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PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS V. NLRC (G.R. NO.

166421)

Facts:
Journal Employees Union (JEU) filed a notice of strike before the NCMB claiming that
petitioner Philippine Journalists Inc (PJI) was guilty of unfair labor practice and that its
planned retrenchment program was illegal. The DOLE Secretary then certified the labor
dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. NLRC declared that the complainants
were illegally dismissed and that there was no basis for petitioner’s implementation of
the retrenchment program as the circumstances belied that PJI incurred losses.
Thereafter, the parties executed a Compromise Agreement where PJI undertook to
reinstate the illegally dismissed employees. NLRC then issued a resolution deeming the
labor dispute already closed and terminated.
In the meantime however, the Union filed another notice of strike claiming that 29
employees were illegally dismissed and that the salaries and benefits of 50 others had
been illegally reduced. The NLRC ruled that the complainants were not illegally
dismissed because the resolution declaring the retrenchment program illegal did not
attain finality as it had been mooted by the compromise agreement entered into by the
parties. The appellate court however, held that the compromise agreement referred only
to the award given by the NLRC to the complainants in the case.
Issue:
Whether the compromise agreement entered into by the parties mooted the NLRC
resolution finding that the union members had been illegally dismissed.
Ruling: NO.
Contrary to the allegation of petitioners, the execution and subsequent approval by the
NLRC of the agreement forged between it and the respondent Union did not render the
NLRC resolution ineffectual, nor rendered it “moot and academic.” The agreement
becomes part of the judgment of the court or tribunal, and as a logical consequence, there
is an implicit waiver of the right to appeal. In any event, the compromise agreement
cannot bind a party who did not voluntarily take part in the settlement itself and gave
specific individual consent. It must be remembered that a compromise agreement is also
a contract; it requires the consent of the parties, and it is only then that the agreement
may be considered as voluntarily entered into.
A careful perusal of the wordings of the compromise agreement will show that the
parties agreed that the only issue to be resolved was the question of the monetary claim
of several employees. The agreement was later approved by the NLRC. The case was
considered closed and terminated and the Resolution fully implemented insofar as the
employees “mentioned in paragraphs 2c and 2d of the compromise agreement” were
concerned. Hence, the CA was correct in holding that the compromise agreement
pertained only to the “monetary obligation” of the employer to the dismissed
employees, and in no way affected the Resolution where the NLRC made the
pronouncement that there was no basis for the implementation of petitioners’
retrenchment program.
G.R. No. 194560 June 11, 2014
NESTOR T. GADRINAB, Petitioner,
vs.
NORAT. SALAMANCA, ANTONIO TALAO AND ELENA LOPEZ, Respondents.
DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

The issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Regional
Trial Court’s decision allowing the physical partition of the property despite finality of
a previous judgment on compromise agreement involving the division of the same
property.

The petition is meritorious.

The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Regional Trial Court’s decision allowing the
physical partition of the property

Respondent Salamanca filed two actions for physical partition. The two parties settled
the first action through a judicial compromise agreement. The same respondent filed the
second action after she had determined that her co-heirs were not being cooperative in
complying with the compromise agreement.
In a compromise agreement, the parties freely enter into stipulations. "[A] judgment
based on a compromise agreement is a judgment on the merits"52 of the case. It has the
effect of res judicata. These principles are impressed both in our law and jurisprudence.
Thus, Article 2037 of the Civil Code provides:
Article 2037. A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata;
but there shall be no execution except in compliance with a judicial compromise.
In Spouses Romero v. Tan,53 this court said:
It is well settled that a judicial compromise has the effect of res judicata and is
immediately executory and not appealable unless set aside [by mistake, fraud, violence,
intimidation, undue influence, or falsity of documents that vitiated the compromise
agreement].54
There is res judicata when the following concur:
1. Previous final judgment;
2. By a court having jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter;
3. On the merits of the case;
4. Between identical parties, on the same subject matter, and cause of action55

There are two rules that embody the principle of res judicata. The first rule refers to "bar
by prior judgment,"56 which means that actions on the same claim or cause of action
cannot be relitigated.57 This rule is embodied in Rule 39, Section 47, paragraph (b) of the
Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. — The effect of a judgment or final order
rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment
or final order, may be as follows:
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly
adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto,
conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the
commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and
under the same title and in the same capacity[.]
The second rule refers to "conclusiveness of judgment."58 This means that facts already
tried and determined in another action involving a different claim or cause of action
cannot anymore be relitigated.59 This rule is embodied in Rule 39, Section 47, paragraph
(c) of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. — The effect of a judgment or final order
rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment
or final order, may be as follows:
....
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that
only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which
appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily
included therein or necessary thereto. (49a)
This case involves "bar by prior judgment." Respondents cannot file another action for
partition after final judgment on compromise had already been rendered in a previous
action for partition involving the same parties and property.
This court explained in FGU Insurance Corporation v. Regional Trial Court60 the
doctrine of finality of judgment:
Under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment, a decision that
has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be
modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by
the Highest Court of the land. Any act which violates this principle must immediately
be struck down.61
This doctrine admits a few exceptions, usually applied to serve substantial justice:
1. "The correction of clerical errors;
2. the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party;
3. void judgments; and
4. whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its
execution unjust and inequitable."62

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