RULING
PEÑAFRANCIA SHIPPING CORPORATION, et al. v. 168 SHIPPING
LINES, INC.,
G. R. NO. 188952, 21 September 2016, THIRD DIVISION
(Jardeleza, J.)
DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:
“The underlying principle of the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies rests on the presumption that the
administrative agency, if afforded a complete chance to pass upon the
matter, will decide the same correctly.”
FACTS
On September 28, 2007, respondent 168 Shipping Lines, Inc.
filed with the MARINA Regional Office V (MARINA RO V), Legaspi City
an application for the issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience
(CPC) to operate M/V Star Ferry I, a roll-on-roll-off vessel, in the route
Matnog, Sorsogon to Allen, Northern Samar, and vice versa. Petitioners
Peñafrancia Shipping Corporation and Santa Clara Shipping
Corporation existing operators who own and operate ferry boats serving
the ports of Allen, Northern Samar and Matnog, Sorsogon, intervened
in the proceeding and opposed the application.
The MARINA RO V, in its Decision dated February 1, 2008,
denied due course to respondent's application. Respondent filed its
Motion for Reconsideration but this was denied.
Marina Board reversed the decision of MARINA RO V and
granted respondent’s application for issuance of a CPC.
Petitioners appealed to the CA via Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
However, the CA dismissed the petition for failure of the petitioners to
exhaust administrative remedies, hence, for lack of cause of action.
Petitioners' failure to resort to the DOTC Secretary and then the Office
of the President, in case of an adverse decision, and the filing of the
herein petition before this Court is a premature invocation of the Court's
intervention which renders the instant petition without cause of action,
hence, dismissible.
ISSUE
Is a Rule 43 appeal to the Court of Appeals the proper remedy
in assailing the resolution of MARINA?
No. The order, ruling decision or resolution of the MARINA
Administrator shall be final and executory within fifteen (15) days
unless an administrative appeal is filed with the MARINA Board or
petition for judicial review is filed with the Court of Appeals or Supreme
Court in accordance with the provisions of the Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioners claim that this provision of the IRR shows that "the
appropriate remedy against the adverse ruling of the MARINA Board is
a petition for review to the Honorable Court of Appeals under Rule 43
of the Rules of Court." However, as correctly pointed out by the
respondent the IRR applies only to an appeal of the order, ruling,
decision or resolution of the MARINA Administrator. There is no
procedure for appeal of the decisions of the MARINA Board. Hence,
the IRR cannot be the basis for petitioners' appeal. Rule 43 governs all
appeals from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or
authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of quasi-judicial
functions. The MARINA is a quasi-judicial agency, and though it is not
among the enumerated agencies in Rule 43, the list is not meant to be
exclusive.
However, while Rule 43 provides for the appeal procedure from
quasi-judicial agencies to the CA, the aggrieved party must still exhaust
administrative remedies prior to recourse to the CA. The doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies empowers the OP to review any
determination or disposition of a department head. The doctrine allows,
indeed requires, an administrative decision to first be appealed to the
administrative superiors up to the highest level before it may be
elevated to a court of justice for review. The underlying principle of the
rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies rests on the presumption
that the administrative agency, if afforded a complete chance to pass
upon the matter, will decide the same correctly. The administrative
process is intended to provide less expensive and more speedy
solutions to disputes. Where the enabling statute indicates a procedure
for administrative review and provides a system of administrative
appeal or reconsideration, the courts—for reasons of law, comity, and
convenience—will not entertain a case unless the available
administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate
authorities have been given an opportunity to act and correct the errors
committed in the administrative forum. While the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies is flexible and may be disregarded in certain
instances, the Supreme Courts finds that the case does not fall under
any of the recognized exceptional circumstances.
Chua Huat vs CA
FACTS:
Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc. requested Manila City Engineer and Building
Official Manuel del Rosario to condemn the dilapidated structures
located in Paco, Manila, all occupied by petitioners. The said official
issued notices of condemnation to petitioners based on Inspection
Reports showing that the buildings suffered from structural
deterioration of as much as 80%. The condemnation orders stated that
the subject buildings were found to be in dangerous condition and
therefore condemned, subject to the confirmation of the Mayor as
required by Section 276 of the Compilation of Ordinances of the City of
Manila. It was stated that the notice was not an order to demolish as
the findings of the City Engineer are still subject to the approval of the
Mayor. The Mayor confirmed the condemnation orders.
More than 3 months after the issuance of the condemnation order,
petitioners protested against the notices of condemnation on the
ground that the buildings are still in good physical condition and are
structurally sound.
Later, the City Engineer issued a demolition order. The petitioners filed
a Petition for Prohibition, with PI or TRO against the City Mayor, City
Engineer, Building Officer and Manuel Uy and Sons Inc.
The Court issued the TRO and required respondents to comment.
Respondents prayed that the petition be dismissed claiming that: (1)
the power to condemn buildings and structures in the City of Manila
falls within the exclusive domain of the City Engineer pursuant to
Sections 275 and 276 of its Compilation of Ordinances (also Revised
Ordinances 1600); and (2) the power to condemn and remove buildings
and structures is an exercise of the police power granted the City of
Manila to promote public safety.
ISSUE:
(1) WON the power to condemn buildings and structures in the City of
Manila falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the City Engineer, who is
at the same time the Building Official;
(2) WON the City Mayor and City Engineer committed grave abuse of
discretion in the exercise of such powers.
HELD:
(1) YES. The power to condemn buildings and structures in the City of
Manila falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the City Engineer, who is
at the same time the Building Officials. The Compilation of Ordinances
of the City of Manila and the National Building Code, also provide the
authority of the Building Officials, with respect to dangerous
buildings. Respondent City Engineer and Building Official can,
therefore, validly issue the questioned condemnation and demolition
orders. This is also true with the Mayor who can approve or deny
the condemnation orders as provided in Section 276 of
the Compilation of Ordinances of the City of Manila.
(2) NO. The orders were made only after thorough ocular
inspections were conducted by the City's Building Inspectors. The
results of the inspections were set forth in a memorandum dated 16
November 1982 where it was shown that all the buildings had
architectural, structural, sanitary, plumbing and electrical defects of up
to 80%. The respondent Mayor's act of approving
the condemnation orders was likewise done in accordance with law.
Petitioners were given the opportunity to protest the condemnation but
only did so long after the lapse of the period (7 days) allowed them
under Section 276 of the Compilation of Ordinances of the City of
Manila.
It is a settled doctrine that there is grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction "when there is a capricious and whimsical exercise
of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, such as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross so as
to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law." (Chua Huat
vs. CA, G.R. No. L-53851, July 9, 1991)