Battle of Passchendaele

For other uses, see Passchendaele (disambiguation). and the opening attack of the Battles of Ypres, the extent
to which the internal troubles of the French armies mo-
tivated British persistence in the offensive, the effect of
The Battle of Passchendaele, also referred to as the
Third Battle of Ypres, was a campaign of the First the weather, the decision to continue the offensive in Oc-
tober and the human cost of the campaign on the soldiers
World War, fought by the Allies of World War I against
the German Empire.[Note 1] The battle took place on the of the German and British armies, have also been argued
over ever since.
Western Front, from July to November 1917, for con-
trol of the ridges south and east of the Belgian city of
Ypres in West Flanders, as part of a strategy decided
by the Allies at conferences in November 1916 and May 1 Background
1917. Passchendaele lay on the last ridge east of Ypres,
5 miles (8.0 km) from a railway junction at Roulers,
which was vital to the supply system of the German 4th 1.1 Flanders 1914–1917
Army.[Note 2] The next stage of the Allied strategy was an
advance to Thourout–Couckelaere, to close the German- The Treaty of London (1839) recognized Belgium as an
controlled railway running through Roulers and Thourout independent and neutral state.[4] The German invasion of
(which did not take place until 1918). Further operations Belgium on 4 August 1914, in violation of Article VII of
and a British supporting attack along the Belgian coast the treaty, was the reason given by the British government
from Nieuwpoort, combined with an amphibious land- for declaring war.[5] British military operations in Bel-
ing (Operation Hush), were to have reached Bruges and gium began with the arrival of the British Expeditionary
then the Dutch frontier. The resistance of the German 4th Force (BEF) at Mons on 22 August. On 16 October the
Army, unusually wet weather, the onset of winter and the Belgians, with some French reinforcements, began the
diversion of British and French resources to Italy, follow- defence of the French channel ports and what remained of
ing the Austro-German victory at the Battle of Caporetto unoccupied Belgium at the Battle of the Yser. Operations
(24 October – 19 November), enabled the Germans to further south in Flanders commenced, after reciprocal at-
avoid a general withdrawal, which had seemed inevitable tempts by the French and German armies to turn their
in early October. The campaign ended in November, opponents’ northern flank through Picardy, Artois and
when the Canadian Corps captured Passchendaele, apart Flanders, (Race to the Sea) reached Ypres. On 10 Oc-
from local attacks in December and the new year. In tober, Lieutenant-General Erich von Falkenhayn, Chief
1918, the Battle of the Lys and the Fifth Battle of Ypres of the General Staff ordered an attack towards Dunkirk
were fought before the Allies occupied the Belgian coast and Calais, followed by a turn south to gain a decisive
and reached the Dutch frontier. victory.[6] When the offensive failed, Falkenhayn ordered
the capture of Ypres to gain a local advantage. By 12
A campaign in Flanders was controversial in 1917 and has November, the First Battle of Ypres had failed, at a cost
remained so. The British Prime Minister Lloyd George of 160,000 German casualties and was stopped on 18
opposed the offensive, as did General Foch the French November.[7]
Chief of the General Staff. The British commander Field
Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, did not receive approval for the In December 1914, the Admiralty began discussions with
Flanders operation from the War Cabinet until 25 July. the War Office, for a combined operation to occupy the
Matters of dispute by the participants, writers and histo- Belgian coast to the Dutch frontier, by an attack along
rians since the war, have included the wisdom of pursuing the coast combined with a landing at Ostend. Eventu-
an offensive strategy in the wake of the Nivelle Offen- ally the British were obliged [8]
to participate in the French
sive, rather than waiting for the arrival of the American offensives further south. Large British offensive oper-
armies in France. The choice of Flanders over areas fur- ations in Flanders were not possible in 1915, due to the
[9]
ther south or the Italian front, the climate and weather in consequent lack of resources. The Germans conducted
Flanders, the choice of General Hubert Gough and the their own Flanders offensive at the Ypres (22 April –
Fifth Army to conduct the offensive, debates over the 15 May 1915), making the Ypres salient more costly to
[10]
nature of the opening attack and between advocates of defend. Sir Douglas Haig succeeded Sir John French
shallow and deeper objectives, have also been controver- as Commander-in-Chief
[11]
of the BEF on 19 December
sial. The passage of time between the Battle of Messines 1915. A week after his appointment, Haig met Vice-
Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon, who emphasised the impor-

1
2 2 PRELUDE

tance of obtaining control of the Belgian coast, to end the the preparations for the offensive at Verdun and later
threat posed by German naval forces. Haig was sceptical to try to divert Allied attention from the Battle of the
of a coast operation, believing that a landing from the sea Somme. Other operations were begun by the British, to
would be far more difficult than anticipated and that an regain territory or to evict the Germans from ground over-
advance along the coast would require so much prepara- looking their positions. Engagements took place on 12
tion that the Germans would have ample warning. Haig February at Boesinge and on 14 February at Hooge and
preferred an advance from Ypres, to bypass the flooded Sanctuary Wood. There were actions on 14–15 Febru-
area around the Yser and the coast, before a coastal attack ary and 1–4 March at The Bluff, 27 March – 16 April
was attempted, to clear the coast to the Dutch border.[8] at the St Eloi Craters and the Battle of Mont Sorrel 2–
In January 1916, Haig ordered General Plumer to plan 13 June.[20] In January 1917, the Second Army (II An-
zac, IX, X and VIII corps) held the line in Flanders from
offensives against Messines Ridge, Lille and Houthoulst
Forest.[12] General Rawlinson was also ordered to plan Laventie to Boesinghe, with eleven divisions and up to
two in reserve. There was much trench mortaring, mining
an attack from the Ypres Salient on 4 February. Plan-
ning by Plumer continued but the demands of the Battles and raiding by both sides and from January to May, the
Second Army had 20,000 casualties. In May, reinforce-
of Verdun and the Somme absorbed the offensive capac-
ity of the BEF.[13] On 15 and 29 November 1916, Haig ments began moving to Flanders from the south, II Corps
met Général d'Armée Joseph Joffre and the other Al- and 17 divisions had arrived by the end of the month.[21]
lies at Chantilly. An offensive strategy to overwhelm the
Central Powers was agreed, with attacks planned on the
1.2 Strategic background
Western, Eastern and Italian fronts, by the first fortnight
in February 1917.[14] A meeting in London of the Admi-
Main article: Western Front (World War I)
ralty and General Staff urged that the Flanders operation
be undertaken in 1917 and Joffre replied on 8 December,
agreeing to the proposal for a Flanders campaign after the Several British and French operations took place beyond
spring offensive.[15] The plan for a year of steady attritionFlanders during the Third Battle of Ypres, intended to
on the Western Front, with the main effort in the summer assist Allied operations at Ypres, by obstructing the flow
being made by the BEF, was scrapped by Nivelle and the of munitions and reinforcements to the 4th Army in Bel-
French government for a decisive battle, to be conducted gium and to exploit opportunities created by the German
in February by the French army, with the British contri- need to economise elsewhere. German offensives in Rus-
bution becoming a preliminary operation, the Battles of sia and against Italy were postponed several times, as the
Arras.[16] demand for men and munitions in Flanders left little avail-
able for other operations and the French army was able to
Nivelle planned an operation in three parts, preliminary
continue its recuperation after the Nivelle Offensive.[22]
offensives to pin German reserves by the British at Ar-
ras and the French between the Somme and the Oise, a
French breakthrough offensive on the Aisne, then pursuit
and exploitation. The plan was welcomed by Haig with 2 Prelude
reservations, which he addressed on 6 January. Nivelle
agreed to a proviso that if the first two parts of the oper- 2.1 Geography and climate
ation failed to lead to part three, they would be stopped
so that the British could move their main forces north for The front line around Ypres had changed relatively little
the Flanders offensive, which Haig argued was of great since the end of the Second Battle of Ypres (22 April – 25
importance to the British government.[17] Haig wrote on May 1915).[23] The British held the city, while the Ger-
23 January, that it would take six weeks to move British mans held the high ground of the Messines–Wytschaete
troops and equipment from the Arras front to Flanders ridge to the south, the lower ridges to the east and the
and on 14 March he noted that the attack on Messines flat ground to the north.[24][Note 3] The Ypres front was
Ridge could be made in May. On 21 March, he wrote to a salient bulging into German positions, overlooked by
Nivelle that it would take two months to prepare the at- German artillery on the higher ground. It was difficult
tacks from Messines to Steenstraat but that the Messines for the British forces to gain ground observation of the
attack could be ready in 5–6 weeks. On 16 May, Haig German rear areas east of the ridges.[26]
wrote that he had divided the Flanders operation into two
phases, one to take Messines Ridge and the main attack In Flanders, sands, gravels and marls predominate, in
several weeks later.[18] British determination to clear the places covered by silts. The coastal strip is sand but a
Belgian coast took on more urgency, after the Germans short way inland, the ground rises to the vale of Ypres, [27]
resumed unrestricted submarine warfare on 1 February which before 1914 was a flourishing market garden.
1917.[19] Ypres is 20 metres (66 ft) above sea level; Bixshoote 4
miles (6.4 km) to the north is at 8.5 metres (28 ft). To
Small operations took place in the Ypres salient in 1916, the east the land is at 20–25 metres (66–82 ft) for several
some being German initiatives to distract the Allies from miles, with the Steenbeek river at 15 metres (49 ft) near
2.2 British plans for a Flanders campaign 3

2.2 British plans for a Flanders campaign

Preparations for operations in Flanders began in 1915,

with the doubling of the Hazebrouck–Ypres rail line and
the building of a new line from Bergues–Proven which
was doubled in early 1917. Progress on roads, rail lines,
railheads and spurs in the Second Army zone was contin-
uous and by mid-1917, gave the area the most efficient
supply system of the BEF.[42] Several plans and mem-
oranda for a Flanders offensive were produced between
January 1916 and May 1917, in which the writers tried
to relate the offensive resources available to the terrain
and the likely German defence. In early 1916, the im-
portance of the capture of the Gheluvelt plateau for an
advance further north was emphasised by Haig and the
army commanders.[43]
On 14 February 1917, Colonel Macmullen of GHQ pro-
posed that the plateau be taken by a mass tank attack,
reducing the need for artillery; in April a reconnaissance
by Captain G. le Q Martel found that the area was un-
suitable for tanks.[44] On 9 February General Rawlinson,
commander of the Fourth Army, suggested that Messines
Ridge could be taken in one day and that the capture of
The progression of the battle and the general disposition of the Gheluvelt plateau should be fundamental to the at-
troops tack further north. He suggested that the southern attack
from St. Yves to Mont Sorrel should come first and that
Mont Sorrel to Steenstraat should be attacked within 48–
72 hours. After discussions with Rawlinson and Plumer
St Julien. There is a low ridge from Messines, 80 me- and the incorporation of Haig’s changes, Macmullen sub-
tres (260 ft) at its highest point, running north-east past mitted his memorandum on 14 February. With amend-
“Clapham Junction” at the west end of Gheluvelt plateau ments the memorandum became the GHQ 1917 plan.[45]
(2 1 ⁄2 miles from Ypres at 65 metres (213 ft) and Ghelu- On 1 May 1917, Haig wrote that the Nivelle Offensive
velt (above 50 metres (160 ft)) to Passchendaele, (5 1 ⁄2 had weakened the German army but that an attempt at
miles from Ypres at 50 metres (160 ft)) declining from a decisive blow would be premature.[46] An offensive at
there to a plain further north. Gradients vary from negli- Ypres would continue the wearing-out process, on a front
gible, to 1:60 at Hooge and 1:33 at Zonnebeke.[28] where the Germans could not refuse to fight. Even a par-
Underneath the soil is London clay, sand and silt; ac- tial success would improve the tactical situation in the
cording to the Commonwealth War Graves Commis- Ypres salient, reducing the exceptional “wastage” which
sion categories of sand, sandy soils and well-balanced occurred even in quiet periods.[47] In early May, Haig set
soils, Messines ridge is well-balanced soil and the ground the timetable for the Flanders offensive, with 7 June the
around Ypres is sandy soil.[29] The ground is drained date for the preliminary attack on Messines Ridge.[48] A
by many streams, canals and ditches which need regu- week after the Battle of Messines Ridge, Haig gave his
lar maintenance. Since 1914 much of the drainage had objectives to his Army commanders: wearing out the en-
been destroyed, although some parts had been restored by emy, securing the Belgian coast and connecting with the
Land Drainage Companies brought from England. The Dutch frontier by the capture of Passchendaele ridge, fol-
area was considered by the British to be drier than Loos, lowed by an advance on Roulers and Operation Hush, an
Givenchy and Plugstreet Wood further south.[30] A 1989 attack along the coast with an amphibious landing. If
study of weather data recorded at Lille, 16 miles (26 manpower and artillery were insufficient, only the first
km) from Ypres from 1867–1916, showed that August part of the plan might be fulfilled. On 30 April, Haig told
was more often dry than wet, that there was a trend to- Gough the Fifth Army commander, that he would lead
wards dry autumns (September–November) and that av- the “Northern Operation” and the coastal force, although
erage rainfall in October had decreased over the previous Cabinet approval for the offensive was not granted until
fifty years.[31][Note 4] 21 June.[49][Note 5]
4 2 PRELUDE

2.3 German defences in Flanders ridge, led Crown Prince Rupprecht on 9 June, to pro-
pose a withdrawal to the Flandern line in the area east
Main article: German defensive preparations: June – July of Messines. Construction of defences in the area be-
1917 gan but on 13 June, Colonel Fritz von Lossberg arrived
The 4th Army held a front of 25 miles (40 km) with three as the new Chief of Staff of the 4th Army.[53] Lossberg
rejected the proposed withdrawal to the Flandern line and
ordered that the current front line east of the Sehnen line
(Oosttaverne Line) be held rigidly, as the front of a deep-
ened Flandern Stellung (Flanders Position), in front of the
Flandern line. The existing line was to become Flandern
I, with a new Flandern II line to be built west of Menin,
northwards to Terhand and Passchendaele, at the back of
a new Flandern II Stellung. Construction of Flandern III
was begun east of Menin to run north to Moorslede.[54]
On 25 June, Erich Ludendorff the First Quartermas-
ter General, suggested to Rupprecht, that Group Ypres
should withdraw to the Wilhelm (third) line, leaving only
outposts in the Albrecht (second) line. On 30 June, the
army group Chief of Staff, General von Kuhl suggested
a withdrawal to Flandern I along Passchendaele ridge,
meeting the old front line in the north near Langemarck
and close to Armentières in the south. Such a withdrawal
would avoid a hasty retreat from Pilckem Ridge and force
the British into a time-consuming redeployment. Loss-
berg disagreed, believing that the British would launch
a broad front offensive, that the ground east of the Seh-
nen line was easy to defend, that the Menin road ridge
could be held, if it was made the Schwerpunkt (point of
main effort) of the German defensive effort. Pilckem
Ridge deprived the British of ground observation over the
Steenbeek Valley, while the Germans could see the area
from Passchendaele Ridge, allowing German infantry to
be supported by observed artillery fire. Lossberg’s judge-
ment was accepted and no withdrawal was made.[55]

2.4 Messines Ridge: 7–17 June

German defensive system, Flanders, mid-1917 Main article: Battle of Messines (1917)
The first stage in the British plan, was a prepara-

“Groups”, composed of corps headquarters and a vary-

ing complement of divisions and Group Staden, based
on the headquarters of the Guards Reserve Corps was
added later. Group Dixmude held 12 miles (19 km) with
four front divisions and two Eingreif divisions, Group
Ypres held 6 miles (9.7 km) from Pilckem to Menin Road
with three front divisions and two Eingreif divisions and
Group Wijtschate held a similar length of front south of
the Menin road, with three front divisions and three Ein-
greif divisions. The Eingreif divisions were stationed be-
hind the Menin and Passchendaele ridges. About 5 miles
(8.0 km) further back, were four more Eingreif divisions
and 7 miles (11 km) beyond them, another two in Oberste
Heeresleitung (OHL) reserve.[52] German trench destroyed by a mine explosion

German anxiety that the British would exploit their vic-

tory at Messines by advancing to the Bassevillebeek tory attack on the German positions south of Ypres at
(Tower Hamlets) spur, beyond the north end of Messines Messines Ridge. The German positions had observation
3.1 First phase, July–August
over Ypres and unless captured, would enable observed
enfilade artillery-fire against a British attack eastwards
from the salient.[56] The British attack began on 7 June,
preceded by a unique display of military pyrotechnics.
Since mid-1915, the British had been covertly digging
mines under the German positions on the ridge. By June
1917, 21 mines had been filled with nearly 1,000,000
lb (450,000 kg) of explosives.[57] The Germans knew
the British were mining and had taken some counter-
measures but they were taken by surprise at the extent
of the British effort.[58] Two of the mines failed to deto-
nate but 19 went off on 7 June, at 3:10 a.m. British Sum-
mer Time. The final objectives were largely gained before
dark and the British, in the morning, had fewer losses than
the plan anticipated, of up to 50% in the initial attack. As
the infantry advanced over the back edge of the ridge, giv-
ing targets to German artillery and machine-guns, British
artillery was less able to provide covering fire.[59] Fight-
ing continued on the lower slopes, on the east side of the
ridge until 14 June.[60] The offensive removed the Ger-
mans from the dominating ground on the southern face
of the Ypres salient, which the 4th Army had held since
1914.[61]
2.5 Kerensky offensive
Main articles: Eastern Front (World War I) and Kerensky
Offensive
The Russian army launched the Kerensky Offensive to
honour the agreement struck with its allies, at the Chan-
tilly meeting of 15–16 November 1916. After a brief
period of success from 1–19 July the German strategic
reserve of six divisions captured Riga from 1–5 Septem-
ber 1917. In Operation Albion (September–October
1917) the Germans took the islands at the mouth of the
Gulf of Riga and the British and French commanders on
the Western Front, had to reckon on the German west-
ern army being strengthened by reinforcements from the
Eastern Front, in late 1917.[62] Haig wished to exploit the
diversion of German forces in Russia for as long as it con-
tinued and urged that the maximum amount of manpower
and munitions be committed to the battle in Flanders.[63]
3 Battles of the Third Ypres cam-
paign
3.1 First phase, July–August
Main article: The British set-piece attack in mid-1917
Haig selected Gough to command the offensive on 30
April and on 10 June, Gough took over the Ypres salient
north of Messines Ridge. Gough planned an offensive
based on the GHQ 1917 plan and the instructions he had
received from Haig.[64] On the understanding that Haig
5
British 18 pounder battery taking up new positions near
Boesinghe, 31 July
wanted a more ambitious version, Gough held meetings
with his Corps commanders on 6 and 16 June, where
the third objective, which included the German Wilhelm
(third) line a second-day objective, was added to the two
objectives due to be taken on the first day. A fourth ob-
jective was also given for the first day but was only to
be attempted at the discretion of divisional and corps
commanders, in places where the German defence had
collapsed.[65] An attack of this nature was not a break-
through operation, because the German defensive posi-
tion Flandern I lay 10,000–12,000 yards (9,100–11,000
m) behind the front line and would not be attacked on
the first day. The Fifth Army plan was more ambitious
than Plumer’s earlier version, which had involved an ad-
vance of 1,000–1,750 yards (910–1,600 m).[66] Major-
General J. Davidson, Director of Operations at GHQ,
wrote in a memorandum that there was “ambiguity as to
what was meant by a step-by-step attack with limited ob-
jectives” and suggested reverting to a 1,750 yards (1,600
m) advance, to increase the concentration of British
artillery.[67] Gough stressed the need to plan to exploit an
opportunity to take ground left temporarily undefended
and that this was more likely in the first attack, which
would have the benefit of long preparation. After dis-
cussions at the end of June, Haig and Plumer the Second
Army commander endorsed the Fifth Army plan.[68]
3.1.1 Battle of Pilckem Ridge
Main article: Battle of Pilckem Ridge
The British attack began at 3:50 a.m. on 31 July; the at-
tack was to commence at dawn but a layer of unbroken
low cloud, meant that it was still dark.[69] The main attack
of the offensive, by II Corps across the Ghelveult Plateau
to the south, confronted the principal German defensive
concentration of artillery, ground-holding and Eingreif
divisions. The attack had most success on the left (north),
6 3 BATTLES OF THE THIRD YPRES CAMPAIGN
in front of XIV Corps and the French First Army. In this
section of the front, the Entente forces advanced 2,500–
3,000 yards (2,300–2,700 m), up to the line of the Steen-
beek stream. In the centre of the British attack, XVIII
Corps and XIX Corps pushed forward to the line of the
Steenbeek to consolidate and sent reserve troops towards
the Green and Red lines (on the XIX Corps front), an
advance of about 4,000 yards (3,700 m). Group Ypres
counter-attacked the flanks of the British break-in, sup-
ported by all available artillery and aircraft at about mid-
day. The German counter-attack was able to drive the
three British brigades back to the black line with 70%
losses, where the German counter-attack was stopped by
mud, artillery and machine-gun fire.[70]
3.1.2 Capture of Westhoek
II Corps attacked on 10 August, to capture the rest of the
black line on the Gheluvelt plateau. The advance suc-
ceeded but German artillery fire and infantry counter-
attacks isolated the infantry of the 18th Division, which
had captured Glencorse Wood. At about 7:00 p.m., Ger-
man infantry attacked behind a smokescreen and recap-
tured all but the north-west corner of the wood, only the
25th Division gains on Westhoek Ridge being held.[71]
Albrecht von Thaer, Staff Officer at Group Wytshchate,
noted that casualties after 14 days in the line averaged
1,500–2,000 men, compared to the Somme 1916 average
of 4,000 men and that German troop morale was higher
than in 1916.[72]
3.1.3 Battle of Hill 70
Main article: Battle of Hill 70
The Battle of Hill 70, was a subsidiary operation by the
Canadian Corps against five divisions of the German 6th
Army. The battle took place on the outskirts of Lens,
Pas-de-Calais, from 15–25 August. Kuhl wrote later that
it was a costly defeat and “wrecked” the plan for relieving
divisions which had been “fought-out” in Flanders.[73]
3.1.4 Battle of Langemarck
Main article: Battle of Langemarck (1917)
The battle was fought from 16–18 August; the Fifth
Army headquarters was influenced by the effect that de-
lay would have on Operation Hush, which needed the high
tides at the end of August or it would have to be post-
poned for a month. Gough intended the rest of the green
line (just beyond the German Wilhelm (third) line, from
Polygon Wood to Langemarck) to be taken and the Steen-
beek crossed further north.[74] In the II Corps area, the
disappointment of 10 August was repeated, with the in-
fantry managing to advance, then being isolated by Ger-
man artillery and (except in the 25th Division area near
Westhoek) forced back to their start line, by German
counter-attacks. Attempts by the German infantry to ad-
vance further, were stopped by British artillery fire with
many losses.[75] The advance further north in the XVIII
Corps area, retook and held the north end of St Julien
and the area south-east of Langemarck, while XIV Corps
captured Langemarck and the Wilhelm (third) line, north
of the Ypres–Staden railway near the Kortebeek. The
French First Army conformed, pushing up to the Korte-
beek and St. Jansbeck stream west of the northern stretch
of the Wilhelm (third) line, where it crossed to the east
side of the Kortebeek.[76]
3.1.5 Subsidiary operations
Most of the smaller British attacks from 19–27 August
failed to hold ground, although a XVIII Corps attack
on 19 August succeeded. Exploiting observation from
higher ground to the east, the Germans were able to inflict
many losses on the British divisions holding the new line
beyond Langemarck. After two fine dry days from 17–
18 August, XIX and XVIII Corps began pushing closer
to the Wilhelm (third) line. On 20 August, an operation
by British tanks, artillery and infantry captured strong
points along the St. Julien–Poelcappelle road and two
days later, more ground was gained by XVIII and XIX
Corps, which still left them overlooked by the Germans,
in the un-captured part of the Wilhelm (third) line.[77] II
Corps resumed operations to capture Nonne Bosschen,
Glencorse Wood and Inverness Copse around the Menin
Road on 22–24 August, which failed with many losses on
both sides.[78]
Gough laid down a new infantry formation of skirmish
lines to be followed by “worms” on 24 August. Cavan
noted that pill-box defences required broad front attacks,
so as to engage them simultaneously.[79] The British gen-
eral offensive intended for 25 August, was delayed be-
cause of the failure of previous attacks to hold ground,
following the Battle of Langemarck and then postponed
due to more bad weather.[80] Attacks on 27 August,
were minor operations which were costly and inconclu-
sive. Haig called a halt to operations amidst tempestuous
weather.[81]
3.1.6 Second offensive battle of Verdun
Main article: Verdun, August 1917
Petain had committed the French Second Army to an
attack at Verdun in mid-July, in support of the opera-
tions in Flanders. The Second Offensive Battle of Ver-
dun was delayed, partly due to the mutinies which had
affected the French army after the failure of the Nivelle
Offensive and also because a German attack at Verdun
from 28–29 June, which captured some of the ground in-
3.2 Second phase: September–October
tended as a jumping-off point for the French attack. A
French counter-attack on 17 July re-captured the ground,
the Germans regained it on 1 August, then took ground
on the east bank on 16 August.[82] The Second Offensive
Battle of Verdun began on 20 August and by 9 Septem-
ber, had taken 10,000 prisoners. Fighting continued spo-
radically into October, adding to the German difficulties
on the Western Front and elsewhere. Ludendorff wrote:
On the left bank, close to the Meuse, one
division had failed ... and yet both here and
in Flanders everything possible had been done
to avoid failure ... The French army was once
more capable of the offensive. It had quickly
overcome its depression.[83]
— Ludendorff: Memoirs
yet there was no German counter-attack, because the lo- 3.2.1 German defensive changes
cal Eingreif divisions were in Flanders.[84]
Main article: German defensive changes: late 1917
3.2 Second phase: September–October
Main article: The British set-piece attack in late 1917
The German 4th Army had defeated the British advance
to all of the objectives of 31 July during August but high
casualties and sickness caused by the ground conditions,
endless bombardments and air attacks worsened the man-
power shortage that the German defensive strategy for
1917 was intended to alleviate.[85] Haig transferred com-
mand of the offensive to General Plumer, the Second
Army commander on 25 August and moved the north-
ern boundary of the Second Army closer to the Ypres–
Roulers railway. More heavy artillery was sent to Flan-
ders from the armies further south and placed opposite
the Gheluvelt plateau.[86]
Plumer continued the development of British attacking
methods, which had also taken place in the Fifth Army,
during the slow and costly progress in August, against the
German defence-in-depth and the unusually wet weather.
After a pause of about three weeks, Plumer intended to
capture Gheluvelt plateau in four steps, with six days be-
tween each step, to allow time to bring forward artillery
and supplies.[87] Each attack was to have limited geo-
graphical objectives like the attacks in August, with in-
fantry brigades re-organised to attack the first objective
with one battalion each and the final one with two bat-
talions. Plumer arranged for much more medium and
heavy artillery to be added to the creeping bombardment,
which had been impossible with the amount of artillery
available to Gough.[88] The revised attack organisation
was intended to have more infantry attacking on narrower
fronts, to a shallower depth than the attack of 31 July.
The quicker and shorter advances were intended to be
consolidated on tactically advantageous ground (particu-
larly on reverse slopes), with the infantry in contact with
7
their artillery and air support, ready to repulse counter-
attacks.[86]
The tempo of the operations was intended to add to Ger-
man difficulties, in replacing tired divisions through the
transport bottlenecks behind the German front.[89] The
pause in British operations while Plumer moved more ar-
tillery into the area of the Gheluvelt plateau, helped to
mislead the Germans. Albrecht von Thaer, Staff Officer
at Group Wijtschate wrote that it was “almost boring”.[72]
At first, Kuhl doubted that the offensive had ended but
by 13 September, had changed his mind. Despite reser-
vations Kuhl allowed two divisions, thirteen heavy bat-
teries and twelve field batteries of artillery, three fighter
squadrons and four other air force units to be transferred
from the 4th Army.[90]
Instead of setting objectives 1–2 miles (1.6–3.2 km) dis-
tant as on 31 July, the British planned an advance of ap-
proximately 1,500 yards (1,400 m), without the disad-
vantages of rain soaked ground and poor visibility, en-
countered in August. The advances were much quicker
and the final objective was reached a few hours after
dawn, which confounded the German counter-attack di-
visions. Having crossed 2 miles (3.2 km) of mud, the
Eingreif divisions found the British already established
along a new defence line, with the forward battle zone
and its weak garrison gone beyond recapture.[91] After
the Battle of Menin Road Ridge, the German defensive
system was changed, beginning a search for expedients
which lasted for the rest of the battle. In August, German
front-line divisions had two regiments of three battalions
deployed forward, with the third regiment in reserve. The
front battalions had needed to be relieved much more fre-
quently than expected, due to the power of British attacks,
constant artillery fire and the weather, which caused re-
placement units to become mixed up with ones holding
the front, rather than operate as formed bodies. Reserve
regiments had not been able to intervene early enough,
leaving front battalions unsupported until Eingreif divi-
sions arrived, some hours after the commencement of the
attack.[92]
After another severe defeat on 26 September, the Ger-
man commanders made more changes to the defensive
dispositions of the infantry and altered their counter-
attack tactics, which had been negated by Plumer’s more
conservative form of limited attacks. In July and August,
German counter-attack (Eingreif) divisions had engaged
in a manner analogous to an advance to contact during
mobile operations, which had given the Germans sev-
eral costly defensive successes.[93] The counter-attacks in
September had been assaults on reinforced field positions,
due to the restrained nature of British infantry advances.
8 3 BATTLES OF THE THIRD YPRES CAMPAIGN

The fine weather in early September, had greatly eased

British supply difficulties, especially in the delivery of
huge amounts of artillery ammunition. Immediately after
their infantry advances, the British had made time to es-
tablish a defence in depth, behind standing barrages. The
British attacks took place in dry clear weather, with in-
creased air support over the battlefield, for counter-attack
reconnaissance, contact patrols and ground-attack oper-
ations. Systematic defensive artillery support was for-
feited by the Germans, due to uncertainty over the po-
sition of their infantry, just when the British infantry
benefitted from the opposite. German counter-attacks
were defeated with many casualties and on 28 September,
Albrecht von Thaer, staff officer at Group Wytschaete,
wrote that the experience was “awful” and that he did not Wounded men at the side of a road after the Battle of Menin
know what to do.[94][72] Road
Ludendorff ordered a strengthening of forward garrisons
by the ground-holding divisions. All machine-guns, in-
cluding those of the support and reserve battalions of the aircraft crews, had been burdened with too many duties
front line regiments, were sent into the forward zone, to in bad weather.[102]
form a cordon of four to eight guns every 250 yards (230
On 20 September, the Allies attacked on a 14,500 yards
m).[95] The ground holding divisions were reinforced by
(13,300 m) front and captured most of their objectives,
the Stoss regiment of an Eingreif division being moved
to a depth of about 1,500 yards (1,400 m) by mid-
up behind each front division, into the artillery protec-
morning.[103] The Germans made many counter-attacks,
tive line behind the forward battle zone, to launch earlier
beginning around 3:00 p.m. until early evening, all of
counter-attacks while the British were consolidating. The
which failed to gain ground or made only a temporary
bulk of the Eingreif divisions were to be held back and
penetration of the new British positions. The German
used for a methodical counter-stroke on the next day or
defence had failed to stop a well-prepared attack made
the one after and for counter-attacks and spoiling attacks
in good weather.[104] Minor attacks took place after 20
between British offensives.[96][97][Note 6] Further changes
September, as both sides jockeyed for position and reor-
of the 4th Army defensive methods were ordered on 30
ganised their defences. A mutually-costly attack by the
September. Operations to increase British infantry losses
Germans on 25 September, recaptured pillboxes at the
in line with the instructions of 22 September were to
south western end of Polygon Wood. Next day, the Ger-
continue. Gas bombardments of forward British infantry
man positions near the wood were swept away in the Bat-
and artillery positions, were to be increased whenever the
tle of Polygon Wood.[105]
winds allowed. Every effort was to be made to induce
the British to reinforce their forward positions, where
the German artillery could engage them.[99] Between 26 3.2.3 Battle of Polygon Wood
September and 3 October, the Germans attacked at least
24 times.[22] Operation Hohensturm, a bigger German Main article: Battle of Polygon Wood
methodical counter-attack, intended to recapture the area The Second Army altered its Corps frontages soon af-
around Zonnebeke was planned for 4 October.[100] ter the attack of 20 September, for the next effort (26
September – 3 October) so that each attacking division
could be concentrated on a 1,000 yards (910 m) front.
3.2.2 Battle of the Menin Road Ridge Roads and light railways were extended to the new front
line, to allow artillery and ammunition to be moved for-
Main article: Battle of the Menin Road Ridge ward. The artillery of VIII Corps and IX Corps in the
The British plan for the battle fought from 20–25 south, simulated preparations for attacks on Zandvoorde
September, included more emphasis on the use of heavy and Warneton. At 5.50 a.m. on 26 September, five lay-
and medium artillery, to destroy German concrete pill- ers of barrage fired by British artillery and machine-guns
boxes and machine-gun nests, which were more numer- began. Dust and smoke thickened the morning mist and
ous in the battle zones being attacked and to engage in the infantry advanced using compass bearings.[106] Each
more counter-battery fire. The British had 575 heavy and of the three German ground-holding divisions attacked
medium and 720 field guns and howitzers, having more on 26 September, had an Eingreif division in support,
than doubled the quantity of artillery available at the Bat- twice the ratio of 20 September. No ground captured by
tle of Pilckem Ridge.[101] Aircraft were to be used for the British was lost and German counter-attacks managed
systematic air observation of German troop movements, only to reach ground to which survivors of the front-line
to avoid the failures of previous battles, where too few divisions had retired.[107]
3.3 Third phase: October–November 9

British soldiers moving forward during the Battle of

Broodseinde. Photo by Ernest Brooks.

in the front defence zone. Reserve battalions moved back

behind the artillery protective line and the Eingreif di-
visions were organised to intervene as swiftly as possi-
ble once an attack commenced, despite the risk of being
devastated by the British artillery. Counter-battery fire to
Australian infantry with small box respirator gas masks, Ypres, reduce British artillery fire was to be increased, to pro-
September 1917 tect the Eingreif divisions as they advanced.[112] All of
the German divisions holding front zones were relieved
and an extra division brought forward, as the British ad-
3.3 Third phase: October–November vances had lengthened the front line. Without the forces
necessary for a counter-offensive, south of the Gheluvelt
plateau towards Kemmel Hill, Rupprecht began to plan
3.3.1 Battle of Broodseinde
for a slow withdrawal from the Ypres salient, even at the
risk of uncovering German positions further north and
Main article: Battle of Broodseinde
the Belgian coast.[113][Note 7]

The Battle of Broodseinde (4 October), was the last as-

sault launched by Plumer in good weather.[108] The op-
eration aimed to complete the capture of the Ghelu- 3.3.3 Battle of Poelcappelle
velt Plateau and occupy Broodseinde Ridge. The Ger-
mans sought to recapture their defences around Zon-
nebeke, with a methodical counter-attack also to begin on Main article: Battle of Poelcappelle
4 October.[100] The British attacked along a 14,000 yards
(13,000 m) front. By coincidence, Australian troops from
The French First Army and British Second and Fifth
I Anzac Corps met attacking troops from the German armies attacked on 9 October, on a 13,500 yards (12,300
45th Reserve Division in no man’s land, when Operation m) front, from south of Broodseinde to St. Jansbeek,
Hohensturm commenced simultaneously.[109] The Ger- to advance half of the distance from Broodseinde ridge
mans had reinforced their front line, to delay the British
to Passchendaele, on the main front, which led to many
capture of their forward positions, until Eingreif divisions
casualties on both sides. Advances in the north of the
could intervene, which put more German troops into the attack front were retained by British and French troops
area most vulnerable to British artillery.[110] The British
but most of the ground taken in front of Passchendaele
inflicted devastating casualties, on the 4th Army divisions
and on the Becelaere and Gheluvelt spurs was lost to
opposite.[111] German counter-attacks.[114] General William Birdwood
later wrote that the return of heavy rain and mud sloughs,
was the main cause of the failure to hold captured ground.
3.3.2 German defensive changes Kuhl concluded that the fighting strained German fighting
power to the limit but that the German forces managed to
Main article: German defensive changes: late 1917 prevent a breakthrough, although it was becoming much
On 7 October, the 4th Army again dispersed its troops harder to replace losses.[115]
10 3 BATTLES OF THE THIRD YPRES CAMPAIGN

3.3.4 First Battle of Passchendaele and 180 guns, as the French advanced up to 3.7 miles
(6.0 km), capturing the village and fort of La Malmaison,
Main article: First Battle of Passchendaele gaining control of the Chemin des Dames ridge. The Ger-
The First Battle of Passchendaele on 12 October, was mans had to withdraw to the north of the Ailette Valley.
Haig was pleased with the French success but regretted
the delay, which had lessened its effect on the Flanders
operations.[119]

3.3.6 Second Battle of Passchendaele

Main article: Second Battle of Passchendaele

The British Fifth Army undertook minor operations

Terrain through which the Canadian Corps advanced at

Aerial view of Passchendaele village before and after the battle Passchendaele, in late 1917

another Allied attempt to gain ground around Passchen-

daele. Heavy rain and mud again made movement
difficult and little artillery could be brought closer to
the front. Allied troops were exhausted and morale
had fallen. After a modest British advance, German
counter-attacks recovered most of the ground lost oppo-
site Passchendaele.[116] There were 13,000 Allied casual-
ties, including 2,735 New Zealanders, 845 of whom had
been killed or lay wounded and stranded, in the mud of
no-man’s-land. In lives lost in a day, this was the worst
day in New Zealand history.[117] At a conference on 13
October, Haig and the army commanders agreed that at-
tacks would stop until the weather improved and roads
could be extended, to carry more artillery and ammuni-
tion forward for better fire support.[118]
Terrain at Passchendaele near where the Canadian Corps
advanced, spring 2015
3.3.5 Battle of La Malmaison
from 20–22 October, to maintain pressure on the Ger-
Main article: Battle of La Malmaison mans and support the French attack at La Malmaison,
while the Canadian Corps prepared for a series of attacks
After numerous requests from Haig, Petain began the from 26 October – 10 November).[120][121] The four di-
Battle of La Malmaison, a long-delayed French attack on visions of the Canadian Corps had been transferred to
the Chemin des Dames, by Maistre’s Sixth Army. The the Ypres Salient from Lens, to capture Passchendaele
artillery preparation started on 17 October. The German and the ridge.[122] The Canadian Corps relieved II An-
defenders were swiftly defeated, losing 11,157 prisoners zac Corps on 18 October and found that the front line
4.2 Casualties 11

was mostly the same as that occupied by the 1st Canadian
Division in April 1915.[123] The Canadian Corps opera-
tion was to be executed in a series of three limited at-
tacks, on 26 October, 30 October and 6 November.[124]
On 26 October, the 3rd Canadian Division captured its
objective at Wolf Copse, then swung back its northern
flank to link with the adjacent division of the Fifth Army.
The 4th Canadian Division captured its objectives but
was forced slowly to retire from Decline Copse against
German counter-attacks and communication failures be-
tween the Canadian and Australian units to the south.[125]
The second stage began on 30 October, to complete the
previous stage and gain a base for the final assault on
Passchendaele.[125] The attackers on the southern flank
quickly captured Crest Farm and sent patrols beyond the
final objective into Passchendaele. The attack on the
northern flank again met with exceptional German re-
sistance. The 3rd Canadian Division captured Vapour
Farm on the Corps boundary, Furst Farm to the west
of Meetcheele and the crossroads at Meetcheele but re-
mained short of its objective.[126] During a seven-day
pause, the Second Army took over another section of
the Fifth Army front adjoining the Canadian Corps.[127]
Three rainless days from 3–5 November, eased prepa-
ration for the next stage, which began on the morning
of 6 November, with the 1st Canadian Division and the
2nd Canadian Division. In fewer than three hours, many
units reached their final objectives and Passchendaele was
captured. The Canadian Corps launched a final action
on 10 November, to gain control of the remaining high
ground north of the village near Hill 52 which ended
the campaign, apart from a night attack at Passchen-
daele on 1/2 December, an attack on the Polderhoek Spur
on 2 December and some minor operations in the new
year.[128][129][Note 8]
had developed a workable system of offensive tactics,
against which the Germans ultimately had no answer.[134]
A decade later, Sheldon wrote that relative casualty fig-
ures were irrelevant, because the German army could
not afford heavy losses or to lose the initiative, by being
compelled to fight another defensive battle, on ground of
the Allies’ choosing. The Third Battle of Ypres pinned
the German army to Flanders and caused unsustainable
casualties.[135] At a conference on 13 October, a scheme
of the Third Army for an attack in mid-November was
discussed. Byng wanted the operations at Ypres to con-
tinue, to hold German troops in Flanders.[136] The Battle
of Cambrai began on 20 November, when the British
breached the first two parts of the Hindenburg Line, in
the first successful mass use of tanks in a combined arms
operation.[137]
The experience of the failure to contain the British at-
tacks at Ypres and the drastic reduction in areas of the
western front which could be considered “quiet”, after
the tank and artillery surprise at Cambrai, left the OHL
with little choice but to return to a strategy of decisive
victory in 1918.[138] On 24 October, the Austro-German
14th Army, under General der Infanterie Otto von Be-
low, attacked the Italian Second Army on the Isonzo, at
the Battle of Caporetto and in 18 days, inflicted casual-
ties of 650,000 men and 3,000 guns.[139] In fear that Italy
might be put out of the war, the French and British Gov-
ernments offered reinforcements.[140] British and French
troops were swiftly moved from 10 November – 12 De-
cember but the diversion of resources from the BEF,
forced Haig to conclude the 3rd Battle of Ypres short of
Westrozebeke, the last substantial attack being made on
10 November.[141]

4 Aftermath
4.2 Casualties
4.1 Analysis
Various casualty figures have been published, sometimes
In a German General Staff publication, it was written that
with acrimony, although the highest estimates for British
“Germany had been brought near to certain destruction
and German casualties appear to be discredited.[142] In
(sicheren Untergang) by the Flanders battle of 1917”.[131]
the Official History, Brigadier-General J. E. Edmonds put
In his memoirs (1938) Lloyd George wrote, “Passchen-
British casualties at 244,897 and wrote that equivalent
daele was indeed one of the greatest disasters of the war
German figures were not available, estimating German
... No soldier of any intelligence now defends this sense-
losses at 400,000. Edmonds considered that 30% needed
less campaign ...”.[132] G. C. Wynne wrote that the British
to be added to German statistics, to make them compa-
had eventually reached Passchendaele Ridge and cap-rable with British casualty criteria.[143] In 2007, Sheldon
tured Flandern I; beyond them was Flandern II and also
wrote that although German casualties from 1 June – 10
Flandern III, which was nearly complete. The GermanNovember were 217,194, a figure available in Volume III
submarine bases on the coast had not been captured but
of the Sanitätsbericht (1934), Edmonds may not have in-
the objective of diverting the Germans from the French
cluded them as they did not fit his case. Sheldon recorded
further south, while they recovered from the Nivelle Of-
182,396 slightly wounded and sick soldiers not struck off
fensive in April, succeeded.[133] unit strength, which if included would make 399,590 Ger-
In 1997, Paddy Griffith wrote that the bite and hold man losses.[144] The British claim to have taken 24,065
system kept moving until November, because the BEF prisoners has not been disputed.[145][Note 10]
12
Tyne Cot Commonwealth War Graves Cemetery and Memorial
to the Missing
4.3 Commemoration
The Menin Gate Memorial to the Missing. commem-
orates those of all Commonwealth nations, except New
Zealand, who died in the Ypres Salient and have no
known grave. In the case of the United Kingdom only ca-
sualties before 16 August 1917 are commemorated on the
memorial. United Kingdom and New Zealand service-
men who died after that date are named on the memorial
at Tyne Cot Cemetery. There are numerous tributes and
memorials all over Australia and New Zealand to AN-
ZAC soldiers who died in the battle, including plaques
at the Christchurch and Dunedin railway stations. The
Canadian Corps participation in the Second Battle of
Passchendaele is commemorated with the Passchendaele
Memorial located at the former site of the Crest Farm on
the south-west fringe of Passchendaele village.[155] One
of the newest monuments to be dedicated to the fight-
ing contribution of a group is the Celtic Cross memo-
rial, commemorating the Scottish contributions and ef-
forts in the fighting in Flanders during the Great War.
This memorial is located on the Frezenberg Ridge where
the Scottish 9th and 15th Divisions, fought during the
Battle of Passchendaele. The monument was dedicated
by Linda Fabiani, the Minister for Europe of the Scottish
Parliament, during the late summer of 2007, the 90th an-
niversary of the battle.[156]
5 See also
• Passchendaele - A Canadian film about the battle
6 Notes
[1] Passchendaele /ˈpæʃəndeɪl/ is the common English ti-
tle. The British Battle Nomenclature Committee called the
Flanders offensives of 1917, The Battle of Messines 1917
6 NOTES
(7–14 June) and The Battles of Ypres 1917 (31 July –
10 November).[1] The German Official History used the
term Third Flanders Battle (Dritte Flandernschlacht) and
the French the Second Battle of Flanders (2ème Bataille
des Flandres).[2]
[2] The series of battles are known to the British as The Bat-
tle of Messines 1917 (7–14 June), The Battle of Pilckem
Ridge (31 July – 2 August), the Battle of Langemarck
(16–18 August), The Battle of Menin Road Ridge (20–
25 September), the Battle of Polygon Wood (26 Septem-
ber – 3 October) the Battle of Broodseinde (4 October),
the Battle of Poelcappelle (9 October), the First Battle
of Passchendaele (12 October) and the Second Battle of
Passchendaele (26 October – 10 November) and referred
to in German works as (Kampf um den Wijtschatebogen)
(The Battle of the Wijtschate Salient) and the (Flandern-
schlacht) (Battle of Flanders) in five periods, First Bat-
tle of Flanders (31 July – 9 August), Second Battle of
Flanders (9–25 August), Third Battle of Flanders (20
September – 8 October) Fourth Battle of Flanders (9–
21 October) and Fifth Battle of Flanders (22 October –
5 December).[1][3]
[3] “High ground” is a relative term. Passchendaele is on a
ridge about 70 feet (21 m) above the surrounding plains.
The Gheluvelt plateau is about 100 feet (30 m) above sur-
rounding area. Wytschaete is about 150 feet (46 m) above
the ground before it; these terrain features were vital for
artillery observation.[25]
[4] Brigadier-General John Charteris, Chief of British Army
Intelligence in France, wrote in 1929 that "... in Flanders
the weather broke early with the regularity of the Indian
monsoon ...”, a claim that has influenced several histori-
ans. The rest of the sentence is rarely quoted, "... once
the autumn rains set in difficulties would be greatly en-
hanced”. On the following page Charteris wrote, “Un-
fortunately there now set in the wettest August recorded
for thirty years”, which contradicted his first statement.[32]
The Official Historian wrote that five times the average
August rainfall in 1915 and 1916 fell in 1917.[33] Win-
ter (1991) wrote that Haig had conclusive evidence that
should have led him to expect heavy rainfall and hence
mud.[34] Cruttwell (1940), Hart and Steel (2001) and
Stevenson (2005), wrote that Haig was unlucky with the
weather.[35][36][37] Sheffield (2011) wrote that the “pre-
dictable” rain in August "... has no foundation in fact. The
rain in Flanders during the battle was abnormally heavy.”,
as did concurring with Terraine (1977).[38][39] In 1958,
Lieutenant-Colonel Ernest Gold, Commandant of the Me-
teorological Section at GHQ contradicted the first part the
claim made by Charteris, “It is quite contrary to the evi-
dence of the records which show that the weather in Au-
gust 1917 was exceptionally bad ...”.[40] Rainfall in August
1917 was 127 millimetres (5.0 in), of which 84 millime-
tres (3.3 in) fell on 1, 8, 14, 26 and 27 August, a month
so dull and windless that the water on the ground dried
slowly. September had 40 millimetres (1.6 in) of rain and
was much sunnier so the ground dried quickly, becoming
hard enough in places for shells to ricochet and for dust
to blow in the breeze. In October 1917, 107 millimetres
(4.2 in) of rain fell, compared to the 1914–1916 average
of 44 millimetres (1.7 in) and from 1–9 November there
 13

was 7.5 millimetres (0.30 in) of rain but only nine hours [2] Terraine 1977, p. 301.
of sunshine, so little of the water dried; 13.4 millimetres
(0.53 in) of rain fell on 10 November.[41] [3] Sheldon 2007, p. xiv.

[5] After mutinies in the French army, the British cabinet felt [4] Albertini 1952, p. 414.
compelled to endorse the Passchaendale offensive, in the
[5] Albertini 1952, p. 504.
hope that more refusals to fight could be “averted by a
great [military] success”. Haig wrote that if the Allies [6] Foley 2007, p. 102.
could win the war in 1917, “the chief people to suffer
would be the socialists”.[50][51] [7] Foley 2007, p. 104.

[6] The 4th Guards Division, 4th Bavarian Division, 6th [8] Edmonds 1932, p. 2.
Bavarian Division, 10th Ersatz Division, 16th Division,
[9] Doughty 2005, p. 137.
19th Reserve Division, 20th Division, 187th Division,
195th Division and 45th Reserve Division took part in the [10] Edmonds 1932, p. 1.
battle.[98]
[11] Terraine 1977, pp. 12–13.
[7] 195th, 16th, 4th Bavarian, 18th, 227th, 240th, 187th and
22nd Reserve divisions).[98] [12] Edmonds 1932, p. 31.

[8] German troops engaged were from the 239th, 39th, 4th, [13] Terraine 1977, pp. 14–15.
44th Reserve, 7th, 11th, 11th Bavarian, 238th, 199th,
27th, 185th, 111th and 40th divisions.[98] [14] Hart & Steel 2001, p. 30.

[9] German casualties were counted in ten-day periods. A [15] Falls 1940, p. 21.
discrepancy of 27,000 fewer casualties recorded in the
[16] Falls 1940, pp. 38–39.
Sanitätsbericht could not be explained by the Reichsarchiv
historians. * Missing totals for 11–30 November and 1– [17] Edmonds & Wynne 1940, p. 14.
31 December are combined[130]
[18] Terraine 1977, pp. 31, 55, 94.
[10] In 1940, C.R.M.F Cruttwell recorded 300,000 British
casualties and 400,000 German.[146] Leon Wolff in [19] Terraine 1999, p. 15.
1958, gave German casualties as 270,713 and British
[20] Edmonds 1932, pp. 163–245.
448,688.[147] In 1959, Cyril Falls estimated 240,000
British, 8,525 French and 260,000 German casualties.[148] [21] Falls 1940, pp. 533–534.
John Terraine followed Falls in 1963 but did not ac-
cept that German losses were as high as 400,000.[149] [22] Terraine 1977, p. 278.
A. J. P. Taylor in 1972, wrote that the Official History
had performed a “conjuring trick” on these figures and [23] Edmonds 1927, p. 353.
that no one believed these “farcical calculations”. Tay- [24] Hart & Steel 2001, pp. 18–19.
lor put British wounded and killed at 300,000 and Ger-
man losses at 200,000.[150] In 1977, Terraine argued that [25] Terraine 1977, p. 2.
20% needed to be added to the German figures to in-
clude some lightly wounded men, who would have been [26] Hart & Steel 2001, p. 42.
included under British definitions of casualties, making
[27] Liddle 1997, pp. 140–158.
German casualties c. 260,400. Terraine refuted Wolff
(1958), who despite writing that 448,614 British casual- [28] Liddle 1997, p. 141.
ties was the total for the BEF in the second half of 1917,
neglected to deduct 75,681 British casualties for the Battle [29] Liddle 1997, p. 142.
of Cambrai given in the Official Statistics, from which he
[30] Edmonds 1948, p. 125.
quoted or “normal wastage”, averaging 35,000 per month
in “quiet” periods.[151] Prior and Wilson in 1997, gave [31] Liddle 1997, pp. 147–148.
British losses as 275,000 and German casualties just under
200,000.[152] Hagenlücke in 1997, gave c. 217,000 Ger- [32] Charteris 1929, pp. 272–273.
man casualties.[72] Sheffield wrote in 2002, that Holmes’s
[33] Edmonds 1948, pp. 205–206.
guess of 260,000 casualties on both sides seemed about
right.[153] In 2011, Sheffield did not offer figures for ei- [34] Winter 1991, pp. 91–92.
ther side, leaving the verdict to General von Kuhl, “The
sacrifices that the British made for the Entente were fully [35] Cruttwell 1940, p. 440.
justified”.[154]
[36] Hart & Steel 2001, pp. 140–141.

[37] Stevenson 2005, p. 335.

7 Footnotes [38] Sheffield 2011, p. 233.

[1] Edmonds 1948, p. iii. [39] Terraine 1977, pp. 205–206.

14 7 FOOTNOTES

[40] Liddle 1997, pp. 153–154. [78] Edmonds 1948, pp. 202–205.

[41] Liddle 1997, pp. 149–151. [79] Simpson 2001, pp. 130–134.

[42] Henniker 1937, p. 273. [80] Rogers 2010, pp. 162–167.

[43] Edmonds 1948, pp. 3–4. [81] Edmonds 1948, p. 208.

[44] Edmonds 1948, p. 25. [82] Doughty 2005, pp. 380–383.

[45] Edmonds 1948, pp. 17–19. [83] Terraine 1977, p. 235.

[46] Powell 1993, p. 169. [84] Edmonds 1948, p. 230.

[47] Terraine 1977, p. 84. [85] Sheldon 2007, pp. 119–120.

[48] Edmonds 1948, p. 24. [86] Nicholson 1962, p. 308.

[49] Sheffield 2011, pp. 227–231. [87] Edmonds 1948, p. 237.

[50] Millman 2001, p. 61. [88] Marble 1998, App 22.

[51] French 1995, pp. 119–122, 92–93, 146. [89] Edmonds 1948, pp. 236–242.

[52] Wynne 1939, pp. 297–298. [90] Terraine 1977, p. 257.

[53] Wynne 1939, pp. 282–283. [91] Wynne 1939, p. 303.

[54] Wynne 1939, p. 284. [92] Rogers 2010, p. 168.

[55] Wynne 1939, pp. 286–287. [93] Sheldon 2007, p. 184.

[56] Sheldon 2007, p. 1. [94] Edmonds 1948, pp. 294–295.

[57] Hart & Steel 2001, pp. 41–44. [95] Wynne 1939, pp. 307–308.

[58] Sheldon 2007, p. 23. [96] Sheldon 2007, pp. 190–191.

[59] Hart & Steel 2001, p. 55. [97] Wynne 1939, p. 307.

[60] Sheldon 2007, p. 28. [98] USWD 1920.

[61] Edmonds 1948, p. 87. [99] Sheldon 2007, pp. 184–186.

[62] Edmonds 1948, p. 234. [100] Prior & Wilson 1996, p. 135.

[63] Terraine 1977, pp. 290–297. [101] Edmonds 1948, pp. 238–239.

[64] Edmonds 1948, p. 127. [102] Jones 1934, p. 181.

[65] Edmonds 1948, pp. 126–127, 431–432. [103] Terraine 1977, p. 261.

[66] Prior & Wilson 1996, pp. 72–75. [104] Harris 2008, p. 366.

[67] Davidson 1953, p. 29. [105] Sheldon 2007, p. 165.

[68] Edmonds 1948, p. 440. [106] Edmonds 1948, p. 284.

[69] Prior & Wilson 1996, p. 89. [107] Edmonds 1948, p. 293.

[70] Prior & Wilson 1996, pp. 90–95. [108] Robbins 2005, p. 128.

[71] Edmonds 1948, pp. 185–187. [109] Bean 1933, pp. 837, 847.

[72] Liddle 1997, pp. 45–58. [110] Malkasian 2002, p. 42.

[73] Terraine 1977, p. 234. [111] Edmonds 1948, pp. 316–317.

[74] Edmonds 1948, pp. 189–202. [112] Wynne 1939, p. 309.

[75] Edmonds 1948, p. 194. [113] Sheldon 2007, pp. 228–229.

[76] Edmonds 1948, p. 201. [114] Bean 1933, p. 887.

[77] Edmonds 1948, p. 203. [115] Terraine 1977, pp. 287–288.


[116] Edmonds 1948, pp. 341–342.
[117] Liddle 1997, p. 285.
[118] Edmonds 1948, p. 345.
[119] Terraine 1977, p. 307.
[120] Bean 1933, p. 930.
[121] Edmonds 1948, p. 347.
[122] Bean 1933, p. 929.
[123] Nicholson 1962, p. 312.
[124] Nicholson 1962, p. 314.
[125] Nicholson 1962, p. 320.
[126] Nicholson 1962, p. 321.
[127] Nicholson 1962, p. 323.
[128] Nicholson 1962, p. 325.
[129] Sheldon 2007, pp. 311–312.
[130] Reichsarchiv 1942, p. 96.
[131] Edmonds 1948, p. xiii.
[132] Terraine 1977, pp. xix–xx.
[133] Wynne 1939, pp. 214–215.
[134] Liddle 1997, p. 71.
[135] Sheldon 2007, pp. 313–317.
[136] Edmonds 1948, pp. 345–346.
[137] Harris 1995, pp. 124–125.
[138] Sheldon 2009, p. 312.
[139] Miles 1948, p. 15.
[140] Bean 1933, pp. 935–936.
[141] Bean 1933, p. 936.
[142] McRandle & Quirk 2006, pp. 667–701.
[143] Edmonds 1948, pp. 361–363.
[144] Sheldon 2007, pp. 313–315.
[145] Boraston 1919, p. 133.
[146] Cruttwell 1940, p. 442.
[147] Wolff 1958, p. 259.
[148] Falls 1959, p. 303.
[149] Terraine 1963, p. 372.
[150] Taylor 1972, pp. 181–182.
[151] Terraine 1977, pp. 344–345.
[152] Prior & Wilson 1996, p. 195.
[153] Sheffield 2001, p. 216.
[154] Sheffield 2011, pp. 248 & 439.
[155] Vance 1997, p. 66.
[156] SG 2007.
15
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Websites
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December 2014.
17
9 Further reading
• Davies, C. B.; Edmonds, J. E.; Maxwell-Hyslop, R.
G. B. (1995) [1937]. Military Operations France
and Belgium, 1918: March – April: Continuation of
the German Offensives. History of the Great War
Based on Official Documents by Direction of the
Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial De-
fence II (Imperial War Museum and Battery Press
ed.). London: HMSO. ISBN 0-89839-223-3.
• Edmonds, J. E.; Maxwell-Hyslop, R. G. B. (1993)
[1947]. Military Operations France and Belgium,
1918: 26th September–11th November The Advance
to Victory. History of the Great War Based on Offi-
cial Documents by Direction of the Historical Sec-
tion of the Committee of Imperial Defence V (Im-
perial War Museum and Battery Press ed.). London:
HMSO. ISBN 0-89839-192-X.
• Kershaw, I. (2000) [1999]. Hitler 1889–1936:
Hubris (reprint ed.). New York: Norton. ISBN 0-
393-04671-0.
10 External links
• Third Ypres, Commonwealth War Graves Commis-
sion
• Passchendaele – Canada’s Other Vimy Ridge, Nor-
man Leach, Canadian Military Journal
• Passchendaele Memorial Plate New Zealand His-
tory Online
• Passchendaele, original reports from The Times
• Battles: The Third Battle of Ypres, 1917
• Westhoek The great war in Flanders Fields – A war
and peace experience
• Second Lieutenant Robert Riddel, Military Cross,
10th Battalion Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders,
Passchendaele, 12 October 1917
• Guernsey students re-trace a soldier’s journey to
Passchendaele, for Radiowaves (2007)
• Passchendaele – The Final Call – James Willard
• Uncovering the secrets of Ypres, Robert Hall, 23
February 2007. BBC News, Belgium
• The Battle of Passchendaele. Day by day description
of battle (with maps)
• Canadian movie of the battle
• Historical film documents on the Battles of Ypres at
www.europeanfilmgateway.eu
18 11 TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

11 Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses

11.1 Text
• Battle of Passchendaele Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Passchendaele?oldid=664079501 Contributors: Derek Ross,
David Parker, Mav, Rjstott, Alex.tan, Gsl, William Avery, SimonP, Maury Markowitz, Heron, Leandrod, Jdlh, Dominus, Liftarn, Sannse,
Frank Shearar, Axlrosen, Arwel Parry, Julesd, John K, JidGom, Adam Bishop, Joe Canuck, RickK, Wik, DJ Clayworth, Tpbradbury, Jnc,
Bevo, Indefatigable, Proteus, RadicalBender, Waerth, PBS, Korath, RedWolf, Nurg, TimothyPilgrim, Sunray, Hadal, SoLando, HaeB,
Dave6, Fabiform, Xyzzyva, Zigger, Everyking, Bkonrad, Curps, Bovlb, Grant65, Bobblewik, Max power, Gdr, Albrecht, Antandrus,
Madmagic, JoJan, SimonArlott, The Land, Thincat, Icairns, Loopy, LHOON, Mzabaluev, M1ss1ontomars2k4, RevRagnarok, Jkl, Rich
Farmbrough, Cfailde, Dpm64, YUL89YYZ, Xezbeth, Bender235, Neko-chan, James Matheson, SpencerWilson, Shanes, Diomidis Spinel-
lis, RobNS, Piddingworth, AKGhetto, Pearle, Alansohn, LtNOWIS, Mo0, Denoir, Andrew Gray, Calton, Hohum, Max rspct, Say1988,
John N., Meertn, Skyring, Harm.frielink, Redvers, Djsasso, Tainter, Tintin1107, RyanGerbil10, Fdewaele, Woohookitty, Oliphaunt, BillC,
Mazca, NickDeGraeve, Siener, Pol098, WadeSimMiser, Tabletop, Kelisi, GregorB, Fxer, Seatterj, GraemeLeggett, Graham87, Boyo-
JonesJr, Justin Bailey, Deltabeignet, Bogfjellmo, Josh Parris, Rjwilmsi, Tim!, Jake Wartenberg, Carl Logan, Vary, Funnyhat, DoubleBlue,
MWAK, Fish and karate, Leithp, Titoxd, InfectedWithRage, RexNL, Gurch, BjKa, Pinkville, Karel Anthonissen, Benlisquare, Volatile-
Chemical, Debivort, Kjlewis, Kummi, YurikBot, RobotE, Filippof, Zafiroblue05, Hede2000, Supasheep, CanadianCaesar, Shell Kinney,
Gaius Cornelius, Cryptic, Kimchi.sg, Wimt, Bullzeye, DonaldDuck, Wiki alf, Welsh, LiamE, Brian Crawford, Zwobot, Sliggy, Gadget850,
Mluton, Barnabypage, David Underdown, Avraham, Canadia, Spondoolicks, Fang Aili, Dspradau, Curpsbot-unicodify, Archer7, Disambig-
Bot, Nick-D, DVD R W, Saikiri, Resolute, SmackBot, Britannicus, Roger Davies, Moeron, Prodego, InverseHypercube, WikiuserNI, LeeZ,
Davewild, Michael Dorosh, Mike McGregor (Can), Terlob, Gilliam, Betacommand, Skizzik, Squiddy, Fetofs, Chris the speller, Trebor,
Rex Germanus, Bjmullan, EncMstr, Papa November, Rcbutcher, Darth Panda, Proofreader, Jwillbur, Labattblueboy, TrulyTory, M0llusk,
AgentFade2Black, Bureau, Ganchelkas, Nakon, Luke C, Ohconfucius, Simon Harley, Khazar, Guroadrunner, EnthusiastFRANCE, Marble-
wonder, Bless sins, Korovioff, Volker89, Grandpafootsoldier, Mr Stephen, Andrwsc, Dl2000, Wild Wolf, Keith-264, Iridescent, Nathang-
ordon, CapitalR, Courcelles, Anger22, Adam sk, JForget, Filiep, Karloman2, CmdrObot, Ale jrb, Tristan benedict, Usgnus, Arkangel
lucifer, Airport 1975, Cydebot, Aodhdubh, Meile, Fair Deal, Warrior Poet, Nick Wilson, Odie5533, Major Despard, Garik, Cancun771,
Kingstowngalway, Skb8721, Epbr123, Nitchell, Jaxsonjo, Mojo Hand, Oliver202, Markdarb, Deschreiber, Inner Earth, Sinn, Stygian-sulfur,
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ward247, Wiki Raja, Tgeairn, J.delanoy, Pharaoh of the Wizards, Elfelix, Trusilver, Wikig39, Acdcmax, Michael Daly, Ncmvocalist, Aon-
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39948282, Jtowler, Squids and Chips, CardinalDan, Hugo999, Ruggenberg~enwiki, Philip Trueman, Paulturtle, Dormskirk, Mechanicsc,
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11.2 Images
• File:18pdrBoesinghe31July1917.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/3d/18pdrBoesinghe31July1917.jpg
License: Public domain Contributors: This is photograph Q 5723 from the collections of the Imperial War Museums (collection no. 1900-13)
Original artist: Ernest Brooks
• File:Australian_infantry_small_box_respirators_Ypres_1917.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/34/
Australian_infantry_small_box_respirators_Ypres_1917.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: This image is available from the
Collection Database of the Australian War Memorial under the ID Number: E00825

This tag does not indicate the copyright status of the attached work. A normal copyright tag is still required. See Commons:Licensing for more information.
Original artist: Photo by Captain Frank Hurley.
11.2 Images 19

• File:Battle_of_Broodseinde_-_silhouetted_troops_marching.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/45/

NLS_Haig_-_Troops_moving_up_at_eventide_-_men_of_a_Yorkshire_regiment_on_the_march.jpg License: Public domain Contribu-
tors: This image is available from the National Library of Scotland under the sequence number or Shelfmark ID C.2494. You can see
this image in its original context, along with the rest of the Library’s digital collections, in the NLS Digital Gallery
Original artist: Ernest Brooks
• File:Battle_of_Menin_Road_-_wounded_at_side_of_the_road.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/ad/
Battle_of_Menin_Road_-_wounded_at_side_of_the_road.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: State Library of New South Wales
file:a479035
http://acms.sl.nsw.gov.au/album/albumView.aspx?acmsID=423850&itemID=824019 Original artist: Frank Hurley
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20 11 TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

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11.3 Content license

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