VOL.

202, OCTOBER 15, 1991 779

Dimaporo vs. Mitra, Jr.

*
G.R. No. 96859. October 15, 1991.

MOHAMMAD ALI DIMAPORO, petitioner, vs. HON.

RAMON V. MITRA, JR., Speaker, House of
Representatives, and (HON QUIRINO D. ABAD SANTOS,
JR.) HON. CAMILO L. SABIO, Secretary, House of
representatives, respondents.

Administrative Law; Election Law; Petitioner's assumption

that the questioned statutory provision is no longer operative does
not hold water.—Obviously then, petitioner's assumption that the
questioned

_______________

* EN BANC.

780

780 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Dimaporo vs. Mitra, Jr.

statutory provision is no longer operative does not hold water. He

failed to discern that rather than cut short the term of office of
elective public officials, this statutory provision seeks to ensure
that such officials serve out their entire term of office by
discouraging them from running for another public office and
thereby cutting short their tenure by making it clear that should
they fail in their candidacy, they cannot go back to their former
position. This is consonant with the constitutional edict that all
public officials must serve the people with utmost loyalty and not
trifle with the mandate which they have received from their
constituents.
 Same; Same; Term of office distinguished from tenure.—In
theorizing that the provision under consideration cuts short the
term of office of a Member of Congress, petitioner seems to
confuse "term" with "tenure" of office. As succinctly distinguished
by the Solicitor General: "The term of office prescribed by the
Constitution may not be extended or shortened by the legislature
(22 R.C.L.), but the period during which an officer actually holds
the office (tenure), may be affected by circumstances within or
beyond the power of said officer. Tenure may be shorter than the
term or it may not exist at all. These situations will not change
the duration of the term of office (see Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles,
76 Phil. 12)."
Same; Same; Same; Fact that the ground cited in Section 67,
Article lX of BP Blg. 881 is not mentioned in the Constitution itself
as a mode of shortening the tenure of office of members of Congress
does not preclude its application to present members of Congress.
—That the ground cited in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881
is not mentioned in the Constitution itself as a mode of shortening
the tenure of office of members of Congress, does not preclude its
application to present members of Congress. Section 2 of Article
XI provides that "(t)he President, the Vice-President, the
Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be
removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of,
culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other
public officers and employees may be removed from office as
provided by law, but not by impeachment. Such constitutional
expression clearly recognizes that the four (4) grounds found in
Article VI of the Constitution by which the tenure of a
Congressman may be shortened are not exclusive.
Same; Same; Forfeiture is automatic and permanently
effective upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy for another
office.—In

781

VOL. 202, OCTOBER 15, 1991 781

Dimaporo vs. Mitra, Jr.

Monroy vs. Court of Appeals, a case involving Section 27 of R.A.

No. 180 above-quoted, this Court categorically pronounced that
"forfeiture (is) automatic and permanently effective upon the
filing of the certificate of candidacy for another office. Only the
moment and act of filing are considered. Once the certificate is
filed, the seat is forever forfeited and nothing save a new election
or appointment can restore the ousted official.
Same; Same; Same; As the mere act of filing the certificate of
candidacy for another office produces automatically the permanent
forfeiture of the elective position being presently held, it is not
necessary as petitioner opines, that the other position be actually
held.—As the mere act of filing the certificate of candidacy for
another office produces automatically the permanent forfeiture of
the elective position being presently held, it is not necessary, as
petitioner opines, that the other position be actually held. The
ground for forfeiture in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution is different from the forfeiture decreed in Section 67,
Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881, which is actually a mode of voluntary
renunciation of office under Section 7, par. 2 of Article VI of the
Constitution.
Constitutional Law; Statute; To justify the nullification of a
law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution not a doubtful and argumentative implication.—The
basic principle which underlies the entire field of legal concepts
pertaining to the validity of legislation is that by enactment of
legislation, a constitutional measure is presumed to be created.
This Court has enunciated the presumption in favor of
constitutionality of legislative enactment. To justify the
nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative
implication. A doubt, even if well-founded, does not suffice.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: Dissenting Opinion

Constitutional Law; Congress cannot add by statute or

administrative act to the causes for disqualification or removal of
constitutional officers.—It is a fundamental principle in
Constitutional Law that Congress cannot add by statute or
administrative act to the causes for disqualification or removal of
constitutional officers. Neither can Congress provide a different
procedure for disciplining constitutional officers other than those
provided in the Constitution. This is as true for the President and
the members of this Court as it is for members of Congress itself.
The causes and procedures for removal found in the Constitution
are not mere disciplinary measures. They are intended

782

782 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Dimaporo us. Mitra, Jr.

to protect constitutional officers in the unhampered and
independent discharge of their functions. It is for this reason that
the court should insure that what the Constitution provides must
be followed.

PETITION to review the decision of the Speaker and

Secretary of the House of Representatives.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Rilloraza, Africa, De Ocampo & Africa and Enrique
M. Fernando for petitioner.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

Petitioner Mohamad Ali Dimaporo was elected

Representative for the Second Legislative District of Lanao
del Sur during the 1987 congressional elections. He took
his oath of office on 9 January 1987 and thereafter
performed the duties and enjoyed the rights and privileges
pertaining thereto.
On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed with the
Commission on Elections a Certificate of Candidacy for the
position of Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao. The election was scheduled for 17
February 1990.
Upon being informed of this development by the
Commission on Elections, respondents Speaker and
Secretary of the House of Representatives excluded
petitioner's name from the Roll of Members of the House of
Representatives pursuant1
to Section 67, Article IX of the
Omnibus Election Code. As2 reported by the Speaker in the
session of 9 February 1990:

"The Order of Business today carries a communication from the

Commission on Elections which states that the Honorable
Mohammad Ali Dimaporo of the Second District of Lanao del Sur
filed a certificate of candidacy for the regional elections in Muslim
Mindanao on February 17, 1990. The House Secretariat,
performing an administrative act, did not include the name of the
Honorable Ali Dimaporo in the Rolls pursuant to the provision of
the Election Code, Article IX, Section 67, which states: 'Any
elective official whether national or local running for any office
other than the one which he is holding in a

_______________

1 Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.

2 Annex "C" of Petition; Rollo, 24.

783
 VOL. 202, OCTOBER 15, 1991 783
Dimaporo vs. Mitra, Jr.

permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President shall

be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of
his certificate of candidacy. The word 'ipso facto' is defined in
Words and Phrases as by the very act itself—by the mere act. And
therefore, by the very act of the (sic) filing his certificate of
candidacy, the Honorable Ali Dimaporo removed himself from the
Rolls of the House of Representatives; and, therefore, his name
has not been carried in today's Roll and will not be carried in the
future Rolls of the House. x x x"

Having lost in the autonomous region elections, petitioner,

in a letter dated 28 June 1990 and addressed to respondent
Speaker, expressed his intention "to resume performing 3
my
duties and functions as elected Member of Congress." The
record does not indicate what action was taken on this
communication, but it is apparent that petitioner failed in
his bid to regain his seat in Congress since this petition
praying for such relief was subsequently filed on 31
January 1991.
In this petition, it is alleged that following the dropping
of his name from the Roll, petitioner was excluded from all
proceedings of the House of Representatives; he was not
paid the emoluments due his office; his staff was dismissed
and disbanded; and his office suites were occupied by other
persons. In effect, he was virtually barred and excluded
from performing his duties and from exercising his rights
and privileges as the duly elected and qualified
congressman from his district.
Petitioner admits that he filed a Certificate of Candidacy
for the position of Regional Governor of Muslim Mindanao.
He, however, maintains that he did not thereby lose his
seat as congressman because Section 67, Article IX of B.P.
Blg. 881 is not operative under the present Constitution,
being contrary thereto, and therefore not applicable to the
present members of Congress.
In support of his contention, petitioner points out that
the term of office of members of the House of
Representatives, as well as the grounds by which the
incumbency of said members may be shortened, are
provided for in the Constitution. Section 2, Article XVIII
thereof provides that "the Senators, Members

_______________

3 Annex "E" of Petition; Id., 30.

 784

784 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Dimaporo vs. Mitra, Jr.

of the House of Representatives and the local officials first

elected under this Constitution shall serve until noon of
June 30, 1992;" while Section 7, Article VI states: "The
Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected
for a term of three years which shall begin, unless
otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of
June next following their election." On the other hand, the
grounds by which such term may be shortened may be
summarized as follows:

"a) Section 13, Article VI: Forfeiture of his seat by

holding any other office or employment in the
government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations or subsidiaries;
b) Section 16 (3): Expulsion as a disciplinary action for
disorderly behavior;
c) Section 17: Disqualification as determined by
resolution of the Electoral Tribunal in an election
contest; and,
d) Section 7, par. 2: Voluntary renunciation of office."

He asserts that under the rule expressio unius est exclusio

alterius, Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is repugnant
to these constitutional provisions in that it provides for the
shortening of a congressman's term of office on a ground
not provided for in the Constitution. For if it were the
intention of the framers to include the provisions of Section
67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 as among the means by
which the term of a Congressman may be shortened, it
would have been a very simple matter to incorporate it in
the present Constitution. They did not do so. On the
contrary, the Constitutional Commission only reaffirmed
the grounds previously found in the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions and deliberately omitted the ground provided
in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881.
On the premise that the provision of law relied upon by
respondents in excluding him from the Roll of Members is
contrary to the present Constitution, petitioner
consequently concludes that respondents acted without
authority. He further maintains that respondents' so-called
"administrative act" of striking out his name is ineffective
in terminating his term as Congressman. Neither can it be
justified as an interpretation of the Constitutional
provision on voluntary renunciation of office as only the
courts may interpret laws. Moreover, he claims that
785

VOL. 202, OCTOBER 15, 1991 785

Dimaporo vs. Mitra, Jr.

he cannot be said to have forfeited his seat as it is only

when a congressman holds another office or employment
that forfeiture is decreed. Filing a certificate of candidacy is
not equivalent to holding another office or employment.
In sum, petitioner's demand that his rights as a duly
elected member of the House of Representatives be
recognized, is anchored on the negative 4
view of the
following issues raised in this petition:

A.

IS SECTION 67, ARTICLE IX, OF B.P. BLG. 881 OPERATIVE

UNDER THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION?

B.

COULD THE RESPONDENT SPEAKER AND/OR THE

RESPONDENT SECRETARY, 'BY ADMINISTRATIVE ACT',
EXCLUDE THE PETITIONER FROM THE ROLLS OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THEREBY PREVENTING
HIM FROM EXERCISING HIS FUNCTIONS AS
CONGRESSMAN, AND DEPRIVING HIM OF HIS RIGHTS AND
PRIVILEGES AS SUCH?"

On the other hand, respondent through the Office of the

Solicitor General contend that Section 67, Article IX of B.P.
Blg. 881 is still operative under the present Constitution,
as the voluntary act of resignation contemplated in said
Section 67 falls within the term Voluntary renunciation" of
office enunciated in par. 2, Section 7, Article VI of the
Constitution. That the ground provided in Section 67 is not
included in the Constitution does not affect its validity as
the grounds mentioned therein are not exclusive. There
are, in addition, other modes of shortening the tenure of
office of Members of Congress, among which are
resignation, death and conviction of a crime which carries a
penalty of disqualification to hold public office.
Respondents assert that petitioner's filing of a
Certificate of Candidacy is an act of resignation which
estops him from claiming otherwise as he is presumed to be
aware of existing

______________

4 Rollo, 8 and 14.

786

786 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Dimaporo vs. Mitra, Jr.

laws. They further maintain that their questioned

"administrative act" is a mere ministerial act which did not
involve any encroachment on judicial powers.
Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 reads:

"Any elective official whether national or local running for any

office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent
capacity except for President and Vice-President shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy."

The precursor of this provision

5
is the last paragraph of
Section 2 of C.A. No. 666, which reads:

"Any elective provincial, municipal, or city official running for an

office, other than the one for which he has been lastly elected,
shall be considered resigned from his office from the moment of
the filing of his certificate of candidacy."

Section 27 of Article 6II of Republic Act No. 180 reiterated

this rule in this wise:

"Sec. 27. Candidate holding office.—Any elective provincial,

municipal or city official running for an office, other than the one
which he is actually holding, shall be considered resigned from
office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy."

The 1971 Election Code imposed7

a similar proviso on local
elective officials as follows:

"Sec. 24. Candidate holding elective office.—Any elective

provincial, sub-provincial, city, municipal or municipal district
officer running for an office other than the one which he is holding
in a permanent capacity shall be considered ipso facto resigned
from his office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.
Every elected official shall take his oath of office on the day his
term of office commences, or within ten days after his
proclamation if said proclamation takes place after such day. His
failure to take his

_______________

5 22 June 1941.
6 Emphasis supplied.
7 Emphasis supplied.

787

VOL. 202, OCTOBER 15, 1991 787

Dimaporo vs. Mitra, Jr.

oath of office as herein provided shall be considered forfeiture of

his right to the new office to which he has been elected unless his
failure is for a cause or causes beyond his control."
8
The 1978 Election Code provided a different rule, thus:

"Sec. 30. Candidates holding political offices.—Governors,

mayors, members of various sanggunians, or barangay officials,
shall, upon filing of a certificate of candidacy, be considered on
forced leave of absence from office."

It must be noted that only in B.P. Blg. 881 are members of

the legislature included in the enumeration of elective
public officials who are to be considered resigned from
office from the moment of the filing of their certificates of
candidacy for another office, except for President and Vice-
President. The advocates of Cabinet Bill No. 2 (now Section
67, Article IX of B.P. 9Blg. 881) elucidated on the rationale
of this inclusion, thus:

"MR. PALMARES:

In the old Election Code, Your Honor, in the 1971 Election Code,
the provision seems to be different—I think this is in Section 24 of
Article III.
Any elective provincial, sub-provincial, city, municipal or
municipal district officer running for an office other than the one
which he is holding in a permanent capacity shall be considered
ipso facto resigned from his office from the moment of the filing of
his certificate of candidacy.
May I know, Your Honor, what is the reason of the Committee
in departing or changing these provisions of Section 24 of the old
Election Code and just adopting it en toto? Why do we have to
change it? What could possibly be the reason behind it, or the
rationale behind it?
MR. PEREZ (L.):

I have already stated the rationale for this, Mr. Speaker, but I

_______________

8 P.D. No. 1296.

9 Records of the Batasang Pambansa, 8 October 1985. Underscoring supplied.

788

788 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Dimaporo vs. Mitra, Jr.

don't mind repeating it. The purpose is that the people must be
given the right to choose any official who belongs to, let us say, to
the Batasan if he wants to run for another office. However, because
of the practice in the past where members of the legislature ran for
local offices, but did not assume the office, because of that spectacle
the impression is that these officials were just trifling with the
mandate of the people. They have already obtained a mandate to
be a member of the legislature, and they want to run for mayor or
for governor and yet when the people give them that mandate, they
do not comply with that latter mandate, but still preferred (sic) to
remain in the earlier mandate. So we believe, Mr. Speaker, that
the people's latest mandate must be the one that will be given due
course, x x x"

Assemblyman Manuel M. Garcia, in answer to the query of

Assemblyman Arturo Tolentino
10
on the constitutionality of
Cabinet Bill No. 2, said:

"MR. GARCIA (M.M.):

Thank you, Mr. Speaker.

Mr. Speaker, on the part of the Committee, we made this
proposal based on constitutional grounds. We did not propose this
amendment mainly on the rationale as stated by the Gentlemen
from Manila that the officials running for office other than the
ones they are holding will be considered resigned not because of
abuse of facilities of power or the use of office facilities but
primarily because under our Constitution, we have this new
chapter on accountability of public officers. Now, this was not in
the 1935 Constitution. It states that (sic) Article XIII, Section 1
—'Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees
shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity,
loyalty and efficiency and shall remain accountable to the people.'
Now, what is the significance of this new provision on
accountability of public officers? This only means that all elective
public officials should honor the mandate they have gotten from
the people. Thus, under our Constitution, it says that: 'Members of
the Batasan shall serve for the term of 6 years, in the case of local
officials and 6 years in the case of barangay officials. Now, Mr.
Speaker, we have precisely included this as part of the

_______________

10 Records of the Batasang Pambansa, 21 October 1985. Underscoring supplied.

789

VOL. 202, OCTOBER 15, 1991 789

Dimaporo vs. Mitra, Jr.

Omnibus Election Code because a Batasan Member who hold (sic)

himself out with the people and seek (sic) their support and
mandate should not be allowed to deviate or allow himself to run
for any other position unless he relinquishes or abandons his
office. Because his mandate to the people is to serve for 6 years.
Now, if you allow a Batasan or a governor or a mayor who was
mandated to serve for 6 years to file for an office other than the one
he was elected to, then, that clearly shows that he has not (sic)
intention to service the mandate of the people which was placed
upon him. and therefore he should be considered ipso facto
resigned. I think more than anything that is the accountability
that the Constitution requires of elective public officials. It is not
because of the use or abuse of powers or facilities of his office, but
it is because of the Constitution itself which I said under the 1973
Constitution called and inserted this new chapter on
accountability.
Now, argument was said that the mere filing is not the
intention to run. Now, what is it for? If a Batasan Member files
the certificate of candidacy, that means that he does not want to
serve, otherwise, why should he file for an office other than the one
he was elected to? The mere fact therefore of filing a certificate
should be considered the overt act of abandoning or relinquishing
his mandate to the people and that he should therefore resign if he
wants to seek another position which he feels he could be of better
service.
As I said, Mr. Speaker, I disagree with the statements of the
Gentleman from Manila because the basis of this Section 62 is the
constitutional provision not only of the fact that Members of the
Batasan and local officials should serve the entire 6-year term for
which we were elected, but because of this new chapter on the
accountability of public officers not only to the community which
voted him to office, but primarily because under this commentary
on accountability of public officers, the elective public officers must
serve their principal, the people, not their own personal ambition.
And that is the reason, Mr. Speaker, why we opted to propose
Section 62 where candidates or elective public officers holding
offices other than the one to which they were elected, should be
considered ipso facto resigned from their office upon the filing of
the certificate of candidacy."

It cannot be gainsaid that the-same constitutional basis for

Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 remains written in
the 1987 Constitution. In fact, Section 1 of Article XI on
"Accounta-
790

790 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Dimaporo us. Mitra, Jr.

11
bility of Public Officers" is more emphatic in stating:

"Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and

employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve
them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency,
act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives."

Obviously then, petitioner's assumption that the

questioned statutory provision is no longer operative does
not hold water. He failed to discern that rather than cut
short the term of office of elective public officials, this
statutory provision seeks to ensure that such officials serve
out their entire term of office by discouraging them from
running for another public office and thereby cutting short
their tenure by making it clear that should they fail in
their candidacy, they cannot go back to their former
position. This is consonant with the constitutional edict
that all public officials must serve the people with utmost
loyalty and not trifle with the mandate which they have
received from their constituents.
In theorizing that the provision under consideration cuts
short the term of office of a Member of Congress, petitioner
seems to confuse "term" with "tenure" of 12office. As
succinctly distinguished by the Solicitor General:

'The term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be

extended or shortened by the legislature (22 R.C.L.), but the
period during which an officer actually holds the office (tenure),
may be affected by circumstances within or beyond the power of
said officer. Tenure may be shorter than the term or it may not
exist at all. These situations will not change the duration of the
term of office (see Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles, 76 Phil. 12)."
_______________

11 Compared to the provision in the 1973 Constitution which reads:

"Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees shall serve
with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, and
shall remain accountable to the people."

12 Memorandum for Respondents, 9.

791

VOL. 202, OCTOBER 15, 1991 791

Dimaporo vs. Mitra, Jr.

Under the questioned provision, when an elective official

covered thereby files a certificate of candidacy for another
office, he is deemed to have voluntarily cut short his
tenure, not his term. The term remains and his successor,
if any, is allowed to serve its unexpired portion.
That the ground cited in Section 67, Article IX of B.P.
Blg. 881 is not mentioned in the Constitution itself as a
mode of shortening the tenure of office of members of
Congress, does not preclude its application to present
members of Congress. Section 2 of Article XI provides that
"(t)he President, the Vice-President, the Members of the
Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from
office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable
violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.
All other public officers and employees may be removed 13
from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
Such constitutional expression clearly recognizes that the
four (4) grounds found in Article VI of the Constitution by
which the tenure of a Congressman may be shortened are
not exclusive.
14
As held in the case of State ex rel. Berge vs.
Lansing, the expression in the constitution of the
circumstances which shall bring about a vacancy does not
necessarily exclude all others. Neither does it 15preclude the
legislature from prescribing other grounds. Events so
enumerated in the constitution or statutes are merely
conditions the occurrence
16
of any one of which the office
shall become vacant not as a penalty but simply as the
legal effect of any one of the events. And would it not be
preposterous to say that a congressman cannot die and cut
his tenure because death is not one of the grounds provided
for in the Constitution? The framers of our fundamental
law never intended such absurdity.
 The basic principle which underlies the entire field of
legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation is
that by enactment of legislation, a constitutional measure
is presumed

_______________

13 Italics supplied.
14 46 Neb. 514, 64 NW 1104.
15 McKittrick vs. Wilson, 350 M 486, 166 SW2d 499, 143 ALR 465.
16 People ex rel. Fleming vs. Shorb, 100 Cal 537 P. 163.

792

792 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Dimaporo vs. Mitra, Jr.

17
to be created. This Court has enunciated the presumption
in favor of constitutionality of legislative enactment. To
justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and
argumentative implication.
18
A doubt, even if well-founded,
does not suffice.
The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius is not to
be applied with the same rigor in construing a constitution
as a statute and only those things expressed in such
positive affirmative terms as plainly imply the negative of
what is not mentioned 19will be considered as inhibiting the
power of "legislature. The maxim is only a rule 20
of
interpretation and not a constitutional command. This
maxim expresses a rule of construction and serves only as
an aid in discovering legislative
21
intent where such intent is
not otherwise manifest.
Even then, the concept of voluntary renunciation of
office under Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution is
broad enough to include the situation envisioned in Section
67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 22881. As discussed by the
Constitutional Commissioners:

"MR. MAAMBONG:

Could I address the clarificatory question to the Committee? The

term Voluntary renunciation' does not only appear in Section 3; it
appears in Section 6.

MR. DAVIDE:

Yes.
MR. MAAMBONG:

It is also a recurring phrase all over the constitution. Could the

Committee please enlighten us exactly what Voluntary
renunciation' means? Is this akin to abandonment?

MR. DAVIDE:

Abandonment is voluntary. In other words, he cannot

circumvent the restriction by merely resigning at any given time

_______________

17 16 Am Jur. 2d, p. 63.

18 People vs. Dacuycuy, 173 SCRA 90; Peralta vs. COMELEC, 82 SCRA 30;
Paredes, et al. vs. Executive Secretary, 128 SCRA 6.
19 State ex rel. Atty. Gen. vs. Martin, 60 Ark. 343, 30 SE 421.
20 State vs. Driscoll, 54 P. 2d 571, 576, 101 Mont. 348.
21 Garrison vs. City of Shreveport, 154 So. 622, 624, 179 La. 605.
22 Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 2, p. 591, 19

793

VOL. 202, OCTOBER 15, 1991 793

Dimaporo vs. Mitra, Jr.

OR the second term.

MR. MAAMBONG:

Is the Committee saying that the term voluntary renunciation

is more general than abandonment and resignation?

MR. DAVIDE:

It is more general, more embracing."

That the act, contemplated in Section 67, Article IX of B.P.

Blg. 881, of filing a certificate of candidacy for another
office constitutes an overt, concrete act of voluntary
renunciation of the elective office presently being held is
evident from this exchange between the23 Members of
Parliament Arturo Tolentino and Jose Roño:

"MR. ROÑO:

My reasonable ground is this: if you will make the person . . . my,

shall we say, basis is that in one case the person is intending to
run for an office which is different from his own, and therefore it
should be considered, at least from the legal significance, an
intention to relinquish his office.
MR. TOLENTINO:

Yes.

MR. ROÑO:

And in the other, because he is running for the same position,

it is otherwise.

MR. TOLENTINO:

Yes, but what I cannot see is why are you going to compel a
person to quit an office which he is only intending to leave? A
relinquishment of office must be clear, must be definite

MR. ROÑO:

Yes, sir. That's precisely, Mr. Speaker, what I'm saying that
while I do not disagree with the conclusion that the intention
cannot be enough, but I am saying that the filing of the certificate
of candidacy is an overt act of such intention. It's not just an
intention: it's already there"
24
In Monroy vs. Court of Appeals, a case involving Section
27 July to 6 August 1986.

_______________

23 Records of the Batasang Pambansa, 21 October 1985, Underscoring

supplied.
24 L-23258, 1 July 1967, 20 SCRA 620, 625.

794

794 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Dimaporo vs. Mitra, Jr.

of R.A. No. 180 above-quoted, this Court categorically

pronounced that "forfeiture (is) automatic and permanently
effective upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy for
another office. Only the moment and act of filing are
considered. Once the certificate is filed, the seat is forever
forfeited and nothing save a new election or appointment
can restore the ousted official. Thus, as We had occasion to
remark, 25through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, in Castro vs.
Gatuslao:

"x x x The wording of the law plainly indicates that only the date
of filing of the certificate of candidacy should be taken into
account. The law does not make the forfeiture dependent upon
future contingencies, unforeseen and unforeseeable, since the
vacating is expressly made as of the moment of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy. x x x' "

As the mere act of filing the certificate of candidacy for

another office produces automatically the permanent
forfeiture of the elective position being presently held, it is
not necessary, as petitioner opines, that the other position
be actually held. The ground for forfeiture in Section 13,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is different from the
forfeiture decreed in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881,
which is actually a mode of voluntary renunciation of office
under Section 7, par. 2 of Article VI of the Constitution.
The legal effects of filing a certificate of candidacy for
another office having been spelled out in Section 67, Article
IX, B.P. Blg. 881 itself, no statutory interpretation was
indulged in by respondents Speaker and Secretary of the
House of Representatives in excluding petitioner's name
from the Roll of Members. The Speaker is the
administrative head of the House of Representatives and
he exercises 26administrative powers and functions attached
to his office. As administrative officers, both the Speaker
and House Secretary-General perform ministerial
functions. It was their duty to remove petitioner's name
from the Roll considering the unequivocal tenor of Section
67, Article IX, B.P. Blg. 881. When the Commission on
Elections communicated to the House of Representatives
that petitioner had filed

_______________

25 98 Phil. 94,196.
26 Section 8, Rule III, Rules of the House of Representatives.

795

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Dimaporo vs. Mitra, Jr.

his certificate of candidacy for regional governor of Muslim

Mindanao, respondents had no choice but to abide by the
clear and unmistakable legal effect of Section 67, Article IX
of B.P. Blg. 881. It was their ministerial duty to do so.
These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the
ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the
duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously
hinder the transaction of public business if these officers
were to be permitted in all cases to question the
constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing
duties upon them and which 27
have not judicially been
declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government
from the highest to the
28
lowest are creatures of the law and
are bound to obey it.
In conclusion, We reiterate the basic concept that a
public office is a public trust. It is created for the interest
and benefit of the people. As such, the holder thereof is
subject to such regulations and conditions as the law may
impose and he cannot complain of any 29
restrictions which
public policy may dictate on his office.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

          Narvasa, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Griño-Aquino,

Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
          Fernan, (C.J.), No part—related to one of the
parties.
     Melencio-Herrera, J., On Leave.
     Gutierrez, Jr., J., Please see dissent
          Padilla, J., I join Mr. Justice Gutierrez in his
dissent.
     Bidin, J., I join in the dissent of Justice Gutierrez,
Jr.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: Dissenting Opinion

I am constrained to dissent from the majority opinion. I

believe that the Speaker and the Secretary of the House of

_______________

27 Cu Unjieng vs. Patstone, 42 Phil. 818.

28 Burton vs. U.S., 202 U.S. 344.
29 42 Am Jur 926.

796

796 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Dimaporo vs. Mitra, Jr.

Representatives have no power, in purported

implementation of an invalid statute, to erase from the
Rolls of the House the name of a member duly elected by
his sovereign constituents to represent them in Congress.
The rejection of the bid of the Honorable Mohammad Ali
Dimaporo to retain his seat in Congress may appear
logical, politically palatable, and salutary to certain
quarters. But I submit that it is in cases like the present
petition where the Court should be vigilant in preventing
the erosion of fundamental concepts of the Constitution.
We must be particularly attentive to violations which are
cloaked in political respectability, seemingly defensible or
arguably beneficial and attractive in the short run.
It is a fundamental principle in Constitutional Law that
Congress cannot add by statute or administrative act to the
causes for disqualification or removal of constitutional
officers. Neither can Congress provide a different procedure
for disciplining constitutional officers other than those
provided in the Constitution. This is as true for the
President and the members of this Court as it is for
members of Congress itself. The causes and procedures for
removal found in the Constitution are not mere
disciplinary measures. They are intended to protect
constitutional officers in the unhampered and independent
discharge of their functions. It is for this reason that the
court should insure that what the Constitution provides
must be followed.
The Constitution provides how the tenure of members of
Congress may be shortened:

"A. Forefeiture of his seat by holding any other office or

employment in the government or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or
subsidiaries (Art. VI, Section 13);
B. Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly
behavior (Art. VI, Sec. 16[3]);
C. Disqualification as determined by resolution of the
Electoral Tribunal in an election contest (Art. VI,
Sec. 17);
D. Voluntary renunciation of office (Art. VI. Sec. 7,
par. 2)." (See Petition, p. 8)

797

VOL. 202, OCTOBER 15, 1991 797

Dimaporo vs. Mitra, Jr.

The respondents would now add to the above provisions, an

enactment of the defunct Batasang Pambansa promulgated
long before the present Constitution took effect. B.P. Blg.
881, Article IX, Section 67 provides:
"Any elective official whether national or local running for any
office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent
capacity except for President and Vice-President shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy." (Petition, p. 8)

I take exception to the Solicitor General's stand that the

grounds for removal mentioned in the Constitution are not
exclusive. They are exclusive. The non-inclusion of physical
causes like death, being permanently comatose on a
hospital bed, or disappearance in the sinking of a ship does
not justify in the slightest an act of Congress expelling one
of its members for reasons other than those found in the
Constitution. Resignation is provided for by the
Constitution. It is voluntary renunciation. So is
naturalization in a foreign country or express renunciation
of Philippine citizenship. Conviction of a crime carrying a
penalty of disqualification is a disqualification against
running for public office. Whether or not the conviction for
such a crime while the Congressman is in office may be a
ground to expel him from Congress is a matter which we
cannot decide obiter. We must await the proper case and
controversy. My point is—Congress cannot by statute or
disciplinary action add to the causes for disqualification or
removal of its members. Only the Constitution can do it.
The citation of the precursors of B.P. 881—namely,
Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 665, Section 27 of
Article II of Rep. Act No. 180, the 1971 Election Code, and
the 1978 Election Code—does not help the respondents. On
the contrary, they strengthen the case of the petitioner.
It may be noted that all the earlier statutes about
elective officials being considered resigned upon the filing
of a certificate of candidacy refer to non-constitutional
officers. Congress has not only the power but also the duty
to prescribe causes for the removal of provincial, city, and
municipal officials, It has no such power when it comes to
constitutional officers.
798

798 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Dimaporo vs. Mitra, Jr.

It was not alone egoistic self-interest which led the

legislature during Commonwealth days or Congress in the
pre-martial law period to exclude their members from the
rule that the filing of a certificate of candidacy for another
office meant resignation from one's current position. It was
also a recognition that such a provision could not be validly
enacted by statute. It has to be in the constitution.
Does running for another elective office constitute
voluntary renunciation of one's public office? In other
words, did the Speaker and the House Secretary correctly
interpret the meaning of "voluntary renunciation" as found
in the Constitution?
From 1935 when the Constitution was promulgated up
to 1985 when B.P. 881 was enacted or for fifty long years,
the filing of a certificate of candidacy by a Senator or
member of the House was not voluntary renunciation of his
seat in Congress. I see no reason why the passage of a
statute by the Batasang Pambansa should suddenly change
the meaning and implications of the act of filing and equate
it with voluntary renunciation. "Voluntary" refers to a state
of the mind and in the context of constitutional
requirements should not be treated lightly. It is true that
intentions may be deduced from a person's acts. I must
stress, however, that for fifty years of our constitutional
history, running for a local government position was not
considered a voluntary renunciation. Congressman
Dimaporo is steeped in the traditions of earlier years. He
has been engaged in politics even before some of his
present colleagues in Congress were born. Neither the
respondents nor this Court can state that he intended to
renounce his seat in Congress when he decided to run for
Regional Governor. I submit that we should not deny to
him the privilege of an existing interpretation of 'Voluntary
renunciation" and wrongly substitute the interpretation
adopted by the respondents.
In interpreting the meaning of voluntary renunciation,
the Court should also be guided by the principle that all
presumptions should be in favor of representation.
As aptly stated by the petitioner:

"We should not lose sight of the fact that what we are dealing
with here is not the mere right of the petitioner to sit in the
House of Representatives, but more important, we are dealing
with the political

799

VOL. 202, OCTOBER 15, 1991 799

GSIS vs. Civil Service Commission

right of the people of the Second Legislative District of Lanao del

Sur to representation in Congress, as against their
 disenfranchisement by mere 'administrative act' of the
respondents.
Such being the case, all presumptions should be strictly in
favor of representation and strictly against disenfranchisement.
And if disenfranchisement should there be, the same should
only be by due process of law, both substantive and procedural,
and not by mere arbitrary, capricious, and ultra vires,
'administrative act' of the respondents." (Reply to Comment, p. 5)

The invocation of the principle of accountability found in

Article XI of the Constitution does not empower the
legislature to add to the grounds for dismissing its
members. When Congressman Dimaporo ran for Regional
Governor, he was not trifling with the mandate of his
people. He wanted to serve a greater number in an
autonomous, more direct, and intimate manner. He claims
(a mistaken claim according to the Commission on
Elections sustained by this Court) that he was cheated of
victory during the elections for regional officers. He wants
to continue serving his people. I fail to see how the
principle of accountability and faithfulness to a trust could
be applied to this specific cause of Congressman Dimaporo.
For the foregoing reasons, I VOTE to GRANT the
petition.
Petition dismissed.

——o0o——

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