Evidence 2018 Lecture - Object and Documentary Evidence

! (https://etriiilaw.
com/)
October 21, 2018 (https://etriiilaw.com/evidence-2018-lecture-2/) | By Atty.

Eduardo Reyes III (https://etriiilaw.com/author/attyed/)
In Evidence (https://etriiilaw.com/category/law-jurisprudence/evidence/),
Laws/Jurisprudence (https://etriiilaw.com/category/law-jurisprudence/)
Evidence 2018 – Lecture 2
OBJECT AND DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
Subject
1. Object Evidence
2. Documentary Evidence
3. Best Evidence Rule
4. Parol Evidence Rule
5. Authentication and Proof of Documents
https://etriiilaw.com/evidence-2018-lecture-2/ 22/10/2018, 7=54 PM

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The grouping of these concepts on evidence fall under the classification of
OBJECT and DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE as distinguished from TESTIMONIAL
EVIDENCE which will be the subject matter of the next lecture outline.
1. Object Evidence; Synonymous with Real, Demonstrative or Physical

Evidence
Section 1, Rule 130. Object as evidence.- Objects as evidence are those

addressed to the senses of the court. When an object is relevant to the fact in
issue, it may be exhibited to, examined or viewed by the court.
A.1. Versus Testimonial Evidence. As opposed to TESTIMONIAL

EVIDENCE, which pertains to the “perception” of the witness which he/ she relates
to the Court, OBJECT EVIDENCE is addressed to the senses of the Court. Thus, in
a sense, while testimonial evidence is a “second-hand, recycled and vicarious”
kind of evidence, object evidence is “first-hand” knowledge of the court.
Thus, it was held, that “Physical evidence is evidence of the highest

order. It speaks more eloquently than a hundred witnesses”[1].

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A.2. Scope or extent. “Object evidence is not visual alone. It covers the entire
range of human senses: hearing, taste, smell, and touch. In a case where the issue
is infringement of a musical composition, the court may listen to the composition
involved. The court may not only look at but also touch the blade of a knife to
know whether or not it could have produced the incision characteristic of sharp
blades”[2].
“Harry Potter Case”
J.K. Rowling, the author of the phenomenal “Harry Potter” book series was sued
for copyright infringement. The judge had to read the entire book series and after
doing so, arrived at the conclusion that the “feel and context” of Rowling’s book
particularly its plot and theme are so far removed from the complainant’s book thus
warranting the dismissal of the case. “The contrast between the total concept and
feel of the works is so stark that any comparison of the two strains credulity” –
District Court Judge Shira Sheindlin
“O.J. Simpson case”
Ironically, the prosecutor, in a case of “over-proving a case”, compelled the

accused O.J. Simpson to put on the gloves which he did before the spectators in
the courtroom and the jury and the judge. But regrettably, OJ struggled to put it in
and it appeared too small for his humongous hands. This prompted famous
attorney, the late Johnnie Cochran, to argue in his closing arguments that, “If it

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does not fit, you must acquit”. (Rumor has it that the gloves were really those of OJ
except that they were leather gloves and since they were kept in custody by the
prosecution for quite sometime, they shrunk. OJ Simpson, for his part, not only
being a famous athlete but has also dabbled in acting, dramatized his struggle to
put on what appeared to be gloves too small for his hands).
A.3. Requisites for Admissibility of object (real) evidence. “An object may be
exhibited, examined or viewed by the court when (1) it is relevant to the fact in
issue, and (2) the present condition of the object be the same at the time in issue”.
A.3.1. “As a general rule, it seems essential that articles shown to the court should
be connected, at least prima facie, with the crime in issue. An article of personal
property, the relevancy of which has been shown by its identification with the
subject matter of the crime, may be exhibited in the courtroom, whether as direct
evidence of a relevant fact, or to enable them to understand the evidence or to
realize more completely its cogency and force, or to assist the court in solving a
material, controverted or doubtful point. Admission of visual, exhibitive or
demonstrative evidence is much within the discretion of the court, and the extent
of identification of such articles necessary before admission varies with
circumstances. The court may inspect and smell the contents of a bottle properly
identified and admitted in evidence. Comparison of materials may also be made
by the court, aided by the evidence of expert witnesses. So, in case the quality of
an article, or its adaptability to a specific use or purpose, is in issue, a sample may

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be shown to the court, together with a specimen of a like material which is shown
to be of good quality or adapted to the required purpose, and the court may then
make a comparison to ascertain possible points of difference.
The propriety of justice of permitting articles and implements such as deadly

weapons, lanterns, masks, counterfeiters’ tools, gambling apparatus and the like,
used by criminals, but which are not shown to be connected with the accused, to
be exhibited to the court may well be doubted. Such a practice, under the pretext
of illustrating or explaining evidence, is well calculated to prejudice the court
against the accused.
GROUNDS TO EXCLUDE OBJECT EVIDENCE-
Generally, where the sole purpose is to arouse prejudice, pity or other passion,
and no legitimate aim is served, it is error to admit articles thus offered. Lack of
some sort of identification or connection with the crime, a plea of guilty, failure to
shed light on an issue, or failure to show condition unchanged, are other grounds
for barring articles from admission as evidence”[3].
A.3.1.1. Indecency or impropriety as ground for disallowing the introduction

of object evidence.

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Gen. Rule- When the object produced as evidence is indecent, or improper, it
should be excluded, unless the same is necessary for ascertaining the truth[4].
-Accused in Rape case with peculiar identifying mark on his organ.
Exception- “But when justice and the discovery of the truth, are at stake, the
ordinary canons of modesty and delicacy of feeling cannot be allowed to impose a
prohibition upon necessary measures. If such matters were not unshrinkingly
discussed and probed, many kinds of crimes would remain unpunished.
Nevertheless, needless spectators having no responsibility for the course of
justice, may well be avoided. Where it is a question of what would otherwise be an
indecency, two limitations seems appropriate: (a) there should be a fair necessity
for inspection, the trial court to determine; (b) the inspection should take place
apart from the public courtroom, in the sole presence of the tribunal and the
parties[5]”.
A.3.2. Authentication of Object Evidence. “It must be emphasized that every

evidence, whether it be a document or an object, needs a witness. Even object
evidence requires statements from a witness to make its way into the realm of
admissible evidence. In short, testimonial evidence provides the foundation for all
types of evidence.”[6]

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Real Evidence Must Be Authenticated Prior to Its Admission Into
Evidence.
The chain of custody rule is but a variation of the principle that real evidence must
be authenticated prior to its admission into evidence. To establish a chain of
custody sufficient to make evidence admissible, the proponent needs only to
prove a rational basis from which to conclude that the evidence is what the party
claims it to be. In other words, in a criminal case, the prosecution must offer
sufficient evidence from which the trier of fact could reasonably believe that an
item still is what the government claims it to be. Specifically in the prosecution of
illegal drugs, the well established federal evidentiary rule in the United States is
that when the evidence is not readily identifiable and is susceptible to alteration by
tampering or contamination, courts require a more stringent foundation entailing a
chain of custody of the item with sufficient completeness to render it improbable
that the original item has either been exchanged with another or been
contaminated or tampered with.
This was adopted in Mallillin v. People, where this Court also discussed how,
ideally, the chain of custody of seized items should be established:

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As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding
that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include
testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to
the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched
the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and
what happened to it while in the witness’ possession, the condition in which it was
received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain.
These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there
had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone
not in the chain to have possession of the same.
~ People v. Romy Lim Y Miranda, G.R. No. 231989, 04 September 2018
A.3.3. Extraction of DNA Samples and the Right Against Self-Incrimination.
“This right, as put by Mr. Justice Holmes in Holt v. United States, 218 US 245, …is
a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion, to extort communications
from him…” It is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the
accused’s own lips, against his will, admission of his guilt. It does not apply to the
instant case where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an
incriminating statement but an object evidence. Wigmore, in 4 Wigmore, 2263,

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discussing the question now before [the Court] in his treatise on evidence, thus,
said: ‘… it is not merely compulsion that is the kernel of the privilege, …
but testimonial compulsion”[7].
A.3.4. Demonstrative Evidence. This is now deemed included within the ambit of
“object” evidence. Maps, diagram, a photograph and a model, fall under this
category.
A.3.4.1. Photographs. – “The courts take judicial notice that all civilized
communities rely on photographic pictures for presenting resemblances of
persons and animals, scenery, natural objects, buildings, and other artificial
objects. It is accordingly well established that photographs of persons, things, and
places, when duly verified and shown by extrinsic evidence to be faithful
representations of the subjects as of the time in question, are, in the discretion
of the trial court, admissible in evidence as aids to it in arriving at an
understanding of the evidence or the condition of objects or premises, the
circumstances of an accident, or the condition or the identity of a person when any
such matter is relevant to the issues being litigated”[8].
A.3.4.2. Maps. “The draftsman of the map must testify as to its accuracy, but any
other witnesses may refer to it while testifying, to illustrate his testimony. It is not
material by whom the map or diagram was prepared providing that he can testify

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that the man or diagram was prepared providing that he can testify that the map or
diagram is accurate and is based on knowledge derived from his own
investigation[9]”.
A.3.5. DNA EVIDENCE. A.M. No. 06-11-05-SC. Deoxyribonucleic acid.
In Agustin v. CA[10], it was ruled that A person’s DNA is the same in each
cell and it does not change throughout a person’s lifetime; the DNA in a person’s
blood is the same as the DNA found in his saliva, sweat, bone, the root and shaft
of hair, earwax, mucus, urine, skin tissue and vaginal or rectal cells. Most
importantly, because of polymorphisms in human genetic structure, no two
individuals have the same DNA, with the notable exception of identical twins”.
Why identical twins?
Rule on Right Against Self-Incrimination in Extraction of Samples.
Guidelines

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How samples were collected.
How they were handled
Possibility of contamination of samples. Liquid samples?
Procedure followed in analyzing samples
Proper standards and procedure followed in conducting tests
Qualification of analyst who conducted the test
DNA Profile.
12 Universally- accepted Markers.
A.3.6. Chain of Custody Rule
RA 9165; Chain of Custody
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, G.R. No. 213221 – versus –

BIYAN MOHAMMAD y ASDORI a.k.a. “BONG BIYAN” and MINA LADJAHASAN y
TOMBREO, Accused, MINA LADJAHASAN y TOMBREO, Present: CARPIO,*
VELASCO, JR.,** J., Chairperson, PERALTA*** ‘ PEREZ, and REYES,JJ.
Promulgated: Accused-Appellant. November 9, 2016 x- – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – ~;or~_

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Contrary to the position of Ladjahasan, there is proof directly linking her in the
illegal sale of shabu. We are in full accord with the factual findings of the lower
courts. The RTC held: 4 The said testimony of PO1 Santiago also illustrates the
participation of accused Mina Ladjahasan in selling of Shabu. She was the one
who opened the door and this must be her role in their drug trafficking operation –
answer the knock on the door and verify the intention of [the one] knocking. In this
case, when she learned that PO 1 Santiago, acting as poseurbuyer, intended to
buy Shabu, she went back inside the room. Thereafter, it was accused Mohammad
that emerged and transacted with PO 1 Santiago. Clearly, when accused
Ladjahasan went back inside the room, she relayed to Mohammad the intention of
PO 1 Santiago, then, Mohammad took over by transacting with Santiago who was
a prospective buyer of Shabu. CA ro/lo, pp. 45-46. Rollo, pp. 43-44. c7 Decision –
6 – G.R. No. 213221 If Ladjahasan was not part of the operation, she would have
turned away PO 1 Santiago as he would only be intruding into their intimate space,
instead, she just went in as if it was a normal occurrence in the usual course of
their business. When inside, she informed Mohammad that there is a buyer
outside. These circumstances when put together warrant an inescapable
conclusion that both accused Mohammad and Ladjahasan were animated by a
common purpose of engaging in drug trafficking. 5 On the other hand, the CA
opined: Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode, method, and manner in
which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused
themselves when such acts point to a point purpose and design, concerted action,
and community of interests. It is clear from the testimony of POI Santiago that
Ladjahasan and Mohammad were of one mind in selling shabu to him as shown by
their series of overt acts during the transaction, to wit: (1) when POI Santiago
knocked on the door of the room occupied by the accused, it was Ladjahasan who
responded by slightly opening the door; (2) after opening the door, Ladjahasan

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then asked PO 1 Santiago of their intention, to which the latter replied that he
wanted to buy P200.00 worth of shabu; (3) after hearing the intention of POI
Santiago, Ladjahasan closed the door; (4) a few seconds later, Mohammad came
at the door, got the money from POI Santiago and handed to the latter the shabu.
No other logical conclusion would follow from the concerted action of both
Mohammad and Ladjahasan except that they had a common purpose and
community of interest. Their modus operandi was for Ladjahasan to screen the
buyer while Mohammad does the actual sale. Conspiracy having been
established, Ladjahasan is liable as co-principal regardless of her participation.6
As to the contention that the buy-bust team failed to observe the chain of custody
rule, this Court similarly discharged in People v. Ros: 7 6 The appellants cannot be
allowed to belatedly question the police officers’ alleged noncompliance with
Section 21 for the first time on appeal. The issue on the chain of custody was
neither raised nor mentioned with specificity during the trial. In no instance did the
appellants manifest or at least intimate before the trial court that there were lapses
in the handling and safekeeping of the seized marijuana that might affect its
admissibility, integrity and evidentiary value. This emission is fatal to the case of
the defense. Whatever “justifiable ground” that may excuse the prosecution from
complying with the statutory requirements on chain of custody will remain unknown
in light of the apparent failure of the appellants to challenge the custody and
safekeeping or the issue of disposition and preservation of the subject drugs
before the RTC. This Court cannot now dwell on the matter because to do so
would CA rollo, p. 42. Id. at 108. G.R. No. 201146, April 15, 2015, 755 SCRA 518.
tfl Decision – 7 – G.R. No. 213221 be against the tenets of fair play and equity. As
We stressed in People v. Sta. Maria: The law excuses noncompliance under
justifiable grounds. However, whatever justifiable grounds that may excuse the
police officers involved in the buy-bust operation x x x from complying with Section

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21 will remain unknown, because appellant did not question during trial the
safekeeping of the items seized from him. Indeed, the police officers’ alleged
violations of Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 were not raised before
the trial court but were instead raised for the first time on appeal. In no instance
did appellant least intimate at the trial court that there were lapses in the
safekeeping of seized items that affected their integrity and evidentiary value.
Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party
desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of
objection. Without such objection he cannot raise the question for the first time on
appeal. The appellants could have also moved for the quashal of the Information
at the first instance, but they did not. Hence, they are deemed to have waived any
objection on the matter. 8 Moreover, it has been consistently held that strict
compliance on the chain of custody rule is not required and that the arrest of an
accused will not be invalidated and the items seized from him rendered
inadmissible on the sole ground of non-compliance with Sec. 21, Art. II of RA No.
9165 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. The most important factor in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused is the preservation of the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items.9 Here, the prosecution was
able to establish with moral certainty and prove to the court beyond reasonable
doubt that the illegal drugs (and drug paraphernalia) presented to the trial court as
evidence are the same items confiscated from the accused, tested and found to
be positive for dangerous substance.”
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MYRNA GAYOSO y ARGUELLES[1],

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“Chain of Custody; 9165
The chain of custody of evidence was not established Appellant impugns the
prosecution’s failure to establish the charges of illegal sale and possession of
shabu against her due to the gaps in the chain of custody and the assailable
integrity of the evidence in view of non-compliance with Section 21, Article II ofRA
9165. There is merit in this protestation. The offense of illegal sale of shabu has the
following elements: “(1) the identities of the buyer and the seller, the object and
consideration of the sale; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor.” 18 On the other hand, the offense of illegal possession of shabu has the
following elements: “(l) the accused is in possession of an item or an object which
is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law;
and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed said drug.” 19 In the
prosecution for illegal sale and possession of shabu, there must be proof that
these offenses were actually committed, coupled with the presentation in court of
evidence of corpus delicti 16 People v. Gatong-o, 250 Phil. 710, 711 (1988). 17
People v. Sta. Maria, 545 Phil. 520, 528-529 (2007). 18 People v. Lorenzo, 633 Phil.
393, 402 (2010). 19 Id. at 403. 20 Id. Decision 8 G.R. No. 206590 In both illegal
sale and illegal possession of [ shabu,] conviction cannot be sustained if there is a
persistent doubt on the identity of said drug. The identity of the [shabu] must be
established with moral certainty. Apart from showing that the elements of
possession or sale are present, the fact that the [shabu] illegally possessed and
sold x xx is the same [shabu] offered in court as exhibit must likewise be
established with the same degree of certitude as that needed to sustain a guilty
verdict.21 “The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it
ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are

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removed.”22 Chain of custody is defined as “duly recorded authorized movements
and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of
dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping, to
presentation in court for destruction.”23 In People v. Havana,24 the Court
expounded on the custodial chain procedure in this wise: As a method of
authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a
finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. lt
would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the
item was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that
every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it
was received, where it W(l.S and what happened to it while in the witness’
possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which
it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then
describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in
the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to
have possession of the same. While the testimony about a perfect chain is
not always the standard because it is almost always impossible to obtain, an
unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential when the
item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not readily identifiable, or when
its condition at the time of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has
failed to observe its wliqueness. The same standard obtains in case the
evidence is susceptible of alteration, tampering, contamination and even
substitution and exchange. In other words, the exhibit’s level of susceptibility
to fungibility, alteration or tampering -without regard to whether the same is

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advertent or otherwise not – dictates the level of strictness in the application
of the chain of custody rule. Thus, as a general rule links in the chain of
custody of the confiscated item must be established
first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the
accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug
seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover
by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug
seized from the forensic chemist to the court.25 Marking is the placing by the
arresting officer or the poseur-buyer of his/her initials and signature on the items
after they have been seized. It is the starting point in the custodial link. It is vital
that the seized items be marked immediately since the succeeding handlers
thereof will use the markings as reference. 26 The chain of custody rule also
requires that the marking of the seized contraband be done “(l) in the presence of
the apprehended violator, and (2) immediately upon confiscation.”27 In this case,
the records do not show that the arresting officers marked the seized items with
their initials in the presence of appellant and immediately upon confiscation. While
P02 Isip testified that the seized sachets of shabu were marked in the police
station,28 no evidence was presented to show that the marking was accomplished
in the presence of appellant. Moreover, the author of the markings on said items
was never identified. None of the police officers admitted placing the markings.
There was therefore a complete absence of evidence to prove authorship of the
markings. While marking of the evidence is allowed in the nearest police station,
this contemplates a case of warrantless searches and seizures.29 Here, the police
officers secured a search warrant prior to their operation. They therefore had
sufficient time and opportunity to prepare for its implementation. However, the

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police officers failed· to mark immediately the plastic sachets of shabu seized
inside appellant’s house in spite of an Inventory of Property Seized that they
prepared while still inside the said house. The failure of the arresting officers to
comply with the marking of evidence immediately after confiscation
constitutes the first gap in the chain of custody. The turnover of the seized
shabu from the arresting officers to the investigating officer in the police station
constitutes the
second link in the chain of custody. In this regard, the Court takes note that the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses failed to identify the person to whom the
seized items were turned over at the police station. While SP03 Salamida was
identified as the property custodian of the police station, this does not necessarily
mean that he is also the investigating officer. There is nothing in the records to
substantiate this presumption. This total want of evidence gains importance
considering that none of the arresting officers presented as witnesses identified
the shabu presented during trial as the same shabu seized from appellant. Thus,
the second link in the chain of custody is missing.
The transfer of the seized shabu from the investigating officer to the forensic
chemist in the crime laboratocy is the third link in the chain of custody. While the
seized shabu was turned over by PI Barber to the PDEA, he no longer had any
personal knowledge of the manner it was handled therein. He also did not identify
the police officer in whose custody the seized sachets of shabu were placed at the
PDEA. He left it to the responsibility of the PDEA to forward the seized shabu to the
crime laboratory. The request for laboratory examination of the PDEA identifies the

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police officer who delivered the seized shabu as a certain SPO 1 Asis, but he was
not presented to testify that the shabu delivered to the crime laboratocy was the
same shabu confiscated from appellant. There is a third break in the chain of
custody. Nothing also can be gained from the testimony of the forensic chemist PSI
Cruto. His testimony is not clear and positive since he failed to assert that the
alleged packs of chemical substance presented for laboratory examination and
tested positive for shabu were the very same substance allegedly recovered from
appellant. His testimony was limited to the result of the examination he conducted
and not on the source of the substance. From the foregoing, it appears that no
chain of custody was established at all. What we have here are individual links with
breaks in-between which could not be seamlessly woven or tied together. The so-
called links in the chain of custody show that the seized shabu was not handled
properly starting from the actual seizure, to its turnover in the police station and the
PDEA, as well as its transfer to the crime laboratory for examination. The Court
therefore cannot conclude with moral certainty that the shabu confiscated from
appellant was the same as that presented for laboratory examination and then
presented in court. It is indeed desirable that the chain of custody should be
perfect and unbroken. In reality however, this rarely occurs. The legal standard that
must therefore be observed “is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items as they will be used to determine the guilt or innocence
of the accused.”30 Her~, the Court finds that the apprehending officers failed to
prope~~ 30 People v. Mendoza, supra note I. Decision 11 G.R. No. 206590
preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated shabu. There are
just too many breaks and gaps to the effect that a chain of custody could not be
established at all. Failure of the prosecution to offer testimony to establish a
substantially complete chain of custody of the shabu and the inappropriate
manner of handling the evidence prior to its offer in court diminishes the

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government’s chance of successfully prosecuting a dtug case. 31 Aside from the
failure of the prosecution to establish an unbroken chain of custody, another
procedural lapse casts farther uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the
subject shabu. This refers to the non-compliance by the arresting officers with the
most basic procedural safeguards relative to the custody and disposition of the
seized item under Section 21(1), Article II of RA 9165, which reads as follows:
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered
Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources qf Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. –
The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as
well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated,
seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner: (1) The
apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drug shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph
the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items
were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof. Corollarily, Section 2l(a) of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations provides as follows: Section 2l(a) The apprehending officer/team
having initial custody and control of the drug shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence offue
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media, the Department
of Justice (DOJ), and a public official who shall be required to sign the copies of
the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory

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and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is
served; or at the ,,/’// nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case ~ ctf/I / ··· People v. Havana, supra note 22 at 537. Decision
12 G.R. No. 206590 of warrantless seizures; Provided, farther, that non-compliance
with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizure of and custody over
said items. In this case, the apprehending team never conducted a physical
inventory of the seized items at the place where the search warrant was served in
the presence of a representative of the Department of Justice, nor did it
photograph the same in the presence of appellant after their initial custody and
control of said drug, and after immediately seizing and confiscating the same.
Neither was an explanation offered for such failure. While this directive of rigid
compliance has been tempered in certain cases, “such liberality, as stated in the
Implementing Rules and Regulations can be applied only when the evidentiary
value and integrity of the illegal drug are properly preserved.”32 Such an
exception does not obtain in this case. “Serious uncertainty is generated on the
identity of the [shabu] in view of the broken linkages in the chain of custody.
[Thus,] the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty
accorded to the [apprehending officers] by the courts below cannot arise.”33
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00744 dated June 23, 2011 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Appellant Myrna Gayoso y Arguelles is hereby ACQUITTED of the charges, her
guilt not having been established beyond reasonable doubt. The Superintendent
for the Correctional Institute for Women is hereby ORDERED to immediately
RELEASE the appellant from custody, unless she is held for another lawful cause.
SO ORDERED. 32 Id. at 538-539. 33 Id. at 539.”

Page 21 of 64
1. Documentary Evidence.
“Section 2. Rule 130. Documentary Evidence.- Documents as evidence

consist of writings or any material containing letters, words, numbers,
figures, symbols or other modes of written expressions offered as proof of
their contents”.
Sec. 1(h), Rule 2 of Rules on Electronic Evidence. “Electronic

document” refers to information or the representation of information, data,
figures, symbols or other modes of written expressions described or however
represented, by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or
by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded,
transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. It
includes digitally signed documents and any print-out or output, readable by
sight or other means, which accurately reflects the electronic data message
or electronic document. For purposes of these Rules, the term ‘electronic
document’ may be used interchangeably with ‘electronic data message’”.

Page 22 of 64
B.1. Nature. Consists of writings or any material containing letters, words,
numbers, figures, symbols or other modes of written expressions offered as proof
of their contents.
B.2. Admissibility of documentary evidence. – “Documentary evidence

is subject to the same basic rules of evidence or tests with respect to relevancy
and materiality as are other types of evidence. Subject to the application of
exclusionary rules and trial court discretion, where such discretion is fitting,
admissibility of documentary evidence, as with other evidence, is determined by
the issues in the particular case.
A proper foundation must be laid for the admission of documentary

evidence; that is, the identity and authenticity of the document must be reasonably
established as a pre-requisite to its admission. However, a party who does not
deny the genuineness of a proferred instrument may not object that it was not
properly identified before it was admitted in evidence”.

Page 23 of 64
e.g. Failure to contest actionable documents. Sec. 8, Rule 8, 1997 Rules on Civil
Procedure. “When an action or defense is founded upon a written instrument,
copied in or attached to the corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding
section, the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be
deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them,
and sets forth what he claims to be the facts; but he requirement of an oath does
not apply when the adverse party does not appear to be a party to the instrument
or when compliance with an order for an inspection of the original instrument is
refused.”
B.3. Requisites for Admissibility of Documentary Evidence.
1. a)The document must be relevant;

2. b)The evidence must be authenticated;
3. c)The document must be authenticated by a competent witness; and,
4. d)The document must be formally offered in evidence.[11]
Important Rules on Documentary Evidence. – “Rules on documentary evidence

which a lawyer must thoroughly familiarize himself to the end that a proper and
effective presentation of documents in evidence may be made are:
ü The Best evidence rule- Secs. 3-4, Rule 130

Page 24 of 64
ü The Rule on Secondary Evidence- Secs. 5-8, Ibid
ü The Parol Evidence Rule- Sec. 9, Ibid
ü The Rule on Authentication and Proof of Documents- Sec. 19-33, Rule 132
ü Documents written in unofficial language must be translated to English or

Filipino- Section 33, Rule 132
1. The Best Evidence Rule; Applicability. “Stated in simple form, the best
evidence rule is that rule which requires the highest grade or evidence
obtainable to prove a disputed fact.”
Reason: to prevent fraud. Because if a party is in possession of such

evidence and withholds it; and seeks to substitute inferior evidence in its place,
the presumption naturally arises that the better evidence is withheld for fraudulent
purposes which its production would expose and defeat.
C.1. Primary Evidence. The highest or best evidence which, from the abstract
nature of the facts to be proved, is procurable, and which, under circumstances of
the particular case, affords the greatest certainty of the fact, that is, renders the
probability of its existence most evident to the understanding. It is that evidence
which does not indicate the existence of other evidence nearer the facts to be
proved.[12]

Page 25 of 64
C.2. Not Applicable when subject of inquiry does not pertain to contents of
document
“The best evidence rule as encapsulated in Rule 130, Section 3, of the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure applies only when the content of such document is the
subject of the inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether such document was
actually executed, or exists, or on the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its
execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is
admissible. Any other substitutionary evidence is likewise admissible without need
to account for the original. Moreover, production of the original may be
dispensed with, in the trial courts discretion, whenever the opponent does
not bona fide dispute the contents of the document and no other useful
purpose will be served by requiring production.
Accordingly, we find that the best evidence rule is not applicable to the instant
case. Here, there was no dispute as to the terms of either deed; hence, the RTC
correctly admitted in evidence mere copies of the two deeds. The petitioner never
even denied their due execution and admitted that she signed the Deed of
Partition. As for the Deed of Sale, petitioner had, in effect, admitted its
genuineness and due execution when she failed to specifically deny it in the
manner required by the rules. The petitioner merely claimed that said documents
do not express the true agreement and intention of the parties since they were only

Page 26 of 64
provisional paper arrangements made upon the advice of counsel. Apparently, the
petitioner does not contest the contents of these deeds but alleges that there was
a contemporaneous agreement that the transfer of Hagonoy Lumber to Chua Sioc
Huan was only temporary.[13]”
– Compare the rulings in Arceo v. People[14] and Magdayao v. People[15]
– Both cases were for prosecution of Bouncing checks law where only
photocopies of checks were offered in evidence
– First case, check was offered to prove “execution or existence of the

document or the circumstances surrounding its execution
– Second case, check was offered to prove “contents, names of drawer,

drawee, date, amount and dishonor
C.3. Best evidence rule not applicable when document is merely collateral to
issue.“When a document is involved in the inquiry but the document is only
collaterally in issue, the best evidence rule does not apply. A document is
collaterally in issue when the purpose of introducing the document is not to
establish its terms, but to show facts that have no reference to its contents like its
existence, condition, execution or delivery[16].

Page 27 of 64
C.4. What constitutes as Original Document.
“The best evidence rule is the rule which requires the highest grade of
evidence obtainable to prove a disputed fact. Although there are certain
recognized exceptions when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document
itself.
However, in the instant case, contrary to petitioners contention, the receipt

presented by SMP is deemed as an original, considering that the triplicate
copy of the provisional receipt was executed at the same time as the other
copies of the same receipt involving the same transaction. Section 4, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 4. Original of document.
(a) The original of the document is one the contents of which are the subject
of inquiry.
(b) When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same
time, with identical contents, all such copies are equally regarded as
originals.

Page 28 of 64
(c) When an entry is repeated in the regular course of business, one being
copied from another at or near the time of the transaction, all the entries are
likewise equally regarded as originals.[17]”
C.4.1. Original of an Electronic Document. – An electronic document shall be

regarded as the equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence
Rule if it is a printout or output readable by sight or other means, shown to
reflect the data accurately. (Section 1, Rule 4 of Rules on Electronic
Evidence).
1. SECONDARY EVIDENCE. Requisites for Introduction in Case of Loss,

Destruction or Unavailability of Original
“The burden of proof rests upon petitioner, as plaintiff, to establish its case based
on a preponderance of evidence. It is well-settled that in civil cases, the party that
alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. Petitioner failed to prove that
respondent had an obligation in the principal amount of P24,388.36, because the
photocopies of the original sales invoices it had presented in court were
inadmissible in evidence. Moreover, had they been admissible, they would still
have had little probative value.

Page 29 of 64
The original copies of the sales invoices are the best evidence to prove the alleged
obligation. Photocopies thereof are mere secondary evidence. As such, they are
inadmissible because petitioner, as the offeror, failed to prove any of the
exceptions provided under Section 3 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as well s
the conditions of their admissibility. Because of the inadmissibility of the
photocopies in the absence of the originals, respondents obligation was not
established.
Section 5 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 5. When original document is unavailable. When the original document has
been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of
its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on
his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some
authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.
Applying the above Rule to the present case, before a party is allowed to adduce
secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original sales invoices, the offeror
must prove the following: (1) the existence or due execution of the original; (2)
the loss and destruction of the original or the reason for its nonproduction in
court; and (3) on the part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to which the
unavailability of the original can be attributed. The correct order of proof is as
follows: existence, execution, loss, and contents. At the sound discretion of
the court, this order may be changed if necessary.
In the present case, the existence of the original sales invoices was established by
the photocopies and the testimony of Hernandez. Petitioner, however, failed to
prove that the originals had been lost or could not be produced in court after
reasonable diligence and good faith in searching for them.

Page 30 of 64
Indeed, the loss of the originals and reasonable diligence in the search for them
were conditions that were not met, because the sales invoices might have been
found by Equitable.Hernandez, testifying that he had requested the originals from
Equitable, failed to show that he had subsequently followed up the request.
Finally, when more than one original copy exists, it must appear that all of them
have been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in court before secondary
evidence can be given of any one. A photocopy may not be used without
accounting for the other originals.
In Santos v. Santos
(http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/oct2000/139524.htm) the Court
upheld the pronouncement of the CA that before the appellees therein could be
allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original, they
had to prove — with the requisite quantum of evidence — the loss, the destruction
or the unavailability of all original copies of the document.
In the present case, triplicates were produced, although the cardholder signed the
sales invoice only once. During the trial, Hernandez explained that an original
copy had gone to respondent, another to the merchant, and still another to
petitioner.
Each of these three copies is regarded as an original in accordance with Section 4

(b) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner failed to show that all three original
copies were unavailable, and that due diligence had been exercised in the search
for them.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner[18]”.

Page 31 of 64
1. Parol Evidence Rule; Applicability
“Rule 130, Section 9 of the Revised Rules on Evidence embodies the parol
evidence rule and states:
SEC. 9. Evidence of written agreements. When the terms of an agreement

have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms
agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors-in-
interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written
agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms
of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties thereto;

Page 32 of 64
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors-
in-interest after the execution of the written agreement.
The term “agreement” includes wills.
The parol evidence rule forbids any addition to, or contradiction of, the terms
of a written agreement by testimony or other evidence purporting to show
that different terms were agreed upon by the parties, varying the
purport of the written contract.[9]
(http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/october2008/164326.htm#_ftn10)
This principle notwithstanding, petitioner would have the Court rule that this
case falls within the exceptions, particularly that the written agreement failed
to express the true intent and agreement of the parties. This argument is
untenable.

Page 33 of 64
Although parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of a contract, it
cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional
contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in the writing
unless there has been fraud or mistake.[10]
(http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/october2008/164326.htm#_ftn11) Eviden
of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not admissible
to vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a valid contract.[11]
The Vehicle Sales Invoice[12]

(http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/october2008/164326.htm#_ftn13) is
the best evidence of the transaction. A sales invoice is a commercial
document. Commercial documents or papers are those used by merchants or
businessmen to promote or facilitate trade or credit transactions.[13]
(http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/october2008/164326.htm#_ftn14) Busine
forms, e.g., order slip, delivery charge invoice and the like, are commonly
recognized in ordinary commercial transactions as valid between the parties
and, at the very least, they serve as an acknowledgment that a business
transaction has in fact transpired.[14]
(http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/october2008/164326.htm#_ftn15)These
documents are not mere scraps of paper bereft of probative value, but vital
pieces of evidence of commercial transactions. They are written memorials of
the details of the consummation of contracts.[15]

Page 34 of 64
The terms of the subject sales invoice are clear. They show that Autocorp sold to
Seaoil one unit Robex 200 LC Excavator paid for by checks issued by one Romeo
Valera. This does not, however, change the fact that Seaoil Petroleum Corporation,
as represented by Yu, is the customer or buyer. The moment a party affixes his or
her signature thereon, he or she is bound by all the terms stipulated therein and is
subject to all the legal obligations that may arise from their breach.[16]
Oral testimony on the alleged conditions, coming from a party who has an
interest in the outcome of the case, depending exclusively on human
memory, is not as reliable as written or documentary evidence.[17]
Hence, petitioners contention that the document falls within the exception to the
parol evidence rule is untenable. The exception obtains only where the written
contract is so ambiguous or obscure in terms that the contractual intention of the
parties cannot be understood from a mere reading of the instrument. In such a
case, extrinsic evidence of the subject matter of the contract, of the relations of the
parties to each other, and of the facts and circumstances surrounding them when
they entered into the contract may be received to enable the court to make a
proper interpretation of the instrument.
Even assuming there is a shred of truth to petitioners contention, the same cannot
be made a basis for holding respondents liable therefor.

Page 35 of 64
As pointed out by the CA, Rodriguez is a person separate and independent from
Autocorp. Whatever obligations Rodriguez contracted cannot be attributed to
Autocorp and vice versa. In fact, the obligation that petitioner proffers as its
defense under the Lease Purchase Agreement was not even incurred by
Rodriguez or by Autocorp but by Uniline.
The Lease Purchase Agreement clearly shows that the parties thereto are two
corporations not parties to this case: Focus Point and Uniline. Under this Lease
Purchase Agreement, it is Uniline, as lessee/purchaser, and not Rodriguez, that
incurred the debt to Focus Point. The obligation of Uniline to Focus Point arose out
of a transaction completely different from the subject of the instant case.
It is settled that a corporation has a personality separate and distinct from its
individual stockholders or members, and is not affected by the personal rights,
obligations and transactions of the latter. The corporation may not be held liable for
the obligations of the persons composing it, and neither can its stockholders be
held liable for its obligation.
Of course, this Court has recognized instances when the corporations separate
personality may be disregarded. However, we have also held that the same may
only be done in cases where the corporate vehicle is being used to defeat public
convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime.[23]

Page 36 of 64
(http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/october2008/164326.htm#_ftn24) Moreov
the wrongdoing must be clearly and convincingly established. It cannot be
presumed.
To reiterate, the transaction under the Vehicle Sales Invoice is separate and
distinct from that under the Lease Purchase Agreement. In the former, it is Seaoil
that owes Autocorp, while in the latter, Uniline incurred obligations to Focus. There
was never any allegation, much less any evidence, that Autocorp was merely an
alter ego of Uniline, or that the two corporations separate personalities were being
used as a means to perpetrate fraud or wrongdoing.
Moreover, Rodriguez, as stockholder and director of Uniline, cannot be held

personally liable for the debts of the corporation, which has a separate legal
personality of its own. While Section 31 of the Corporation Code lays down the
exceptions to the rule, the same does not apply in this case. Section 31 makes a
director personally liable for corporate debts if he willfully and knowingly votes for
or assents to patently unlawful acts of the corporation. Section 31 also makes a
director personally liable if he is guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in directing
the affairs of the corporation. The bad faith or wrongdoing of the director must be
established clearly and convincingly. Bad faith is never presumed.
The burden of proving bad faith or wrongdoing on the part of Rodriguez was, on
petitioner, a burden which it failed to discharge. Thus, it was proper for the trial
court to have dismissed the third-party complaint against Rodriguez on the ground

Page 37 of 64
that he was not a party to the sale of the excavator.
Rule 6, Section 11 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure defines a third-party

complaint as a claim that a defending party may, with leave of court, file against a
person not a party to the action, called the third-party defendant, for contribution,
indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponents claim.
The purpose of the rule is to permit a defendant to assert an independent

claim against a third party which he, otherwise, would assert in another
action, thus preventing multiplicity of suits. Had it not been for the rule, the
claim could have been filed separately from the original complaint.
Petitioners claim against Rodriguez was fully ventilated in the proceedings before
the trial court, tried and decided on its merits. The trial courts ruling operates
as res judicata against another suit involving the same parties and same cause of
action. This is rightly so because the trial court found that Rodriguez was not a
party to the sale of the excavator. On the other hand, petitioner Seaoils liability has
been successfully established by respondent.
A last point. We reject Seaoils claim that the ownership of the subject excavator,
having been legally and completely transferred to Focus Point International, Inc.,
cannot be subject of replevin and plaintiff [herein respondent Autocorp] is not
[30]

Page 38 of 64
legally entitled to any writ of replevin.[30]
(http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/october2008/164326.htm#_ftn31) The
claim is negated by the sales invoice which clearly states that [u]ntil after the
vehicle is fully paid inclusive of bank clearing time, it remains the property of
Autocorp Group which reserves the right to take possession of said vehicle at any
time and place without prior notice.[31]
Considering, first, that Focus Point was not a party to the sale of the excavator
and, second, that Seaoil indeed failed to pay for the excavator in full, the same still
rightfully belongs to Autocorp. Additionally, as the trial court found, Seaoil had
already assigned the same to its contractor for the construction of its depot in
Batangas. Hence, Seaoil has already enjoyed the benefit of the transaction even
as it has not complied with its obligation. It cannot be permitted to unjustly enrich
itself at the expense of another.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition is hereby DENIED.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 20, 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No.
72193 is AFFIRMED.[19]”

Page 39 of 64
PURPOSE OF PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
“The appellate court is correct in declaring that under the parole evidence rule,
when the parties have reduced their agreement into writing, they are deemed to
have intended such written agreement to be the sole repository and memorial of
everything that they have agreed upon. All their prior and contemporaneous
agreements are deemed to be merged in the written document so that, as
between them and their successors-in-interest, such writing
becomes exclusive evidence of the terms thereof and any verbal agreement
which tends to vary, alter or modify the same is not admissible.
Here, the terms of the subject promissory note and the deed of chattel mortgage
are clear and explicit and devoid of any conditionality upon which its validity
depends. To be sure, Allied Bank was not a party to SEC Case No. 2042 where the
management committee was ordered created; hence, it would not be correct to
presume that it had notice of the existence of the management committee which,
incidentally, was still to be created when the subject promissory note was
executed on 12 August 1981. Notably, while the parties in SEC Case No. 2042
agreed to form the management committee on 27 July 1981, it was only on 14
August 1981 when the committee was actually created and its members

Page 40 of 64
appointed. Clearly then, the subject promissory note was outside the realm of
authority of the management committee. Corollarily, the chattel mortgage
accessory to it is likewise valid.
We thus declare and so hold that Allied Banks foreclosure of the chattel mortgage
constituted over the vessel Jean III was justified. On this score, we also rule that
the loss of the mortgaged chattel brought about by its sinking must be borne not
by Allied Bank but by the spouses Cheng. As owners of the fishing vessel, it was
incumbent upon the spouses to insure it against loss. Thus, when the vessel sank
before the chattel mortgage could be foreclosed, uninsured as it is, its loss must
be borne by the spouses Cheng”[20].
E.1. Applicability of Parol Evidence Rule Does not Require A Particular form
“REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; PAROL EVIDENCE RULE; DOES NOT SPECIFY

THAT THE WRITTEN AGREEMENT BE A PUBLIC INSTRUMENT.- Clearly, the
rule does not specify that the written agreement be a public document. What is
required is that the agreement be in writing as the rule is in fact founded on “long
experience that written evidence is so much more certain and accurate than that
which rests in fleeting memory only, that it would be unsafe, when parties have
expressed the terms of their contract in writing, to admit weaker evidence to
control and vary the stronger and to show that the parties intended a different

Page 41 of 64
contract from that expressed in the writing signed by them” [FRANCISCO, THE
RULES OF COURT OF THE PHILIPPINES, Vol. VII, Part I, 1990 ed., p. 179] Thus,
for the parol evidence rule to apply, a written contract need not be in any particular
form, or be signed by both parties. As a general rule, bills, notes and other
instruments of a similar nature are not subject to be varied or contradicted by parol
or extrinsic evidence.”[21]
E.2. Not Applicable to Labor Cases
“In determining arbitral awards then, aside from the MOA, courts considered other
factors and documents including, as in this case, the financial documents[6]
(http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/june2011/190515.htm#_ftn6) submitted
by respondent as well as its previous bargaining history and financial outlook and
improvements as stated in its own website.[7]
(http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/june2011/190515.htm#_ftn7)
The appellate courts ruling that giving credence to the Pahayag and the minutes of
the meeting which were not verified and notarized would violate the rule on parol
evidence is erroneous. The parol evidence rule, like other rules on evidence,

Page 42 of 64
should not be strictly applied in labor cases. Interphil Laboratories Employees
Union-FFW v. Interphil Laboratories, Inc. [8]
(http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/june2011/190515.htm#_ftn8) teaches:
[R]eliance on the parol evidence rule is misplaced. In labor cases pending before
the Commission or the Labor Arbiter, the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of
law or equity are not controlling. Rules of procedure and evidence are not applied
in a very rigid and technical sense in labor cases. Hence, the Labor Arbiter is not
precluded from accepting and evaluating evidence other than, and even contrary
to, what is stated in the CBA. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)”[22]
Right of Repurchase and the
Statute of Frauds
A.“Since a right to repurchase is a part of the contract of sale, it is

governed also by the Statute of Frauds. However, when the contract of sale has
been reduced in writing, parol evidence may be adduced to prove the agreement
allowing the right of repurchase the property sold, since the deed of sale and the
verbal agreement allowing the right of repurchase should be considered as an

Page 43 of 64
integral whole, then the deed of sale relied upon by the seller “is in itself the note
or memorandum evidencing the contract” which would take the case outside the
provisions of the Statute of Frauds”[23].
1. Waiver; Estoppel
1.4. Basically, in Nool v. CA,[24] the doctrine was laid down that a right of
repurchase must be part and parcel of a contract of sale and cannot be
embodied in a separate contract.
-“under the wise, just and equitable presumption in Article 1602, a document
which appears on its face to be a sale- absolute or with pacto de retro- may be
proven by the vendor or vendor-a –retro to be one of a loan with mortgage. In this
case, parol evidence becomes competent and admissible to prove that the
instrument was in truth and in fact given merely as a security for the payment of a
loan. And upon proof of the truth of such allegations, the court will enforce the
agreement or understanding in consonance with the true intent of the parties at the
time of the execution of the contract”[25].

Page 44 of 64
[1] People v. Suunpongco, 163 SCRA 222; People v. Pardella, G.R. No. L-45266,
November 24, 1988; People v. Bardaaje, 99 SCRA 388; People v. Estrebella, 164
SCRA 114.
[2] See Riano on Evidence p. 186, 2013
[3] See Francisco on Evidence, pp. 105-106, Volume VII Part I, 1997 Edition citing
Underhill’s Evidence, 5th Ed., Vol. I, pp. 196-197
[4] Brown v. Swineford, 44 Wis. 282, 28 Am. Rep. 582
[5] Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 1159
[6] P. 187, Riano on Evidence
[7] People v. Malimit, 264 SCRA 167
[8] 20 AM. Jur. 607 as cited on p. 112, Francisco, Ibid.
[9] Underhill’s Criminal Evidence, 5th Ed., Vol. I, pp. 228, 229, 230-231, cited on p.
119, Francisco, Ibid.
[10] 460 SCRA 315
[11] P. 229, Riano, Ibid.
[12] Francisco, Ibid.. p. 131
[13] Concepcion Chua Gaw v. Sps. Chua, G.R. No. 160855, April 16, 2008
[14] 495 SCRA 204
436 SCRA 677

Page 45 of 64
[16] See Riano, p. 238, Ibid.
[17] Bank of the Philippine Islands v. SMP, Inc., G.R. No. 175466, December 23,
2009
[18] Citibank v. Efren Teodoro, [G.R. No. 150905. September 23, 2003]
[19] Seaoil Petroleum Corporation v. Autocorp Group and Paul L. Rodriguez, G.R.
No. 164326, October 17, 2008
[20] Allied Banking Corporation v. Cheng Yong and Lilia Gaw, G.R. Nos. 151040 &
154109, October 6, 2005
[21] Baldomero Inciong, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 96405, June 26, 1996
[22] Cirtek Employees Labor Union- Federation of Free Workers v. Cirtek

Electronics, Inc. G.R. No. 190515, June 6, 2011
[23] Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals, 263 SCRA
736 (1996)
[24] 276 SCRA 287
[25] Matanguihan v. Court of Appeals, 275 SCRA 280
Authentication and Proof of Documents

Page 46 of 64
1. AUTHENTICATION AND PROOF OF DOCUMENTS
Section 19. Classes of Documents. — For the purpose of their presentation

evidence, documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority,
official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a
foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledge before a notary public except last wills and
testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to
the entered therein.
All other writings are private. (20a)
Section 20. Proof of private document. — Before any private document offered as
authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be
proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to
be. (21a)

Page 47 of 64
Section 21. When evidence of authenticity of private document not
necessary. — Where a private document is more than thirty years old, is produced
from the custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine, and is
unblemished by any alterations or circumstances of suspicion, no other evidence
of its authenticity need be given. (22a)
Section 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. — The handwriting of a

person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of
such person because he has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting
to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus
acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person. Evidence respecting the
handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by the witness or the court,
with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the
evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. (23a)
COMMENT:
Forgery; How Proved
Furthermore, forgery, as a rule, cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear,

positive and convincing evidence, and the burden of proof lies on the party
alleging forgery – in this case, petitioners. The fact of forgery can only be
established by a comparison between the alleged forged signature and the
authentic and genuine signature of the person whose signature is theorized to
have been forged. 57 Pertinently, Section 22, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of
Court provides:

Page 48 of 64
Section. 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. – The handwriting of a
person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting
of such person because he has seen the person write, or has seen writing
purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and
has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person. Evidence
respecting the handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by the
witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party
against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the
satisfaction of the judge. (Emphasis supplied)
In Gepulle-Garbo v. Spouses Garabato, the Court explained the factors involved in

the examination and comparison of handwritings in this wise: x x x [T]he
authenticity of a questioned signature cannot be determined solely upon its
general characteristics, similarities or dissimilarities with the genuine signature.
Dissimilarities as regards spontaneity, rhythm, pressure of the pen, loops in the
strokes, signs of stops, shades, etc., that may be found between the questioned
signature and the genuine one are not decisive on the question of the former’s
authenticity. The result of examinations of questioned handwriting, even with the
benefit of aid of experts and scientific instruments, is, at best, inconclusive. There
are other factors that must be taken into consideration. The position of the writer,
the condition of the surface on which the paper where the questioned signature is
written is placed, his state of mind, feelings and nerves, and the kind of pen and/or
paper used, play an important role on the general appearance of the signature.
Unless, therefore, there is, in a given case, absolute absence, or manifest

Page 49 of 64
dearth, of direct or circumstantial competent evidence on the character of a
questioned handwriting, much weight should not be given to characteristic
similarities, or dissimilarities, between that questioned handwriting and an
authentic one. 59 To prove forgery, petitioners offered in evidence the findings
and testimony given by expert witness Perez, who declared that she found
“significant divergences in the manner of execution, line quality, stroke structure
and other individual handwriting characteristics” between the signature that
appears on the Deed of Absolute Sale and the standard signatures of Donton,
thereby concluding that they were not written by one and the same person. 60 On
cross-examination, however, Perez admitted that she had no actual knowledge of
the source of the specimen signatures given to her for examination, as it was the
CIDG personnel who provided her with the same. 61 Thus, as the CA correctly
observed, Perez’s findings deserve little or no probative weight at all, considering
that the signatures which she used for comparison came from an unverified
source. Perforce, petitioners are left with no conclusive evidence to prove their
allegation that Donton’s signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale was forged. It
bears stressing that the opinion of handwriting experts are not necessarily binding
upon the court, the expert’s function being to place 58 Supra note 57. 59 Id. at
856, citing Jimenez v. Commission on Ecumenical Mission, United Presbyterian
Church, USA, 432 Phil. 895, 908-909 (2002). 60 See Questioned Document Report
No. 153-02; records, Vol. I, pp. 203-204. 61 TSN, March 26, 2003, pp. 23-24. ~
Decision 9 G.R. No. 216491 before the court data upon which the court can form
its own opinion. This principle holds true especially when the question involved is
mere handwriting similarity or dissimilarity, which can be determined by a visual
comparison of specimens of the questioned signatures with those of the currently
existing ones. A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimonies of
handwriting experts, because the judge must conduct an independent

Page 50 of 64
examination of the questioned signature in order to arrive at a reasonable
conclusion as to its authenticity.62 In fine, the Court, therefore, upholds the
findings of the courts a quo in this respect. Be that as it may, the Court, however,
differs from the findings of the courts a quo with respect to Stier’s citizenship. More
than the Certification63 issued by the BOI, which clearly states that Stier is an
American citizen, the records contain other documents validating the information.
For instance, in paragraph 1 64 of respondents’ Answer with Counterclaim, 65 they
admitted paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of the Complaint insofar as their personal
circumstances are concerned, and paragraph 2 of the Complaint states: “2.
Defendant DUANE STIER is of legal age, married, an American citizen, a non-
resident alien with postal address at Blk. 5, Lot 27, A, B, Phase 1, St. Michael
Home Subd., Binangonan, Rizal; xx x”66 (Emphases supplied) Similarly, one of the
attachments to the Manifestation 67 filed by respondents before the RTC is an
Affidavit68 executed by Stier himself, stating: “I, DUANE STIER, of legal age,
married, American citizen x x x”69 (Emphasis supplied) The foregoing statements
made by Stier are admissions against interest and are therefore binding upon him.
An admission against interest is the best evidence which affords the greatest
certainty of the facts in dispute since no man would declare anything against
himself unless such declaration is true. Thus, an admission against interest binds
the person who makes the same, and absent any showing that this was made
through palpable mistake, 62 Supra note 57, at 856-857. 63 Records, Vol. I, p. 202.
64 Id. at 35. 65 Id. at 35-40. 66 Id. at 2. 67 Id. at 223-226. 68 Id. at 242-244. 69 Id.
at 242. ‘ v Decision 10 G.R. No. 216491 no amount of rationalization can offset it,70
especially so in this case where respondents failed to present even one piece of
evidence in their defense. 71 Hence, the courts a quo erred in ruling that Stier’ s
American citizenship was not established in this case, effectively rendering the
sale of the subject property as to him void ab initio, in light of the clear proscription

Page 51 of 64
under Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution against foreigners acquiring real
property in the Philippines, to wit: Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain. Thus, lands of the public domain, which include private lands, may
be transferred or conveyed only to individuals or entities qualified to acquire or
hold private lands or lands of the public domain. Aliens, whether individuals or
corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain as
well as private lands.72 In light of the foregoing, even if petitioners failed to prove
that Donton’s signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale was a forgery, the sale of the
subject property to Stier is in violation of the Constitution; hence, null and void ab
initio. A contract that violates the Constitution and the law is null and void and
vests no rights and creates no obligations. It produces no legal effect at all.
Furthermore, Stier is barred from recovering any amount that he paid for the
subject property, the action being proscribed by the Constitution.
Nevertheless, considering that petitioners failed to prove their allegation that
Maggay, the other vendee, had no capacity to purchase the subject property,
the sale to her remains valid but only up to the extent of her undivided one-
half share therein. 75 Meanwhile, the other undivided one-half share, which
pertained to Stier, shall revert to Donton, the original owner, for being the
subject of a transaction void ab initio. Consequently, the Deed of Absolute
Sale, together with TCT No. N-225996 issued in respondents’ favor, must be
annulled only insofar as Stier is concerned, without prejudice, however, to
the rights of any subsequent purchasers for value of the subject property.

Page 52 of 64
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated June 13,
2014 and the Resolution dated January 21, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 97138, which affirmed the dismissal of the complaint filed by
petitioners on the ground of insufficiency of evidence, are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE, and a NEW ONE is entered: (1) annulling the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated July 16, 2001 insofar as respondent Duane Stier is concerned; (2) annulling
Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-225996 insofar as respondent Duane Stier is
concerned; and (3) directing the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City to issue a new
title in the name of Peter Donton and Emily Maggay, all without prejudice to the
rights of any subsequent purchasers for value of the subject property.
– THE HEIRS OF PETER DONTON, through their legal representative, FELIPE

G. CAPULONG, – versus – DUANE STIER and EMILY MAGGAY,
G.R. No. 216491, 23 August 2017
Section 23. Public documents as evidence. — Documents consisting of entries in

public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated. All other public documents are
evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their
execution and of the date of the latter. (24a)
Section 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public documents referred to
in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be
evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer
having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the
record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the

Page 53 of 64
custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in foreign country, the certificate
may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul,
vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the
Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office. (25a)
Section 19 (a), Rule 132 of the Rules of Court should be read in tandem with
Section 24, Rule 132, thus:
Sec. 19 (a)
“Public documents are:
(a) Written official acts, or records of official acts of sovereign

authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the
Philippines or of a foreign country. X x x
Sec. 24. Proof of official record. –

Page 54 of 64
The record of public documents referred to in para. (a) of
Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an
official publication thereof or, by a copy attested by the officer having legal
custody of the record or by his deputy.
X x x”
In the 23 January 2017 case of Republic v. Carmen Santo Rio, (G.R. No.
215009), it was held that:
“The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications [do]

not fall within the the class of public documents contemplated in the first
sentence of Section23 of Rule 132. The certifications do not reflect “entries in
public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer” such
as entries made by the Civil Registrar in the books of registries, or by a ship
captain in the ship’s logbook. The certifications are not the certified copies
or authenticated reproductions of original official records in the legal
custody of a government office. The certifications are not even records of
public documents. X x x

Page 55 of 64
In fact, the contents of the certifications are hearsay because respondent’s
sole witness and attorney-in-fact, Lea Galeno Barroca, was incompetent to
testify on the veracity of their contents, as she did not prepare any of the
certifications nor was she a public officer of the concerned government
agencies.
Section 25. What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever a copy of a

document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must
state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific
part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of
the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal,
under the seal of such court. (26a)
Section 26. Irremovability of public record. — Any public record, an official copy
of which is admissible in evidence, must not be removed from the office in which it
is kept, except upon order of a court where the inspection of the record is essential
to the just determination of a pending case. (27a)
Section 27. Public record of a private document. — An authorized public record of

a private document may be proved by the original record, or by a copy thereof,
attested by the legal custodian of the record, with an appropriate certificate that
such officer has the custody. (28a)

Page 56 of 64
Section 28. Proof of lack of record. — A written statement signed by an officer
having the custody of an official record or by his deputy that after diligent search
no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office,
accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that
the records of his office contain no such record or entry. (29)
Section 29. How judicial record impeached. — Any judicial record may be
impeached by evidence of: (a) want of jurisdiction in the court or judicial officer, (b)
collusion between the parties, or (c) fraud in the party offering the record, in
respect to the proceedings. (30a)
Section 30. Proof of notarial documents. — Every instrument duly acknowledged

or proved and certified as provided by law, may be presented in evidence without
further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of the
execution of the instrument or document involved. (31a)
.“Generally, a notarized document carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it

with respect to its due execution, and documents acknowledged before a notary
public have in their favour the presumption of regularity which may only be
rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. However, the presumptions that attach
to notarized documents can be affirmed only so long as it is beyond dispute that
the notarization was regular. A defective notarization will strip the document of its
public character and reduce it to a private document. Consequently, when there is
a defect in the notarization of a document, the clear and convincing evidentiary
standard normally attached to a duly-notarized document is dispensed with, and

Page 57 of 64
the measure to test the validity of such document is preponderance of evidence”.
(Spouses Charito M. Reyes et al., v. Heirs of Benjamin Malan Ce etc., G.R. No.
219071, August 24, 2016)
Section 31. Alteration in document, how to explain. — The party producing a

document as genuine which has been altered and appears to have been altered
after its execution, in a part material to the question in dispute, must account for
the alteration. He may show that the alteration was made by another, without his
concurrence, or was made with the consent of the parties affected by it, or was
otherwise properly or innocent made, or that the alteration did not change the
meaning or language of the instrument. If he fails to do that, the document shall
not be admissible in evidence. (32a)
Section 32. Seal. — There shall be no difference between sealed and unsealed
private documents insofar as their admissibility as evidence is concerned. (33a)
Section 33. Documentary evidence in an unofficial language. — Documents

written in an unofficial language shall not be admitted as evidence, unless
accompanied with a translation into English or Filipino. To avoid interruption of
proceedings, parties or their attorneys are directed to have such translation
prepared before trial. (34a)
[1] G.R. No. 206590, March 27, 2017

Page 58 of 64

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October 21, 2018 (https://etriiilaw.com/evidence-2018-lecture-2/) | By Atty.

Evidence 2018 – Lecture 2

OBJECT AND DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

https://etriiilaw.com/evidence-2018-lecture-2/ 22/10/2018, 7=54 PM

1. Object Evidence; Synonymous with Real, Demonstrative or Physical

Section 1, Rule 130. Object as evidence.- Objects as evidence are those

A.1. Versus Testimonial Evidence. As opposed to TESTIMONIAL

Thus, it was held, that “Physical evidence is evidence of the highest

https://etriiilaw.com/evidence-2018-lecture-2/ 22/10/2018, 7=54 PM

“Harry Potter Case”

“O.J. Simpson case”

Ironically, the prosecutor, in a case of “over-proving a case”, compelled the

https://etriiilaw.com/evidence-2018-lecture-2/ 22/10/2018, 7=54 PM

https://etriiilaw.com/evidence-2018-lecture-2/ 22/10/2018, 7=54 PM

The propriety of justice of permitting articles and implements such as deadly

GROUNDS TO EXCLUDE OBJECT EVIDENCE-

A.3.1.1. Indecency or impropriety as ground for disallowing the introduction

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-Accused in Rape case with peculiar identifying mark on his organ.

A.3.2. Authentication of Object Evidence. “It must be emphasized that every

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https://etriiilaw.com/evidence-2018-lecture-2/ 22/10/2018, 7=54 PM

~ People v. Romy Lim Y Miranda, G.R. No. 231989, 04 September 2018

A.3.3. Extraction of DNA Samples and the Right Against Self-Incrimination.

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https://etriiilaw.com/evidence-2018-lecture-2/ 22/10/2018, 7=54 PM

A.3.5. DNA EVIDENCE. A.M. No. 06-11-05-SC. Deoxyribonucleic acid.

Why identical twins?

Rule on Right Against Self-Incrimination in Extraction of Samples.

https://etriiilaw.com/evidence-2018-lecture-2/ 22/10/2018, 7=54 PM

12 Universally- accepted Markers.

A.3.6. Chain of Custody Rule

RA 9165; Chain of Custody

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, G.R. No. 213221 – versus –

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https://etriiilaw.com/evidence-2018-lecture-2/ 22/10/2018, 7=54 PM

https://etriiilaw.com/evidence-2018-lecture-2/ 22/10/2018, 7=54 PM

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MYRNA GAYOSO y ARGUELLES[1],

https://etriiilaw.com/evidence-2018-lecture-2/ 22/10/2018, 7=54 PM

https://etriiilaw.com/evidence-2018-lecture-2/ 22/10/2018, 7=54 PM

https://etriiilaw.com/evidence-2018-lecture-2/ 22/10/2018, 7=54 PM

https://etriiilaw.com/evidence-2018-lecture-2/ 22/10/2018, 7=54 PM

https://etriiilaw.com/evidence-2018-lecture-2/ 22/10/2018, 7=54 PM

https://etriiilaw.com/evidence-2018-lecture-2/ 22/10/2018, 7=54 PM

https://etriiilaw.com/evidence-2018-lecture-2/ 22/10/2018, 7=54 PM

https://etriiilaw.com/evidence-2018-lecture-2/ 22/10/2018, 7=54 PM

“Section 2. Rule 130. Documentary Evidence.- Documents as evidence

Sec. 1(h), Rule 2 of Rules on Electronic Evidence. “Electronic

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B.2. Admissibility of documentary evidence. – “Documentary evidence

A proper foundation must be laid for the admission of documentary

https://etriiilaw.com/evidence-2018-lecture-2/ 22/10/2018, 7=54 PM

B.3. Requisites for Admissibility of Documentary Evidence.

1. a)The document must be relevant;

Important Rules on Documentary Evidence. – “Rules on documentary evidence

ü The Best evidence rule- Secs. 3-4, Rule 130

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ü The Parol Evidence Rule- Sec. 9, Ibid

ü Documents written in unofficial language must be translated to English or

Reason: to prevent fraud. Because if a party is in possession of such

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