The role of the military in Turkish politics.

“How can the role of the military in Turkish politics be explained and analysed, before and after
the latest reforms aiming on strengthening the civilian politicians vis à vis the military in line with
Turkey’s attempt to fulfil EU’s political criteria?”

By Bertil Videt Knudsen

Copenhagen University
Department of Political Science
Instructor: Jesper Møller Sørensen
January 2005
Bertil Videt The role of the military in Turkish politics

Table of contents

1. Introduction - What duty?.................................................................... 3

2. Methodology and use of theory ............................................................ 4

3. The shaping of the military’s role in Turkish politics........................ 6

3.2 The 1960-coup and the permanent injuring of civilian rule ......................... 7

3.3 The 1971 coup by memorandum...................................................................... 8

3.4 The 1980 Military Coup d’état......................................................................... 8

3.5 The 1997 post-modern coup – a new era?....................................................... 9

4. Turkey’s reforms and EU-aspirations............................................... 11

4.1 The 7th reform package and subsequent reforms ......................................... 12

4.2 EU-reactions..................................................................................................... 13

4.3 Reactions from the military............................................................................ 14

4.4 Theorizing the military’s actual role in Turkish politics............................. 15

5. Conclusions .......................................................................................... 16

6. References: ........................................................................................... 19

2
Bertil Videt The role of the military in Turkish politics

1. Introduction - What duty?

“Ordu göreve!” - “Military, do you duty!” said banners at a huge demonstration in Ankara in October
2003, protesting against the Turkish governments attempt to reform the higher education, which were
criticised for limiting non-religious state control over education (see image on front page).

The presence of such a banner at a demonstration dealing with educational policy raises immediately the
question: What is the duty of the military and what role does it play in Turkish politics? This is the basic
question that I will seek to shed light on in this paper, and from which I will develop the research question,
to be presented at the end of the introduction.

Without further investigation it is obvious that for the pro-secular demonstrators in Ankara, the duty of the
military is not the one prescribed by the liberal-democratic model of civil-military control: “The military is
now differentiated from the civil power, but subordinated to it, highly professionalized and depoliticised.”1

Short time before the demonstration the head of land forces, General Aytac Yalman, met with 8 university
rectors. A meeting that is interpreted as a public warning to the government over its plans.2 This meeting
also suggests that General Yalman does not see his role as being subordinated to the civil power.

Since the foundation of the modern secular Turkish republic in 1923 by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the
Turkish army have seen itself as the guardians of the Kemalism, the official state ideology, even though
Atatürk separated the military from politics.3 According to the Turkish General Staff the principles of
Atatürk – also called the “six arrows” are republicanism, secularism, nationalism, populism, etatism and
revolutionism.4 In concrete terms, the military has mainly felt obliged to intervene in politics when they
felt a threat to the nationalism and the territorial integrity from Turkey’s Kurdish minority, and when they
have felt a threat to the secularism from political Islamists. The role of the military has been visibly
underlined by three coup d’états in 1960, 1971 and 1980 and by what has been labelled a post-modern
coup, where Prime Minister Erbakan, from the pro-Islamist refah (welfare) party stepped down under
mounting pressure from the military in 1997.5

1
Hale, William: Turkish Politics and the Military, Routledge, London, 1994, p. 308.
2
Dorian Jones: Army Enters Into Row With Rectors, The Times Higher Education Supplement, October 10, 2003
3
Momayezi, Nasser: “Civil-military relations in Turkey”, International Journal on World Peace. New York: Sep 1998.
Vol. 15, Iss. 3., p. 3.
4
Atatürks Principles according to TSK: http://www.tsk.mil.tr/anitkabir/anitkabir_eng/ilkeler.html
5
Momayezi 1998, pp. 19-22.

3
Bertil Videt The role of the military in Turkish politics

Ironically, the military, which traditionally have been an important force in Turkey’s ongoing
Westernization, has also posed an obstacle to Turkey’s desire to become a member of the European Union
(EU). As the above-mentioned examples indicate, the military plays a role in Turkish politics, which
clearly differs from the role in Western liberal democracies. The current Turkish government has taken
some important steps in order to reduce the role of the military in politics, especially with the 7th reform
package passed late July 2003, with the aim of fulfilling EU’s political criteria (Copenhagen criteria) and
thereby open accession talks. According to an editorial in the Financial Times the reforms passed with the
7th reform package constitutes nothing less than a ‘quiet revolution’.6 The response from the EU has
equally been positive. The European Commission’s 2003 Regular Report on Turkey’s progress towards
accession says: “Some of the reforms carry great political significance as they impinge upon sensitive
issues in the Turkish context, such as freedom of expression, freedom of demonstration, cultural rights and
civilian control of the military,” 7 even though it only pays minor attention to the issue about the military’s
role in politics.

The aim of this paper is to analyze the 7th reform package, the EU’s reactions on it, current role of the
military in Turkish politics and the possibilities for a military withdrawal from civil politics. I will look
upon the three ordinary coup d’états in 1960, 1971 and 1980 and the post-modern coup of 1997. My aim is
not to explain these previous coups in detail and the short-term consequences of these, but rather to explain
the present situation, and explain how it has been shaped by these coups. This leads me to my research
questions, extending the questions raised in the very beginning:

How can the role of the military in Turkish politics be explained and analysed, before and after the
latest reforms aiming on strengthening the civilian politicians vis à vis the military in line with Turkey’s
attempt to fulfil EU’s political criteria?

2. Methodology and use of theory

The body of theory that I will use in order to analyse and explain the evolution of the army’s role in
Turkish politics will be based on Hales typologies of civil-military relations and typologies of military
regimes, developed to fit an analysis of the Turkish case8. This set of typology characterizing different
types of civil-military relationships is developed by Nordlinger and Jannowitz and thus abbreviated and
combined by Hale in three typologies, that I have summarized in table 2.1

6
Financial Times (editorial): A quiet revolution: Less power for Turkey's army is a triumph for the EU, July 31, 2003.
7
European Commission: 2003 Regular Report on Turkey’s progress towards accession, November 5, 2003. Quotation
from p. 132.
8
Hale 1994, p. 308.

4
Bertil Videt The role of the military in Turkish politics

Model Characteristics Empirical examples

Traditional- Civil and military powers shared by aristocratic class. Cannot be applied in modern
aristocratic states.

Liberal- Military is highly depoliticised, differentiated from Pluralist democracies (mainly

democratic and subordinated to civil power. Soldiers imbued with Western Europe and North
‘civilian ethic’ and accept civilian control, even over America
the armed forces’ budget and internal structure.
Totalitarian- Military officers imbued with ideas of ruling party, Communist regimes of the
penetration and political conformity is rewarded. Political officers Soviet Union and China
are frequently attached to regiments in order to secure
direct control. Secret police or paramilitary forces
commanded by the ruling party often counterbalance
regular military forces.
Table 2.1 Typologies of civil-military relationship (according to Hale).

The three above listed models of civil-military relationship do all describe regimes, where the military is
subordinated to the civil authority and does not exercise political power itself. These models can thereby
not constitute any help in understanding and explaining military regimes. For this purpose Hale presents,
on the basis of the work of Nordlinger, Clapham and Philip, three models of military regimes, which are
relevant to the Turkish case. These are, here in a summarized and simplified version9:

1. The moderator or veto regimes where the state still is directed by civilian politicians, but the armed
forces exercise veto power, without taking over power itself. The military can restrict or direct the
decisions by the civilian governments in many ways. Generally the moderator regimes are
conservative, and may carry out ‘displacement coups’, where another one more acceptable to the
military replaces the civilian government.
2. The guardian regimes where the military exercise a higher degree of penetration and control. A
fundamental characteristic of the guardian regime is that the military take over direct political
power without intending to exercise it indefinitely, and they proclaim their duty is to ‘sort out the
mess’ the civilian politicians created, and return the power to the civilians after having created
conditions which will not lead to a new need for a military intervention. Hale underlines that the
guardian regimes, like all military regimes, are authoritarian and limit civil rights,

9
Hale 1994, pp. 309-310.

5
Bertil Videt The role of the military in Turkish politics

3. The ruler regimes which exercise a far greater political control, and for a far longer period, than
the previous three models. The military leaders of a ruler regime aim to effect long-term changes
in the distribution of political power by overthrowing existing political institutions.

It must be underlined that the three models of civilian-military relationships and the three models of
military regimes all are to be perceived as ideal types in a Weberian meaning. Hereby I mean that
empirical analyses of civilian-military relationships and of military regimes often will tend to display
characteristics from more than one of the models, rather than exactly fit into one of the models.

3. The shaping of the military’s role in Turkish politics

The military has always occupied a special place in the Turkish society, which can be traced back to its
decisive role in the very foundation of the Turkish republic and the showdown with the previous Ottoman
Empire. According to Ahmed Feroz the military’s involvement in Turkish politics is partially rationalised
in the context of Ottoman-Turkish history10. He argues for a continuity in the dominant role of the army
from Ottoman times to the present: “… the army was an institution which never changed its world view,
that it stood above society and acted independently of it.”11 In consonance with this argument Ali
Karaosmanoğlu argues that “Turkey has historically displayed a relatively consistent security culture of
realpolitik which has evolved across the centuries from a dominant offensive character into a dominant
defensive one.”12

Atatürk was himself a child of the Ottoman army. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century the
ruling sultans carried through a range of reforms in order to modernise the state and to modernise the
army. One of the means was the establishment of military schools and academies based on Western
models. From these institutions grew a new generation of reformist and politicised officers, who later
attempted to overthrow the sultan Abdülahmid II. The officers set up the secret society, the Committee of
Union and Progress (CUP), in 1889. In this committee Atatürk played a decisive role alongside with his
co-officers Enver Pasha and Jemal Pasha. In 1908 the CUP conducted a rebellion against Abdülahmid,
who was forced to restore the constitution he previously had shelved. According to Feroz “This was the
beginning of the Young Turk revolution which continued for the next ten years, ending with the defeat of
the Ottoman Empire in the First World War.”13

10
Ahmad, Feroz: The Making of Modern Turkey, Routledge, London, 1993; pp.2ff.
11
Ibid. p. 3.
12
Karaosmanoglu, Ali: The evolution of the national security culture and the military in Turkey, Journal of International
Affairs. New York: Fall 2000. Vol. 54, Iss. 1; p. 200.
13
Ahmad, p. 2.

6
Bertil Videt The role of the military in Turkish politics

The army played an extremely critical role in defeating the Sultanate and establishing the Turkish
Republic. Even though Atatürk separated the army from politics, the armed forces were given a place of
honour in the republic and continued to perceive themselves as the guardians of the secular, reformist and
democratic goals proclaimed by Atatürk.14
Hale argues that there are important similarities with the totalitarian-penetration model and Turkey during
the presidencies of Atatürk and his successor İsmet İnönü. Turkey was a single-party state most of this
period, and the armed forces were a supportive part of it.15 The widely quoted Mao saying ‘Political
power grows out of the barrel of a gun (…) the party commands the gun and the gun shall never be
allowed to command the party’16 sums up the idea of the totalitarian-penetration model and fits well
Turkey for this single-party period. Hale concludes “The civil-military relationship had some elements of
the penetration model, but civilian supremacy was ensured by the particular circumstances and
personalities of the early 1920s rather than by the apparatus of a totalitarian state.”17

3.2 The 1960-coup and the permanent injuring of civilian rule

From the period after the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the military stayed outside politics
until 1960, when they made the first military coup of the modern Turkey. According to Momayezi “the
military takeover of the government in 1960 was broadly accepted by the Turks as justified to prevent the
perversion of the democratic system.”18 The 1960 coup was aimed at Democratic Party government, who
had been in power for 10 years. Prime Minister Menderes was executed in the aftermath of the coup. His
government was accused of mounting authoritarianism, which alienated important parts of the reformist
elite – including a sizable proportion of the officers. According to Hale the 1960 coup resulted in a regime
of the guardian type established by the senior commanders, even though a group of junior officers, active
in taking the initiative to the coup, wished to establish a ruler regime.19 The officers kept their promise of
returning the power to the civilians, and did so in October 1961. The army managed to leave important
footprints on Turkey’s political structure, legalizing and guaranteeing more permanent roles for the army.
The junta provided that its members become permanent members of the senate, and military pressure
secured that the head of the junta was elected president of the new parliament.20 I will argue that the most
critical long-term outcome of this period was the creation of the National Security Council (NSC), where
the leaders of the armed forces and the chief of staff directly could intervene with the top civilian
leadership, upon all matters vaguely defined as touching on the security of the state. In this way the 1961
constitution created what Sakallioğlu labels “a double headed political system: the civilian council of

14
Momayezi 1998, p. 3.
15
Hale 1994, p. 312.
16
Quotiation by Mao Tse Tung, reproduced in Hale, 1994, p. 309.
17
Hale 1994, pp. 312-313
18
Momayezi 1998, pp. 6-7
19
Hale 1994, p. 313.
20
Momayezi 1998, p. 7.

7
Bertil Videt The role of the military in Turkish politics

ministers coexisted with the national security council on the executive level, and the military system of
justice continued to operate independently alongside the civilian justice system.”21 Cem Eroğul contends
that the events of 1960 permanently injured the civilian rule in Turkey.

3.3 The 1971 coup by memorandum

This military intervention has been known as the “coup by memorandum”, since the armed forces did not
seize power, but remained behind the scenes.
Momayezi explains the 1971 coup by the instability, largely due to the 1961-Constitution guaranteeing
political rights.22 In 1969 eight parties were represented in Meclis, the national assembly, and none could
gain a majority in order to form a government. Thereby the legislative process became paralyzed, and
dissatisfied groups took their demands to the streets. Political violence and disorder spread, and law and
order deterred rapidly. In March 1971 the commanders of the three armed forces signed an ultimatum,
which warned that the military establishment would “use its legal rights and seize power directly to
accomplish its duty of protecting and supervising the Turkish Republic.”23 Prime Minister Demirel stepped
down, and Meclis installed various civilian technocratic administrations, whereby the officers remained in
the background.

Making a comparison to the earlier presented typologies of military regimes, the period of the coup by
memorandum fits the model of a moderator or veto regime, where the state is directed by civilian
politicians, but the armed forces exercise veto power, without taking over power itself. Furthermore I will
argue that this event proved the strength of NSC as a mean for the military to keep a tight control over
Turkish politics.

3.4 The 1980 Military Coup d’état

The expanded role of the Turkish military in modern times can be traced back to the period around the
coup d’état of 1980. Sakallioğlu argues that “The military autonomy of the period since 1980 represents a
considerable shift in the military’s influence, rather than a pattern of continuity. The patterns of politics
established by the coup makers after 1980 was more authoritarian than ever before.”24
The patterns leading to the 1980 coup resembled the one previous to the 1971 coup, with widespread
disorder and political violence, but in a much more serious scale. The period reflected a growing
ideological polarization. The main polarization force was the far right Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi
Hareket Partisi), whose ‘street fighters’, the Grey Wolves, stood behind numerous deadly attacks, mainly

21
Sakallioglu, Cizre: The Anatomy of the Turkish Military's Autonomy, Comparative Politics, vol. 29, no. 2, 1997, p. 157.
22
Momayezi 1998, pp. 7-8.
23
Reproduced in: Momayezi 1998, p. 8.
24
Sakallioglu, Cizre,1997, p. 162.

8
Bertil Videt The role of the military in Turkish politics

on leftists and Alewis. Furthermore a number of radical leftist groups and Necmettin Erbakan’s National
Salvation Party on the religious right contributed to the polarization. The latter organised a mass rally in
the religious town of Konya, “(…) which flouted everything Kemal Atatürk and the Turkish Army had ever
stood for.”25 Both General Evren and General Saltik have afterwards singled out this concrete event as a
catalytic factor in their decision to intervene.26

On September 12 1980 the military intervened directly, and NSC took over the government. Again the
military made it clear that they intended to return power to elected civilians, even though they would
implement some critical reforms and not return power immediately. The military regime constituted thus a
guardian regime, and made it clear that they would not accept a return to status quo.27 Before returning
power to the civilian politicians the junta designed a new constitution in 1982, which still is the
constitution in force, that strengthened the role of NSC: from now on its recommendations would be given
priority consideration by the council of ministers. Furthermore the number and weight of senior
commanders in NSC increased at the expense of its civilian members.28
The military junta returned only the power to the civilian politicians under a strict control. In the first
elections in 1983 NSC refused permission to almost all formerly prominent politicians to run for elections.
As Özbudun notes: “The 1983 Turkish transition is almost a textbook example of the degree to which a
departing military regime can dictate the conditions of its departure (…)”29
The 1982 constitution contained also a number of provisional articles securing the army a strict control of
the process of returning the power to elected civilians “by means of several provisional articles”.30

3.5 The 1997 post-modern coup – a new era?

During the 1980s and 1990s – and to some extent still today - I will argue that two perceived threats
against the modern Turkey has served as an obstacle for removing or radically decreasing the political role
of the military: the Kurdish issue and the political Islam. The main focus of this paragraph will be on the
relation between the rise of political Islam provoking the so-called post-modern coup of 1997, and the
continuing role of the military in Turkish politics. Nonetheless, I find that the Kurdish issue, which by the
Turkish elite is perceived as a threat to the territorial integrity of the republic, has been a critical factor in
explaining the lack of reforms concerning the military’s engagement in politics. This was especially clear
in the period from 1984, when Kurdistans Workers Party (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan – PKK) began a
bloody armed struggle against the Turkish authorities, until the capture of the PKK-leader Abdullah

25
Ibid. P. 9.
26
Ibid.
27
Hale 1994, p. 315.
28
Sakallioglu, Cizre (1997) pp. 157-158
29
Özbudun, Ergun: Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation, Lynne Rienner Publishers,
2000; p. 117.
30
Momayezi 1998, p. 13.

9
Bertil Videt The role of the military in Turkish politics

Öcalan in 1999. In this atmosphere of civil war it was hard to imagine a military withdrawal from political
life, especially as the Turkish side mainly chose to consider the issue as a military and not a political
problem. As Gunter suggested in 1997, at the peak of this bloody war, the Kurdish problem helped the
military preserve its control and impeded the improvement of democracy and human rights.31

During the 1990s, Turkey experienced not only a more and more violent and absurd civil war in its
southeastern corner, but also a revival of Islam as a political force, under the leadership of Erbakan. Since
the Islamist parties continuously were shut down, Erbakan led several parties, belonging to the Mili Görüş
(National View) movement. The most successful one was the Refah (Welfare) Party, which existed from
1983 to 1998. Ironically it can be argued that the policies of the military regimes partially paved the way
for the rise in political Islam. As noticed by Momayezi the military used Islam as an instrument for
promoting social and political stability32. With the 1982 constitution religious education became
compulsory and the state provided increased financial resources to the Directorate of Religious Affairs.
The Refah Party experienced a growing popularity culminating with the 1995 general elections, where it
emerged as the strongest party with 21,4 percent of the national vote. Erbakan’s anti-Western election
campaign concentrated on the ambiguous slogan ‘just order’ which referred both to a just distribution of
wealth and to an Islamic order. Erbakan managed to negotiate a coalition government with former Prime
Minister Tansu Çiller, an outspoken secularist, who previously had made it clear she would make “no
coalition with the fundamentalist.”33
Once in power Erbakan did not carry through as radical policies as the electoral campaign might have
suggested, but took steps, primarily symbolic, which disturbed the image of Turkey as a stronghold of
secularism.34
The military began its slow coup in 1997, after several confrontations, by presenting Erbakan with
humiliating demands. On February 28, 1997 NSC issued a tense communiqué, assessing that “no steps
away from the contemporary values of the Turkish Republic would be tolerated.”35. Thereby constituting
an extraordinary public warning by the army to the government. During the following months the pressure
mounted and Erbakan eventually decided to step down as prime minister. In January 1998 Turkey’s
highest court dissolved the Welfare-party and ruled that its leader, former Prime Minister Erbakan, could
not participate in politics for the next five years.

Like the 1971 coup the 1998 coup fits well to the model of the moderator or veto regimes. In both cases
the military did not take over power itself, but managed to get its will through pressure. The coup of 1998

31
Gunter, Michael M., 1997, p.127.
32
Momayezi 1998, p. 15
33
Ibid. P. 17.
34
Ibid. P. 18.
35
Ibid. P. 20.

10
Bertil Videt The role of the military in Turkish politics

fits well to Hale’s notion of ‘displacement coups’, where the civilian government is replaced with another
civilian government, more acceptable to the military. An important difference from the 1971 coup is that
the power in 1998 went directly from one elected civilian politician to another, whereas in the aftermath of
the 1971 coup various civilian technocratic administrations were installed.

In table 3.1 I have summarised the types of the four coups Turkey has experiences. And the type of the
following military regime.

Year Type of coup Type of military regime

1960 Coup d’état Guardian regime
1971 Coup by memorandum Moderator or veto regime
1980 Coup d’état Guardian regime
1998 Post-modern coup Moderator or veto regimes
Table 3.1 Military coups in Turkey and types of military regimes.

4. Turkey’s reforms and EU-aspirations

When Turkey in 1963 signed an association agreement with the European Economic Community the
possibility for a Turkish membership of the European Communities was opened. Turkey has long had a
commitment to become full member of the EU, and membership of EU is considered as the final
realization of Turkey’s Westernization project, which has been going since the very foundation of the
Turkish Republic in 1923. Under the Finnish EU-presidency in 1999 Turkey was accepted as a candidate
country for full membership of EU.
Once a country gets the status as a candidate state, it must comply with the so-called Copenhagen Criteria.
These are the political criteria, formulated by the Copenhagen Summit in 1993. As stated in the
‘Copenhagen European Summit - Conclusions of the Presidency 1993’, before becoming a full member of
the EU, the candidate state must achieve: “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of
law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; the existence of a functioning market
economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; the
ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic
and monetary union has created : the conditions for its integration through the adjustment of its
administrative structures, so that European Community legislation transposed into national legislations
implemented effectively through appropriate administrative and judicial structures.”36

36
European Council in Copenhagen 21 - 22 June 1993. Conclusions of the Presidency. Available at
http://www.europarl.eu.int/summits/copenhagen/default_en.htm

11
Bertil Videt The role of the military in Turkish politics

Since 2001 Turkey has passed an impressive amount of acts in order to comply with the Copenhagen
Criteria. One of the more important reform packages was passed on August 3, 2002. This package
contained important steps, such as abolition of death penalty in peacetime, legalisation of TV- and radio
broadcasting in Kurdish, legalisation of teaching in Kurdish and other regional languages in special
courses, increased regulation of the police and increased rights to non-Muslim religious communities.
Especially the abolition of death penalty was a critical demand from EU even though Turkey had not
executed any death penalties since 1984. It was perceived as a major step when Meclis decided to reverse
the death penalty of PKK-leader Abdullah Öcalan.

The aim of this paper is quite narrowly to analyze the role of the military in Turkish politics, and for this
paragraph to look upon what impact the process of Turkey’s rapprochement to the EU has in this respect. I
will therefore not go further into detail about the many different reforms Turkey has passed in order to
comply with EU-standards. According to Hansen the EU has been prudent about speaking directly about
the role of the armed forces, since there within EU-circles has been a comprehension that the military has
contributed to the stability, secured the secularism and that it has an internal legitimacy within Turkey.37
It is though noteworthy how relatively low priority the 2003 Commission’s report gives to the military’s
political role. This seems to confirm Hansen’s assertion, that this plays a minor role in the relation between
EU and Turkey, compared to questions like compliance with human rights and respect of linguistic and
ethnic minorities. However looking at the 2004 Commission’s report and declarations from leading EU
figures it seems that this issue recently has got higher priority and that Hansen’s argument is less correct
now than just one or two years ago, as the prospect of actual Turkish EU-membership is becoming more
actual.
It seems obvious that the privileged role the military plays in Turkish politics, mainly through NSC, does
not correspond to the, however vaguely formulated, demands of “stability of institutions guaranteeing
democracy” and “the rule of law” that the previously mentioned Copenhagen Criteria prescribe.

4.1 The 7th reform package and subsequent reforms

The current government consisting of the Justice and Development Party – AK-Party, led by Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, took on the difficult task of reducing the role of the military in Turkish
politics, as a part of its efforts to start accession talks with the EU. This task is difficult since it touches
upon a sensitive issue, but arguably especially difficult for the AK-Party, which has its political roots in
Erbakan’s Islamist movements and therefore is viewed with suspicion by the military and the secularist
establishment because of its Islamist roots.

37
Hansen, Birthe: Tyrkiets dilemmaer – Tyrkiets politik EU og USA, Institut for Internationale Studier, Copenhagen,
2003. pp. 39-40.

12
Bertil Videt The role of the military in Turkish politics

Nonetheless the Meclis, where the AK-Party has an absolute majority, passed on July 23, 2003, the so-
called seventh reform package, which exactly aimed at limiting the role of the military, through reforms of
NSC. Firstly it is now underlined, that NSC is a consultative body, and the quantity of civilian members of
NSC is increased. The 7th reform package made it possible to appoint a civilian Secretary General of NSC,
which actually happened in August 2004. The council has not anymore expanded executive and
monitoring authorities, and has for instance not any more the authority on behalf of the president and the
prime minister to follow up on the implementation of NSC’s ‘recommendations’. In addition, NSC has
not anymore unlimited access to all civil institutions. NSC does not longer have a representative in the
Supervision Board of Cinema, Video and Music. It was however still represented in civil institution such
as the High Board for Radio and TV (RTÜK) and the Commission for higher educations (YÖK), but after
critics in the 2003 Commission report this representation was withdrawn from both institutions in 2004. 38
Despite the impressive institutional changes the 2004 Commission report concludes that ”Although the
process of aligning civil-military relations with EU practice is underway, the Armed Forces in Turkey
continue to exercise influence through a series of informal channels.”39

4.2 EU-reactions
Almost as soon as the seventh reform package was passed, it was commended from EU officials. The
seventh reform package came along with a partial amnesty to subordinate PKK-members. An EU diplomat
was quoted in Financial Times for saying: "These two moves are undoubtedly very welcome. This is about
Turkey getting ready to start accession negotiations."40
The European Commission’s “2003 Regular Report on Turkey’s progress towards accession”, that was
issued on November 5, 2003, was also quite positive, even though more balanced than Financial Times’
source. In the Report it is assessed that the amendments “could significantly modify the functioning” of
NSC.41 The Commission underlined in 2003 that it sees it as decisive, that the reforms are implemented
effectively, that the military representation is withdrawn from civilian institutions and that the Meclis gets
full control over the defence budget. As outlined in paragraph 4.1. the military representation has been
withdrawn from the remaining mentioned civilian institutions during 2004. Furthermore parliamentary
control over military and defence expenditures has been strengthened, the competence of military courts is
narrowed and the State Security Courts has been abolished. 42

38
Informations in this passage are from: European Commission: 2003 Regular Report on Turkey’s progress towards
accession, November 5, 2003 and European Commission: 2004 Regular Report on Turkey’s progress towards accession,
October 6, 2004.
39
European Commission: 2004 Regular Report on Turkey’s progress towards accession, October 6, 2004. P. 15.
40
Financial Times: EU lauds Turkey's military reforms, July 30, 2003.
41
European Commission: 2003 Regular Report on Turkey’s progress towards accession, November 5, 2003, p. 19.
42
European Commission: 2004 Regular Report on Turkey’s progress towards accession, October 6, 2004. P. 15.

13
Bertil Videt The role of the military in Turkish politics

4.3 Reactions from the military

Even though the army is perceived as very pro-Western and an important factor in the modernization
process, in general pro-EU, at least parts of the armed forces were not content with the changes brought by
the seventh reform package. "With the reforms, the council... has kept its place legally, but was left
functionless," General Kilinc, NSC's outgoing secretary general, said in a speech at a handover
ceremony.43 Just days after the Meclis has passed the reforms the Turkish military appointed a senior
general, Sukru Sariisik, as new secretary general of NSC. The appointment happened before President
Ahmet Necdet Sezer approved the reform, and was thereby not yet in effect, so the army technically was
able to make an outright appointment to the post.44 In this period it was not clear whether the president
would approve the reforms, or use his right of veto. According to Turkish Daily News “Some newspaper
reports have claimed the generals had advised Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in a recent meeting
of military officials also attended by government members, not to press to pass the reforms for a second
time if they were vetoed by the president.”45

In a news conference in April 2004 Chief of the General Staff Hilmi Özkök suggested that the army would
continue to play a political role, saying that “nobody should expect the Turkish Armed Forces to remain
impartial on the issues of secularism and modernity” and that the Army will always remain partial "on the
eternal protection and preservation of Turkey's unity as a nation and territory, a republic which is
democratic, secular and social".46

In the news conference Özkök criticized “certain circles” who have tried to depict the Army as the main
obstacle to reform in Turkey and he pointed out that the Turkish Army welcomed constructive criticism
based on “correct” information.47 Unlike some of his lower ranged colleagues Özkök has remained from
criticising the reforms, and the Army’s low profile during the 2004 attempts to negotiate a solution to the
Cyprus issue, which traditionally is regarded as a vital issue in Turkish security politics, could suggest that
the army might be ready to accept a restricted role in Turkish politics. Even though Özkök critized the
Annan plan for a solution of the Cyprus issue and he underlines that the issue does not only concern
Cyprus but is a concern of Turkey, Özkök declared that it would be inappropriate for the Armed Forces to
say ‘yes’or ‘no’ to the Annan plan.48

43
AFP: Turkish general slams EU-linked reform curbing military's power, August 26, 2003
44
AFP: Turkish army appoints general to key post despite bid to curb power, August 5, 2003
45
Turkish Daily News: Sezer upholds government move to curb military influence, August 8, 2003
46
BBC Monitoring International Reports, TURKISH CHIEF OF STAFF BRIEFS MEDIA ON ARMY'S STAND ON
CYPRUS, DUTY TO NATION April 13, 2004
47
Ibid.
48
” Genelkurmay Başkanı, son MGK bildirisinde yeralan görüşleri tekrarlayarak, Annan Planı’nın artıları ve eksileri
olduğunu belirtti. “Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri’nin ‘evet’ ya da ‘hayır’ denmesi beklenmemeli” diyerek sorumluluğun
Hükümet’de olduğunu, son kararı Kıbrıslı Türkler ve TBMM’nin vereceğini söyledi.” NTVMSNBC: TSK: KKTC
halkına baskı olmasın, April 13, 2004, http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/265678.asp?cp1=1

14
Bertil Videt The role of the military in Turkish politics

It seems that the opposition – or at best reluctance – from segments of the military to the reforms can be a
source of conflict in Turkey. I have mentioned that the military enjoys a very wide legitimacy in the
Turkish society. On the other hand, the reform process and the perspective of EU membership gain support
from a very large majority of the Turkish population. If the military will jeopardize EU membership and
democratisation in order to maintain its privileged role over Turkish politics I doubt that it will be able to
maintain its high level of popular legitimacy. The terror attacks on synagogues and British interests in
Istanbul, November 2003, can raise concern about a renewed terror threat that could result in a
reformulation of the main security threat again to be considered as the internal one. If this happens the
military will regain legitimacy for its arguments about its important guardian role.49

4.4 Theorizing the military’s actual role in Turkish politics.

With the recent Turkish reforms aiming at complying with EU’s political criteria most of the legal
privileges of the armed forces have been removed. However it is far from accurate to categorize the
Turkish civil – military relationship as a ‘liberal-democratic’ one. Indeed the current situation does not fit
well into any of the three models of civil-military relationship developed by Nordlinger and Jannowitz,
that I have presented in table 2.1.

In order to truly understand the power of the military in Turkish politics I believe that one also must look
upon the underlying structural relations of power. This suggestion fits furthermore the previously quoted
notion from the 2004 Commission Report that “the Armed Forces in Turkey continue to exercise influence
through a series of informal channels“.50

Hereby I will argue in line with Steven Lukes, that a three-dimensional view of power is adequate in order
to grasp the more complex structural power relations: “(…) the three-dimensional view of power involves
a thoroughgoing critique of the behavioural focus of the first two views as too individualistic and allows
for consideration of the many ways in which potential issues are kept out of politics, whether through the
operation of social forces and institutional Practices or through individuals' decisions. (…) What one may
have here is a latent conflict, which consists in a contradiction between the interests of those exercising
power and the real interests of those they exclude.”51

49
Videt, Bertil: „Tyrkiet er rystet”, Dagbladet Information, November 22, 2003, p. 4 and Videt, Bertil: „Militærets rolle i
tyrkiet; Militær, gør jeres pligt!“, Mellemøst-Information, nr. 2, 2004 p. 16
50
European Commission: 2004 Regular Report on Turkey’s progress towards accession, October 6, 2004. P. 15.
51
Lukes, pp. 24-25

15
Bertil Videt The role of the military in Turkish politics

Lukes draws attention to the importance of structural power and the impact of social structures into which
all human beings are born, socialised, and accepted as enduring elements of their “reality.” In line with this
argument I find Foucault’s notion that attempts to localise the power with institutions and individuals veil
the different forms and ramifications – and thereby veil an understanding of the power, which is hidden
and spread52 relevant to the case of the role of the military in Turkish politics. This suggests that there are
deeper structural power relations, which are not immediately changed by institutional reforms.

In this paper the popular legitimacy of the armed forces has been mentioned suggesting that the structural
power of the military (at least partially) is based on its popular support. This argument support Hannah
Arendt’s notion that it is “the people’s support that lends power to the institutions of a country, and this
support is but the continuation of the consent that brought the laws into existence to begin with. (…) All
political institutions are manifestations and materializations of power; they petrify and decay as soon as
the living power of the people ceases to uphold them. This is what Madison meant when he said ‘all
governments rest on opinion’, a word no less true for the various forms of monarchy than for
democracies.”53

I will argue that there is a gap in the existing theory, which cannot analyse the complex role of the military
in Turkish politics, after the recent reforms that have removed the institutionalised privileged role of the
military. In order to grasp the role of the military a deep understanding of the informal processes of
exercising power, of the popular legitimacy and of the symbolic role of the military in Turkish society.

5. Conclusions

In this paper I have attempted to analyze the role of the military in Turkish politics. The analysis has been
divided into two levels, which could be labelled respectively the rise and the decline of the role of the
army in Turkish politics:

1. The shape of the role of the military in Turkish politics. The military has always occupied a special
place in the Turkish society, which can be traced back to the critical role the army played in the
showdown with the Ottoman Empire and the foundation of the modern Turkish Republic. The
army was effectively isolated from the political life in the first period of the republic, from its
foundation in 1923 to the first military coup in 1960. With the creation of the National Security

52
Lauesen, Torkil: Foucault, Michel, Reference at www.leksikon.org, http://www.leksikon.org/art.php?n=885
53
Arendt, Hannah: On Violence, Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, London, 1970, p. 41

16
Bertil Videt The role of the military in Turkish politics

Council, NSC, the military guardian regime that was installed in 1960, assured a constitutional
guaranteed privileged role for the military in Turkish politics and injured permanently civilian rule.
With the “coup by memorandum” in 1971 the armed forces did not seize power, but forced Prime
Minister Süleyman Demirel to step down and be replaced by civilian technocratic administrations,
and thereby proved the strength of NSC, as a mean for the military to keep a tight control over
Turkish politics. The military autonomy increased though considerably with the 1982 constitution,
written by the military guardian regime installed by the 1980 coup d’état. The transition to
democracy in 1983 went only on under a very strict control. Afterwards NSC got increased
powers, and from 1982 it had a military majority. Again in 1997 the military proved through NSC
that it had the last say, when it forced Prime Minister Erbakan to step down by what has been
known as a post-modern coup.

2. The decreasing role of the military and the process of democratisation and rapprochement to the
EU. Since its very foundation, Turkey has followed a strategy of Westernization and an eventual
EU-membership can be perceived as the final station of Westernization. Since Turkey in 1999 was
granted official status as a candidate state, it has passed a number of reforms, in order to comply
with EU’s political Copenhagen Criteria. Even though there in EU circles may be a comprehension
that the military has contributed to the stability, secured the secularism and that it has an internal
legitimacy within Turkey, it seems obvious that the privileged role of the military in Turkish
politics, mainly through NSC, does not correspond to the demands of democracy, prescribed by the
Copenhagen Criteria. The current government consisting of the Justice and Development Party –
AK-Party took on the difficult task of reducing the role of the military in Turkish politics, as a part
of its efforts to start accession talks with the EU. This task is especially hard for the AK-Party
government, since it has its roots in the political Islam and is regarded with suspicion by the
military and secularist establishment. Nonetheless, the Meclis passed in July 2003 the seventh
reform package aiming at limiting the role of the military, through reforms of NSC. The moves
have been welcomed by the EU, but the European Commissions regular report on Turkey,
published on November 5, 2003, argues that the reforms must be implemented effectively, that the
military representation is withdrawn from civilian institutions and that the Meclis gets full control
over the defence budget. Even though there have been no signs that the military would intervene
against the reforms, the messages from the army have been rather negative regarding their
decreased role in politics.

It seems that Turkey presently is at a crossroad regarding the dilemma of ensuring a privileged role for the
military in politics, and continuing the democratisation process with the aim of being granted full
membership of the EU. As the European Commission rightly points out in its regular report from 2003 the

17
Bertil Videt The role of the military in Turkish politics

reforms need still to be implemented, and even after an effective implementation the military still have a
say in areas which can not be considered as defence policy or the national security. For the present, I will
argue that Turkey still has a system of double authority, on the one hand the elected civilian Meclis and
government, and on the other the military who through NSC keeps – though reduced – say in a variety of
political areas.

Today it seems very unlikely that a regular military coup d’état will occur again in Turkey, partially
because such a step would neither be tolerated by Turkey’s Western allies nor would it strengthen the
popular image of the military. However, as Momayezi puts it: “coups avoidance is not the same as civilian
control.”54 The latest developments, after the passage of the seventh reform package, indicate that the
military will continue to do efforts to maintain its privileged role within the formally civilian political
system. No matter how much popular legitimacy the military might have, it is obvious that it in no ways is
responsible and accountable, since the popular legitimacy not necessarily has anything to do with a
democratically legitimacy. As the banner that demanded military intervention in the education policy
illustrated, there are groups within the Turkish society who are more sedulously adherents of the military’s
role than the military itself. A persistent withdrawal of the military from Turkish politics will require some
confrontations with both the military itself and the secular fundamentalists of Turkey.

Among the Turkish people there is a huge majority supporting the democratisation process and who
wishes Turkish EU-membership. In no other candidate countries have these two topics been so closely
interconnected. If segments of the secular elite and the military jeopardize the democratisation process and
the possibility of EU-membership I seriously doubt that the military will be able to maintain its high
popular legitimacy.

54
Momayezi 1998, p. 24.

18
Bertil Videt The role of the military in Turkish politics

6. References:

• AFP: Turkish army appoints general to key post despite bid to curb power, August 5, 2003
• AFP: Turkish general slams EU-linked reform curbing military's power, August 26, 2003
• Ahmad, Feroz: The Making of Modern Turkey, Routledge, London, 1993
• Arendt, Hannah: On Violence, Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, London, 1970
• BBC Monitoring International Reports, TURKISH CHIEF OF STAFF BRIEFS MEDIA ON
ARMY'S STAND ON CYPRUS, DUTY TO NATION April 13, 2004
• Erogul, Cem ”The establishment of Multiparty Rule: 1945-71” in: Schick, Irvin C. ad Tonak,
Ertuğrul Ahmet (eds) Turkey in Transition: New Perspectives New York University Press, New
York, 1987
• Ertuğrul, Ahmet (eds) Turkey in Transition: New Perspectives New York University Press, New
York, 1987
• European Commission: 2003 Regular Report on Turkey’s progress towards accession, November
5, 2003.
• European Commission: 2004 Regular Report on Turkey’s progress towards accession, October 6,
2004.
• European Council in Copenhagen 21 - 22 June 1993. Conclusions of the Presidency. Available at
http://www.europarl.eu.int/summits/copenhagen/default_en.htm
• Financial Times: EU lauds Turkey's military reforms, July 30, 2003.
• Financial Times (editorial): A quiet revolution: Less power for Turkey's army is a triumph for the
EU, July 31, 2003.
• Guney, Aylin & Heper, Metin: “The military and the consolidation of democracy: The recent
Turkish experience”, Armed Forces and Society Vol. 26, Iss. 4.. New Brunswick: Summer 2000.
• Gunter, Michael M.: The Kurds and the Future of Turkey, St. Martins Press, New York, 1997.
• Hale, William: Turkish Politics and the Military, Routledge, London, 1994.
• Hansen, Birthe: Tyrkiets dilemmaer – Tyrkiets politik EU og USA, Institut for Internationale
Studier, København 2003.
• Jones, Dorian: “Army Enters Into Row With Rectors”, The Times Higher Education Supplement,
October 10, 2003.
• Karaosmanoglu, Ali: “The evolution of the national security culture and the military in Turkey”,
Journal of International Affairs. New York: Fall 2000. Vol. 54, Iss. 1.
• Lauesen, Torkil: Foucault, Michel, Reference at www.leksikon.org,
http://www.leksikon.org/art.php?n=885

19
Bertil Videt The role of the military in Turkish politics

• Lukes, Steven: Power: A Radical View, Palgrave, Hampshire, 1974

• Milli Güvenlik Kurulu Genel Sekreterliği: http://www.NSC.gov.tr/
• Momayezi, Nasser: “Civil-military relations in Turkey”, International Journal on World Peace.
New York: Sep 1998. Vol. 15, Iss. 3.
• NTVMSNBC: TSK: KKTC halkına baskı olmasın, April 13, 2004,
http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/265678.asp?cp1=1
• Özbudun, Ergun: Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation, Lynne
Rienner Publishers, 2000.
• SABAH gazetesi: Özkök: En hayırlısı oldu, April 27, 2004:
http://www.sabah.com.tr/2004/04/27/siy106.html
• Sakallioglu, Cizre: “The Anatomy of the Turkish Military's Autonomy”, Comparative Politics,vol.
29, no. 2, 1997.
• Turkish Daily News: Sezer upholds government move to curb military influence, August 8, 2003
• Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri: www.tsk.mil.tr
• Videt, Bertil: „Tyrkiet er rystet”, Dagbladet Information, November 22, 2003, page 4
• Videt, Bertil: „Militærets rolle i Tyrkiet; Militær, gør jeres pligt!“, Mellemøst-Information, nr. 2,
2004

20