corporations, applying for licenses and the like.
She corroborated the testimony of
GREGORY ONG CASE
RE: ALLEGATIONS MADE UNDER OATH AT THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE
HEARING HELD ON SEPTEMBER 26, 2013 AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE GREGORY S.
ONG, SANDIGANBAYAN
September 23, 2014
Per Curiam
FACTS: When the Pork Barrel Scam broke the news in 2013, incriminating evidence
surfaced implicating Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan Gregory Ong. Multiple
sworn statements and verbal testimonies of Marina Sula pointed out that Ong had
visited the office of key Pork Barrel Scam player Janet Lim Napoles. A photo published
by Rappler showed Senator Jinggoy Estrada, Napoles and Ong together in a party. Ong
explained himself in a letter to CJ Sereno, saying that the photo was taken in one of Sen.
Estrada’s birthday parties and it would have been rude of him not to pose with other
guests. He categorically stated that he did not attend any event hosted by Napoles
during or after she had a case (the Kevlar cases) in the Sandiganbayan in which she was
acquitted.
Sereno then requested the court En Banc to conduct an investigation motu proprio
under this Court's power of administrative supervision over members of the judiciary
and members of the legal profession. Ong filed a comment saying that the testimony of
Sula was merely heresay and that what Napoles told her was simply to convince the
people helping her that their cases would be fixed and may not have been true. As to
Sula’s testimony that Ong visited Napoles’ office, Ong clarified that he struck uyp a
conversation with Napoles during Senator Esrtrada’s party regarding the “miraculous
healing power of the robe or clothing of the Black Nazarene of Quiapo” and that
Napoles had a way to help Ong access the statue in order to help him with his Prostate
Cancer (they’re both devotees). Because of this, he wanted to personally thank Napoles
and that was the occasion when he went to her office and that in that time she no
longer had any pending case with the Sandiganbayan.
Upon the court finding possible transgressions to the New Code of Judicial Conduct,
they Re-docketed the case and assigned it to retired SC Justice Angelina Sandoval-
Gutierrez for investigation. She examined the statements made by Benhur Luy during
the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee investigations pointing out that because he is
Napoles’ second cousin, she divulged to him, prior to the release of the Kevlar case
decision, that her contact in the Sandiganbayan was Ong. He also testified that he kept
ledgers showing that Napoles spent a total of P100M in the Snadiganbayan when she
gave various amounts to different people during the pendency of the case and to Ong in
particular after which, she was already confident that she would be acquitted. He also
testified to a transaction between Ong and Napoles regaring P25.5M that they wanted
to put into an account so that it would accrue 13% interest and that he personally
prepared the checks used for this transaction. Justice Sandoval Gutierrez also examined
the statements made by Sula, an employee of JLN corporation in charge of formation of
Benhur Luy and reiterated her previous testimony on Napoles promisisng her that a TRO
would be iussued in thew case investigating the PDAF case. She said that every time
Napoles talked to her and the other employees, she would say that Justice Ong will help
her in the Kevlar case. Sula likewise testified that Napoles told her and the other
employees that she will fix (aayusin) the "PDAF case" in the Sandiganbayan.
In his defense, Ong denied that he ever met Napoles prior to or during the pendency of
the Kevlar case, denied that he received any money from Napoles, that the Kevlar case
was decided based on the merits, he never had any transactions with Napoles, he only
visited her office for the purpose of thanking her for that Black Nazarene thing, and that
the whistleblowers’ testimonies were conflicting and lack credibility.
Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez evaluated and concluded that the testimonies of Benhur Luy
and Marina Sula, because they were only denied and in no way challenged or refuted by
Ong via adverse testimony, were not lies. Ong did not present Napoles to rebut the
testimonies of Benhur and Sula and he failed to consider that his testimony is likewise
hearsay. He should have presented Msgr. Ramirez and Napoles as witnesses to support
his claim regarding their role which enabled him to wear the robe of the Holy Black
Nazarene. His act of visitng Napoles’ office is unquestionably disgraceful and renders
him morally unfit as a member of the Judiciary and unworthy of the privileges the law
confers on him. Dishonesty violates Canon 2 ( 1 and 2) on Integrity of the same Code
providing in part that judges must ensure that their conduct is above reproach and must
reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity of the Judiciary and further constitutes gross
misconduct in violation of Canon 4 on Propriety of the same Code. Section 1 provides
that judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.
In the end of her investigation report, Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez recommended that
Ong be found guilty of gross misconduct, dishonesty, and impropriety, all in violations of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary and be meted the penalty
of DISMISSAL from the service WITH FORFEITURE of all retirement benefits.
RULING: The SC adopts the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the
Investigating Justice which are well-supported by the evidence on record.
It is a settled rule that the findings of investigating magistrates are generally given great
weight by the Court by reason of their unmatched opportunity to see the deportment of
the witnesses as they testified. The rule which concedes due respect, and even finality,
to the assessment of credibility of witnesses by trial judges in civil and criminal cases
applies a
fortiori to administrative cases. In particular, we concur with Justice Sandoval-
Gutierrez's assessment on the credibility of Luy and Sula, and disagree with
respondent's claim that these witnesses are simply telling lies about his association with
Napoles.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a
forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, unlawful behavior, willful in character, improper or
wrong behavior; while ·"gross" has been defined as "out of all measure beyond
allowance; flagrant; shameful; such conduct as is not to be excused." Ong’s association
with Napoles during the pendency of the Kevlar case resulting in her acquittal,
constitutes gross misconduct.
In administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is
required. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable
ground to believe that respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained of,
even if such evidence might not be overwhelming or even preponderant. The
testimonies of Luy and Sula, considering that they were employees of Napoles privy to
her daily business and personal activities and that she occasionally updated them on
developments regarding the case, were able to provide substantial evidence.
Bribery is committed when a public officer agrees to perform an act in connection with
the performance of official duties in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present
received. An accusation of bribery is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. The
complainant must present a panoply of evidence in support of such an accusation.
Inasmuch as what is imputed against Ong connotes a grave misconduct, the quantum of
proof required should be more than substantial. Concededly, the evidence in this case is
insufficient to sustain the bribery and corruption charges against Ong. Notwithstanding
the absence of direct evidence of any corrupt act by the respondent, we find credible
evidence of his association with Napoles.
Ong’s act of voluntarily meeting with Napoles at her office on two occasions was grossly
improper and violated Section 1, Canon 4 (Propriety) of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct. A judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial and
that fraternizing with litigants tarnishes this appearance. The SC’s previous
pronouncements have enjoined judges to avoid association or socializing with persons
who have pending cases before their court.
Caneda v. Alaan: "A judicial office traces a line around his official as well as personal
conduct, a price one has to pay for occupying an exalted position in the judiciary,
beyond which he may not freely venture. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct enjoins a judge to avoid not just impropriety in the performance of judicial
duties but in all his activities whether in his public or private life. He must conduct
himself in a manner that gives no ground for reproach."
In this light, it does not matter that the case is no longer pending when improper acts
were committed by the judge. Because magistrates are under constant public scrutiny,
the termination of a case will not deter public criticisms for acts which may cast
suspicion on its disposition or resolution.
In her report, Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez noted that respondent's purported reason for
visiting Napoles in her office remains uncorroborated, as Napoles and the Quiapo parish
priest were not presented as witnesses despite her suggestion to respondent and his
counsel. On the other hand, Luy's testimony on what transpired in one of respondent's
meeting with Napoles at her office appears to be the more plausible and truthful
version. The Court finds that respondent, in not being truthful on crucial matters even
before the administrative complaint was filed against him motu proprio, is guilty of
Dishonesty, a violation of Canon 3 (Integrity) of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
Dishonesty is a "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of
integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and
straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray." Dishonesty, being a
grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture
of retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, and with perpetual disqualification
from reemployment in the government service.
DISPOSITIVE: Court finds Ong GUILTY of GROSS MISCONDUCT, DISHONESTY and
IMPROPRIETY, for which he is hereby
DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued
leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch, agency or
instrumentality of the government including government-owned or -controlled
corporations.
2. SISON-BARIAS VS RUBIA
Facts:
Complainant Emilie Sison-Barias is involved in three cases pending before the sala
of respondent Judge Marino Rubia.
The first case is an intestate proceeding. 1 Complainant filed a petition for letters
of administration over the intestate estate of her late husband, Ramon A. Barias.
This was opposed by her mother-in-law, Romelias Almeda-Barias.
The second case is a guardianship proceeding over Romelias Almeda-Barias.
Evelyn Tanael, the guardian appointed by the court, submitted a property inventory
report that included not only the properties of Romelias Almeda-Barias but also
properties forming part of the estate of complainant's late husband.
The third case is a civil action 5 for annulment of contracts and reconveyance of
real properties filed by Romelias Almeda-Barias, represented by Evelyn Tanael,
against complainant, among others. Complainant alleged that there was delay in
the publication of the notice in the petition for issuance of letters of administration
filed. She was then informed by her brother, Enrique "Ike" Sison, that respondent
Eileen Pecaña, the daughter of his good friend, was a data encoder in the Office
of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna. 8

Complainant, together with her two brothers, Enrique and Perlito "Jun" Sison, Jr.,
met with respondent Pecaña on February 20, 2010. During this meeting,
complainant informed respondent Pecaña of the delay in the publication of the
notice in the petition for issuance of letters of administration. She then asked
respondent Pecaña to check the status of the publication of the notice. 11
Respondent Pecaña asked for complainant's number so that she could inform her
as soon as any development takes place in the case. 12 Enrique 13 and Perlito 14
executed affidavits to corroborate these allegations.
Respondent Pecaña asked complainant to meet her again at her house in Biñan,
Laguna. Complainant went there with Enrique. 16 Respondent Pecaña then
informed complainant that she could no longer assist her since respondent Judge
Rubia had already given administration of the properties to Evelyn Tanael. 17
Complainant stated that she was not interested in the grant of administration to
Tanael because these concerned the properties of her mother-in-law, Romelias
Almeda-Barias. She was only concerned with the administration of the properties
of her late husband, to which respondent Pecaña replied, "Ah ganun ba? Iba pala
ung kaso mo." Complainant called respondent Pecaña who informed her that
respondent Judge Rubia wanted to talk to her. 21 Complainant agreed to meet
with respondent Judge Rubia over dinner, on the condition that respondent Pecaña
would be present as well.
On March 3, 2010 23 at around 7:00 p.m., complainant picked up respondent
Pecaña at 6750 Ayala Avenue in Makati City. They proceeded to Café Juanita in
The Fort, Bonifacio Global City. Respondent Pecaña said that respondent Judge
Rubia would arrive late as he would be coming from a Rotary Club meeting held
at the Mandarin Hotel.
Respondent Judge Rubia arrived at Café Juanita around 8:30 p.m. During the
dinner meeting, respondents allegedly asked complainant inappropriate questions.
Respondent Judge Rubia allegedly asked whether she was still connected with
Philippine Airlines, which she still was at that time. 25 Complainant was then
informed that respondent Judge Rubia knew of this fact through Atty. Noe Zarate,
counsel of Romelias Almeda-Barias. This disclosure surprised complainant, as
she was under the impression that opposing counsel and respondent Judge Rubia
had no business discussing matters that were not relevant to their pending cases.
27
Respondent Judge Rubia also allegedly asked her questions about her supposed
involvement with another man and other accusations made by Romelias Almeda-
Barias.
These details, according to complainant, were never discussed in the pleadings or
in the course of the trial. Thus, she inferred that respondent Judge Rubia had been
talking to the opposing counsel regarding these matters outside of the court
proceedings. The impression of complainant was that respondent Judge Rubia
was actively taking a position in favor of Atty. Zarate.
To confirm her suspicion, respondents then allegedly "told complainant to just talk
to Atty. Zarate, counsel for the oppositor, claiming that he is a nice person.
Complainant was appalled by such suggestion and replied[,] 'Why will I talk to him?
Judge di ko yata kaya gawin un.'" Complainant alleged that respondent Judge
Rubia acted in a manner that showed manifest partiality in favor of the opposing
parties, namely, Romelias Almeda-Barias and Evelyn Tanael, as represented by
their counsel, Atty. Noe Zarate. She alleged that respondent Judge Rubia failed to
require a timely filing of the pre-trial brief on the part of Evelyn Tanael and Romelias
Almeda-Barias, and despite their non-compliance on four (4) separate pre-trials
that were postponed, Tanael and Almeda-Barias were not declared in default. 44
She also alleged that respondent Judge Rubia stated that the burden to prove
ownership of the property was on complainant, when in fact it was the oppositor,
or Tanael and Almeda-Barias, who had the burden of proof to show that the land
was fraudulently transferred to her late husband. Complainant moved for
respondent Judge Rubia's inhibition. This was denied on October 6, 2010.
Complainant then filed a motion for reconsideration denied in an order 49 dated
November 15, 2010. On November 11, 2010, complainant filed a complaint
affidavit 51 before the Office of the Court Administrator charging respondent
Pecaña for gross misconduct and respondent Judge Rubia for conduct
unbecoming of a judge, partiality, gross ignorance of the law or procedure,
incompetence, and gross misconduct.
ISSUE:
Whether respondents Judge Rubia and Pecaña should be held
administratively liable.
HELD:
Yes. This court must set aside the findings of fact and reject the report of
Justice Samuel Gaerlan. Respondents Judge Rubia and Pecaña should be held
administratively liable for their actions.
Pecaña took place on March 10, 2010 on the side street of Burgos Circle in
Bonifacio Global City, after the Rotary Club of Makati, Southwest Chapter meeting
and dinner at Numa Restaurant, on their way to the parking lot. This means that
the testimony of and the evidence presented by Rodel do not disprove the
occurrence of the dinner meeting as alleged by complainant, since the meeting of
the Rotary Club and the dinner meeting alleged by complainant took place on
different dates.
Assuming that the alleged chance meeting between complainant and respondent
Judge Rubia took place on March 10, 2010 as alleged by respondents, this does
not discount the veracity of complainant's allegations. Both the Rotary Club of
Makati, Southwest Chapter dinner and the dinner meeting alleged by complainant
took place in the vicinity of Bonifacio Global City. This could have allowed
respondent Judge Rubia ample time to travel to the dinner meeting after the
meeting of the Rotary Club of Makati.
The investigation report stated that the attendance sheet and the program of
meeting that Rodel submitted corroborated his testimony. The date indicated on
the attendance sheet and on the program of meeting was March 10, 2010, not
March 3, 2010. However, there was nothing to indicate the time of arrival or
departure of the attendees. Neither was there an indication of the time when the
meeting began or ended. The attendance sheet and the program of meeting, by
themselves or taken as corroborative evidence of Rodel's testimony, do not
discount the distinct and tangible possibility that the dinner meeting as narrated by
complainant took place.
On the other hand, we find the allegation that the dinner meeting took place on
March 3, 2010 more credible.
Complainant presented a document containing a list of calls she made from
January to March 2010. 119 She identified her cellular phone number 120 as well
as respondent Pecaña's. 121 Respondent Pecaña admitted that the number
identified by complainant was her number. 122 On March 2 and 3, 2010, calls were
made to respondent Pecaña's number. 123 Respondent Pecaña admitted that she
had received a call from complainant before the latter picked her up at 6750 Makati
City. 124 However, no calls to respondent Pecaña were recorded on March 10,
2010 in the document presented. 125 On the other hand, the calls made to
respondent Pecaña as shown in the document coincided with complainant's
allegations.
The totality of these circumstances places doubt on the alibi of respondent Judge
Rubia and Rodel's narration of events. The strongest corroborative evidence to
support complainant's allegations was the exchange of text messages between
complainant and respondent Pecaña regarding the dinner meeting. These text
messages were admitted by respondent Pecaña. 128 However, Justice Gaerlan
failed to give any weight to the exchange of text messages. This fact was not
included in his investigation report.
The content of the text messages of respondent Pecaña belied respondents' claim
that the alleged dinner meeting in Burgos Circle was only a chance encounter.
AILEEN PECAÑA [sic]
Bkt xa galit kng mkpg kta ka smin widout his knowledge. I cnt fathom y wil it end
up filing an admin case. (August 8, 2010, 4:29 p.m.)
AILEEN PECAÑA [sic]
Pls Emily do something 2 pacify ur lawyer, juj rubia will definitely get mad wid us.
(August 8, 2010, 4:30 p.m.) 130 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent Pecaña used the phrase, "mkpg kta," which may be translated to
"have a meeting." "Mkpg kta" can in no way mean a chance encounter.
Further, respondent Pecaña's text messages sent to complainant belied her claim
of an innocent chance encounter. She said that respondent Judge Rubia would
get angry after complainant had informed her that her lawyer might file an
administrative case against them. Respondent Judge Rubia would not have had a
reason to get upset because of the possibility of administrative liability if an
innocent and coincidental encounter happened and not a dinner meeting.
However, if the meeting took place as alleged by complainant, this would have
logically led to a hostile reaction from respondents, particularly respondent Judge
Rubia.
There was clearly no reason for respondent Pecaña to go out of her way to greet
respondent Judge Rubia. In fact, after allegedly being repeatedly reminded that
court employees should not have any dealings with litigants, respondent Pecaña
should not have gone out to greet respondent Judge Rubia since she was dining
with a litigant.
Respondent Judge Rubia committed gross violations of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct
By meeting a litigant and advising her to talk to opposing counsel,
respondent Judge Rubia violated several canons of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct.
Respondent Judge Rubia failed to act in a manner that upholds the dignity
mandated by his office. He was already made aware of the impropriety of
respondent Pecaña's actions by virtue of her admissions in her comment. At the
time of the referral of the complaint to the Office of the Court Administrator,
respondent Judge Rubia was already the Executive Judge of Branch 24 of the
Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna. As a judge, he had the authority to
ensure that all court employees, whether or not they were under his direct
supervision, act in accordance with the esteem of their office.
Respondent Pecaña even alleged that respondent Judge Rubia made several
warnings to all court employees not to intercede in any case pending before any
court under his jurisdiction as Executive Judge. However, nothing in the record
shows that respondent Judge Rubia took action after being informed of respondent
Pecaña's interactions with a litigant, such as ascertaining her actions, conducting
an inquiry to admonish or discipline her, or at least reporting her actions to the
Office of the Court Administrator.
For this failure alone, respondent Judge Rubia should be held administratively
liable.
Furthermore, the evidence on record supports the allegations that a meeting with
complainant, a litigant with several cases pending before his sala, took place.
Respondent Judge Rubia's mere presence in the dinner meeting provides a
ground for administrative liability.
In Gandeza Jr. v. Tabin,
142
this court reminded judges:
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to avoid not only
impropriety but also the mere appearance of impropriety in all activities.
They are the intermediaries between conflicting interests and the embodiments of
the people's sense of justice. Thus, their official conduct should be beyond
reproach. 148 (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied)
This is telling of a culture of tolerance that has led to the decay of the exacting
nature of judicial propriety. Instead of being outraged by respondent Judge Rubia's
meeting an opposing party, Atty. Zarate defended respondent Judge Rubia's
actions.
Had it been true that a settlement was being brokered by respondent Judge Rubia,
it should have been done in open court with the record reflecting such an initiative.
The eight-month delay in the filing of the administrative complaint is of no
consequence. Delay in filing an administrative complaint should not be construed
as basis to question its veracity or credibility. There are considerations that a
litigant must think about before filing an administrative case against judges and
court personnel. This is more so for lawyers where the possibility of appearing
before the judge where an administrative complaint has been filed is high. Filing
an administrative case against respondents is a time-consuming ordeal, and it
would require additional time and resources that litigants would rather not expend
in the interest of preserving their rights in the suit. Complainant might have decided
to tread with caution so as not to incur the ire of Judge Rubia for fear of the reprisal
that could take place after the filing of an administrative complaint. Judges and
court personnel wield extraordinary control over court proceedings of cases filed.
Thus, litigants are always cautious in filing administrative cases against judges and
court personnel. In any case, administrative offenses, including those committed
by members of the bench and bar, are not subject to a fixed period within which
they must be reported. To stress how the law frowns upon even any appearance
of impropriety in a magistrate’s activities, it has often been held that a judge must
be like Caesar’s wife — above suspicion and beyond reproach. Respondent’s act
discloses a deficiency in prudence and discretion that a member of the Judiciary
must exercise in the performance of his official functions and of his activities as a
private individual. It is never trite to caution respondent to be prudent and
circumspect in both speech and action, keeping in mind that her conduct in and
outside the courtroom is always under constant observation. Judge Rubia clearly
failed to live up to the standards of his office. By participating in the dinner meeting
and by failing to admonish respondent Pecaña for her admitted impropriety,
respondent Judge Rubia violated Canons 1 and 2 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct.
3. BLATANT DISREGARD OF BASIC, ELEMENTARY, AND WELLKNOWN RULES OF
PROCEDURE AND LAW
ATTY. REY FERDINAND T. GARAY, Petitioner, vs.
JUDGE ROLANDO S. VENADAS, SR., Respondent. A.M. No.
RTJ-06-2000, A.M. No. RTJ-06-2000 DEL CASTILLO, J.
FACTS:
A judge owes the public and the court the duty to know the law by heart and to have
the basic rules of procedure at the palm of his hands.
This involves two consolidated cases: (1) a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals ; and (2) an Administrative Complaint against Judge Rolando S.
Venadas, Sr. (Judge Venadas, Sr.) of the RTC of Malaybalay, Bukidnon, Branch 8, for
Grave Abuse of Authority and Grave Misconduct.
Spouses Reynaldo and Hilly G. Sombilon were the previous owners of a 601-square
meter property, with two buildings constructed on it, in South Poblacion, Maramag,
Bukidnon. The said property, which they mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank as
security for their loan, was foreclosed and sold at public auction, where PNB emerged as
the winning bidder. The one-year redemption period lapsed but spouses Sombilon failed
to redeem the property.
The spouses Sombilon sought the help of Atty. Rey Ferdinand T. Garay who was once
appointed by the court as counsel de officio for Hilly Sombilon in a criminal case and
who happens to be the owner of a lot adjacent to the property. The spouses were
hoping that he would agree to advance the money and, in exchange, they promised to
sell him the 331-square meter portion of the property.
Upon learning that Atty. Garay intended to purchase the entire property for himself,
spouses Sombilon offered to buy back the property from PNB. The bank advised them to
make a 10% down payment of the bank’s total claim to formalize their offer.
PNB decided to approve the purchase offer of Atty. Garay since spouses Sombilon failed
to make the required down payment.
G.R. No. 179914
PNB filed an Ex-Parte Petition for Issuance of a Writ of Possession before the
RTC of Malaybalay City, Bukidnon presided over by Judge Venadas, Sr. which
was granted.
The spouses Sombilon moved for a reconsideration of the issuance of the Writ of
Possession arguing that Atty. Garay, who was the former counsel of Hilly, was barred
from purchasing the property pursuant to paragraph 5,32 Article 1491 of the Civil Code.
Judge Venadas, Sr. issued an Order holding in abeyance the implementation of the Writ
of Possession.
The CA found grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Venadas, Sr. in holding
in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession.
A.M. No. RTJ-06-2000
Atty. Garay filed a Verified Complaint against Judge Venadas, Sr., charging him with
Grave Abuse of Authority and Grave Misconduct. Atty. Garay claims that Judge Venadas,
Sr. should be administratively sanctioned for holding in abeyance the Writ of Possession
he earlier issued and for ignoring Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court as
he proceeded to hear the motion despite lack of notice to PNB.
In his defense, Judge Venadas, Sr. contends that he did not annul the Writ of Possession
but merely stayed its execution and implementation to prevent any injustice. He insists
there was no violation of due process because he immediately scheduled a hearing for
PNB to present its evidence.
The OCA, in its Report, found Judge Venadas, Sr. administratively liable for grave abuse
of authority bordering on gross ignorance of procedure. It found Judge Venadas, Sr.
guilty of blatantly disregarding Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court when
he acted on the defective motion filed by spouses Sombilon.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether Judge Venadas, Sr. committed grave abuse of discretion in holding
in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession; and
(2) Whether he should be administratively sanctioned for holding in abeyance
the implementation of the Writ of Possession and for disregarding Sections 4, 5, and 6,
Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
RULING:
1. YES. The issuance of a writ of possession is ministerial upon the court. Once
title is consolidated under the name of the purchaser, the issuance of the writ of
possession becomes ministerial on the part of the court; thus, no discretion is left to the
court. Questions regarding the regularity and validity of the mortgage or the foreclosure
sale may not be raised as a ground to oppose or hold in abeyance the issuance of the
writ of possession as these must be raised in a separate action for the annulment of the
mortgage or the foreclosure sale. The pendency of such action is also not a ground to
stay the issuance of a writ of possession.
In this case, the redemption period had long lapsed when PNB applied for the issuance
of the Writ of Possession. In fact, the title over the subject property had already been
consolidated in PNB’s name. Thus, it was ministerial upon Judge Venadas, Sr. to issue
the Writ of Possession in favor of PNB, the registered owner of the subject property. The
alleged invalidity of the sale is not a ground to oppose or defer the issuance of the Writ
of Possession as this does not affect PNB’ s right to possess the subject property.
WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 179914, the Petition is hereby DENIED.
2. YES. The Court agrees with the findings of the OCA. Records show that
spouses Sombilon failed to comply with the three-day notice rule and the required
proof of service embodied in Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court,
thereby rendering the motion fatally defective. Despite this, Judge Venadas, Sr. still
took cognizance of the motion filed by spouses Sombilon, depriving PNB and Atty.
Garay of their right to due process.
Blatant disregard of basic, elementary, and well-known rules of procedure and law is
gross ignorance of the law, which is classified as a serious charge under Rule 140,
Section 8 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, punishable by
either dismissal from service, suspension for more than three months but not exceeding
six months, or a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
In Administrative Matter No. RTJ-06-2000, Judge Rolando S.
Venadas, Sr. of the Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, Branch 8, is
hereby found guilty of grave abuse of authority bordering on gross ignorance of the law
and is ordered to pay a FINE of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS.
5. IPI No. 12-205-CA-J December 10, 2013
RE: VERIFIED COMPLAINT OF THOMAS S. MERDEGIA AGAINST HON.
VICENTE S.E. VELOSO, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS, RELATIVE TO CA G.R. SP No. 119461.
x---------------x
A.C. No.: 10300
RE: RESOLUTION DATED OCTOBER 8, 2013 IN OCA IPI No. 12-205-CA-
J AGAINST ATTY. HOMOBONO ADAZA II.
Facts: Atty. Adaza was the counsel for Thomas Merdegia for a case wherein
Justice Veloso was the presiding justice. Atty. Adaza asserted that both he and
his client observed Justice Veloso’s partiality during the oral arguments, but
instead of immediately filing an administrative complaint against him, he
counseled Merdegia to first file a Motion to Inhibit Justice Veloso from the case.
However, upon finding that Justice Veloso refused to inhibit himself, Merdegia
repeated his request to file an administrative complaint against Justice Veloso, to
which Atty. Adaza acceded. Thus, Atty. Adaza pleaded that he should not be
faulted for assisting his client, especially when he so believes in the merits of his
client’s case.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Adaza can be held for contempt of court.
Ruling: Yes.
The resolution dismissing the motion for inhibition should have disposed of the
issue of Justice Veloso’s bias. While we do not discount the fact that it was
Justice Veloso who penned the resolution denying the motion for inhibition, we
note that he was allowed to do this under the 2009 Internal Rules of the Court of
Appeals. Had Merdegia and Atty. Adaza doubted the legality of this
resolution, the proper remedy would have been to file a petition for
certiorari assailing the order denying the motion for inhibition. The
settled rule is that administrative complaints against justices cannot
and should not substitute for appeal and other judicial remedies
against an assailed decision or ruling.
What tipped the balance against Atty. Adaza, in this case, is the totality of the
facts of the case that, when read together with the administrative complaint he
prepared, shows that his complaint is merely an attempt to malign the
administration of justice. It has been noted that in several other occasions, Atty.
Adaza had filed several motions for inhibition against judges for merely ruling
negatively as to his clients’ causes.
To our mind, imposing a disciplinary sanction against Atty. Adaza through a
contempt proceeding violates the basic tenets of due process as a disciplinary
action is independent and separate from a proceeding for contempt. A person
charged of an offense, whether in an administrative or criminal proceeding, must
be informed of the nature of the charge against him, and given ample
opportunity to explain his side. While the two proceedings can proceed
simultaneously with each other, a contempt proceeding cannot
substitute for a disciplinary proceeding for erring lawyers, and vice
versa. Jurisprudence describes a contempt proceeding as penal and summary in
nature, while a disciplinary proceeding against an erring lawyer is sui generis in
nature; it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal. Contempt proceedings and
disciplinary actions are also governed by different procedures. Contempt of court
is governed by the procedures under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, whereas
disciplinary actions in the practice of law are governed by Rules138 and 139
thereof.
IN THESE LIGHTS, the Court finds Atty. Homobomo Adaza II GUILTY
OF INDIRECT CONTEMPT for filing a frivolous suit against Court of
Appeals Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso, and hereby sentences
him to pay, within the period of fifteen days from the promulgation of
this judgment, a fine of P5,000.00. The respondent is also WARNED
that further similar misbehavior on his part may be a ground for the
institution of disciplinary proceedings against him.

In one case, we cited a litigant in indirect contempt of court for his

predisposition to indiscriminately file administrative complaints
against members of the Judiciary. We held that this conduct degrades
the judicial office, interferes with the due performance of their work
for the Judiciary, and thus constitutes indirect contempt of court.
Applying this principle to the present case, we hold that Atty. Adaza’s
acts constitute an improper conduct that tends to degrade the
administration of justice, and is thus punishable for indirect contempt
under Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.
6. A.M. No. MTJ-13-1834 October 2, 2013
(Formerly OCA l.P.l. No. 12-2541)
JESUS D. CARBAJOSA, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE HANNIBAL R. PATRICIO, Presiding Judge, Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, President Roxas, Capiz,Respondent.
Facts: The case stemmed from a case of grave coercion by
Carbajosa against Dolores Bieles. Bieles was convicted and was
ordered to pay Carbajosa. This became final and executory.
Carbajosa thereafter filed a Motion for Execution of Judgment before
the MCTC presided by herein respondent Judge Patricio. Bieles
opposed the motion stating that she sent a letter addressed to the
Chief Justice, Honorable Reynato S. Puno asking for a review of her
case on the merits, which was favorably acted upon.
Judge Patricio resolved the conflict by holding in abeyance the
resolution of Carbajosa’s Motion for Execution of Judgment to await
the result of the referral/endorsement made by the Chief Justice
before a ruling on the propriety of the issuance of a writ of execution
was made. Carbajosa did not agree with this, and thus insisted on
the issuance of the writ of execution, but this was not headed.
These circumstances prompted Carbajosa to institute the herein
administrative complaint imputing gross ignorance of the law,
manifest partiality and evident bad faith against Judge Patricio in
continuously deferring the issuance of a writ of execution for the
final and executory judgment.
The case was brought to the OCA, where they found Judge Patricio
guilty of gross ignorance of the law and recommended that he
should be fined in the amount of P21,000.00.
Ruling: We agree with the OCA’s findings and recommendation.
Any delay in the full execution of a final and executory
decision is repugnant to the ideal administration of justice.
Hence the rule that once a judgment attains finality, it
thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. The
enforcement of such judgment should not be hampered or
evaded; for the immediate enforcement of the parties’
rights, confirmed by final judgment, is a major component of
the ideal administration of justice. Our penal laws and rules
of procedure, in particular, enjoin that when the judgment
of conviction is already final and executory its execution is
ministerial.
As correctly observed by the OCA, the Court’s Resolution affirming
the conviction of Bieles and the Entry of Judgment dated evidently
carried more legal and procedural significance and effect in the
criminal case as against the endorsement referring the letter of
Bieles to the Third Division for Agenda. The endorsement did not
result in a definite action on the part of the Court as it did not even
remotely suggest that the criminal case will be re-opened. Hence,
there was absolutely no justifiable reason for Judge Patricio to rely
on the latter and thereby thwart the basic rules on execution of
judgment.
A judge is not given the discretion whether or not to
implement the judgment. He is to effect execution without
delay and supervise implementation strictly in accordance
with the judgment. Judge Patricio’s actuations unmistakably
exhibit gross ignorance of the law.
Canon 4 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics requires that the judge
should be studious of the principles of law. Canon18 mandates that
he should administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the
system of the law itself, remembering that he is not a depository of
arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction of law. Indeed, it
has been said that when the inefficiency springs from a failure to
consider a basic and elemental rule, a law or principle in the
discharge of his duties, a judge is either too incompetent and
undeserving of the position and the title he holds or is too vicious
that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and
in grave abuse of judicial authority. While judges should not be
disciplined for inefficiency on account merely of occasional mistakes
or errors of judgments, it is highly imperative that they should be
conversant with fundamental and basic legal principles in order to
merit the confidence of the citizenry.
Under A.M. No. 01-8-1 0-SC or the Amendment to Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court Re: Discipline of Justices and Judges, gross ignorance
of the law is a serious charge, punishable by a fine of more
than P20,000.00, but not exceeding P40,000.00, suspension from
office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3)
months but not exceeding six ( 6) months, or dismissal from the
service. Based on the attendant circumstances of this case, a fine
of P21 ,000.00 is the appropriate penalty.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Judge Hannibal R.
Patricio, Presiding Judge, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, President
Roxas-Pilar, President Roxas, Capiz is hereby FOUND GUILTY of
Gross Ignorance of the Law and FINED in the amount of P21
,000.00, with a stern WARNING that a repetition of the same will be
dealt with more severely.
7. A.M. No. MTJ-11-1778 June 5, 2013
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 08-1966-MTJ)
MARICOR L. GARADO, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE LIZABETH GUTIERREZ-TORRES, Respondent.
Facts: Complainant alleges that she is the plaintiff in the aforesaid
civil case for sum of money and damages. She complaints that the
case is covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure
and only involves a claim for the payment of a loan amounting to
P50,000 plus interest and a claim for damages amounting to
P30,000, but the case has remained unresolved for more than 20
months from the time it was filed.
Timeline of Events:
1. Complaint filed against Rose Virgie Estor August 22, 2005
(private respondent)
2. Judge Torres denied motion to dismiss July 3, 2006
by Estor
3. Estor filed an Urgent Ex-parte Motion for November 16, 2006
Extension of Time followed by a second
motion to dismiss
4. Garado filed a motion to render November 27, 2006
judgment with an opposition to the second
motion to dismiss
5. The two motions were submitted for November 27, 2006 and
resolution January 15, 2007
6. Both motions remained unresolved as of May 9, 2007
the date of the filing of the administrative
complaint
7. Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) May 17, 2007
submitted the 1st Indorsement which
directed Judge Torres to file her Comment
on the complaint within ten days
8. Judge Torres received the 1st July 24, 2007
Tracer against her
9. Judge Torres failed to comply with the
directive, so OCA again required for her to
submit her Comment within 5 days from
notice.
10. Respondent judge also received the 1st August 3, 2007
Indorsement on Tracer but still failed to
comply
11. SC directed Judge Torres to show cause March 10, 2008
why she should not be held administratively
liable because of her refusal to submit her
Comment, and to file her Comment within 5
days, otherwise, an administrative case will
be filed against her.
12. Respondent judge received a copy of the April 16, 2008
Resolution
13. Because of failure to comply with the July 14, 2008
Resolution, the Court issued another
Resolution imposing a fine of P1,000
Despite receipt of the Resolution, however, Judge Torres neither
complied with the Resolution nor paid the fine.
In recommending the penalty of dismissal, the OCA noted that in
five previous administrative cases,10 respondent was found liable for
undue delay in rendering a decision, resolution or order, and sternly
warned that the commission of the same or similar offense will be
dealt with more severely. The OCA also noted eight other pending
administrative cases11 filed by different litigants against respondent
judge involving offenses of similar nature. As well, the OCA noted
the four instances under the present administrative case where
respondent judge failed to comply with directives/orders issued by
this Court.
Issue: Whether or not Judge Torres should be held administratively
liable
Ruling: We agree with the OCA that respondent judge should be
held administratively liable.
Respondent’s failure to submit her Comment and compliance as
required by the OCA and this Court is tantamount to insubordination,
inefficiency, and neglect of duty
Judges are oft-reminded of their duty to act promptly upon cases
and matters pending before their courts. Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct directs judges to "dispose of the court’s
business promptly and decide cases within the required periods."
Canons 6 and 7 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics further exhort
judges to be prompt and punctual in the disposition and resolution of
cases and matters pending before their courts:
6. PROMPTNESS
He should be prompt in disposing of all matters submitted to him,
remembering that justice delayed is often justice denied.
7. PUNCTUALITY
He should be punctual in the performance of his judicial duties,
recognizing that the time of litigants, witnesses, and attorneys is of
value and that if the judge is unpunctual in his habits, he sets a
bad example to the bar and tends to create dissatisfaction with the
administration of justice.
Accordingly, judges should be imbued with a high sense of duty and
responsibility in the discharge of their obligation to administer justice
promptly. In this case, respondent judge failed to live up to the
exacting standards of duty and responsibility that her position
required. Upon the failure of the defendant Estor to file her Answer
in Civil Case No. 20129, respondent was then required under Section
6 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure to render
judgment in Civil Case No. 20129 within 30 days. She failed to do so
contrary to the rationale behind the said Rule, which was precisely
adopted to promote a more expeditious and inexpensive
determination of cases, and to enforce the constitutional rights of
litigants to the speedy disposition of cases.
Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended, classifies
undue delay in rendering a decision and violation of Supreme Court
directives as less serious charges which are punishable with the
penalty of suspension from office without salary and other benefits
for one month to three months, or a fine of P10,000 to P20,000.
Given that respondent had been previously dismissed from the
service in Lugares v. Gutierrez-Torres, however, the penalty of
suspension is already inapplicable.
WHEREFORE, respondent Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres is found LIABLE
of the less serious charges of undue delay in resolving Civil Case No.
No. 20129 and violation or Supreme Court directives. She is FINED
the amount or P20,000 for the first offense and another P10,000 for
the second offense, both amounts to be deducted from her accrued
leave credits. To effect the penalties imposed, the Employee's Leave
Division, Office of Administrative Services-OCA, is DIRECTED to
ascertain respondent Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres's total earned leave
credits. Thereafter, the Finance Division, Fiscal Management Office-
OCA, is DIRECTED to compute the monetary value or respondent
Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres's total accrued leave credits and deduct
therefrom the amount of the fines imposed, without prejudice to
whatever penalty the Court may impose on other remaining and/or
pending administrative cases against her, if any.
8. A.M. No. RTJ-10-2217 April 8, 2013
SONIA C. DECENA and REY C. DECENA, Petitioners,
vs.
JUDGE NILO A. MALANYAON, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 32, IN PILI, CAMARINES SUR, Respondent.
Doctrine: A judge may not involve himself in any activity
that is an aspect of the private practice of law. His
acceptance of an appointment to the Bench inhibits him
from engaging in the private practice of law, regardless of
the beneficiary of the activity being a member of his
immediate family. He is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a
judge otherwise.
Facts: Complainants averred that complainant Rey C. Decena had
brought an administrative case in Regional Office No. V of the Civil
Service Commission in Legaspi City, Albay against Judge Malanyaon’s
wife, Dr. Amelita C. Malanyaon (Dr. Amelita), then the Assistant
Provincial Health Officer of the Province of Camarines Sur; that
during the hearing of the administrative case on May 4, 2006, Judge
Malanyaon sat beside his daughter, Atty. Ma. Kristina C. Malanyaon,
the counsel of Dr. Amelita in the case.
During the trial, Judge Malanyaon coached her daughter in making
motions by scribbling on a piece of paper and giving it to his
daughter. Judge Malanyaon also proudly introduced himself and
manifested that he was the "counsel of the respondent’s counsel."
When his propriety was questioned since he was a member of the
judiciary, he demanded that he be shown that prohibited him from
sitting at the lawyer’s bench. He insisted that he was merely
"assisting" her daughter, who "just passed the bar", defend the
respondent, and was likewise helping the latter defend herself.
The complainants averred that the actuations of Judge Malanyaon
during the hearing of his wife’s administrative case in the Civil
Service Commission constituted violations of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippines Judiciary.
Issue: Whether the actuations of Judge Malanyaon complained of
constituted conduct unbecoming of a judge, and if so, what would
be the proper sanction
Ruling: The following actuations of Judge Malanyaon constituted
conduct unbecoming of a judge.
First was Judge Malanyaon’s occupying a seat beside his
daughter that was reserved for the lawyers during the
hearing
Being an incumbent RTC Judge, he always represented the Judiciary,
and should have acted with greater circumspection and self-
restraint, simply because the administrative hearing was unavoidably
one in which he could not but be partisan. Simple prudence should
have counselled him to avoid any form of suspicion of his motives, or
to suppress any impression of impropriety on his part as an RTC
judge by not going to the hearing himself.
Second was Judge Malanyaon’s admission that his presence
in that hearing was to advise his daughter on what to do
and say during the hearing, to the point of coaching his
daughter.
Section 35 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court expressly prohibits
sitting judges like Judge Malanyaon from engaging in the private
practice of law or giving professional advice to clients. Section
11, Canon 4 (Propriety), of the New Code of Judicial Conduct and
Rule 5.07 of the Code of Judicial Conduct reiterate the prohibition
from engaging in the private practice of law or giving professional
advice to clients. The prohibition is based on sound reasons of public
policy, considering that the rights, duties, privileges and functions of
the office of an attorney are inherently incompatible with the high
official functions, duties, powers, discretion and privileges of a sitting
judge.
Thus, an attorney who accepts an appointment to the Bench
must accept that his right to practice law as a member of
the Philippine Bar is thereby suspended, and it shall
continue to be so suspended for the entire period of his
incumbency as a judge. The term practice of law is not
limited to the conduct of cases in court or to participation in
court proceedings, but extends to the preparation of
pleadings or papers in anticipation of a litigation, the giving
of legal advice to clients or persons needing the same, the
preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which
legal rights are secured, and the preparation of papers
incident to actions and special proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds and pronounces JUDGE NILO A.
MALANYAON, Presiding Judge of Branch 32 of the Regional Trial
Court in Pili, Camarines Sur, administratively liable for conduct
unbecoming of a Judge, and penalizes him with a fine of P40,000.00.
9. Office of the Court
Administrator v. Judge
Necessario (A.M. No.
MTJ-07-1691, April 2, 2013)
Facts:
Due to an administrative case filed on
July 6, 2007, the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) formed a judicial audit team that
investigated on irregularities in the solemnization
of
marriages in several MTCs and RTCs in
Cebu. The head of the audit team created went
undercover with another lawyer to see if the
allegations were true that there were fixers or
facilitators offering package fees to parties who
would like to apply for marriage. After their
interviews and investigation, the OCA
recommended the dismissal of the following judges
and
court employees generally for gross neglect of duty
due to the following circumstances:
Judge Necessario - solemnized marriages with
questionable documents even where one of the
contracting parties (foreigner) submitted an affidavit
instead of a certificate of legal capacity from
his embassy; and under Art. 34 (one of the contracting
parties was a minor during cohabitation)
Judge Acosta – failed to make sure that
solemnization fee has been paid and also
solemnized a
marriage under Art. 34
Judge Rosales – failed to make sure the solemnization
fee has been paid and solemnized marriage
between foreigner who only submitted an
affidavit; also solemnized a marriage without the
marriage license
Judge Tormis – solemnized marriages with
questionable documents; failed to make sure
solemnization fee has been paid; solemnized
marriage between foreigner who only submitted an
affidavit; solemnized marriage with expired marriage
license.
Helen Monggaya – violated Sec. 2, Canon 1 of
the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel –
prohibition from soliciting any gifts and for giving false
information for the purpose of perpetrating
an irregular marriage
Rhona Rodriguez – violated Sec. 2, Canon 1 by
participating in the collection of an agreed upon
additional fee to process the documents, and in one
case, received 4,000 pesos to facilitate an
irregular marriage
10. A.M. No. MTJ-11-1801 (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 11-2438
MTJ) February 27, 2013

ANONYMOUS, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE RIO C. ACHAS, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch
2, Ozamiz City, Misamis Occidental,Respondent.

Facts: An anonymous letter was sent to the court which calls on the
Court to look into the morality of respondent Judge Achas and
alleges that: (1) it is of public knowledge in the city that Judge Achas
is living scandalously with a woman who is not his wife; (2) he lives
beyond his means; (3) he is involved with illegal activities through
his connection with bad elements, the kuratongs; ( 4) he comes to
court very untidy and dirty; (5) he decides his cases unfairly in
exchange for material and monetary consideration; and (6) he is
involved with cockfighting/gambling.

The matter went to OCA, where none of the alleged complaints were
upheld due to lack of substantiation except with regards to the first
matter. It was discovered that Judge Achas found for himself a
suitable young lass whom he occasionally goes out with in public and
such a fact is not a secret around town. However, Judge Achas
denied any of the allegations against him. So, the case was docketed
as a regular Administrative case. An investigation was conducted by
Judge Dungog. Two witnesses were presented by Judge Achas, but
the anonymous complainant never appeared.

Judge Achas again denied all the charges but admitted that he was
married and only separated de facto from his legal wife for 26 years,
and that he reared game cocks for leisure and extra income, having
inherited such from his forefathers. Judge Dungog found that "it is
not commendable, proper or moral per Canons of Judicial Ethics to
be perceived as going out with a woman not his wife," and for him
to be involved in rearing game cocks.
In its Memorandum, dated December 17, 2012, the OCA
recommended that Judge Achas be reprimanded as to the charge of
immorality. It was further recommended that he be ordered to
refrain from going to cockpits or avoid such places altogether, with a
warning that the same or similar complaint in the future shall be
dealt with more severely. The other charges were recommended to
be dismissed for lack of merit.
Issue: Whether or not a judge may be complained of anonymously
Ruling: Yes.
Under Section 1 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, anonymous
complaints may be filed against judges, but they must be supported
by public records of indubitable integrity. Courts have acted in such
instances needing no corroboration by evidence to be offered by the
complainant. Thus, for anonymous complaints, the burden of proof
in administrative proceedings which usually rests with the
complainant, must be buttressed by indubitable public records and
by what is sufficiently proven during the investigation. If the burden
of proof is not overcome, the respondent is under no obligation to
prove his defense.
In the present case, no evidence was attached to the letter-
complaint. The complainant never appeared, and no public records
were brought forth during the investigation. However, the court
ruled on only the first and the fifth allegations.
The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
pertinently provides:
CANON 2
INTEGRITY
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial
office but also to the personal demeanor of judges.
SEC. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above
reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a
reasonable observer.
SEC. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the
people’s faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not
merely be done but must also be seen to be done.
CANON 4
PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the
performance of all the activities of a judge.
SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all of their activities.
SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept
personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the
ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular,
judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the
dignity of the judicial office.
Notwithstanding Judge Acha’s admission that he had been legally
separated with his wife, the fact remains that he is still legally
married. The Court, therefore, agrees with Judge Dungog in finding
that it is not commendable, proper or moral for a judge to be
perceived as going out with a woman not his wife. Such is a blemish
to his integrity and propriety, as well as to that of the Judiciary. For
going out in public with a woman not his wife, Judge Achas has
clearly failed to abide by the above-cited Canons of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for Philippine Judiciary.
No position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness
from its occupant than does the judicial office. Judges in particular
must be individuals of competence, honesty and probity, charged as
they are with safeguarding the integrity of the court and its
proceedings. He should behave at all times so as to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, and avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all his activities.
His personal behaviour outside the court, and not only while in the
performance of his official duties, must be beyond reproach, for he is
perceived to be the personification of law and justice. Thus, any
demeaning act of a judge degrades the institution he represents.
Under Section 10 in relation to Section 11 C (1) of Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court, as amended, "unbecoming conduct" is classified as a
light charge, punishable by any of the following sanctions: (1) a fine
of not less than Pl,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00; and/or (2)
censure; (3) reprimand; ( 4) admonition with warning. The Court,
thus, finds that the penalty of a fine in the amount of P5,000.00 and
reprimand are proper under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, for violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct,
respondent Judge Rio Concepcion Achas is
REPRlMANDED and FINED in the amount of FIVE THOUSAND
PESOS (P5,000.00), ADMONISHED not to socially mingle with
cockfighting enthusiasts and bettors, and STERNLY WARNED that
a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely.
In re Gregory Ong, A.M. No. SB-14-21-J, Sept. 23, 2014;
Barias v. Rubia, A.M. No. RTJ-14-2388, Jun. 10, 2014)
3. Impartiality
(Bernas v. Reyes, A.M. MTJ-09-1728, Jul. 21, 2010;
Jorda v. Bitas, A.M. RTJ-14-2376, Mar. 4, 2014;
Lopez v. Lucmayon, A.M. No. MTJ-13-1837, Sept. 24, 2014;
Tormis v. Paredes, A.M. No. RTJ-13-2366, Feb. 4, 2015;
Pangandag v. Abinal, A.M. No. MTJ-16-1877, June 13, 2016)
4. Propriety
(Lorenzana v. Austria, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200, Apr. 2, 2014;
Arevalo v. Mantua, A.M. RTJ-13-2760, Nov. 19, 2014)

5. Equality
Judicial Ethics (New Code of Judicial Conduct)
6. Competence and Diligence
(Oca v. Necessario, A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691, Apr. 2, 2013;
IX. New Code of Judicial Conduct
Garado v. Torres, A.M. No. MTJ-11-1778, June 5, 2013;
A. Bangalore Draft
Carbajosa v. Patricio, A.M. No. MTJ-13-1834, Oct. 20, 2013;
B. Applicability of the Canons of Judicial Ethics and the Code of
Junio v. Beltran, A.M. RTJ-14-2367, Jan. 14, 2014;
Judicial Conduct
Tupal v. Rojo, A.M. MTJ-14-1842, Feb. 24, 2014;
C. Qualities of an Ideal Judge
Marcelo v. Pichay, A.M. MTJ-13-1838, Mar. 12, 2014;
1. Independence
Garay v. Venadas, A.M. No. RTJ-06-2000, June 16, 2014;
(Decena v. Malanyaon, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1669, Apr. 8, 2013;
Uy v. Flores, A.M. RTJ-12-2332, June 25, 2014;
Ongcuangco v. Pinlac, A.M. No. RTJ-14-2402, Apr. 15, 2015)
Andres v. Nambi, A.C. No. 7158, Mar. 9, 2015
; Complaint by Parreno against Justices Leagogo, Ybanez,
Lazaro-Javier, OCA IPI 14-220-CA-J, Mar. 17, 2015;
2. Integrity
Bandoy v. Jacinto, A.M. No. RTJ-14-2399, Nov. 19, 2015;
(Anonymous v. Achas, A.M. No. MTJ-11-1801, Feb. 27, 2013;
Balanay v. White, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2443, Jan. 11, 2016)

X. Discipline of Members of the Judiciary

A. Supreme Court
(In the matter of the charges of Plagiarism against J. Del
Castillo, A.M. No. 10-7-17—SC, Feb. 8, 2011)

B. Lower Court Judges and Justices of the CA, SB and CTA

(Office of the Court Administrator v. Amor, A.M. RTJ-08-2440,
Oct. 7, 2014; Campos v. Campos, A.C. 8644, Jun. 20, 2014;
OCA v. Tormis, Resolution 5, A.C. No. 9920, Aug. 30, 2016)

C. Disqualification of Justices and Judges (Rule 13