Crisostomo B. Aquino vs. Municipality Of Malay, Aklan ordinance and yet it failed to do so.

led to do so. If such was the case, the

G.R. No. 211356; September 29, 2014
Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.
FACTS:
In a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, petitioner
Crisostomo Aquino, the president and chief executive officer
of Boracay Island West Cove, assailed the decisions of the
Municipality of Malay, Aklan for denying his application for
zoning compliance and issuing demolition closure and
demolition order and the CA for denying his petition for
certiorari for being the improper remedy.
Petitioner’s application for zoning compliance and building
permit covering the construction of an additional three-storey
hotel over a parcel of land covered by a Forest Land Use
Agreement for Tourism Purposes (FLAgT) were denied by the
Municipal Zoning Administrator on the ground that the
proposed construction site was within the "no build zone"
demarcated in a Municipal Ordinance. Thereafter, the
respondent issued a 1) Cease and Desist Order enjoining the
expansion of the resort, and 2) EO No. 10 ordering the closure
and demolition of Boracay West Cove’s hotel. EO 10 was
partially implemented on June 10, 2011. Also, respondents
demolished the improvements introduced by Boracay West
Cove.
Petitioner alleged that the order was issued and executed with
grave abuse of discretion. He argued that judicial proceedings
should first be conducted before the respondent mayor could
order the demolition of the company’s establishment.
On the other hand, respondents argued that the demolition
needed no court order because the municipal mayor has the
express power under the Local Government Code (LGC) to
order the removal of illegally constructed buildings.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the procedural due process (of due
notice and hearing) was complied with.
2. Whether or not judicial proceedings should first be
conducted before the respondent mayor could order
the demolition of the company’s establishment.
RULING:
grace period can be deemed observed and the establishment
was already ripe for closure and demolition by the time EO 10
was issued in June.
2. No, petitioner’s right to due process was not violated
for lack of judicial proceedings prior to the issuance of
demolition order.
The government may enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations
to promote the general welfare. One such piece of legislation
is the Local Government Code (LGC), which authorizes city and
municipal governments, acting through their local chief
executives, to issue demolition orders and to hear issues
involving property rights of individuals and to come out with
an effective order or resolution thereon. Pertinent herein is
Sec. 444 (b)(3)(vi) of the LGC, which empowered the mayor to
order the closure and removal of illegally constructed
establishments for failing to secure the necessary permits.
Though the court agreed with Petitioner’s contention that,
under the LGC, the Sanggunian does not have the power to
authorize the extrajudicial condemnation and destruction of a
nuisance per accidens, still the SC ruled that the LGU may
nevertheless properly order the hotel’s demolition without
due hearing thereon in a tribunal, because in the exercise of
police power and the general welfare clause provided in the
Constitution, property rights of individuals may be subjected
to restraints and burdens in order to fulfil the objectives of the
government.
Hence, the right to due process was satisfied in the case at bar.

1. Yes, the procedural due process (of due notice and

hearing) was complied with.
First, basic is the rule that public officers enjoy the
presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties.
The burden is on the petitioner herein to prove that Boracay
West Cove was deprived of the opportunity to be heard before
EO 10 was issued. Regrettably, copies of the Cease and Desist
Order issued by the LGU and of the assailed EO 10 itself were
never attached to the petition before this Court, which
documents could have readily shed light on whether or not
petitioner has been accorded the 10-day grace period
provided in Section 10 of the Ordinance. In view of this fact,
the presumption of regularity must be sustained.
Second, as quoted by petitioner in his petition before the CA,
the assailed EO 10 states that petitioner received notices from
the municipality government on March 7 and 28, 2011,
requiring Boracay West Cove to comply with the zoning
1. BROWN MADONNA PRESS INC., THADDEUS ANTHONY A.
CABANGON, FORTUNE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY (now
Fortune General Insurance Corporation) and/or ANTONIO
CABANGON CHUA,
vs.
MARIA ROSARIO M. CASAS,
FACTS:
In 1984, Casas was hired as an accounting clerk at Fortune
General Insurance. She eventually rose from the ranks; she
was transferred to BMPI, another ALC member company, as its
Vice President for Finance and Administration.
Casas met with BMPI’s company president, and the Vice
President for the Central Human Resource Department of the
ALC Group of Companies. During the meeting, Casas was
allegedly told not to report to work anymore starting January
8, 2007, upon the instructions of Cabangon-Chua, ALC’s
Chairman Emeritus. Casas claims that the reason for her
abrupt dismissal was not disclosed to her, but she was
promised a separation pay. She thus packed her things and
left.
BMPI, on the other hand, asserts that it was Casas who
requested a graceful exit from the company. The meeting was
supposedly held to confront Casas about certain complaints
against her, and about the growing rift between her and
another company officer. BMPI asserts that Casas opted to
leave the company to avoid an administrative investigation
against her and to give her the chance to jumpstart her career
outside the company. She succeeded in convincing Cabangon
to grant her some form of financial assistance as they were
friends.4
Casas no longer reported for work and BMPI, for its part,
started the processing of her clearance. Casas sent Cabangon-
Chua a letter asking for the reconsideration of his decision to
terminate her employment. Cabangon-Chua did not act on this
letter.
Casas filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and for payment of
separation pay, backwages, retirement benefits and attorney’s
fees.
ISSUE: WON Casas had been illegally dismissed.
(Did she voluntarily resign from, or abandon her work at, BMPI,
or was she summarily dismissed by Cabangon?)
HELD: YES, Casas had been illegally dismissed.
The CA did not err in affirming the NLRC’s factual finding that
Casas had been dismissed from work
In illegal dismissal cases, the employer has the burden of
proving that the employee’s dismissal was
legal.1âwphi1However, to discharge this burden, the
employee must first prove, by substantial evidence, that he
had been dismissed from employment.
The CA, in affirming the NLRC’s conclusion that Casas had been
dismissed, gave emphasis to the existence of two documents
on record: first, the unsigned clearance and quitclaim
document unilaterally prepared by BMPI, and second, the
letter Casas sent to Cabangon-Chua, asking the latter to
reconsider her termination.
These pieces of evidence sufficiently establish Casas’ dismissal
from the company.
The Clearance and Quitclaim document discloses that Casas
would "cease to be connected with the company at the close
of office on January 16, 2007." The document, which was even
introduced as evidence by the petitioners, was prepared
unilaterally at Cabangon’s instructions. It shows the company’s
intent to sever its employment relationship with Casas.
Considered together with the letter Casas sent Cabangon-Chua
asking for her reinstatement on May 17, 2007, these
documents back Casas’sr assertion that she was compelled to
leave her job on January 5, 2007.
As their main defense, BMPI and Cabangon claim that they
never dismissed Casas from work, and that she instead
requested a graceful exit from the company.
Jurisprudence has established that employers interposing
their employee’s resignation as a defense from illegal dismissal
cases have the burden of proving that the employee indeed
voluntarily resigned.33 Resignation — the formal
pronouncement or relinquishment of a position or office — is
the voluntary act of an employee compelled by personal
reason(s) to disassociate himself from employment.34 It is
done with the intention of relinquishing an office,
accompanied by the act manifesting this intent.35
In the present case, the petitioners allege that Casas asked for
a graceful exit from the company to avoid an administrative
investigation against her. They claim that Casas had grossly
failed to manage and take control of BMPI’s ex-deal assets,
which caused the company serious losses. When Casas was
confronted about these reports of mismanagement, she
voluntarily resigned from office in exchange for separation
pay.
NLRC and CA correctly disregarded these allegations in
concluding that Casas had been terminated from office.
First, the pieces of evidence that the petitioners submitted are
insufficient to establish their claim. To prove that Casas
voluntarily abandoned her work, the petitioners submitted
affidavits from their employees, Domingo Almoninia, Jr. and
Victoria C. Nava, who both testified to the events leading to a
private conversation between Casas and Cabangon.
Domingo Almoninia, Jr., BMPI’s former Chief Audit Executive,
Testified36 that he had informed Cabangon of reports
regarding Casas’s mismanagement of BMPI’s ex-deal assets on
January 5, 2007. Casas, together with Vice President for
Human Resources Victoria Nava, were then summoned to
Cabangon’s room. According to Almoninia, he witnessed
Cabangon confront Casas regarding reports about her
mismanagement and certain unauthorized transactions. In the
course of the discussion, Cabangon allegedly told Casas that
the reports against her would have to be investigated, and
instructed her to settle her differences with a certain Mr.
Tayag. Casas asked Cabangon if she was being dismissed, to
which the latter answered in the negative. Both Almoninia and
Nava were then asked to leave the room.
Nava, on the other hand, corroborated Almoninia’s narration,
and added insinuations that Casas had been having problems
in the company.37
In considering their affidavits, we emphasize that neither
Almoninia nor Nava were present in the private conversation
that ensued between Cabangon and Casas, after the
confrontation that they witnessed. This leaves Cabangon’s
claim that Casas asked for a graceful exit from the company
uncorroborated; what stands is Casas’ statement contradicting
the claim that she had not been dismissed from her job.
Second, Cabangon failed to provide any documentary
evidence supporting Casas’ voluntary resignation. BMPI failed
to show any resignation letter from Casas. The Clearance and
Quitclaim document, which shows Casas’ severance from the
company, does not contain her signature. 38 Neither was Casas
given any return to work order, notice of infraction, or notice
of termination, all of which could have supported BMPI’s
theory that Casas was never prevented from going back to
work.
Third, Cabangon, Almoninia and Nava’s testimonies show that
Casas could have entertained the motive to resign from her
work, but does not prove her intent to leave her office. Intent
to relinquish one’s office is determined from the acts of an
employee before and after the alleged resignation. Casas’ acts
after allegedly resigning from work negate this intent: she
wrote a letter asking Cabangon-Chua to reconsider her
termination from office; she refused to sign the Clearance and
Quitclaim document; and she filed an illegal dismissal case
against her employers.
The CA did not err in affirming the NLRC’s conclusion that
Casas’ dismissal violated the procedural requirements of the
Labor Code The sudden termination from office was without
just cause and violated procedural due process.
According to the NLRC, despite the serious allegations that the
BMPI lodged against Casas, it never asked her to explain her
acts, and instead opted to sever its employment relations with
her. On this basis alone, the NLRC concluded that Casas’
dismissal had been illegal and non-compliant with procedural
due process.
Casas had been dismissed prior to any probe on her reported
violation of company rules and regulations.
In determining whether an employee’s dismissal had been
legal, the inquiry focuses on whether the dismissal violated his
right to substantial and procedural due process. An
employee’s right not to be dismissed without just or
authorized cause as provided by law, is covered by his right to
substantial due process. Compliance with procedure provided
in the Labor Code, on the other hand, constitutes the
procedural due process right of an employee.
The violation of either the substantial due process right or the
procedural due process right of an employee produces
different results. Termination without a just or authorized
cause renders the dismissal invalid, and entitles the employee
to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges and full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and
other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from
the time the compensation was not paid up to the time of
actual reinstatement.
An employee’s removal for just or authorized cause but
without complying with the proper procedure, on the other
hand, does not invalidate the dismissal. It obligates the erring
employer to pay nominal damages to the employee, as penalty
for not complying with the procedural requirements of due
process.
Thus, two separate inquiries must be made in resolving illegal
dismissal cases: first, whether the dismissal had been made in
accordance with the procedure set in the Labor Code; and
second, whether the dismissal had been for just or authorized
cause.
There can be no doubt that the procedural requirements had
not been complied with in the present case: shortly after a
private conversation between Cabangon and Casas, Casas took
her belongings from the office and left the building. As
explained earlier, Casas’s acts after this private conversation
reveal that she had been summarily dismissed: Casas gave no
resignation letter, refused to sign the Clearance and Quitclaim
document that the company issued, and sent a letter asking
for her reinstatement.
Notably, the private conversation that led to Casas’s summary
dismissal did not conform, in any way, to the procedural due
process requirements embodied in Rule XIV of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing the Labor Code, viz:
RULE XIV Termination of Employment
SECTION 1. Security of tenure and due process. — No workers
shall be dismissed except for a just or authorized cause
provided by law and after due process.
SECTION 2. Notice of dismissal.— Any employer who seeks to
dismiss a worker shall furnish him a written notice stating the
particular acts or omission constituting the grounds for his
dismissal. In cases of abandonment of work, the notice shall be
served at the worker's last known address.
xxx
SECTION 5. Answer and hearing. — The worker may answer
the allegations stated against him in the notice of dismissal
within a reasonable period from receipt of such notice. The
employer shall afford the worker ample opportunity to be
heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his
representative, if he so desires.
SECTION 6. Decision to dismiss. — The employer shall
immediately notify a worker in writing of a decision to dismiss
him stating clearly the reasons therefor.
Cabangon failed to show any written notice provided to Casas
informing her of the charges against her, and neither had she
been informed in writing of her dismissal and the reasons
behind it.
Even assuming arguendo that Casas had indeed voluntarily
abandoned her work – an uncorroborated claim by Cabangon
– Cabangon had the duty to give Casas a written notice of the
grounds leading to her dismissal.
Thus, Cabangon failed to comply with the two-notice
requirement under the law, resulting in a violation of Casas’s
right to procedural due process.
The CA did not err in finding no grave abuse of discretion in
the NLRC’s decision to hold that Casas had been dismissed
without just cause
Casas’s dismissal had not been for just cause, because at the
time she was dismissed, not one of the charges against her had
been proven. Casas was, at the time of her dismissal,
presumed innocent until proven guilty; thus, there existed no
just cause to terminate her employment at the time she was
summarily dismissed.
In reaching this conclusion, the CA reviewed whether the NLRC
acted with grave abuse of discretion in holding that Casas’s
dismissal had no just cause. The NLRC, in its decision, held that
Casas’s dismissal had not been for just cause because she was
not even allowed to explain the supposed acts that had been
inimical to BMPI’s interests.
In affirming the NLRC’s decision, the CA clarified the
application of procedural and substantial due process in the
present case: Casas had not been given the two-notice
requirement in the law, and hence, her procedural due process
rights had been violated. And because not one of the
allegations against her had been proven at the time she was
summarily dismissed, there existed no cause to terminate her
services.
We have, in the past, affirmed the NLRC in ruling that an
employee’s act not proven at the time he had been dismissed
does not constitute just cause for his dismissal. In other words,
for an act to justify an employee’s dismissal, it should have
been proven, with substantial evidence, at the time he was
dismissed. Otherwise, the dismissal would not be for just
cause.
This conclusion finds support in cases emphasizing that an
unsubstantiated accusation will not ripen into a holding that
there is just cause for dismissal.47 A mere accusation of
wrongdoing is not sufficient cause for a valid dismissal of an
employee. The facts for which a dismissal is based should be
backed by substantial evidence at the time the employee is
dismissed, and not at the time his dismissal is being questioned
before the courts.
In the present case, the petitioners allege that Casas had
committed various infractions that would have warranted
disciplinary action against her. At the time that Casas was
dismissed, however, these alleged infractions were mere
speculations. The present petition for review on certiorari
admits this reality in two instances: first, in the body of the
petition itself stating that at the time of the January 5, 2007
meeting, disciplinary proceedings had yet to be initiated
against Casas and that the reports against her would still have
to be verified;48 and second, through its annexes, which
provided that the result of the investigation in the ex-deal
assets that Casas allegedly mismanaged was produced only on
February 17, 2007, or a full month after Casas’ dismissal.
Thus, at the time Cabangon asked Casas to leave her
employment, all he had as basis for Casas’s dismissal were
speculations. Worse, Cabangon’s summary dismissal of Casas
left her with little opportunity to adequately defend herself
from the allegations against her.
In these lights, we support the CA in holding that Casas’
summary dismissal had not been for just cause.
Just cause must be proven with substantial evidence at the
time of
dismissal
At its core, substantive due process guarantees a right to
liberty that cannot be taken away or unduly constricted,
except through valid causes provided in the law.
The concepts of procedural and substantive due process had
been carried over and applied to illegal dismissal cases,
although notably, employers are not governmental bodies to
which these rights usually refer. Agabon v. NLRC 51 described
the due process required in dismissing employees as statutory
– requirements that the law imposes on employers to comply
with, in contrast to constitutional due process rights that
guarantee against overreach from the government.
Although statutory in nature, the procedural and substantive
due process requirements in illegal dismissal cases stem from
the protection that the Constitution provides labor – the
Constitution has tasked the State to promote the workers’
security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living
wage. These guarantees, as well as a host of other rights and
responsibilities, find implementation through the Labor Code,
which fleshed out the concept of security of tenure54 as the
continuance of regular employment until an employee's
services are terminated because of just or authorized causes
enumerated in the law.
Thus, despite the differences in origin and application between
constitutional due process rights and the statutory
requirements in the Labor Code, we have applied concepts
implementing constitutional due process rights to the
statutory due process requirements of the Labor Code. We did
this in the present case, when we emphasized the need for
substantial evidence to support the just cause for the
employee's dismissal at the time her services were terminated.
In the same way that the crime charged against an accused
must first be proven before his or her right to liberty is taken
away, or that a government employee's infraction must first
be proven before the accused is deprived of the right to
continue !o hold office, so too, must just cause against an
employee be proven before he or she may be deprived of a
means of livelihood. Otherwise, the employee's right to
substantive due process would be violated.
In these lights, and in order to give full effect to the
embodiment of substantive due process in illegal dismissal
cases, it is necessary to rule, that an employee, in this present
case Casas, cannot be terminated from service without
sufficient substantial evidence of the just cause that would
merit her dismissal.
ATTY. JANET D. NACION v. COA
FACTS:
Petitioner was administratively charged by Commission on
Audit (COA) for grave misconduct. She was assigned by COA in
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewage System (MWSS).
During the petitioner’s assignment in MWSS from 2001 to
2003, she availed of the MWSS Multi-Purpose Loan Program,
such as car loan, housing loan, and received benefits and
bonuses from the latter. Petitioner avers that she availed of
the housing and car loan in an honest belief that she could
avail of the benefits in the absence of any prohibition thereon,
considering that COA Resolution that prohibited COA
personnel from availing of all forms of loan, monetary benefits
from agencies under their jurisdiction was issued only on 2004.
She denied receiving any allowances and bonuses and argued
that the documents submitted to establish the same are not
conclusive evidence that she indeed received the money. COA
cited violation of Sec. 18 of RA 6758 prohibiting COA personnel
from receiving salaries, bonuses, allowances or other
emoluments from government entity, local government unit,
GOCCs and government financial institution, except the
compensation directly paid by COA. She was given one-year
suspension as penalty, finding in her favor mitigating
circumstances her waiver of the formal investigation and
admission of availment of MWSS Housing and Car Loans.
The petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. She
avers that she was denied of the right to due process as she
argues that the records during her tenure with the MWSS
should not have been included by the audit team in
its investigations, as no office order covering it was issued by
the COA Chairman.
ISSUE:
whether or not the COA committed grave abuse of discretion
in finding Nacion guilty of grave misconduct and violation of
reasonable office rules and regulations.
To support her petition against the COA, Nacion invokes due
process as she argues that the records during her tenure with
the MWSS should not have been included by the audit team in
its investigations, as no office order covering it was issued by
the COA Chairman. Furthermore, the documentary evidence
considered by the Fraud Audit and Investigation Office (FAIO)
did not constitute substantial evidence to prove the
commission of the offenses with which she was charged.
Ruling of the Court
The petition is bereft of merit. At the outset, the Court
reiterates:
The concept is well-entrenched: grave abuse of discretion
exists when there is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in
contemplation of law as when the judgment rendered is not
based on law and evidence but on caprice, whim, and
despotism. Not every error in the proceedings, or every
erroneous conclusion of law or fact, constitutes grave abuse of
discretion. The abuse of discretion to be qualified as "grave"
must be so patent or gross as to constitute an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty or to act
at all in contemplation of law.[20] (Citations omitted)
Thus, the Court emphasized in Dycoco v. Court of
Appeals[21] that "[a]n act of a court or tribunal can only be
considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is
done in a 'capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.'"[22]
Upon review, the Court holds that no such grave abuse of
discretion may be attributed to the COA for the procedure it
observed, its factual findings and conclusions in Nacion's case.
Due Process in Administrative Proceedings
In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is
the opportunity to explain one's side or seek a reconsideration
of the action or ruling complained of, and to submit any
evidence he may have in support of his defense. The demands
of due process are sufficiently met when the parties are given
the opportunity to be heard before judgment is
rendered.[23] Given this and the circumstances under which the
rulings of the COA were issued, the Court finds no violation of
Nacion's right to due process. As the Office of the Solicitor
General correctly argued, the constitution of a separate fact-
finding team specifically for Nacion's case was not necessary
for the satisfaction of such right.
It bears stressing that Nacion was formally charged by
Chairperson Tan, following evidence that pointed to
irregularities committed while she was with the MWSS. Being
the COA Chairperson who, under the law, could initiate
administrative proceedings motu proprio, no written
complaint against Nacion from another person was necessary.
Section 2 of the COA Memorandum No. 76-48,[24] which
Nacion herself invokes, provides:
Sec. 2. How commenced.
(1) Administrative proceedings may be commenced against a
subordinate official or employee of the Commission by the
Chairman motu proprio, or upon sworn, written complaint of
any other person. (Sec. 38 [a], PD 807).
x x x x (Emphasis ours)
The power of the COA to discipline its officials then could not
be limited by the procedure being insisted upon by Nacion.
Neither is the authority of the Chairperson to commence the
action through the issuance of the formal charge restricted by
the requirement of a prior written complaint. As may be
gleaned from the cited provision, a written complaint under
oath is demanded only when the administrative case is
commenced by a person other than the COA Chairperson.
Contrary to Nacion's claim, the COA also did not act beyond its
jurisdiction when her case was considered by the FAIO
investigating team, notwithstanding the fact that the office
order which commanded an inquiry upon MWSS personnel
merely referred to alleged unauthorized receipt of bonuses
and benefits from the agency by Atty. Norberto Cabibihan
(Atty. Cabibihan) and his staff. Since Nacion's stint in MWSS
was before Atty. Cabibihan's, she argued that the team should
not have looked into the records and circumstances during her
term. In including benefits received during her term, Nacion
claimed that the investigating team acted beyond its
jurisdiction and deprived her of the right to due process.
The contention fails to persuade; a separate office order was
not necessary for the audit team's investigation of Nacion's
case. It should be emphasized that prior to the issuance of the
formal charge, the investigations conducted by the team were
merely fact-finding. The crucial point was the COA's
observance of the demands of due process prior to its finding
or decision that Nacion was administratively liable. The
formation of a separate fact-finding team that should look
specifically into Nacion's acts was not necessary to satisfy the
requirement. The formal charge was as yet to be issued by the
COA Chairperson, and Nacion's formal investigation
commenced only after she had filed her answer to the charge.
It was undisputed that Nacion, despite a chance, did not
request for such formal investigation, a circumstance which
the COA later considered as mitigating. In any case, she was
still accorded before the COA a reasonable opportunity to
present her defenses, through her answer to the formal charge
and eventually, motion for reconsideration of the COA's
decision.
FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA, PRESIDING JUDGE, MCTC,
COMPOSTELA-NEW BATAAN, COMPOSTELAVALLEY
PROVINCE, Petitioner, v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL,
Respondent.
Summary:
 Petitioner applied for a position as a judge in a second
level court but JBC did not include his name in the list of
applicants since he failed to qualify.
 This is because the JBC put priority to incumbent judges
who served their position for at least five years and
petitioner here only served as judged for more than a
year.
 The petitioner assailed, inter alia, the authority of the JBC
to add another qualification (5-year-qualitification)
because the said qualification was already prescribed
 The Supreme Court ruled that the internal process of
choosing people who would qualify done by the JBC was
valid since under Sect. 8 (5), Art. VIII of the Constitution
gave the JBC principal function of recommending
appointees to the judiciary
FACTS:
Herein petitioner, Judge Ferdinand R. Villanueva was a
presiding judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Compostela- New Bataas, Poblacion, Compostela Valley
Province, Region XI, which is a first-level court. He applied on
second-level courts such as Branch 31, Tagum City; Branch 13,
Davao City; and Branch 6, Prosperidad, Adusan Del Sur.
The Judicial and Bar Council’s (JBC) Office of Recruitment,
Selection and Nomination, informed the petitioner through a
letter that we failed to qualify for the said position he applied
on. On the same day, petitioner sent a letter (electronic mail).
He seeks reconsideration of his non-inclusion in the list of the
considered applicants. He also protested the inclusion of
applicants who failed the prejudicature examination.
Through a letter, the JBC Executive officer informed him that
his protest and reconsideration was duly noted by the JBC
en banc. Still the non-inclusion of his name in the list of
applicants was upheld. The reason was, the JBS’s long standing
policy of giving priority to incumbent judges that served
their current position for at least five years. Since
the petitioner only served as a judged for more than a year
only, his name was not included in the list.
Petitioner argues that: 1.) Qualifications was already
prescribed so the JBC could add no more, 2.) The five-year-
requirement violates the equal protection and due process
clauses of the constitution, 3.) The same requirement violates
theconstitutional provision on Social Justice and Human Rights
for Equal Opportunity of employment, and 4.) The
requirement of passing the prejudicature exam should be
mandatory.
Respondents argue that 1.) The writ of certiorari and
prohibition cannot issue to prevent the JBC from performing
itsprincipal function under the constitution to recommend
appointees to the judiciary because the JBC is not a
tribunalexercising judicial or quasi-judicial function, 2.)
Remedy of mandamus and declaratory relief will not lie
because petitioner doesnot have any legal right that need to
be protected, 3.) Legal protection clause is not violated
because the 5-year-requirement is performance and
experience based, and 4.) No violation of due process since the
policy is merely internal in nature.
HELD:
Equal Protection
There is no question that JBC employs standards to have a
rational basis to screen applicants who cannot be all
accommodated and appointed to a vacancy in the judiciary, to
determine who is best qualified among the applicants, and not
to discriminate against any particular individual or class.
The equal protection clause of the Constitution does not
require the universal application of the laws to all persons or
things without distinction; what it requires is simply equality
among equals as determined according to a valid classification.
Hence, the Court has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a
fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, the classification
stands as long as it bears a rational relationship to some
legitimate government end.[21]
"The equal protection clause, therefore, does not preclude
classification of individuals who may be accorded different
treatment under the law as long as the classification is
reasonable and not arbitrary."[22] "The mere fact that the
legislative classification may result in actual inequality is not
violative of the right to equal protection, for every
classification of persons or things for regulation by law
produces inequality in some degree, but the law is not thereby
rendered invalid."[23]
That is the situation here. In issuing the assailed policy, the JBC
merely exercised its discretion in accordance with the
constitutional requirement and its rules that a member of the
Judiciary must be of proven competence, integrity, probity and
independence.[24] "To ensure the fulfillment of these standards
in every member of the Judiciary, the JBC has been tasked to
screen aspiring judges and justices, among others, making
certain that the nominees submitted to the President are all
qualified and suitably best for appointment. In this way, the
appointing process itself is shielded from the possibility of
extending judicial appointment to the undeserving and
mediocre and, more importantly, to the ineligible or
disqualified."[25]
Consideration of experience by JBC as one factor in choosing
recommended appointees does not constitute a violation of
the equal protection clause. The JBC does not discriminate
when it employs number of years of service to screen and
differentiate applicants from the competition. The number of
years of service provides a relevant basis to determine proven
competence which may be measured by experience, among
other factors. The difference in treatment between lower
court judges who have served at least five years and those who
have served less than five years, on the other hand, was
rationalized by JBC as follows:
Formulating policies which streamline the selection process
falls squarely under the purview of the JBC. No other
constitutional body is bestowed with the mandate and
competency to set criteria for applicants that refer to the more
general categories of probity, integrity and independence.
The assailed criterion or consideration for promotion to a
second-level court, which is five years experience as judge of a
first-level court, is a direct adherence to the qualities
prescribed by the Constitution. Placing a premium on many
years of judicial experience, the JBC is merely applying one of
the stringent constitutional standards requiring that a member
of the judiciary be of "proven competence." In determining
competence, the JBC considers, among other
qualifications, experience and performance.
Based on the JBC's collective judgment, those who have been
judges of first-level courts for five (5) years are better qualified
for promotion to second-level courts. It deems length of
experience as a judge as indicative of conversance with the law
and court procedure. Five years is considered as a sufficient
span of time for one to acquire professional skills for the next
level court, declog the dockets, put in place improved
procedures and an efficient case management system, adjust
to the work environment, and gain extensive experience in the
judicial process.
A five-year stint in the Judiciary can also provide evidence of
the integrity, probity, and independence of judges seeking
promotion. To merit JBC's nomination for their promotion,
they must have had a "record of, and reputation for, honesty,
integrity, incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct, and fidelity
to sound moral and ethical standards." Likewise, their
decisions must be reflective of the soundness of their
judgment, courage, rectitude, cold neutrality and strength of
character.
Hence, for the purpose of determining whether judges are
worthy of promotion to the next level court, it would be
premature or difficult to assess their merit if they have had less
than one year of service on the bench.[26] (Citations omitted
and emphasis in the original)
At any rate, five years of service as a lower court judge is not
the only factor that determines the selection of candidates for
RTC judge to be appointed by the President. Persons with this
qualification are neither automatically selected nor do they
automatically become nominees. The applicants are chosen
based on an array of factors and are evaluated based on their
individual merits. Thus, it cannot be said that the questioned
policy was arbitrary, capricious, or made without any basis.
Clearly, the classification created by the challenged policy
satisfies the rational basis test. The foregoing shows that
substantial distinctions do exist between lower court judges
with five year experience and those with less than five years of
experience, like the petitioner, and the classification enshrined
in the assailed policy is reasonable and relevant to its
legitimate purpose. The Court, thus, rules that the questioned
policy does not infringe on the equal protection clause as it is
based on reasonable classification intended to gauge the
proven competence of the applicants. Therefore, the said
policy is valid and constitutional.
Due Process
The petitioner averred that the assailed policy violates
procedural due process for lack of publication and non-
submission to the University of the Philippines Law Center
Office of the National Administrative Register (ONAR). The
petitioner said that the assailed policy will affect all applying
judges, thus, the said policy should have been published.
Contrary to the petitioner's contention, the assailed JBC policy
need not be filed in the ONAR because the publication
requirement in the ONAR is confined to issuances of
administrative agencies under the Executive branch of the
government.[27] Since the JBC is a body under the supervision
of the Supreme Court,[28] it is not covered by the publication
requirements of the Administrative Code.
Nevertheless, the assailed JBC policy requiring five years of
service as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as
applicants to second-level courts should have been published.
As a general rule, publication is indispensable in order that all
statutes, including administrative rules that are intended to
enforce or implement existing laws, attain binding force and
effect. There are, however, several exceptions to the
requirement of publication, such as interpretative regulations
and those merely internal in nature, which regulate only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public.
Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of
instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the
rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the
performance of their duties.[29]
Here, the assailed JBC policy does not fall within the
administrative rules and regulations exempted from the
publication requirement. The assailed policy involves a
qualification standard by which the JBC shall determine proven
competence of an applicant. It is not an internal regulation,
because if it were, it would regulate and affect only the
members of the JBC and their staff. Notably, the selection
process involves a call to lawyers who meet the qualifications
in the Constitution and are willing to serve in the Judiciary to
apply to these vacant positions. Thus, it is but a natural
consequence thereof that potential applicants be informed of
the requirements to the judicial positions, so that they would
be able to prepare for and comply with them.
The Court also noted the fact that in JBC-009, otherwise known
as the Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council, the JBC had put its
criteria in writing and listed the guidelines in determining
competence, independence, integrity and probity. Section 1,
Paragraph 1 of Rule 9 expressly provides that applicants for the
Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan, should, as a general
rule, have at least five years of experience as an RTC judge,
thus:
RULE 9 - SPECIAL GUIDELINES FOR NOMINATION TO A
VACANCY IN THE COURT OF APPEALS AND SANDIGANBAYAN
Section 1. Additional criteria for nomination to the Court of
Appeals and the Sandiganbayan. - In addition to the foregoing
guidelines the Council should consider the following in
evaluating the merits of applicants for a vacancy in the Court
of Appeals and Sandiganbayan:
1. As a general rule, he must have at least five years of
experience as a judge of Regional Trial Court, except when he
has in his favor outstanding credentials, as evidenced by, inter
alia, impressive scholastic or educational record and
performance in the Bar examinations, excellent reputation for
honesty, integrity, probity and independence of mind; at least
very satisfactory performance rating for three (3) years
preceding the filing of his application for nomination; and
excellent potentials for appellate judgeship.
x x x x (Emphasis ours)
The express declaration of these guidelines in JBC-009, which
have been duly published on the website of the JBC and in a
newspaper of general circulation suggests that the JBC is
aware that these are not mere internal rules, but are rules
implementing the Constitution that should be published. Thus,
if the JBC were so-minded to add special guidelines for
determining competence of applicants for RTC judges, then it
could and should have amended its rules and published the
same. This, the JBC did not do as JBC-009 and its amendatory
rule do not have special guidelines for applicants to the RTC.
Moreover, jurisprudence has held that rules implementing a
statute should be published. Thus, by analogy, publication is
also required for the five-year requirement because it seeks to
implement a constitutional provision requiring proven
competence from members of the judiciary.
Nonetheless, the JBC's failure to publish the assailed policy has
not prejudiced the petitioner's private interest. At the risk of
being repetitive, the petitioner has no legal right to be included
in the list of nominees for judicial vacancies since the
possession of the constitutional and statutory qualifications
for appointment to the Judiciary may not be used to legally
demand that one's name be included in the list of candidates
for a judicial vacancy. One's inclusion in the shortlist is strictly
within the discretion of the JBC.[30]
As to the issue that the JBC failed or refused to implement the
completion of the prejudicature program as a requirement for
appointment or promotion in the judiciary under R.A. No.
8557, this ground of the petition, being unsubstantiated, was
unfounded. Clearly, it cannot be said that JBC unlawfully
neglects the performance of a duty enjoined by law.
Finally, the petitioner argued but failed to establish that the
assailed policy violates the constitutional provision under
social justice and human rights for equal opportunity of
employment. The OSG explained:
[T]he questioned policy does not violate equality of
employment opportunities. The constitutional provision does
not call for appointment to the Judiciary of all who might, for
any number of reasons, wish to apply. As with all professions,
it is regulated by the State. The office of a judge is no ordinary
office. It is imbued with public interest and is central in the
administration of justice x x x. Applicants who meet the
constitutional and legal qualifications must vie and withstand
the competition and rigorous screening and selection process.
They must submit themselves to the selection criteria,
processes and discretion of respondent JBC, which has the
constitutional mandate of screening and selecting candidates
whose names will be in the list to be submitted to the
President. So long as a fair opportunity is available for all
applicants who are evaluated on the basis of their individual
merits and abilities, the questioned policy cannot be struck
down as unconstitutional.[31] (Citations omitted)
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the petitioner has not
established a clear legal right to justify the issuance of a
preliminary injunction. The petitioner has merely filed an
application with the JBC for the position of RTC judge, and he
has no clear legal right to be nominated for that office nor to
be selected and included in the list to be submitted to the
President which is subject to the discretion of the JBC. The JBC
has the power to determine who shall be recommended to the
judicial post. To be included in the list of applicants is a
privilege as one can only be chosen under existing criteria
imposed by the JBC itself. As such, prospective applicants,
including the petitioner, cannot claim any demandable right to
take part in it if they fail to meet these criteria. Hence, in the
absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of an injunctive writ
is not justified.
As the constitutional body granted with the power of searching
for, screening, and selecting applicants relative to
recommending appointees to the Judiciary, the JBC has the
authority to determine how best to perform such
constitutional mandate. Pursuant to this authority, the JBC
issues various policies setting forth the guidelines to be
observed in the evaluation of applicants, and formulates rules
and guidelines in order to ensure that the rules are updated to
respond to existing circumstances. Its discretion is freed from
legislative, executive or judicial intervention to ensure that the
JBC is shielded from any outside pressure and improper
influence. Limiting qualified applicants in this case to those
judges with five years of experience was an exercise of
discretion by the JBC. The potential applicants, however,
should have been informed of the requirements to the judicial
positions, so that they could properly prepare for and comply
with them. Hence, unless there are good and compelling
reasons to do so, the Court will refrain from interfering with
the exercise of JBC's powers, and will respect the initiative and
independence inherent in the latter.
KABATAAN PARTY LIST, et. al., Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 221318 December 16, 2015
FACTS:
RA 10367 mandates the COMELEC to implement a
mandatory biometrics registration system for new voters in
order to establish a clean, complete, permanent, and updated
list of voters through the adoption of biometric technology.
RA 10367 likewise directs that “registered voters
whose biometrics have not been captured shall submit
themselves for validation.” “Voters who fail to submit for
validation on or before the last day of filing of application for
registration for purposes of the May 2016 elections shall
be deactivated x x x.”
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9721 as amended by
Resolutions No. 9863 and 10013. Among others, the said
Resolution provides that: “the registration records of voters
without biometrics data who failed to submit for validation on
or before the last day of filing of applications for registration
for the purpose of the May 9, 2016 National and Local
Elections shall be deactivated.
Herein petitioners filed the instant petition
with application for temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction (WPI) assailing the
constitutionality of the biometrics validation requirement
imposed under RA 10367, as well as COMELEC Resolution Nos.
9721, 9863, and 10013, all related thereto. They contend that:
(a) biometrics validation rises to the level of an additional,
substantial qualification where there is penalty of
deactivation;[41] (b) biometrics deactivation is not the
disqualification by law contemplated by the 1987
Constitution;[42] (c) biometrics validation gravely violates the
Constitution, considering that, applying the strict scrutiny test,
it is not poised with a compelling reason for state regulation
and hence, an unreasonable deprivation of the right to
suffrage;[43] (d) voters to be deactivated are not afforded due
process;[44] and (e) poor experience with biometrics should
serve as warning against exacting adherence to the
system.[45] Albeit already subject of a prior petition[46] filed
before this Court, petitioners also raise herein the argument
that deactivation by November 16, 2015 would result in the
premature termination of the registration period contrary to
Section 8[47] of RA 8189.[48] Ultimately, petitioners pray that
this Court declare RA 10367, as well as COMELEC Resolution
Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013, unconstitutional and that the
COMELEC be commanded to desist from deactivating
registered voters without biometric information, to reinstate
voters who are compliant with the requisites of RA 8189 but
have already been delisted, and to extend the system of
continuing registration and capture of biometric information
of voters until January 8, 2016.
ISSUE: RA 10367, and its penalty of deactivation in case of failure to
Petitioners further aver that RA 10367 and the COMELEC comply. Thus, there was no violation of procedural due
Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013 violate the tenets of process.
procedural due process because of the short periods of time
between hearings and notice, and the summary nature of the
deactivation proceedings.[102]

HELD:
Petitioners are mistaken.

At the outset, it should be pointed out that the COMELEC,

through Resolution No. 10013, had directed EOs to: (a) "[p]ost
the lists of voters without biometrics data in the bulletin
boards of the City/Municipal hall, Office of the Election Officer
and in the barangay hall along with the notice of ERB hearing;"
and (b) [s]end individual notices to the affected voters
included in the generated list of voters without biometrics
data.[103] The same Resolution also accords concerned
individuals the opportunity to file their opposition/objection
to the deactivation of VRRs not later than November 9, 2015
in accordance with the period prescribed in Section
4,[104] Chapter I, Resolution No. 9853. Meanwhile, Resolution
Nos. 9721 and 9863 respectively state that "[d]eactivation x x
x shall comply with the requirements on posting, ERB hearing
and service of individual notices to the deactivated
voters,"[105] and that the "Reactivation for cases falling under
this ground shall be made during the November 16, 2015
Board hearing."[106] While the proceedings are summary in
nature, the urgency of finalizing the voters' list for the
upcoming May 2016 Elections calls for swift and immediate
action on the deactivation of VRRs of voters who fail to comply
with the mandate of RA 10367. After all, in the preparation for
the May 2016 National and Local Elections, time is of the
essence. The summary nature of the proceedings does not
depart from the fact that petitioners were given the
opportunity to be heard.

Relatedly, it deserves emphasis that the public has been

sufficiently informed of the implementation of RA 10367 and
its deactivation feature. RA 10367 was duly published as early
as February 22, 2013,[107] and took effect fifteen (15) days
after.[108]Accordingly, dating to the day of its publications, all
are bound to know the terms of its provisions, including the
consequences of non-compliance. As implemented, the
process of biometrics validation commenced on July 1, 2013,
or approximately two and a half (2 1/2) years before the
October 31, 2015 deadline. To add, the COMELEC conducted a
massive public information campaign, i.e., NoBio-NoBoto,
from May 2014 until October 31, 2015, or a period of eighteen
(18) months, whereby voters were reminded to update and
validate their registration records. On top of that, the
COMELEC exerted efforts to make the validation process more
convenient for the public as it enlisted the assistance of malls
across Metro Manila to serve as satellite registration centers
and declared Sundays as working days for COMELEC offices
within the National Capital Region and in highly urbanized
cities.[109] Considering these steps, the Court finds that the
public has been sufficiently apprised of the implementation of