8.

QUOROM (SECTION 16)

JOSE AVELINO, petitioner, vs. MARIANO J. CUENCO, respondent

[G.R. No. L-2821. March 4, 1949.]

By: Rhoda Bagor

Facts:
1.) In a Senate Session, Sen. Tañada’s request on his right to speak on the floor
for the charges against Sen. Avelino for the next session was approved.
Though approved, the Senate President and his followers used dilatory tactics
to prevent Sen. Tañada from delivering his speech.
2.) The Senate had later on some disorderly conduct during the session which
made Senator Cabili request for the incident to be recorded:
 The deliberate abandonment of the Chair by the petitioner, made it
incumbent upon Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz and the remaining
members of the Senate to continue the session in order not to paralyze the
functions of the Senate.
 Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz suggested that respondent be
designated to preside over the session which suggestion was carried
unanimously.
 The respondent, Senator Mariano Cuenco, thereupon took the Chair.
3.) Gregorio Abad was appointed Acting Secretary, because the Assistant Secretary,
who was then acting as Secretary, had followed the petitioner when the latter
abandoned the session.
4.) Senator Tañada, after being recognized by the Chair, was then finally able to
deliver his privilege speech. Thereafter Senator Sanidad read aloud the complete
text of said Resolution (No. 68), and submitted his motion for approval thereof and
the same was unanimously approved.
5.) The petitioners, Senator Jose Avelino, in a quo warranto proceeding, asked the
court to declare him the rightful Senate President and oust the respondent,
Mariano Cuenco, contending that the latter had not been validly elected because
twelve members did not constitute a quorum – the majority required of the 24-
member Senate.
Issues:
Whether or not Resolutions 67 and 68 was validly approved by the qourum

Ruling:
Yes, Resolutions was valid.

The question depends upon these sub-questions. (1) Was the session of the so-called
rump Senate a continuation of the session validly assembled with twenty-two Senators
in the morning of February 21, 1949? ; (2) Was there a quorum in that session? Mr.
Justice Montemayor and Mr. Justice Reyes deem it useless, for the present to pass on
these questions once it is held, as they do, that the Court has no jurisdiction over the
case. What follows is the opinion of the other four on those sub-questions.

Supposing the Court has jurisdiction on the said matter, Justice Paras, Feria, Pablo
and Bengzon say there was the majority required by the Constitution for the transaction
of the business of the Senate, because, firstly, the minute say so, secondly, because
at the beginning of such session there were at least fourteen senators including
Senators Pendatun and Lopez, and thirdly because in view of the absence from the
country of Senator Tomas Confesor twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate
of twenty-three senators.

When the Constitution declares that a majority of “each House” shall constitute a
quorum, “the House: does not mean “all” the members. Even a majority of all the
members constitute “the House”. There is a difference between a majority of “the
House”, the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority
(12) of all the members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority
of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum.

Defensor Santiago v. Guingona Jr.

 GR No. 134577 (Nov. 18, 1998)
By: Alexandra Barbaso

Facts:

The Senate of the Philippines, with Sen. John Henry R. Osmeña as

presiding officer, convened on July 27, 1998 for the first regular session of the
eleventh Congress. On the agenda for the day was the election of officers. Sen.
Fernan was declared the duly elected President of Senate. During the discussion
on who should constitute the Senate "minority," Sen. Juan M. Flavier manifested
that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party — numbering
seven (7) and, thus, also a minority — had chosen Senator Guingona as the
minority leader. No consensus on the matter was arrived at. On July 30, 1998,
the majority leader informed the body that he was in receipt of a letter signed by
the seven Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, 9 9 stating that they had elected
Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate President
formally recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate. The
following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad led before this Court the subject
petition for quo warranto , alleging in the main that Senator Guingona had been
usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority
leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.
Petitioners contend that "majority" in the constitutional provision refers to that
group of senators who (1) voted for the winning Senate President and (2)
accepted committee chairmanships.

Issue:

Whether or not there was a violation of the constitution in recognizing

Respondent Guingona as the Senate minority leader.

Held:

The court believes that the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no

clear support from the Constitution, the laws, the Rules of the Senate or even
from practices of the Upper House. The plain and unambiguous words of the
subject constitutional clause simply mean that the Senate President must obtain
the votes of more than one half of all the senators. Not by any construal does it
thereby delineate who comprise the "majority", much less the "minority," in the
said body. While the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate
must be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members
thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso
facto constitute the "minority", who could thereby elect the minority leader. All
that the Charter says is that "[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it
may deem necessary." To our mind, the method of choosing who will be such
other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred
by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be
prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.

Arroyo v. De Venecia
 G.R. No. 127255 (1998)
By: Jayvee Cad

STATUTES
Rule XVI, 96 of the Rules of the HOR
Manner of Addressing the Chair – When a member desires to speak, he shall rise
and respectfully address the Chair Mr. Speaker.

Rule XXVI, 59 of the Rules of HOR

Whenever a Senator wishes to speak, he shall rise and request the President or
the Presiding Officer to allow him to have the floor which consent shall be necessary
before he may proceed.
If various Senators wish to have the floor, the President or Presiding Officer shall
recognize the one who first made the request.

Rule XX, 121 of the Rules of HOR

Definition
Questions of privilege are those affecting the duties, conduct, rights,
privileges, dignity, integrity or reputation of the House or of its members,
collectively or individually.
Points of order or questions of order are legislative devices used in
requiring the House or any of its Members to observe its own rules and follow
regular or established parliamentary procedure. In effect, they are either
objections to pending proceedings as violative of some of those rules or demands
for immediate return to the aforementioned parliamentary procedure.

FACTS
The Petitioners seek a hearing and reconsideration of the Courts decision
dismissing their petition for certiorari and prohibition.
The contention of the Petitioners is when the Majority Leader (Rep. Rodolfo
Albano) moved for the approval of the conference committee report on the bill that later
became R.A. No. 8240. During the hearing, the leading Chair (Deputy Speaker Raul Daza)
asked if there was any objection to the motion, Rep. Joker Arroyo asked, “What is that,
Mr. Speaker?”, the Chair allegedly ignored his question and instead declared the report
approved. The petitioner claimed that his question was a privileged question or a point
of order which, under the rules of the House, has precedence over other matters, with
the exception of motions to adjourn.
Basing on the Rule XVI (96) and Rule XXVI (59) of the Rules of HOR, the contention
has no merit for the Petitioner did not have the floor when he raised the question. He
simply stood up and started talking without first drawing the attention of the chair. As a
result, the Chair did not hear him and just proceeded to ask if there were objections to
the Majority Leaders motion. Hearing none, he declared the report approved.
On the same day when the approval was of the conference committee was
declared by the Chair, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives
and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses
of Congress. The bill was signed into law by President Ramos.
Petitioners further charge that there was a disregard of Rule XIX (112) and Rule
XVII (103) of the Rules of HOR which require that the Chair should state a motion and ask
for the individual votes of the members instead of merely asking whether there was any
objection to the motion. As explained already in the decision of this case, the practice in
cases involving the approval of a conference committee report is for the Chair simple to
ask if there are objections to the motion for approval of the report. This practice is well-
established and is as much and part of parliamentary law as the formal rules of the House.
As explained my Mr. Tolentino, if nobody objects, it means unanimous action of the
house. If there is an objection, then a debate will follow and the voting comes in.

ISSUES
1. Whether or not the House of Representatives acted with grave abuse and
discretion in approving RA 8240.

RULING
NO. Even if the Rules of HOR is violated, Courts ordinarily have no concern with
their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.
Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the
act taken if the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular measure. But this
is subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person
other than members of the legislative body, the question presented is necessarily judicial
in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where private rights are
involved.
The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House
with which the Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum
but only that, the Petitioner was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of
a quorum. Petitioner’s earlier motion to adjourn of lack of quorum had already been
defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum
cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present for the
purpose of delaying the business of the house.

The Motion for rehearing and reconsideration DENIED with FINALITY.

Abas Kida vs. Senate of the Philippines

G.R. No. 196271, October 18, 2011

 By: Yves Dela Pena

Parties:

Petitioners:

 Datu Michael Abas Kida, in his personal capacity, and in representation of

Maguindanao Federation of the Autonomous Irrigators Association, Inc.

 Hadji Muhmina J. Usman,John Anthony L. Lim, Jamilon T. Odin, Asrin Timbol

Jaiyari, Mujib M. Kalang, Alih Al-Saidi J. Sapi-e, Kessar Damsie Abdil, and Bassam
Aluh Saupi

Respondents

 Senate of the Philippines

OSS:

On June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153, entitled “An Act Providing for the Synchronization
of the Elections in the autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) with the National
and Local Elections and for Other Purposes.“ Resetting the ARMM elections from the 8 th
of August 2011 to the second Monday of May 2013 and every 3 years thereafter to
coincide with the regular national and local elections. It also grants the President the power
to “appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) for the office of the Regional Governor, the Regional
Vice-Governor, and the Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly.

Facts:

Section 15 to 22, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, mandated the creation of autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras.

There several laws enacted by Congress pertaining to ARMM. On August 1, 1989,

Congress acted through RA No. 6734 an act establishing the ARMM and scheduled the
first regular elections for the ARMM regional officials. RA No. 9054 reset the regular
elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001. RA
No.9333 reset the ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005, and on the
same date every 3 years thereafter.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333 the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on
August 8, 2011. COMMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had
accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected. But on
June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the ARMM elections to May 2013,
to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the country.

In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the petitioners
assailed the constitutionality of RA No. 10153. (G.R. No. 196271, 196305, 197221,
197282, 197392, 197454 and 197280)

Issue:

A. Whether or not the 1987 constitution mandates the synchronization of the

elections

B. Whether or not the requirement of a super majority vote for amendments or

revisions to RA No. 9054 violate Section 1 and Section 16 (2), Article VI of the 198
Constitution and the corollary doctrine on irrepealable laws

C. Whether or not the grant (to the President) of the power to appoint OICs
violates Section 15, 16 and 18 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution

Ruling:

The Supreme Court DISMISS the consolidated petitions assailing the validity of
RA No. 10153 for lack of Merit, and UPHOLD the constitutionality of RA No. 10153.

A. YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of the elections.

While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize
national and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned
from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, 10 which show the
extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to
the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization of elections.
 Synchronization of national and local elections is a constitutional mandate that
Congress must provide for this synchronization must include the ARMM elections.

B. Yes, Supermajority voting requirement is unconstitutional for giving Ra No.

9054 the character of an irreplealable law

Even assuming that RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 did in fact amend RA No. 9054,
the super majority (2/3) voting requirement required under Section 1, Article XVII of
RA No. 9054 32 has to be struck down for giving RA No. 9054 the character of an
irrepealable law by requiring more than what the Constitution demands.

Section 16 (2), Article VI of the Constitution provides that a "majority of each House

shall constitute a quorum to do business." In other words, as long as majority of the

members of the House of Representatives or the Senate are present, these bodies
have the

quorum needed to conduct business and hold session. Within a quorum, a vote of

majority is generally sufficient to enact laws or approve acts.

This legislature cannot bind a future legislature to a particular mode of repeal. It

cannot

declare in advance the intent of subsequent legislatures or the effect of subsequent

legislation upon existing statutes.

Thus, while a supermajority is not a total ban against a repeal, it is a limitation in

excess

of what the Constitution requires on the passage of bills and is constitutionally

obnoxious

because it significantly constricts the future legislators' room for action and flexibility.

C. YES, the grant (to the President) of the power to appoint OICs in the the
ARMM is Constitutional
 The power to appoint is essential executive in nature. The appointing power is
embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution.

Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with he consent of the Commission
on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls or officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in
this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of
other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.

This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President can
appoint.

These are:

First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public ministers
and consuls; officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel or
naval captain; and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this
Constitution;

Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law;

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest
in the President alone. Since the President's authority to appoint OICs emanates from
RA No. 10153, it falls under the third group of officials that the President can appoint
pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the assailed law facially
rests on clear constitutional basis.

10. Discipline

Osmena v. Pendatun

GR No. L-17144, October 28, 1960

 By: Antonette Gabuya

Parties:

Petitioners:

 Sergio Osmeña, Jr.

Respondent:

 Salipada K. Pendatun, Leon Z. Guinto, Jr., Vicente L. Peralta, Faustino Tobia,

Lorenzo G. Teves, Jose J. Roy, Fausto Dugenio, Antonio Y. De Pio, Benjamin T.
Ligot, Pedro G. Trono, Felipe Abrigo, Felipe S. Abeleda, Tecla San Andres Ziga,
Angel B. Fernandez, And Eugenio S. Baltao, in their capacity as members of the
Special Committee created by House Resolution No. 59, respondents.

Facts:
On June 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr. delivered a speech entitled “A
message to Garcia.” In the said speech, the congressman made charges against then
president Carlos Garcia and his administration.
The special committee submitted its report on July 18, 1960, finding said
congressman guilty of serious disorderly behavior and suspending him from office for
fifteen months.
On July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr., submitted to this Court a
verified petition for "declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction" against Congressman Salipada K. Pendatun and fourteen other congressmen
in their capacity as members of the Special Committee created by House Resolution No.
59.
He asked for annulment of such Resolution on the ground of infringement of his
parliamentary immunity; he also asked, principally, that said members of the special
committee be enjoined from proceeding in accordance with it, particularly the portion
authorizing them to require him to substantiate his charges against the President, with
the admonition that if he failed to do so, he must show cause why the House should not
punish him.
In support of his request, Congressman Osmeña alleged:
(1) the Resolution violated his constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity for
speeches delivered in the House;
(2) his words constituted no actionable conduct; and
(3) after his allegedly objectionable speech and words, the House took up other
business, and Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of the House provides that if
other business has intervened after the Member had uttered obnoxious
words in debate, he shall not be held to answer therefor nor be subject to
censure by the House
Respondents filed their answer challenged the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain
the petition, defended the power of Congress to discipline its members with suspension,
upheld House Resolution No. 175 and then invited attention to the fact that Congress
having ended its session on July 18, 1960, the Committee — whose members are the
sole respondents — had thereby ceased to exist

Issue:
 Whether or not Osmeña’s immunity has been violated

Ruling:

Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental

privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world.
Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any speech or debate" in
Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of Representatives "shall not be
questioned in any other place." This section was taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of
Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States. In that country, the provision has always
been understood to mean that although exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their
words uttered in Congress, the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned
in Congress itself.
Furthermore, the Rules of the House which petitioner himself has invoked (Rule
XVII, sec. 7), recognize the House's power to hold a member responsible "for words
spoken in debate."
On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive
constitutes disorderly conduct for which Osmeña may be disciplined, many arguments
pro and con have been advanced. We believe, however, that the House is the judge of
what constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only because the Constitution has conferred
jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual
circumstances of which the House knows best but which cannot be depicted in black
and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts.
Accordingly, the petition has to be, and is hereby dismissed. So ordered.

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, FRANCIS E.

GARCHITORENA, JOSE S. BALAJADIA AND MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO, AS PRESIDING
JUSTICE AND MEMBERS OF THE FIRST DIVISION, respondents.
By: Trisha Guzman

FACTS:

The Court is called upon to review the act of the Sandiganbayan, and how far it can go,
in ordering the preventive suspension of petitioner, Mme. Senator Miriam Defensor-
Santiago, in connection with pending in criminal cases against her for alleged violation
of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti- Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. She was accused of approving the application for legalisation of the stay of
about 32 aliens which is said to be illegal and tainted with bad faith. On top of that, two
other criminal cases, one for violation of the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 46
and the other for libel.

Francis Garchitorena, the presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan, issued a warrant of

arrest against Santiago. Santiago petitioned for provisional liberty since she was just
recovering from a car accident which was approved.

In 1995, a motion was filed with the Sandiganbayan for the suspension of Santiago, who
was then a senator. The Sandiganbayan ordered the Senate President to suspend
Santiago from office for 90 days.

The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an incumbent

public official charged with violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has both
legal and jurisprudential support. Section 13 of the statute provides:

"SECTION 13. Suspension and loss of benefits ts. — Any incumbent public officer
against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or
under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon
government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense
and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court,
shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose
all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be
entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive
during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed
against him.

Segovia vs. Sandiganbayan

"The validity of Section 13, R.A. 3019, as amended — treating of the suspension
pendente lite of an accused public officer — may no longer be put at issue, having
been repeatedly upheld by this Court.

"The provision of suspension pendente lite applies to all persons indicted upon a valid
information under the Act, whether they be appointive or elective officials; or
permanent or temporary employees, or pertaining to the career or non- career
service."

ISSUE:

Is the Sandiganbayan authorised to decree a ninety-day preventive suspension of Mme.

Miriam Defensor- Santiago, a Senator of the Republic of the Philippines, from any
government position, and furnishing a copy thereof to the Senate of the Philippines for
the implementation of the suspension order.

RULING:

The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power
of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution which provides that each
— ". . . house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for
disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend
or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty
days."

In a previous case, Paredes, Jr. v Sandiganbayan — ". . . Petitioner's invocation of

Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution — which deals with the power of each
House of Congress inter alia to 'punish its Members for disorderly behavior,' and
'suspend or expel a Member' by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members subject to the
qualification that the penalty of suspension, when imposed, should not exceed sixty
days — is unavailing, as it appears to be quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in
Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure,
prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for
misbehavior as a Member of the House of Representatives."

The provision allowing the Court to look into any possible grave abuse of discretion
committed by any government instrumentality has evidently been couched in general
terms in order to make it malleable to judicial interpretation in the light of any emerging
milieu.

Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress
and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed
preventive suspension order.

Petition for Certiorari Dismissed.

LASTIMOSA-DALAWAMPU V. CUENCA
AC No. 7345
April 18, 2017
By: Kate Parilla
OSS: This is a disbarment complaint against respondents who allegedly abused
their prerogatives as as the Chairperson and Vice Chairperson of the Committee
on Dangerous Drugs of the House of Representatives.
RELEVANT PROVISION/S: Section 16 (3), Article VI.─ Each House may
determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior,
and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a
Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.
FACTS: On Sept. 4, 2004, a raid by PDEA of a suspected shabu laboratory in
Mandaue City led to the arrest of 11 personalities whom the local media called
“Shabu 11”. Consequently, they were charged under RA 9165 or the
Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002 before RTC Mandaue. The case was raffled to
Judge Marilyn L. Yap.
The respodents, Hon. Roque R. Ablan, Jr. and Hon. Antonio V. Cuenco, as the
Chairperson and Vice Chairperson of the Committee on Dangerous Drugs of the
House of Representatives went to the Mandaue City Jail to conduct an
investigation. As a result, they learned that a certain Calvin de Jesus Tan had
financed the suspected shabu laboratory and thus should be included in “Shabu
11”.
The complainant, Atty. Gloria Lastimosa-Dalawampu, acted as the counsel of Tan.
She alleged that respondents had abused their prerogatives as members of
Congress by conspiring with Judge Yap in rigging the case against her client.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents should be disciplined for their conduct.
RULING: No. Because their conduct pertained to their functions as the
Chairperson and Vice Chairperson of the Committee on Dangerous Drugs of the
House of Representatives. In line with the principle of separation of powers, the
Supreme Court cannot overstep the boundaries in order to inquire into the conduct
of the respondents as members of Congress. Section 16 (3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution vests in Congress the exclusive authority to discipline its members for
disorderly behavior. Evidently, the Court is not the appropriate forum to probe the
conduct of the respondents as legislators. Administrative Complaint dismissed.

11. Journal and Congressional Records

a. The Enrolled Bill Theory

Mabanag vs Lopez
By: Kent Te

OSS: The Court denied the petition since the issue involved was a political
question which is not within the province of judiciary.
Enrolled Bill Theory: An enrolled bill is one duly introduced and finally passed by
both Houses, authenticated by the proper officers of each, and approved by the
President. The enrolled bill is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of
the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. Court is bound
under the doctrine of separation of powers by the contents of a duly authenticated
measure of the legislature
Facts:
Three of the plaintiff senators and eight of the plaintiff representatives had been
proclaimed by a majority vote of the Commission on Elections as having been
elected senators and representatives in the elections held on April 23, 1946.
The three senators were suspended by the Senate shortly after the opening of the
first session of Congress following the elections, on account of alleged
irregularities in their election. The eight representatives since their election had not
been allowed to sit in the lower House, except to take part in the election of the
Speaker, for the same reason, although they had not been formally suspended.
A resolution for their suspension had been introduced in the House of
Representatives, but that resolution had not been acted upon definitely by the
House when the present petition was filed.
As a consequence these three senators and eight representatives did not take part
in the passage of the questioned resolution, nor was their membership reckoned
within the computation of the necessary three-fourths vote which is required in
proposing an amendment to the Constitution. If these members of Congress had
been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would
have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress.
Petitioners filed a petition for prohibition to prevent the enforcement of a
congressional resolution designated "Resolution of both houses proposing an
amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an ordinance
thereto."
The petitioners contend that the enrolled bill rule has not found acceptance in this
jurisdiction, citing the case of United States vs. Pons (34 Phil., 729). It is argued
that this Court examined the journal in that case to find out whether or not the
contention of the appellant was right.
The respondents deny that this Court has jurisdiction, relying on the
conclusiveness on the courts of an enrolled bill or resolution. The respondent's
other chief reliance is on the contention that a duly authenticated bill or resolution
imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court may inquire upon the irregularities in the approval of the
resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution.

Held:
NO. Political questions are not within the province of the judiciary, except to the
extent that power to deal with such questions has been conferred upon the courts
by express constitutional or statutory provision. This doctrine is predicated on the
principle of the separation of powers.
If ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to
ratification has to be a political question. It is to be noted that the amendatory
process as provided in section 1 of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution
"consists of (only) two distinct parts: proposal and ratification." Proposal to amend
the Constitution is a highly political function performed by the Congress in its
sovereign legislative capacity and committed to its charge by the Constitution itself.

Arroyo v. De Venecia
GR No. 127255, August 14, 1997
By: Snowie Trugillo
Parties:
Petitioners:
 Joker P. Arroyo, Edcel C. Lagman, John Henry R. Osmeña,
Wigberto E. Tañada, and Ronaldo B. Zamora
 Respondents:

 Jose De Venecia, Raul Daza, Rodolfo Albano, The Executive

Secretary, The Secretary of Finance, and The Commissioner of
Internal Revenue

This is a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition challenging the validity of

Republic Act No. 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal
Revenue Code by imposing so-called "sin taxes" (actually specific taxes) on the
manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes.

Facts:

Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought

this suit
against respondents Jose de Venecia, Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Deputy
Speaker Raul Daza, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano, the Executive Secretary,
the Secretary
of Finance, and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, charging violation of the
rules of the
House which petitioners claim are "constitutionally mandated" so that their
violation is
tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.
The law originated from the House of Representatives. The senate
approved it with certain amendments. A bicameral conference committee was
formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions
of the bill.
During the interpellation, Rep. Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack of
quorum. After a roll call, presence of quorum was declared. The events after
Rep. Arroyo’s interpellation are shown in the following transcript:

MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move that we now approve and ratify the
conference committee report.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). Any objection to the motion?

MR. ARROYO. What is that, Mr. Speaker?

 THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There being none, approved.

(Gavel)

MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr. Speaker, I stood up. I want
to
know what is the question that the Chair asked the
distinguished sponsor.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There was a motion by the Majority
Leader for approval of the report, and the Chair called
for the motion.

MR. ARROYO. Objection, I stood up, so I wanted to object.

Only the proceedings of the House of Representatives on the conference

committee
report on H. No. 7198 are in question. Petitioners' principal argument is that R.A.
No. 8240
is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House; that
these
rules embody the "constitutional mandate" in Art. VI, §16(3) that "each House
may
determine the rules of its proceedings" and that, consequently, violation of the
House rules
is a violation of the Constitution itself. They contend that the certification of
Speaker De
Venecia that the law was properly passed is false and spurious.
Respondents' defense is anchored on the principle of separation of
powers and the enrolled bill doctrine. They argue that the Court is not the proper
forum for the enforcement of the rules of the House and that there is no
justification for reconsidering the enrolled bill doctrine respondent De Venecia
denies that his certification of H. No. 7198 is false and spurious and contends
that under the journal entry rule, the judicial inquiry sought by the petitioners is
barred. Indeed, Journal No. 39 of the House of Representatives, covering the
sessions of November 20 and 21, 1996, shows that "On Motion of Mr. Albano,
there being no objection, the Body approved the Conference Committee Report
on House Bill No. 7198." This Journal was approved on December 2, 1996 over
the lone objection of petitioner Rep. Lagman.
Issues:
Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in
violation of the rules of the house

Held:
It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been
violated in
the enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal rules of procedure of the
House rather
than constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law.
Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they
are subject to revocation, modi􀁂cation or waiver at the pleasure of the body
adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no
concern
with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative
body.
If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the
legislature
void on account merely of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself,
it follows
that such a case does not present a situation in which a branch of the
government has
"gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction" so as to call for the
exercise of
our Art. VIII, §1 power.
The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although
Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader's motion, the approval
of the conference committee report CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018
cdasiaonline.com had by then already been declared by the Chair, symbolized by
its banging of the gavel.
Petitioners argue that, in accordance with the rules of the House, Rep.
Albano's motion for the approval of the conference committee report should have
been stated by the Chair and later the individual votes of the Members should
have been taken.
No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which specifically
requires
that in cases such as this involving approval of a conference committee report,
the Chair must restate the motion and conduct a viva voce or nominal voting.
Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker
of
the House and the President of the Senate and the certification by the
secretaries of both
Houses of Congress that it was passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of
its due enactment. There is no claim either here that the enrolled bill embodies a
conclusive presumption. In one case we "went behind" an enrolled bill and
consulted the Journal to determine whether certain provisions of a statute had
been approved by the Senate. But, whereas here there is no evidence to the
contrary, this Court will respect the certification of the presiding officers of both
Houses that a bill has been duly passed.
The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of evidence, is well established. To
overrule the doctrine now, as the dissent urges, is to repudiate the massive
teaching of our cases and overthrow an established rule of evidence.
Moreover, as already noted, the due enactment of the law in question is
confirmed
by the Journal of the House of November 21, 1996 which shows that the
conference
committee report on H. No. 7198, which became R.A. No. 8240, was approved
on that day.
The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are
required by the Constitution to be recorded therein. With respect to other matters,
in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Journals have also been
accorded conclusive effect.
After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground
for holding
that Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240.
This case
is therefore dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED.

Casco vs. Gimenez

G.R. No. L-17931
February 28, 1963
Petitioners: CASCO PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL CO., INC.,
Respondents: HON. PEDRO GIMENEZ, in his capacity as Auditor General of the
Philippines, and HON. ISMAEL MATHAY, in his capacity as Auditor of the Central
Bank
By: Tin Villanueva

SYLLABUS:
ENROLLED BILL THEORY: The enrolled bill rule is a principle of judicial
interpretation of rules of procedure in legislative bodies. Under the doctrine, once
a bill passes a legislative body and is signed into law, the courts assume that all
rules of procedure in the enactment process were properly followed.
FACTS: Casco Chemical Co., which is engaged in the manufacture of synthetic
resin glues used in bonding lumber and veneer by plywood and hardwood
producers, bought foreign exchange for the importation of urea AND formaldehyde
which are the main raw materials in the production of the said glues. They paid
P33,765.42 in November and December 1949 and P6345.72 in May 1960. Prior
thereto, the petitioner sought the refund of the first and second sum relying upon
Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board of said bank, dated November 3, 1959,
declaring that the separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from
said fee. Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2609 reads: The margin established by the
Monetary Board pursuant to the provision of section one hereof shall not be
imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the following:.
XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when
imported by and for the exclusive use of end-users. The Auditor of the Bank, Pedro
Gimenez, refused to pass in audit and approve the said refund on the ground that
the exemption granted by the board in not in accord with the provision of section 2
of RA 2609.
ISSUE: Whether or not Urea and Formaldehyde are exempt by law from the
payment of the margin fee.
HELD: No, it is not exempt from payment of the marginal fee. Urea formaldehyde
is clearly a finished product which is distinct from urea and formaldehyde. The
petitioner’s contends that the bill approved in Congress contained the conjunction
“and” between the terms “urea” and “formaldehyde” separately as essential
elements in the manufacture of “urea formaldehyde” and not the latter. But this is
not reflective of the view of the Senate and the intent of the House of
Representatives in passing the bill. If there has been any mistake in the printing of
the bill before it was passed the only remedy is by amendment or curative
legislation, not by judicial decree. Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with cost
against the petitioner.
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance
By: Kent Te

Facts:
RA 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law, is an act that
seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its
administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are
various suits questioning and challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on
various grounds.
Tolentino contends that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively from the House of
Representatives but is a mere consolidation of HB. No. 11197 and SB. No. 1630
and it did not pass three readings on separate days on the Senate thus violating
Article VI, Sections 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution, respectively.
Art. VI, Section 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing
increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or
concur with amendments.
Art. VI, Section 26(2): No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless
it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its
final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage,
except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to
meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no
amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken
immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.

Issue:
Whether or not RA 7716 violated Art. VI, Section 24 and Art. VI, Section 26(2) of
the Constitution.
The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives
as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of theConstitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is
not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and not only
the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must
substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate’s power not only
to concur with amendmentsbut also to propose amendments. Indeed, what
the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills
authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of localapplication must
come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from
the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local
needs and problems. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a
substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by
the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.

The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on
separate days as required by the Constitution because the second and third readings
were done on the same day. But this was because the President had certified S. No. 1630
as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing
but also that of reading the bill on separate days. That upon the certification of a bill by the
President the requirement of 3 readings on separate days and of printing and distribution
can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice.

US v. Pons
By: Kent Te
 Probative Value of Journal
OSS: The Supreme Court rejected Pon’s claim ruling that the probative value of
the journal could not be questioned, otherwise proof of legislative action would be
uncertain and would now have to depend on the imperfect memory of men.
Facts:
Gabino Beliso, Juan Pons, and Jacinto Lasarte were charged with the crime of
illegal importation of opium.
On motion of counsel Juan Pons and Gabino Beliso were tried separately. (Jacinto
Lasarte had not yet been arrested.) Both appealed. Beliso later withdrew his
appeal and the judgment as to him has become final.
Pon alleged and offered to prove that the last day of the special session of the
Philippine Legislature for 1914 was the 28th day of February; that Act No. 2381,
under which Pons must be punished if found guilty, was not passed or approved
on the 28th of February but on March 1 of that year; and that, therefore, the same
is null and void.

Issues:
Whether or not the Court can look to legislative journals as proof when the
adjournment of Legislature happened;
Whether or not the Court can go behind the legislative journals to determine the
date of adjournment.

Held:
The Act of Congress, approved July 1, 1902, provides, among other things, in
section 7, that the Philippine Assembly "shall keep in journal of its proceedings,
which shall be published . . . ." In obedience to this mandate, the journal of the
Assembly's proceedings for the sessions of 1914 was duly published and it
appears therein (vol. 9, p. 1029), that the Assembly adjourned sine die at 12
o'clock midnight on February 28, 1914.
Section 275 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the existence of the
"official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United
States and of the Philippine Islands ... shall be judicially recognized by the court
without the introduction of proof; but the court may receive evidence upon any of
the subjects in this section states, when it shall find it necessary for its own
information, and may resort for its aid to appropriate books, documents, or
evidence." And section 313 [as amended by sec. 1 of Act No. 2210], of the same
Code also provides that:
Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . .
(2) The proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislative body that
may be provided for the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those
bodies or of either house thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by
copies certified by the clerk or secretary or printed by their order: Provided, That
in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature when
there is in existence a copy signed by the presiding officers and the secretaries of
said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Act and of the
due enactment thereof.
The SC looked into the Journals to ascertain the date of adjournment but the SC
refused to go beyond the recitals in the legislative Journals.
Counsel for the appellant, in order to establish his contention, must necessarily
depend upon the memory or recollection of witnesses, while the legislative journals
are the acts of the Government or sovereign itself. From their very nature and
object the records of the Legislature are as important as those of the judiciary, and
to inquiry into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they
are, as we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the
spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into
existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department of the Government,
and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature.

Astorga v. Villegas
By: Kent Te
 Journal Entry Rule v. Enrolled Bill Theory
OSS: Enrolled bill prevails, except as to matters which, under the Constitution,
must be entered in the Journal.

Facts:
House Bill No. 9266 was passed from the House of Representatives to the Senate.
Senator Arturo Tolentino made substantial amendments which were approved by
the Senate. The House, without notice of said amendments, thereafter signed its
approval until all the presiding officers of both houses certified and attested to the
bill. The President also signed it and thereupon became RA 4065.
Senator Tolentino made a press statement that the enrolled copy of House Bill No.
9266 was a wrong version of the bill because it did not embody the amendments
introduced by him and approved by the Senate. Both the Senate President and the
President withdrew their signatures and denounced RA 4065 as invalid.
The Mayor of Manila, Antonio Villegas, issued circulars to the department heads
and chiefs of offices of the city government as well as to the owners, operators
and/or managers of business establishments in Manila to disregard the provisions
of Republic Act 4065. He likewise issued an order to the Chief of Police to recall
five members of the city police force who had been assigned to the Vice-Mayor
presumably under authority of Republic Act 4065.
Reacting to these steps taken by Mayor Villegas, the then Vice-Mayor, Herminio
A. Astorga, filed a petition with this Court on September 7, 1964 for "Mandamus,
Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory
Injunction" to compel respondents Mayor of Manila, the Executive Secretary, the
Commissioner of Civil Service, the Manila Chief of Police, the Manila City
Treasurer and the members of the municipal board to comply with the provisions
of Republic Act 4065.
Respondents' position is that the so-called Republic Act 4065 never became law
since it was not the bill actually passed by the Senate, and that the entries in the
journal of that body and not the enrolled bill itself should be decisive in the
resolution of the issue.
On April 28, 1965, upon motion of respondent Mayor, who was then going abroad
on an official trip, this Court issued a restraining order, without bond, "enjoining the
petitioner Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga from exercising any of the powers of an
Acting Mayor purportedly conferred upon the Vice-Mayor of Manila under the so-
called Republic Act 4065 and not otherwise conferred upon said Vice-Mayor under
any other law until further orders from this Court."
Petitioner's argument that the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is
conclusive proof of a bill's due enactment, required, it is said, by the respect due
to a co-equal department of the government.
Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the bill is not mandatory but argues that the
disclaimer thereof by the Senate President, granting it to have been validly made,
would only mean that there was no attestation at all, but would not affect the validity
of the statute. Hence, it is pointed out, Republic Act No. 4065 would remain valid
and binding.

Issue:
Whether or not Republic Act No. 4065 would remain valid and binding.

Held:
Since both the Senate President and the Chief Executive withdrew their signatures
therein, the Court declared that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not
become a law. The Constitution requires that each House shall keep a journal. An
importance of having a journal is that in the absence of attestation or evidence of
the bill’s due enactment, the court may resort to the journals of the Congress to
verify such. “Where the journal discloses that substantial amendment were
introduced and approved and were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the
President for signature, the court can declare that the bill has not been duly
enacted and did not become a law.”
The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record.
The Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and
is subject to the risks of misprinting and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this
case. This Court is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266
signed by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of
Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, this Court can
do this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that
substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved
by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President
and signed by him. This Court is not asked to incorporate such amendments into
the alleged law, which admittedly is a risky undertaking, 13 but to declare that the
bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. This We do, as indeed
both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive did, when they withdrew
their signatures therein. In the face of the manifest error committed and
subsequently rectified by the President of the Senate and by the Chief Executive,
for this Court to perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding
that the erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and
bring about mischievous consequences not intended by the law-making body.
 Morales v. Subido
27 SCRA 131

By: Alexandra Barbaso

Facts:
 The present insistence of the petitioner is that the version of the provision,
as amended at the behest of Sen. Rodrigo, was the version approved by the
Senate on third reading, and that when the bill emerged from the conference
committee the only change made in the provision was the insertion of the phrase
"or has served as chief of police with exemplary record." In support of this
assertion, the petitioner submitted certified photostatic copies of the different
drafts of House Bill 6951 showing the various changes made. The omission —
whether deliberate or unintended — of the phrase, "who has served the police
department of a city or," was made not at any stage of the legislative proceedings
but only in the course of the engrossment of the bill, more specifically in the
proofreading thereof; that the change was made not by Congress but only by an
employee thereof; and that what purportedty was a rewriting to suit some stylistic
preferences was in truth an alteration of meaning. It is for this reason that the
petitioner would have the Court look searchingly into the matter.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court can review the passage of a bill in its omission of a
phrase.

Held:
The Court cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what really
happened. The respect due to the other branches of the Government demands
that we act upon the faith and credit of what the officers of the said branches
attest to as the official acts of their respective departments. House cleaning —
the immediate and imperative need for which seems to be suggested by the
petitioner — can best be effected by the occupants thereof. In Marshall Field &
Co . it was held that the signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives
and by the President of the Senate of an enrolled bill is an official attestation by
the two houses that such bill is the one that has passed Congress. And when the
bill thus attested is signed by the President and deposited in the archives, its
authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete
and unimpeachable. The Court holds that with respect to matters not expressly
required to be entered on the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the event of any
discrepancy.
Arroyo v. De Venecia
GR No. 127255, August 14, 1997

By: Antonette Gabuya

Parties:
Petitioners:
  Joker P. Arroyo, Edcel C. Lagman, John Henry R. Osmeña,
Wigberto E. Tañada, and Ronaldo B. Zamora

Respondents:

 Jose De Venecia, Raul Daza, Rodolfo Albano, The Executive

Secretary, The Secretary of Finance, and The Commissioner of
Internal Revenue

This is a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition challenging the validity of

Republic Act No. 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal
Revenue Code by imposing so-called "sin taxes" (actually specific taxes) on the
manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes.

Facts:

Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought

this suit
against respondents Jose de Venecia, Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Deputy
Speaker Raul Daza, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano, the Executive Secretary,
the Secretary
of Finance, and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, charging violation of the
rules of the
House which petitioners claim are "constitutionally mandated" so that their
violation is
tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.
The law originated from the House of Representatives. The senate
approved it with certain amendments. A bicameral conference committee was
formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions
of the bill.
During the interpellation, Rep. Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack of
quorum. After a roll call, presence of quorum was declared. The events after
Rep. Arroyo’s interpellation are shown in the following transcript:

MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move that we now approve and ratify the
conference committee report.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). Any objection to the motion?

 MR. ARROYO. What is that, Mr. Speaker?

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There being none, approved.

(Gavel)

MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr. Speaker, I stood up. I want
to
know what is the question that the Chair asked the
distinguished sponsor.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There was a motion by the Majority
Leader for approval of the report, and the Chair called
for the motion.

MR. ARROYO. Objection, I stood up, so I wanted to object.

Only the proceedings of the House of Representatives on the conference

committee
report on H. No. 7198 are in question. Petitioners' principal argument is that R.A.
No. 8240
is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House; that
these
rules embody the "constitutional mandate" in Art. VI, §16(3) that "each House
may
determine the rules of its proceedings" and that, consequently, violation of the
House rules
is a violation of the Constitution itself. They contend that the certification of
Speaker De
Venecia that the law was properly passed is false and spurious.
Respondents' defense is anchored on the principle of separation of
powers and the enrolled bill doctrine. They argue that the Court is not the proper
forum for the enforcement of the rules of the House and that there is no
justification for reconsidering the enrolled bill doctrine respondent De Venecia
denies that his certification of H. No. 7198 is false and spurious and contends
that under the journal entry rule, the judicial inquiry sought by the petitioners is
barred. Indeed, Journal No. 39 of the House of Representatives, covering the
sessions of November 20 and 21, 1996, shows that "On Motion of Mr. Albano,
there being no objection, the Body approved the Conference Committee Report
on House Bill No. 7198." This Journal was approved on December 2, 1996 over
the lone objection of petitioner Rep. Lagman.

Issues:
Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in
violation of the rules of the house

Held:
It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been
violated in
the enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal rules of procedure of the
House rather
than constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law.
Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they
are subject to revocation, modi􀁂cation or waiver at the pleasure of the body
adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no
concern
with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative
body.
If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the
legislature
void on account merely of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself,
it follows
that such a case does not present a situation in which a branch of the
government has
"gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction" so as to call for the
exercise of
our Art. VIII, §1 power.
The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although
Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader's motion, the approval
of the conference committee report CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018
cdasiaonline.com had by then already been declared by the Chair, symbolized by
its banging of the gavel.
Petitioners argue that, in accordance with the rules of the House, Rep.
Albano's motion for the approval of the conference committee report should have
been stated by the Chair and later the individual votes of the Members should
have been taken.
No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which specifically
requires
that in cases such as this involving approval of a conference committee report,
the Chair must restate the motion and conduct a viva voce or nominal voting.
Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker
of
the House and the President of the Senate and the certification by the
secretaries of both
Houses of Congress that it was passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of
its due enactment. There is no claim either here that the enrolled bill embodies a
conclusive presumption. In one case we "went behind" an enrolled bill and
consulted the Journal to determine whether certain provisions of a statute had
been approved by the Senate. But, whereas here there is no evidence to the
contrary, this Court will respect the certification of the presiding officers of both
Houses that a bill has been duly passed.
The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of evidence, is well established. To
overrule the doctrine now, as the dissent urges, is to repudiate the massive
teaching of our cases and overthrow an established rule of evidence.
Moreover, as already noted, the due enactment of the law in question is
confirmed
by the Journal of the House of November 21, 1996 which shows that the
conference
committee report on H. No. 7198, which became R.A. No. 8240, was approved
on that day.
The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are
required by the Constitution to be recorded therein. With respect to other matters,
in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Journals have also been
accorded conclusive effect.
After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground
for holding
that Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240.
This case
is therefore dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED.