ABOITIZ SHIPPING V. CA (G.R. NO.

84458)

Facts:

Anacleto Viana boarded the vessel M/V Antonia owned by petitioner Aboitiz Shipping Corp at the port at San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro, bound for Manila. The vessel arrived at Pier 4, North Harbor, Manila and was taken over by Pioneer
Stevedoring for the latter to unload the cargoes from the said vessel pursuant to their Memorandum of Agreement. An
hour after the passengers and Viana had disembarked the vessel the crane operator began its unloading operation.
While the crane was being operated, Viana who had already disembarked the vessel remembered that some of his
cargoes were still loaded there. He went back and while he was pointing to the crew where his cargoes were, the crane
hit him pinning him between the side of the vessel and the crane resulting to his death. A complaint for damages was
filed against petitioner for breach of contract of carriage. Petitioner contends that Viana ceased to be a passenger when
he disembarked the vessel and that consequently his presence there was no longer reasonable. CA affirmed the trial
court’s order holding Aboitiz liable. Hence the petition.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner is still responsible as a carrier to Viana after the latter had already disembarked the vessel.

Ruling: YES.

The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the passenger has been landed at the port of
destination and has left the vessel owner’s dock or premises. Once created, the relationship will not ordinarily terminate
until the passenger has, after reaching his destination, safely alighted from the carrier’s conveyance or had a reasonable
opportunity to leave the carrier’s premises. All persons who remain on the premises a reasonable time after leaving the
conveyance are to be deemed passengers, and what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be
determined from all the circumstances, and includes a reasonable time to see after his baggage and prepare for his
departure. The carrier-passenger relationship is not terminated merely by the fact that the person transported has been
carried to his destination if, for example, such person remains in the carrier’s premises to claim his baggage.

The primary factor to be considered is the existence of a reasonable cause as will justify the presence of the victim on or
near the petitioner’s vessel. We believe there exists such a justifiable cause. When the accident occurred, the victim was
in the act of unloading his cargoes, which he had every right to do, from petitioner’s vessel. As earlier stated, a carrier is
duty bound not only to bring its passengers safely to their destination but also to afford them a reasonable time to claim
their baggage.

Consequently, under the foregoing circumstances, the victim Anacleto Viana is still deemed a passenger of said carrier at
the time of his tragic death.

PRECILLANO NECESITO, ETC. vs. NATIVIDAD PARAS, ET AL.G.R. No. L-10605, June 30, 1958)

FACTS:
A mother and her son boarded a passenger auto-truck of the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines. While entering a wooden
bridge, its front wheels swerved to the right, the driver lost control and the truck fell into a breast-deep creek. The
mother drowned and the son sustained injuries. These cases involve actions ex contractu against the owners of PRBL
filed by the son and the heirs of the mother. Lower Court dismissed the actions, holding that the accident was a
fortuitous event.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the carrier is liable for the manufacturing defect of the steering knuckle, and whether the evidence
discloses that in regard thereto the carrier exercised the diligence required by law (Art. 1755, new Civil Code)

HELD:Yes.
While the carrier is not an insurer of the safety of the passengers, the manufacturer of the defective appliance is
considered in law the agent of the carrier, and the good repute of the manufacturer will not relieve the carrier from
liability. The rationale of the carrier’s liability is the fact that the passengers has no privity with the manufacturer of the
defective equipment; hence, he has no remedy against him, while the carrier has. We find that the defect could be
detected. The periodical, usual inspection of the steering knuckle did not measure up to the “utmost diligence of a very
cautious person” as “far as human care and foresight can provide” and therefore the knuckle’s failure cannot be
considered a fortuitous event that exempts the carrier from responsibility.

Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc. VS Court of AppealsGR 118126 4 March 1996

FACTS:Atty Renato Arroyo purchased a ticket from Trans-Asia Shipping lines, Inc. for the voyage of M/V Asia Thailand
vessel to Cagayan de Oro from Cebu Sity. Upon boarding he noticed that engines of the vessel were being repaired.
Regardless, he boarded the same.

The vessel departed on time with only 1 engine running. It stopped near Kawit Island and after half an hour of stillness,
the passengers, who already were suffering from mental distress, demanded that they be brought back to their port of
origin.

Cebu City, passengers who wished to disembark were allowed and given 10 minutes. Atty. Arroyo as one of the
passengers. After which, the vessel continued its voyage.

On this account, Passenger Arroyo filed before the trial court a complaint for damages against Trans-Asia Shipping Inc.
for failure of transporting the former to his place of destination.

ISSUE:WON a vessel being unworthy of the sea is tantamount to a breach of contract?

HELD:Under Article 1733 of the Civil Code, the petitioner was bound to observe extraordinary diligence in ensuring the
safety of the private respondent. That meant that the petitioner was, pursuant to Article 1755 of the said Code, bound
to carry the private respondent safely as far as human care and foresight could provide, using the utmost diligence of
very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances. In this case, we are in full accord with the Court of
Appeals that the petitioner failed to discharge this obligation.Before commencing the contracted voyage, the petitioner
undertook some repairs on the cylinder head of one of the vessel's engines. But even before it could finish these repairs,
it allowed the vessel to leave the port of origin on only one functioning engine, instead of two. Moreover, even the lone
functioning engine was not in perfect condition as sometime after it had run its course, it conked out. This caused the
vessel to stop and remain a drift at sea, thus in order to prevent the ship from capsizing, it had to drop anchor. Plainly,
the vessel was unseaworthy even before the voyage began. For a vessel to be seaworthy, it must be adequately
equipped for the voyage and manned with a sufficient number of competent officers and crew. 21 The failure of a
common carrier to maintain in seaworthy condition its vessel involved in a contract of carriage is a clear breach of its
duty prescribed in Article 1755 of the Civil Code.

SINGSON vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS

FACTS:

Petitioner CARLOS SINGSON and his cousin Crescentino Tiongson bought from respondent Cathay Pacific Airways two (2)
open-dated, identically routed, round trip plane tickets (Manila to LA and vice versa). Each ticket consisted of six (6)
flight coupons, each would be detached at the start of each leg of the trip.
Singson failed to obtain a booking in LA for their to Manila; apparently, the coupon corresponding to the 5th leg of the
trip was missing and instead the 3rd was still attached. It was not until few days later that the defendant finally was able
to arrange for his return to Manila.
Singson commenced an action for damages based on breach of contract of carriage against CATHAY before the Regional
Trial Court.
CATHAY alleged that there was no contract of carriage yet existing such that CATHAY’s refusal to immediately book him
could not be construed as breach of contract of carriage.
The trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner herein holding that CATHAY was guilty of gross negligence
amounting to malice and bad faith for which it was adjudged to pay petitioner P20,000.00 for actual damages with
interest at the legal rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum from 26 August 1988 when the complaint was filed until
fully paid, P500,000.00 for moral damages, P400,000.00 for exemplary damages, P100,000.00 for attorney’s fees, and, to
pay the costs.
On appeal by CATHAY, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s finding that there was gross negligence amounting
to bad faith or fraud and, accordingly, modified its judgment by deleting the awards for moral and exemplary damages,
and the attorney’s fees as well.

ISSUES: 1.) whether a breach of contract was committed by CATHAY when it failed to confirm the booking of petitioner.
HELD:
1.) Yes. x x x the round trip ticket issued by the carrier to the passenger was in itself a complete written contract by and
between the carrier and the passenger. It had all the elements of a complete written contract, to wit: (a) the consent of
the contracting parties manifested by the fact that the passenger agreed to be transported by the carrier to and from
Los Angeles via San Francisco and Hong Kong back to the Philippines, and the carrier’s acceptance to bring him to his
destination and then back home; (b) cause or consideration, which was the fare paid by the passenger as stated in his
ticket; and, (c) object, which was the transportation of the passenger from the place of departure to the place of
destination and back, which are also stated in his ticket. In fact, the contract of carriage in the instant case was already
partially executed as the carrier complied with its obligation to transport the passenger to his destination, i.e., Los
Angeles. , x x x the loss of the coupon was attributable to the negligence of CATHAY’s agents and was the proximate
cause of the non-confirmation of petitioner's return flight.
Japan Airlines vs Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 118664)

Facts: Private respondents boarded a JAL flight in San Francisco, California bound for Manila. It included an overnight
stopover at Narita, Japan at JAL’s expense. Due to the Mt. Pinatubo eruption, private respondents’ trip to Manila was
cancelled. JAL rebooked all the Manila-bound passengers and paid for the hotel expenses of their unexpected overnight
stay. The flight of private respondents was again cancelled due to NAIA’s indefinite closure. JAL informed the
respondents that it would no longer defray their hotel and accommodation expense during their stay in Narita. The
respondents were forced to pay for their accommodations and meal expenses for 5 days.

Issues:Whether or not JAL has the obligation to shoulder the hotel and meal expenses even if the delay was caused by
force majeure

Held:When a party is unable to fulfill his obligation because of force majeure, the general rule is that he cannot be held
liable for damages for non-performance. When JAL was prevented from resuming its flight to Manila due to the effects
of the eruption, whatever losses or damages in the form of hotel and meal expenses the stranded passengers incurred
cannot be charged to JAL. The predicament of the private respondents was not due to the fault or negligence of JAL. JAL
had the duty to arrange the respondents’ flight back to Manila. However, it failed to look after the comfort and
convenience of its passengers when it made the passengers arrange their flight back to Manila on their own and after
waiting in the airport for a whole day.
YOBIDO v CA [G.R. No. 113003. October 17, 1997.] ALBERTA YOBIDO and CRESENCIO YOBIDO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, LENY TUMBOY, ARDEE TUMBOY and JASMIN TUMBOY, respondents.

FACTS:
On April 26, 1988, spouses Tito and Leny Tumboy and their minor children, Ardee and Jasmin, boarded at Mangagoy, Surigao del
Sur, a Yobido bus bound for Davao City. Along Picop road in Km. 17, Sta. Maria, Agusan del Sur, the left front tire of the bus
suddenly exploded. The bus fell into a ravine around three (3) feet from the road and struck a tree which resulted in the death of Tito
Tumboy and physical injuries to other passengers. Thereafter, a complaint for breach of contract of carriage, damages and attorney's
fees was filed by Leny and her children against Alberta Yobido, the owner of the bus, and Cresencio Yobido, its driver in the Regional
Trial Court of Davao City.

Defenses:
Abundio Salce, who was the bus conductor when the incident happened, testified that 1. the 42-seater bus was not full as there were
only 32 passengers, such that he himself managed to get a seat;
2. the bus was running at a speed of "60 to 50" and that it was going slow because of the zigzag road.
3. the left front tire that exploded was a "brand new tire" that he mounted on the bus on April 21, 1988 or only five (5) days before the
incident.

DECISION:
(1) Trial Court: dismissing the action for lack of merit
(2) Court of Appeals: rendered a decision reversing that of the lower court

ISSUE:
Whether the tire blow-out is a fortuitous event

RULING:
No.
A fortuitous event is possessed of the following characteristics:
(a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligations must be
independent of human will;
(b) it must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to
avoid;
(c) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and
(d) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor.

As Article 1174 provides, no person shall be responsible for a fortuitous event which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen
was inevitable. In other words, there must be an entire exclusion of human agency from the cause of injury or loss.

There is no reason to overturn the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals. Petitioners' contention that they are exempted
from liability because the tire blowout was a fortuitous event that could not have been foreseen, must fail. It is settled that an accident
caused either by defects in the automobile or through the negligence of its driver is not a caso fortuito that would exempt the carrier
from liability for damages. Accordingly, the challenged decision is affirmed subject to modification that petitioners shall additionally
pay herein, respondents P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.
The explosion of the new tire may not be considered a fortuitous event. There are human factors involved in the situation. The fact
that the tire was new did not imply that it was entirely free from manufacturing defects or that it was properly mounted on the vehicle.
Neither may the fact that the tire bought and used in the vehicle is of a brand name noted for quality, resulting in the conclusion that it
could not explode within five days' use. Be that as it may, it is settled that an accident caused either by defects in the automobile or
through the negligence of its driver is not a caso fortuito that would exempt the carrier from liability for damages.

It was incumbent upon the defense to establish that it took precautionary measures considering partially dangerous condition of the
road. As stated above, proof that the tire was new and of good quality is not sufficient proof that it was not negligent. Petitioners
should have shown that it undertook extraordinary diligence in the care of its carrier such as conducting daily routinary check-ups of
the vehicle's parts. As the late Justice J.B.L. Reyes said: "It may be impracticable, as appellee argues, to require of carriers to test the
strength of each and every part of its vehicles before each trip, but we are of the opinion that a due regard for the carrier's obligations
toward the traveling public demands adequate periodical tests to determine the condition and strength of those vehicle portions the
failure of which may endanger the safety of the passengers."

Baliwag Transit vs. CA(GR 116110, 15 May 1996)

FACTS:On 31 July 1980, Leticia Garcia, and her 5-year old son, Allan Garcia, boarded Baliwag Transit Bus 2036 bound for
Cabanatuan City driven by Jaime Santiago. They took the seat behind the driver.
At about 7:30 p.m., in Malimba, Gapan, Nueva Ecija, the bus passengers saw a cargo truck, owned by A & J Trading,
parked at the shoulder of the national highway. Its left rear portion jutted to the outer lane, as the shoulder of the road
was too narrow to accommodate the whole truck. A kerosene lamp appeared at the edge of the road obviously to serve
as a warning device. The truck driver, and his helper were then replacing a flat tire.
Bus driver Santiago was driving at an inordinately fast speed and failed to notice the truck and the kerosene lamp at the
edge of the road. Santiago’s passengers urged him to slow down but he paid them no heed. Santiago even carried
animated conversations with his co-employees while driving. When the danger of collision became imminent, the bus
passengers shouted “Babangga tayo!”. Santiago stepped on the brake, but it was too late. His bus rammed into the
stalled cargo truck killing him instantly and the truck’s helper, and injury to several others among them herein
respondents.
Thus, a suit was filed against Baliwag Transit, Inc., A & J Trading and Julio Recontique for damages in the RTC of Bulacan.
After trial, it found Baliwag Transit, Inc. liable for having failed to deliver Garcia and her son to their point of destination
safely in violation of Garcia’s and Baliwag Transit’s contractual relation; and likewise found A & J and its truck driver
liable for failure to provide its cargo truck with an early warning device in violation of the Motor Vehicle Law. All were
ordered to pay solidarily the Garcia spouses. On appeal, the CA modified the trial court’s Decision by absolving A & J
Trading from liability.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Baliwag should be held solely liable for the injuries.
HELD:Yes.
As a common carrier, Baliwag breached its contract of carriage when it failed to deliver its passengers, Leticia and Allan
Garcia to their destination safe and sound. A common carrier is bound to carry its passengers safely as far as human care
and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, with due regard for all the
circumstances. In a contract of carriage, it is presumed that the common carrier was at fault or was negligent when a
passenger dies or is injured. Unless the presumption is rebutted, the court need not even make an express finding of
fault or negligence on the part of the common carrier. This statutory presumption may only be overcome by evidence
that the carrier exercised extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code.
Article 1759 of the Civil Code provides that “Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers
through the negligence or willfull acts of the former’s employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the
scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers. This liability of the common carriers do not
cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection or supervision of their
employees.”
Section 34 (g) of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code provides “Lights and reflector when parked or disabled. —
Appropriate parking lights or flares visible one hundred meters away shall be displayed at the corner of the vehicle
whenever such vehicle is parked on highways or in places that are not well-lighted or, is placed in such manner as to
endanger passing traffic. Furthermore, every motor vehicle shall be provided at all times with built-in reflectors or other
similar warning devices either pasted, painted or attached at its front and back which shall likewise be visible at night at
least one hundred meters away. No vehicle not provided with any of the requirements mentioned in this subsection
shall be registered. ”
x x x However, the evidence shows that Recontique and Ecala placed a kerosene lamp or torch at the edge of the road,
near the rear portion of the truck to serve as an early warning device. This substantially complies with Section 34 (g) of
the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. The law clearly allows the use not only of an early warning device of the
triangular reflectorized plates variety but also parking lights or flares visible 100 meters away. Indeed, Col. dela Cruz
himself admitted that a kerosene lamp is an acceptable substitute for the reflectorized plates. No negligence, therefore,
may be imputed to A & J Trading and its driver, Recontique.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA-GR CV-31246) with the modification reducing the
actual damages for hospitalization and medical fees to P5,017.74; without costs.

JOSE PILAPIL vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALATCO TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC.

(G.R. No. 52159, December 22, 1989)

FACTS:
Petitioner Pilapil, on board respondent’s bus was hit above his eye by a stone hurled by an unidentified bystander.
Respondent’s personnel lost no time in bringing him to a hospital, but eventually petitioner partially lost his left eye’s
vision and sustained a permanent scar.
Thus, Petitioner lodged an action for recovery of damages before the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur which the
latter granted. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed said decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not common carriers assume risks to passengers such as the stoning in this case?
HELD:
In consideration of the right granted to it by the public to engage in the business of transporting passengers and goods, a
common carrier does not give its consent to become an insurer of any and all risks to passengers and goods. It merely
undertakes to perform certain duties to the public as the law imposes, and holds itself liable for any breach thereof.
While the law requires the highest degree of diligence from common carriers in the safe transport of their passengers
and creates a presumption of negligence against them, it does not, however, make the carrier an insurer of the absolute
safety of its passengers.
Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the wilful acts or
negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier's employees through the exercise of the diligence
of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.
Clearly under the above provision, a tort committed by a stranger which causes injury to a passenger does not accord
the latter a cause of action against the carrier. The negligence for which a common carrier is held responsible is the
negligent omission by the carrier's employees to prevent the tort from being committed when the same could have
been foreseen and prevented by them. Further, under the same provision, it is to be noted that when the violation of
the contract is due to the willful acts of strangers, as in the instant case, the degree of care essential to be exercised by
the common carrier for the protection of its passenger is only that of a good father of a family.

FORTUNE EXPRESS vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PAULIE CAORONG and HER MINOR CHILDREN, 305 SCRA 14 (1999)

FACTS:

 Pauli Caurong filed a complaint for damages against petitioner, a bus company operating in Northern Mindanao,
for the death of her husband, Atty. Talib Caorong. Atty. Caurong was shot by Maranaos in an ambush involving
said bus.

 BACKGROUND OF THE STORY:

o In November 1989, a bus of Fortune was involved in an accident with a passenger jeepney resulting in
the deaths of several passengers.

o Crisanto Generalao, a local field agent of the Philippine Constabulary, conducted an investigation on the
accident and found that the owner of the jeepney was a Maranao and that several Maranaos were
planning to burn some of Fortune’s buses for revenge.

o Generalao informed Diosdado Bravo, operations manager of Fortune, about the plot, and Bravo assured
him that they would take the necessary precautions for safety.

o Several days later, Atty. Caorong was on board a bus to Iligan when three Maranaos went on board the
vehicle. The leader of the group ordered the passengers to leave the bus. Atty. Caorong later went back
to get something when he saw that the Maranaos were already pouring gasoline on the bus and on the
driver. Atty. Caorong pleaded for the life of the driver, after which the driver jumped out of the vehicle.
Caorong was shot to death as a result.

 RTC dismissed the complaint:

o Fortune was not negligent. Disregarding the suggestion of providing its buses with security guards is not
an omission of petitioner’s duty. The evidence showed that the assailants did not intend to harm the
passengers. The death of Atty. Caorong was an unexpected and unforeseen occurrence beyond
petitioner’s control.
  CA REVERSED RTC’s ruling:

o Fortune is negligent. Despite the tip to Manager Bravo of the devious plan by several Maranaos,
management did not do not take any safety precautions at all.

o One available safeguard that could have absolved Fortune from liability was frisking of incoming
passengers en route to dangerous areas and bag inspection at the terminals, which Fortune failed to
do. The frisking system is not novel in sensitive and dangerous places. Many companies adopt this
measure. Fortune did “absolutely nothing”.

o ISSUE:

1. W/N Petitioner is liable for the death of Atty. Caorong by failing to take necessary precautions to ensure the
safety of its passengers;

2. W/N the attack by the Maranaos constituted causo fortuito?

HELD: Petitioner is liable. Attack was not a fortuitous event.

 Article 1763 holds common carriers liable for the injuries to passengers caused by the wilful act of other
passengers, if its employees failed to exercise the diligence of a good father in preventing the act.

 Despite the warning by the constabulary officer, petitioner did nothing to protect the safety of its passengers.

 If petitioner took the necessary precautions, they would have discovered the weapons and the large quantity of
gasoline the malefactors carried with them.

 A common carrier is liable for failing to prevent hijacking by frisking passengers and inspecting baggages.1

 The seizure of the bus was not force majeure. Of the four elements to constitute an event as caso fotuito, the
element of “unforeseeable or unavoidable circumstances” was lacking. The seizure of the bus was foreseeable,
given the fact that petitioner was well-informed of the possibility, days before the incident. This situation was
likened to a case2 where the common carrier failed to take safety precautions despite warnings of an
approaching typhoon.

 Petitioner is solely liable for Atty. Caorong’s death. There was no contributory negligence on the part of the
victim, since all he did was pleading for the life of the driver. His heroic effort was neither an act of negligence or
recklessness.

1
Gacal vs. Philippine Airlines.
2 Vasquez vs. Court of Appeals