B.

PRIVILEGE SPEECH AND DEBATE

SERGIO OSMEÑA, JR vs. SALIPADA K. PENDATUN, et. al, in their capacity as members of the Special Committee created by House
Resolution No. 59

On July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr., submitted to this Court a petition for annulment of House Resolution No. 59 on
the ground of infringement of his parliamentary immunity. He also asked that said members of the special committee be enjoined
from proceeding in accordance with it, particularly the portion authorizing them to require him to substantiate his charges against the
President with the admonition that if he failed to do so, he must show cause why the House should not punish him.

FACTS:

On the 23rd day of June, 1960, Hon. Sergio Osmeña, Jr., Member of the House of Representatives from the 2nd District of
Cebu province, delivered a privileged speech, entitled 'A Message to Garcia;

He made serious imputations of bribery against the President, that under the President’s administration, the free things
people used to get from the government are now for sale at premium prices. Even pardons are for sale, and that regardless of the
gravity or seriousness of a criminal case, the culprit can always be bailed out forever from jail as long as he can come across with a
handsome dole.

The House of Representative issued House Resolution No. 59 which created a special committee of 15 Members, appointed
by the Speaker, to investigate the truth of the charges against the President of the Philippines made by Osmeña.

The Special Committee was authorized to summon Osmeña to appear before it to substantiate his charges, and if he fails to
do so, he shall show cause why he should not be punished by the House.

Osmeña’s contention:

1. The Resolution violated his constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the House;
2. His words constituted no actionable conduct;
3. He shall not be held to answer because after his allegedly objectionable speech and words, the House took up other business
and Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of House provides that if other business has intervened after the member had uttered
obnoxious words in debate, he shall not be held to answer therefore nor be subject to censure by the House.
4. That the House has no power, under the Constitution, to suspend one of its members.

On July 18, 1960, the special committee, after giving Congressman Osmeña a chance to defend himself, found Osmeña guilty of
serious disorderly behaviour.

Acting on such report, the House approved on the same day—before closing its session—House Resolution No. 175, declaring him
guilty as recommended, and suspending him from office for 15 months.

Thereafter, on July 19, 1960, the respondents (with the exception of Congressmen De Pio, Abeleda, San Andres Ziga, Fernandez
and Balatao) filed their answer to Osmeña’s petition.

1. This Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition

2. Congress has the power to discipline its members with suspension
3. House Resolution No. 175 should be upheld.

Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any speech or debate" in Congress, the Senators or Members of the
House of Representative "shall not be questioned in any other place."

This section was taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States. In that country, the
provision has always been understood to mean that although exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in
Congress, the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself. Observe that "they shall not be questioned
in any other place" than Congress.

The Rules of Philippine House of Representatives provide that the parliamentary practices of the Congress of the United States
shall apply in a supplementary manner to its proceedings.
 Furthermore, the Rules of the House which petitioner himself has invoked (Rule XVII, sec. 7), recognize the House's power to hold
a member responsible "for words spoken in debate."

Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of
the democratic world. Its purpose "is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness
and success" for "it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from
the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom exercise of that liberty may occasion offense."

Such immunity guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or
civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall.

But is does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered
by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof.

For unparliamentary conduct, members of Parliament or of Congress have been, or could be censured, committed to prison, even
expelled by the votes of their colleagues. And to cite a local illustration, the Philippine Senate, in April 1949, suspended a senator for
one year.

This brings up the third point of petitioner: the House may no longer take action against me, he argues, because after my speech,
and before approving Resolution No. 59, it had taken up other business.

In the case of Congressman Stanbery of Ohio, who insulted the Speaker, for which Act a resolution of censure was presented, the
House approved the resolution, despite the argument that other business had intervened after the objectionable remarks.

On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly conduct for which Osmeña may
be disciplined, we believe that the House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior, not only because the Constitution has
conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best
but which cannot be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts.

If this Court assumed the power to determine whether Osmeña’s conduct constituted disorderly behavior, it would thereby have
assumed jurisdiction which the Constitution never intended to confer upon it.

SEC. 200. Judicial Interference with Legislature. — The principle is well established that the courts will not assume a jurisdiction
in any case amount to an interference by the judicial department with the legislature since each department is equally independent
within the power conferred upon it by the Constitution.

The Supreme Court of California declined to interfere, explaining that, even in the absence of an express provision conferring the
power, every legislative body vested with the general legislative power of the state has the implied power to expel a member for any
cause which it may deem sufficient.

In Hiss. vs. Barlett, 3 Gray 473, 63 Am. Dec. 768, the supreme court of Mass. says, in substance, that this power is inherent in
every legislative body; that it is necessary to enable the body 'to perform its high functions, and is necessary to the safety of the state;'

'That it is a power of self-protection, and that the legislative body must necessarily be the sole judge of the exigency which may
justify and require its exercise. '. . . There is no provision authorizing courts to control, direct, supervise, or forbid the exercise by either
house of the power to expel a member. These powers are functions of the legislative department and therefore, in the exercise of the
power this committed to it, the senate is supreme.

We refuse to intervene because an attempt by this court to direct or control the legislature in the exercise of their power, would
be an attempt to exercise legislative functions, which it is expressly forbidden to do.

Osmeña’s argument against the House's power to suspend was based on the Alejandrino precedent.

 In 1924, Senator Alejandrino was, by resolution of Senate, suspended from office for 12 months because he had assaulted
another member for certain phrases the latter had uttered in the course of a debate.

The Senator challenged the validity of the resolution. Although this Court held that in view of the separation of powers, it had no
jurisdiction to compel the Senate to reinstate petitioner, it said the Senate had no power to adopt the resolution because suspension
for 12 months amounted to removal, and the Jones Law (under which the Senate was then functioning) gave the Senate no power to
remove an appointive member, like Senator Alejandrino.
 It must be observed, however, that at that time the Legislature had only those power which were granted to it by the Jones Law;
whereas now the Congress has the full legislative powers and prerogatives of a sovereign nation, except as restricted by the
Constitution. At the present times, the Congress has the inherent legislative prerogative of suspension. In fact, as already pointed out,
the Philippine Senate had already suspended a Senator for 12 months in 1949. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed.

Jimenez et al. Vs Cabangbang

This is a civil action for recovery by sums of money by the petitioners against Cabangbang for the damages caused by the publication
of his libelous open letter to the president.

FACTS:

"The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all

cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace. Be privileged from arrest
during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and
returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be
questioned in any other place." (Article VI, Section 15.)

A complaint was filed by the petitioners against the defendant pertaining the letter in question. The defendant moved to
dismiss the complaint on the ground that the letter was not libelous and even if it was, it is considered as “ privileged" because
Cabangbang was a congressman at the time of the publication of the letter.

The letter describes “allegedly three (3) operational plans". The First plan is said to be "an insidious plan for a massive
political
build-up" of then Secretary of National Defense, Jesus Vargas, by propagandizing and
glamorizing him in such a way as to "be prepared to become a candidate for President
in 1961". To this end, the "planners" are said to "have adopted the sales-talk that
Secretary Vargas is 'Communists' Public Enemy No. 1 in the Philippines." Moreover, the
P4,000,000.00 "intelligence and psychological warfare funds of the Department of
National Defense, and the "Peace and Amelioration Fund" — the letter says — are
"available to adequately finance a political campaign.

Among those that were under the control of the planners are the petitioners, Jimenez et al.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the publication in question is a privileged communication;

Whether it is libelous or not.

RULINGS:

First Issue: The letter was published when the congress was not in session and it was not part of the performance of duty of any
congressmen.

The provision in the constitution refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance
of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast
in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session as well as bills introduced in
Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by
Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the
official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional
Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such at the time of the
performance of the acts in question.

The said publication of the letter was not what the constitution meant. Cabangbang had the letter published to newspapers of general
circulation. It was done when the congress was not in session and it was not part of his official duty. Thus judge said, it can't be
considered privileged.

Second Issue. Is it libelous?

“The letter in question recommended: (1) that Secretary Vargas be asked to

resign; (2) that the Armed Forces be divorced absolutely from politics; (3) that the
Secretary of National Defense be a civilian, not a professional military man; (4) that no
Congressman be appointed to said oDce; (5) that Gen. Arellano be asked to resign or
retire; (6) that the present chiefs of the various intelligence agencies in the Armed
Forces, including chiefs of the NICA, NBI, and other intelligence agencies mentioned
elsewhere in the letter, be reassigned, considering that "they were handpicked by
Secretary Vargas and Gen. Arellano"; and that, "most probably, they belong to the
Vargas-Arellano clique"; (7) that all military personnel now serving civilian offices be
returned to the AFP, except those holding positions by provision of law; (8) that the
Regular Division of the AFP stationed in Laur, Nueva Ecija, be dispersed by battalion
strength to the various stand-by or training divisions throughout the country; and (9)
that Vargas and Arellano should disqualify themselves from holding or undertaking an
investigation of the planned "coup d'état".”

The letter is claimed to be false.

SC decision: the order appealed from is affirmed. Basis: Article VI, Sec 15

Pobre vs. Santiago, G.R. no. AC no. 7399

Pertinent provisions:

Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution

“…No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee
thereof.”

Facts:

After the speech delivered by respondent Santiago in the Senate, herein petitioner asks the Court for disbarment proceedings or other
disciplinary actions be initiated against respondent. He says it reflected a total disrespect by the senator towards the Chief Justice and
other members of the Supreme Court by uttering the words “Supreme Court of idiots...” in her speech.

Respondent Santiago invoked parliamentary immunity, as provided for in Article VI, Sec.11 of the Constitution, and in justifying her
remarks she said it was to “bring out in the open controversial anomalies” and she wanted to expose the supposedly “unjust act of
the JBC” for sending out public invitations for the nomination to the soon-to-be vacated position of Chief Justice. Eventually, only the
incumbent justices of the SC would qualify for the nomination which undoubtedly vexed herein respondent.

Issue:

Can herein respondent, invoking parliamentary immunity, be liable for her remarks made in her speech?

Ruling:
Although the Court wouldn’t want the issue to slide, nonetheless they dismissed the letter.

Parliamentary immunity is a safeguard in our government system to enable the legislators to use speech as freely as they must in
order for public good and never for their private indulgence. Further, any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala
fides of the statements uttered by the member of the Congress does not destroy the privilege. In view of this, the Court finds that
indeed herein respondent is within her limits and her speech is not actionable criminally or could be subject to a disciplinary
proceeding.

Still, it did not pass by the SC to reprimand the respondent invoking the Canons on Judicial ethics and jurisprudence wherein the Court
over and over again stressed the importance of keeping public trust and faith in the judiciary. The very utterances of herein respondent
was clearly vindicative in nature as it stemmed from the issue that she did not get chosen as a qualified nominee in a position of Chief
Justice. Parliamentary immunity is not an individual privilege accorded to the individual members of the Congress for their personal
benefit, but rather a privilege for the benefit of the people and the institution that represents them.

Lastly, the Court noted that none within her House had referred her actions to the Senate Ethics Committee for appropriate disciplinary
action as the rule dictates under the circumstances.

Other points of consideration:

The Court also looked into the alleged “unjust act” and found that Santiago’s remarks towards the members of the Court were surely
out of place. Except the Chief Justice as ex-officio chairperson, the individual members of the Court have no official duty to nominate
candidates for the position of Chief Justice.
C. RESTRICTIONS (Secs. 12, 13, 14, 20)

ADAZA v. PACANA
GR no. 68159 March 18, 1985
Facts:
Petitioner Adaza was elected governor of the province of Misamis Oriental in the January 30, 1980 elections. His vice-governor
Fernando Pacana Jr. , the respondent, was likewise qualified for and assumed said office on March 3, 1980. Under the law, their
respective terms of office would expire on March 3 1986.

Respondent filed his certificate of candidacy for the May 1984 Batasan Pambansa elections on March 27,1984 followed by
filing of candidacy also by the petitioner at the time of April 27, 1984. The petitioner won by placing first among the candidates and
took his oath of office as Mambabatas Pambansa on July 19, 1984.

Respondent assumed office and performed duties of governor. Claiming to be the lawful occupant of governor’s office, the
petitioner has brought this petition to exclude respondent therefrom. He argues that he was elected to said office for a term of six
years, that he remains to be the governor of the province until his term expires on March 6, 1986 as provided by law

Issue:
WON a provincial governor who was elected and had qualified as a Mambabatas Pambansa can exercise and discharge
functions of both office simultaneously

Ruling:
No, it is prohibited under Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 constitution that a member of Batasan Pambansa from holding
any office or employment in the government during his tenure is clear and unambiguous.

Ratio:
Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 constitution say that:
"Section 10. A member of the National Assembly [now Batasan Pambansa] shall not hold any other of􀀾ce or employment in the
government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, during
his tenure, except that of prime minister or member of the cabinet . . ."

A public office is a public trust. It is created for the interest and the benefit of the people. As such, a holder thereof "is subject
to such regulations and conditions as the law may impose" and "he cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate
on his holding of more than one office."

Puyat vs. De Guzman

G.R. No. L-51122, 113 SCRA 31, 25 March 2018
Melencio-Herrera, J.:

ONE SENTENCE SUMMARY:

The suit for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction is poised against the order of respondent Associate
Commissioner of the Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) granting Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez leave to intervene in
SEC Case No. 1747.

FACTS:
On May 14, 1979, Eugenio Puyat and his group were elected as directors of the International Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI).
The eleven directors were group in two, Puyat Group and Acero Group, where the former would be in control of the Board and of the
management of IPI. On May 25, 1979, the Acero Group instituted at SEC quo warranto proceedings, docketed as Case No. 1747,
questioning the May 14, 1979 election. Acero Group claimed that the stockholders’ votes were not properly counted. On May 25-31,
1979, the Puyat Group claims that at conferences of parties with respondent SEC Commissioner de Guzman, Justice Estanislao A.
Fernadez, then member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, orally entered his appearance as counsel for Acero Group to which Puyat
Group objected on Constitutional grounds. Section 11, Article VII, of the 1973 Constitution, then in force, provided that no
Assemblyman could appear as counsel before… any administrative body, and SEC was an administrative body. That being cleared,
Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his appearance for Acero. On May 31, 1979, when the SEC was called, it turned out that on
May 15, 1979, Assemblyman Fernandez had purchased from Augusto Morales ten (10) shares of stock of IPI for P200.00 upon request
of Acero to qualify him to run for election as a Director. That the Deed of Sale was notarized on May 30, 1979 and was sought to be
registered on the said date. And that on May 31, 1979, Assemblyman Fernandez filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention in the SEC
Case as the owner of ten (10) IPI shares alleging legal interest in the matter in litigation. On July 17, 1979, the SEC granted leave to
intervene on the basis of Assemblyman Fernandez’ ownership of the said ten shares. Hence, the instant petition for certiorari and
prohibition with injunction was filed. On July 3, 1979, Assemblyman Fernandez appeared as counsel for the defendant Excelsior in the
case of Reyes vs Excelsior where the Court ruled that he cannot appear as counsel in a case originally filed with the Court of First
Instance, being without appellate jurisdiction. On September 4, 1979, the Court en banc issued a Temporary Restraining Order
enjoining respondent SEC Associate Commissioner from allowing the participation as an intervenor of respondent Assemblyman
Fernandez at the proceedings of the SEC Case.

ISSUES:
1. WHETHER or NOT Assemblyman Fernandez, as a then stockholder of IPI, may intervene in the SEC Case without violating
Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution; and
2. WHETHER or NOT, in intervening the SEC Case, Assemblyman Fernandez is, in effect, appearing as counsel, albeit indirectly,
before an administrative body in contravention of the Constitutional provision.

RULINGS:
1. No, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot appear before the SEC body under the guise that he is not appearing as a counsel.
Ordinarily, by Motion for Intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as a counsel in behalf of
others but for the protection of his ownership of 10 shares of IPI. However, certain salient circumstances militate against
intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC Case. For he acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stocks, representing 10
shares out of the 262,843 outstanding shares, and that he acquired them after the contested election of Directors, after the
quo warranto suit has been filed, and one day before the scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC. And what is more,
before he moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as counsel for respondent Acero but was objected by
petitioners Also, he appeared as a counsel for defendant Excelsior, co-defendant of Acero in a case filed in Rizal Court of First
Instance. With that, the Court is constrained to find that there has been an indirect appearance as counsel before…an
administrative body and is a violation of the Constitutional provision.
2. Yes, the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in SEC No. 1747 falls within the ambit of the prohibition contained in Section
11, Article VII of the Constitution. The intervention was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings
in some other capacity. That which the Constitution directly prohibits may not be done by indirection or by a general
legislative act which is intended to accomplish the objects specifically or impliedly prohibited.

WHEREFORE, respondent Commissioner’s Order granting Assemblyman Fernandez’ leave to intervene in SEC Case No. 1747 is set
aside and reversed. The Temporary Restraining Order issued is hereby made permanent.

Dante V. Liban, Reynaldo M. Bernardo and Salvador M. Viari

vs. Richard J. Gordon
G.R. No. 175352 July 15, 2009
(Case Digest by Angie Japitan)

FACTS:
1) Dante V. Liban , Reynaldo M. Bernardo and Salvador M. Viani (petitioners), who were officers of the board of directors of Quezon
City Red Cross Chapter, filed a petition to the supreme court to declare the respondent Senator Richard J. Gordon as “having
forfeited his seat in the senate,” who was elected Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors during
his incumbency as a senator.

2) On February 23, 2006, the respondent was elected Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors. Petitioners Dante Liban , et al
alleged that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors , respondent has ceased to be an incumbent member
of the senate pursuant to Sec. 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution , which states that “ No Senator or member of the house of
 representatives may hold any other office or employment in the Gov’t , or any subdivision , agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government –owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither
shall he be appointed to any office which has been created on the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was
elected.”

3) Petitioners also cited the case of Camporedondo v NLRC GR No. 129094, decided August 06, 1999, which stated that the PNRC is
a Government owned and Controlled Corporation (GOCC), in support to their argument that respondent automatically forfeit his
seat in the senate when he accepted the position as chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors.

4) On the contrary, respondent argued that PNRC is not a government owned or controlled corporation and that the prohibition
under section 13, Article VI of the constitution does not apply in the present case since volunteer service to the PNRC is not an
office or an employment. Respondent also argued that the petitioners cannot raise a constitutional question as taxpayers for
there is no claim that they suffered some actual damage or there is an issue of illegal disbursement of public funds.

5) Petitioner’s contended that the present petition is a taxpayer’s suit for it is a question of unlawful disbursement of funds given
that the respondent has been accepting his salary and other compensation as a Senator even if he is no longer entitled to his
office. This is an issue of transcendental importance thus; the court has jurisdiction.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing on the case.
2) Whether or not PNRC is a private or government owned and controlled corporation.
3) Whether or not the office of the chairman of PNRC is a government office or an office in a government owned or controlled
corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Sec. 13, Art. VI of the Constitution.

HELD:
1) NO. The petition is an action for quo warranto (Sec. 1, Rule 66, Rules of Court – an action for the usurpation of a public office
against a public officer who does or suffers an act which constitutes a ground for forfeiture of his office). Petitioners do not claim
to be entitled to the Senate office of respondent.

2) PNRC is a private corporation.

The Philippine gov’t does not own the PNRC – does not have government assets and does not receive any appropriation from the
Congress. It is financed primarily by contributions from private individuals/entities obtained through solicitation campaigns
organized by its Board of Governors.

The gov’t does not control the PNRC - Only 6 of the 30 members of the PNRC Board of Governors are appointed by the President
of the Philippines (Sec. 6, PNRC Charter). A majority of 4/5 of the PNRC Board are elected/chosen by the private sector members
of the PNRC.

The PNRC Chairman is not appointed by the President or any subordinate gov’t official, therefore, he is not an official/employee of
the Philippine Government. Sec. 16, Art. VII of Constitution – President appoints all officials & employees in the Executive branch
whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution or by law. President also appoints those whose appointments
are not otherwise provided by law. The law may also authorize the “heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards”.

3) The office of the PNRC Chairman is a private office.

The President cannot review, reverse or modify the decisions/actions of the PNRC Board and the PNRC Chairman. Only the PNRC
Board can review, reverse or modify the decisions/actions of the PNRC Chairman.

Given that the PNRC is a private corporation, the office of the PNRC chairman is not violative of Article 6, Sec 13 of the Constitution.

Dennis Funa vs. Ermita

GR 184740

FACTS:
  October 4, 2006 – President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo appointed Maria Elena Bautista as Undersecretary of the Department
of Transportation and Communications (DOTC).
 October 23, 2006 - Bautista was designated as Undersecretary for Maritime Transport of the department under a special
order
 September 1, 2008 – Bautista was designated as OIC for the Office of the Administrator of MARINA following the resignation
of Vincente T. Suazo in concurrent capacity as DOTC Undersecretary.
 January 5, 2009 – Bautista was appointed Administrator of MARINA and she assumed her duties and responsibilities on
February 2, 2009.

Dennis Funa, in his capacity as tax payer, concerned citizen and a lawyer filed an instant petition challenging the constitutionally
of Bautista’s appointment/designation, which is proscribed by the prohibition on the President, Vice President, the Members of
the Cabinet, and their deputies and assistants to hold any other office or employment.

Funa’s Argument:

 Bautista’s concurrent positions as DOTC Usec and MARINA OIC is in violation of Sec 13, Aricle VII of the 1987 Constitution.
While it is pointed out in Civil Liberties Union that the prohibition does not apply to those positions held in ex-officio
capacities, the position of MARINA Administrator is not ex-officio to the post of DOTC Undersecretary. The fact that Bautista
was extended an appointment naming her as OIC of MARINA shows that she does not occupy it in an exx officio capacity
since an ex-officio position does not require any “further warrant or appoint”
 Even if the appointment or designation was temporary, Sec 13 of Article VII does not enumerate temporariness as one of the
exceptions to the prohibition. Temporary designation in effect circumvents the prohibition since it does not have a
maximum duration, it can go for months or years.
 There is an incompatibility between the posts of DOTC Usec and MARINA Administrator. With respect to the affairs in the
maritime industry, the recommendations of the MARINA may be the subject counter or opposing recommendations from the
Usec of Maritime Transport. Hence, the DOTC Usec for Maritime Transport and OIC of MARINA have become one and the
same person removing checks and balances in the maritime industry.

Respondent’s Argument:

 Petition is Moot and Academic since she relinquished her post as DOTC Usec for Maritime Transport when she assumed
office for MARINA Administrator during the pendency of this petition.
 There was no violation of Section 13, Article VII because Bautista was merely designated acting head of MARINA on
September 1, 2008. She was designated MARINA OIC in temporary capacity and not MARINA Administrator. Her case
thus falls under the recognized exceptions to the rule against multiple office, i.e. without additional compensation and
as required by the primary functions of the office.
 They are not incompatible offices invoking the test laid in People v. Green “The offices must subordinate, one over the
other and they must, per se, have the right to interfere, one with the other, before they are compatible at common law.”
Recommendation by MARINA Administrator concerning issues of policy and administration go to the MARINA Board and
not the Usec for Maritime Transport who is under direct supervision of DOTC Sec.

Issue: Whether or not the designation of Bautista as OIC of MARINA, concurrent with the position of DOTC Undersecretary for
Maritime Transport to which she had been appointed, violated the constitutional proscription against dual or multiple offices for
Cabinet Members and their deputies and assistants.

Ruling:

 Undersecretary Bautista’s designation as MARINA OIC falls under the stricter prohibition under Sec 13 Art VII of the 1987
Constitution:
“SEC 13. The President, Vice President, the Members of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure.
 Bautista being then the appointed Undersecretary of DOTC was covered by the stricter prohibition above and cannot
invoke the exception provided in Article IX-B, Sec 7 (2) where holding another office is allowed by law or the primary
functions of the position.

 Apart from the bare assertion that respondent did not receive any compensation when she was OIC of MARINA, they
failed to demonstrate clearly that her designation as OIC was in ex officio capacity as required by the primary functions
of her office as DOTC Usec for Maritime Transport.
 Respondent’s theory that being just a “designation” and temporary at that, Bautista was never really “appointed” as OIC
Administrator is untenable.

Appointment – selection by the authority vested with power of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given
office.

Designation - connotes the imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent official and hold the office only in a
temporary capacity.

It must be stressed that while the designation was in the nature of an acting and temporary capacity, the words “ hold
the office” were employed. Such holding of office pertains to both appointment and designation because the appointee
or designate performs the duties and functions of the office. The prohibition of dual or multiple offices, as well as
incompatible offices, refers to the holding of the office, and not to the nature of the appointment or designation.

WHEREFORE, The petition is granted. The designation of Bautista as OIC of Maritime Industry Authority in a concurrent capacity as
DOTC Usec is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Raul A. Villegas vs. Assemblyman Valentino L. Legaspi

G.R. No. L-53869

March 25, 1982

Appearance in Court by a Congressman

This case is a consolidation of two cases involving the issue of whether or not a member of Congress may appear before the
regular courts as counsel for ordinary litigants.

FACTS:
In September 1979, Raul Villegas filed a civil case against spouses Vera Cruz et al before the Court of First Instance (CFI) Cebu.
The Vera Cruz spouses filed their answer to the complaint and they were represented by Valentino Legaspi, then a member of the
Batasang Pambansa. Villegas then challenged the representation made by Legaspi as counsel for the spouses on the ground that it is
unconstitutional; as pointed out by Villegas “no member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel before any court without
appellate jurisdiction”. The presiding judge however overruled Villegas’ challenged and proceeded with the trial. The judge said that
CFIs have appellate jurisdiction.
 In July 1979, Edgardo Reyes filed a civil case against N. V. Verenigde Buinzenfabrieken Excelsior-De Maas, a corporation,
before CFI Rizal. Estanisalo Fernandez appeared as counsel for the corporation. Reyes questions the appearance of Fernandez as
counsel for the corporation on the same ground invoked in Case 1 because Fernandez is also a member of the Batasang Pambansa.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the said members, Estanislao Fernandez and Valentino Legaspi, of the Batasang Pambansa may appear as
counsels before the said CFIs.

HELD:
No. Members of Congress are prohibited to appear as counsel before CFI’s acting in their original jurisdiction. CFI’s have dual
personalities. They can be courts of general original jurisdiction (courts of origin) or appellate courts depending on the case that they
took cognizance of. In the cases at bar, CFI Cebu and CFI Rizal acted as a courts of general original jurisdiction. Both cases were not
elevated to the said CFIs from any lower courts. Thus, the CFIs in the case at bar are “courts without appellate jurisdiction”

NOTE:
Under Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution:

“No Senator or member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or
before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested
financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He
shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act
on account of his office.”

Appearance of the legislator is now barred before all courts of justice, regardless of rank, composition, or jurisdiction. The
disqualification also applies to the revived Electoral Tribunal and to all administrative bodies, like the Securities and Exchange
Commission and the National Labor Relations Commission. Courts martial and military tribunals, being administrative agencies, are
included.

[G.R. No. 127255. August 14, 1997.] JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY R. OSMEÑA, WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, AND
RONALDO B. ZAMORA , petitioners, vs. JOSE DE VENECIA, RAUL DAZA, RODOLFO ALBANO, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE
SECRETARY OF FINANCE, AND THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition challenging the validity of Republic Act No. 8240, which amends certain
provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-called sin taxes on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes.
Petitioners brought this suit against herein respondents claiming that the latter violated for this matter, petitioners assert that
violation of the House Rules is a violation of the Constitution thereof.

This is a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition challenging the validity of Republic Act No. 8240, which amends certain
provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-called "sin taxes" (actually specific taxes) on the manufacture and
sale of beer and cigarettes.

The law originated in the House of Representatives as H. No. 7198. This bill was approved on third reading on September 12,
1996 and transmitted on September 16, 1996 to the Senate which approved it with certain amendments on third reading on November
17, 1996. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of
the bill.

The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the House at 8 a.m. on November 21, 1996. At 11:48 a.m., after
a recess, Rep. Exequiel Javier, chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, proceeded to deliver his sponsorship speech, after
which he was interpellated. Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento was Brst to interpellate. He was interrupted when Rep. Arroyo moved to adjourn
for lack of quorum. Rep. Antonio Cuenco objected to the motion and asked for a head count. After a roll call, the Chair (Deputy Speaker
Raul Daza) declared the presence of a quorum. 1 Rep. Arroyo appealed the ruling of the Chair, but his motion was defeated when put
to a vote. The interpellation of the sponsor thereafter proceeded. Petitioner Rep. Joker Arroyo registered to interpellate. He was
fourth in the order, following Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento, Rep. Edcel C. Lagman and Rep. Enrique Garcia. In the course of his interpellation,
Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a question on the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he never did.
What happened thereafter is shown in the following transcript of the session on November 21, 1996 of the House of Representatives,
as published by Congress in the newspaper issues of December 5 and 6, 1996.

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and
certiBed by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been Bnally passed by the House of Representatives and
by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996.
Petitioners claim that there are actually four different versions of the transcript of this portion of Rep. Arroyo's interpellation: (1) the
transcript of audio-sound recording of the proceedings in the session hall immediately after the session adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on
November 21, 1996, which petitioner Rep. Edcel C. Lagman obtained from the operators of the sound system; (2) the transcript of the
proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996, as certified by the Chief of the Transcription Division on November
21, 1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman; (3) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996 as
certiBed by the Chief of the Transcription Division on November 28, 1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman; and (4) the published version
above quoted. According to petitioners, the four versions differ on three points, to wit: (1) in the audio-sound recording the word
"approved," which appears on line 13 in the three other versions, cannot be heard; (2) in the transcript certified on November 21,
1996 the word "no" on line 17 appears only once, while in the other versions it is repeated three times; and (3) the published version
does not contain the sentence "(Y)ou better prepare for a quorum because I will raise the question of the quorum," which appears in
the other versions.

Petitioners' allegations are vehemently denied by respondents. However, there is no need to discuss this point as petitioners
have announced that, in order to expedite the resolution of this petition, they admit, without conceding, the correctness of the
transcripts relied upon by the respondents. Petitioners agree that for purposes of this proceeding the word "approved" appears in the
transcripts.

Only the proceedings of the House of Representatives on the conference committee report on H. No. 7198 are in question.
Petitioners' principal argument is that R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House; that
these rules embody the "constitutional mandate" in Art. VI, §16(3) that "each House may determine the rules of its proceedings" and
that, consequently, violation of the House rules is a violation of the Constitution itself. They contend that the certiBcation of Speaker
De Venecia that the law was properly passed is false and spurious. More specifically, petitioners charge that (1) in violation of Rule
VIII, §35 and Rule XVII, §103 of the rules of the House, 2 the Chair, in submitting the conference committee.

Report to the House, did not call for the yeas or days, but simply asked for its approval by motion in order to prevent petitioner
Arroyo from questioning the presence of a quorum; (2) in violation of Rule XIX, §112, 3 the Chair deliberately ignored Rep. Arroyo's
question, "What is that . . . Mr. Speaker?" and did not repeat Rep. Albano's motion to approve or ratify; (3) in violation of Rule XVI,
§97, 4 the Chair refused to recognize Rep. Arroyo and instead proceeded to act on Rep. Albano's motion and afterward declared the
report approved; and (4) in violation of Rule XX, §§121-122, Rule XXI, §123, and Rule XVIII, §109, 5 the Chair suspended the session
without ruling on Rep. Arroyo's question which, it is alleged, is a point of order or a privileged motion. It is argued that Rep. Arroyo's
query should have been resolved upon the resumption of the session on November 28, 1996, because the parliamentary situation at
the time of the adjournment remained upon the resumption of the session. Petitioners also charge that the session was hastily
adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November 21, 1996 and the bill certiBed by Speaker Jose De Venecia to prevent petitioner Rep. Arroyo from
formally challenging the existence of a quorum and asking for a reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Republic Act 8240 violated Rule VIII, Section 35, Rule XVII, Section 103, Rule XIX, Section 112, Rule XVI, Section
97, Rule XX Section 121-122, Rule XXI Section 123 and Rule XVIII Section 109 of the House Rules.

DECISION:

After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground for holding that Congress committed a grave abuse of
discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240. This case is therefore dismissed.

1. It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been violated in the enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are merely
internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law, i.e. , Art. VI,
§§26-27. Petitioners do not claim that there was no quorum but only that, by some maneuver allegedly in violation of the
rules of the House, Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum.

2. Petitioners, quoting former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion's sponsorship in the Constitutional Commission, contend that
under Art. VIII, §1, "nothing involving abuse of discretion [by the other branches of the government] amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction is beyond judicial review." 19 Implicit in this statement of the former Chief Justice, however, is an
acknowledgment that the jurisdiction of this Court is subject to the case and controversy requirement of Art. VIII, §5 and,
therefore, to the requirement of a justiciable controversy before courts can adjudicate constitutional questions such as those
 which arise in the Beld of foreign relations. For while Art. VIII, §1 has broadened the scope of judicial inquiry into areas
normally left to the political departments to decide, such as those relating to national security, 20 it has not altogether done
away with political questions such as those which arise in the Beld of foreign relations. As we have already held, under Art.
VIII, §1, this Court's function is merely [to] check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the
constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing . . . [of] grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power. . . . It
has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error.

3. Petitioners claim that the passage of the law in the House was "railroaded." They claim that Rep. Arroyo was still making a
query to the Chair when the latter declared Rep. Albano's motion approved.
E. Rules and Proceedings
PIMENTEL v. SENATE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

Petitioners seek to enjoin the Senate Committee of the Whole from conducting further hearings on the complaint filed by Sen.
Madrigal against Sen. Villar pursuant to SR No. 706 on the alleged insertion of 200M for the C-5 Road Ext. Project in the 2008 GAA.
FACTS:
On 8 October 2008, Senator Madrigal introduced P.S. Resolution 706, which directed the Senate Ethics Committee to
investigate the alleged double insertion of P200 million by Senator Villar into the C5 Extension Project. After the election of Senator
Juan Ponce Enrile as Senate President, the Ethics Committee was reorganized, but the Minority failed to name its representatives to
the Committee, prompting a delay in the investigation. Thereafter, the Senate adopted the Rules of the Ethics Committee.

In another privilege speech, Senator Villar stated he will answer the accusations before the Senate, and not with the Ethics
Committee. Senator Lacson, then chairperson of the Ethics Committee, then moved that the responsibility of the Ethics Committee
be transferred to the Senate as a Committee of the Whole, which was approved by the majority. In the hearings of such Committee,
petitioners objected to the application of the Rules of the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole. They also
questioned the quorum, and proposed amendments to the Rules. Senator Pimentel raised the issue on the need to publish the rules
of the Senate Committee of the Whole.

ISSUES:

[1] Is Senator Madrigal, who filed the complaint against Senator Villar, an indispensable party in this petition?

[2] Is the petition premature for failure to observe the doctrine of primary jurisdiction or prior resort?

[3] Is the transfer of the complaint against Senator Villar from the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole violative
of Senator Villar's right to equal protection?

[4] Is the adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee as Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole violative of Senator Villar's
right to due process and of the majority quorum requirement under Art. VI, Section 16(2) of the Constitution?

[5] Is publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole required for their effectivity?
HELD:

[1] An indispensable party is a party who has an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made,
in his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest. In this case, Senator Madrigal is not an indispensable party to the petition
before the Court. While it may be true that she has an interest in the outcome of this case as the author of P.S. Resolution 706, the
issues in this case are matters of jurisdiction and procedure on the part of the Senate Committee of the Whole which can be resolved
without affecting Senator Madrigal's interest.

[2] The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not apply to this case. The issues presented here do not require the expertise, specialized
skills and knowledge of respondent for their resolution. On the contrary, the issues here are purely legal questions which are within
the competence and jurisdiction of the Court.

[3] While ordinarily an investigation about one of its members alleged irregular or unethical conduct is within the jurisdiction of
the Ethics Committee, the Minority effectively prevented it from pursuing the investigation when they refused to nominate their
members to the Ethics Committee. The referral of the investigation to the Committee of the Whole was an extraordinary remedy
undertaken by the Ethics Committee and approved by a majority of the members of the Senate, and not violative of the right to
equal protection.

[4] The adoption by the Senate Committee of the Whole of the Rules of the Ethics Committee does not violate Senator Villar's
right to due process. The Constitutional right of the Senate to promulgate its own rules of proceedings has been recognized and
affirmed by this Court in Section 16(3), Article VI of the Philippine Constitution, which states: "Each House shall determine the rules
of its proceedings."

[5] The Constitution does not require publication of the internal rules of the House or Senate. Since rules of the House or the Senate
that affect only their members are internal to the House or Senate, such rules need not be published, unless such rules expressly
provide for their publication before the rules can take effect. Hence, in this particular case, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the
Whole itself provide that the Rules must be published before the Rules can take effect. Thus, even if publication is not required under
the Constitution, publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is required because the Rules expressly mandate
their publication.

PARTIALLY GRANTED.