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Alcantara v. Alcantara, G.R. No. 167746, Aug. 28, 2007

FACTS: On 8 December 1982 he and respondent, without securing the required marriage license, went to
the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a marriage for
them. They met a person who, for a fee, arranged their wedding. They got married on the same day.
Another marriage was held in a church in Tondo. The marriage was likewise celebrated without the
parties securing a marriage license. The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite,
appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they never
went to Carmona to apply for a license with the local civil registrar of the said place. A petition for
annulment of marriage was filed by petitioner against respondent. Rosita however asserts the validity of
their marriage and maintains that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification from
the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. Restituto has a mistress with whom he has three
children. Restituto only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution for concubinage.
Rosita, in fact, has filed a case for concubinage against Restituto.

ISSUE: Whether or not their marriage is valid.

HELD: A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Art 53 of NCC. Their marriage contract
reflects a marriage license number. A certification was also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona,
Cavite. The certification is precise since it specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license
was issued. Issuance of a marriage license where none of the parties is resident, is just an irregularity.
Marriage is still valid even if the marriage license is issued in a place not the domicile of the parties.

Sevilla v. Cardenas, 497 SCRA 429

FACTS: Jaime O. Sevilla and Carmelita N. Cardenas were married at Manila City Hall where they
executed a marriage contract. A marriage license number was indicated in the contract, which Jaime
never applied for. A church ceremony was conducted on May 31, 1969 using the same license. They lived
as husband and wife and later on went to Spain for Jaime‘s medical education supported by Jaime‘s
parents. When in Spain their marriage turned bad since Jaime was having a hard time balancing marriage
and medical studies; obsession of Jaime with Carmelita‘s knees which he would take countless pictures
of, intrafemural sex between her knees which are attributed to Jaime‘s drug addiction. Their marriage
became unbearable, as plaintiff physically and verbally abused her, and this led to a break up in their
marriage. Jaime went to the US to get a divorce in 1981 and a judicial separation in 1983. Later, she
learned that plaintiff married one Angela Garcia in 1991 in the United States. Sevilla presented 3
certifications from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan which states that the marriage license with that
number cannot be found. The parish where they were wed presented a Certified copy of a Marriage
certificate dated April 11, 1994. RTC ruled that marriage is null due to lack of marriage license. CA
reversed RTC‘s decision. Marriage license was probably issued but cannot be located

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ISSUE: W/N the marriage is valid

HELD: Valid. Decision of the CA affirmed. The local civil registry of San Juan testified that they "failed
to locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is registered," for the reason that "the employee
handling is already retired." Failure to locate does not mean non-existence of the marriage license. Every
intendment of the law or fact leans toward the indissolubility of marriage bonds. Always presume
marriage.

Republic vs Dayot
Republic vs. Dayot
GR No. 175581, March 28, 2008

FACTS:

Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the Pasay City Hall on November 24, 1986. In lieu of a
marriage license, they executed a sworn affidavit that they had lived together for at least 5years. On
August 1990, Jose contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual. They were both employees of
the National Statistics and Coordinating Board. Felisa then filed on June 1993 an action for bigamy
against Jose and an administrative complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman. On the other hand,
Jose filed a complaint on July 1993 for annulment and/or declaration of nullity of marriage where he
contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham and his consent was secured through fraud.

ISSUE: Whether or not Jose’s marriage with Felisa is valid considering that they executed a sworn
affidavit in lieu of the marriage license requirement.

HELD:

CA indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they
executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. Jose and Felisa started living together only
in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage on November
1986. Findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding in the Supreme Court.

The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and invalidates a
marriage. Furthermore, “the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of
Jose and Felisa’s cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the
requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact
that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath”. Hence, Jose
and Felisa’s marriage is void ab initio. The court also ruled that an action for nullity of marriage is
imprescriptible. The right to impugn marriage does not prescribe and may be raised any time.

De Castro v. De Castro, G.R. No. 160172, February 13, 2008

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FACTS: Reinel and Annabelle met became a couple in 1991. They applied for a marriage license in
September 1994. When the couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license
had already expired. Thus, in order to push through with the wedding despite of absence of marriage
license, they executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been living together as
husband and wife for at least five years. They got married on the same day. However, they did not live
together as husband and wife. In November 1995, Annabelle gave birth to a daughter, and supported the
child on her own. Annabelle then filed a complaint for support against petitioner before the RTC Pasig. In
her complaint, respondent alleged that she is married to petitioner and that the latter has a responsibility or
obligation to financially support her as his wife and their child. Reinel denied that they are married and
claimed that the marriage is void ab initio because the affidavit they jointly executed is a fake. And that
he was only forced by Annabelle to marry her to avoid the humiliation that the pregnancy without
marriage may bring her. The trial court ruled that the marriage is not valid because it was solemnized
without a marriage license. However, it declared petitioner as the natural father of the child, and thus
obliged to give her support.

ISSUE: Whether or not their marriage is valid.

HELD: The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they could push through with the
marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage
license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab
initio.

VAN DORN vs. ROMILLO, G.R. No. L-68470 October 8,

1985
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner, VS. HON. MANUEL ROMILLO JR., as Presiding Judge of
Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD
UPTON, respondents
October 8, 1985

FACTS:
Alice Reyes, the petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Richard Upton is a citizen of the
United States. They were married in Hong Kong in 1972 and they established residence in the Philippines. They had
two children and they were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982. The petitioner remarried in Nevada to Theodore Van
Dorn. The private responded filed against petitioner stating that the petitioner’s business is a conjugal property of
the parties and that respondent is declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss
the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the
Nevada Court, where respondent acknowledged that they had no community property as of June 11, 1982.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the private respondent as petitioner’s husband is entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets?

RULING:
The petition is granted. Complaint is dismissed.
The policy against absolute divorce cover only Philippine nationals. However, aliens may obtain divorce abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines provided they are valid according to their national
law.

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From the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves marriage, the divorce in Nevada released
private respondent from the marriage between them with the petitioner. Thus, pursuant to his national law, private
respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case as petitioner’s
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is estopped by his own representation before said court
from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

FE D. QUITA, petitioner, VS. COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN,

respondents
December 22, 1998

Facts:
Fe D. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on May 18, 1941. No
children were born out of their marriage. On July 23, 1954, petitioner obtained a final judgment of
divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. On April 16, 1972, Arturo died leaving no will. On August
31, 1972, Lino Javier Inciong filed apetition with the RTC for issuance of letters of administration
concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan,
claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Dandan and the surviving children, all surnamed Padlan,
opposed the petition. The RTC expressed that the marriage between Antonio and petitioner subsisted until
the death of Arturo in 1972, that the marriage existed between private respondent and Arturo was clearly
void since it was celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner. The Court of
Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
Issues:
1. Should the case be remanded to the lower court?
2. Who between the petitioner and private respondent is the proper heir of the decedent?
Held:
If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to
the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and
decided as in ordinary cases.
No dispute exists as to the right of the six Padlan children to inherit from the decedent because there are
proofs that they have been duly acknowledged by him and petitioner herself even recognizes them
asheirs of Arturo Padlan, nor as to their respective hereditary shares.
Private respondent is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status presupposes a
legitimate relationship. Her marriage to Arturo being a bigamous marriage considered void ab inito under
Articles 80 and 83 of the Civil Code renders her not a surviving spouse.
The decision of the Court of Appeals ordering the remand of the case is affirmed.

BAYOT VS CA G.R. NO. 155635

Posted by kaye lee on 6:57 PM
G.R. No. 155635 November 7, 2008

FACTS:

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On April 20, 1979, Vicente, a Filipino, and Rebecca, an American, were married in Muntinlupa. They
had a child name Alix, born in November 27, 1982 in California.

In February 22, 1996, Rebecca initiated divorce proceedings in Dominican Republic, which was docketed
as Civil Decree No. 362/96 ordering the dissolution of the marriage. The same court also issued Civil
Decree No. 406/97 settling the couple's conjugal property in Muntinlupa in March 4, 1997.

She then filed a declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of Vicente's alleged
psychological incapacity,
docketed as Civil Case No. 01-094. She sought dissolution of the conjugal partnerships of gains with
application for support pendente lite for her and Alix. She also prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay a
permanent monthly support for their daughter Alix in the amount of P 220,000.00.

On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action and that the
petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce.

RTC denied Vicente's motion to dismiss. CA dismissed Civil Case No. 01-094 and set aside RTC's
incidental orders. According the the CA, RTC ought to have granted Vicente's motion to dismiss, since
the marriage between the spouses is already dissolved when the divorce decree was granted since
Rebecca was an American citizen when she applied for the decree.

Issue:
Whether or not the divorce decree obtained by Rebecca in Dominican Republic is valid.

Ruling:

Yes. Civil Decrees No. 362/96 and 406/97 are valid.

Rebecca at that time she applied and obtained her divorce was an American citizen and remains to be one,
being born to American parents in Guam, an American territory which follows the principle of jus soli
granting American citizenship to those who are born there. She was, and still may be, a holder of
American passport.

She had consistently professed, asserted and represented herself as an American citizen, as shown in her
marriage certificate, in Alix's birth certificate, when she secured divorce in Dominican Republic.

Being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the United States of America, a
country which allows divorce.

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The Civil Decree No. 406/97 issued by the Dominican Republic court properly adjudicated the ex-
couple's property relations.

The Court said, in order that a foreign divorce can be recognized here, the divorce decree must be proven
as a fact and as valid under the national law of the alien spouse.

The fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she secured the divorce and that divorce is
recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce
decree duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.

Thus the foreign decrees rendered and issued by the Dominican Republic court are valid, and
consequently, bind both Rebecca and Vicente.

The fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognised as a Filipino citizen by force of the June 8, 2000
affirmation by the DOJ Secretary of the October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of Recognition will not, stand
alone, work to nullify or invalidate the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an American citizen in
1996. In determining whether or not a divorce is secured abroad would come within the pale of the
country's policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a
valid divorce is obtained.

Republic vs Iyoy (G.R. No. 152577)

Posted: August 8, 2011 in Civil Law

Tags: Divorce, Marriage

Facts:

The case is a petition for review by the RP represented by the Office of the Solicitor General on certiorari
praying for thereversal of the decision of the CA dated July 30, 2001 affirming the judgment of the RTC
declaring the marriage of Crasus L. Iyoy(respondent) and Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void based on Article
36.

On December 16, 1961 Crasus Iyoy and Ada Rosal-Iyoy married each other, they had 5 children. In 1984,
Fely went to the US, inthe same year she sent letters to Crasus asking him to sign divorce papers. In 1985,
Crasus learned that Fely married an Americanand had a child. Fely went back to the Philippines on
several occasions, during one she attended the marriage of one of her children inwhich she used her
husband’s last name as hers in the invitation.

March 25, 1997, Crasus filed a complaint for declaration of nullity alleging that Fely’s acts brought
“danger and dishonor” to the family and were manifestations of her psychological incapacity. Crasus

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submitted his testimony, the certification of the recording of their marriage contract, and the invitation
where Fely used her newhusband’s last name as evidences.

Fely denied the claims and asserted that Crasus was a drunkard, womanizer, had no job, and thatsince
1988 she was already an American citizen and not covered by our laws. The RTC found the evidences
sufficient and granted thedecree; it was affirmed in the CA.

Issue:

Does abandonment and sexual infidelity per se constitute psychological incapacity?

Held:

The evidences presented by the respondent fail to establish psychological incapacity.

Furthermore, Article 36 “contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to

assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the
part of the errant spouse. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by
themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said Article.”

Finally, Article 36 “is not to be confused with a divorce law thatcuts the marital bond at the time the
causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting aparty even
before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.”

Ninal vs. Bayadog [G.R. No. 133778] March 14, 2000

by Quolete

Fact:

Pepito married his second wife Norma a year and eight months after his first wife Teodulfa’s death.
Pepito and Norma got married without any marriage license because they lived together for 5 years and
thus exempt from marriage license. Some years after, Pepito died in a car accident.

The heirs as petitioners, fearing problems in successional rights (succession only occurs after the death of
an ascendant) due to the second marriage, filed a ‘petition for declaration for nullity of marriage’ (a.k.a.
declaration of nullity of void marriages) between Pepito (deceased) and Norma using the absence of a
marriage license as a legal basis.

Issues:

The lower court dismissed the petition because:

(1) The Family Code is silent whether the petition has a ’cause of action’. Can there be such a petition
when the heirs’ parent is deceased?

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(2) Are the heirs a ‘proper party’?

(3) Determination whether the second marriage is void ab initio (from the beginning) is a must but is a
different matter. Void marriages cannot be attacked collaterally.

(4) Whether the petition for declaration for nullity of marriage has prescribed.

The lower court ruled:

(1) Petitioners should have filed an action to declare null and void their father’s marriage before the
latter’s death.

(2) The prescription period and the proper party in an annulment proceeding were used as a basis to
dismiss petitioner’s case.

Petitioners disagree with the decision and petitions for a review.

Held:

The Supreme Court ruled that:

(1) The applicable law, for the determination of marriage, is the Civil Code and not the Family Code. (In
determining the validity of marriage, it is to be tested by the law in force at the time the marriage was
contracted.)

(2) There is no second marriage. The absence of a marriage license renders marriage void ab initio. The
exemption for a marriage license, the cohabitation, was not the one described by the Civil Code. It is not
the one described by the Civil Code because the cohabitation, after the first marriage, was only twenty
months whereas the law requires five years. If the respondent took into consideration the other years and
months before the second marriage, then the cohabitation would include the period of the first marriage.
This is in violation of the law.

(3) Separation in fact (not the legal separation) by the first marriage does not count cohabitation.

“This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a
period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity – meaning no third party was involved at any time
within the 5 years and continuity – that is unbroken.”

(4) The judge’s ruling (lower court), where void and voidable marriages are made identical is
erroneous. Void and voidable marriages are not identical.

“A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is
void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken place.”

“A voidable can be generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while a void
marriage can never be ratified.”

“A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage
can be attacked collaterally.”

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“Void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be
assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and
their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.”

“The action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action
prescribes.”

“Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void
marriage.“

“Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning the properties of the
alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution, and its effect on
the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well
as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing voidable
marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the children conceived before its annulment are
legitimate.”

(5) The Supreme Court requires a judicial decree of nullity of second marriage before determining
succession rights.

“Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the
nullity of a marriage. But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial
declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second
marriage.”

“However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an
absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that
matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question
the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue
that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary
even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause “on the basis of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void” in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be
obtained only for purpose of remarriage.”

Case Digest: G.R. No. 174689. October 22, 2007

Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio, petitioner, vs. Republic of the Philippines, respondent.
_______________________________________________________________________

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Facts: Petitioner was born and registered as male. He admitted that he is a male transsexual, that is,
“anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a “female” and that he had always identified himself with
girls since childhood. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment, breast augmentation
and sex reassignment surgery. From then on, petitioner lived as female and was in fact engaged to be
married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from Rommel Jacinto to Mely,
and his sex from male to female. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner. Republic of
the Philippines thru the OSG filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. CA rendered a decision
in favor of the Republic.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to change his name and sex in his birth certificate.

Ruling: Article 376 of the Civil Code provides that no person can change his name or surname without
judicial authority which was amended by RA 9048 – Clerical Error Law which does not sanction a
change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Before a person can legally change his given
name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. In
addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. In this case, he
failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official
name. Article 412 of the Civil Code provides that no entry in the civil register shall be changed or
corrected without a judicial order. The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein,
including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. Hence, no correction is
necessary. Article 413 of the Civil Code provides that all other matters pertaining to the registration of
civil status shall be governed by special laws. However, there is no such special law in the Philippines
governing sex reassignment and its effects. Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical
record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth,
visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant.
Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex
made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error is immutable

For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the
intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for
that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his
birth certificate. The remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely
by the legislature, not by the courts. Hence, petition is denied.

Republic vs Cagandahan
Republic vs. Cagandahan

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GR. No. 166676, September 12, 2008

FACTS:

Jennifer Cagandahan was registered as a female in her Certificate of Live Birth. During her
childhood years, she suffered from clitoral hypertrophy and was later on diagnosed that her ovarian
structures had minimized. She likewise has no breast nor menstruation. Subsequently, she was
diagnosed of having Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH), a condition where those afflicted
possess secondary male characteristics because of too much secretion of male hormones,
androgen. According to her, for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has
become a male person. She filed a petition at RTC Laguna for Correction of Entries in her Birth
Certificate such that her gender or sex be changed to male and her first name be changed to Jeff.

ISSUE: WON correction of entries in her birth certificate should be granted.

HELD:

The Court considered the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as
variations which should not be subject to outright denial. SC is of the view that where the person is
biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what
the individual, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. As in this
case, respondent, thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces high levels of
male hormones, there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being a male. Sexual
development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is
at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.

Case Digest: Tañada vs. Tuvera

G.R. No. L-63915 (146 SCRA 446) April 24, 1985
Tañada vs. Tuvera

FACTS:

Petitioners sought a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause
the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general
orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders, invoking
the right to be informed on matters of public concern as recognized by the 1973 constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the publication of presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders is necessary
before its enforcement.

RULING:

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Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that “laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided ” The Court has
ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does
not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of
effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the
date when it goes into effect. Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official
Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity.

The publication of all presidential issuances “of a public nature” or “of general applicability” is mandated
by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or
otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category.
Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as
administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been
circularized to all concerned.

Publication is, therefore, mandatory.

Case Digest: Floresca vs. Philex Mining

Corporation
G.R. No. L-30642 (April 30, 1985)

Floresca vs. Philex Mining Corporation

FACTS:

Several miners, who, while working at its copper mines underground operations at Tuba, Benguet on
June 28, 1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the mine. The heirs of
the deceased claimed their benefits pursuant to the Workmen’s Compensation Act before the
Workmen’s Compensation Commission. They also petitioned before the regular courts and sue
Philex for additional damages, pointing out that the complaint alleges gross and brazen negligence on
the part of Philex in failing to take necessary security for the protection of the lives of its employees
working underground. Philex invoked that they can no longer be sued because the petitioners have
already claimed benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, which, Philex insists, holds
jurisdiction over provisions for remedies.

ISSUE:

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Whether or not the heirs of the deceased have a right of selection between availing themselves of the
worker’s right under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the
Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and exemplary) from the employers by virtue of that
negligence or fault of the employers or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both
actions.

RULING:

The court held that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act, such may not preclude them from bringing an action before the regular courtbecause
they became cognizant of the fact that Philex has been remiss in its contractual obligations with the
deceased miners only after receiving compensation under the Act. Had petitioners been aware of said
violation of government rules and regulations by Philex, and of itsnegligence, they would not have sought
redress under the Workmen’s Compensation Commission which awarded a lesser amount for
compensation. The choice of the first remedy was based on ignorance or a mistake of fact, which nullifies
the choice as it was not an intelligent choice. The case should therefore be remanded to the lower court
for further proceedings. However, should the petitioners be successful in their bid before the lower court,
the payments made under the Workmen’s Compensation Act should be deducted from the damages that
may be decreed in their favor.

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