resignation is the result of his repudiation by the people. There is
another reason why this Court cannot give any legal significance to petitioners letter and this shall be discussed in issue
number III of this Decision.
After petitioner contended that as a matter of fact he did not resign, he also argues that he could not resign as a
matter of law. He relies on section 12 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which
allegedly prohibits his resignation, viz:

Sec. 12. No public officer shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation, criminal or administrative, or pending a
prosecution against him, for any offense under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery.

The separation or cessation of a public official from office shall not be a bar to his prosecution under this Act for an
offense committed during his incumbency.

(D) Is this a Trial by Publicity by a biased Ombudsman, No. There are two (2) principal legal and philosophical schools of
thought on how to deal with the rain of unrestrained publicity during the investigation and trial of high profile cases.
The British approach the problem with the presumption that publicity will prejudice a jury. Thus, English courts readily
stay and stop criminal trials when the right of an accused to fair trial suffers a threat. The American approach is
different. US courts assume a skeptical approach about the potential effect of pervasive publicity on the right of an
accused to a fair trial. They have developed different strains of tests to resolve this issue, i.e., substantial probability of
irreparable harm, strong likelihood, clear and present danger, etc.

We cannot sustain appellants claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity. It is true that
the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high stake criminal
trials. Then and now, we now rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. To be
sure, responsible reporting enhances an accuseds right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out, a responsible press has always
been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field. The press does not
simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and
judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism. Nor can we adopt the theory of derivative prejudice of
petitioner, i.e., that the prejudice of respondent Ombudsman flows to his subordinates.

There is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin the preliminary investigation of the petitioner by the
respondent Ombudsman. Petitioner needs to offer more than hostile headlines to discharge his burden of proof.
 PERMIT TO CARRY FOR SECRET AGENTS

FACTS
THE PEOPLE OF THE PEOPLE OF THE THE PEOPLE OF THE THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. PHILIPPINES PHILIPPINES vs. MARIO PHILIPPINES vs. MORO
JOSE JABINAL Y CARMEN vs. MAPA Y MAPULONG SUMAGUINA MACARANDANG
JESUS SANTAYANA Y
ESCUDERO
February 27, 1974 November 15, 1976 August 30, 1967 December 23, 1959
Illegal possession of Illegal possession of Illegal possession of Illegal possession of firearms
firearms firearms firearms

Secret Agent, Order by Special Agent, Order by Peace officer, Order by Peace officer, Order by Governor
Governor of Batangas, Colonel Jose C. Maristela, Governor of Batangas, of Lanao, issued 1962
1962; Confidential Agent, Chief of CIS, Issued 1962 issued 1963
by PC of Batangas, 1964
Caught in Manila Caught in Marantao
ISSUES
W/N the men are in violation of the law in carrying firearms as “peace officers”
RULING
It follows, therefore, that Plaintiff is acquitted. Plaintiff is found guilty. Plaintiff is acquitted.
considering that appellant
conferred his appointments At the time of appellant's It is not within the power …but section 879 of the Revised
as Secret Agent and apprehension, the doctrine of this Court to set aside Administrative Code…"peace
Confidential Agent and then prevailing is the clear and explicit officers" are exempted from the
authorized to possess a enunciated in the case of mandate of a statutory requirements relating to the
firearm pursuant to the People vs. provision. issuance of license to possess
prevailing doctrine Macarandang 7wherein We firearms.
enunciated held that the appointment of To the extent therefore
in Macarandang and Lucero, a civilian as "secret agent to that this decision The appointment of the accused
under which no criminal assist in the maintenace of conflicts with what was as secret agent to the assist in the
liability would attach to his peace and order campaigns held in People v. maintenance of peace and order
possession of said firearm and detection of crimes Macarandang, it no campaigns and detention of
in spite of the absence of a sufficiently puts him within longer speaks with crimes, sufficiently put him
license and permit therefor, the category of a 'peace authority within the category of a "peace
appellant must be absolved. officer' equivalent even to a officer" equivalent even to a
member of the municipal It reverses the member of the municipal police
Certainly, appellant may police expressly covered by jurisprudence issued at expressly covered by section 879.
not be punished for an act Section 879." the time of Macarandang.
which at the time it was
done was held not to be The case of People vs.
punishable. Mapa 8 revoked the doctrine
in the Macarandang case
only on August 30, 1967.
Under the Macarandang rule
therefore obtaining at the
time of appellant's
appointment as secret
agent, he incurred no
criminal liability for
possession of the pistol in
question.

He was released because at

the time of his
apprehension, the rule was
in his favor.

DAVID G. NITAFAN, WENCESLAO M.
POLO, and MAXIMO A. SAVELLANO,
JR.,
vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE and THE FINANCIAL
OFFICER, SUPREME COURT OF THE
PHILIPPINES (1987)
Petitioners, duly appointed and
qualified Judges,…seek to prohibit
and/or perpetually enjoin
respondents,… from making any
deduction of withholding taxes from
their salaries.
"Any tax withheld from their
emoluments or compensation as
judicial officers constitutes a decrease
or diminution of their salaries,
contrary to the provision of Section 10,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
mandating that "(d)uring their
continuance in office, their salary shall
not be decreased."
The clear intent of the Constitutional
Commission was to delete the
proposed express grant of exemption
from payment of income tax to
members of the Judiciary, so as to "give
substance to equality among the three
branches of Government"
TAXATION OF JUDICIARY’S INCOME
PASTOR M. ENDENCIA and
FERNANDO JUGO vs. SATURNINO
DAVID, as Collector of Internal
Revenue (1953)
FACTS:
This is a joint appeal… declaring
section 13 of Republic Act No. 590
unconstitutional, and ordering the
appellant… to re-fund to Justice Pastor
M. Endencia … the income tax collected
on his salary… in 1951;
and to Justice Fernando Jugo … the
income tax collected on his salary from
January 1,1950 to October 19, 1950, as
Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals,
and from October 20, 1950 to December
31,1950, as Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court, without special
pronouncement as to costs.
Now comes the Legislature and in
section 13, Republic Act No. 590, says
that "no salary wherever received by
any public officer of the Republic
(naturally including a judicial officer)
shall be considered as exempt from the
income tax," and proceeds to declare
that payment of said income tax is not a
diminution of his compensation.
SEC 13. No salary wherever received by
any public officer of the Republic of the
Philippines shall be considered as exempt
from the income tax, payment of which is
hereby declared not to be dimunition
of his compensation fixed by the
Constitution or by law.
By legislative fiat as enunciated in
section 13, Republic Act NO. 590,
Congress says that taxing the salary of a
judicial officer is not a decrease of
compensation. This is a clear example of
interpretation or ascertainment of the
GREGORIO PERFECTO
vs.
BIBIANO MEER, Collector of
Internal Revenue (1950)
In April, 1947 the Collector of Internal
Revenue required Mr. Justice Gregorio
Perfecto to pay income tax upon his
salary as member of this Court during
the year 1946. After paying the
amount (P802), he instituted this
action in the Manila Court of First
Instance contending that the
assessment was illegal, his salary not
being taxable for the reason that
imposition of taxes thereon would
reduce it in violation of the
Constitution.
Death of original Plaintiff…Yet
adjudication may not be declined,
because (a) we are not legally
disqualified; (b) jurisdiction may not
be renounced, as it is the defendant
who appeals to this Court, and there is
no other tribunal to which the
controversy may be referred; (c)
supreme courts in the United States
have decided similar disputes relating
to themselves; (d) the question
touches all the members of the
judiciary from top to bottom; and (e)
the issue involves the right of other
constitutional officers whose
compensation is equally protected by
the Constitution
Enumerates a list of cases similar in
nature but through the US
Constitution…Of course, the Secretary
of Justice correctly opined that the
O'Malley decision "resolved the issue
of taxability of judges' salaries into a
question of policy." But that policy
must be enunciated by Congressional
enactment, as was done in the
O'Malley case, not by Executive Fiat or
interpretation = meaning through
legislature.

ISSUE: W/N Judges’ salaries are subjected to income tax.
Additionally in, Endencia vs. CIR: W/N RA 590 is unconstitutional
In favor of Respondent, petition for
prohibition is dismissed.
This intent (in the provision) was
somehow and inadvertently not clearly
set forth.
1935 Constitution: used the term
diminished
1973 Constitution: used the term
decreased
The draft proposal of Section 10,
Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution
read:
Section 13. The salary of the
Chief Justice and the Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court
and of judges of the lower
courts shall be fixed by law.
During their continuance in
office, their salary shall not be
diminished nor subjected to
income tax.
And during the period of amendments
on the draft Article, on July 14, 1986,
Commissioner Cirilo A. Rigos proposed
that the term "diminished" be changed
to "decreased" and that the words "nor
subjected to income tax" be deleted so
meaning of the phrase "which shall not
be diminished during their continuance
in office," found in section 9, Article VIII
of the Constitution, referring to the
salaries of judicial officers. This act of
interpreting the Constitution or any part
thereof by the Legislature is an invasion
of the well-defined and established
province and jurisdiction of the
Judiciary.
RULING:
In favor of Appellant-Plaintiff, In favor of Appellant-Plaintiff,
petition for prohibition is granted petition for prohibition is granted
We have held despite the ruling Based on US Constitution
enunciated by the United States Federal
Supreme Court in the case of O 'Malley
vs. Woodrought 307 U. S., 277, that
taxing the salary of a judicial officer in
the Philippines is a diminution of such
salary and so violates the Constitution.
Republic Act No. 590, it would seem that
one of the main reasons behind the
enactment of the law was the feeling
among certain legislators that members
of the Supreme Court should not enjoy
any exemption and that as citizens, out
of patriotism and love for their country,
they should pay income tax on their
salaries. It might be stated in this
connection that the exemption is not
enjoyed by the members of the Supreme
Court alone but also by all judicial
officers including Justices of the Court of
Appeals and judges of inferior courts.
The exemption was not primarily
intended to benefit judicial officers, but
was grounded on public policy.
The primary purpose of the prohibition
against diminution was not to benefit
the judges, but, like the clause in
respect of tenure, to attract good and
competent men to the bench and to
promote that independence of action
as to "give substance to equality
among the three branches in the
government.
and judgment which is essential to the
maintenance of the guaranties,
limitations and pervading principles of
the Constitution and to the
administration of justice without
respect to person and with equal
concern for the poor and the rich. Such
being its purpose, it is to be construed,
not as a private grant, but as a limitation
imposed in the public interest; in other
words, not restrictively, but in accord
with its spirit and the principle on which
it proceeds.