TITLE Carmen Lapuz-Sy v.

Eufemio Sy

GR NUMBER L-30977

DATE January 31, 1972

PONENTE Reyes, J.B.L., J.

NATURE/KEYWORDS Legal Separation

FACTS On 18 August 1953, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal

separation against Eufemio S. Eufemio, alleging, in the main, that
they were married civilly on 21 September 1934 and canonically
on 30 September 1934; that they had lived together as husband
and wife continuously until 1943 when her husband abandoned
her; that they had no child; that they acquired properties during
their marriage; and that she discovered her husband cohabiting
with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok at 1319 Sisa Street, Manila,
on or about March 1949.

She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation that

would order that the defendant Eufemio S. Eufemio be deprived
of his share of the conjugal partnership profits.

Eufemio affirmed the allegations and counter-claimed for the

declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage with Carmen O.
Lapuz-Sy on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage with
Go Hiok. On May 31, 1968, Carmen died in a vehicular accident.
Counsel for deceased substituted the deceased Carmen by her
father Macario Lapuz who refused to dismiss the case as filed by
Eufemio.

ISSUE(S) 1. Who may file a suit for legal separation?

2. When an action for legal separation is converted by the
counterclaim into one for a declaration of nullity of a
marriage, does the death of a party abate the proceedings?

RULING(S) HELD:

1. An action for legal separation which involves nothing more

than the bed-and-board separation of the spouses (there
being no absolute divorce in this jurisdiction) is purely
 personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes this
in its Article 100, by allowing only the innocent spouse (and
no one else) to claim legal separation; and in its Article
108, by providing that the spouses can, by their
reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even
rescind a decree of legal separation already rendered.
Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one
party to the action causes the death of the action itself
- actio personalis moritur cum persona.

When one of the spouses is dead, there is no need for

divorce, because the marriage is dissolved. The heirs
cannot even continue the suit, if the death of the spouse
takes place during the course of the suit (Article 244,
Section 3). The action is absolutely dead.

2. Yes. The petition for legal separation and the counterclaim

to declare the nullity of the self same marriage can stand
independent and separate adjudication. They are not
inseparable nor was the action for legal separation
converted into one for a declaration of nullity by the
counterclaim, for legal separation pre-supposes a valid
marriage, while the petition for nullity has a voidable
marriage as a pre-condition.

TITLE Development Bank of the Philippines v. Adil

GR NUMBER L-48889

DATE May 11, 1989

PONENTE Gancayco

NATURE/KEYWORDS Charges upon Obligation in CPG, with consent

FACTS February 10, 1940 spouses Patricio Confesor and Jovita Villafuerte
obtained an agricultural loan from the Agricultural and Industrial
Bank (AIB), now the Development of the Philippines (DBP), in the
 sum of P2,000.00 as evidenced by a promissory note of said date
where they bound themselves jointly and severally to pay the
account in ten (10) equal yearly amortizations.

As the obligation remained outstanding and unpaid even after the

lapse of the aforesaid ten-year period, Confesor, who was by then
a member of the Congress of the Philippines, executed a second
promissory note on April 11, 1961 expressly acknowledging said
loan and promising to pay the same on or before June 15, 1961.

Spouses were not able to pay the obligation on the specified date,
thus, DBP filed a complaint in the Court of Iloilo City on September
11, 1970. They were ordered to pay the DBP jointly and severally.
Spouses filed an appeal to CFI and reversed the decision and
counter-claim against the plaintiff. A motion for reconsideration
by the plaintiff was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE(S) Does the signing of the second promissory note of respondent

Patricio Confessor bind the conjugal partnership?

RULING(S) Yes: Under Article 165 of the Civil Code, the husband is the
administrator of the conjugal partnership. As such administrator,
all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit
of the conjugal partnership, are chargeable to the conjugal
partnership. No doubt, in this case, respondent Confesor signed
the second promissory note for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. Hence the conjugal partnership is liable for this
obligation.

The petition was granted and the decision of the City Court of
Iloilo City was reinstated.

TITLE Modequillo v. Breva

GR NUMBER 86355

DATE May 31, 1990

PONENTE Gancayco

NATURE/KEYWORDS Family Home

FACTS On January 29, 1988, a judgment was rendered by the

Court of Appeals in the case entitled "Francisco Salinas, et al. vs.
 Jose Modequillo, et al. It has become final and executory and Jose
Modequillo and Benito Malubay were held jointly and severally
liable. Thus, the Regional Trial Court of Davao issued a writ of
execution to satisfy the said judgment on the goods and chattels
of the defendants Jose Modequillo and Benito Malubay at Malalag,
Davao del Sur.

On July 7, 1988, the sheriff levied on a parcel of residential

land located at Poblacion Malalag, Davao del Sur and an
agricultural land located in Dalagbong Bulacan, Malalag, Davao
del Sur both registered in the name of Jose Modequillo in the office
of the Provincial Assessor of Davao del Sur.

A motion to quash and/or to set aside levy of execution

was filed by defendant Jose Modequillo alleging that the
residential land located at Poblacion, Malalag is where the family
home is built since 1969 prior to the commencement of this case
and as such is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment
under Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code except for liabilities
mentioned in Article 155, and that the judgment debt sought to
be enforced against the family home of defendant is not one of
those enumerated under Article 155 of the Family Code. As to the
agricultural land although it is declared in the name of defendant
it is alleged to be still part of the public land and the transfer in
his favor by the original possessor and applicant who was a
member of a cultural minority was not approved by the proper
government agency. An opposition was filed by the plaintiffs.

ISSUE(S) Is the family home of petitioner exempt from execution of the

money judgment aforecited?

RULING(S) No. The debt or liability which was the basis of the judgment arose
or was incurred at the time of the vehicular accident on March 16,
1976 and the money judgment arising therefrom was rendered by
the appellate court on January 29, 1988. Both preceded the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. This case does
not fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the
Family Code.

As to the agricultural land subject of the execution, the trial court

correctly ruled that the levy to be made by the sheriff shall be on
whatever rights the petitioner may have on the land.

The petition was DISMISSED for lack of merit.

 TITLE Casimiro Mendoza v. CA and Teopista Toring Tunacao

GR NUMBER 86302

DATE September 24, 1991

PONENTE

Cruz, J.

NATURE/KEYWORDS Filiation; Open and continuous possession of status

FACTS Teopista Toring Tunaca claimed she was the illegitimate

daughter of Casimiro Mendoza, but the latter denied her claim. He
denied it to his dying day. The trial court believed him and
dismissed her complaint for compulsory recognition. The appellate
court reversed the judgment of the court below. Hence, this
petition on certiorari.

The complaint was filed on August 21, 1981, in the

Regional Trial Court in Cebu City. Teopista Toring Tufiacao, private
respondent, alleged that she was born on August 20, 1930, to
Brigida Toring, who was then single, and defendant Casimiro
Mendoza, married at that time to Emiliana Barrientos. She averred
that Mendoza recognized her as an illegitimate child by treating
her as such and according her the rights and privileges of a
recognized illegitimate child.

In May 1988, Casimiro Mendoza, then 91 years old, died and he

was substituted by Vincente Toring who claims to be the sole
recognized natural child of Casimiro and stood to lose much
inheritance if Teopista’s claim were to be recognized.

ISSUE(S) ISSUE: Whether or not Teopista was in continuous possession of

her claimed status of an illegitimate child of Casimiro Mendoza?

RULING(S) HELD:

Yes. The rules on compulsory recognition are embodied in Article

283 of the Civil Code and it’s reproduced in Article 172 and 175 of
the Family Code. Although Teofista failed to prove that he was in
“continuous” possession of the status necessary to comply with
certain jurisprudential requirements, the Supreme Court found
that the present case satisfies the requisites as embodied in Rule
130 Section 39 of the Rules of Court established that status by
another method.

What both the trial court and the respondent court did not
take into account is that an illegitimate child is allowed to establish
his claimed filiation by "any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws," according to the Civil Code, or "by
evidence or proof in his favor that the defendant is her father,"
according to the Family Code. Such evidence may consist of his
baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which
his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his
pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and
other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court.

The trial court conceded that "the defendant's parents, as

well as the plaintiff himself, told Gaudencio Mendoza and Isaac
Mendoza (witnesses), that Teopista was the daughter of the
defendant." It should have probed this matter further in light of
Rule 130, Section 39, of the Rules of Court, providing as follows:

Sec. 39. — Act or declarations about pedigree. — The act

or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify,
in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him
by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it
occurred before the controversy, and the relationship
between the two persons is shown by evidence other than
such act or declaration. The word "pedigree" includes
relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the
dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and
the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family
history intimately connected with pedigree.

The requisites in the said provisions were satisfied in the

present case. Hence, the petition was denied. Judgment is hereby
rendered DECLARING Teopista Toring Tuñacao to be the
illegitimate child of the late Casimiro Mendoza and entitled to all
the rights appurtenant to such status.
 TITLE Title: Feliciano Sanchez v. Francisco Zulueta CA and
Teopista Toring Tunacao

GR NUMBER L-45616

DATE May 16, 1939

PONENTE Avancena, C.J.

NATURE/KEYWORDS Support; Petition for Certiorari

FACTS In a civil case no. 3199, plaintiffs, Josefa Diego and Mario Sanchez
claimed for support from Feliciano Sanchez. Josefa alleged that
they are the wife and child of the defendant. She alleged that the
defendant refused and still refuses to give support since 1932.

In defense, Francisco alleged that Josefa abandoned the conjugal

home on October 7, 1930 without his consent and that she
committed adultery with Macario Sanchez with whom she had, as
a result of that illicit relations a child, Macario Sanchez.

The following month, the plaintiffs asked the court to compel the
defendant to give them support by way of allowance the sum of
P50.00 monthly. In opposition, Francisco claimed that Mario is not
his legitimate child.

In view of these facts, the defendant filed a petition for prohibition

before the Court of Appeals against the judge of the Court of First
Instance and the plaintiffs. The Court of Appeals denied the
petition, and from this resolution, the defendant comes to this
court on certiorari.

ISSUE(S) ISSUE: Can Francisco be compelled to give support to

Macario Sanchez?

RULING(S) No. We are of the opinion that the Court of Appeals erred in not
allowing the defendant to present his evidence for the purpose of
determining whether it is sufficient prima facie to overcome the
application. Adultery on the part of the wife is a valid defense
against an action for support (Quintana vs. Lerma, 24 Phil., 285).
Consequently, as to the child, it is also a defense that it is the fruit
of such adulterous relations, for in that case, it would not be the
child of the defendant and, hence, would not be entitled to support
as such. But as this defense should be established, and not merely
 alleged, it would be unavailing if proof thereof is not permitted. It
is not of course necessary to go fully into the merits of the case,
it being sufficient the court ascertain the kind and amount of
evidence which it may deem sufficient to enable it to justly resolve
the application, one way or the other, in view of the merely
provisional character of the resolution to be entered.

The decision rendered by the Court Appeals is reversed, and it is

ordered that the petitioner be given an opportunity to present
evidence in support of his defense against the application for
support.

TITLE Republic v Marcos

GR NUMBER L-31065

DATE February 10, 1990

PONENTE Grino-Aquino, J.

NATURE/KEYWORDS Petition for certiori review the order of the Court of First Instance
of Baguio and Benguet, Br. Marcos, J.

FACTS On March 30, 1968, a verified petition was filed by private

respondent Pang Cha Quen alleging that she is a citizen of
Nationalist China, married to Alfredo De la Cruz, a Filipino citizen;
that she had resided in Baguio City since her birth on January 29,
1930; that by a previous marriage to Sia Bian alias Huang Tzeh
Lik, a citizen of Nationalist China, she gave birth to a daughter,
May Sia alias Manman Huang on January 28, 1958 in the City of
Manila; that on January 12, 1959, she caused her daughter to be
registered as an alien under the name of Mary Pang, i.e., using
the maternal surname, because the child's father had abandoned
them; that her daughter has always used the name Mary Pang at
home and in the Baguio Chinese Patriotic School where she
studies.

Further, she alleges that on August 16, 1966, petitioner Pang Cha
Quen married Alfredo De la Cruz; that as her daughter has grown
to love and recognize her stepfather, Alfredo De la Cruz, as her
own father, she desires to adopt and use his surname "De la Cruz"
 in addition to her name "Mary Pang" so that her full name shall be
Mary Pang De la Cruz; that Alfredo De la Cruz gave his conformity
to the petition by signing at the bottom of the pleading; that the
petition was not made for the purpose of concealing a crime as
her ten-year old daughter has not committed any, nor to evade
the execution of a judgment as she has never been sued in court,
and the petition is not intended to cause damage or prejudice to
any third person. She prayed that her daughter be allowed to
change her name from May Sia, alias Manman Huang, to Mary
Pang De la Cruz.

On February 12, 1969, respondent Judge Pio Marcos of the

Regional Trial Court of Baguio and Benguet granted the petition.
The Government, through the Solicitor General, appealed to the
Supreme Court on the ground that the court's order is contrary to
law.

ISSUE(S) 1. Whether or not respondent Judge had acquired jurisdiction

over the case; and
2. Whether respondent Judge erred in granting the petition
although private respondent Pang Cha Quen failed to
adduce proper and reasonable cause for changing the
name of the minor "May Sia" alias Manman Huang."

RULING(S) 1. Yes. In the case at bar, the caption of both the verified
petition dated March 30,1968, and the published order of
the trial court dated April 4, 1968 read, thus:

IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME OF THE

MINOR MAY SIA ALIAS MANMAN HUANG TO MARY
PANG DE LA CRUZ, PANG CHA QUEN, Petitioner.

The omission of her other alias-- "Mary Pang"-- in the captions of

the court's order and of the petition defeats the purpose of the
publication. In view of that defect, the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the subject of the proceedings, i.e., the various
names and aliases of the petitioner which she wished to change
to "Mary Pang De la Cruz."

In Go Chin Beng vs. Republic, L-29574, August 18, 1972, we held

that all aliases of the applicant must be set forth in the title of the
published petition, for the omission of any of such aliases, would
be fatal to the petition even if such other aliases are mentioned in
the body of the petition.

2. Yes. The second ground for the Government's appeal is the

failure of the petitioner below, Pang Cha Quen, to state a
 proper and reasonable cause for changing the
name/names of her daughter.

The following have been considered valid grounds for a change of

name:

(1) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable, or extremely

difficult to write or pronounce;

(2) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in

legitimation;

(3) when the change will avoid confusion ;

(4) having continuously used and been known since childhood by

a Filipino name, unaware of his alien parentage; or

(5) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of

former alienage all in good faith and not to prejudice anybody.

As may be gleaned from the petition filed in the lower

court, the reasons offered for changing the name of petitioner's
daughter are: (1) that "her daughter grew up with, and learned
to love and recognize Alfredo de la Cruz as her own father"; (2)
to afford her daughter a feeling of security and (3) that "Alfredo
de la Cruz agrees to this petition, and has signified his conformity
at the foot of this pleading"

Clearly, these are not valid reasons for a change of name.

The general rule is that a change of name should not be permitted
if it will give a false impression of family relationship to another
where none actually exists (Laperal vs. Republic, L-18008,
October 30, 1962; Johnson vs. Republic, L-18284, April 30, 1963;
Moore vs. Republic, L-18407, June 26, 1963). In Padilla vs.
Republic, 113 SCRA 789, we specifically held that our laws do not
authorize legitimate children to adopt the surname of a person not
their father, for to allow them to adopt the surname of their
mother's husband, who is not their father, can result in confusion
of their paternity.

Another reason for disallowing the petition for change of

name is that it was not filed by the proper party as embodied in
Sections 1 and 2, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. The petition for
change of name must be filed by the person desiring to change
his/her name, even if it may be signed and verified by some other
person in his behalf. In this case, however, the petition was filed
by Pang Cha Quen not by May Sia.

The petition for certiorari is granted.